Merge branch 'ximinez/lending-number-simple' into ximinez/lending-number-enabled

- Remove redundant "else" because of early return.
- Add a concept "Integral64" to use in the template parameter for
  normalizeToRange.
- Add documentation to STTakesAsset, associateAsset, and add explanation
  for how `STNumber` uses it.
- Assert that `numberToJson` is always outside of a Transaction context.
- Remove copy of `InitialFibSeqPct` and the assert in
  `Number::operator*=` that prompted me to add it.
- Add amendment gating to `STAmount::operator=`

.config/cspell.config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+ignorePaths:
+  - build/**
+  - src/libxrpl/crypto
+  - src/test/** # Will be removed in the future
+  - CMakeUserPresets.json
+  - Doxyfile
+  - docs/**/*.puml
+  - cmake/**
+  - LICENSE.md
+language: en
+allowCompoundWords: true
+ignoreRandomStrings: true
+minWordLength: 5
+dictionaries:
+  - cpp
+  - en_US
+  - en_GB
+ignoreRegExpList:
+  - /[rs][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{25,34}/g # addresses and seeds
+  - /(XRPL|BEAST)_[A-Z_0-9]+_H_INCLUDED+/g # include guards
+  - /(XRPL|BEAST)_[A-Z_0-9]+_H+/g # include guards
+  - /::[a-z:_]+/g # things from other namespaces
+  - /lib[a-z]+/g # libraries
+  - /[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}[,:][A-Za-zÀ-ÖØ-öø-ÿ.\s]+/g # copyright dates
+  - /[0-9]{4}[,:]?\s*[A-Za-zÀ-ÖØ-öø-ÿ.\s]+/g # copyright years
+  - /\[[A-Za-z0-9-]+\]\(https:\/\/github.com\/[A-Za-z0-9-]+\)/g # Github usernames
+  - /-[DWw][a-zA-Z0-9_-]+=/g # compile flags
+  - /[\['"`]-[DWw][a-zA-Z0-9_-]+['"`\]]/g # compile flags
+suggestWords:
+  - xprl->xrpl
+  - unsynched->unsynced
+  - synched->synced
+  - synch->sync
+words:
+  - abempty
+  - AMMID
+  - amt
+  - amts
+  - asnode
+  - asynchrony
+  - attestation
+  - authorises
+  - autobridge
+  - autobridged
+  - autobridging
+  - bimap
+  - bindir
+  - bookdir
+  - Bougalis
+  - Britto
+  - Btrfs
+  - canonicality
+  - checkme
+  - chrono
+  - citardauq
+  - clawback
+  - clawbacks
+  - coeffs
+  - coldwallet
+  - compr
+  - conanfile
+  - conanrun
+  - connectability
+  - coro
+  - coros
+  - cowid
+  - cryptocondition
+  - cryptoconditional
+  - cryptoconditions
+  - csprng
+  - ctid
+  - currenttxhash
+  - daria
+  - dcmake
+  - dearmor
+  - deleteme
+  - demultiplexer
+  - deserializaton
+  - desync
+  - desynced
+  - determ
+  - distro
+  - doxyfile
+  - dxrpl
+  - endmacro
+  - exceptioned
+  - Falco
+  - finalizers
+  - firewalled
+  - fmtdur
+  - funclets
+  - gcov
+  - gcovr
+  - ghead
+  - Gnutella
+  - gpgcheck
+  - gpgkey
+  - hotwallet
+  - ifndef
+  - inequation
+  - insuf
+  - insuff
+  - iou
+  - ious
+  - isrdc
+  - jemalloc
+  - jlog
+  - keylet
+  - keylets
+  - keyvadb
+  - ledgerentry
+  - ledgerhash
+  - ledgerindex
+  - leftw
+  - legleux
+  - levelization
+  - levelized
+  - libpb
+  - libxrpl
+  - llection
+  - LOCALGOOD
+  - logwstream
+  - lseq
+  - lsmf
+  - ltype
+  - MEMORYSTATUSEX
+  - Merkle
+  - Metafuncton
+  - misprediction
+  - mptbalance
+  - mptflags
+  - mptid
+  - mptissuance
+  - mptissuanceid
+  - mptoken
+  - mptokenid
+  - mptokenissuance
+  - mptokens
+  - mpts
+  - multisig
+  - multisign
+  - multisigned
+  - Nakamoto
+  - nftid
+  - nftoffer
+  - nftoken
+  - nftokenid
+  - nftokenpages
+  - nftokens
+  - nftpage
+  - nikb
+  - nonxrp
+  - noripple
+  - nudb
+  - nullptr
+  - nunl
+  - Nyffenegger
+  - ostr
+  - partitioner
+  - paychan
+  - paychans
+  - permdex
+  - perminute
+  - permissioned
+  - pointee
+  - preauth
+  - preauthorization
+  - preauthorize
+  - preauthorizes
+  - preclaim
+  - protobuf
+  - protos
+  - ptrs
+  - pyenv
+  - qalloc
+  - queuable
+  - Raphson
+  - replayer
+  - rerere
+  - retriable
+  - RIPD
+  - ripdtop
+  - rippleci
+  - rippled
+  - ripplerpc
+  - rippletest
+  - RLUSD
+  - rngfill
+  - rocksdb
+  - Rohrs
+  - roundings
+  - sahyadri
+  - Satoshi
+  - secp
+  - sendq
+  - seqit
+  - sf
+  - shamap
+  - shamapitem
+  - sidechain
+  - SIGGOOD
+  - sle
+  - sles
+  - soci
+  - socidb
+  - sslws
+  - statsd
+  - STATSDCOLLECTOR
+  - stissue
+  - stnum
+  - stobj
+  - stobject
+  - stpath
+  - stpathset
+  - sttx
+  - stvar
+  - stvector
+  - stxchainattestations
+  - superpeer
+  - superpeers
+  - takergets
+  - takerpays
+  - ters
+  - TMEndpointv2
+  - trixie
+  - tx
+  - txid
+  - txids
+  - txjson
+  - txn
+  - txns
+  - txs
+  - umant
+  - unacquired
+  - unambiguity
+  - unauthorizes
+  - unauthorizing
+  - unergonomic
+  - unfetched
+  - unflatten
+  - unfund
+  - unimpair
+  - unroutable
+  - unscalable
+  - unserviced
+  - unshareable
+  - unshares
+  - unsquelch
+  - unsquelched
+  - unsquelching
+  - unvalidated
+  - unveto
+  - unvetoed
+  - upvotes
+  - USDB
+  - variadics
+  - venv
+  - vfalco
+  - vinnie
+  - wextra
+  - wptr
+  - writeme
+  - wsrch
+  - wthread
+  - xbridge
+  - xchain
+  - ximinez
+  - XMACRO
+  - xrpkuwait
+  - xrpl
+  - xrpld
+  - xrplf
+  - xxhash
+  - xxhasher

.gitattributes

@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
 # Set default behaviour, in case users don't have core.autocrlf set.
 #* text=auto
-
-# These annoying files
-rippled.1 binary
-LICENSE binary
+# cspell: disable
 
 # Visual Studio
 *.sln       text eol=crlf

.github/CODEOWNERS

@@ -1,2 +1,8 @@
 # Allow anyone to review any change by default.
 *
+
+# Require the rpc-reviewers team to review changes to the rpc code.
+include/xrpl/protocol/ @xrplf/rpc-reviewers
+src/libxrpl/protocol/ @xrplf/rpc-reviewers
+src/xrpld/rpc/ @xrplf/rpc-reviewers
+src/xrpld/app/misc/ @xrplf/rpc-reviewers

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: Bug Report
-about: Create a report to help us improve rippled
-title: "[Title with short description] (Version: [rippled version])"
+about: Create a report to help us improve xrpld
+title: "[Title with short description] (Version: [xrpld version])"
 labels: ""
 assignees: ""
 ---
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ assignees: ""
 ## Environment
 
 <!--Please describe your environment setup (such as Ubuntu 18.04 with Boost 1.70).-->
-<!-- If you are using a formal release, please use the version returned by './rippled --version' as the version number-->
+<!-- If you are using a formal release, please use the version returned by './xrpld --version' as the version number-->
 <!-- If you are working off of develop, please add the git hash via 'git rev-parse HEAD'-->
 
 ## Supporting Files

.github/actions/build-deps/action.yml

@@ -4,9 +4,6 @@ description: "Install Conan dependencies, optionally forcing a rebuild of all de
 # Note that actions do not support 'type' and all inputs are strings, see
 # https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/metadata-syntax#inputs.
 inputs:
-  build_dir:
-    description: "The directory where to build."
-    required: true
   build_type:
     description: 'The build type to use ("Debug", "Release").'
     required: true
@@ -28,18 +25,13 @@ runs:
     - name: Install Conan dependencies
       shell: bash
       env:
-        BUILD_DIR: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
         BUILD_NPROC: ${{ inputs.build_nproc }}
         BUILD_OPTION: ${{ inputs.force_build == 'true' && '*' || 'missing' }}
         BUILD_TYPE: ${{ inputs.build_type }}
         LOG_VERBOSITY: ${{ inputs.log_verbosity }}
       run: |
         echo 'Installing dependencies.'
-        conan export --version 0.42.1 external/wasmi  #TODO Switch to conan package
-        mkdir -p "${BUILD_DIR}"
-        cd "${BUILD_DIR}"
         conan install \
-          --output-folder . \
           --build="${BUILD_OPTION}" \
           --options:host='&:tests=True' \
           --options:host='&:xrpld=True' \
@@ -47,4 +39,4 @@ runs:
           --conf:all tools.build:jobs=${BUILD_NPROC} \
           --conf:all tools.build:verbosity="${LOG_VERBOSITY}" \
           --conf:all tools.compilation:verbosity="${LOG_VERBOSITY}" \
-          ..
+          .

.github/actions/print-env/action.yml

@@ -11,12 +11,6 @@ runs:
         echo 'Checking environment variables.'
         set
 
-        echo 'Checking CMake version.'
-        cmake --version
-
-        echo 'Checking Conan version.'
-        conan --version
-
     - name: Check configuration (Linux and macOS)
       if: ${{ runner.os == 'Linux' || runner.os == 'macOS' }}
       shell: bash
@@ -27,17 +21,23 @@ runs:
         echo 'Checking environment variables.'
         env | sort
 
-        echo 'Checking CMake version.'
-        cmake --version
-
         echo 'Checking compiler version.'
         ${{ runner.os == 'Linux' && '${CC}' || 'clang' }} --version
 
-        echo 'Checking Conan version.'
-        conan --version
-
         echo 'Checking Ninja version.'
         ninja --version
 
         echo 'Checking nproc version.'
         nproc --version
+
+    - name: Check configuration (all)
+      shell: bash
+      run: |
+        echo 'Checking Ccache version.'
+        ccache --version
+
+        echo 'Checking CMake version.'
+        cmake --version
+
+        echo 'Checking Conan version.'
+        conan --version

.github/scripts/levelization/README.md

@@ -3,21 +3,26 @@
 Levelization is the term used to describe efforts to prevent rippled from
 having or creating cyclic dependencies.
 
-rippled code is organized into directories under `src/rippled` (and
+rippled code is organized into directories under `src/xrpld`, `src/libxrpl` (and
 `src/test`) representing modules. The modules are intended to be
 organized into "tiers" or "levels" such that a module from one level can
 only include code from lower levels. Additionally, a module
-in one level should never include code in an `impl` folder of any level
+in one level should never include code in an `impl` or `detail` folder of any level
 other than it's own.
 
+The codebase is split into two main areas:
+
+- **libxrpl** (`src/libxrpl`, `include/xrpl`): Reusable library modules with public interfaces
+- **xrpld** (`src/xrpld`): Application-specific implementation code
+
 Unfortunately, over time, enforcement of levelization has been
 inconsistent, so the current state of the code doesn't necessarily
 reflect these rules. Whenever possible, developers should refactor any
 levelization violations they find (by moving files or individual
 classes). At the very least, don't make things worse.
 
-The table below summarizes the _desired_ division of modules, based on the
-state of the rippled code when it was created. The levels are numbered from
+The table below summarizes the _desired_ division of modules, based on the current
+state of the rippled code. The levels are numbered from
 the bottom up with the lower level, lower numbered, more independent
 modules listed first, and the higher level, higher numbered modules with
 more dependencies listed later.
@@ -25,18 +30,33 @@ more dependencies listed later.
 **tl;dr:** The modules listed first are more independent than the modules
 listed later.
 
+## libxrpl Modules (Reusable Libraries)
+
+| Level / Tier | Module(s)                           |
+| ------------ | ----------------------------------- |
+| 01           | xrpl/beast                          |
+| 02           | xrpl/basics                         |
+| 03           | xrpl/json xrpl/crypto               |
+| 04           | xrpl/protocol                       |
+| 05           | xrpl/core xrpl/resource xrpl/server |
+| 06           | xrpl/ledger xrpl/nodestore xrpl/net |
+| 07           | xrpl/shamap                         |
+
+## xrpld Modules (Application Implementation)
+
+| Level / Tier | Module(s)                        |
+| ------------ | -------------------------------- |
+| 05           | xrpld/conditions xrpld/consensus |
+| 06           | xrpld/core xrpld/peerfinder      |
+| 07           | xrpld/shamap xrpld/overlay       |
+| 08           | xrpld/app                        |
+| 09           | xrpld/rpc                        |
+| 10           | xrpld/perflog                    |
+
+## Test Modules
+
 | Level / Tier | Module(s)                                                                                                |
 | ------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| 01           | ripple/beast ripple/unity                                                                                |
-| 02           | ripple/basics                                                                                            |
-| 03           | ripple/json ripple/crypto                                                                                |
-| 04           | ripple/protocol                                                                                          |
-| 05           | ripple/core ripple/conditions ripple/consensus ripple/resource ripple/server                             |
-| 06           | ripple/peerfinder ripple/ledger ripple/nodestore ripple/net                                              |
-| 07           | ripple/shamap ripple/overlay                                                                             |
-| 08           | ripple/app                                                                                               |
-| 09           | ripple/rpc                                                                                               |
-| 10           | ripple/perflog                                                                                           |
 | 11           | test/jtx test/beast test/csf                                                                             |
 | 12           | test/unit_test                                                                                           |
 | 13           | test/crypto test/conditions test/json test/resource test/shamap test/peerfinder test/basics test/overlay |
@@ -45,8 +65,8 @@ listed later.
 | 16           | test/rpc test/app                                                                                        |
 
 (Note that `test` levelization is _much_ less important and _much_ less
-strictly enforced than `ripple` levelization, other than the requirement
-that `test` code should _never_ be included in `ripple` code.)
+strictly enforced than `xrpl`/`xrpld` levelization, other than the requirement
+that `test` code should _never_ be included in `xrpl` or `xrpld` code.)
 
 ## Validation
 
@@ -61,10 +81,10 @@ It generates many files of [results](results):
 
 - `rawincludes.txt`: The raw dump of the `#includes`
 - `paths.txt`: A second dump grouping the source module
-  to the destination module, deduped, and with frequency counts.
+  to the destination module, de-duped, and with frequency counts.
 - `includes/`: A directory where each file represents a module and
   contains a list of modules and counts that the module _includes_.
-- `includedby/`: Similar to `includes/`, but the other way around. Each
+- `included_by/`: Similar to `includes/`, but the other way around. Each
   file represents a module and contains a list of modules and counts
   that _include_ the module.
 - [`loops.txt`](results/loops.txt): A list of direct loops detected

.github/scripts/levelization/generate.sh

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ pushd results
 oldifs=${IFS}
 IFS=:
 mkdir includes
-mkdir includedby
+mkdir included_by
 echo Build levelization paths
 exec 3< ${includes} # open rawincludes.txt for input
 while read -r -u 3 file include
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ do
         echo $level $includelevel | tee -a paths.txt
     fi
 done
-echo Sort and dedup paths
+echo Sort and deduplicate paths
 sort -ds paths.txt | uniq -c | tee sortedpaths.txt
 mv sortedpaths.txt paths.txt
 exec 3>&- #close fd 3
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ exec 4<paths.txt # open paths.txt for input
 while read -r -u 4 count level include
 do
     echo ${include} ${count} | tee -a includes/${level}
-    echo ${level} ${count} | tee -a includedby/${include}
+    echo ${level} ${count} | tee -a included_by/${include}
 done
 exec 4>&- #close fd 4
 

.github/scripts/levelization/results/loops.txt

@@ -19,12 +19,6 @@ Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.rpc
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.shamap
   xrpld.shamap ~= xrpld.app
 
-Loop: xrpld.core xrpld.perflog
-  xrpld.perflog == xrpld.core
-
 Loop: xrpld.overlay xrpld.rpc
   xrpld.rpc ~= xrpld.overlay
 
-Loop: xrpld.perflog xrpld.rpc
-  xrpld.rpc ~= xrpld.perflog
-

.github/scripts/levelization/results/ordering.txt

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 libxrpl.basics > xrpl.basics
+libxrpl.core > xrpl.basics
+libxrpl.core > xrpl.core
 libxrpl.crypto > xrpl.basics
 libxrpl.json > xrpl.basics
 libxrpl.json > xrpl.json
@@ -30,6 +32,7 @@ test.app > test.rpc
 test.app > test.toplevel
 test.app > test.unit_test
 test.app > xrpl.basics
+test.app > xrpl.core
 test.app > xrpld.app
 test.app > xrpld.core
 test.app > xrpld.overlay
@@ -42,7 +45,7 @@ test.app > xrpl.resource
 test.basics > test.jtx
 test.basics > test.unit_test
 test.basics > xrpl.basics
-test.basics > xrpld.perflog
+test.basics > xrpl.core
 test.basics > xrpld.rpc
 test.basics > xrpl.json
 test.basics > xrpl.protocol
@@ -61,8 +64,8 @@ test.core > test.jtx
 test.core > test.toplevel
 test.core > test.unit_test
 test.core > xrpl.basics
+test.core > xrpl.core
 test.core > xrpld.core
-test.core > xrpld.perflog
 test.core > xrpl.json
 test.core > xrpl.server
 test.csf > xrpl.basics
@@ -119,6 +122,7 @@ test.resource > xrpl.resource
 test.rpc > test.jtx
 test.rpc > test.toplevel
 test.rpc > xrpl.basics
+test.rpc > xrpl.core
 test.rpc > xrpld.app
 test.rpc > xrpld.core
 test.rpc > xrpld.overlay
@@ -146,6 +150,8 @@ test.unit_test > xrpl.basics
 tests.libxrpl > xrpl.basics
 tests.libxrpl > xrpl.json
 tests.libxrpl > xrpl.net
+xrpl.core > xrpl.basics
+xrpl.core > xrpl.json
 xrpl.json > xrpl.basics
 xrpl.ledger > xrpl.basics
 xrpl.ledger > xrpl.protocol
@@ -165,9 +171,9 @@ xrpl.shamap > xrpl.nodestore
 xrpl.shamap > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.app > test.unit_test
 xrpld.app > xrpl.basics
+xrpld.app > xrpl.core
 xrpld.app > xrpld.conditions
 xrpld.app > xrpld.consensus
-xrpld.app > xrpld.perflog
 xrpld.app > xrpl.json
 xrpld.app > xrpl.ledger
 xrpld.app > xrpl.net
@@ -181,13 +187,14 @@ xrpld.consensus > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.consensus > xrpl.json
 xrpld.consensus > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.core > xrpl.basics
+xrpld.core > xrpl.core
 xrpld.core > xrpl.json
 xrpld.core > xrpl.net
 xrpld.core > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.overlay > xrpl.basics
+xrpld.overlay > xrpl.core
 xrpld.overlay > xrpld.core
 xrpld.overlay > xrpld.peerfinder
-xrpld.overlay > xrpld.perflog
 xrpld.overlay > xrpl.json
 xrpld.overlay > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.overlay > xrpl.resource
@@ -196,8 +203,11 @@ xrpld.peerfinder > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.peerfinder > xrpld.core
 xrpld.peerfinder > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.perflog > xrpl.basics
+xrpld.perflog > xrpl.core
+xrpld.perflog > xrpld.rpc
 xrpld.perflog > xrpl.json
 xrpld.rpc > xrpl.basics
+xrpld.rpc > xrpl.core
 xrpld.rpc > xrpld.core
 xrpld.rpc > xrpl.json
 xrpld.rpc > xrpl.ledger

.github/scripts/rename/README.md

@@ -19,13 +19,21 @@ run from the repository root.
 1. `.github/scripts/rename/definitions.sh`: This script will rename all
    definitions, such as include guards, from `RIPPLE_XXX` and `RIPPLED_XXX` to
    `XRPL_XXX`.
-2. `.github/scripts/rename/copyright.sh`: This script will remove superflous
+2. `.github/scripts/rename/copyright.sh`: This script will remove superfluous
    copyright notices.
 3. `.github/scripts/rename/cmake.sh`: This script will rename all CMake files
    from `RippleXXX.cmake` or `RippledXXX.cmake` to `XrplXXX.cmake`, and any
    references to `ripple` and `rippled` (with or without capital letters) to
    `xrpl` and `xrpld`, respectively. The name of the binary will remain as-is,
    and will only be renamed to `xrpld` by a later script.
+4. `.github/scripts/rename/binary.sh`: This script will rename the binary from
+   `rippled` to `xrpld`, and reverses the symlink so that `rippled` points to
+   the `xrpld` binary.
+5. `.github/scripts/rename/namespace.sh`: This script will rename the C++
+   namespaces from `ripple` to `xrpl`.
+6. `.github/scripts/rename/config.sh`: This script will rename the config from
+   `rippled.cfg` to `xrpld.cfg`, and updating the code accordingly. The old
+   filename will still be accepted.
 
 You can run all these scripts from the repository root as follows:
 
@@ -33,4 +41,7 @@ You can run all these scripts from the repository root as follows:
 ./.github/scripts/rename/definitions.sh .
 ./.github/scripts/rename/copyright.sh .
 ./.github/scripts/rename/cmake.sh .
+./.github/scripts/rename/binary.sh .
+./.github/scripts/rename/namespace.sh .
+./.github/scripts/rename/config.sh .
 ```

.github/scripts/rename/binary.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# Exit the script as soon as an error occurs.
+set -e
+
+# On MacOS, ensure that GNU sed is installed and available as `gsed`.
+SED_COMMAND=sed
+if [[ "${OSTYPE}" == 'darwin'* ]]; then
+  if ! command -v gsed &> /dev/null; then
+      echo "Error: gsed is not installed. Please install it using 'brew install gnu-sed'."
+      exit 1
+  fi
+  SED_COMMAND=gsed
+fi
+
+# This script changes the binary name from `rippled` to `xrpld`, and reverses
+# the symlink that currently points from `xrpld` to `rippled` so that it points
+# from `rippled` to `xrpld` instead.
+# Usage: .github/scripts/rename/binary.sh <repository directory>
+
+if [ "$#" -ne 1 ]; then
+    echo "Usage: $0 <repository directory>"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+DIRECTORY=$1
+echo "Processing directory: ${DIRECTORY}"
+if [ ! -d "${DIRECTORY}" ]; then
+    echo "Error: Directory '${DIRECTORY}' does not exist."
+    exit 1
+fi
+pushd ${DIRECTORY}
+
+# Remove the binary name override added by the cmake.sh script.
+${SED_COMMAND} -z -i -E 's@\s+# For the time being.+"rippled"\)@@' cmake/XrplCore.cmake
+
+# Reverse the symlink.
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@create_symbolic_link\(rippled@create_symbolic_link(xrpld@' cmake/XrplInstall.cmake
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@/xrpld\$\{suffix\}@/rippled${suffix}@' cmake/XrplInstall.cmake
+
+# Rename references to the binary.
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@rippled@xrpld@g' BUILD.md
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@rippled@xrpld@g' CONTRIBUTING.md
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@rippled@xrpld@g' .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md
+
+# Restore and/or fix certain renames. The pre-commit hook will update the
+# formatting upon saving/committing.
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@ripple/xrpld@XRPLF/rippled@g' BUILD.md
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@XRPLF/xrpld@XRPLF/rippled@g' BUILD.md
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@xrpld \(`xrpld`\)@xrpld@g' BUILD.md
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's@XRPLF/xrpld@XRPLF/rippled@g' CONTRIBUTING.md
+
+popd
+echo "Processing complete."

.github/scripts/rename/config.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# Exit the script as soon as an error occurs.
+set -e
+
+# On MacOS, ensure that GNU sed is installed and available as `gsed`.
+SED_COMMAND=sed
+if [[ "${OSTYPE}" == 'darwin'* ]]; then
+  if ! command -v gsed &> /dev/null; then
+      echo "Error: gsed is not installed. Please install it using 'brew install gnu-sed'."
+      exit 1
+  fi
+  SED_COMMAND=gsed
+fi
+
+# This script renames the config from `rippled.cfg` to `xrpld.cfg`, and updates
+# the code accordingly. The old filename will still be accepted.
+# Usage: .github/scripts/rename/config.sh <repository directory>
+
+if [ "$#" -ne 1 ]; then
+    echo "Usage: $0 <repository directory>"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+DIRECTORY=$1
+echo "Processing directory: ${DIRECTORY}"
+if [ ! -d "${DIRECTORY}" ]; then
+    echo "Error: Directory '${DIRECTORY}' does not exist."
+    exit 1
+fi
+pushd ${DIRECTORY}
+
+# Add the xrpld.cfg to the .gitignore.
+if ! grep -q 'xrpld.cfg' .gitignore; then
+  ${SED_COMMAND} -i '/rippled.cfg/a\
+/xrpld.cfg' .gitignore
+fi
+
+# Rename the files.
+if [ -e rippled.cfg ]; then
+  mv rippled.cfg xrpld.cfg
+fi
+if [ -e cfg/rippled-example.cfg ]; then
+  mv cfg/rippled-example.cfg cfg/xrpld-example.cfg
+fi
+
+# Rename inside the files.
+DIRECTORIES=("cfg" "cmake" "include" "src")
+for DIRECTORY in "${DIRECTORIES[@]}"; do
+  echo "Processing directory: ${DIRECTORY}"
+
+  find "${DIRECTORY}" -type f \( -name "*.h" -o -name "*.hpp" -o -name "*.ipp" -o -name "*.cpp" -o -name "*.cmake" -o -name "*.txt" -o -name "*.cfg" -o -name "*.md" \) | while read -r FILE; do
+      echo "Processing file: ${FILE}"
+      ${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's/rippled(-example)?[ .]cfg/xrpld\1.cfg/g' "${FILE}"
+  done
+done
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/rippled/xrpld/g' cfg/xrpld-example.cfg
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/rippled/xrpld/g' src/test/core/Config_test.cpp
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/ripplevalidators/xrplvalidators/g' src/test/core/Config_test.cpp # cspell: disable-line
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/rippleConfig/xrpldConfig/g' src/test/core/Config_test.cpp
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's@ripple/@xrpld/@g' src/test/core/Config_test.cpp
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/Rippled/File/g' src/test/core/Config_test.cpp
+
+
+# Restore the old config file name in the code that maintains support for now.
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/configLegacyName = "xrpld.cfg"/configLegacyName = "rippled.cfg"/g' src/xrpld/core/detail/Config.cpp
+
+# Restore an URL.
+${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/connect-your-xrpld-to-the-xrp-test-net.html/connect-your-rippled-to-the-xrp-test-net.html/g' cfg/xrpld-example.cfg
+
+popd
+echo "Renaming complete."

.github/scripts/rename/copyright.sh

@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ for DIRECTORY in "${DIRECTORIES[@]}"; do
       # Handle the cases where the copyright notice is enclosed in /* ... */
       # and usually surrounded by //---- and //======.
       ${SED_COMMAND} -z -i -E 's@^//-------+\n+@@' "${FILE}"
-      ${SED_COMMAND} -z -i -E 's@^.*Copyright.+(Ripple|Bougalis|Falco|Hinnant|Null|Ritchford|XRPLF).+PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE\.\n\*/\n+@@' "${FILE}"
+      ${SED_COMMAND} -z -i -E 's@^.*Copyright.+(Ripple|Bougalis|Falco|Hinnant|Null|Ritchford|XRPLF).+PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE\.\n\*/\n+@@' "${FILE}" # cspell: ignore Bougalis Falco Hinnant Ritchford
       ${SED_COMMAND} -z -i -E 's@^//=======+\n+@@' "${FILE}"
 
       # Handle the cases where the copyright notice is commented out with //.
-      ${SED_COMMAND} -z -i -E 's@^//\n// Copyright.+Falco \(vinnie dot falco at gmail dot com\)\n//\n+@@' "${FILE}"
+      ${SED_COMMAND} -z -i -E 's@^//\n// Copyright.+Falco \(vinnie dot falco at gmail dot com\)\n//\n+@@' "${FILE}" # cspell: ignore Vinnie Falco
   done
 done
 
@@ -83,16 +83,16 @@ if ! grep -q 'Dev Null' src/xrpld/rpc/handlers/ValidatorInfo.cpp; then
   echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2019 Dev Null Productions\n\n$(cat src/xrpld/rpc/handlers/ValidatorInfo.cpp)" > src/xrpld/rpc/handlers/ValidatorInfo.cpp
 fi
 if ! grep -q 'Bougalis' include/xrpl/basics/SlabAllocator.h; then
-  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2022, Nikolaos D. Bougalis <nikb@bougalis.net>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/basics/SlabAllocator.h)" > include/xrpl/basics/SlabAllocator.h
+  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2022, Nikolaos D. Bougalis <nikb@bougalis.net>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/basics/SlabAllocator.h)" > include/xrpl/basics/SlabAllocator.h # cspell: ignore Nikolaos Bougalis nikb
 fi
 if ! grep -q 'Bougalis' include/xrpl/basics/spinlock.h; then
-  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2022, Nikolaos D. Bougalis <nikb@bougalis.net>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/basics/spinlock.h)" > include/xrpl/basics/spinlock.h
+  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2022, Nikolaos D. Bougalis <nikb@bougalis.net>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/basics/spinlock.h)" > include/xrpl/basics/spinlock.h # cspell: ignore Nikolaos Bougalis nikb
 fi
 if ! grep -q 'Bougalis' include/xrpl/basics/tagged_integer.h; then
-  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2014, Nikolaos D. Bougalis <nikb@bougalis.net>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/basics/tagged_integer.h)" > include/xrpl/basics/tagged_integer.h
+  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2014, Nikolaos D. Bougalis <nikb@bougalis.net>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/basics/tagged_integer.h)" > include/xrpl/basics/tagged_integer.h # cspell: ignore Nikolaos Bougalis nikb
 fi
 if ! grep -q 'Ritchford' include/xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h; then
-  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2014, Tom Ritchford <tom@swirly.com>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h)" > include/xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h
+  echo -e "// Copyright (c) 2014, Tom Ritchford <tom@swirly.com>\n\n$(cat include/xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h)" > include/xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h # cspell: ignore Ritchford
 fi
 
 # Restore newlines and tabs in string literals in the affected file.

.github/scripts/rename/namespace.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# Exit the script as soon as an error occurs.
+set -e
+
+# On MacOS, ensure that GNU sed is installed and available as `gsed`.
+SED_COMMAND=sed
+if [[ "${OSTYPE}" == 'darwin'* ]]; then
+  if ! command -v gsed &> /dev/null; then
+      echo "Error: gsed is not installed. Please install it using 'brew install gnu-sed'."
+      exit 1
+  fi
+  SED_COMMAND=gsed
+fi
+
+# This script renames the `ripple` namespace to `xrpl` in this project.
+# Specifically, it renames all occurrences of `namespace ripple` and `ripple::`
+# to `namespace xrpl` and `xrpl::`, respectively, by scanning all header and
+# source files in the specified directory and its subdirectories, as well as any
+# occurrences in the documentation. It also renames them in the test suites.
+# Usage: .github/scripts/rename/namespace.sh <repository directory>
+
+if [ "$#" -ne 1 ]; then
+    echo "Usage: $0 <repository directory>"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+DIRECTORY=$1
+echo "Processing directory: ${DIRECTORY}"
+if [ ! -d "${DIRECTORY}" ]; then
+    echo "Error: Directory '${DIRECTORY}' does not exist."
+    exit 1
+fi
+pushd ${DIRECTORY}
+
+DIRECTORIES=("include" "src" "tests")
+for DIRECTORY in "${DIRECTORIES[@]}"; do
+  echo "Processing directory: ${DIRECTORY}"
+
+  find "${DIRECTORY}" -type f \( -name "*.h" -o -name "*.hpp" -o -name "*.ipp" -o -name "*.cpp" \) | while read -r FILE; do
+      echo "Processing file: ${FILE}"
+      ${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/namespace ripple/namespace xrpl/g' "${FILE}"
+      ${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/ripple::/xrpl::/g' "${FILE}"
+      ${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's/(BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE.+)ripple(.+)/\1xrpl\2/g' "${FILE}"
+  done
+done
+
+# Special case for NuDBFactory that has ripple twice in the test suite name.
+${SED_COMMAND} -i -E 's/(BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE.+)ripple(.+)/\1xrpl\2/g' src/test/nodestore/NuDBFactory_test.cpp
+
+DIRECTORY=$1
+find "${DIRECTORY}" -type f -name "*.md" | while read -r FILE; do
+    echo "Processing file: ${FILE}"
+    ${SED_COMMAND} -i 's/ripple::/xrpl::/g' "${FILE}"
+done
+
+popd
+echo "Renaming complete."

.github/scripts/strategy-matrix/generate.py

@@ -232,6 +232,8 @@ def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config) -> list:
             f"-{architecture['platform'][architecture['platform'].find('/') + 1 :]}"
         )
         config_name += f"-{build_type.lower()}"
+        if "-Dcoverage=ON" in cmake_args:
+            config_name += "-coverage"
         if "-Dunity=ON" in cmake_args:
             config_name += "-unity"
 

.github/scripts/strategy-matrix/linux.json

@@ -15,196 +15,196 @@
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "12",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "13",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "14",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "15",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "16",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "17",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "18",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "19",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "bookworm",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "20",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "trixie",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "14",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "trixie",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "15",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "trixie",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "20",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "debian",
       "distro_version": "trixie",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "21",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "8",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "14",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "8",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "any",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "9",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "12",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "9",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "13",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "9",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "14",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "9",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "any",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "10",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "14",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "rhel",
       "distro_version": "10",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "any",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "ubuntu",
       "distro_version": "jammy",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "12",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "ubuntu",
       "distro_version": "noble",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "13",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "ubuntu",
       "distro_version": "noble",
       "compiler_name": "gcc",
       "compiler_version": "14",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "ubuntu",
       "distro_version": "noble",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "16",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "ubuntu",
       "distro_version": "noble",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "17",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "ubuntu",
       "distro_version": "noble",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "18",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     },
     {
       "distro_name": "ubuntu",
       "distro_version": "noble",
       "compiler_name": "clang",
       "compiler_version": "19",
-      "image_sha": "ca4517d"
+      "image_sha": "cc09fd3"
     }
   ],
   "build_type": ["Debug", "Release"],

.github/workflows/on-pr.yml

@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ jobs:
       matrix:
         os: [linux, macos, windows]
     with:
+      # Enable ccache only for events targeting the XRPLF repository, since
+      # other accounts will not have access to our remote cache storage.
+      ccache_enabled: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' }}
       os: ${{ matrix.os }}
     secrets:
       CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/on-trigger.yml

@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ jobs:
       matrix:
         os: [linux, macos, windows]
     with:
+      # Enable ccache only for events targeting the XRPLF repository, since
+      # other accounts will not have access to our remote cache storage.
+      # However, we do not enable ccache for events targeting the master or a
+      # release branch, to protect against the rare case that the output
+      # produced by ccache is not identical to a regular compilation.
+      ccache_enabled: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && !(github.base_ref == 'master' || startsWith(github.base_ref, 'release')) }}
       os: ${{ matrix.os }}
       strategy_matrix: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && 'all' || 'minimal' }}
     secrets:

.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ on:
 jobs:
   # Call the workflow in the XRPLF/actions repo that runs the pre-commit hooks.
   run-hooks:
-    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@34790936fae4c6c751f62ec8c06696f9c1a5753a
+    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@5ca417783f0312ab26d6f48b85c78edf1de99bbd
     with:
       runs_on: ubuntu-latest
       container: '{ "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/tools-rippled-pre-commit:sha-a8c7be1" }'

.github/workflows/publish-docs.yml

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ defaults:
     shell: bash
 
 env:
-  BUILD_DIR: .build
+  BUILD_DIR: build
   NPROC_SUBTRACT: 2
 
 jobs:
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
 
       - name: Get number of processors
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/actions/get-nproc@046b1620f6bfd6cd0985dc82c3df02786801fe0a
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/get-nproc@2ece4ec6ab7de266859a6f053571425b2bd684b6
         id: nproc
         with:
           subtract: ${{ env.NPROC_SUBTRACT }}

.github/workflows/reusable-build-test-config.yml

@@ -3,11 +3,6 @@ name: Build and test configuration
 on:
   workflow_call:
     inputs:
-      build_dir:
-        description: "The directory where to build."
-        required: true
-        type: string
-
       build_only:
         description: 'Whether to only build or to build and test the code ("true", "false").'
         required: true
@@ -15,8 +10,14 @@ on:
 
       build_type:
         description: 'The build type to use ("Debug", "Release").'
-        type: string
         required: true
+        type: string
+
+      ccache_enabled:
+        description: "Whether to enable ccache."
+        required: false
+        type: boolean
+        default: false
 
       cmake_args:
         description: "Additional arguments to pass to CMake."
@@ -26,8 +27,8 @@ on:
 
       cmake_target:
         description: "The CMake target to build."
-        type: string
         required: true
+        type: string
 
       runs_on:
         description: Runner to run the job on as a JSON string
@@ -59,6 +60,11 @@ defaults:
   run:
     shell: bash
 
+env:
+  # Conan installs the generators in the build/generators directory, see the
+  # layout() method in conanfile.py. We then run CMake from the build directory.
+  BUILD_DIR: build
+
 jobs:
   build-and-test:
     name: ${{ inputs.config_name }}
@@ -66,26 +72,47 @@ jobs:
     container: ${{ inputs.image != '' && inputs.image || null }}
     timeout-minutes: 60
     env:
-      ENABLED_VOIDSTAR: ${{ contains(inputs.cmake_args, '-Dvoidstar=ON') }}
-      ENABLED_COVERAGE: ${{ contains(inputs.cmake_args, '-Dcoverage=ON') }}
+      # Use a namespace to keep the objects separate for each configuration.
+      CCACHE_NAMESPACE: ${{ inputs.config_name }}
+      # Ccache supports both Redis and HTTP endpoints.
+      # * For Redis, use the following format: redis://ip:port, see
+      #   https://github.com/ccache/ccache/wiki/Redis-storage. Note that TLS is
+      #   not directly supported by ccache, and requires use of a proxy.
+      # * For HTTP use the following format: http://ip:port/cache when using
+      #   nginx as backend or http://ip:port|layout=bazel when using Bazel
+      #   Remote Cache, see https://github.com/ccache/ccache/wiki/HTTP-storage.
+      #   Note that HTTPS is not directly supported by ccache.
+      CCACHE_REMOTE_ONLY: true
+      CCACHE_REMOTE_STORAGE: http://cache.dev.ripplex.io:8080|layout=bazel
+      # Ignore the creation and modification timestamps on files, since the
+      # header files are copied into separate directories by CMake, which will
+      # otherwise result in cache misses.
+      CCACHE_SLOPPINESS: include_file_ctime,include_file_mtime
+      # Determine if coverage and voidstar should be enabled.
+      COVERAGE_ENABLED: ${{ contains(inputs.cmake_args, '-Dcoverage=ON') }}
+      VOIDSTAR_ENABLED: ${{ contains(inputs.cmake_args, '-Dvoidstar=ON') }}
     steps:
       - name: Cleanup workspace (macOS and Windows)
         if: ${{ runner.os == 'macOS' || runner.os == 'Windows' }}
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/actions/cleanup-workspace@01b244d2718865d427b499822fbd3f15e7197fcc
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/cleanup-workspace@2ece4ec6ab7de266859a6f053571425b2bd684b6
 
       - name: Checkout repository
         uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/actions/prepare-runner@ff9f8f649df5855ffe1a1ae715df43e51807f2e0
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@65da1c59e81965eeb257caa3587b9d45066fb925
         with:
-          disable_ccache: false
+          enable_ccache: ${{ inputs.ccache_enabled }}
+
+      - name: Set ccache log file
+        if: ${{ inputs.ccache_enabled && runner.debug == '1' }}
+        run: echo "CCACHE_LOGFILE=${{ runner.temp }}/ccache.log" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
 
       - name: Print build environment
         uses: ./.github/actions/print-env
 
       - name: Get number of processors
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/actions/get-nproc@046b1620f6bfd6cd0985dc82c3df02786801fe0a
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/get-nproc@2ece4ec6ab7de266859a6f053571425b2bd684b6
         id: nproc
         with:
           subtract: ${{ inputs.nproc_subtract }}
@@ -96,7 +123,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build dependencies
         uses: ./.github/actions/build-deps
         with:
-          build_dir: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
           build_nproc: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
           build_type: ${{ inputs.build_type }}
           # Set the verbosity to "quiet" for Windows to avoid an excessive
@@ -104,7 +130,7 @@ jobs:
           log_verbosity: ${{ runner.os == 'Windows' && 'quiet' || 'verbose' }}
 
       - name: Configure CMake
-        working-directory: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
+        working-directory: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}
         env:
           BUILD_TYPE: ${{ inputs.build_type }}
           CMAKE_ARGS: ${{ inputs.cmake_args }}
@@ -117,7 +143,7 @@ jobs:
             ..
 
       - name: Build the binary
-        working-directory: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
+        working-directory: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}
         env:
           BUILD_NPROC: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
           BUILD_TYPE: ${{ inputs.build_type }}
@@ -129,23 +155,30 @@ jobs:
             --parallel "${BUILD_NPROC}" \
             --target "${CMAKE_TARGET}"
 
-      - name: Upload rippled artifact (Linux)
+      - name: Show ccache statistics
+        if: ${{ inputs.ccache_enabled }}
+        run: |
+          ccache --show-stats -vv
+          if [ '${{ runner.debug }}' = '1' ]; then
+            cat "${CCACHE_LOGFILE}"
+            curl ${CCACHE_REMOTE_STORAGE%|*}/status || true
+          fi
+
+      - name: Upload the binary (Linux)
         if: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && runner.os == 'Linux' }}
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
-        env:
-          BUILD_DIR: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
         with:
-          name: rippled-${{ inputs.config_name }}
-          path: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/rippled
+          name: xrpld-${{ inputs.config_name }}
+          path: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/xrpld
           retention-days: 3
           if-no-files-found: error
 
       - name: Check linking (Linux)
         if: ${{ runner.os == 'Linux' }}
-        working-directory: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
+        working-directory: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}
         run: |
-          ldd ./rippled
-          if [ "$(ldd ./rippled | grep -E '(libstdc\+\+|libgcc)' | wc -l)" -eq 0 ]; then
+          ldd ./xrpld
+          if [ "$(ldd ./xrpld | grep -E '(libstdc\+\+|libgcc)' | wc -l)" -eq 0 ]; then
             echo 'The binary is statically linked.'
           else
             echo 'The binary is dynamically linked.'
@@ -153,14 +186,14 @@ jobs:
           fi
 
       - name: Verify presence of instrumentation (Linux)
-        if: ${{ runner.os == 'Linux' && env.ENABLED_VOIDSTAR == 'true' }}
-        working-directory: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
+        if: ${{ runner.os == 'Linux' && env.VOIDSTAR_ENABLED == 'true' }}
+        working-directory: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}
         run: |
-          ./rippled --version | grep libvoidstar
+          ./xrpld --version | grep libvoidstar
 
       - name: Run the separate tests
         if: ${{ !inputs.build_only }}
-        working-directory: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
+        working-directory: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}
         # Windows locks some of the build files while running tests, and parallel jobs can collide
         env:
           BUILD_TYPE: ${{ inputs.build_type }}
@@ -173,11 +206,11 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Run the embedded tests
         if: ${{ !inputs.build_only }}
-        working-directory: ${{ runner.os == 'Windows' && format('{0}/{1}', inputs.build_dir, inputs.build_type) || inputs.build_dir }}
+        working-directory: ${{ runner.os == 'Windows' && format('{0}/{1}', env.BUILD_DIR, inputs.build_type) || env.BUILD_DIR }}
         env:
           BUILD_NPROC: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
         run: |
-          ./rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs "${BUILD_NPROC}"
+          ./xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs "${BUILD_NPROC}"
 
       - name: Debug failure (Linux)
         if: ${{ failure() && runner.os == 'Linux' && !inputs.build_only }}
@@ -188,8 +221,8 @@ jobs:
           netstat -an
 
       - name: Prepare coverage report
-        if: ${{ !inputs.build_only && env.ENABLED_COVERAGE == 'true' }}
-        working-directory: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
+        if: ${{ !inputs.build_only && env.COVERAGE_ENABLED == 'true' }}
+        working-directory: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}
         env:
           BUILD_NPROC: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
           BUILD_TYPE: ${{ inputs.build_type }}
@@ -201,13 +234,13 @@ jobs:
             --target coverage
 
       - name: Upload coverage report
-        if: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && !inputs.build_only && env.ENABLED_COVERAGE == 'true' }}
+        if: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && !inputs.build_only && env.COVERAGE_ENABLED == 'true' }}
         uses: codecov/codecov-action@18283e04ce6e62d37312384ff67231eb8fd56d24 # v5.4.3
         with:
           disable_search: true
           disable_telem: true
           fail_ci_if_error: true
-          files: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}/coverage.xml
+          files: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/coverage.xml
           plugins: noop
           token: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
           verbose: true

.github/workflows/reusable-build-test.yml

@@ -8,21 +8,24 @@ name: Build and test
 on:
   workflow_call:
     inputs:
-      build_dir:
-        description: "The directory where to build."
+      ccache_enabled:
+        description: "Whether to enable ccache."
         required: false
-        type: string
-        default: ".build"
+        type: boolean
+        default: false
+
       os:
         description: 'The operating system to use for the build ("linux", "macos", "windows").'
         required: true
         type: string
+
       strategy_matrix:
         # TODO: Support additional strategies, e.g. "ubuntu" for generating all Ubuntu configurations.
         description: 'The strategy matrix to use for generating the configurations ("minimal", "all").'
         required: false
         type: string
         default: "minimal"
+
     secrets:
       CODECOV_TOKEN:
         description: "The Codecov token to use for uploading coverage reports."
@@ -46,9 +49,9 @@ jobs:
       matrix: ${{ fromJson(needs.generate-matrix.outputs.matrix) }}
       max-parallel: 10
     with:
-      build_dir: ${{ inputs.build_dir }}
       build_only: ${{ matrix.build_only }}
       build_type: ${{ matrix.build_type }}
+      ccache_enabled: ${{ inputs.ccache_enabled }}
       cmake_args: ${{ matrix.cmake_args }}
       cmake_target: ${{ matrix.cmake_target }}
       runs_on: ${{ toJSON(matrix.architecture.runner) }}

.github/workflows/reusable-check-levelization.yml

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
         env:
           MESSAGE: |
 
-            The dependency relationships between the modules in rippled have
+            The dependency relationships between the modules in xrpld have
             changed, which may be an improvement or a regression.
 
             A rule of thumb is that if your changes caused something to be

.github/workflows/reusable-check-rename.yml

@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ jobs:
         run: .github/scripts/rename/copyright.sh .
       - name: Check CMake configs
         run: .github/scripts/rename/cmake.sh .
+      - name: Check binary name
+        run: .github/scripts/rename/binary.sh .
+      - name: Check namespaces
+        run: .github/scripts/rename/namespace.sh .
+      - name: Check config name
+        run: .github/scripts/rename/config.sh .
       - name: Check for differences
         env:
           MESSAGE: |

.github/workflows/upload-conan-deps.yml

@@ -64,21 +64,21 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Cleanup workspace (macOS and Windows)
         if: ${{ runner.os == 'macOS' || runner.os == 'Windows' }}
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/actions/cleanup-workspace@01b244d2718865d427b499822fbd3f15e7197fcc
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/cleanup-workspace@2ece4ec6ab7de266859a6f053571425b2bd684b6
 
       - name: Checkout repository
         uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/actions/prepare-runner@ff9f8f649df5855ffe1a1ae715df43e51807f2e0
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@65da1c59e81965eeb257caa3587b9d45066fb925
         with:
-          disable_ccache: false
+          enable_ccache: false
 
       - name: Print build environment
         uses: ./.github/actions/print-env
 
       - name: Get number of processors
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/actions/get-nproc@046b1620f6bfd6cd0985dc82c3df02786801fe0a
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/get-nproc@2ece4ec6ab7de266859a6f053571425b2bd684b6
         id: nproc
         with:
           subtract: ${{ env.NPROC_SUBTRACT }}
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build dependencies
         uses: ./.github/actions/build-deps
         with:
-          build_dir: .build
           build_nproc: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
           build_type: ${{ matrix.build_type }}
           force_build: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event.inputs.force_source_build == 'true' }}

.gitignore

@@ -1,69 +1,48 @@
 # .gitignore
+# cspell: disable
 
-bin/boostbook_catalog.xml
-bin/config.log
-bin/project-cache.jam
-
-# Ignore vim swap files.
-*.swp
-
-# Ignore SCons support files.
-.sconsign.dblite
-
-# Ignore python compiled files.
-*.pyc
-
-# Ignore Macintosh Desktop Services Store files.
+# Macintosh Desktop Services Store files.
 .DS_Store
 
-# Ignore backup/temps
+# Build, intermediate, and temporary artifacts.
 *~
-
-# Ignore object files.
 *.o
-.nih_c
-tags
-TAGS
-GTAGS
-GRTAGS
-GPATH
-bin/rippled
-Debug/*.*
-Release/*.*
+*.pdb
+*.swp
+/.clangd
+Debug/
+Release/
+/.build/
+/build/
+/db/
+/out.txt
+/Testing/
+/tmp/
+CMakeSettings.json
+CMakeUserPresets.json
 
-# Ignore coverage files.
+# Coverage files.
 *.gcno
 *.gcda
 *.gcov
 
-# Levelization checking
+# Profiling data.
+gmon.out
+
+# Levelization data.
 .github/scripts/levelization/results/*
 !.github/scripts/levelization/results/loops.txt
 !.github/scripts/levelization/results/ordering.txt
 
-# Ignore tmp directory.
-tmp
+# Customized configs.
+/rippled.cfg
+/xrpld.cfg
+/validators.txt
 
-# Ignore database directory.
-db/
-db/*.db
-db/*.db-*
+# Locally patched Conan recipes
+external/conan-center-index/
 
-# Ignore debug logs
-debug_log.txt
-
-# Ignore customized configs
-rippled.cfg
-validators.txt
-
-# Doxygen generated documentation output
-HtmlDocumentation
-docs/html_doc
-
-# Xcode user-specific project settings
-# Xcode
-.DS_Store
-/build/
+# XCode IDE.
 *.pbxuser
 !default.pbxuser
 *.mode1v3
@@ -76,38 +55,16 @@ xcuserdata
 profile
 *.moved-aside
 DerivedData
-.idea/
 *.hmap
 
-# Intel Parallel Studio 2013 XE
-My Amplifier XE Results - RippleD
+# JetBrains IDE.
+/.idea/
 
-# Compiler intermediate output
-/out.txt
+# Microsoft Visual Studio IDE.
+/.vs/
+/.vscode/
 
-# Build Log
-rippled-build.log
-
-# Profiling data
-gmon.out
-
-Builds/VisualStudio2015/*.db
-Builds/VisualStudio2015/*.user
-Builds/VisualStudio2015/*.opendb
-Builds/VisualStudio2015/*.sdf
-
-# MSVC
-*.pdb
-.vs/
-CMakeSettings.json
-compile_commands.json
-.clangd
-packages
-pkg_out
-pkg
-CMakeUserPresets.json
-bld.rippled/
-.vscode
-
-# Suggested in-tree build directory
-/.build*/
+# AI tools.
+/.augment
+/.claude
+/CLAUDE.md

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -36,6 +36,21 @@ repos:
     hooks:
       - id: black
 
+  - repo: https://github.com/streetsidesoftware/cspell-cli
+    rev: v9.2.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: cspell # Spell check changed files
+        exclude: .config/cspell.config.yaml
+      - id: cspell # Spell check the commit message
+        name: check commit message spelling
+        args:
+          - --no-must-find-files
+          - --no-progress
+          - --no-summary
+          - --files
+          - .git/COMMIT_EDITMSG
+        stages: [commit-msg]
+
 exclude: |
   (?x)^(
       external/.*|

BUILD.md

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 ## Branches
 
 For a stable release, choose the `master` branch or one of the [tagged
-releases](https://github.com/ripple/rippled/releases).
+releases](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases).
 
 ```bash
 git checkout master
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ git checkout develop
 
 See [System Requirements](https://xrpl.org/system-requirements.html).
 
-Building rippled generally requires git, Python, Conan, CMake, and a C++
+Building xrpld generally requires git, Python, Conan, CMake, and a C++
 compiler. Some guidance on setting up such a [C++ development environment can be
 found here](./docs/build/environment.md).
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ found here](./docs/build/environment.md).
     It is possible to build with Conan 1.60+, but the instructions are
     significantly different, which is why we are not recommending it.
 
-`rippled` is written in the C++20 dialect and includes the `<concepts>` header.
+`xrpld` is written in the C++20 dialect and includes the `<concepts>` header.
 The [minimum compiler versions][2] required are:
 
 | Compiler    | Version   |
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Linux](./docs/build/environment.md#linux).
 
 ### Mac
 
-Many rippled engineers use macOS for development.
+Many xrpld engineers use macOS for development.
 
 Here are [sample instructions for setting up a C++ development environment on
 macOS](./docs/build/environment.md#macos).
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ default profile.
 ### Patched recipes
 
 The recipes in Conan Center occasionally need to be patched for compatibility
-with the latest version of `rippled`. We maintain a fork of the Conan Center
+with the latest version of `xrpld`. We maintain a fork of the Conan Center
 [here](https://github.com/XRPLF/conan-center-index/) containing the patches.
 
 To ensure our patched recipes are used, you must add our Conan remote at a
@@ -141,20 +141,37 @@ Alternatively, you can pull the patched recipes into the repository and use them
 locally:
 
 ```bash
+# Extract the version number from the lockfile.
+function extract_version {
+  version=$(cat conan.lock | sed -nE "s@.+${1}/(.+)#.+@\1@p" | head -n1)
+  echo ${version}
+}
+
+# Define which recipes to export.
+recipes=(ed25519 grpc secp256k1 snappy soci)
+
+# Selectively check out the recipes from our CCI fork.
 cd external
+mkdir -p conan-center-index
+cd conan-center-index
 git init
 git remote add origin git@github.com:XRPLF/conan-center-index.git
 git sparse-checkout init
-git sparse-checkout set recipes/ed25519
-git sparse-checkout add recipes/snappy
-git sparse-checkout add recipes/soci
+for recipe in ${recipes[@]}; do
+  echo "Checking out ${recipe}..."
+  git sparse-checkout add recipes/${recipe}/all
+done
 git fetch origin master
 git checkout master
-conan export --version 2015.03 recipes/ed25519/all
-conan export --version 1.1.10 recipes/snappy/all
-conan export --version 4.0.3 recipes/soci/all
-conan export --version 0.42.1 external/wasmi
-rm -rf .git
+cd ../..
+
+# Export the recipes into the local cache.
+for recipe in ${recipes[@]}; do
+  version=$(extract_version ${recipe})
+  echo "Exporting ${recipe}/${version}..."
+  conan export --version $(extract_version ${recipe}) \
+    external/conan-center-index/recipes/${recipe}/all
+done
 ```
 
 In the case we switch to a newer version of a dependency that still requires a
@@ -275,7 +292,7 @@ sed -i.bak -e 's|^compiler\.libcxx=.*$|compiler.libcxx=libstdc++11|' $(conan con
 to do that is to run the shortcut "x64 Native Tools Command Prompt" for the
 version of Visual Studio that you have installed.
 
-Windows developers must also build `rippled` and its dependencies for the x64
+Windows developers must also build `xrpld` and its dependencies for the x64
 architecture:
 
 ```bash
@@ -384,19 +401,6 @@ tools.build:cxxflags=['-DBOOST_ASIO_DISABLE_CONCEPTS']
    `--settings build_type=$BUILD_TYPE` or in the profile itself,
    under the section `[settings]` with the key `build_type`.
 
-   If you are using a Microsoft Visual C++ compiler,
-   then you will need to ensure consistency between the `build_type` setting
-   and the `compiler.runtime` setting.
-
-   When `build_type` is `Release`, `compiler.runtime` should be `MT`.
-
-   When `build_type` is `Debug`, `compiler.runtime` should be `MTd`.
-
-   ```
-   conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Release --settings compiler.runtime=MT
-   conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Debug --settings compiler.runtime=MTd
-   ```
-
 3. Configure CMake and pass the toolchain file generated by Conan, located at
    `$OUTPUT_FOLDER/build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake`.
 
@@ -418,9 +422,9 @@ tools.build:cxxflags=['-DBOOST_ASIO_DISABLE_CONCEPTS']
    cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE:FILEPATH=build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake -Dxrpld=ON -Dtests=ON  ..
    ```
 
-   **Note:** You can pass build options for `rippled` in this step.
+   **Note:** You can pass build options for `xrpld` in this step.
 
-4. Build `rippled`.
+4. Build `xrpld`.
 
    For a single-configuration generator, it will build whatever configuration
    you passed for `CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE`. For a multi-configuration generator, you
@@ -439,26 +443,26 @@ tools.build:cxxflags=['-DBOOST_ASIO_DISABLE_CONCEPTS']
    cmake --build . --config Debug
    ```
 
-5. Test rippled.
+5. Test xrpld.
 
    Single-config generators:
 
    ```
-   ./rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs N
+   ./xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs N
    ```
 
    Multi-config generators:
 
    ```
-   ./Release/rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs N
-   ./Debug/rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs N
+   ./Release/xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs N
+   ./Debug/xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs N
    ```
 
    Replace the `--unittest-jobs` parameter N with the desired unit tests
    concurrency. Recommended setting is half of the number of available CPU
    cores.
 
-   The location of `rippled` binary in your build directory depends on your
+   The location of `xrpld` binary in your build directory depends on your
    CMake generator. Pass `--help` to see the rest of the command line options.
 
 ## Coverage report
@@ -477,18 +481,18 @@ Prerequisites for the coverage report:
 
 A coverage report is created when the following steps are completed, in order:
 
-1. `rippled` binary built with instrumentation data, enabled by the `coverage`
+1. `xrpld` binary built with instrumentation data, enabled by the `coverage`
    option mentioned above
 2. completed one or more run of the unit tests, which populates coverage capture data
 3. completed run of the `gcovr` tool (which internally invokes either `gcov` or `llvm-cov`)
    to assemble both instrumentation data and the coverage capture data into a coverage report
 
 The last step of the above is automated into a single target `coverage`. The instrumented
-`rippled` binary can also be used for regular development or testing work, at
+`xrpld` binary can also be used for regular development or testing work, at
 the cost of extra disk space utilization and a small performance hit
-(to store coverage capture data). Since `rippled` binary is simply a dependency of the
+(to store coverage capture data). Since `xrpld` binary is simply a dependency of the
 coverage report target, it is possible to re-run the `coverage` target without
-rebuilding the `rippled` binary. Note, running of the unit tests before the `coverage`
+rebuilding the `xrpld` binary. Note, running of the unit tests before the `coverage`
 target is left to the developer. Each such run will append to the coverage data
 collected in the build directory.
 
@@ -516,16 +520,16 @@ stored inside the build directory, as either of:
 
 ## Options
 
-| Option     | Default Value | Description                                                                |
-| ---------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `assert`   | OFF           | Enable assertions.                                                         |
-| `coverage` | OFF           | Prepare the coverage report.                                               |
-| `san`      | N/A           | Enable a sanitizer with Clang. Choices are `thread` and `address`.         |
-| `tests`    | OFF           | Build tests.                                                               |
-| `unity`    | OFF           | Configure a unity build.                                                   |
-| `xrpld`    | OFF           | Build the xrpld (`rippled`) application, and not just the libxrpl library. |
-| `werr`     | OFF           | Treat compilation warnings as errors                                       |
-| `wextra`   | OFF           | Enable additional compilation warnings                                     |
+| Option     | Default Value | Description                                                        |
+| ---------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| `assert`   | OFF           | Enable assertions.                                                 |
+| `coverage` | OFF           | Prepare the coverage report.                                       |
+| `san`      | N/A           | Enable a sanitizer with Clang. Choices are `thread` and `address`. |
+| `tests`    | OFF           | Build tests.                                                       |
+| `unity`    | OFF           | Configure a unity build.                                           |
+| `xrpld`    | OFF           | Build the xrpld application, and not just the libxrpl library.     |
+| `werr`     | OFF           | Treat compilation warnings as errors                               |
+| `wextra`   | OFF           | Enable additional compilation warnings                             |
 
 [Unity builds][5] may be faster for the first build
 (at the cost of much more memory) since they concatenate sources into fewer
@@ -569,7 +573,7 @@ you might have generated CMake files for a different `build_type` than the
 `CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE` you passed to Conan.
 
 ```
-/rippled/.build/pb-xrpl.libpb/xrpl/proto/xrpl.pb.h:10:10: fatal error: 'google/protobuf/port_def.inc' file not found
+/xrpld/.build/pb-xrpl.libpb/xrpl/proto/xrpl.pb.h:10:10: fatal error: 'google/protobuf/port_def.inc' file not found
    10 | #include <google/protobuf/port_def.inc>
       |          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 1 error generated.

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ elseif(MSVC)
     add_compile_options(/wd4068) # Ignore unknown pragmas
 endif()
 
+# Enable ccache to speed up builds.
+include(Ccache)
+
 # make GIT_COMMIT_HASH define available to all sources
 find_package(Git)
 if(Git_FOUND)
@@ -89,14 +92,7 @@ find_package(OpenSSL 1.1.1 REQUIRED)
 set_target_properties(OpenSSL::SSL PROPERTIES
   INTERFACE_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 )
-set(SECP256K1_INSTALL TRUE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_BENCHMARK FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_TESTS FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_CTIME_TESTS FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXAMPLES FALSE)
-add_subdirectory(external/secp256k1)
-add_library(secp256k1::secp256k1 ALIAS secp256k1)
+
 add_subdirectory(external/antithesis-sdk)
 find_package(gRPC REQUIRED)
 find_package(lz4 REQUIRED)
@@ -119,7 +115,7 @@ endif()
 find_package(date REQUIRED)
 find_package(ed25519 REQUIRED)
 find_package(nudb REQUIRED)
-find_package(wasmi REQUIRED)
+find_package(secp256k1 REQUIRED)
 find_package(xxHash REQUIRED)
 
 target_link_libraries(xrpl_libs INTERFACE

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ your verifying key. Please set up [signature verification][signing].
 
 In general, external contributions should be developed in your personal
 [fork][forking]. Contributions from developers with write permissions
-should be done in [the main repository][rippled] in a branch with
+should be done in [the main repository][xrpld] in a branch with
 a permitted prefix. Permitted prefixes are:
 
 - XLS-[a-zA-Z0-9]+/.+
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Ensure that your code compiles according to the build instructions in
 
 Please write tests for your code.
 If your test can be run offline, in under 60 seconds, then it can be an
-automatic test run by `rippled --unittest`.
+automatic test run by `xrpld --unittest`.
 Otherwise, it must be a manual test.
 
 If you create new source files, they must be organized as follows:
@@ -256,13 +256,13 @@ pre-commit install
 We are using [Antithesis](https://antithesis.com/) for continuous fuzzing,
 and keep a copy of [Antithesis C++ SDK](https://github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-cpp/)
 in `external/antithesis-sdk`. One of the aims of fuzzing is to identify bugs
-by finding external conditions which cause contracts violations inside `rippled`.
+by finding external conditions which cause contracts violations inside `xrpld`.
 The contracts are expressed as `XRPL_ASSERT` or `UNREACHABLE` (defined in
 `include/xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h`), which are effectively (outside
 of Antithesis) wrappers for `assert(...)` with added name. The purpose of name
 is to provide contracts with stable identity which does not rely on line numbers.
 
-When `rippled` is built with the Antithesis instrumentation enabled
+When `xrpld` is built with the Antithesis instrumentation enabled
 (using `voidstar` CMake option) and ran on the Antithesis platform, the
 contracts become
 [test properties](https://antithesis.com/docs/using_antithesis/properties.html);
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ For this reason:
 - Example **bad** name
   `"RFC1751::insert(char* s, int x, int start, int length) : length is greater than or equal zero"`
   (missing namespace, unnecessary full function signature, description too verbose).
-  Good name: `"ripple::RFC1751::insert : minimum length"`.
+  Good name: `"xrpl::RFC1751::insert : minimum length"`.
 - In **few** well-justified cases a non-standard name can be used, in which case a
   comment should be placed to explain the rationale (example in `contract.cpp`)
 - Do **not** rename a contract without a good reason (e.g. the name no longer
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ For this reason:
 
 To execute all unit tests:
 
-`rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs=<number of cores>`
+`xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs=<number of cores>`
 
 (Note: Using multiple cores on a Mac M1 can cause spurious test failures. The
 cause is still under investigation. If you observe this problem, try specifying fewer jobs.)
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ cause is still under investigation. If you observe this problem, try specifying
 To run a specific set of test suites:
 
 ```
-rippled --unittest TestSuiteName
+xrpld --unittest TestSuiteName
 ```
 
 Note: In this example, all tests with prefix `TestSuiteName` will be run, so if
@@ -555,16 +555,16 @@ Rippled uses a linear workflow model that can be summarized as:
 git fetch --multiple upstreams user1 user2 user3 [...]
 git checkout -B release-next --no-track upstream/develop
 
-# Only do an ff-only merge if prbranch1 is either already
+# Only do an ff-only merge if pr-branch1 is either already
 # squashed, or needs to be merged with separate commits,
 # and has no merge commits.
-# Use -S on the ff-only merge if prbranch1 isn't signed.
-git merge [-S] --ff-only user1/prbranch1
+# Use -S on the ff-only merge if pr-branch1 isn't signed.
+git merge [-S] --ff-only user1/pr-branch1
 
-git merge --squash user2/prbranch2
+git merge --squash user2/pr-branch2
 git commit -S # Use the commit message provided on the PR
 
-git merge --squash user3/prbranch3
+git merge --squash user3/pr-branch3
 git commit -S # Use the commit message provided on the PR
 
 [...]
@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ git push --delete upstream-push master-next
 
 #### Special cases: point releases, hotfixes, etc.
 
-On occassion, a bug or issue is discovered in a version that already
+On occasion, a bug or issue is discovered in a version that already
 had a final release. Most of the time, development will have started
 on the next version, and will usually have changes in `develop`
 and often in `release`.
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ git fetch upstreams
 [contrib]: https://docs.github.com/en/get-started/quickstart/contributing-to-projects
 [squash]: https://docs.github.com/en/pull-requests/collaborating-with-pull-requests/incorporating-changes-from-a-pull-request/about-pull-request-merges#squash-and-merge-your-commits
 [forking]: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/fork
-[rippled]: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
+[xrpld]: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
 [signing]: https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/managing-commit-signature-verification/about-commit-signature-verification
 [setup-upstreams]: ./bin/git/setup-upstreams.sh
 [squash-branches]: ./bin/git/squash-branches.sh

SECURITY.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ For more information on responsible disclosure, please read this [Wikipedia arti
 
 ## Report Handling Process
 
-Please report the bug directly to us and limit further disclosure. If you want to prove that you knew the bug as of a given time, consider using a cryptographic precommitment: hash the content of your report and publish the hash on a medium of your choice (e.g. on Twitter or as a memo in a transaction) as "proof" that you had written the text at a given point in time.
+Please report the bug directly to us and limit further disclosure. If you want to prove that you knew the bug as of a given time, consider using a cryptographic pre-commitment: hash the content of your report and publish the hash on a medium of your choice (e.g. on Twitter or as a memo in a transaction) as "proof" that you had written the text at a given point in time.
 
 Once we receive a report, we:
 

cfg/validators-example.txt

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # Default validators.txt
 #
-# This file is located in the same folder as your rippled.cfg file
+# This file is located in the same folder as your xrpld.cfg file
 # and defines which validators your server trusts not to collude.
 #
 # This file is UTF-8 with DOS, UNIX, or Mac style line endings.

cfg/xrpld-example.cfg

@@ -29,18 +29,18 @@
 #
 # Purpose
 #
-#   This file documents and provides examples of all rippled server process
-#   configuration options. When the rippled server instance is launched, it
+#   This file documents and provides examples of all xrpld server process
+#   configuration options. When the xrpld server instance is launched, it
 #   looks for a file with the following name:
 #
-#     rippled.cfg
+#     xrpld.cfg
 #
-#   For more information on where the rippled server instance searches for the
+#   For more information on where the xrpld server instance searches for the
 #   file, visit:
 #
 #     https://xrpl.org/commandline-usage.html#generic-options
 #
-#   This file should be named rippled.cfg. This file is UTF-8 with DOS, UNIX,
+#   This file should be named xrpld.cfg. This file is UTF-8 with DOS, UNIX,
 #   or Mac style end of lines. Blank lines and lines beginning with '#' are
 #   ignored. Undefined sections are reserved. No escapes are currently defined.
 #
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@
 #
 #
 #
-#   rippled offers various server protocols to clients making inbound
-#   connections. The listening ports rippled uses are "universal" ports
+#   xrpld offers various server protocols to clients making inbound
+#   connections. The listening ports xrpld uses are "universal" ports
 #   which may be configured to handshake in one or more of the available
 #   supported protocols. These universal ports simplify administration:
 #   A single open port can be used for multiple protocols.
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
 #
 #   A list of port names and key/value pairs. A port name must start with a
 #   letter and contain only letters and numbers. The name is not case-sensitive.
-#   For each name in this list, rippled will look for a configuration file
+#   For each name in this list, xrpld will look for a configuration file
 #   section with the same name and use it to create a listening port. The
 #   name is informational only; the choice of name does not affect the function
 #   of the listening port.
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
 #       ip = 127.0.0.1
 #       protocol = http
 #
-#   When rippled is used as a command line client (for example, issuing a
+#   When xrpld is used as a command line client (for example, issuing a
 #   server stop command), the first port advertising the http or https
 #   protocol will be used to make the connection.
 #
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
 #       same time. It is possible have both Websockets and Secure Websockets
 #       together in one port.
 #
-#       NOTE    If no ports support the peer protocol, rippled cannot
+#       NOTE    If no ports support the peer protocol, xrpld cannot
 #               receive incoming peer connections or become a superpeer.
 #
 #   limit = <number>
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@
 #       required. IP address restrictions, if any, will be checked in addition
 #       to the credentials specified here.
 #
-#       When acting in the client role, rippled will supply these credentials
+#       When acting in the client role, xrpld will supply these credentials
 #       using HTTP's Basic Authentication headers when making outbound HTTP/S
 #       requests.
 #
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
 #       administrative commands.
 #
 #       NOTE    A common configuration value for the admin field is "localhost".
-#               If you are listening on all IPv4/IPv6 addresses by specifing
+#               If you are listening on all IPv4/IPv6 addresses by specifying
 #               ip = :: then you can use admin = ::ffff:127.0.0.1,::1 to allow
 #               administrative access from both IPv4 and IPv6 localhost
 #               connections.
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@
 #       WS, or WSS protocol interfaces. If administrative commands are
 #       disabled for a port, these credentials have no effect.
 #
-#       When acting in the client role, rippled will supply these credentials
+#       When acting in the client role, xrpld will supply these credentials
 #       in the submitted JSON for any administrative command requests when
 #       invoking JSON-RPC commands on remote servers.
 #
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@
 #       resource controls will default to those for non-administrative users.
 #
 #       The secure_gateway IP addresses are intended to represent
-#       proxies. Since rippled trusts these hosts, they must be
+#       proxies. Since xrpld trusts these hosts, they must be
 #       responsible for properly authenticating the remote user.
 #
 #       If some IP addresses are included for both "admin" and
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
 #       Use the specified files when configuring SSL on the port.
 #
 #       NOTE    If no files are specified and secure protocols are selected,
-#               rippled will generate an internal self-signed certificate.
+#               xrpld will generate an internal self-signed certificate.
 #
 #       The files have these meanings:
 #
@@ -297,12 +297,12 @@
 #       Control the ciphers which the server will support over SSL on the port,
 #       specified using the OpenSSL "cipher list format".
 #
-#       NOTE    If unspecified, rippled will automatically configure a modern
+#       NOTE    If unspecified, xrpld will automatically configure a modern
 #               cipher suite. This default suite should be widely supported.
 #
 #               You should not modify this string unless you have a specific
 #               reason and cryptographic expertise. Incorrect modification may
-#               keep rippled from connecting to other instances of rippled or
+#               keep xrpld from connecting to other instances of xrpld or
 #               prevent RPC and WebSocket clients from connecting.
 #
 #   send_queue_limit = [1..65535]
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
 #-----------------
 #
 #   These settings control security and access attributes of the Peer to Peer
-#   server section of the rippled process. Peer Protocol implements the
+#   server section of the xrpld process. Peer Protocol implements the
 #   Ripple Payment protocol. It is over peer connections that transactions
 #   and validations are passed from to machine to machine, to determine the
 #   contents of validated ledgers.
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
 #   true - enables compression
 #   false - disables compression [default].
 #
-#   The rippled server can save bandwidth by compressing its peer-to-peer communications,
+#   The xrpld server can save bandwidth by compressing its peer-to-peer communications,
 #   at a cost of greater CPU usage. If you enable link compression,
 #   the server automatically compresses communications with peer servers
 #   that also have link compression enabled.
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
 #
 # [ips_fixed]
 #
-#   List of IP addresses or hostnames to which rippled should always attempt to
+#   List of IP addresses or hostnames to which xrpld should always attempt to
 #   maintain peer connections with. This is useful for manually forming private
 #   networks, for example to configure a validation server that connects to the
 #   Ripple network through a public-facing server, or for building a set
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@
 #
 #   minimum_txn_in_ledger_standalone = <number>
 #
-#       Like minimum_txn_in_ledger when rippled is running in standalone
+#       Like minimum_txn_in_ledger when xrpld is running in standalone
 #       mode. Default: 1000.
 #
 #   target_txn_in_ledger = <number>
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@
 #
 # [validator_token]
 #
-#   This is an alternative to [validation_seed] that allows rippled to perform
+#   This is an alternative to [validation_seed] that allows xrpld to perform
 #   validation without having to store the validator keys on the network
 #   connected server. The field should contain a single token in the form of a
 #   base64-encoded blob.
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@
 #
 #   Specify the file by its name or path.
 #   Unless an absolute path is specified, it will be considered relative to
-#   the folder in which the rippled.cfg file is located.
+#   the folder in which the xrpld.cfg file is located.
 #
 #   Examples:
 #    /home/ripple/validators.txt
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@
 #
 #   0: Disable the ledger replay feature [default]
 #   1: Enable the ledger replay feature. With this feature enabled, when
-#      acquiring a ledger from the network, a rippled node only downloads
+#      acquiring a ledger from the network, a xrpld node only downloads
 #      the ledger header and the transactions instead of the whole ledger.
 #      And the ledger is built by applying the transactions to the parent
 #      ledger.
@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@
 #
 #----------------
 #
-#   The rippled server instance uses HTTPS GET requests in a variety of
+#   The xrpld server instance uses HTTPS GET requests in a variety of
 #   circumstances, including but not limited to contacting trusted domains to
 #   fetch information such as mapping an email address to a Ripple Payment
 #   Network address.
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@
 #
 #------------
 #
-#   rippled creates 4 SQLite database to hold bookkeeping information
+#   xrpld creates 4 SQLite database to hold bookkeeping information
 #   about transactions, local credentials, and various other things.
 #   It also creates the NodeDB, which holds all the objects that
 #   make up the current and historical ledgers.
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@
 #   the performance of the server.
 #
 #   Partial pathnames will be considered relative to the location of
-#   the rippled.cfg file.
+#   the xrpld.cfg file.
 #
 #   [node_db]               Settings for the Node Database (required)
 #
@@ -920,11 +920,11 @@
 #   type = NuDB
 #
 #       NuDB is a high-performance database written by Ripple Labs and optimized
-#       for rippled and solid-state drives.
+#       for xrpld and solid-state drives.
 #
 #       NuDB maintains its high speed regardless of the amount of history
 #       stored. Online delete may be selected, but is not required. NuDB is
-#       available on all platforms that rippled runs on.
+#       available on all platforms that xrpld runs on.
 #
 #   type = RocksDB
 #
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@
 #
 #       recovery_wait_seconds
 #                           The online delete process checks periodically
-#                           that rippled is still in sync with the network,
+#                           that xrpld is still in sync with the network,
 #                           and that the validated ledger is less than
 #                           'age_threshold_seconds' old. If not, then continue
 #                           sleeping for this number of seconds and
@@ -1069,8 +1069,8 @@
 #   The server creates and maintains 4 to 5 bookkeeping SQLite databases in
 #   the 'database_path' location. If you omit this configuration setting,
 #   the server creates a directory called "db" located in the same place as
-#   your rippled.cfg file.
-#   Partial pathnames are relative to the location of the rippled executable.
+#   your xrpld.cfg file.
+#   Partial pathnames are relative to the location of the xrpld executable.
 #
 #   [sqlite]       Tuning settings for the SQLite databases (optional)
 #
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@
 #                           The default is "wal", which uses a write-ahead
 #                           log to implement database transactions.
 #                           Alternately, "memory" saves disk I/O, but if
-#                           rippled crashes during a transaction, the
+#                           xrpld crashes during a transaction, the
 #                           database is likely to be corrupted.
 #                           See https://www.sqlite.org/pragma.html#pragma_journal_mode
 #                           for more details about the available options.
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@
 #       synchronous         Valid values: off, normal, full, extra
 #                           The default is "normal", which works well with
 #                           the "wal" journal mode. Alternatively, "off"
-#                           allows rippled to continue as soon as data is
+#                           allows xrpld to continue as soon as data is
 #                           passed to the OS, which can significantly
 #                           increase speed, but risks data corruption if
 #                           the host computer crashes before writing that
@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@
 #                           The default is "file", which will use files
 #                           for temporary database tables and indices.
 #                           Alternatively, "memory" may save I/O, but
-#                           rippled does not currently use many, if any,
+#                           xrpld does not currently use many, if any,
 #                           of these temporary objects.
 #                           See https://www.sqlite.org/pragma.html#pragma_temp_store
 #                           for more details about the available options.
@@ -1173,7 +1173,7 @@
 #
 #   These settings are designed to help server administrators diagnose
 #   problems, and obtain detailed information about the activities being
-#   performed by the rippled process.
+#   performed by the xrpld process.
 #
 #
 #
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@
 #
 #   Configuration parameters for the Beast. Insight stats collection module.
 #
-#   Insight is a module that collects information from the areas of rippled
+#   Insight is a module that collects information from the areas of xrpld
 #   that have instrumentation. The configuration parameters control where the
 #   collection metrics are sent. The parameters are expressed as key = value
 #   pairs with no white space. The main parameter is the choice of server:
@@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@
 #
 #       Choice of server to send metrics to. Currently the only choice is
 #       "statsd" which sends UDP packets to a StatsD daemon, which must be
-#       running while rippled is running. More information on StatsD is
+#       running while xrpld is running. More information on StatsD is
 #       available here:
 #           https://github.com/b/statsd_spec
 #
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@
 #                 in the format, n.n.n.n:port.
 #
 #       "prefix"  A string prepended to each collected metric. This is used
-#                 to distinguish between different running instances of rippled.
+#                 to distinguish between different running instances of xrpld.
 #
 #     If this section is missing, or the server type is unspecified or unknown,
 #     statistics are not collected or reported.
@@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@
 #
 #   Example:
 #     [perf]
-#     perf_log=/var/log/rippled/perf.log
+#     perf_log=/var/log/xrpld/perf.log
 #     log_interval=2
 #
 #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@
 #----------
 #
 #   The vote settings configure settings for the entire Ripple network.
-#   While a single instance of rippled cannot unilaterally enforce network-wide
+#   While a single instance of xrpld cannot unilaterally enforce network-wide
 #   settings, these choices become part of the instance's vote during the
 #   consensus process for each voting ledger.
 #
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@
 #       The reference transaction is the simplest form of transaction.
 #       It represents an XRP payment between two parties.
 #
-#       If this parameter is unspecified, rippled will use an internal
+#       If this parameter is unspecified, xrpld will use an internal
 #       default. Don't change this without understanding the consequences.
 #
 #       Example:
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@
 #       account's XRP balance that is at or below the reserve may only be
 #       spent on transaction fees, and not transferred out of the account.
 #
-#       If this parameter is unspecified, rippled will use an internal
+#       If this parameter is unspecified, xrpld will use an internal
 #       default. Don't change this without understanding the consequences.
 #
 #       Example:
@@ -1284,45 +1284,12 @@
 #       each ledger item owned by the account. Ledger items an account may
 #       own include trust lines, open orders, and tickets.
 #
-#       If this parameter is unspecified, rippled will use an internal
+#       If this parameter is unspecified, xrpld will use an internal
 #       default. Don't change this without understanding the consequences.
 #
 #       Example:
 #           owner_reserve = 2000000      # 2 XRP
 #
-#   extension_compute_limit = <gas>
-#
-#       The extension compute limit is the maximum amount of gas that can be
-#       consumed by a single transaction. The gas limit is used to prevent
-#       transactions from consuming too many resources.
-#
-#       If this parameter is unspecified, rippled will use an internal
-#       default. Don't change this without understanding the consequences.
-#
-#       Example:
-#           extension_compute_limit = 1000000      # 1 million gas
-#
-#   extension_size_limit = <bytes>
-#
-#       The extension size limit is the maximum size of a WASM extension in
-#       bytes. The size limit is used to prevent extensions from consuming
-#       too many resources.
-#
-#       If this parameter is unspecified, rippled will use an internal
-#       default. Don't change this without understanding the consequences.
-#
-#       Example:
-#           extension_size_limit = 100000      # 100 kb
-#
-#   gas_price = <bytes>
-#
-#       The gas price is the conversion between WASM gas and its price in drops.
-#
-#       If this parameter is unspecified, rippled will use an internal
-#       default. Don't change this without understanding the consequences.
-#
-#       Example:
-#           gas_price = 1000000      # 1 drop per gas
 #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 #
 # 9. Misc Settings
@@ -1359,7 +1326,7 @@
 #   tool instead.
 #
 #   This flag has no effect on the "sign" and "sign_for" command line options
-#   that rippled makes available.
+#   that xrpld makes available.
 #
 #   The default value of this field is "false"
 #
@@ -1438,7 +1405,7 @@
 #--------------------
 #
 #   Administrators can use these values as a starting point for configuring
-#   their instance of rippled, but each value should be checked to make sure
+#   their instance of xrpld, but each value should be checked to make sure
 #   it meets the business requirements for the organization.
 #
 # Server
@@ -1448,7 +1415,7 @@
 #   "peer"
 #
 #       Peer protocol open to everyone. This is required to accept
-#       incoming rippled connections. This does not affect automatic
+#       incoming xrpld connections. This does not affect automatic
 #       or manual outgoing Peer protocol connections.
 #
 #   "rpc"
@@ -1465,7 +1432,7 @@
 #
 #       ETL commands for Clio. We recommend setting secure_gateway
 #       in this section to a comma-separated list of the addresses
-#       of your Clio servers, in order to bypass rippled's rate limiting.
+#       of your Clio servers, in order to bypass xrpld's rate limiting.
 #
 #   This port is commented out but can be enabled by removing
 #   the '#' from each corresponding line including the entry under [server]
@@ -1482,8 +1449,8 @@
 #   NOTE
 #
 #       To accept connections on well known ports such as 80 (HTTP) or
-#       443 (HTTPS), most operating systems will require rippled to
-#       run with administrator privileges, or else rippled will not start.
+#       443 (HTTPS), most operating systems will require xrpld to
+#       run with administrator privileges, or else xrpld will not start.
 
 [server]
 port_rpc_admin_local
@@ -1529,7 +1496,7 @@ secure_gateway = 127.0.0.1
 
 #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-# This is primary persistent datastore for rippled.  This includes transaction
+# This is primary persistent datastore for xrpld.  This includes transaction
 # metadata, account states, and ledger headers.  Helpful information can be
 # found at https://xrpl.org/capacity-planning.html#node-db-type
 # type=NuDB is recommended for non-validators with fast SSDs. Validators or
@@ -1544,19 +1511,19 @@ secure_gateway = 127.0.0.1
 #    deletion.
 [node_db]
 type=NuDB
-path=/var/lib/rippled/db/nudb
+path=/var/lib/xrpld/db/nudb
 nudb_block_size=4096
 online_delete=512
 advisory_delete=0
 
 [database_path]
-/var/lib/rippled/db
+/var/lib/xrpld/db
 
 
 # This needs to be an absolute directory reference, not a relative one.
 # Modify this value as required.
 [debug_logfile]
-/var/log/rippled/debug.log
+/var/log/xrpld/debug.log
 
 # To use the XRP test network
 # (see https://xrpl.org/connect-your-rippled-to-the-xrp-test-net.html),
@@ -1566,7 +1533,7 @@ advisory_delete=0
 
 # File containing trusted validator keys or validator list publishers.
 # Unless an absolute path is specified, it will be considered relative to the
-# folder in which the rippled.cfg file is located.
+# folder in which the xrpld.cfg file is located.
 [validators_file]
 validators.txt
 

cmake/Ccache.cmake

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+find_program(CCACHE_PATH "ccache")
+if (NOT CCACHE_PATH)
+    return()
+endif ()
+
+# For Linux and macOS we can use the ccache binary directly.
+if (NOT MSVC)
+    set(CMAKE_C_COMPILER_LAUNCHER "${CCACHE_PATH}")
+    set(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_LAUNCHER "${CCACHE_PATH}")
+    message(STATUS "Found ccache: ${CCACHE_PATH}")
+    return()
+endif ()
+
+# For Windows more effort is required. The code below is a modified version of
+# https://github.com/ccache/ccache/wiki/MS-Visual-Studio#usage-with-cmake.
+if ("${CCACHE_PATH}" MATCHES "chocolatey")
+    message(DEBUG "Ccache path: ${CCACHE_PATH}")
+    # Chocolatey uses a shim executable that we cannot use directly, in which
+    # case we have to find the executable it points to. If we cannot find the
+    # target executable then we cannot use ccache.
+    find_program(BASH_PATH "bash")
+    if (NOT BASH_PATH)
+        message(WARNING "Could not find bash.")
+        return()
+    endif ()
+
+    execute_process(
+            COMMAND bash -c "export LC_ALL='en_US.UTF-8'; ${CCACHE_PATH} --shimgen-noop | grep -oP 'path to executable: \\K.+' | head -c -1"
+            OUTPUT_VARIABLE CCACHE_PATH)
+
+    if (NOT CCACHE_PATH)
+        message(WARNING "Could not find ccache target.")
+        return()
+    endif ()
+    file(TO_CMAKE_PATH "${CCACHE_PATH}" CCACHE_PATH)
+endif ()
+message(STATUS "Found ccache: ${CCACHE_PATH}")
+
+# Tell cmake to use ccache for compiling with Visual Studio.
+file(COPY_FILE
+        ${CCACHE_PATH} ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/cl.exe
+        ONLY_IF_DIFFERENT)
+set(CMAKE_VS_GLOBALS
+        "CLToolExe=cl.exe"
+        "CLToolPath=${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}"
+        "TrackFileAccess=false"
+        "UseMultiToolTask=true")
+
+# By default Visual Studio generators will use /Zi, which is not compatible with
+# ccache, so tell it to use /Z7 instead.
+set(CMAKE_MSVC_DEBUG_INFORMATION_FORMAT "$<$<CONFIG:Debug,RelWithDebInfo>:Embedded>")

cmake/XrplCompiler.cmake

@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ elseif (use_gold AND is_gcc)
     ERROR_QUIET OUTPUT_VARIABLE LD_VERSION)
     #[=========================================================[
        NOTE: THE gold linker inserts -rpath as DT_RUNPATH by
-       default intead of DT_RPATH, so you might have slightly
+       default instead of DT_RPATH, so you might have slightly
        unexpected runtime ld behavior if you were expecting
        DT_RPATH.  Specify --disable-new-dtags to gold if you do
        not want the default DT_RUNPATH behavior. This rpath

cmake/XrplCore.cmake

@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ target_link_libraries(xrpl.imports.main
     Xrpl::opts
     Xrpl::syslibs
     secp256k1::secp256k1
-    wasmi::wasmi
     xrpl.libpb
     xxHash::xxhash
     $<$<BOOL:${voidstar}>:antithesis-sdk-cpp>
@@ -95,10 +94,18 @@ target_link_libraries(xrpl.libxrpl.protocol PUBLIC
 )
 
 # Level 05
+add_module(xrpl core)
+target_link_libraries(xrpl.libxrpl.core PUBLIC
+  xrpl.libxrpl.basics
+  xrpl.libxrpl.json
+  xrpl.libxrpl.protocol
+)
+
+# Level 06
 add_module(xrpl resource)
 target_link_libraries(xrpl.libxrpl.resource PUBLIC xrpl.libxrpl.protocol)
 
-# Level 06
+# Level 07
 add_module(xrpl net)
 target_link_libraries(xrpl.libxrpl.net PUBLIC
   xrpl.libxrpl.basics
@@ -145,6 +152,7 @@ target_sources(xrpl.libxrpl PRIVATE ${sources})
 target_link_modules(xrpl PUBLIC
   basics
   beast
+  core
   crypto
   json
   protocol
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@ if(xrpld)
   )
   exclude_if_included(xrpld)
   # define a macro for tests that might need to
-  # be exluded or run differently in CI environment
+  # be excluded or run differently in CI environment
   if(is_ci)
     target_compile_definitions(xrpld PRIVATE XRPL_RUNNING_IN_CI)
   endif ()
@@ -224,6 +232,4 @@ if(xrpld)
       src/test/ledger/Invariants_test.cpp
       PROPERTIES SKIP_UNITY_BUILD_INCLUSION TRUE)
   endif()
-  # For the time being, we will keep the name of the binary as it was.
-  set_target_properties(xrpld PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME "rippled")
 endif()

cmake/XrplDocs.cmake

@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
    docs target (optional)
 #]===================================================================]
 
-option(with_docs "Include the docs target?" FALSE)
-
-if(NOT (with_docs OR only_docs))
+if(NOT only_docs)
   return()
 endif()
 

cmake/XrplInstall.cmake

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ install (
     xrpl.libxrpl
     xrpl.libxrpl.basics
     xrpl.libxrpl.beast
+    xrpl.libxrpl.core
     xrpl.libxrpl.crypto
     xrpl.libxrpl.json
     xrpl.libxrpl.ledger
@@ -61,14 +62,14 @@ if (is_root_project AND TARGET xrpld)
         message (\"-- Skipping : \$ENV{DESTDIR}\${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/\${DEST}/\${NEWNAME}\")
       endif ()
     endmacro()
-    copy_if_not_exists(\"${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/cfg/rippled-example.cfg\" etc rippled.cfg)
+    copy_if_not_exists(\"${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/cfg/xrpld-example.cfg\" etc xrpld.cfg)
     copy_if_not_exists(\"${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/cfg/validators-example.txt\" etc validators.txt)
   ")
   install(CODE "
     set(CMAKE_MODULE_PATH \"${CMAKE_MODULE_PATH}\")
     include(create_symbolic_link)
-    create_symbolic_link(rippled${suffix} \
-       \$ENV{DESTDIR}\${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}/xrpld${suffix})
+    create_symbolic_link(xrpld${suffix} \
+       \$ENV{DESTDIR}\${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}/rippled${suffix})
   ")
 endif ()
 

conan.lock

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+{
+    "version": "0.5",
+    "requires": [
+        "zlib/1.3.1#b8bc2603263cf7eccbd6e17e66b0ed76%1756234269.497",
+        "xxhash/0.8.3#681d36a0a6111fc56e5e45ea182c19cc%1756234289.683",
+        "sqlite3/3.49.1#8631739a4c9b93bd3d6b753bac548a63%1756234266.869",
+        "soci/4.0.3#a9f8d773cd33e356b5879a4b0564f287%1756234262.318",
+        "snappy/1.1.10#968fef506ff261592ec30c574d4a7809%1756234314.246",
+        "secp256k1/0.7.0#9c4ab67bdc3860c16ea5b36aed8f74ea%1765202256.763",
+        "rocksdb/10.5.1#4a197eca381a3e5ae8adf8cffa5aacd0%1762797952.535",
+        "re2/20230301#ca3b241baec15bd31ea9187150e0b333%1764175362.029",
+        "protobuf/6.32.1#f481fd276fc23a33b85a3ed1e898b693%1764863245.83",
+        "openssl/3.5.4#a1d5835cc6ed5c5b8f3cd5b9b5d24205%1760106486.594",
+        "nudb/2.0.9#fb8dfd1a5557f5e0528114c2da17721e%1763150366.909",
+        "lz4/1.10.0#59fc63cac7f10fbe8e05c7e62c2f3504%1756234228.999",
+        "libiconv/1.17#1e65319e945f2d31941a9d28cc13c058%1756223727.64",
+        "libbacktrace/cci.20210118#a7691bfccd8caaf66309df196790a5a1%1756230911.03",
+        "libarchive/3.8.1#ffee18995c706e02bf96e7a2f7042e0d%1764175360.142",
+        "jemalloc/5.3.0#e951da9cf599e956cebc117880d2d9f8%1729241615.244",
+        "grpc/1.72.0#f244a57bff01e708c55a1100b12e1589%1763158050.628",
+        "ed25519/2015.03#ae761bdc52730a843f0809bdf6c1b1f6%1764270189.893",
+        "doctest/2.4.12#eb9fb352fb2fdfc8abb17ec270945165%1762797941.757",
+        "date/3.0.4#862e11e80030356b53c2c38599ceb32b%1763584497.32",
+        "c-ares/1.34.5#5581c2b62a608b40bb85d965ab3ec7c8%1764175359.429",
+        "bzip2/1.0.8#c470882369c2d95c5c77e970c0c7e321%1764175359.429",
+        "boost/1.88.0#8852c0b72ce8271fb8ff7c53456d4983%1756223752.326",
+        "abseil/20250127.0#9e8e8cfc89a1324139fc0ee3bd4d8c8c%1753819045.301"
+    ],
+    "build_requires": [
+        "zlib/1.3.1#b8bc2603263cf7eccbd6e17e66b0ed76%1756234269.497",
+        "strawberryperl/5.32.1.1#707032463aa0620fa17ec0d887f5fe41%1756234281.733",
+        "protobuf/6.32.1#f481fd276fc23a33b85a3ed1e898b693%1764863245.83",
+        "nasm/2.16.01#31e26f2ee3c4346ecd347911bd126904%1756234232.901",
+        "msys2/cci.latest#1996656c3c98e5765b25b60ff5cf77b4%1764840888.758",
+        "m4/1.4.19#70dc8bbb33e981d119d2acc0175cf381%1763158052.846",
+        "cmake/4.2.0#ae0a44f44a1ef9ab68fd4b3e9a1f8671%1764175359.44",
+        "cmake/3.31.10#313d16a1aa16bbdb2ca0792467214b76%1764175359.429",
+        "b2/5.3.3#107c15377719889654eb9a162a673975%1756234226.28",
+        "automake/1.16.5#b91b7c384c3deaa9d535be02da14d04f%1755524470.56",
+        "autoconf/2.71#51077f068e61700d65bb05541ea1e4b0%1731054366.86",
+        "abseil/20250127.0#9e8e8cfc89a1324139fc0ee3bd4d8c8c%1753819045.301"
+    ],
+    "python_requires": [],
+    "overrides": {
+        "protobuf/5.27.0": [
+            "protobuf/6.32.1"
+        ],
+        "lz4/1.9.4": [
+            "lz4/1.10.0"
+        ],
+        "boost/1.83.0": [
+            "boost/1.88.0"
+        ],
+        "sqlite3/3.44.2": [
+            "sqlite3/3.49.1"
+        ],
+        "lz4/[>=1.9.4 <2]": [
+            "lz4/1.10.0#59fc63cac7f10fbe8e05c7e62c2f3504"
+        ]
+    },
+    "config_requires": []
+}

conan/profiles/default

@@ -20,12 +20,6 @@ compiler.libcxx={{detect_api.detect_libcxx(compiler, version, compiler_exe)}}
 {% endif %}
 
 [conf]
-{% if compiler == "clang" and compiler_version >= 19 %}
-grpc/1.50.1:tools.build:cxxflags+=['-Wno-missing-template-arg-list-after-template-kw']
-{% endif %}
-{% if compiler == "apple-clang" and compiler_version >= 17 %}
-grpc/1.50.1:tools.build:cxxflags+=['-Wno-missing-template-arg-list-after-template-kw']
-{% endif %}
 {% if compiler == "gcc" and compiler_version < 13 %}
 tools.build:cxxflags+=['-Wno-restrict']
 {% endif %}

conanfile.py

@@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
 
     requires = [
         "ed25519/2015.03",
-        "grpc/1.50.1",
+        "grpc/1.72.0",
         "libarchive/3.8.1",
         "nudb/2.0.9",
         "openssl/3.5.4",
+        "secp256k1/0.7.0",
         "soci/4.0.3",
-        "wasmi/0.42.1",
         "zlib/1.3.1",
     ]
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
     ]
 
     tool_requires = [
-        "protobuf/3.21.12",
+        "protobuf/6.32.1",
     ]
 
     default_options = {
@@ -58,8 +58,19 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         "unity": False,
         "xrpld": False,
         "date/*:header_only": True,
+        "ed25519/*:shared": False,
         "grpc/*:shared": False,
         "grpc/*:secure": True,
+        "grpc/*:codegen": True,
+        "grpc/*:cpp_plugin": True,
+        "grpc/*:csharp_ext": False,
+        "grpc/*:csharp_plugin": False,
+        "grpc/*:node_plugin": False,
+        "grpc/*:objective_c_plugin": False,
+        "grpc/*:php_plugin": False,
+        "grpc/*:python_plugin": False,
+        "grpc/*:ruby_plugin": False,
+        "grpc/*:otel_plugin": False,
         "libarchive/*:shared": False,
         "libarchive/*:with_acl": False,
         "libarchive/*:with_bzip2": False,
@@ -86,6 +97,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         "rocksdb/*:with_jemalloc": False,
         "rocksdb/*:with_lz4": True,
         "rocksdb/*:with_snappy": True,
+        "secp256k1/*:shared": False,
         "snappy/*:shared": False,
         "soci/*:shared": False,
         "soci/*:with_sqlite3": True,
@@ -116,7 +128,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         self.requires("boost/1.88.0", force=True, **transitive_headers_opt)
         self.requires("date/3.0.4", **transitive_headers_opt)
         self.requires("lz4/1.10.0", force=True)
-        self.requires("protobuf/3.21.12", force=True)
+        self.requires("protobuf/6.32.1", force=True)
         self.requires("sqlite3/3.49.1", force=True)
         if self.options.jemalloc:
             self.requires("jemalloc/5.3.0")
@@ -170,12 +182,10 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         libxrpl.libs = [
             "xrpl",
             "xrpl.libpb",
-            "ed25519",
-            "secp256k1",
         ]
         # TODO: Fix the protobufs to include each other relative to
-        # `include/`, not `include/ripple/proto/`.
-        libxrpl.includedirs = ["include", "include/ripple/proto"]
+        # `include/`, not `include/xrpl/proto/`.
+        libxrpl.includedirs = ["include", "include/xrpl/proto"]
         libxrpl.requires = [
             "boost::headers",
             "boost::chrono",
@@ -198,8 +208,8 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
             "openssl::crypto",
             "protobuf::libprotobuf",
             "soci::soci",
+            "secp256k1::secp256k1",
             "sqlite3::sqlite",
-            "wasmi::wasmi",
             "xxhash::xxhash",
             "zlib::zlib",
         ]

docs/.gitignore

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-html
-temp
-out.txt

docs/0001-negative-unl/README.md

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ validation messages (_PAV_) received from each validator on the node's UNL. Note
 that the node will only count the validation messages that agree with its own
 validations.
 
-We define the **PAV** as the **P**ercentage of **A**greed **V**alidation
+We define the **PAV** as the Percentage of Agreed Validation
 messages received for the last N ledgers, where N = 256 by default.
 
 When the PAV drops below the **_low-water mark_**, the validator is considered

docs/0001-negative-unl/negativeUNLSqDiagram.puml

@@ -43,14 +43,14 @@ alt phase == OPEN
             alt sqn%256==0
             CA -[#green]> RM: <font color=green>getValidations
             CA -[#green]> CA: <font color=green>create UNLModify Tx
-            hnote over CA#lightgreen: use validatations of the last 256 ledgers\nto figure out UNLModify Tx candidates.\nIf any, create UNLModify Tx, and add to TxSet.
+            hnote over CA#lightgreen: use validations of the last 256 ledgers\nto figure out UNLModify Tx candidates.\nIf any, create UNLModify Tx, and add to TxSet.
             end
         CA -> GC
         GC -> CA: propose
         deactivate CA
     end
 else phase == ESTABLISH
-    hnote over GC: receive peer postions
+    hnote over GC: receive peer positions
     GC -> GC : update our position
     GC -> CA : propose \n(if position changed)
     GC -> GC : check if have consensus

docs/README.md

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ There is a `docs` target in the CMake configuration.
 ```
 mkdir build
 cd build
-cmake ..
-cmake --build . --target docs
+cmake -Donly_docs=ON ..
+cmake --build . --target docs --parallel
 ```
 
 The output will be in `build/docs/html`.

docs/consensus.md

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ validations. It checks this on every call to `timerEntry`.
 - _Wrong Ledger_ indicates the node is not working on the correct prior ledger
   and does not have it available. It requests that ledger from the network, but
   continues to work towards consensus this round while waiting. If it had been
-  _proposing_, it will send a special "bowout" proposal to its peers to indicate
+  _proposing_, it will send a special "bow-out" proposal to its peers to indicate
   its change in mode for the rest of this round. For the duration of the round,
   it defers to peer positions for determining the consensus outcome as if it
   were just _observing_.
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ are excerpts of the generic consensus implementation and of helper types that wi
 interact with the concrete implementing class.
 
 ```{.cpp}
-// Represents a transction under dispute this round
+// Represents a transaction under dispute this round
 template <class Tx_t, class NodeID_t> class DisputedTx;
 
 // Represents how the node participates in Consensus this round

external/README.md

@@ -5,4 +5,3 @@ The subdirectories in this directory contain external libraries used by rippled.
 | Folder           | Upstream                                                       | Description                                                                                  |
 | :--------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `antithesis-sdk` | [Project](https://github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-cpp/) | [Antithesis](https://antithesis.com/docs/using_antithesis/sdk/cpp/overview.html) SDK for C++ |
-| `secp256k1`      | [Project](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1)           | ECDSA digital signatures using the **secp256k1** curve                                       |

external/secp256k1/.cirrus.yml

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-env:
-  ### cirrus config
-  CIRRUS_CLONE_DEPTH: 1
-  ### compiler options
-  HOST:
-  WRAPPER_CMD:
-  # Specific warnings can be disabled with -Wno-error=foo.
-  # -pedantic-errors is not equivalent to -Werror=pedantic and thus not implied by -Werror according to the GCC manual.
-  WERROR_CFLAGS: -Werror -pedantic-errors
-  MAKEFLAGS: -j4
-  BUILD: check
-  ### secp256k1 config
-  ECMULTWINDOW: 15
-  ECMULTGENKB: 22
-  ASM: no
-  WIDEMUL: auto
-  WITH_VALGRIND: yes
-  EXTRAFLAGS:
-  ### secp256k1 modules
-  EXPERIMENTAL: no
-  ECDH: no
-  RECOVERY: no
-  EXTRAKEYS: no
-  SCHNORRSIG: no
-  MUSIG: no
-  ELLSWIFT: no
-  ### test options
-  SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS: 64
-  BENCH: yes
-  SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS: 2
-  CTIMETESTS: yes
-  # Compile and run the tests
-  EXAMPLES: yes
-
-cat_logs_snippet: &CAT_LOGS
-  always:
-    cat_tests_log_script:
-      - cat tests.log || true
-    cat_noverify_tests_log_script:
-      - cat noverify_tests.log || true
-    cat_exhaustive_tests_log_script:
-      - cat exhaustive_tests.log || true
-    cat_ctime_tests_log_script:
-      - cat ctime_tests.log || true
-    cat_bench_log_script:
-      - cat bench.log || true
-    cat_config_log_script:
-      - cat config.log || true
-    cat_test_env_script:
-      - cat test_env.log || true
-    cat_ci_env_script:
-      - env
-
-linux_arm64_container_snippet: &LINUX_ARM64_CONTAINER
-  env_script:
-    - env | tee /tmp/env
-  build_script:
-    - DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --file "ci/linux-debian.Dockerfile" --tag="ci_secp256k1_arm"
-    - docker image prune --force  # Cleanup stale layers
-  test_script:
-    - docker run --rm --mount "type=bind,src=./,dst=/ci_secp256k1" --env-file /tmp/env --replace --name "ci_secp256k1_arm" "ci_secp256k1_arm" bash -c "cd /ci_secp256k1/ && ./ci/ci.sh"
-
-task:
-  name: "ARM64: Linux (Debian stable)"
-  persistent_worker:
-    labels:
-      type: arm64
-  env:
-    ECDH: yes
-    RECOVERY: yes
-    EXTRAKEYS: yes
-    SCHNORRSIG: yes
-    MUSIG: yes
-    ELLSWIFT: yes
-  matrix:
-     # Currently only gcc-snapshot, the other compilers are tested on GHA with QEMU
-     - env: { CC: 'gcc-snapshot' }
-  << : *LINUX_ARM64_CONTAINER
-  << : *CAT_LOGS
-
-task:
-  name: "ARM64: Linux (Debian stable), Valgrind"
-  persistent_worker:
-    labels:
-      type: arm64
-  env:
-    ECDH: yes
-    RECOVERY: yes
-    EXTRAKEYS: yes
-    SCHNORRSIG: yes
-    MUSIG: yes
-    ELLSWIFT: yes
-    WRAPPER_CMD: 'valgrind --error-exitcode=42'
-    SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS: 2
-  matrix:
-     - env: { CC: 'gcc' }
-     - env: { CC: 'clang' }
-     - env: { CC: 'gcc-snapshot' }
-     - env: { CC: 'clang-snapshot' }
-  << : *LINUX_ARM64_CONTAINER
-  << : *CAT_LOGS

external/secp256k1/.gitattributes

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-src/precomputed_ecmult.c linguist-generated
-src/precomputed_ecmult_gen.c linguist-generated

external/secp256k1/.gitignore

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-bench
-bench_ecmult
-bench_internal
-noverify_tests
-tests
-exhaustive_tests
-precompute_ecmult_gen
-precompute_ecmult
-ctime_tests
-ecdh_example
-ecdsa_example
-schnorr_example
-ellswift_example
-musig_example
-*.exe
-*.so
-*.a
-*.csv
-*.log
-*.trs
-*.sage.py
-
-Makefile
-configure
-.libs/
-Makefile.in
-aclocal.m4
-autom4te.cache/
-config.log
-config.status
-conftest*
-*.tar.gz
-*.la
-libtool
-.deps/
-.dirstamp
-*.lo
-*.o
-*~
-
-coverage/
-coverage.html
-coverage.*.html
-*.gcda
-*.gcno
-*.gcov
-
-build-aux/ar-lib
-build-aux/config.guess
-build-aux/config.sub
-build-aux/depcomp
-build-aux/install-sh
-build-aux/ltmain.sh
-build-aux/m4/libtool.m4
-build-aux/m4/lt~obsolete.m4
-build-aux/m4/ltoptions.m4
-build-aux/m4/ltsugar.m4
-build-aux/m4/ltversion.m4
-build-aux/missing
-build-aux/compile
-build-aux/test-driver
-libsecp256k1.pc
-
-### CMake
-/CMakeUserPresets.json
-# Default CMake build directory.
-/build

external/secp256k1/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-# Changelog
-
-All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
-
-The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
-and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
-
-## [0.6.0] - 2024-11-04
-
-#### Added
- - New module `musig` implements the MuSig2 multisignature scheme according to the [BIP 327 specification](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki). See:
-   - Header file `include/secp256k1_musig.h` which defines the new API.
-   - Document `doc/musig.md` for further notes on API usage.
-   - Usage example `examples/musig.c`.
- - New CMake variable `SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS` for appending linker flags to the build command.
-
-#### Changed
- - API functions now use a significantly more robust method to clear secrets from the stack before returning. However, secret clearing remains a best-effort security measure and cannot guarantee complete removal.
- - Any type `secp256k1_foo` can now be forward-declared using `typedef struct secp256k1_foo secp256k1_foo;` (or also `struct secp256k1_foo;` in C++).
- - Organized CMake build artifacts into dedicated directories (`bin/` for executables, `lib/` for libraries) to improve build output structure and Windows shared library compatibility.
-
-#### Removed
- - Removed the `secp256k1_scratch_space` struct and its associated functions `secp256k1_scratch_space_create` and `secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy` because the scratch space was unused in the API.
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-The symbols `secp256k1_scratch_space_create` and `secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy` were removed.
-Otherwise, the library maintains backward compatibility with versions 0.3.x through 0.5.x.
-
-## [0.5.1] - 2024-08-01
-
-#### Added
- - Added usage example for an ElligatorSwift key exchange.
-
-#### Changed
- - The default size of the precomputed table for signing was changed from 22 KiB to 86 KiB. The size can be changed with the configure option `--ecmult-gen-kb` (`SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` for CMake).
- - "auto" is no longer an accepted value for the `--with-ecmult-window` and `--with-ecmult-gen-kb` configure options (this also applies to  `SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE` and `SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` in CMake). To achieve the same configuration as previously provided by the "auto" value, omit setting the configure option explicitly.
-
-#### Fixed
- - Fixed compilation when the extrakeys module is disabled.
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-The ABI is backward compatible with versions 0.5.0, 0.4.x and 0.3.x.
-
-## [0.5.0] - 2024-05-06
-
-#### Added
- - New function `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort` that sorts public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order.
-
-#### Changed
- - The implementation of the point multiplication algorithm used for signing and public key generation was changed, resulting in improved performance for those operations.
-   - The related configure option `--ecmult-gen-precision` was replaced with `--ecmult-gen-kb` (`SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` for CMake).
-   - This changes the supported precomputed table sizes for these operations. The new supported sizes are 2 KiB, 22 KiB, or 86 KiB (while the old supported sizes were 32 KiB, 64 KiB, or 512 KiB).
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-The ABI is backward compatible with versions 0.4.x and 0.3.x.
-
-## [0.4.1] - 2023-12-21
-
-#### Changed
- - The point multiplication algorithm used for ECDH operations (module `ecdh`) was replaced with a slightly faster one.
- - Optional handwritten x86_64 assembly for field operations was removed because modern C compilers are able to output more efficient assembly. This change results in a significant speedup of some library functions when handwritten x86_64 assembly is enabled (`--with-asm=x86_64` in GNU Autotools, `-DSECP256K1_ASM=x86_64` in CMake), which is the default on x86_64. Benchmarks with GCC 10.5.0 show a 10% speedup for `secp256k1_ecdsa_verify` and `secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify`.
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-The ABI is backward compatible with versions 0.4.0 and 0.3.x.
-
-## [0.4.0] - 2023-09-04
-
-#### Added
- - New module `ellswift` implements ElligatorSwift encoding for public keys and x-only Diffie-Hellman key exchange for them.
-   ElligatorSwift permits representing secp256k1 public keys as 64-byte arrays which cannot be distinguished from uniformly random. See:
-   - Header file `include/secp256k1_ellswift.h` which defines the new API.
-   - Document `doc/ellswift.md` which explains the mathematical background of the scheme.
-   - The [paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/759) on which the scheme is based.
- - We now test the library with unreleased development snapshots of GCC and Clang. This gives us an early chance to catch miscompilations and constant-time issues introduced by the compiler (such as those that led to the previous two releases).
-
-#### Fixed
- - Fixed symbol visibility in Windows DLL builds, where three internal library symbols were wrongly exported.
-
-#### Changed
- - When consuming libsecp256k1 as a static library on Windows, the user must now define the `SECP256K1_STATIC` macro before including `secp256k1.h`.
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-This release is backward compatible with the ABI of 0.3.0, 0.3.1, and 0.3.2. Symbol visibility is now believed to be handled properly on supported platforms and is now considered to be part of the ABI. Please report any improperly exported symbols as a bug.
-
-## [0.3.2] - 2023-05-13
-We strongly recommend updating to 0.3.2 if you use or plan to use GCC >=13 to compile libsecp256k1. When in doubt, check the GCC version using `gcc -v`.
-
-#### Security
- - Module `ecdh`: Fix "constant-timeness" issue with GCC 13.1 (and potentially future versions of GCC) that could leave applications using libsecp256k1's ECDH module vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. The fix avoids secret-dependent control flow during ECDH computations when libsecp256k1 is compiled with GCC 13.1.
-
-#### Fixed
- - Fixed an old bug that permitted compilers to potentially output bad assembly code on x86_64. In theory, it could lead to a crash or a read of unrelated memory, but this has never been observed on any compilers so far.
-
-#### Changed
- - Various improvements and changes to CMake builds. CMake builds remain experimental.
-   - Made API versioning consistent with GNU Autotools builds.
-   - Switched to `BUILD_SHARED_LIBS` variable for controlling whether to build a static or a shared library.
-   - Added `SECP256K1_INSTALL` variable for the controlling whether to install the build artefacts.
- - Renamed asm build option `arm` to `arm32`. Use `--with-asm=arm32` instead of `--with-asm=arm` (GNU Autotools), and `-DSECP256K1_ASM=arm32` instead of `-DSECP256K1_ASM=arm` (CMake).
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-The ABI is compatible with versions 0.3.0 and 0.3.1.
-
-## [0.3.1] - 2023-04-10
-We strongly recommend updating to 0.3.1 if you use or plan to use Clang >=14 to compile libsecp256k1, e.g., Xcode >=14 on macOS has Clang >=14. When in doubt, check the Clang version using `clang -v`.
-
-#### Security
- - Fix "constant-timeness" issue with Clang >=14 that could leave applications using libsecp256k1 vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. The fix avoids secret-dependent control flow and secret-dependent memory accesses in conditional moves of memory objects when libsecp256k1 is compiled with Clang >=14.
-
-#### Added
-  - Added tests against [Project Wycheproof's](https://github.com/google/wycheproof/) set of ECDSA test vectors (Bitcoin "low-S" variant), a fixed set of test cases designed to trigger various edge cases.
-
-#### Changed
- - Increased minimum required CMake version to 3.13. CMake builds remain experimental.
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-The ABI is compatible with version 0.3.0.
-
-## [0.3.0] - 2023-03-08
-
-#### Added
- - Added experimental support for CMake builds. Traditional GNU Autotools builds (`./configure` and `make`) remain fully supported.
- - Usage examples: Added a recommended method for securely clearing sensitive data, e.g., secret keys, from memory.
- - Tests: Added a new test binary `noverify_tests`. This binary runs the tests without some additional checks present in the ordinary `tests` binary and is thereby closer to production binaries. The `noverify_tests` binary is automatically run as part of the `make check` target.
-
-#### Fixed
- - Fixed declarations of API variables for MSVC (`__declspec(dllimport)`). This fixes MSVC builds of programs which link against a libsecp256k1 DLL dynamically and use API variables (and not only API functions). Unfortunately, the MSVC linker now will emit warning `LNK4217` when trying to link against libsecp256k1 statically. Pass `/ignore:4217` to the linker to suppress this warning.
-
-#### Changed
- - Forbade cloning or destroying `secp256k1_context_static`. Create a new context instead of cloning the static context. (If this change breaks your code, your code is probably wrong.)
- - Forbade randomizing (copies of) `secp256k1_context_static`. Randomizing a copy of `secp256k1_context_static` did not have any effect and did not provide defense-in-depth protection against side-channel attacks. Create a new context if you want to benefit from randomization.
-
-#### Removed
- - Removed the configuration header `src/libsecp256k1-config.h`. We recommend passing flags to `./configure` or `cmake` to set configuration options (see `./configure --help` or `cmake -LH`). If you cannot or do not want to use one of the supported build systems, pass configuration flags such as `-DSECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG` manually to the compiler (see the file `configure.ac` for supported flags).
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-Due to changes in the API regarding `secp256k1_context_static` described above, the ABI is *not* compatible with previous versions.
-
-## [0.2.0] - 2022-12-12
-
-#### Added
- - Added usage examples for common use cases in a new `examples/` directory.
- - Added `secp256k1_selftest`, to be used in conjunction with `secp256k1_context_static`.
- - Added support for 128-bit wide multiplication on MSVC for x86_64 and arm64, giving roughly a 20% speedup on those platforms.
-
-#### Changed
- - Enabled modules `schnorrsig`, `extrakeys` and `ecdh` by default in `./configure`.
- - The `secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979` nonce function, used by default by `secp256k1_ecdsa_sign`, now reduces the message hash modulo the group order to match the specification. This only affects improper use of ECDSA signing API.
-
-#### Deprecated
- - Deprecated context flags `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY` and `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN`. Use `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE` instead.
- - Renamed `secp256k1_context_no_precomp` to `secp256k1_context_static`.
- - Module `schnorrsig`: renamed `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign` to `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32`.
-
-#### ABI Compatibility
-Since this is the first release, we do not compare application binary interfaces.
-However, there are earlier unreleased versions of libsecp256k1 that are *not* ABI compatible with this version.
-
-## [0.1.0] - 2013-03-05 to 2021-12-25
-
-This version was in fact never released.
-The number was given by the build system since the introduction of autotools in Jan 2014 (ea0fe5a5bf0c04f9cc955b2966b614f5f378c6f6).
-Therefore, this version number does not uniquely identify a set of source files.
-
-[0.6.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.5.1...v0.6.0
-[0.5.1]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1
-[0.5.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.4.1...v0.5.0
-[0.4.1]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.4.0...v0.4.1
-[0.4.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.3.2...v0.4.0
-[0.3.2]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.3.1...v0.3.2
-[0.3.1]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.3.0...v0.3.1
-[0.3.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.2.0...v0.3.0
-[0.2.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/423b6d19d373f1224fd671a982584d7e7900bc93..v0.2.0
-[0.1.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/commit/423b6d19d373f1224fd671a982584d7e7900bc93

external/secp256k1/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -1,405 +0,0 @@
-cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.16)
-
-#=============================
-# Project / Package metadata
-#=============================
-project(libsecp256k1
-  # The package (a.k.a. release) version is based on semantic versioning 2.0.0 of
-  # the API. All changes in experimental modules are treated as
-  # backwards-compatible and therefore at most increase the minor version.
-  VERSION 0.6.0
-  DESCRIPTION "Optimized C library for ECDSA signatures and secret/public key operations on curve secp256k1."
-  HOMEPAGE_URL "https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1"
-  LANGUAGES C
-)
-enable_testing()
-list(APPEND CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake)
-
-if(CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS 3.21)
-  # Emulates CMake 3.21+ behavior.
-  if(CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR STREQUAL CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR)
-    set(PROJECT_IS_TOP_LEVEL ON)
-    set(${PROJECT_NAME}_IS_TOP_LEVEL ON)
-  else()
-    set(PROJECT_IS_TOP_LEVEL OFF)
-    set(${PROJECT_NAME}_IS_TOP_LEVEL OFF)
-  endif()
-endif()
-
-# The library version is based on libtool versioning of the ABI. The set of
-# rules for updating the version can be found here:
-# https://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/manual/html_node/Updating-version-info.html
-# All changes in experimental modules are treated as if they don't affect the
-# interface and therefore only increase the revision.
-set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_CURRENT 5)
-set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION 0)
-set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_AGE 0)
-
-#=============================
-# Language setup
-#=============================
-set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 90)
-set(CMAKE_C_EXTENSIONS OFF)
-
-#=============================
-# Configurable options
-#=============================
-option(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS "Build shared libraries." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_DISABLE_SHARED "Disable shared library. Overrides BUILD_SHARED_LIBS." OFF)
-if(SECP256K1_DISABLE_SHARED)
-  set(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS OFF)
-endif()
-
-option(SECP256K1_INSTALL "Enable installation." ${PROJECT_IS_TOP_LEVEL})
-
-## Modules
-
-# We declare all options before processing them, to make sure we can express
-# dependendencies while processing.
-option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH "Enable ECDH module." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY "Enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module." OFF)
-option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS "Enable extrakeys module." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG "Enable schnorrsig module." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG "Enable musig module." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT "Enable ElligatorSwift module." ON)
-
-# Processing must be done in a topological sorting of the dependency graph
-# (dependent module first).
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT)
-  add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT=1)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG)
-  if(DEFINED SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG AND NOT SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG)
-    message(FATAL_ERROR "Module dependency error: You have disabled the schnorrsig module explicitly, but it is required by the musig module.")
-  endif()
-  set(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG ON)
-  add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG=1)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG)
-  if(DEFINED SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS AND NOT SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS)
-    message(FATAL_ERROR "Module dependency error: You have disabled the extrakeys module explicitly, but it is required by the schnorrsig module.")
-  endif()
-  set(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS ON)
-  add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG=1)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS)
-  add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS=1)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY)
-  add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY=1)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH)
-  add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH=1)
-endif()
-
-option(SECP256K1_USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS "Enable external default callback functions." OFF)
-if(SECP256K1_USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS)
-  add_compile_definitions(USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS=1)
-endif()
-
-set(SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE 15 CACHE STRING "Window size for ecmult precomputation for verification, specified as integer in range [2..24]. The default value is a reasonable setting for desktop machines (currently 15). [default=15]")
-set_property(CACHE SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE PROPERTY STRINGS 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24)
-include(CheckStringOptionValue)
-check_string_option_value(SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE)
-add_compile_definitions(ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE=${SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE})
-
-set(SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB 86 CACHE STRING "The size of the precomputed table for signing in multiples of 1024 bytes (on typical platforms). Larger values result in possibly better signing or key generation performance at the cost of a larger table. Valid choices are 2, 22, 86. The default value is a reasonable setting for desktop machines (currently 86). [default=86]")
-set_property(CACHE SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB PROPERTY STRINGS 2 22 86)
-check_string_option_value(SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB)
-if(SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB EQUAL 2)
-  add_compile_definitions(COMB_BLOCKS=2)
-  add_compile_definitions(COMB_TEETH=5)
-elseif(SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB EQUAL 22)
-  add_compile_definitions(COMB_BLOCKS=11)
-  add_compile_definitions(COMB_TEETH=6)
-elseif(SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB EQUAL 86)
-  add_compile_definitions(COMB_BLOCKS=43)
-  add_compile_definitions(COMB_TEETH=6)
-endif()
-
-set(SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY "OFF" CACHE STRING "Test-only override of the (autodetected by the C code) \"widemul\" setting. Legal values are: \"OFF\", \"int128_struct\", \"int128\" or \"int64\". [default=OFF]")
-set_property(CACHE SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY PROPERTY STRINGS "OFF" "int128_struct" "int128" "int64")
-check_string_option_value(SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY)
-if(SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY)
-  string(TOUPPER "${SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY}" widemul_upper_value)
-  add_compile_definitions(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_${widemul_upper_value}=1)
-endif()
-mark_as_advanced(FORCE SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY)
-
-set(SECP256K1_ASM "AUTO" CACHE STRING "Assembly to use: \"AUTO\", \"OFF\", \"x86_64\" or \"arm32\" (experimental). [default=AUTO]")
-set_property(CACHE SECP256K1_ASM PROPERTY STRINGS "AUTO" "OFF" "x86_64" "arm32")
-check_string_option_value(SECP256K1_ASM)
-if(SECP256K1_ASM STREQUAL "arm32")
-  enable_language(ASM)
-  include(CheckArm32Assembly)
-  check_arm32_assembly()
-  if(HAVE_ARM32_ASM)
-    add_compile_definitions(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM=1)
-  else()
-    message(FATAL_ERROR "ARM32 assembly requested but not available.")
-  endif()
-elseif(SECP256K1_ASM)
-  include(CheckX86_64Assembly)
-  check_x86_64_assembly()
-  if(HAVE_X86_64_ASM)
-    set(SECP256K1_ASM "x86_64")
-    add_compile_definitions(USE_ASM_X86_64=1)
-  elseif(SECP256K1_ASM STREQUAL "AUTO")
-    set(SECP256K1_ASM "OFF")
-  else()
-    message(FATAL_ERROR "x86_64 assembly requested but not available.")
-  endif()
-endif()
-
-option(SECP256K1_EXPERIMENTAL "Allow experimental configuration options." OFF)
-if(NOT SECP256K1_EXPERIMENTAL)
-  if(SECP256K1_ASM STREQUAL "arm32")
-    message(FATAL_ERROR "ARM32 assembly is experimental. Use -DSECP256K1_EXPERIMENTAL=ON to allow.")
-  endif()
-endif()
-
-set(SECP256K1_VALGRIND "AUTO" CACHE STRING "Build with extra checks for running inside Valgrind. [default=AUTO]")
-set_property(CACHE SECP256K1_VALGRIND PROPERTY STRINGS "AUTO" "OFF" "ON")
-check_string_option_value(SECP256K1_VALGRIND)
-if(SECP256K1_VALGRIND)
-  find_package(Valgrind MODULE)
-  if(Valgrind_FOUND)
-    set(SECP256K1_VALGRIND ON)
-    include_directories(${Valgrind_INCLUDE_DIR})
-    add_compile_definitions(VALGRIND)
-  elseif(SECP256K1_VALGRIND STREQUAL "AUTO")
-    set(SECP256K1_VALGRIND OFF)
-  else()
-    message(FATAL_ERROR "Valgrind support requested but valgrind/memcheck.h header not available.")
-  endif()
-endif()
-
-option(SECP256K1_BUILD_BENCHMARK "Build benchmarks." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_BUILD_TESTS "Build tests." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS "Build exhaustive tests." ON)
-option(SECP256K1_BUILD_CTIME_TESTS "Build constant-time tests." ${SECP256K1_VALGRIND})
-option(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXAMPLES "Build examples." OFF)
-
-# Redefine configuration flags.
-# We leave assertions on, because they are only used in the examples, and we want them always on there.
-if(MSVC)
-  string(REGEX REPLACE "/DNDEBUG[ \t\r\n]*" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO}")
-  string(REGEX REPLACE "/DNDEBUG[ \t\r\n]*" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE}")
-  string(REGEX REPLACE "/DNDEBUG[ \t\r\n]*" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL}")
-else()
-  string(REGEX REPLACE "-DNDEBUG[ \t\r\n]*" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO}")
-  string(REGEX REPLACE "-DNDEBUG[ \t\r\n]*" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE}")
-  string(REGEX REPLACE "-DNDEBUG[ \t\r\n]*" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL}")
-  # Prefer -O2 optimization level. (-O3 is CMake's default for Release for many compilers.)
-  string(REGEX REPLACE "-O3( |$)" "-O2\\1" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE}")
-endif()
-
-# Define custom "Coverage" build type.
-set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO} -O0 -DCOVERAGE=1 --coverage" CACHE STRING
-  "Flags used by the C compiler during \"Coverage\" builds."
-  FORCE
-)
-set(CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS_COVERAGE "${CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO} --coverage" CACHE STRING
-  "Flags used for linking binaries during \"Coverage\" builds."
-  FORCE
-)
-set(CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS_COVERAGE "${CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO} --coverage" CACHE STRING
-  "Flags used by the shared libraries linker during \"Coverage\" builds."
-  FORCE
-)
-mark_as_advanced(
-  CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE
-  CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS_COVERAGE
-  CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS_COVERAGE
-)
-
-if(PROJECT_IS_TOP_LEVEL)
-  get_property(is_multi_config GLOBAL PROPERTY GENERATOR_IS_MULTI_CONFIG)
-  set(default_build_type "RelWithDebInfo")
-  if(is_multi_config)
-    set(CMAKE_CONFIGURATION_TYPES "${default_build_type}" "Release" "Debug" "MinSizeRel" "Coverage" CACHE STRING
-      "Supported configuration types."
-      FORCE
-    )
-  else()
-    set_property(CACHE CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE PROPERTY
-      STRINGS "${default_build_type}" "Release" "Debug" "MinSizeRel" "Coverage"
-    )
-    if(NOT CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE)
-      message(STATUS "Setting build type to \"${default_build_type}\" as none was specified")
-      set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE "${default_build_type}" CACHE STRING
-        "Choose the type of build."
-        FORCE
-      )
-    endif()
-  endif()
-endif()
-
-include(TryAppendCFlags)
-if(MSVC)
-  # Keep the following commands ordered lexicographically.
-  try_append_c_flags(/W3) # Production quality warning level.
-  try_append_c_flags(/wd4146) # Disable warning C4146 "unary minus operator applied to unsigned type, result still unsigned".
-  try_append_c_flags(/wd4244) # Disable warning C4244 "'conversion' conversion from 'type1' to 'type2', possible loss of data".
-  try_append_c_flags(/wd4267) # Disable warning C4267 "'var' : conversion from 'size_t' to 'type', possible loss of data".
-  # Eliminate deprecation warnings for the older, less secure functions.
-  add_compile_definitions(_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS)
-else()
-  # Keep the following commands ordered lexicographically.
-  try_append_c_flags(-pedantic)
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wall) # GCC >= 2.95 and probably many other compilers.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wcast-align) # GCC >= 2.95.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wcast-align=strict) # GCC >= 8.0.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wconditional-uninitialized) # Clang >= 3.0 only.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wextra) # GCC >= 3.4, this is the newer name of -W, which we don't use because older GCCs will warn about unused functions.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wnested-externs)
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wno-long-long) # GCC >= 3.0, -Wlong-long is implied by -pedantic.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wno-overlength-strings) # GCC >= 4.2, -Woverlength-strings is implied by -pedantic.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wno-unused-function) # GCC >= 3.0, -Wunused-function is implied by -Wall.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wreserved-identifier) # Clang >= 13.0 only.
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wshadow)
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wstrict-prototypes)
-  try_append_c_flags(-Wundef)
-endif()
-
-set(CMAKE_C_VISIBILITY_PRESET hidden)
-
-set(print_msan_notice)
-if(SECP256K1_BUILD_CTIME_TESTS)
-  include(CheckMemorySanitizer)
-  check_memory_sanitizer(msan_enabled)
-  if(msan_enabled)
-    try_append_c_flags(-fno-sanitize-memory-param-retval)
-    set(print_msan_notice YES)
-  endif()
-  unset(msan_enabled)
-endif()
-
-set(SECP256K1_APPEND_CFLAGS "" CACHE STRING "Compiler flags that are appended to the command line after all other flags added by the build system. This variable is intended for debugging and special builds.")
-if(SECP256K1_APPEND_CFLAGS)
-  # Appending to this low-level rule variable is the only way to
-  # guarantee that the flags appear at the end of the command line.
-  string(APPEND CMAKE_C_COMPILE_OBJECT " ${SECP256K1_APPEND_CFLAGS}")
-endif()
-
-set(SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS "" CACHE STRING "Linker flags that are appended to the command line after all other flags added by the build system. This variable is intended for debugging and special builds.")
-if(SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS)
-  # Appending to this low-level rule variable is the only way to
-  # guarantee that the flags appear at the end of the command line.
-  string(APPEND CMAKE_C_CREATE_SHARED_LIBRARY " ${SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS}")
-  string(APPEND CMAKE_C_LINK_EXECUTABLE " ${SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS}")
-endif()
-
-if(NOT CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY)
-  set(CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
-endif()
-if(NOT CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY)
-  set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
-endif()
-if(NOT CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY)
-  set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
-endif()
-add_subdirectory(src)
-if(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXAMPLES)
-  add_subdirectory(examples)
-endif()
-
-message("\n")
-message("secp256k1 configure summary")
-message("===========================")
-message("Build artifacts:")
-if(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS)
-  set(library_type "Shared")
-else()
-  set(library_type "Static")
-endif()
-
-message("  library type ........................ ${library_type}")
-message("Optional modules:")
-message("  ECDH ................................ ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH}")
-message("  ECDSA pubkey recovery ............... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY}")
-message("  extrakeys ........................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS}")
-message("  schnorrsig .......................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG}")
-message("  musig ............................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG}")
-message("  ElligatorSwift ...................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT}")
-message("Parameters:")
-message("  ecmult window size .................. ${SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE}")
-message("  ecmult gen table size ............... ${SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB} KiB")
-message("Optional features:")
-message("  assembly ............................ ${SECP256K1_ASM}")
-message("  external callbacks .................. ${SECP256K1_USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS}")
-if(SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY)
-  message("  wide multiplication (test-only) ..... ${SECP256K1_TEST_OVERRIDE_WIDE_MULTIPLY}")
-endif()
-message("Optional binaries:")
-message("  benchmark ........................... ${SECP256K1_BUILD_BENCHMARK}")
-message("  noverify_tests ...................... ${SECP256K1_BUILD_TESTS}")
-set(tests_status "${SECP256K1_BUILD_TESTS}")
-if(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE STREQUAL "Coverage")
-  set(tests_status OFF)
-endif()
-message("  tests ............................... ${tests_status}")
-message("  exhaustive tests .................... ${SECP256K1_BUILD_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS}")
-message("  ctime_tests ......................... ${SECP256K1_BUILD_CTIME_TESTS}")
-message("  examples ............................ ${SECP256K1_BUILD_EXAMPLES}")
-message("")
-if(CMAKE_CROSSCOMPILING)
-  set(cross_status "TRUE, for ${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME}, ${CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR}")
-else()
-  set(cross_status "FALSE")
-endif()
-message("Cross compiling ....................... ${cross_status}")
-message("Valgrind .............................. ${SECP256K1_VALGRIND}")
-get_directory_property(definitions COMPILE_DEFINITIONS)
-string(REPLACE ";" " " definitions "${definitions}")
-message("Preprocessor defined macros ........... ${definitions}")
-message("C compiler ............................ ${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID} ${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_VERSION}, ${CMAKE_C_COMPILER}")
-message("CFLAGS ................................ ${CMAKE_C_FLAGS}")
-get_directory_property(compile_options COMPILE_OPTIONS)
-string(REPLACE ";" " " compile_options "${compile_options}")
-message("Compile options ....................... " ${compile_options})
-if(NOT is_multi_config)
-  message("Build type:")
-  message(" - CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE ................... ${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE}")
-  string(TOUPPER "${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE}" build_type)
-  message(" - CFLAGS ............................. ${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_${build_type}}")
-  message(" - LDFLAGS for executables ............ ${CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS_${build_type}}")
-  message(" - LDFLAGS for shared libraries ....... ${CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS_${build_type}}")
-else()
-  message("Supported configurations .............. ${CMAKE_CONFIGURATION_TYPES}")
-  message("RelWithDebInfo configuration:")
-  message(" - CFLAGS ............................. ${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO}")
-  message(" - LDFLAGS for executables ............ ${CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO}")
-  message(" - LDFLAGS for shared libraries ....... ${CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO}")
-  message("Debug configuration:")
-  message(" - CFLAGS ............................. ${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG}")
-  message(" - LDFLAGS for executables ............ ${CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS_DEBUG}")
-  message(" - LDFLAGS for shared libraries ....... ${CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS_DEBUG}")
-endif()
-if(SECP256K1_APPEND_CFLAGS)
-  message("SECP256K1_APPEND_CFLAGS ............... ${SECP256K1_APPEND_CFLAGS}")
-endif()
-if(SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS)
-  message("SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS .............. ${SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS}")
-endif()
-message("")
-if(print_msan_notice)
-  message(
-    "Note:\n"
-    "  MemorySanitizer detected, tried to add -fno-sanitize-memory-param-retval to compile options\n"
-    "  to avoid false positives in ctime_tests. Pass -DSECP256K1_BUILD_CTIME_TESTS=OFF to avoid this.\n"
-  )
-endif()
-if(SECP256K1_EXPERIMENTAL)
-  message(
-    "  ******\n"
-    "  WARNING: experimental build\n"
-    "  Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for production use.\n"
-    "  ******\n"
-  )
-endif()

external/secp256k1/CMakePresets.json

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "cmakeMinimumRequired": {"major": 3, "minor": 21, "patch": 0}, 
-  "version": 3,
-  "configurePresets": [
-    {
-      "name": "dev-mode",
-      "displayName": "Development mode (intended only for developers of the library)",
-      "cacheVariables": {
-        "SECP256K1_EXPERIMENTAL": "ON",
-        "SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY": "ON",
-        "SECP256K1_BUILD_EXAMPLES": "ON"
-      },
-      "warnings": {
-        "dev": true,
-        "uninitialized": true
-      }
-    }
-  ]
-}

external/secp256k1/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-# Contributing to libsecp256k1
-
-## Scope
-
-libsecp256k1 is a library for elliptic curve cryptography on the curve secp256k1, not a general-purpose cryptography library.
-The library primarily serves the needs of the Bitcoin Core project but provides additional functionality for the benefit of the wider Bitcoin ecosystem.
-
-## Adding new functionality or modules
-
-The libsecp256k1 project welcomes contributions in the form of new functionality or modules, provided they are within the project's scope.
-
-It is the responsibility of the contributors to convince the maintainers that the proposed functionality is within the project's scope, high-quality and maintainable.
-Contributors are recommended to provide the following in addition to the new code:
-
-* **Specification:**
-    A specification can help significantly in reviewing the new code as it provides documentation and context.
-    It may justify various design decisions, give a motivation and outline security goals.
-    If the specification contains pseudocode, a reference implementation or test vectors, these can be used to compare with the proposed libsecp256k1 code.
-* **Security Arguments:**
-    In addition to a defining the security goals, it should be argued that the new functionality meets these goals.
-    Depending on the nature of the new functionality, a wide range of security arguments are acceptable, ranging from being "obviously secure" to rigorous proofs of security.
-* **Relevance Arguments:**
-    The relevance of the new functionality for the Bitcoin ecosystem should be argued by outlining clear use cases.
-
-These are not the only factors taken into account when considering to add new functionality.
-The proposed new libsecp256k1 code must be of high quality, including API documentation and tests, as well as featuring a misuse-resistant API design.
-
-We recommend reaching out to other contributors (see [Communication Channels](#communication-channels)) and get feedback before implementing new functionality.
-
-## Communication channels
-
-Most communication about libsecp256k1 occurs on the GitHub repository: in issues, pull request or on the discussion board.
-
-Additionally, there is an IRC channel dedicated to libsecp256k1, with biweekly meetings (see channel topic).
-The channel is `#secp256k1` on Libera Chat.
-The easiest way to participate on IRC is with the web client, [web.libera.chat](https://web.libera.chat/#secp256k1).
-Chat history logs can be found at https://gnusha.org/secp256k1/.
-
-## Contributor workflow & peer review
-
-The Contributor Workflow & Peer Review in libsecp256k1 are similar to Bitcoin Core's workflow and review processes described in its [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md).
-
-### Coding conventions
-
-In addition, libsecp256k1 tries to maintain the following coding conventions:
-
-* No runtime heap allocation (e.g., no `malloc`) unless explicitly requested by the caller (via `secp256k1_context_create` or `secp256k1_scratch_space_create`, for example). Moreover, it should be possible to use the library without any heap allocations.
-* The tests should cover all lines and branches of the library (see [Test coverage](#coverage)).
-* Operations involving secret data should be tested for being constant time with respect to the secrets (see [src/ctime_tests.c](src/ctime_tests.c)).
-* Local variables containing secret data should be cleared explicitly to try to delete secrets from memory.
-* Use `secp256k1_memcmp_var` instead of `memcmp` (see [#823](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/823)).
-* As a rule of thumb, the default values for configuration options should target standard desktop machines and align with Bitcoin Core's defaults, and the tests should mostly exercise the default configuration (see [#1549](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/1549#issuecomment-2200559257)).
-
-#### Style conventions
-
-* Commits should be atomic and diffs should be easy to read. For this reason, do not mix any formatting fixes or code moves with actual code changes. Make sure each individual commit is hygienic: that it builds successfully on its own without warnings, errors, regressions, or test failures.
-* New code should adhere to the style of existing, in particular surrounding, code. Other than that, we do not enforce strict rules for code formatting.
-* The code conforms to C89. Most notably, that means that only `/* ... */` comments are allowed (no `//` line comments). Moreover, any declarations in a `{ ... }` block (e.g., a function) must appear at the beginning of the block before any statements. When you would like to declare a variable in the middle of a block, you can open a new block:
-    ```C
-    void secp256k_foo(void) {
-        unsigned int x;              /* declaration */
-        int y = 2*x;                 /* declaration */
-        x = 17;                      /* statement */
-        {
-            int a, b;                /* declaration */
-            a = x + y;               /* statement */
-            secp256k_bar(x, &b);     /* statement */
-        }
-    }
-    ```
-* Use `unsigned int` instead of just `unsigned`.
-* Use `void *ptr` instead of `void* ptr`.
-* Arguments of the publicly-facing API must have a specific order defined in [include/secp256k1.h](include/secp256k1.h).
-* User-facing comment lines in headers should be limited to 80 chars if possible.
-* All identifiers in file scope should start with `secp256k1_`.
-* Avoid trailing whitespace.
-
-### Tests
-
-#### Coverage
-
-This library aims to have full coverage of reachable lines and branches.
-
-To create a test coverage report, configure with `--enable-coverage` (use of GCC is necessary):
-
-    $ ./configure --enable-coverage
-
-Run the tests:
-
-    $ make check
-
-To create a report, `gcovr` is recommended, as it includes branch coverage reporting:
-
-    $ gcovr --exclude 'src/bench*' --print-summary
-
-To create a HTML report with coloured and annotated source code:
-
-    $ mkdir -p coverage
-    $ gcovr --exclude 'src/bench*' --html --html-details -o coverage/coverage.html
-
-#### Exhaustive tests
-
-There are tests of several functions in which a small group replaces secp256k1.
-These tests are *exhaustive* since they provide all elements and scalars of the small group as input arguments (see [src/tests_exhaustive.c](src/tests_exhaustive.c)).
-
-### Benchmarks
-
-See `src/bench*.c` for examples of benchmarks.

external/secp256k1/COPYING

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-Copyright (c) 2013 Pieter Wuille
-
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
-THE SOFTWARE.

external/secp256k1/Makefile.am

@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
-ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I build-aux/m4
-
-# AM_CFLAGS will be automatically prepended to CFLAGS by Automake when compiling some foo
-# which does not have an explicit foo_CFLAGS variable set.
-AM_CFLAGS = $(SECP_CFLAGS)
-
-lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsecp256k1.la
-include_HEADERS = include/secp256k1.h
-include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_preallocated.h
-noinst_HEADERS =
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_4x64.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_8x32.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_low.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_4x64_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_8x32_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_low_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/group.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/group_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecdsa.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecdsa_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/eckey.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/eckey_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_compute_table.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_compute_table_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_const.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_const_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen_compute_table.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen_compute_table_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/field_10x26.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/field_10x26_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modinv32.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modinv32_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modinv64.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modinv64_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/precomputed_ecmult.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/precomputed_ecmult_gen.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/assumptions.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/checkmem.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/testutil.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/util.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/int128.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/int128_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/int128_native.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/int128_native_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/int128_struct.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/int128_struct_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/selftest.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/hash.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/hash_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/field.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/field_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/bench.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/wycheproof/ecdsa_secp256k1_sha256_bitcoin_test.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/hsort.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/hsort_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_parsing.h
-noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_parsing.c
-noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h
-noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.c
-noinst_HEADERS += examples/examples_util.h
-
-PRECOMPUTED_LIB = libsecp256k1_precomputed.la
-noinst_LTLIBRARIES = $(PRECOMPUTED_LIB)
-libsecp256k1_precomputed_la_SOURCES =  src/precomputed_ecmult.c src/precomputed_ecmult_gen.c
-# We need `-I$(top_srcdir)/src` in VPATH builds if libsecp256k1_precomputed_la_SOURCES have been recreated in the build tree.
-# This helps users and packagers who insist on recreating the precomputed files (e.g., Gentoo).
-libsecp256k1_precomputed_la_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/src $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-
-if USE_EXTERNAL_ASM
-COMMON_LIB = libsecp256k1_common.la
-else
-COMMON_LIB =
-endif
-noinst_LTLIBRARIES += $(COMMON_LIB)
-
-pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
-pkgconfig_DATA = libsecp256k1.pc
-
-if USE_EXTERNAL_ASM
-if USE_ASM_ARM
-libsecp256k1_common_la_SOURCES = src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s
-endif
-endif
-
-libsecp256k1_la_SOURCES = src/secp256k1.c
-libsecp256k1_la_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-libsecp256k1_la_LIBADD = $(COMMON_LIB) $(PRECOMPUTED_LIB)
-libsecp256k1_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -version-info $(LIB_VERSION_CURRENT):$(LIB_VERSION_REVISION):$(LIB_VERSION_AGE)
-
-noinst_PROGRAMS =
-if USE_BENCHMARK
-noinst_PROGRAMS += bench bench_internal bench_ecmult
-bench_SOURCES = src/bench.c
-bench_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
-bench_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-bench_internal_SOURCES = src/bench_internal.c
-bench_internal_LDADD = $(COMMON_LIB) $(PRECOMPUTED_LIB)
-bench_internal_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-bench_ecmult_SOURCES = src/bench_ecmult.c
-bench_ecmult_LDADD = $(COMMON_LIB) $(PRECOMPUTED_LIB)
-bench_ecmult_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-endif
-
-TESTS =
-if USE_TESTS
-TESTS += noverify_tests
-noinst_PROGRAMS += noverify_tests
-noverify_tests_SOURCES = src/tests.c
-noverify_tests_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-noverify_tests_LDADD = $(COMMON_LIB) $(PRECOMPUTED_LIB)
-noverify_tests_LDFLAGS = -static
-if !ENABLE_COVERAGE
-TESTS += tests
-noinst_PROGRAMS += tests
-tests_SOURCES  = $(noverify_tests_SOURCES)
-tests_CPPFLAGS = $(noverify_tests_CPPFLAGS) -DVERIFY
-tests_LDADD    = $(noverify_tests_LDADD)
-tests_LDFLAGS  = $(noverify_tests_LDFLAGS)
-endif
-endif
-
-if USE_CTIME_TESTS
-noinst_PROGRAMS += ctime_tests
-ctime_tests_SOURCES = src/ctime_tests.c
-ctime_tests_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
-ctime_tests_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-endif
-
-if USE_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS
-noinst_PROGRAMS += exhaustive_tests
-exhaustive_tests_SOURCES = src/tests_exhaustive.c
-exhaustive_tests_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-if !ENABLE_COVERAGE
-exhaustive_tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVERIFY
-endif
-# Note: do not include $(PRECOMPUTED_LIB) in exhaustive_tests (it uses runtime-generated tables).
-exhaustive_tests_LDADD = $(COMMON_LIB)
-exhaustive_tests_LDFLAGS = -static
-TESTS += exhaustive_tests
-endif
-
-if USE_EXAMPLES
-noinst_PROGRAMS += ecdsa_example
-ecdsa_example_SOURCES = examples/ecdsa.c
-ecdsa_example_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -DSECP256K1_STATIC
-ecdsa_example_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
-ecdsa_example_LDFLAGS = -static
-if BUILD_WINDOWS
-ecdsa_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
-endif
-TESTS += ecdsa_example
-if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
-noinst_PROGRAMS += ecdh_example
-ecdh_example_SOURCES = examples/ecdh.c
-ecdh_example_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -DSECP256K1_STATIC
-ecdh_example_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
-ecdh_example_LDFLAGS = -static
-if BUILD_WINDOWS
-ecdh_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
-endif
-TESTS += ecdh_example
-endif
-if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG
-noinst_PROGRAMS += schnorr_example
-schnorr_example_SOURCES = examples/schnorr.c
-schnorr_example_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -DSECP256K1_STATIC
-schnorr_example_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
-schnorr_example_LDFLAGS = -static
-if BUILD_WINDOWS
-schnorr_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
-endif
-TESTS += schnorr_example
-endif
-if ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
-noinst_PROGRAMS += ellswift_example
-ellswift_example_SOURCES = examples/ellswift.c
-ellswift_example_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -DSECP256K1_STATIC
-ellswift_example_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
-ellswift_example_LDFLAGS = -static
-if BUILD_WINDOWS
-ellswift_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
-endif
-TESTS += ellswift_example
-endif
-if ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
-noinst_PROGRAMS += musig_example
-musig_example_SOURCES = examples/musig.c
-musig_example_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -DSECP256K1_STATIC
-musig_example_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
-musig_example_LDFLAGS = -static
-if BUILD_WINDOWS
-musig_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
-endif
-TESTS += musig_example
-endif
-endif
-
-### Precomputed tables
-EXTRA_PROGRAMS = precompute_ecmult precompute_ecmult_gen
-CLEANFILES = $(EXTRA_PROGRAMS)
-
-precompute_ecmult_SOURCES = src/precompute_ecmult.c
-precompute_ecmult_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES) -DVERIFY
-precompute_ecmult_LDADD = $(COMMON_LIB)
-
-precompute_ecmult_gen_SOURCES = src/precompute_ecmult_gen.c
-precompute_ecmult_gen_CPPFLAGS = $(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES) -DVERIFY
-precompute_ecmult_gen_LDADD = $(COMMON_LIB)
-
-# See Automake manual, Section "Errors with distclean".
-# We don't list any dependencies for the prebuilt files here because
-# otherwise make's decision whether to rebuild them (even in the first
-# build by a normal user) depends on mtimes, and thus is very fragile.
-# This means that rebuilds of the prebuilt files always need to be
-# forced by deleting them.
-src/precomputed_ecmult.c:
-	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) precompute_ecmult$(EXEEXT)
-	./precompute_ecmult$(EXEEXT)
-src/precomputed_ecmult_gen.c:
-	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) precompute_ecmult_gen$(EXEEXT)
-	./precompute_ecmult_gen$(EXEEXT)
-
-PRECOMP = src/precomputed_ecmult_gen.c src/precomputed_ecmult.c
-precomp: $(PRECOMP)
-
-# Ensure the prebuilt files will be build first (only if they don't exist,
-# e.g., after `make maintainer-clean`).
-BUILT_SOURCES = $(PRECOMP)
-
-.PHONY: clean-precomp
-clean-precomp:
-	rm -f $(PRECOMP)
-maintainer-clean-local: clean-precomp
-
-### Pregenerated test vectors
-### (see the comments in the previous section for detailed rationale)
-TESTVECTORS = src/wycheproof/ecdsa_secp256k1_sha256_bitcoin_test.h
-
-src/wycheproof/ecdsa_secp256k1_sha256_bitcoin_test.h:
-	mkdir -p $(@D)
-	python3 $(top_srcdir)/tools/tests_wycheproof_generate.py $(top_srcdir)/src/wycheproof/ecdsa_secp256k1_sha256_bitcoin_test.json > $@
-
-testvectors: $(TESTVECTORS)
-
-BUILT_SOURCES += $(TESTVECTORS)
-
-.PHONY: clean-testvectors
-clean-testvectors:
-	rm -f $(TESTVECTORS)
-maintainer-clean-local: clean-testvectors
-
-### Additional files to distribute
-EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh CHANGELOG.md SECURITY.md
-EXTRA_DIST += doc/release-process.md doc/safegcd_implementation.md
-EXTRA_DIST += doc/ellswift.md doc/musig.md
-EXTRA_DIST += examples/EXAMPLES_COPYING
-EXTRA_DIST += sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage
-EXTRA_DIST += sage/gen_split_lambda_constants.sage
-EXTRA_DIST += sage/group_prover.sage
-EXTRA_DIST += sage/prove_group_implementations.sage
-EXTRA_DIST += sage/secp256k1_params.sage
-EXTRA_DIST += sage/weierstrass_prover.sage
-EXTRA_DIST += src/wycheproof/WYCHEPROOF_COPYING
-EXTRA_DIST += src/wycheproof/ecdsa_secp256k1_sha256_bitcoin_test.json
-EXTRA_DIST += tools/tests_wycheproof_generate.py
-
-if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
-include src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include
-endif
-
-if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
-include src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include
-endif
-
-if ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
-include src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include
-endif
-
-if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG
-include src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include
-endif
-
-if ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
-include src/modules/musig/Makefile.am.include
-endif
-
-if ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
-include src/modules/ellswift/Makefile.am.include
-endif

external/secp256k1/README.md

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-libsecp256k1
-============
-
-![Dependencies: None](https://img.shields.io/badge/dependencies-none-success)
-[![irc.libera.chat #secp256k1](https://img.shields.io/badge/irc.libera.chat-%23secp256k1-success)](https://web.libera.chat/#secp256k1)
-
-High-performance high-assurance C library for digital signatures and other cryptographic primitives on the secp256k1 elliptic curve.
-
-This library is intended to be the highest quality publicly available library for cryptography on the secp256k1 curve. However, the primary focus of its development has been for usage in the Bitcoin system and usage unlike Bitcoin's may be less well tested, verified, or suffer from a less well thought out interface. Correct usage requires some care and consideration that the library is fit for your application's purpose.
-
-Features:
-* secp256k1 ECDSA signing/verification and key generation.
-* Additive and multiplicative tweaking of secret/public keys.
-* Serialization/parsing of secret keys, public keys, signatures.
-* Constant time, constant memory access signing and public key generation.
-* Derandomized ECDSA (via RFC6979 or with a caller provided function.)
-* Very efficient implementation.
-* Suitable for embedded systems.
-* No runtime dependencies.
-* Optional module for public key recovery.
-* Optional module for ECDH key exchange.
-* Optional module for Schnorr signatures according to [BIP-340](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki).
-* Optional module for ElligatorSwift key exchange according to [BIP-324](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0324.mediawiki).
-* Optional module for MuSig2 Schnorr multi-signatures according to [BIP-327](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki).
-
-Implementation details
-----------------------
-
-* General
-  * No runtime heap allocation.
-  * Extensive testing infrastructure.
-  * Structured to facilitate review and analysis.
-  * Intended to be portable to any system with a C89 compiler and uint64_t support.
-  * No use of floating types.
-  * Expose only higher level interfaces to minimize the API surface and improve application security. ("Be difficult to use insecurely.")
-* Field operations
-  * Optimized implementation of arithmetic modulo the curve's field size (2^256 - 0x1000003D1).
-    * Using 5 52-bit limbs
-    * Using 10 26-bit limbs (including hand-optimized assembly for 32-bit ARM, by Wladimir J. van der Laan).
-      * This is an experimental feature that has not received enough scrutiny to satisfy the standard of quality of this library but is made available for testing and review by the community.
-* Scalar operations
-  * Optimized implementation without data-dependent branches of arithmetic modulo the curve's order.
-    * Using 4 64-bit limbs (relying on __int128 support in the compiler).
-    * Using 8 32-bit limbs.
-* Modular inverses (both field elements and scalars) based on [safegcd](https://gcd.cr.yp.to/index.html) with some modifications, and a variable-time variant (by Peter Dettman).
-* Group operations
-  * Point addition formula specifically simplified for the curve equation (y^2 = x^3 + 7).
-  * Use addition between points in Jacobian and affine coordinates where possible.
-  * Use a unified addition/doubling formula where necessary to avoid data-dependent branches.
-  * Point/x comparison without a field inversion by comparison in the Jacobian coordinate space.
-* Point multiplication for verification (a*P + b*G).
-  * Use wNAF notation for point multiplicands.
-  * Use a much larger window for multiples of G, using precomputed multiples.
-  * Use Shamir's trick to do the multiplication with the public key and the generator simultaneously.
-  * Use secp256k1's efficiently-computable endomorphism to split the P multiplicand into 2 half-sized ones.
-* Point multiplication for signing
-  * Use a precomputed table of multiples of powers of 16 multiplied with the generator, so general multiplication becomes a series of additions.
-  * Intended to be completely free of timing sidechannels for secret-key operations (on reasonable hardware/toolchains)
-    * Access the table with branch-free conditional moves so memory access is uniform.
-    * No data-dependent branches
-  * Optional runtime blinding which attempts to frustrate differential power analysis.
-  * The precomputed tables add and eventually subtract points for which no known scalar (secret key) is known, preventing even an attacker with control over the secret key used to control the data internally.
-
-Building with Autotools
------------------------
-
-    $ ./autogen.sh
-    $ ./configure
-    $ make
-    $ make check  # run the test suite
-    $ sudo make install  # optional
-
-To compile optional modules (such as Schnorr signatures), you need to run `./configure` with additional flags (such as `--enable-module-schnorrsig`). Run `./configure --help` to see the full list of available flags.
-
-Building with CMake (experimental)
-----------------------------------
-
-To maintain a pristine source tree, CMake encourages to perform an out-of-source build by using a separate dedicated build tree.
-
-### Building on POSIX systems
-
-    $ mkdir build && cd build
-    $ cmake ..
-    $ cmake --build .
-    $ ctest  # run the test suite
-    $ sudo cmake --install .  # optional
-
-To compile optional modules (such as Schnorr signatures), you need to run `cmake` with additional flags (such as `-DSECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG=ON`). Run `cmake .. -LH` to see the full list of available flags.
-
-### Cross compiling
-
-To alleviate issues with cross compiling, preconfigured toolchain files are available in the `cmake` directory.
-For example, to cross compile for Windows:
-
-    $ cmake .. -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../cmake/x86_64-w64-mingw32.toolchain.cmake
-
-To cross compile for Android with [NDK](https://developer.android.com/ndk/guides/cmake) (using NDK's toolchain file, and assuming the `ANDROID_NDK_ROOT` environment variable has been set):
-
-    $ cmake .. -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE="${ANDROID_NDK_ROOT}/build/cmake/android.toolchain.cmake" -DANDROID_ABI=arm64-v8a -DANDROID_PLATFORM=28
-
-### Building on Windows
-
-To build on Windows with Visual Studio, a proper [generator](https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/manual/cmake-generators.7.html#visual-studio-generators) must be specified for a new build tree.
-
-The following example assumes using of Visual Studio 2022 and CMake v3.21+.
-
-In "Developer Command Prompt for VS 2022":
-
-    >cmake -G "Visual Studio 17 2022" -A x64 -S . -B build
-    >cmake --build build --config RelWithDebInfo
-
-Usage examples
------------
-Usage examples can be found in the [examples](examples) directory. To compile them you need to configure with `--enable-examples`.
-  * [ECDSA example](examples/ecdsa.c)
-  * [Schnorr signatures example](examples/schnorr.c)
-  * [Deriving a shared secret (ECDH) example](examples/ecdh.c)
-  * [ElligatorSwift key exchange example](examples/ellswift.c)
-
-To compile the Schnorr signature and ECDH examples, you also need to configure with `--enable-module-schnorrsig` and `--enable-module-ecdh`.
-
-Benchmark
-------------
-If configured with `--enable-benchmark` (which is the default), binaries for benchmarking the libsecp256k1 functions will be present in the root directory after the build.
-
-To print the benchmark result to the command line:
-
-    $ ./bench_name
-
-To create a CSV file for the benchmark result :
-
-    $ ./bench_name | sed '2d;s/ \{1,\}//g' > bench_name.csv
-
-Reporting a vulnerability
-------------
-
-See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)
-
-Contributing to libsecp256k1
-------------
-
-See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)

external/secp256k1/SECURITY.md

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# Security Policy
-
-## Reporting a Vulnerability
-
-To report security issues send an email to secp256k1-security@bitcoincore.org (not for support).
-
-The following keys may be used to communicate sensitive information to developers:
-
-| Name | Fingerprint |
-|------|-------------|
-| Pieter Wuille | 133E AC17 9436 F14A 5CF1  B794 860F EB80 4E66 9320 |
-| Jonas Nick | 36C7 1A37 C9D9 88BD E825  08D9 B1A7 0E4F 8DCD 0366 |
-| Tim Ruffing | 09E0 3F87 1092 E40E 106E  902B 33BC 86AB 80FF 5516 |
-
-You can import a key by running the following command with that individual’s fingerprint: `gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --recv-keys "<fingerprint>"` Ensure that you put quotes around fingerprints containing spaces.

external/secp256k1/autogen.sh

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-set -e
-autoreconf -if --warnings=all

external/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-dnl escape "$0x" below using the m4 quadrigaph @S|@, and escape it again with a \ for the shell.
-AC_DEFUN([SECP_X86_64_ASM_CHECK],[
-AC_MSG_CHECKING(for x86_64 assembly availability)
-AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-  #include <stdint.h>]],[[
-  uint64_t a = 11, tmp;
-  __asm__ __volatile__("movq \@S|@0x100000000,%1; mulq %%rsi" : "+a"(a) : "S"(tmp) : "cc", "%rdx");
-  ]])], [has_x86_64_asm=yes], [has_x86_64_asm=no])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$has_x86_64_asm])
-])
-
-AC_DEFUN([SECP_ARM32_ASM_CHECK], [
-  AC_MSG_CHECKING(for ARM32 assembly availability)
-  SECP_ARM32_ASM_CHECK_CFLAGS_saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-  CFLAGS="-x assembler"
-  AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-    .syntax unified
-    .eabi_attribute 24, 1
-    .eabi_attribute 25, 1
-    .text
-    .global main
-    main:
-      ldr r0, =0x002A
-      mov r7, #1
-      swi 0   
-    ]])], [has_arm32_asm=yes], [has_arm32_asm=no])
-  AC_MSG_RESULT([$has_arm32_asm])
-  CFLAGS="$SECP_ARM32_ASM_CHECK_CFLAGS_saved_CFLAGS"
-])
-
-AC_DEFUN([SECP_VALGRIND_CHECK],[
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for valgrind support])
-if test x"$has_valgrind" != x"yes"; then
-  CPPFLAGS_TEMP="$CPPFLAGS"
-  CPPFLAGS="$VALGRIND_CPPFLAGS $CPPFLAGS"
-  AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-    #include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
-  ]], [[
-    #if defined(NVALGRIND)
-    #  error "Valgrind does not support this platform."
-    #endif
-  ]])], [has_valgrind=yes])
-  CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS_TEMP"
-fi
-AC_MSG_RESULT($has_valgrind)
-])
-
-AC_DEFUN([SECP_MSAN_CHECK], [
-AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether MemorySanitizer is enabled)
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-  #if defined(__has_feature)
-  #  if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
-       /* MemorySanitizer is enabled. */
-  #  elif
-  #    error "MemorySanitizer is disabled."
-  #  endif
-  #else
-  #  error "__has_feature is not defined."
-  #endif
-  ]])], [msan_enabled=yes], [msan_enabled=no])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$msan_enabled])
-])
-
-dnl SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS(flags, VAR)
-dnl Append flags to VAR if CC accepts them.
-AC_DEFUN([SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS], [
-  AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports $1])
-  SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS_saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-  CFLAGS="$1 $CFLAGS"
-  AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], [flag_works=yes], [flag_works=no])
-  AC_MSG_RESULT($flag_works)
-  CFLAGS="$SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS_saved_CFLAGS"
-  if test x"$flag_works" = x"yes"; then
-    $2="$$2 $1"
-  fi
-  unset flag_works
-  AC_SUBST($2)
-])
-
-dnl SECP_SET_DEFAULT(VAR, default, default-dev-mode)
-dnl Set VAR to default or default-dev-mode, depending on whether dev mode is enabled
-AC_DEFUN([SECP_SET_DEFAULT], [
-  if test "${enable_dev_mode+set}" != set; then
-    AC_MSG_ERROR([[Set enable_dev_mode before calling SECP_SET_DEFAULT]])
-  fi
-  if test x"$enable_dev_mode" = x"yes"; then
-    $1="$3"
-  else
-    $1="$2"
-  fi
-])

external/secp256k1/ci/ci.sh

@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-set -eux
-
-export LC_ALL=C
-
-# Print commit and relevant CI environment to allow reproducing the job outside of CI.
-git show --no-patch
-print_environment() {
-    # Turn off -x because it messes up the output
-    set +x
-    # There are many ways to print variable names and their content. This one
-    # does not rely on bash.
-    for var in WERROR_CFLAGS MAKEFLAGS BUILD \
-            ECMULTWINDOW ECMULTGENKB ASM WIDEMUL WITH_VALGRIND EXTRAFLAGS \
-            EXPERIMENTAL ECDH RECOVERY EXTRAKEYS MUSIG SCHNORRSIG ELLSWIFT \
-            SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS BENCH SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS CTIMETESTS\
-            EXAMPLES \
-            HOST WRAPPER_CMD \
-            CC CFLAGS CPPFLAGS AR NM \
-            UBSAN_OPTIONS ASAN_OPTIONS LSAN_OPTIONS
-    do
-        eval "isset=\${$var+x}"
-        if [ -n "$isset" ]; then
-            eval "val=\${$var}"
-            # shellcheck disable=SC2154
-            printf '%s="%s" ' "$var" "$val"
-        fi
-    done
-    echo "$0"
-    set -x
-}
-print_environment
-
-env >> test_env.log
-
-# If gcc is requested, assert that it's in fact gcc (and not some symlinked Apple clang).
-case "${CC:-undefined}" in
-    *gcc*)
-        $CC -v 2>&1 | grep -q "gcc version" || exit 1;
-        ;;
-esac
-
-if [ -n "${CC+x}" ]; then
-    # The MSVC compiler "cl" doesn't understand "-v"
-    $CC -v || true
-fi
-if [ "$WITH_VALGRIND" = "yes" ]; then
-    valgrind --version
-fi
-if [ -n "$WRAPPER_CMD" ]; then
-    $WRAPPER_CMD --version
-fi
-
-# Workaround for https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=452758 (fixed in valgrind 3.20.0).
-case "${CC:-undefined}" in
-    clang*)
-        if [ "$CTIMETESTS" = "yes" ] && [ "$WITH_VALGRIND" = "yes" ]
-        then
-            export CFLAGS="${CFLAGS:+$CFLAGS }-gdwarf-4"
-        else
-            case "$WRAPPER_CMD" in
-                valgrind*)
-                    export CFLAGS="${CFLAGS:+$CFLAGS }-gdwarf-4"
-                    ;;
-            esac
-        fi
-        ;;
-esac
-
-./autogen.sh
-
-./configure \
-    --enable-experimental="$EXPERIMENTAL" \
-    --with-test-override-wide-multiply="$WIDEMUL" --with-asm="$ASM" \
-    --with-ecmult-window="$ECMULTWINDOW" \
-    --with-ecmult-gen-kb="$ECMULTGENKB" \
-    --enable-module-ecdh="$ECDH" --enable-module-recovery="$RECOVERY" \
-    --enable-module-ellswift="$ELLSWIFT" \
-    --enable-module-extrakeys="$EXTRAKEYS" \
-    --enable-module-schnorrsig="$SCHNORRSIG" \
-    --enable-module-musig="$MUSIG" \
-    --enable-examples="$EXAMPLES" \
-    --enable-ctime-tests="$CTIMETESTS" \
-    --with-valgrind="$WITH_VALGRIND" \
-    --host="$HOST" $EXTRAFLAGS
-
-# We have set "-j<n>" in MAKEFLAGS.
-build_exit_code=0
-make > make.log 2>&1 || build_exit_code=$?
-cat make.log
-if [ $build_exit_code -ne 0 ]; then
-    case "${CC:-undefined}" in
-        *snapshot*)
-            # Ignore internal compiler errors in gcc-snapshot and clang-snapshot
-            grep -e "internal compiler error:" -e "PLEASE submit a bug report" make.log
-            return $?;
-            ;;
-        *)
-            return 1;
-            ;;
-    esac
-fi
-
-# Print information about binaries so that we can see that the architecture is correct
-file *tests* || true
-file bench* || true
-file .libs/* || true
-
-# This tells `make check` to wrap test invocations.
-export LOG_COMPILER="$WRAPPER_CMD"
-
-make "$BUILD"
-
-# Using the local `libtool` because on macOS the system's libtool has nothing to do with GNU libtool
-EXEC='./libtool --mode=execute'
-if [ -n "$WRAPPER_CMD" ]
-then
-    EXEC="$EXEC $WRAPPER_CMD"
-fi
-
-if [ "$BENCH" = "yes" ]
-then
-    {
-        $EXEC ./bench_ecmult
-        $EXEC ./bench_internal
-        $EXEC ./bench
-    } >> bench.log 2>&1
-fi
-
-if [ "$CTIMETESTS" = "yes" ]
-then
-    if [ "$WITH_VALGRIND" = "yes" ]; then
-        ./libtool --mode=execute valgrind --error-exitcode=42 ./ctime_tests > ctime_tests.log 2>&1
-    else
-        $EXEC ./ctime_tests > ctime_tests.log 2>&1
-    fi
-fi
-
-# Rebuild precomputed files (if not cross-compiling).
-if [ -z "$HOST" ]
-then
-    make clean-precomp clean-testvectors
-    make precomp testvectors
-fi
-
-# Check that no repo files have been modified by the build.
-# (This fails for example if the precomp files need to be updated in the repo.)
-git diff --exit-code

external/secp256k1/ci/linux-debian.Dockerfile

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-FROM debian:stable-slim
-
-SHELL ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
-
-WORKDIR /root
-
-# A too high maximum number of file descriptors (with the default value
-# inherited from the docker host) can cause issues with some of our tools:
-#  - sanitizers hanging: https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/1662 
-#  - valgrind crashing: https://stackoverflow.com/a/75293014
-# This is not be a problem on our CI hosts, but developers who run the image
-# on their machines may run into this (e.g., on Arch Linux), so warn them.
-# (Note that .bashrc is only executed in interactive bash shells.)
-RUN echo 'if [[ $(ulimit -n) -gt 200000 ]]; then echo "WARNING: Very high value reported by \"ulimit -n\". Consider passing \"--ulimit nofile=32768\" to \"docker run\"."; fi' >> /root/.bashrc
-
-RUN dpkg --add-architecture i386 && \
-    dpkg --add-architecture s390x && \
-    dpkg --add-architecture armhf && \
-    dpkg --add-architecture arm64 && \
-    dpkg --add-architecture ppc64el
-
-# dkpg-dev: to make pkg-config work in cross-builds
-# llvm: for llvm-symbolizer, which is used by clang's UBSan for symbolized stack traces
-RUN apt-get update && apt-get install --no-install-recommends -y \
-        git ca-certificates \
-        make automake libtool pkg-config dpkg-dev valgrind qemu-user \
-        gcc clang llvm libclang-rt-dev libc6-dbg \
-        g++ \
-        gcc-i686-linux-gnu libc6-dev-i386-cross libc6-dbg:i386 libubsan1:i386 libasan8:i386 \
-        gcc-s390x-linux-gnu libc6-dev-s390x-cross libc6-dbg:s390x \
-        gcc-arm-linux-gnueabihf libc6-dev-armhf-cross libc6-dbg:armhf \
-        gcc-powerpc64le-linux-gnu libc6-dev-ppc64el-cross libc6-dbg:ppc64el \
-        gcc-mingw-w64-x86-64-win32 wine64 wine \
-        gcc-mingw-w64-i686-win32 wine32 \
-        python3 && \
-        if ! ( dpkg --print-architecture | grep --quiet "arm64" ) ; then \
-         apt-get install --no-install-recommends -y \
-         gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu libc6-dev-arm64-cross libc6-dbg:arm64 ;\
-        fi && \
-        apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
-
-# Build and install gcc snapshot
-ARG GCC_SNAPSHOT_MAJOR=15
-RUN apt-get update && apt-get install --no-install-recommends -y wget libgmp-dev libmpfr-dev libmpc-dev flex && \
-    mkdir gcc && cd gcc && \
-    wget --progress=dot:giga --https-only --recursive --accept '*.tar.xz' --level 1 --no-directories "https://gcc.gnu.org/pub/gcc/snapshots/LATEST-${GCC_SNAPSHOT_MAJOR}" && \
-    wget "https://gcc.gnu.org/pub/gcc/snapshots/LATEST-${GCC_SNAPSHOT_MAJOR}/sha512.sum" && \
-    sha512sum --check --ignore-missing sha512.sum && \
-    # We should have downloaded exactly one tar.xz file
-    ls && \
-    [ $(ls *.tar.xz | wc -l) -eq "1" ] && \
-    tar xf *.tar.xz && \
-    mkdir gcc-build && cd gcc-build && \
-    ../*/configure --prefix=/opt/gcc-snapshot --enable-languages=c --disable-bootstrap --disable-multilib --without-isl && \
-    make -j $(nproc) && \
-    make install && \
-    cd ../.. && rm -rf gcc && \
-    ln -s /opt/gcc-snapshot/bin/gcc /usr/bin/gcc-snapshot && \
-    apt-get autoremove -y wget libgmp-dev libmpfr-dev libmpc-dev flex && \
-    apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
-
-# Install clang snapshot, see https://apt.llvm.org/
-RUN \
-    # Setup GPG keys of LLVM repository
-    apt-get update && apt-get install --no-install-recommends -y wget && \
-    wget -qO- https://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key | tee /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/apt.llvm.org.asc && \
-    # Add repository for this Debian release
-    . /etc/os-release && echo "deb http://apt.llvm.org/${VERSION_CODENAME} llvm-toolchain-${VERSION_CODENAME} main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list && \
-    apt-get update && \
-    # Determine the version number of the LLVM development branch
-    LLVM_VERSION=$(apt-cache search --names-only '^clang-[0-9]+$' | sort -V | tail -1 | cut -f1 -d" " | cut -f2 -d"-" ) && \
-    # Install
-    apt-get install --no-install-recommends -y "clang-${LLVM_VERSION}" && \
-    # Create symlink
-    ln -s "/usr/bin/clang-${LLVM_VERSION}" /usr/bin/clang-snapshot && \
-    # Clean up
-    apt-get autoremove -y wget && \
-    apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
-

external/secp256k1/cmake/CheckArm32Assembly.cmake

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-function(check_arm32_assembly)
-  try_compile(HAVE_ARM32_ASM
-    ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/check_arm32_assembly
-    SOURCES ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake/source_arm32.s
-  )
-endfunction()

external/secp256k1/cmake/CheckMemorySanitizer.cmake

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-include_guard(GLOBAL)
-include(CheckCSourceCompiles)
-
-function(check_memory_sanitizer output)
-  set(CMAKE_TRY_COMPILE_TARGET_TYPE STATIC_LIBRARY)
-  check_c_source_compiles("
-    #if defined(__has_feature)
-    #  if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
-         /* MemorySanitizer is enabled. */
-    #  elif
-    #    error \"MemorySanitizer is disabled.\"
-    #  endif
-    #else
-    #  error \"__has_feature is not defined.\"
-    #endif
-  " HAVE_MSAN)
-  set(${output} ${HAVE_MSAN} PARENT_SCOPE)
-endfunction()

external/secp256k1/cmake/CheckStringOptionValue.cmake

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-function(check_string_option_value option)
-  get_property(expected_values CACHE ${option} PROPERTY STRINGS)
-  if(expected_values)
-    if(${option} IN_LIST expected_values)
-      return()
-    endif()
-    message(FATAL_ERROR "${option} value is \"${${option}}\", but must be one of ${expected_values}.")
-  endif()
-  message(AUTHOR_WARNING "The STRINGS property must be set before invoking `check_string_option_value' function.")
-endfunction()

external/secp256k1/cmake/CheckX86_64Assembly.cmake

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-include(CheckCSourceCompiles)
-
-function(check_x86_64_assembly)
-  check_c_source_compiles("
-    #include <stdint.h>
-
-    int main()
-    {
-      uint64_t a = 11, tmp;
-      __asm__ __volatile__(\"movq $0x100000000,%1; mulq %%rsi\" : \"+a\"(a) : \"S\"(tmp) : \"cc\", \"%rdx\");
-    }
-  " HAVE_X86_64_ASM)
-  set(HAVE_X86_64_ASM ${HAVE_X86_64_ASM} PARENT_SCOPE)
-endfunction()

external/secp256k1/cmake/FindValgrind.cmake

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-if(CMAKE_HOST_APPLE)
-  find_program(BREW_COMMAND brew)
-  execute_process(
-    COMMAND ${BREW_COMMAND} --prefix valgrind
-    OUTPUT_VARIABLE valgrind_brew_prefix
-    ERROR_QUIET
-    OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
-  )
-endif()
-
-set(hints_paths)
-if(valgrind_brew_prefix)
-  set(hints_paths ${valgrind_brew_prefix}/include)
-endif()
-
-find_path(Valgrind_INCLUDE_DIR
-  NAMES valgrind/memcheck.h
-  HINTS ${hints_paths}
-)
-
-if(Valgrind_INCLUDE_DIR)
-  include(CheckCSourceCompiles)
-  set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_INCLUDES ${Valgrind_INCLUDE_DIR})
-  check_c_source_compiles("
-    #include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
-    #if defined(NVALGRIND)
-    #  error \"Valgrind does not support this platform.\"
-    #endif
-
-    int main() {}
-  " Valgrind_WORKS)
-endif()
-
-include(FindPackageHandleStandardArgs)
-find_package_handle_standard_args(Valgrind
-  REQUIRED_VARS Valgrind_INCLUDE_DIR Valgrind_WORKS
-)
-
-mark_as_advanced(
-  Valgrind_INCLUDE_DIR
-)

external/secp256k1/cmake/GeneratePkgConfigFile.cmake

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-function(generate_pkg_config_file in_file)
-  set(prefix ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX})
-  set(exec_prefix \${prefix})
-  set(libdir \${exec_prefix}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR})
-  set(includedir \${prefix}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_INCLUDEDIR})
-  set(PACKAGE_VERSION ${PROJECT_VERSION})
-  configure_file(${in_file} ${PROJECT_NAME}.pc @ONLY)
-endfunction()

external/secp256k1/cmake/TryAppendCFlags.cmake

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-include(CheckCCompilerFlag)
-
-function(secp256k1_check_c_flags_internal flags output)
-  string(MAKE_C_IDENTIFIER "${flags}" result)
-  string(TOUPPER "${result}" result)
-  set(result "C_SUPPORTS_${result}")
-  if(NOT MSVC)
-    set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_FLAGS "-Werror")
-  endif()
-
-  # This avoids running a linker.
-  set(CMAKE_TRY_COMPILE_TARGET_TYPE STATIC_LIBRARY)
-  check_c_compiler_flag("${flags}" ${result})
-
-  set(${output} ${${result}} PARENT_SCOPE)
-endfunction()
-
-# Append flags to the COMPILE_OPTIONS directory property if CC accepts them.
-macro(try_append_c_flags)
-  secp256k1_check_c_flags_internal("${ARGV}" result)
-  if(result)
-    add_compile_options(${ARGV})
-  endif()
-endmacro()

external/secp256k1/cmake/arm-linux-gnueabihf.toolchain.cmake

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-set(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME Linux)
-set(CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR arm)
-set(CMAKE_C_COMPILER arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc)

external/secp256k1/cmake/config.cmake.in

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-@PACKAGE_INIT@
-
-include("${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/@PROJECT_NAME@-targets.cmake")
-
-check_required_components(@PROJECT_NAME@)

external/secp256k1/cmake/source_arm32.s

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-.syntax unified
-.eabi_attribute 24, 1
-.eabi_attribute 25, 1
-.text
-.global main
-main:
-	ldr	r0, =0x002A
-	mov	r7, #1
-	swi	0   

external/secp256k1/cmake/x86_64-w64-mingw32.toolchain.cmake

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-set(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME Windows)
-set(CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR x86_64)
-set(CMAKE_C_COMPILER x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc)

external/secp256k1/configure.ac

@@ -1,517 +0,0 @@
-AC_PREREQ([2.60])
-
-# The package (a.k.a. release) version is based on semantic versioning 2.0.0 of
-# the API. All changes in experimental modules are treated as
-# backwards-compatible and therefore at most increase the minor version.
-define(_PKG_VERSION_MAJOR, 0)
-define(_PKG_VERSION_MINOR, 6)
-define(_PKG_VERSION_PATCH, 0)
-define(_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, true)
-
-# The library version is based on libtool versioning of the ABI. The set of
-# rules for updating the version can be found here:
-# https://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/manual/html_node/Updating-version-info.html
-# All changes in experimental modules are treated as if they don't affect the
-# interface and therefore only increase the revision.
-define(_LIB_VERSION_CURRENT, 5)
-define(_LIB_VERSION_REVISION, 0)
-define(_LIB_VERSION_AGE, 0)
-
-AC_INIT([libsecp256k1],m4_join([.], _PKG_VERSION_MAJOR, _PKG_VERSION_MINOR, _PKG_VERSION_PATCH)m4_if(_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, [true], [], [-dev]),[https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues],[libsecp256k1],[https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1])
-
-AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([build-aux])
-AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([build-aux/m4])
-AC_CANONICAL_HOST
-
-# Require Automake 1.11.2 for AM_PROG_AR
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11.2 foreign subdir-objects])
-
-# Make the compilation flags quiet unless V=1 is used.
-m4_ifdef([AM_SILENT_RULES], [AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])])
-
-if test "${CFLAGS+set}" = "set"; then
-  CFLAGS_overridden=yes
-else
-  CFLAGS_overridden=no
-fi
-AC_PROG_CC
-AM_PROG_AS
-AM_PROG_AR
-
-# Clear some cache variables as a workaround for a bug that appears due to a bad
-# interaction between AM_PROG_AR and LT_INIT when combining MSVC's archiver lib.exe.
-# https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=54421
-AS_UNSET(ac_cv_prog_AR)
-AS_UNSET(ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR)
-LT_INIT([win32-dll])
-
-build_windows=no
-
-case $host_os in
-  *darwin*)
-     if  test x$cross_compiling != xyes; then
-       AC_CHECK_PROG([BREW], brew, brew)
-       if test x$BREW = xbrew; then
-         # These Homebrew packages may be keg-only, meaning that they won't be found
-         # in expected paths because they may conflict with system files. Ask
-         # Homebrew where each one is located, then adjust paths accordingly.
-         if $BREW list --versions valgrind >/dev/null; then
-           valgrind_prefix=$($BREW --prefix valgrind 2>/dev/null)
-           VALGRIND_CPPFLAGS="-I$valgrind_prefix/include"
-         fi
-       else
-         AC_CHECK_PROG([PORT], port, port)
-         # If homebrew isn't installed and macports is, add the macports default paths
-         # as a last resort.
-         if test x$PORT = xport; then
-           CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -isystem /opt/local/include"
-           LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/opt/local/lib"
-         fi
-       fi
-     fi
-   ;;
-   cygwin*|mingw*)
-     build_windows=yes
-   ;;
-esac
-
-# Try if some desirable compiler flags are supported and append them to SECP_CFLAGS.
-#
-# These are our own flags, so we append them to our own SECP_CFLAGS variable (instead of CFLAGS) as
-# recommended in the automake manual (Section "Flag Variables Ordering"). CFLAGS belongs to the user
-# and we are not supposed to touch it. In the Makefile, we will need to ensure that SECP_CFLAGS
-# is prepended to CFLAGS when invoking the compiler so that the user always has the last word (flag).
-#
-# Another advantage of not touching CFLAGS is that the contents of CFLAGS will be picked up by
-# libtool for compiling helper executables. For example, when compiling for Windows, libtool will
-# generate entire wrapper executables (instead of simple wrapper scripts as on Unix) to ensure
-# proper operation of uninstalled programs linked by libtool against the uninstalled shared library.
-# These executables are compiled from C source file for which our flags may not be appropriate,
-# e.g., -std=c89 flag has lead to undesirable warnings in the past.
-#
-# TODO We should analogously not touch CPPFLAGS and LDFLAGS but currently there are no issues.
-AC_DEFUN([SECP_TRY_APPEND_DEFAULT_CFLAGS], [
-    # GCC and compatible (incl. clang)
-    if test "x$GCC" = "xyes"; then
-      # Try to append -Werror to CFLAGS temporarily. Otherwise checks for some unsupported
-      # flags will succeed.
-      # Note that failure to append -Werror does not necessarily mean that -Werror is not
-      # supported. The compiler may already be warning about something unrelated, for example
-      # about some path issue. If that is the case, -Werror cannot be used because all
-      # of those warnings would be turned into errors.
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_DEFAULT_CFLAGS_saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Werror], CFLAGS)
-
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-std=c89 -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wnested-externs -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wundef], $1) # GCC >= 3.0, -Wlong-long is implied by -pedantic.
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wno-overlength-strings], $1) # GCC >= 4.2, -Woverlength-strings is implied by -pedantic.
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wall], $1) # GCC >= 2.95 and probably many other compilers
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wno-unused-function], $1) # GCC >= 3.0, -Wunused-function is implied by -Wall.
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wextra], $1) # GCC >= 3.4, this is the newer name of -W, which we don't use because older GCCs will warn about unused functions.
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wcast-align], $1) # GCC >= 2.95
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wcast-align=strict], $1) # GCC >= 8.0
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wconditional-uninitialized], $1) # Clang >= 3.0 only
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-Wreserved-identifier], $1) # Clang >= 13.0 only
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-fvisibility=hidden], $1) # GCC >= 4.0
-
-      CFLAGS="$SECP_TRY_APPEND_DEFAULT_CFLAGS_saved_CFLAGS"
-    fi
-
-    # MSVC
-    # Assume MSVC if we're building for Windows but not with GCC or compatible;
-    # libtool makes the same assumption internally.
-    # Note that "/opt" and "-opt" are equivalent for MSVC; we use "-opt" because "/opt" looks like a path.
-    if test x"$GCC" != x"yes" && test x"$build_windows" = x"yes"; then
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-W3], $1) # Production quality warning level.
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-wd4146], $1) # Disable warning C4146 "unary minus operator applied to unsigned type, result still unsigned".
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-wd4244], $1) # Disable warning C4244 "'conversion' conversion from 'type1' to 'type2', possible loss of data".
-      SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-wd4267], $1) # Disable warning C4267 "'var' : conversion from 'size_t' to 'type', possible loss of data".
-      # Eliminate deprecation warnings for the older, less secure functions.
-      CPPFLAGS="-D_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS $CPPFLAGS"
-    fi
-])
-SECP_TRY_APPEND_DEFAULT_CFLAGS(SECP_CFLAGS)
-
-###
-### Define config arguments
-###
-
-# In dev mode, we enable all binaries and modules by default but individual options can still be overridden explicitly.
-# Check for dev mode first because SECP_SET_DEFAULT needs enable_dev_mode set.
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(dev_mode, [], [],
-    [enable_dev_mode=no])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(benchmark,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-benchmark],[compile benchmark [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_benchmark], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(coverage,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-coverage],[enable compiler flags to support kcov coverage analysis [default=no]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_coverage], [no], [no])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(tests,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-tests],[compile tests [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_tests], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(ctime_tests,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-ctime-tests],[compile constant-time tests [default=yes if valgrind enabled]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_ctime_tests], [auto], [auto])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(experimental,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-experimental],[allow experimental configure options [default=no]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_experimental], [no], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(exhaustive_tests,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-exhaustive-tests],[compile exhaustive tests [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_exhaustive_tests], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(examples,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-examples],[compile the examples [default=no]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_examples], [no], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_ecdh,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-ecdh],[enable ECDH module [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_module_ecdh], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_recovery,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-recovery],[enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module [default=no]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_module_recovery], [no], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_extrakeys,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-extrakeys],[enable extrakeys module [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_module_extrakeys], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_schnorrsig,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-schnorrsig],[enable schnorrsig module [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_module_schnorrsig], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_musig,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-musig],[enable MuSig2 module [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_module_musig], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_ellswift,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-ellswift],[enable ElligatorSwift module [default=yes]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_module_ellswift], [yes], [yes])])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(external_default_callbacks,
-    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-external-default-callbacks],[enable external default callback functions [default=no]]), [],
-    [SECP_SET_DEFAULT([enable_external_default_callbacks], [no], [no])])
-
-# Test-only override of the (autodetected by the C code) "widemul" setting.
-# Legal values are:
-#  * int64 (for [u]int64_t),
-#  * int128 (for [unsigned] __int128),
-#  * int128_struct (for int128 implemented as a structure),
-#  *  and auto (the default).
-AC_ARG_WITH([test-override-wide-multiply], [] ,[set_widemul=$withval], [set_widemul=auto])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([asm], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-asm=x86_64|arm32|no|auto],
-[assembly to use (experimental: arm32) [default=auto]])],[req_asm=$withval], [req_asm=auto])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([ecmult-window], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ecmult-window=SIZE],
-[window size for ecmult precomputation for verification, specified as integer in range [2..24].]
-[Larger values result in possibly better performance at the cost of an exponentially larger precomputed table.]
-[The table will store 2^(SIZE-1) * 64 bytes of data but can be larger in memory due to platform-specific padding and alignment.]
-[A window size larger than 15 will require you delete the prebuilt precomputed_ecmult.c file so that it can be rebuilt.]
-[For very large window sizes, use "make -j 1" to reduce memory use during compilation.]
-[The default value is a reasonable setting for desktop machines (currently 15). [default=15]]
-)],
-[set_ecmult_window=$withval], [set_ecmult_window=15])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([ecmult-gen-kb], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ecmult-gen-kb=2|22|86],
-[The size of the precomputed table for signing in multiples of 1024 bytes (on typical platforms).]
-[Larger values result in possibly better signing/keygeneration performance at the cost of a larger table.]
-[The default value is a reasonable setting for desktop machines (currently 86). [default=86]]
-)],
-[set_ecmult_gen_kb=$withval], [set_ecmult_gen_kb=86])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([valgrind], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-valgrind=yes|no|auto],
-[Build with extra checks for running inside Valgrind [default=auto]]
-)],
-[req_valgrind=$withval], [req_valgrind=auto])
-
-###
-### Handle config options (except for modules)
-###
-
-if test x"$req_valgrind" = x"no"; then
-  enable_valgrind=no
-else
-  SECP_VALGRIND_CHECK
-  if test x"$has_valgrind" != x"yes"; then
-    if test x"$req_valgrind" = x"yes"; then
-      AC_MSG_ERROR([Valgrind support explicitly requested but valgrind/memcheck.h header not available])
-    fi
-    enable_valgrind=no
-  else
-    enable_valgrind=yes
-  fi
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_ctime_tests" = x"auto"; then
-    enable_ctime_tests=$enable_valgrind
-fi
-
-print_msan_notice=no
-if test x"$enable_ctime_tests" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_MSAN_CHECK
-  # MSan on Clang >=16 reports unitialized memory in function parameters and return values, even if
-  # the uninitalized variable is never actually "used". This is called "eager" checking, and it's
-  # sounds like good idea for normal use of MSan. However, it yields many false positives in the
-  # ctime_tests because many return values depend on secret (i.e., "uninitialized") values, and
-  # we're only interested in detecting branches (which count as "uses") on secret data.
-  if test x"$msan_enabled" = x"yes"; then
-    SECP_TRY_APPEND_CFLAGS([-fno-sanitize-memory-param-retval], SECP_CFLAGS)
-    print_msan_notice=yes
-  fi
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"; then
-    SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DCOVERAGE=1"
-    SECP_CFLAGS="-O0 --coverage $SECP_CFLAGS"
-    # If coverage is enabled, and the user has not overridden CFLAGS,
-    # override Autoconf's value "-g -O2" with "-g". Otherwise we'd end up
-    # with "-O0 --coverage -g -O2".
-    if test "$CFLAGS_overridden" = "no"; then
-      CFLAGS="-g"
-    fi
-    LDFLAGS="--coverage $LDFLAGS"
-else
-    # Most likely the CFLAGS already contain -O2 because that is autoconf's default.
-    # We still add it here because passing it twice is not an issue, and handling
-    # this case would just add unnecessary complexity (see #896).
-    SECP_CFLAGS="-O2 $SECP_CFLAGS"
-fi
-
-if test x"$req_asm" = x"auto"; then
-  SECP_X86_64_ASM_CHECK
-  if test x"$has_x86_64_asm" = x"yes"; then
-    set_asm=x86_64
-  fi
-  if test x"$set_asm" = x; then
-    set_asm=no
-  fi
-else
-  set_asm=$req_asm
-  case $set_asm in
-  x86_64)
-    SECP_X86_64_ASM_CHECK
-    if test x"$has_x86_64_asm" != x"yes"; then
-      AC_MSG_ERROR([x86_64 assembly requested but not available])
-    fi
-    ;;
-  arm32)
-    SECP_ARM32_ASM_CHECK
-    if test x"$has_arm32_asm" != x"yes"; then
-      AC_MSG_ERROR([ARM32 assembly requested but not available])
-    fi
-    ;;
-  no)
-    ;;
-  *)
-    AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly selection])
-    ;;
-  esac
-fi
-
-# Select assembly
-enable_external_asm=no
-
-case $set_asm in
-x86_64)
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DUSE_ASM_X86_64=1"
-  ;;
-arm32)
-  enable_external_asm=yes
-  ;;
-no)
-  ;;
-*)
-  AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly selection])
-  ;;
-esac
-
-if test x"$enable_external_asm" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DUSE_EXTERNAL_ASM=1"
-fi
-
-
-# Select wide multiplication implementation
-case $set_widemul in
-int128_struct)
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DUSE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128_STRUCT=1"
-  ;;
-int128)
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DUSE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128=1"
-  ;;
-int64)
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DUSE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64=1"
-  ;;
-auto)
-  ;;
-*)
-  AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid wide multiplication implementation])
-  ;;
-esac
-
-error_window_size=['window size for ecmult precomputation not an integer in range [2..24]']
-case $set_ecmult_window in
-''|*[[!0-9]]*)
-  # no valid integer
-  AC_MSG_ERROR($error_window_size)
-  ;;
-*)
-  if test "$set_ecmult_window" -lt 2 -o "$set_ecmult_window" -gt 24 ; then
-    # not in range
-    AC_MSG_ERROR($error_window_size)
-  fi
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE=$set_ecmult_window"
-  ;;
-esac
-
-case $set_ecmult_gen_kb in
-2)
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DCOMB_BLOCKS=2 -DCOMB_TEETH=5"
-  ;;
-22)
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DCOMB_BLOCKS=11 -DCOMB_TEETH=6"
-  ;;
-86)
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DCOMB_BLOCKS=43 -DCOMB_TEETH=6"
-  ;;
-*)
-  AC_MSG_ERROR(['ecmult gen table size not 2, 22 or 86'])
-  ;;
-esac
-
-if test x"$enable_valgrind" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES $VALGRIND_CPPFLAGS -DVALGRIND"
-fi
-
-# Add -Werror and similar flags passed from the outside (for testing, e.g., in CI).
-# We don't want to set the user variable CFLAGS in CI because this would disable
-# autoconf's logic for setting default CFLAGS, which we would like to test in CI.
-SECP_CFLAGS="$SECP_CFLAGS $WERROR_CFLAGS"
-
-###
-### Handle module options
-###
-
-# Processing must be done in a reverse topological sorting of the dependency graph
-# (dependent module first).
-if test x"$enable_module_ellswift" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT=1"
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"; then
-  if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"no"; then
-    AC_MSG_ERROR([Module dependency error: You have disabled the schnorrsig module explicitly, but it is required by the musig module.])
-  fi
-  enable_module_schnorrsig=yes
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG=1"
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then
-  if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"no"; then
-    AC_MSG_ERROR([Module dependency error: You have disabled the extrakeys module explicitly, but it is required by the schnorrsig module.])
-  fi
-  enable_module_extrakeys=yes
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG=1"
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS=1"
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY=1"
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_ECDH=1"
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_external_default_callbacks" = x"yes"; then
-  SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DUSE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS=1"
-fi
-
-###
-### Check for --enable-experimental if necessary
-###
-
-if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"no"; then
-  if test x"$set_asm" = x"arm32"; then
-    AC_MSG_ERROR([ARM32 assembly is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
-  fi
-fi
-
-###
-### Generate output
-###
-
-AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile libsecp256k1.pc])
-AC_SUBST(SECP_CFLAGS)
-AC_SUBST(SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES)
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_COVERAGE], [test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_TESTS], [test x"$enable_tests" != x"no"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_CTIME_TESTS], [test x"$enable_ctime_tests" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS], [test x"$enable_exhaustive_tests" != x"no"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXAMPLES], [test x"$enable_examples" != x"no"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_BENCHMARK], [test x"$enable_benchmark" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS], [test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG], [test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG], [test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT], [test x"$enable_module_ellswift" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXTERNAL_ASM], [test x"$enable_external_asm" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ASM_ARM], [test x"$set_asm" = x"arm32"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([BUILD_WINDOWS], [test "$build_windows" = "yes"])
-AC_SUBST(LIB_VERSION_CURRENT, _LIB_VERSION_CURRENT)
-AC_SUBST(LIB_VERSION_REVISION, _LIB_VERSION_REVISION)
-AC_SUBST(LIB_VERSION_AGE, _LIB_VERSION_AGE)
-
-AC_OUTPUT
-
-echo
-echo "Build Options:"
-echo "  with external callbacks = $enable_external_default_callbacks"
-echo "  with benchmarks         = $enable_benchmark"
-echo "  with tests              = $enable_tests"
-echo "  with ctime tests        = $enable_ctime_tests"
-echo "  with coverage           = $enable_coverage"
-echo "  with examples           = $enable_examples"
-echo "  module ecdh             = $enable_module_ecdh"
-echo "  module recovery         = $enable_module_recovery"
-echo "  module extrakeys        = $enable_module_extrakeys"
-echo "  module schnorrsig       = $enable_module_schnorrsig"
-echo "  module musig            = $enable_module_musig"
-echo "  module ellswift         = $enable_module_ellswift"
-echo
-echo "  asm                     = $set_asm"
-echo "  ecmult window size      = $set_ecmult_window"
-echo "  ecmult gen table size   = $set_ecmult_gen_kb KiB"
-# Hide test-only options unless they're used.
-if test x"$set_widemul" != xauto; then
-echo "  wide multiplication     = $set_widemul"
-fi
-echo
-echo "  valgrind                = $enable_valgrind"
-echo "  CC                      = $CC"
-echo "  CPPFLAGS                = $CPPFLAGS"
-echo "  SECP_CFLAGS             = $SECP_CFLAGS"
-echo "  CFLAGS                  = $CFLAGS"
-echo "  LDFLAGS                 = $LDFLAGS"
-
-if test x"$print_msan_notice" = x"yes"; then
-  echo
-  echo "Note:"
-  echo "  MemorySanitizer detected, tried to add -fno-sanitize-memory-param-retval to SECP_CFLAGS"
-  echo "  to avoid false positives in ctime_tests. Pass --disable-ctime-tests to avoid this."
-fi
-
-if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"yes"; then
-  echo
-  echo "WARNING: Experimental build"
-  echo "  Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for"
-  echo "  production use."
-fi

external/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c

@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille                                    *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
- * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "lax_der_parsing.h"
-
-int ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen) {
-    size_t rpos, rlen, spos, slen;
-    size_t pos = 0;
-    size_t lenbyte;
-    unsigned char tmpsig[64] = {0};
-    int overflow = 0;
-
-    /* Hack to initialize sig with a correctly-parsed but invalid signature. */
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, sig, tmpsig);
-
-    /* Sequence tag byte */
-    if (pos == inputlen || input[pos] != 0x30) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    pos++;
-
-    /* Sequence length bytes */
-    if (pos == inputlen) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    lenbyte = input[pos++];
-    if (lenbyte & 0x80) {
-        lenbyte -= 0x80;
-        if (lenbyte > inputlen - pos) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        pos += lenbyte;
-    }
-
-    /* Integer tag byte for R */
-    if (pos == inputlen || input[pos] != 0x02) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    pos++;
-
-    /* Integer length for R */
-    if (pos == inputlen) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    lenbyte = input[pos++];
-    if (lenbyte & 0x80) {
-        lenbyte -= 0x80;
-        if (lenbyte > inputlen - pos) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        while (lenbyte > 0 && input[pos] == 0) {
-            pos++;
-            lenbyte--;
-        }
-        if (lenbyte >= sizeof(size_t)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        rlen = 0;
-        while (lenbyte > 0) {
-            rlen = (rlen << 8) + input[pos];
-            pos++;
-            lenbyte--;
-        }
-    } else {
-        rlen = lenbyte;
-    }
-    if (rlen > inputlen - pos) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    rpos = pos;
-    pos += rlen;
-
-    /* Integer tag byte for S */
-    if (pos == inputlen || input[pos] != 0x02) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    pos++;
-
-    /* Integer length for S */
-    if (pos == inputlen) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    lenbyte = input[pos++];
-    if (lenbyte & 0x80) {
-        lenbyte -= 0x80;
-        if (lenbyte > inputlen - pos) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        while (lenbyte > 0 && input[pos] == 0) {
-            pos++;
-            lenbyte--;
-        }
-        if (lenbyte >= sizeof(size_t)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        slen = 0;
-        while (lenbyte > 0) {
-            slen = (slen << 8) + input[pos];
-            pos++;
-            lenbyte--;
-        }
-    } else {
-        slen = lenbyte;
-    }
-    if (slen > inputlen - pos) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    spos = pos;
-
-    /* Ignore leading zeroes in R */
-    while (rlen > 0 && input[rpos] == 0) {
-        rlen--;
-        rpos++;
-    }
-    /* Copy R value */
-    if (rlen > 32) {
-        overflow = 1;
-    } else if (rlen) {
-        memcpy(tmpsig + 32 - rlen, input + rpos, rlen);
-    }
-
-    /* Ignore leading zeroes in S */
-    while (slen > 0 && input[spos] == 0) {
-        slen--;
-        spos++;
-    }
-    /* Copy S value */
-    if (slen > 32) {
-        overflow = 1;
-    } else if (slen) {
-        memcpy(tmpsig + 64 - slen, input + spos, slen);
-    }
-
-    if (!overflow) {
-        overflow = !secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, sig, tmpsig);
-    }
-    if (overflow) {
-        memset(tmpsig, 0, 64);
-        secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, sig, tmpsig);
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-

external/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille                                    *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
- * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-/****
- * Please do not link this file directly. It is not part of the libsecp256k1
- * project and does not promise any stability in its API, functionality or
- * presence. Projects which use this code should instead copy this header
- * and its accompanying .c file directly into their codebase.
- ****/
-
-/* This file defines a function that parses DER with various errors and
- * violations. This is not a part of the library itself, because the allowed
- * violations are chosen arbitrarily and do not follow or establish any
- * standard.
- *
- * In many places it matters that different implementations do not only accept
- * the same set of valid signatures, but also reject the same set of signatures.
- * The only means to accomplish that is by strictly obeying a standard, and not
- * accepting anything else.
- *
- * Nonetheless, sometimes there is a need for compatibility with systems that
- * use signatures which do not strictly obey DER. The snippet below shows how
- * certain violations are easily supported. You may need to adapt it.
- *
- * Do not use this for new systems. Use well-defined DER or compact signatures
- * instead if you have the choice (see secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der and
- * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact).
- *
- * The supported violations are:
- * - All numbers are parsed as nonnegative integers, even though X.609-0207
- *   section 8.3.3 specifies that integers are always encoded as two's
- *   complement.
- * - Integers can have length 0, even though section 8.3.1 says they can't.
- * - Integers with overly long padding are accepted, violation section
- *   8.3.2.
- * - 127-byte long length descriptors are accepted, even though section
- *   8.1.3.5.c says that they are not.
- * - Trailing garbage data inside or after the signature is ignored.
- * - The length descriptor of the sequence is ignored.
- *
- * Compared to for example OpenSSL, many violations are NOT supported:
- * - Using overly long tag descriptors for the sequence or integers inside,
- *   violating section 8.1.2.2.
- * - Encoding primitive integers as constructed values, violating section
- *   8.3.1.
- */
-
-#ifndef SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H
-#define SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H
-
-/* #include secp256k1.h only when it hasn't been included yet.
-   This enables this file to be #included directly in other project
-   files (such as tests.c) without the need to set an explicit -I flag,
-   which would be necessary to locate secp256k1.h. */
-#ifndef SECP256K1_H
-#include <secp256k1.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** Parse a signature in "lax DER" format
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args: ctx:      a secp256k1 context object
- *  Out:  sig:      pointer to a signature object
- *  In:   input:    pointer to the signature to be parsed
- *        inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input
- *
- *  This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the
- *  encoded numbers are out of range. In addition, it will accept signatures
- *  which violate the DER spec in various ways. Its purpose is to allow
- *  validation of the Bitcoin blockchain, which includes non-DER signatures
- *  from before the network rules were updated to enforce DER. Note that
- *  the set of supported violations is a strict subset of what OpenSSL will
- *  accept.
- *
- *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the
- *  encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is
- *  guaranteed to fail for every message and public key.
- */
-int ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig,
-    const unsigned char *input,
-    size_t inputlen
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H */

external/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.c

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille                              *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
- * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h"
-
-int ec_privkey_import_der(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *out32, const unsigned char *privkey, size_t privkeylen) {
-    const unsigned char *end = privkey + privkeylen;
-    int lenb = 0;
-    int len = 0;
-    memset(out32, 0, 32);
-    /* sequence header */
-    if (end < privkey+1 || *privkey != 0x30) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    privkey++;
-    /* sequence length constructor */
-    if (end < privkey+1 || !(*privkey & 0x80)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    lenb = *privkey & ~0x80; privkey++;
-    if (lenb < 1 || lenb > 2) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (end < privkey+lenb) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    /* sequence length */
-    len = privkey[lenb-1] | (lenb > 1 ? privkey[lenb-2] << 8 : 0);
-    privkey += lenb;
-    if (end < privkey+len) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    /* sequence element 0: version number (=1) */
-    if (end < privkey+3 || privkey[0] != 0x02 || privkey[1] != 0x01 || privkey[2] != 0x01) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    privkey += 3;
-    /* sequence element 1: octet string, up to 32 bytes */
-    if (end < privkey+2 || privkey[0] != 0x04 || privkey[1] > 0x20 || end < privkey+2+privkey[1]) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (privkey[1]) memcpy(out32 + 32 - privkey[1], privkey + 2, privkey[1]);
-    if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, out32)) {
-        memset(out32, 0, 32);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-int ec_privkey_export_der(const secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *privkey, size_t *privkeylen, const unsigned char *key32, int compressed) {
-    secp256k1_pubkey pubkey;
-    size_t pubkeylen = 0;
-    if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key32)) {
-        *privkeylen = 0;
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (compressed) {
-        static const unsigned char begin[] = {
-            0x30,0x81,0xD3,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x20
-        };
-        static const unsigned char middle[] = {
-            0xA0,0x81,0x85,0x30,0x81,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x30,0x2C,0x06,0x07,0x2A,0x86,0x48,
-            0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x21,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
-            0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
-            0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,0x2F,0x30,0x06,0x04,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x01,0x07,0x04,
-            0x21,0x02,0x79,0xBE,0x66,0x7E,0xF9,0xDC,0xBB,0xAC,0x55,0xA0,0x62,0x95,0xCE,0x87,
-            0x0B,0x07,0x02,0x9B,0xFC,0xDB,0x2D,0xCE,0x28,0xD9,0x59,0xF2,0x81,0x5B,0x16,0xF8,
-            0x17,0x98,0x02,0x21,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
-            0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B,0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,
-            0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41,0x02,0x01,0x01,0xA1,0x24,0x03,0x22,0x00
-        };
-        unsigned char *ptr = privkey;
-        memcpy(ptr, begin, sizeof(begin)); ptr += sizeof(begin);
-        memcpy(ptr, key32, 32); ptr += 32;
-        memcpy(ptr, middle, sizeof(middle)); ptr += sizeof(middle);
-        pubkeylen = 33;
-        secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ptr, &pubkeylen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
-        ptr += pubkeylen;
-        *privkeylen = ptr - privkey;
-    } else {
-        static const unsigned char begin[] = {
-            0x30,0x82,0x01,0x13,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x20
-        };
-        static const unsigned char middle[] = {
-            0xA0,0x81,0xA5,0x30,0x81,0xA2,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x30,0x2C,0x06,0x07,0x2A,0x86,0x48,
-            0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x21,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
-            0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
-            0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,0x2F,0x30,0x06,0x04,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x01,0x07,0x04,
-            0x41,0x04,0x79,0xBE,0x66,0x7E,0xF9,0xDC,0xBB,0xAC,0x55,0xA0,0x62,0x95,0xCE,0x87,
-            0x0B,0x07,0x02,0x9B,0xFC,0xDB,0x2D,0xCE,0x28,0xD9,0x59,0xF2,0x81,0x5B,0x16,0xF8,
-            0x17,0x98,0x48,0x3A,0xDA,0x77,0x26,0xA3,0xC4,0x65,0x5D,0xA4,0xFB,0xFC,0x0E,0x11,
-            0x08,0xA8,0xFD,0x17,0xB4,0x48,0xA6,0x85,0x54,0x19,0x9C,0x47,0xD0,0x8F,0xFB,0x10,
-            0xD4,0xB8,0x02,0x21,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
-            0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B,0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,
-            0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41,0x02,0x01,0x01,0xA1,0x44,0x03,0x42,0x00
-        };
-        unsigned char *ptr = privkey;
-        memcpy(ptr, begin, sizeof(begin)); ptr += sizeof(begin);
-        memcpy(ptr, key32, 32); ptr += 32;
-        memcpy(ptr, middle, sizeof(middle)); ptr += sizeof(middle);
-        pubkeylen = 65;
-        secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ptr, &pubkeylen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED);
-        ptr += pubkeylen;
-        *privkeylen = ptr - privkey;
-    }
-    return 1;
-}

external/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille                              *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
- * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-/****
- * Please do not link this file directly. It is not part of the libsecp256k1
- * project and does not promise any stability in its API, functionality or
- * presence. Projects which use this code should instead copy this header
- * and its accompanying .c file directly into their codebase.
- ****/
-
-/* This file contains code snippets that parse DER private keys with
- * various errors and violations.  This is not a part of the library
- * itself, because the allowed violations are chosen arbitrarily and
- * do not follow or establish any standard.
- *
- * It also contains code to serialize private keys in a compatible
- * manner.
- *
- * These functions are meant for compatibility with applications
- * that require BER encoded keys. When working with secp256k1-specific
- * code, the simple 32-byte private keys normally used by the
- * library are sufficient.
- */
-
-#ifndef SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H
-#define SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H
-
-/* #include secp256k1.h only when it hasn't been included yet.
-   This enables this file to be #included directly in other project
-   files (such as tests.c) without the need to set an explicit -I flag,
-   which would be necessary to locate secp256k1.h. */
-#ifndef SECP256K1_H
-#include <secp256k1.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** Export a private key in DER format.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if the private key was valid.
- *  Args: ctx:        pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  Out: privkey:     pointer to an array for storing the private key in BER.
- *                    Should have space for 279 bytes, and cannot be NULL.
- *       privkeylen:  Pointer to an int where the length of the private key in
- *                    privkey will be stored.
- *  In:  seckey:      pointer to a 32-byte secret key to export.
- *       compressed:  1 if the key should be exported in
- *                    compressed format, 0 otherwise
- *
- *  This function is purely meant for compatibility with applications that
- *  require BER encoded keys. When working with secp256k1-specific code, the
- *  simple 32-byte private keys are sufficient.
- *
- *  Note that this function does not guarantee correct DER output. It is
- *  guaranteed to be parsable by secp256k1_ec_privkey_import_der
- */
-SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int ec_privkey_export_der(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    unsigned char *privkey,
-    size_t *privkeylen,
-    const unsigned char *seckey,
-    int compressed
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Import a private key in DER format.
- * Returns: 1 if a private key was extracted.
- * Args: ctx:        pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL).
- * Out:  seckey:     pointer to a 32-byte array for storing the private key.
- *                   (cannot be NULL).
- * In:   privkey:    pointer to a private key in DER format (cannot be NULL).
- *       privkeylen: length of the DER private key pointed to be privkey.
- *
- * This function will accept more than just strict DER, and even allow some BER
- * violations. The public key stored inside the DER-encoded private key is not
- * verified for correctness, nor are the curve parameters. Use this function
- * only if you know in advance it is supposed to contain a secp256k1 private
- * key.
- */
-SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int ec_privkey_import_der(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const unsigned char *privkey,
-    size_t privkeylen
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H */

external/secp256k1/doc/ellswift.md

@@ -1,483 +0,0 @@
-# ElligatorSwift for secp256k1 explained
-
-In this document we explain how the `ellswift` module implementation is related to the
-construction in the
-["SwiftEC: Shallue–van de Woestijne Indifferentiable Function To Elliptic Curves"](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/759)
-paper by Jorge Chávez-Saab, Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez, and Mehdi Tibouchi.
-
-* [1. Introduction](#1-introduction)
-* [2. The decoding function](#2-the-decoding-function)
-  + [2.1 Decoding for `secp256k1`](#21-decoding-for-secp256k1)
-* [3. The encoding function](#3-the-encoding-function)
-  + [3.1 Switching to *v, w* coordinates](#31-switching-to-v-w-coordinates)
-  + [3.2 Avoiding computing all inverses](#32-avoiding-computing-all-inverses)
-  + [3.3 Finding the inverse](#33-finding-the-inverse)
-  + [3.4 Dealing with special cases](#34-dealing-with-special-cases)
-  + [3.5 Encoding for `secp256k1`](#35-encoding-for-secp256k1)
-* [4. Encoding and decoding full *(x, y)* coordinates](#4-encoding-and-decoding-full-x-y-coordinates)
-  + [4.1 Full *(x, y)* coordinates for `secp256k1`](#41-full-x-y-coordinates-for-secp256k1)
-
-## 1. Introduction
-
-The `ellswift` module effectively introduces a new 64-byte public key format, with the property
-that (uniformly random) public keys can be encoded as 64-byte arrays which are computationally
-indistinguishable from uniform byte arrays. The module provides functions to convert public keys
-from and to this format, as well as convenience functions for key generation and ECDH that operate
-directly on ellswift-encoded keys.
-
-The encoding consists of the concatenation of two (32-byte big endian) encoded field elements $u$
-and $t.$ Together they encode an x-coordinate on the curve $x$, or (see further) a full point $(x, y)$ on
-the curve.
-
-**Decoding** consists of decoding the field elements $u$ and $t$ (values above the field size $p$
-are taken modulo $p$), and then evaluating $F_u(t)$, which for every $u$ and $t$ results in a valid
-x-coordinate on the curve. The functions $F_u$ will be defined in [Section 2](#2-the-decoding-function).
-
-**Encoding** a given $x$ coordinate is conceptually done as follows:
-* Loop:
-  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  * Compute the set $L = F_u^{-1}(x)$ of $t$ values for which $F_u(t) = x$, which may have up to *8* elements.
-  * With probability $1 - \dfrac{\\#L}{8}$, restart the loop.
-  * Select a uniformly random $t \in L$ and return $(u, t).$
-
-This is the *ElligatorSwift* algorithm, here given for just x-coordinates. An extension to full
-$(x, y)$ points will be given in [Section 4](#4-encoding-and-decoding-full-x-y-coordinates).
-The algorithm finds a uniformly random $(u, t)$ among (almost all) those
-for which $F_u(t) = x.$ Section 3.2 in the paper proves that the number of such encodings for
-almost all x-coordinates on the curve (all but at most 39) is close to two times the field size
-(specifically, it lies in the range $2q \pm (22\sqrt{q} + O(1))$, where $q$ is the size of the field).
-
-## 2. The decoding function
-
-First some definitions:
-* $\mathbb{F}$ is the finite field of size $q$, of characteristic 5 or more, and $q \equiv 1 \mod 3.$
-  * For `secp256k1`, $q = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977$, which satisfies that requirement.
-* Let $E$ be the elliptic curve of points $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}^2$ for which $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$, with $a$ and $b$
-  public constants, for which $\Delta_E = -16(4a^3 + 27b^2)$ is a square, and at least one of $(-b \pm \sqrt{-3 \Delta_E} / 36)/2$ is a square.
-  This implies that the order of $E$ is either odd, or a multiple of *4*.
-  If $a=0$, this condition is always fulfilled.
-  * For `secp256k1`, $a=0$ and $b=7.$
-* Let the function $g(x) = x^3 + ax + b$, so the $E$ curve equation is also $y^2 = g(x).$
-* Let the function $h(x) = 3x^3 + 4a.$
-* Define $V$ as the set of solutions $(x_1, x_2, x_3, z)$ to $z^2 = g(x_1)g(x_2)g(x_3).$
-* Define $S_u$ as the set of solutions $(X, Y)$ to $X^2 + h(u)Y^2 = -g(u)$ and $Y \neq 0.$
-* $P_u$ is a function from $\mathbb{F}$ to $S_u$ that will be defined below.
-* $\psi_u$ is a function from $S_u$ to $V$ that will be defined below.
-
-**Note**: In the paper:
-* $F_u$ corresponds to $F_{0,u}$ there.
-* $P_u(t)$ is called $P$ there.
-* All $S_u$ sets together correspond to $S$ there.
-* All $\psi_u$ functions together (operating on elements of $S$) correspond to $\psi$ there.
-
-Note that for $V$, the left hand side of the equation $z^2$ is square, and thus the right
-hand must also be square. As multiplying non-squares results in a square in $\mathbb{F}$,
-out of the three right-hand side factors an even number must be non-squares.
-This implies that exactly *1* or exactly *3* out of
-$\\{g(x_1), g(x_2), g(x_3)\\}$ must be square, and thus that for any $(x_1,x_2,x_3,z) \in V$,
-at least one of $\\{x_1, x_2, x_3\\}$ must be a valid x-coordinate on $E.$ There is one exception
-to this, namely when $z=0$, but even then one of the three values is a valid x-coordinate.
-
-**Define** the decoding function $F_u(t)$ as:
-* Let $(x_1, x_2, x_3, z) = \psi_u(P_u(t)).$
-* Return the first element $x$ of $(x_3, x_2, x_1)$ which is a valid x-coordinate on $E$ (i.e., $g(x)$ is square).
-
-$P_u(t) = (X(u, t), Y(u, t))$, where:
-
-$$
-\begin{array}{lcl}
-X(u, t) & = & \left\\{\begin{array}{ll}
-  \dfrac{g(u) - t^2}{2t} & a = 0 \\
-  \dfrac{g(u) + h(u)(Y_0(u) - X_0(u)t)^2}{X_0(u)(1 + h(u)t^2)} & a \neq 0
-\end{array}\right. \\
-Y(u, t) & = & \left\\{\begin{array}{ll}
-  \dfrac{X(u, t) + t}{u \sqrt{-3}} = \dfrac{g(u) + t^2}{2tu\sqrt{-3}} & a = 0 \\
-  Y_0(u) + t(X(u, t) - X_0(u)) & a \neq 0
-\end{array}\right.
-\end{array}
-$$
-
-$P_u(t)$ is defined:
-* For $a=0$, unless:
-  * $u = 0$ or $t = 0$ (division by zero)
-  * $g(u) = -t^2$ (would give $Y=0$).
-* For $a \neq 0$, unless:
-  * $X_0(u) = 0$ or $h(u)t^2 = -1$ (division by zero)
-  * $Y_0(u) (1 - h(u)t^2) = 2X_0(u)t$ (would give $Y=0$).
-
-The functions $X_0(u)$ and $Y_0(u)$ are defined in Appendix A of the paper, and depend on various properties of $E.$
-
-The function $\psi_u$ is the same for all curves: $\psi_u(X, Y) = (x_1, x_2, x_3, z)$, where:
-
-$$
-\begin{array}{lcl}
-  x_1 & = & \dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2} && \\
-  x_2 & = & -\dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2} && \\
-  x_3 & = & u + 4Y^2 && \\
-  z   & = & \dfrac{g(x_3)}{2Y}(u^2 + ux_1 + x_1^2 + a) = \dfrac{-g(u)g(x_3)}{8Y^3}
-\end{array}
-$$
-
-### 2.1 Decoding for `secp256k1`
-
-Put together and specialized for $a=0$ curves, decoding $(u, t)$ to an x-coordinate is:
-
-**Define** $F_u(t)$ as:
-* Let $X = \dfrac{u^3 + b - t^2}{2t}.$
-* Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t}{u\sqrt{-3}}.$
-* Return the first $x$ in $(u + 4Y^2, \dfrac{-X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2}, \dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
-
-To make sure that every input decodes to a valid x-coordinate, we remap the inputs in case
-$P_u$ is not defined (when $u=0$, $t=0$, or $g(u) = -t^2$):
-
-**Define** $F_u(t)$ as:
-* Let $u'=u$ if $u \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise (guaranteeing $u' \neq 0$).
-* Let $t'=t$ if $t \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise (guaranteeing $t' \neq 0$).
-* Let $t''=t'$ if $g(u') \neq -t'^2$; $2t'$ otherwise (guaranteeing $t'' \neq 0$ and $g(u') \neq -t''^2$).
-* Let $X = \dfrac{u'^3 + b - t''^2}{2t''}.$
-* Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t''}{u'\sqrt{-3}}.$
-* Return the first $x$ in $(u' + 4Y^2, \dfrac{-X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u'}{2}, \dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u'}{2})$ for which $x^3 + b$ is square.
-
-The choices here are not strictly necessary. Just returning a fixed constant in any of the undefined cases would suffice,
-but the approach here is simple enough and gives fairly uniform output even in these cases.
-
-**Note**: in the paper these conditions result in $\infty$ as output, due to the use of projective coordinates there.
-We wish to avoid the need for callers to deal with this special case.
-
-This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_xswiftec_frac_var` (which decodes to an x-coordinate represented as a fraction), and
-in `secp256k1_ellswift_xswiftec_var` (which outputs the actual x-coordinate).
-
-## 3. The encoding function
-
-To implement $F_u^{-1}(x)$, the function to find the set of inverses $t$ for which $F_u(t) = x$, we have to reverse the process:
-* Find all the $(X, Y) \in S_u$ that could have given rise to $x$, through the $x_1$, $x_2$, or $x_3$ formulas in $\psi_u.$
-* Map those $(X, Y)$ solutions to $t$ values using $P_u^{-1}(X, Y).$
-* For each of the found $t$ values, verify that $F_u(t) = x.$
-* Return the remaining $t$ values.
-
-The function $P_u^{-1}$, which finds $t$ given $(X, Y) \in S_u$, is significantly simpler than $P_u:$
-
-$$
-P_u^{-1}(X, Y) = \left\\{\begin{array}{ll}
-Yu\sqrt{-3} - X & a = 0 \\
-\dfrac{Y-Y_0(u)}{X-X_0(u)} & a \neq 0 \land X \neq X_0(u) \\
-\dfrac{-X_0(u)}{h(u)Y_0(u)} & a \neq 0 \land X = X_0(u) \land Y = Y_0(u)
-\end{array}\right.
-$$
-
-The third step above, verifying that $F_u(t) = x$, is necessary because for the $(X, Y)$ values found through the $x_1$ and $x_2$ expressions,
-it is possible that decoding through $\psi_u(X, Y)$ yields a valid $x_3$ on the curve, which would take precedence over the
-$x_1$ or $x_2$ decoding. These $(X, Y)$ solutions must be rejected.
-
-Since we know that exactly one or exactly three out of $\\{x_1, x_2, x_3\\}$ are valid x-coordinates for any $t$,
-the case where either $x_1$ or $x_2$ is valid and in addition also $x_3$ is valid must mean that all three are valid.
-This means that instead of checking whether $x_3$ is on the curve, it is also possible to check whether the other one out of
-$x_1$ and $x_2$ is on the curve. This is significantly simpler, as it turns out.
-
-Observe that $\psi_u$ guarantees that $x_1 + x_2 = -u.$ So given either $x = x_1$ or $x = x_2$, the other one of the two can be computed as
-$-u - x.$ Thus, when encoding $x$ through the $x_1$ or $x_2$ expressions, one can simply check whether $g(-u-x)$ is a square,
-and if so, not include the corresponding $t$ values in the returned set. As this does not need $X$, $Y$, or $t$, this condition can be determined
-before those values are computed.
-
-It is not possible that an encoding found through the $x_1$ expression decodes to a different valid x-coordinate using $x_2$ (which would
-take precedence), for the same reason: if both $x_1$ and $x_2$ decodings were valid, $x_3$ would be valid as well, and thus take
-precedence over both. Because of this, the $g(-u-x)$ being square test for $x_1$ and $x_2$ is the only test necessary to guarantee the found $t$
-values round-trip back to the input $x$ correctly. This is the reason for choosing the $(x_3, x_2, x_1)$ precedence order in the decoder;
-any order which does not place $x_3$ first requires more complicated round-trip checks in the encoder.
-
-### 3.1 Switching to *v, w* coordinates
-
-Before working out the formulas for all this, we switch to different variables for $S_u.$ Let $v = (X/Y - u)/2$, and
-$w = 2Y.$ Or in the other direction, $X = w(u/2 + v)$ and $Y = w/2:$
-* $S_u'$ becomes the set of $(v, w)$ for which $w^2 (u^2 + uv + v^2 + a) = -g(u)$ and $w \neq 0.$
-* For $a=0$ curves, $P_u^{-1}$ can be stated for $(v,w)$ as $P_u^{'-1}(v, w) = w\left(\frac{\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v\right).$
-* $\psi_u$ can be stated for $(v, w)$ as $\psi_u'(v, w) = (x_1, x_2, x_3, z)$, where
-
-$$
-\begin{array}{lcl}
-  x_1 & = & v \\
-  x_2 & = & -u - v \\
-  x_3 & = & u + w^2 \\
-  z   & = & \dfrac{g(x_3)}{w}(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a) = \dfrac{-g(u)g(x_3)}{w^3}
-\end{array}
-$$
-
-We can now write the expressions for finding $(v, w)$ given $x$ explicitly, by solving each of the $\\{x_1, x_2, x_3\\}$
-expressions for $v$ or $w$, and using the $S_u'$ equation to find the other variable:
-* Assuming $x = x_1$, we find $v = x$ and $w = \pm\sqrt{-g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)}$ (two solutions).
-* Assuming $x = x_2$, we find $v = -u-x$ and $w = \pm\sqrt{-g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)}$ (two solutions).
-* Assuming $x = x_3$, we find $w = \pm\sqrt{x-u}$ and $v = -u/2 \pm \sqrt{-w^2(4g(u) + w^2h(u))}/(2w^2)$ (four solutions).
-
-### 3.2 Avoiding computing all inverses
-
-The *ElligatorSwift* algorithm as stated in Section 1 requires the computation of $L = F_u^{-1}(x)$ (the
-set of all $t$ such that $(u, t)$ decode to $x$) in full. This is unnecessary.
-
-Observe that the procedure of restarting with probability $(1 - \frac{\\#L}{8})$ and otherwise returning a
-uniformly random element from $L$ is actually equivalent to always padding $L$ with $\bot$ values up to length 8,
-picking a uniformly random element from that, restarting whenever $\bot$ is picked:
-
-**Define** *ElligatorSwift(x)* as:
-* Loop:
-  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  * Compute the set $L = F_u^{-1}(x).$
-  * Let $T$ be the 8-element vector consisting of the elements of $L$, plus $8 - \\#L$ times $\\{\bot\\}.$
-  * Select a uniformly random $t \in T.$
-  * If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
-
-Now notice that the order of elements in $T$ does not matter, as all we do is pick a uniformly
-random element in it, so we do not need to have all $\bot$ values at the end.
-As we have 8 distinct formulas for finding $(v, w)$ (taking the variants due to $\pm$ into account),
-we can associate every index in $T$ with exactly one of those formulas, making sure that:
-* Formulas that yield no solutions (due to division by zero or non-existing square roots) or invalid solutions are made to return $\bot.$
-* For the $x_1$ and $x_2$ cases, if $g(-u-x)$ is a square, $\bot$ is returned instead (the round-trip check).
-* In case multiple formulas would return the same non- $\bot$ result, all but one of those must be turned into $\bot$ to avoid biasing those.
-
-The last condition above only occurs with negligible probability for cryptographically-sized curves, but is interesting
-to take into account as it allows exhaustive testing in small groups. See [Section 3.4](#34-dealing-with-special-cases)
-for an analysis of all the negligible cases.
-
-If we define $T = (G_{0,u}(x), G_{1,u}(x), \ldots, G_{7,u}(x))$, with each $G_{i,u}$ matching one of the formulas,
-the loop can be simplified to only compute one of the inverses instead of all of them:
-
-**Define** *ElligatorSwift(x)* as:
-* Loop:
-  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  * Pick a uniformly random integer $c$ in $[0,8).$
-  * Let $t = G_{c,u}(x).$
-  * If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
-
-This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_xelligatorswift_var`.
-
-### 3.3 Finding the inverse
-
-To implement $G_{c,u}$, we map $c=0$ to the $x_1$ formula, $c=1$ to the $x_2$ formula, and $c=2$ and $c=3$ to the $x_3$ formula.
-Those are then repeated as $c=4$ through $c=7$ for the other sign of $w$ (noting that in each formula, $w$ is a square root of some expression).
-Ignoring the negligible cases, we get:
-
-**Define** $G_{c,u}(x)$ as:
-* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$ (for $x_1$ and $x_2$ formulas):
-  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot$ (as $x_3$ would be valid and take precedence).
-  * If $c \in \\{0, 4\\}$ (the $x_1$ formula) let $v = x$, otherwise let $v = -u-x$ (the $x_2$ formula)
-  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)$ (using $s = w^2$ in what follows).
-* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$ (for $x_3$ formulas):
-  * Let $s = x-u.$
-  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}.$
-  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2$ if $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$; $(-r/s - u)/2$ otherwise.
-* Let $w = \sqrt{s}.$
-* Depending on $c:$
-  * If $c \in \\{0, 1, 2, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
-  * If $c \in \\{4, 5, 6, 7\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
-
-Whenever a square root of a non-square is taken, $\bot$ is returned; for both square roots this happens with roughly
-50% on random inputs. Similarly, when a division by 0 would occur, $\bot$ is returned as well; this will only happen
-with negligible probability. A division by 0 in the first branch in fact cannot occur at all, because $u^2 + uv + v^2 + a = 0$
-implies $g(-u-x) = g(x)$ which would mean the $g(-u-x)$ is square condition has triggered
-and $\bot$ would have been returned already.
-
-**Note**: In the paper, the $case$ variable corresponds roughly to the $c$ above, but only takes on 4 possible values (1 to 4).
-The conditional negation of $w$ at the end is done randomly, which is equivalent, but makes testing harder. We choose to
-have the $G_{c,u}$ be deterministic, and capture all choices in $c.$
-
-Now observe that the $c \in \\{1, 5\\}$ and $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$ conditions effectively perform the same $v \rightarrow -u-v$
-transformation. Furthermore, that transformation has no effect on $s$ in the first branch
-as $u^2 + ux + x^2 + a = u^2 + u(-u-x) + (-u-x)^2 + a.$ Thus we can extract it out and move it down:
-
-**Define** $G_{c,u}(x)$ as:
-* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
-  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
-  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a).$
-  * Let $v = x.$
-* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
-  * Let $s = x-u.$
-  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}.$
-  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-* Let $w = \sqrt{s}.$
-* Depending on $c:$
-  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
-  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w).$
-  * If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
-  * If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, -w).$
-
-This shows there will always be exactly 0, 4, or 8 $t$ values for a given $(u, x)$ input.
-There can be 0, 1, or 2 $(v, w)$ pairs before invoking $P_u^{'-1}$, and each results in 4 distinct $t$ values.
-
-### 3.4 Dealing with special cases
-
-As mentioned before there are a few cases to deal with which only happen in a negligibly small subset of inputs.
-For cryptographically sized fields, if only random inputs are going to be considered, it is unnecessary to deal with these. Still, for completeness
-we analyse them here. They generally fall into two categories: cases in which the encoder would produce $t$ values that
-do not decode back to $x$ (or at least cannot guarantee that they do), and cases in which the encoder might produce the same
-$t$ value for multiple $c$ inputs (thereby biasing that encoding):
-
-* In the branch for $x_1$ and $x_2$ (where $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$):
-  * When $g(u) = 0$, we would have $s=w=Y=0$, which is not on $S_u.$ This is only possible on even-ordered curves.
-    Excluding this also removes the one condition under which the simplified check for $x_3$ on the curve
-    fails (namely when $g(x_1)=g(x_2)=0$ but $g(x_3)$ is not square).
-    This does exclude some valid encodings: when both $g(u)=0$ and $u^2+ux+x^2+a=0$ (also implying $g(x)=0$),
-    the $S_u'$ equation degenerates to $0 = 0$, and many valid $t$ values may exist. Yet, these cannot be targeted uniformly by the
-    encoder anyway as there will generally be more than 8.
-  * When $g(x) = 0$, the same $t$ would be produced as in the $x_3$ branch (where $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$) which we give precedence
-    as it can deal with $g(u)=0$.
-    This is again only possible on even-ordered curves.
-* In the branch for $x_3$ (where $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$):
-  * When $s=0$, a division by zero would occur.
-  * When $v = -u-v$ and $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$, the same $t$ would be returned as in the $c \in \\{2, 6\\}$ cases.
-    It is equivalent to checking whether $r=0$.
-    This cannot occur in the $x_1$ or $x_2$ branches, as it would trigger the $g(-u-x)$ is square condition.
-    A similar concern for $w = -w$ does not exist, as $w=0$ is already impossible in both branches: in the first
-    it requires $g(u)=0$ which is already outlawed on even-ordered curves and impossible on others; in the second it would trigger division by zero.
-* Curve-specific special cases also exist that need to be rejected, because they result in $(u,t)$ which is invalid to the decoder, or because of division by zero in the encoder:
-  * For $a=0$ curves, when $u=0$ or when $t=0$. The latter can only be reached by the encoder when $g(u)=0$, which requires an even-ordered curve.
-  * For $a \neq 0$ curves, when $X_0(u)=0$, when $h(u)t^2 = -1$, or when $w(u + 2v) = 2X_0(u)$ while also either $w \neq 2Y_0(u)$ or $h(u)=0$.
-
-**Define** a version of $G_{c,u}(x)$ which deals with all these cases:
-* If $a=0$ and $u=0$, return $\bot.$
-* If $a \neq 0$ and $X_0(u)=0$, return $\bot.$
-* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
-  * If $g(u) = 0$ or $g(x) = 0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
-  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
-  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a)$ (cannot cause division by zero).
-  * Let $v = x.$
-* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
-  * Let $s = x-u.$
-  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-  * If $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$ and $r=0$, return $\bot.$
-  * If $s = 0$, return $\bot.$
-  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-* Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-* If $a \neq 0$ and $w(u+2v) = 2X_0(u)$ and either $w \neq 2Y_0(u)$ or $h(u) = 0$, return $\bot.$
-* Depending on $c:$
-  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
-  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w).$
-  * If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
-  * If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, -w).$
-* If $a=0$ and $t=0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
-* If $a \neq 0$ and $h(u)t^2 = -1$, return $\bot.$
-* Return $t.$
-
-Given any $u$, using this algorithm over all $x$ and $c$ values, every $t$ value will be reached exactly once,
-for an $x$ for which $F_u(t) = x$ holds, except for these cases that will not be reached:
-* All cases where $P_u(t)$ is not defined:
-  * For $a=0$ curves, when $u=0$, $t=0$, or $g(u) = -t^2.$
-  * For $a \neq 0$ curves, when $h(u)t^2 = -1$, $X_0(u) = 0$, or $Y_0(u) (1 - h(u) t^2) = 2X_0(u)t.$
-* When $g(u)=0$, the potentially many $t$ values that decode to an $x$ satisfying $g(x)=0$ using the $x_2$ formula. These were excluded by the $g(u)=0$ condition in the $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$ branch.
-
-These cases form a negligible subset of all $(u, t)$ for cryptographically sized curves.
-
-### 3.5 Encoding for `secp256k1`
-
-Specialized for odd-ordered $a=0$ curves:
-
-**Define** $G_{c,u}(x)$ as:
-* If $u=0$, return $\bot.$
-* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
-  * If $(-u-x)^3 + b$ is square, return $\bot$
-  * Let $s = -(u^3 + b)/(u^2 + ux + x^2)$ (cannot cause division by 0).
-  * Let $v = x.$
-* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
-  * Let $s = x-u.$
-  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4(u^3 + b) + 3su^2)}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-  * If $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$ and $r=0$, return $\bot.$
-  * If $s = 0$, return $\bot.$
-  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-* Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-* Depending on $c:$
-  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $w(\frac{\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v).$
-  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $w(\frac{\sqrt{-3}+1}{2}u + v).$
-  * If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}:$ return $w(\frac{-\sqrt{-3}+1}{2}u + v).$
-  * If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}:$ return $w(\frac{-\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v).$
-
-This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_xswiftec_inv_var`.
-
-And the x-only ElligatorSwift encoding algorithm is still:
-
-**Define** *ElligatorSwift(x)* as:
-* Loop:
-  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  * Pick a uniformly random integer $c$ in $[0,8).$
-  * Let $t = G_{c,u}(x).$
-  * If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
-
-Note that this logic does not take the remapped $u=0$, $t=0$, and $g(u) = -t^2$ cases into account; it just avoids them.
-While it is not impossible to make the encoder target them, this would increase the maximum number of $t$ values for a given $(u, x)$
-combination beyond 8, and thereby slow down the ElligatorSwift loop proportionally, for a negligible gain in uniformity.
-
-## 4. Encoding and decoding full *(x, y)* coordinates
-
-So far we have only addressed encoding and decoding x-coordinates, but in some cases an encoding
-for full points with $(x, y)$ coordinates is desirable. It is possible to encode this information
-in $t$ as well.
-
-Note that for any $(X, Y) \in S_u$, $(\pm X, \pm Y)$ are all on $S_u.$ Moreover, all of these are
-mapped to the same x-coordinate. Negating $X$ or negating $Y$ just results in $x_1$ and $x_2$
-being swapped, and does not affect $x_3.$ This will not change the outcome x-coordinate as the order
-of $x_1$ and $x_2$ only matters if both were to be valid, and in that case $x_3$ would be used instead.
-
-Still, these four $(X, Y)$ combinations all correspond to distinct $t$ values, so we can encode
-the sign of the y-coordinate in the sign of $X$ or the sign of $Y.$ They correspond to the
-four distinct $P_u^{'-1}$ calls in the definition of $G_{u,c}.$
-
-**Note**: In the paper, the sign of the y coordinate is encoded in a separately-coded bit.
-
-To encode the sign of $y$ in the sign of $Y:$
-
-**Define** *Decode(u, t)* for full $(x, y)$ as:
-* Let $(X, Y) = P_u(t).$
-* Let $x$ be the first value in $(u + 4Y^2, \frac{-X}{2Y} - \frac{u}{2}, \frac{X}{2Y} - \frac{u}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
-* Let $y = \sqrt{g(x)}.$
-* If $sign(y) = sign(Y)$, return $(x, y)$; otherwise return $(x, -y).$
-
-And encoding would be done using a $G_{c,u}(x, y)$ function defined as:
-
-**Define** $G_{c,u}(x, y)$ as:
-* If $c \in \\{0, 1\\}:$
-  * If $g(u) = 0$ or $g(x) = 0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
-  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
-  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a)$ (cannot cause division by zero).
-  * Let $v = x.$
-* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3\\}:$
-  * Let $s = x-u.$
-  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-  * If $c = 3$ and $r = 0$, return $\bot.$
-  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-* Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-* Let $w' = w$ if $sign(w/2) = sign(y)$; $-w$ otherwise.
-* Depending on $c:$
-  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w').$
-  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w').$
-
-Note that $c$ now only ranges $[0,4)$, as the sign of $w'$ is decided based on that of $y$, rather than on $c.$
-This change makes some valid encodings unreachable: when $y = 0$ and $sign(Y) \neq sign(0)$.
-
-In the above logic, $sign$ can be implemented in several ways, such as parity of the integer representation
-of the input field element (for prime-sized fields) or the quadratic residuosity (for fields where
-$-1$ is not square). The choice does not matter, as long as it only takes on two possible values, and for $x \neq 0$ it holds that $sign(x) \neq sign(-x)$.
-
-### 4.1 Full *(x, y)* coordinates for `secp256k1`
-
-For $a=0$ curves, there is another option. Note that for those,
-the $P_u(t)$ function translates negations of $t$ to negations of (both) $X$ and $Y.$ Thus, we can use $sign(t)$ to
-encode the y-coordinate directly. Combined with the earlier remapping to guarantee all inputs land on the curve, we get
-as decoder:
-
-**Define** *Decode(u, t)* as:
-* Let $u'=u$ if $u \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise.
-* Let $t'=t$ if $t \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise.
-* Let $t''=t'$ if $u'^3 + b + t'^2 \neq 0$; $2t'$ otherwise.
-* Let $X = \dfrac{u'^3 + b - t''^2}{2t''}.$
-* Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t''}{u'\sqrt{-3}}.$
-* Let $x$ be the first element of $(u' + 4Y^2, \frac{-X}{2Y} - \frac{u'}{2}, \frac{X}{2Y} - \frac{u'}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
-* Let $y = \sqrt{g(x)}.$
-* Return $(x, y)$ if $sign(y) = sign(t)$; $(x, -y)$ otherwise.
-
-This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_swiftec_var`. The used $sign(x)$ function is the parity of $x$ when represented as in integer in $[0,q).$
-
-The corresponding encoder would invoke the x-only one, but negating the output $t$ if $sign(t) \neq sign(y).$
-
-This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_elligatorswift_var`.
-
-Note that this is only intended for encoding points where both the x-coordinate and y-coordinate are unpredictable. When encoding x-only points
-where the y-coordinate is implicitly even (or implicitly square, or implicitly in $[0,q/2]$), the encoder in
-[Section 3.5](#35-encoding-for-secp256k1) must be used, or a bias is reintroduced that undoes all the benefit of using ElligatorSwift
-in the first place.

external/secp256k1/doc/musig.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-Notes on the musig module API
-===========================
-
-The following sections contain additional notes on the API of the musig module (`include/secp256k1_musig.h`).
-A usage example can be found in `examples/musig.c`.
-
-## API misuse
-
-The musig API is designed with a focus on misuse resistance.
-However, due to the interactive nature of the MuSig protocol, there are additional failure modes that are not present in regular (single-party) Schnorr signature creation.
-While the results can be catastrophic (e.g. leaking of the secret key), it is unfortunately not possible for the musig implementation to prevent all such failure modes.
-
-Therefore, users of the musig module must take great care to make sure of the following:
-
-1. A unique nonce per signing session is generated in `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen`.
-   See the corresponding comment in `include/secp256k1_musig.h` for how to ensure that.
-2. The `secp256k1_musig_secnonce` structure is never copied or serialized.
-   See also the comment on `secp256k1_musig_secnonce` in `include/secp256k1_musig.h`.
-3. Opaque data structures are never written to or read from directly.
-   Instead, only the provided accessor functions are used.
-
-## Key Aggregation and (Taproot) Tweaking
-
-Given a set of public keys, the aggregate public key is computed with `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg`.
-A plain tweak can be added to the resulting public key with `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add` by setting the `tweak32` argument to the hash defined in BIP 32. Similarly, a Taproot tweak can be added with `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add` by setting the `tweak32` argument to the TapTweak hash defined in BIP 341.
-Both types of tweaking can be combined and invoked multiple times if the specific application requires it.
-
-## Signing
-
-This is covered by `examples/musig.c`.
-Essentially, the protocol proceeds in the following steps:
-
-1. Generate a keypair with `secp256k1_keypair_create` and obtain the public key with `secp256k1_keypair_pub`.
-2. Call `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg` with the pubkeys of all participants.
-3. Optionally add a (Taproot) tweak with `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_xonly_tweak_add` and a plain tweak with `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_ec_tweak_add`.
-4. Generate a pair of secret and public nonce with `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen` and send the public nonce to the other signers.
-5. Someone (not necessarily the signer) aggregates the public nonces with `secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg` and sends it to the signers.
-6. Process the aggregate nonce with `secp256k1_musig_nonce_process`.
-7. Create a partial signature with `secp256k1_musig_partial_sign`.
-8. Verify the partial signatures (optional in some scenarios) with `secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_verify`.
-9. Someone (not necessarily the signer) obtains all partial signatures and aggregates them into the final Schnorr signature using `secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_agg`.
-
-The aggregate signature can be verified with `secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify`.
-
-Steps 1 through 5 above can occur before or after the signers are aware of the message to be signed.
-Whenever possible, it is recommended to generate the nonces only after the message is known.
-This provides enhanced defense-in-depth measures, protecting against potential API misuse in certain scenarios.
-However, it does require two rounds of communication during the signing process.
-The alternative, generating the nonces in a pre-processing step before the message is known, eliminates these additional protective measures but allows for non-interactive signing.
-Similarly, the API supports an alternative protocol flow where generating the aggregate key (steps 1 to 3) is allowed to happen after exchanging nonces (steps 4 to 5).
-
-## Verification
-
-A participant who wants to verify the partial signatures, but does not sign itself may do so using the above instructions except that the verifier skips steps 1, 4 and 7.

external/secp256k1/doc/release-process.md

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-# Release process
-
-This document outlines the process for releasing versions of the form `$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH`.
-
-We distinguish between two types of releases: *regular* and *maintenance* releases.
-Regular releases are releases of a new major or minor version as well as patches of the most recent release.
-Maintenance releases, on the other hand, are required for patches of older releases.
-
-You should coordinate with the other maintainers on the release date, if possible.
-This date will be part of the release entry in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md) and it should match the dates of the remaining steps in the release process (including the date of the tag and the GitHub release).
-It is best if the maintainers are present during the release, so they can help ensure that the process is followed correctly and, in the case of a regular release, they are aware that they should not modify the master branch between merging the PR in step 1 and the PR in step 3.
-
-This process also assumes that there will be no minor releases for old major releases.
-
-We aim to cut a regular release every 3-4 months, approximately twice as frequent as major Bitcoin Core releases. Every second release should be published one month before the feature freeze of the next major Bitcoin Core release, allowing sufficient time to update the library in Core.
-
-## Sanity checks
-Perform these checks when reviewing the release PR (see below):
-
-1. Ensure `make distcheck` doesn't fail.
-   ```shell
-   ./autogen.sh && ./configure --enable-dev-mode && make distcheck
-   ```
-2. Check installation with autotools:
-   ```shell
-   dir=$(mktemp -d)
-   ./autogen.sh && ./configure --prefix=$dir && make clean && make install && ls -RlAh $dir
-   gcc -o ecdsa examples/ecdsa.c $(PKG_CONFIG_PATH=$dir/lib/pkgconfig pkg-config --cflags --libs libsecp256k1) -Wl,-rpath,"$dir/lib" && ./ecdsa
-   ```
-3. Check installation with CMake:
-   ```shell
-   dir=$(mktemp -d)
-   build=$(mktemp -d)
-   cmake -B $build -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=$dir && cmake --build $build && cmake --install $build && ls -RlAh $dir
-   gcc -o ecdsa examples/ecdsa.c -I $dir/include -L $dir/lib*/ -l secp256k1 -Wl,-rpath,"$dir/lib",-rpath,"$dir/lib64" && ./ecdsa
-   ```
-4. Use the [`check-abi.sh`](/tools/check-abi.sh) tool to verify that there are no unexpected ABI incompatibilities and that the version number and the release notes accurately reflect all potential ABI changes. To run this tool, the `abi-dumper` and `abi-compliance-checker` packages are required.
-   ```shell
-   tools/check-abi.sh
-   ```
-
-## Regular release
-
-1. Open a PR to the master branch with a commit (using message `"release: prepare for $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example) that
-   * finalizes the release notes in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md) by
-       * adding a section for the release (make sure that the version number is a link to a diff between the previous and new version),
-       * removing the `[Unreleased]` section header,
-       * ensuring that the release notes are not missing entries (check the `needs-changelog` label on github), and
-       * including an entry for `### ABI Compatibility` if it doesn't exist,
-   * sets `_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE` to `true` in `configure.ac`, and,
-   * if this is not a patch release,
-       * updates `_PKG_VERSION_*` and `_LIB_VERSION_*`  in `configure.ac`, and
-       * updates `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_*` in `CMakeLists.txt`.
-2. Perform the [sanity checks](#sanity-checks) on the PR branch.
-3. After the PR is merged, tag the commit, and push the tag:
-   ```
-   RELEASE_COMMIT=<merge commit of step 1>
-   git tag -s v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH -m "libsecp256k1 $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH" $RELEASE_COMMIT
-   git push git@github.com:bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH
-   ```
-4. Open a PR to the master branch with a commit (using message `"release cleanup: bump version after $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example) that
-   * sets `_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE` to `false` and increments `_PKG_VERSION_PATCH` and `_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `configure.ac`,
-   * increments the `$PATCH` component of `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `CMakeLists.txt`, and
-   * adds an `[Unreleased]` section header to the [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
-
-   If other maintainers are not present to approve the PR, it can be merged without ACKs.
-5. Create a new GitHub release with a link to the corresponding entry in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
-6. Send an announcement email to the bitcoin-dev mailing list.
-
-## Maintenance release
-
-Note that bug fixes need to be backported only to releases for which no compatible release without the bug exists.
-
-1. If there's no maintenance branch `$MAJOR.$MINOR`, create one:
-   ```
-   git checkout -b $MAJOR.$MINOR v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$((PATCH - 1))
-   git push git@github.com:bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git $MAJOR.$MINOR
-   ```
-2. Open a pull request to the `$MAJOR.$MINOR` branch that
-   * includes the bug fixes,
-   * finalizes the release notes similar to a regular release,
-   * increments `_PKG_VERSION_PATCH` and `_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `configure.ac`
-     and the `$PATCH` component of `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `CMakeLists.txt`
-     (with commit message `"release: bump versions for $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example).
-3. Perform the [sanity checks](#sanity-checks) on the PR branch.
-4. After the PRs are merged, update the release branch, tag the commit, and push the tag:
-   ```
-   git checkout $MAJOR.$MINOR && git pull
-   git tag -s v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH -m "libsecp256k1 $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"
-   git push git@github.com:bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH
-   ```
-6. Create a new GitHub release with a link to the corresponding entry in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
-7. Send an announcement email to the bitcoin-dev mailing list.
-8. Open PR to the master branch that includes a commit (with commit message `"release notes: add $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example) that adds release notes to [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).

external/secp256k1/doc/safegcd_implementation.md

@@ -1,819 +0,0 @@
-# The safegcd implementation in libsecp256k1 explained
-
-This document explains the modular inverse and Jacobi symbol implementations in the `src/modinv*.h` files.
-It is based on the paper
-["Fast constant-time gcd computation and modular inversion"](https://gcd.cr.yp.to/papers.html#safegcd)
-by Daniel J. Bernstein and Bo-Yin Yang. The references below are for the Date: 2019.04.13 version.
-
-The actual implementation is in C of course, but for demonstration purposes Python3 is used here.
-Most implementation aspects and optimizations are explained, except those that depend on the specific
-number representation used in the C code.
-
-## 1. Computing the Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) using divsteps
-
-The algorithm from the paper (section 11), at a very high level, is this:
-
-```python
-def gcd(f, g):
-    """Compute the GCD of an odd integer f and another integer g."""
-    assert f & 1  # require f to be odd
-    delta = 1     # additional state variable
-    while g != 0:
-        assert f & 1  # f will be odd in every iteration
-        if delta > 0 and g & 1:
-            delta, f, g = 1 - delta, g, (g - f) // 2
-        elif g & 1:
-            delta, f, g = 1 + delta, f, (g + f) // 2
-        else:
-            delta, f, g = 1 + delta, f, (g    ) // 2
-    return abs(f)
-```
-
-It computes the greatest common divisor of an odd integer *f* and any integer *g*. Its inner loop
-keeps rewriting the variables *f* and *g* alongside a state variable *δ* that starts at *1*, until
-*g=0* is reached. At that point, *|f|* gives the GCD. Each of the transitions in the loop is called a
-"division step" (referred to as divstep in what follows).
-
-For example, *gcd(21, 14)* would be computed as:
-- Start with *δ=1 f=21 g=14*
-- Take the third branch: *δ=2 f=21 g=7*
-- Take the first branch: *δ=-1 f=7 g=-7*
-- Take the second branch: *δ=0 f=7 g=0*
-- The answer *|f| = 7*.
-
-Why it works:
-- Divsteps can be decomposed into two steps (see paragraph 8.2 in the paper):
-  - (a) If *g* is odd, replace *(f,g)* with *(g,g-f)* or (f,g+f), resulting in an even *g*.
-  - (b) Replace *(f,g)* with *(f,g/2)* (where *g* is guaranteed to be even).
-- Neither of those two operations change the GCD:
-  - For (a), assume *gcd(f,g)=c*, then it must be the case that *f=a c* and *g=b c* for some integers *a*
-    and *b*. As *(g,g-f)=(b c,(b-a)c)* and *(f,f+g)=(a c,(a+b)c)*, the result clearly still has
-    common factor *c*. Reasoning in the other direction shows that no common factor can be added by
-    doing so either.
-  - For (b), we know that *f* is odd, so *gcd(f,g)* clearly has no factor *2*, and we can remove
-    it from *g*.
-- The algorithm will eventually converge to *g=0*. This is proven in the paper (see theorem G.3).
-- It follows that eventually we find a final value *f'* for which *gcd(f,g) = gcd(f',0)*. As the
-  gcd of *f'* and *0* is *|f'|* by definition, that is our answer.
-
-Compared to more [traditional GCD algorithms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclidean_algorithm), this one has the property of only ever looking at
-the low-order bits of the variables to decide the next steps, and being easy to make
-constant-time (in more low-level languages than Python). The *δ* parameter is necessary to
-guide the algorithm towards shrinking the numbers' magnitudes without explicitly needing to look
-at high order bits.
-
-Properties that will become important later:
-- Performing more divsteps than needed is not a problem, as *f* does not change anymore after *g=0*.
-- Only even numbers are divided by *2*. This means that when reasoning about it algebraically we
-  do not need to worry about rounding.
-- At every point during the algorithm's execution the next *N* steps only depend on the bottom *N*
-  bits of *f* and *g*, and on *δ*.
-
-
-## 2. From GCDs to modular inverses
-
-We want an algorithm to compute the inverse *a* of *x* modulo *M*, i.e. the number a such that *a x=1
-mod M*. This inverse only exists if the GCD of *x* and *M* is *1*, but that is always the case if *M* is
-prime and *0 < x < M*. In what follows, assume that the modular inverse exists.
-It turns out this inverse can be computed as a side effect of computing the GCD by keeping track
-of how the internal variables can be written as linear combinations of the inputs at every step
-(see the [extended Euclidean algorithm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm)).
-Since the GCD is *1*, such an algorithm will compute numbers *a* and *b* such that a&thinsp;x + b&thinsp;M = 1*.
-Taking that expression *mod M* gives *a&thinsp;x mod M = 1*, and we see that *a* is the modular inverse of *x
-mod M*.
-
-A similar approach can be used to calculate modular inverses using the divsteps-based GCD
-algorithm shown above, if the modulus *M* is odd. To do so, compute *gcd(f=M,g=x)*, while keeping
-track of extra variables *d* and *e*, for which at every step *d = f/x (mod M)* and *e = g/x (mod M)*.
-*f/x* here means the number which multiplied with *x* gives *f mod M*. As *f* and *g* are initialized to *M*
-and *x* respectively, *d* and *e* just start off being *0* (*M/x mod M = 0/x mod M = 0*) and *1* (*x/x mod M
-= 1*).
-
-```python
-def div2(M, x):
-    """Helper routine to compute x/2 mod M (where M is odd)."""
-    assert M & 1
-    if x & 1: # If x is odd, make it even by adding M.
-        x += M
-    # x must be even now, so a clean division by 2 is possible.
-    return x // 2
-
-def modinv(M, x):
-    """Compute the inverse of x mod M (given that it exists, and M is odd)."""
-    assert M & 1
-    delta, f, g, d, e = 1, M, x, 0, 1
-    while g != 0:
-        # Note that while division by two for f and g is only ever done on even inputs, this is
-        # not true for d and e, so we need the div2 helper function.
-        if delta > 0 and g & 1:
-            delta, f, g, d, e = 1 - delta, g, (g - f) // 2, e, div2(M, e - d)
-        elif g & 1:
-            delta, f, g, d, e = 1 + delta, f, (g + f) // 2, d, div2(M, e + d)
-        else:
-            delta, f, g, d, e = 1 + delta, f, (g    ) // 2, d, div2(M, e    )
-        # Verify that the invariants d=f/x mod M, e=g/x mod M are maintained.
-        assert f % M == (d * x) % M
-        assert g % M == (e * x) % M
-    assert f == 1 or f == -1  # |f| is the GCD, it must be 1
-    # Because of invariant d = f/x (mod M), 1/x = d/f (mod M). As |f|=1, d/f = d*f.
-    return (d * f) % M
-```
-
-Also note that this approach to track *d* and *e* throughout the computation to determine the inverse
-is different from the paper. There (see paragraph 12.1 in the paper) a transition matrix for the
-entire computation is determined (see section 3 below) and the inverse is computed from that.
-The approach here avoids the need for 2x2 matrix multiplications of various sizes, and appears to
-be faster at the level of optimization we're able to do in C.
-
-
-## 3. Batching multiple divsteps
-
-Every divstep can be expressed as a matrix multiplication, applying a transition matrix *(1/2 t)*
-to both vectors *[f, g]* and *[d, e]* (see paragraph 8.1 in the paper):
-
-```
-  t = [ u,  v ]
-      [ q,  r ]
-
-  [ out_f ] = (1/2 * t) * [ in_f ]
-  [ out_g ] =             [ in_g ]
-
-  [ out_d ] = (1/2 * t) * [ in_d ]  (mod M)
-  [ out_e ]               [ in_e ]
-```
-
-where *(u, v, q, r)* is *(0, 2, -1, 1)*, *(2, 0, 1, 1)*, or *(2, 0, 0, 1)*, depending on which branch is
-taken. As above, the resulting *f* and *g* are always integers.
-
-Performing multiple divsteps corresponds to a multiplication with the product of all the
-individual divsteps' transition matrices. As each transition matrix consists of integers
-divided by *2*, the product of these matrices will consist of integers divided by *2<sup>N</sup>* (see also
-theorem 9.2 in the paper). These divisions are expensive when updating *d* and *e*, so we delay
-them: we compute the integer coefficients of the combined transition matrix scaled by *2<sup>N</sup>*, and
-do one division by *2<sup>N</sup>* as a final step:
-
-```python
-def divsteps_n_matrix(delta, f, g):
-    """Compute delta and transition matrix t after N divsteps (multiplied by 2^N)."""
-    u, v, q, r = 1, 0, 0, 1 # start with identity matrix
-    for _ in range(N):
-        if delta > 0 and g & 1:
-            delta, f, g, u, v, q, r = 1 - delta, g, (g - f) // 2, 2*q, 2*r, q-u, r-v
-        elif g & 1:
-            delta, f, g, u, v, q, r = 1 + delta, f, (g + f) // 2, 2*u, 2*v, q+u, r+v
-        else:
-            delta, f, g, u, v, q, r = 1 + delta, f, (g    ) // 2, 2*u, 2*v, q  , r
-    return delta, (u, v, q, r)
-```
-
-As the branches in the divsteps are completely determined by the bottom *N* bits of *f* and *g*, this
-function to compute the transition matrix only needs to see those bottom bits. Furthermore all
-intermediate results and outputs fit in *(N+1)*-bit numbers (unsigned for *f* and *g*; signed for *u*, *v*,
-*q*, and *r*) (see also paragraph 8.3 in the paper). This means that an implementation using 64-bit
-integers could set *N=62* and compute the full transition matrix for 62 steps at once without any
-big integer arithmetic at all. This is the reason why this algorithm is efficient: it only needs
-to update the full-size *f*, *g*, *d*, and *e* numbers once every *N* steps.
-
-We still need functions to compute:
-
-```
-  [ out_f ] = (1/2^N * [ u,  v ]) * [ in_f ]
-  [ out_g ]   (        [ q,  r ])   [ in_g ]
-
-  [ out_d ] = (1/2^N * [ u,  v ]) * [ in_d ]  (mod M)
-  [ out_e ]   (        [ q,  r ])   [ in_e ]
-```
-
-Because the divsteps transformation only ever divides even numbers by two, the result of *t&thinsp;[f,g]* is always even. When *t* is a composition of *N* divsteps, it follows that the resulting *f*
-and *g* will be multiple of *2<sup>N</sup>*, and division by *2<sup>N</sup>* is simply shifting them down:
-
-```python
-def update_fg(f, g, t):
-    """Multiply matrix t/2^N with [f, g]."""
-    u, v, q, r = t
-    cf, cg = u*f + v*g, q*f + r*g
-    # (t / 2^N) should cleanly apply to [f,g] so the result of t*[f,g] should have N zero
-    # bottom bits.
-    assert cf % 2**N == 0
-    assert cg % 2**N == 0
-    return cf >> N, cg >> N
-```
-
-The same is not true for *d* and *e*, and we need an equivalent of the `div2` function for division by *2<sup>N</sup> mod M*.
-This is easy if we have precomputed *1/M mod 2<sup>N</sup>* (which always exists for odd *M*):
-
-```python
-def div2n(M, Mi, x):
-    """Compute x/2^N mod M, given Mi = 1/M mod 2^N."""
-    assert (M * Mi) % 2**N == 1
-    # Find a factor m such that m*M has the same bottom N bits as x. We want:
-    #     (m * M) mod 2^N = x mod 2^N
-    # <=> m mod 2^N = (x / M) mod 2^N
-    # <=> m mod 2^N = (x * Mi) mod 2^N
-    m = (Mi * x) % 2**N
-    # Subtract that multiple from x, cancelling its bottom N bits.
-    x -= m * M
-    # Now a clean division by 2^N is possible.
-    assert x % 2**N == 0
-    return (x >> N) % M
-
-def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
-    """Multiply matrix t/2^N with [d, e], modulo M."""
-    u, v, q, r = t
-    cd, ce = u*d + v*e, q*d + r*e
-    return div2n(M, Mi, cd), div2n(M, Mi, ce)
-```
-
-With all of those, we can write a version of `modinv` that performs *N* divsteps at once:
-
-```python3
-def modinv(M, Mi, x):
-    """Compute the modular inverse of x mod M, given Mi=1/M mod 2^N."""
-    assert M & 1
-    delta, f, g, d, e = 1, M, x, 0, 1
-    while g != 0:
-        # Compute the delta and transition matrix t for the next N divsteps (this only needs
-        # (N+1)-bit signed integer arithmetic).
-        delta, t = divsteps_n_matrix(delta, f % 2**N, g % 2**N)
-        # Apply the transition matrix t to [f, g]:
-        f, g = update_fg(f, g, t)
-        # Apply the transition matrix t to [d, e]:
-        d, e = update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi)
-    return (d * f) % M
-```
-
-This means that in practice we'll always perform a multiple of *N* divsteps. This is not a problem
-because once *g=0*, further divsteps do not affect *f*, *g*, *d*, or *e* anymore (only *&delta;* keeps
-increasing). For variable time code such excess iterations will be mostly optimized away in later
-sections.
-
-
-## 4. Avoiding modulus operations
-
-So far, there are two places where we compute a remainder of big numbers modulo *M*: at the end of
-`div2n` in every `update_de`, and at the very end of `modinv` after potentially negating *d* due to the
-sign of *f*. These are relatively expensive operations when done generically.
-
-To deal with the modulus operation in `div2n`, we simply stop requiring *d* and *e* to be in range
-*[0,M)* all the time. Let's start by inlining `div2n` into `update_de`, and dropping the modulus
-operation at the end:
-
-```python
-def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
-    """Multiply matrix t/2^N with [d, e] mod M, given Mi=1/M mod 2^N."""
-    u, v, q, r = t
-    cd, ce = u*d + v*e, q*d + r*e
-    # Cancel out bottom N bits of cd and ce.
-    md = -((Mi * cd) % 2**N)
-    me = -((Mi * ce) % 2**N)
-    cd += md * M
-    ce += me * M
-    # And cleanly divide by 2**N.
-    return cd >> N, ce >> N
-```
-
-Let's look at bounds on the ranges of these numbers. It can be shown that *|u|+|v|* and *|q|+|r|*
-never exceed *2<sup>N</sup>* (see paragraph 8.3 in the paper), and thus a multiplication with *t* will have
-outputs whose absolute values are at most *2<sup>N</sup>* times the maximum absolute input value. In case the
-inputs *d* and *e* are in *(-M,M)*, which is certainly true for the initial values *d=0* and *e=1* assuming
-*M > 1*, the multiplication results in numbers in range *(-2<sup>N</sup>M,2<sup>N</sup>M)*. Subtracting less than *2<sup>N</sup>*
-times *M* to cancel out *N* bits brings that up to *(-2<sup>N+1</sup>M,2<sup>N</sup>M)*, and
-dividing by *2<sup>N</sup>* at the end takes it to *(-2M,M)*. Another application of `update_de` would take that
-to *(-3M,2M)*, and so forth. This progressive expansion of the variables' ranges can be
-counteracted by incrementing *d* and *e* by *M* whenever they're negative:
-
-```python
-    ...
-    if d < 0:
-        d += M
-    if e < 0:
-        e += M
-    cd, ce = u*d + v*e, q*d + r*e
-    # Cancel out bottom N bits of cd and ce.
-    ...
-```
-
-With inputs in *(-2M,M)*, they will first be shifted into range *(-M,M)*, which means that the
-output will again be in *(-2M,M)*, and this remains the case regardless of how many `update_de`
-invocations there are. In what follows, we will try to make this more efficient.
-
-Note that increasing *d* by *M* is equal to incrementing *cd* by *u&thinsp;M* and *ce* by *q&thinsp;M*. Similarly,
-increasing *e* by *M* is equal to incrementing *cd* by *v&thinsp;M* and *ce* by *r&thinsp;M*. So we could instead write:
-
-```python
-    ...
-    cd, ce = u*d + v*e, q*d + r*e
-    # Perform the equivalent of incrementing d, e by M when they're negative.
-    if d < 0:
-        cd += u*M
-        ce += q*M
-    if e < 0:
-        cd += v*M
-        ce += r*M
-    # Cancel out bottom N bits of cd and ce.
-    md = -((Mi * cd) % 2**N)
-    me = -((Mi * ce) % 2**N)
-    cd += md * M
-    ce += me * M
-    ...
-```
-
-Now note that we have two steps of corrections to *cd* and *ce* that add multiples of *M*: this
-increment, and the decrement that cancels out bottom bits. The second one depends on the first
-one, but they can still be efficiently combined by only computing the bottom bits of *cd* and *ce*
-at first, and using that to compute the final *md*, *me* values:
-
-```python
-def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
-    """Multiply matrix t/2^N with [d, e], modulo M."""
-    u, v, q, r = t
-    md, me = 0, 0
-    # Compute what multiples of M to add to cd and ce.
-    if d < 0:
-        md += u
-        me += q
-    if e < 0:
-        md += v
-        me += r
-    # Compute bottom N bits of t*[d,e] + M*[md,me].
-    cd, ce = (u*d + v*e + md*M) % 2**N, (q*d + r*e + me*M) % 2**N
-    # Correct md and me such that the bottom N bits of t*[d,e] + M*[md,me] are zero.
-    md -= (Mi * cd) % 2**N
-    me -= (Mi * ce) % 2**N
-    # Do the full computation.
-    cd, ce = u*d + v*e + md*M, q*d + r*e + me*M
-    # And cleanly divide by 2**N.
-    return cd >> N, ce >> N
-```
-
-One last optimization: we can avoid the *md&thinsp;M* and *me&thinsp;M* multiplications in the bottom bits of *cd*
-and *ce* by moving them to the *md* and *me* correction:
-
-```python
-    ...
-    # Compute bottom N bits of t*[d,e].
-    cd, ce = (u*d + v*e) % 2**N, (q*d + r*e) % 2**N
-    # Correct md and me such that the bottom N bits of t*[d,e]+M*[md,me] are zero.
-    # Note that this is not the same as {md = (-Mi * cd) % 2**N} etc. That would also result in N
-    # zero bottom bits, but isn't guaranteed to be a reduction of [0,2^N) compared to the
-    # previous md and me values, and thus would violate our bounds analysis.
-    md -= (Mi*cd + md) % 2**N
-    me -= (Mi*ce + me) % 2**N
-    ...
-```
-
-The resulting function takes *d* and *e* in range *(-2M,M)* as inputs, and outputs values in the same
-range. That also means that the *d* value at the end of `modinv` will be in that range, while we want
-a result in *[0,M)*. To do that, we need a normalization function. It's easy to integrate the
-conditional negation of *d* (based on the sign of *f*) into it as well:
-
-```python
-def normalize(sign, v, M):
-    """Compute sign*v mod M, where v is in range (-2*M,M); output in [0,M)."""
-    assert sign == 1 or sign == -1
-    # v in (-2*M,M)
-    if v < 0:
-        v += M
-    # v in (-M,M). Now multiply v with sign (which can only be 1 or -1).
-    if sign == -1:
-        v = -v
-    # v in (-M,M)
-    if v < 0:
-        v += M
-    # v in [0,M)
-    return v
-```
-
-And calling it in `modinv` is simply:
-
-```python
-   ...
-   return normalize(f, d, M)
-```
-
-
-## 5. Constant-time operation
-
-The primary selling point of the algorithm is fast constant-time operation. What code flow still
-depends on the input data so far?
-
-- the number of iterations of the while *g &ne; 0* loop in `modinv`
-- the branches inside `divsteps_n_matrix`
-- the sign checks in `update_de`
-- the sign checks in `normalize`
-
-To make the while loop in `modinv` constant time it can be replaced with a constant number of
-iterations. The paper proves (Theorem 11.2) that *741* divsteps are sufficient for any *256*-bit
-inputs, and [safegcd-bounds](https://github.com/sipa/safegcd-bounds) shows that the slightly better bound *724* is
-sufficient even. Given that every loop iteration performs *N* divsteps, it will run a total of
-*&lceil;724/N&rceil;* times.
-
-To deal with the branches in `divsteps_n_matrix` we will replace them with constant-time bitwise
-operations (and hope the C compiler isn't smart enough to turn them back into branches; see
-`ctime_tests.c` for automated tests that this isn't the case). To do so, observe that a
-divstep can be written instead as (compare to the inner loop of `gcd` in section 1).
-
-```python
-    x = -f if delta > 0 else f         # set x equal to (input) -f or f
-    if g & 1:
-        g += x                         # set g to (input) g-f or g+f
-        if delta > 0:
-            delta = -delta
-            f += g                     # set f to (input) g (note that g was set to g-f before)
-    delta += 1
-    g >>= 1
-```
-
-To convert the above to bitwise operations, we rely on a trick to negate conditionally: per the
-definition of negative numbers in two's complement, (*-v == ~v + 1*) holds for every number *v*. As
-*-1* in two's complement is all *1* bits, bitflipping can be expressed as xor with *-1*. It follows
-that *-v == (v ^ -1) - (-1)*. Thus, if we have a variable *c* that takes on values *0* or *-1*, then
-*(v ^ c) - c* is *v* if *c=0* and *-v* if *c=-1*.
-
-Using this we can write:
-
-```python
-    x = -f if delta > 0 else f
-```
-
-in constant-time form as:
-
-```python
-    c1 = (-delta) >> 63
-    # Conditionally negate f based on c1:
-    x = (f ^ c1) - c1
-```
-
-To use that trick, we need a helper mask variable *c1* that resolves the condition *&delta;>0* to *-1*
-(if true) or *0* (if false). We compute *c1* using right shifting, which is equivalent to dividing by
-the specified power of *2* and rounding down (in Python, and also in C under the assumption of a typical two's complement system; see
-`assumptions.h` for tests that this is the case). Right shifting by *63* thus maps all
-numbers in range *[-2<sup>63</sup>,0)* to *-1*, and numbers in range *[0,2<sup>63</sup>)* to *0*.
-
-Using the facts that *x&0=0* and *x&(-1)=x* (on two's complement systems again), we can write:
-
-```python
-    if g & 1:
-        g += x
-```
-
-as:
-
-```python
-    # Compute c2=0 if g is even and c2=-1 if g is odd.
-    c2 = -(g & 1)
-    # This masks out x if g is even, and leaves x be if g is odd.
-    g += x & c2
-```
-
-Using the conditional negation trick again we can write:
-
-```python
-    if g & 1:
-        if delta > 0:
-            delta = -delta
-```
-
-as:
-
-```python
-    # Compute c3=-1 if g is odd and delta>0, and 0 otherwise.
-    c3 = c1 & c2
-    # Conditionally negate delta based on c3:
-    delta = (delta ^ c3) - c3
-```
-
-Finally:
-
-```python
-    if g & 1:
-        if delta > 0:
-            f += g
-```
-
-becomes:
-
-```python
-    f += g & c3
-```
-
-It turns out that this can be implemented more efficiently by applying the substitution
-*&eta;=-&delta;*. In this representation, negating *&delta;* corresponds to negating *&eta;*, and incrementing
-*&delta;* corresponds to decrementing *&eta;*. This allows us to remove the negation in the *c1*
-computation:
-
-```python
-    # Compute a mask c1 for eta < 0, and compute the conditional negation x of f:
-    c1 = eta >> 63
-    x = (f ^ c1) - c1
-    # Compute a mask c2 for odd g, and conditionally add x to g:
-    c2 = -(g & 1)
-    g += x & c2
-    # Compute a mask c for (eta < 0) and odd (input) g, and use it to conditionally negate eta,
-    # and add g to f:
-    c3 = c1 & c2
-    eta = (eta ^ c3) - c3
-    f += g & c3
-    # Incrementing delta corresponds to decrementing eta.
-    eta -= 1
-    g >>= 1
-```
-
-A variant of divsteps with better worst-case performance can be used instead: starting *&delta;* at
-*1/2* instead of *1*. This reduces the worst case number of iterations to *590* for *256*-bit inputs
-(which can be shown using convex hull analysis). In this case, the substitution *&zeta;=-(&delta;+1/2)*
-is used instead to keep the variable integral. Incrementing *&delta;* by *1* still translates to
-decrementing *&zeta;* by *1*, but negating *&delta;* now corresponds to going from *&zeta;* to *-(&zeta;+1)*, or
-*~&zeta;*. Doing that conditionally based on *c3* is simply:
-
-```python
-    ...
-    c3 = c1 & c2
-    zeta ^= c3
-    ...
-```
-
-By replacing the loop in `divsteps_n_matrix` with a variant of the divstep code above (extended to
-also apply all *f* operations to *u*, *v* and all *g* operations to *q*, *r*), a constant-time version of
-`divsteps_n_matrix` is obtained. The full code will be in section 7.
-
-These bit fiddling tricks can also be used to make the conditional negations and additions in
-`update_de` and `normalize` constant-time.
-
-
-## 6. Variable-time optimizations
-
-In section 5, we modified the `divsteps_n_matrix` function (and a few others) to be constant time.
-Constant time operations are only necessary when computing modular inverses of secret data. In
-other cases, it slows down calculations unnecessarily. In this section, we will construct a
-faster non-constant time `divsteps_n_matrix` function.
-
-To do so, first consider yet another way of writing the inner loop of divstep operations in
-`gcd` from section 1. This decomposition is also explained in the paper in section 8.2. We use
-the original version with initial *&delta;=1* and *&eta;=-&delta;* here.
-
-```python
-for _ in range(N):
-    if g & 1 and eta < 0:
-        eta, f, g = -eta, g, -f
-    if g & 1:
-        g += f
-    eta -= 1
-    g >>= 1
-```
-
-Whenever *g* is even, the loop only shifts *g* down and decreases *&eta;*. When *g* ends in multiple zero
-bits, these iterations can be consolidated into one step. This requires counting the bottom zero
-bits efficiently, which is possible on most platforms; it is abstracted here as the function
-`count_trailing_zeros`.
-
-```python
-def count_trailing_zeros(v):
-    """
-    When v is zero, consider all N zero bits as "trailing".
-    For a non-zero value v, find z such that v=(d<<z) for some odd d.
-    """
-    if v == 0:
-        return N
-    else:
-        return (v & -v).bit_length() - 1
-
-i = N # divsteps left to do
-while True:
-    # Get rid of all bottom zeros at once. In the first iteration, g may be odd and the following
-    # lines have no effect (until "if eta < 0").
-    zeros = min(i, count_trailing_zeros(g))
-    eta -= zeros
-    g >>= zeros
-    i -= zeros
-    if i == 0:
-        break
-    # We know g is odd now
-    if eta < 0:
-        eta, f, g = -eta, g, -f
-    g += f
-    # g is even now, and the eta decrement and g shift will happen in the next loop.
-```
-
-We can now remove multiple bottom *0* bits from *g* at once, but still need a full iteration whenever
-there is a bottom *1* bit. In what follows, we will get rid of multiple *1* bits simultaneously as
-well.
-
-Observe that as long as *&eta; &geq; 0*, the loop does not modify *f*. Instead, it cancels out bottom
-bits of *g* and shifts them out, and decreases *&eta;* and *i* accordingly - interrupting only when *&eta;*
-becomes negative, or when *i* reaches *0*. Combined, this is equivalent to adding a multiple of *f* to
-*g* to cancel out multiple bottom bits, and then shifting them out.
-
-It is easy to find what that multiple is: we want a number *w* such that *g+w&thinsp;f* has a few bottom
-zero bits. If that number of bits is *L*, we want *g+w&thinsp;f mod 2<sup>L</sup> = 0*, or *w = -g/f mod 2<sup>L</sup>*. Since *f*
-is odd, such a *w* exists for any *L*. *L* cannot be more than *i* steps (as we'd finish the loop before
-doing more) or more than *&eta;+1* steps (as we'd run `eta, f, g = -eta, g, -f` at that point), but
-apart from that, we're only limited by the complexity of computing *w*.
-
-This code demonstrates how to cancel up to 4 bits per step:
-
-```python
-NEGINV16 = [15, 5, 3, 9, 7, 13, 11, 1] # NEGINV16[n//2] = (-n)^-1 mod 16, for odd n
-i = N
-while True:
-    zeros = min(i, count_trailing_zeros(g))
-    eta -= zeros
-    g >>= zeros
-    i -= zeros
-    if i == 0:
-        break
-    # We know g is odd now
-    if eta < 0:
-        eta, f, g = -eta, g, -f
-    # Compute limit on number of bits to cancel
-    limit = min(min(eta + 1, i), 4)
-    # Compute w = -g/f mod 2**limit, using the table value for -1/f mod 2**4. Note that f is
-    # always odd, so its inverse modulo a power of two always exists.
-    w = (g * NEGINV16[(f & 15) // 2]) % (2**limit)
-    # As w = -g/f mod (2**limit), g+w*f mod 2**limit = 0 mod 2**limit.
-    g += w * f
-    assert g % (2**limit) == 0
-    # The next iteration will now shift out at least limit bottom zero bits from g.
-```
-
-By using a bigger table more bits can be cancelled at once. The table can also be implemented
-as a formula. Several formulas are known for computing modular inverses modulo powers of two;
-some can be found in Hacker's Delight second edition by Henry S. Warren, Jr. pages 245-247.
-Here we need the negated modular inverse, which is a simple transformation of those:
-
-- Instead of a 3-bit table:
-  - *-f* or *f ^ 6*
-- Instead of a 4-bit table:
-  - *1 - f(f + 1)*
-  - *-(f + (((f + 1) & 4) << 1))*
-- For larger tables the following technique can be used: if *w=-1/f mod 2<sup>L</sup>*, then *w(w&thinsp;f+2)* is
-  *-1/f mod 2<sup>2L</sup>*. This allows extending the previous formulas (or tables). In particular we
-  have this 6-bit function (based on the 3-bit function above):
-  - *f(f<sup>2</sup> - 2)*
-
-This loop, again extended to also handle *u*, *v*, *q*, and *r* alongside *f* and *g*, placed in
-`divsteps_n_matrix`, gives a significantly faster, but non-constant time version.
-
-
-## 7. Final Python version
-
-All together we need the following functions:
-
-- A way to compute the transition matrix in constant time, using the `divsteps_n_matrix` function
-  from section 2, but with its loop replaced by a variant of the constant-time divstep from
-  section 5, extended to handle *u*, *v*, *q*, *r*:
-
-```python
-def divsteps_n_matrix(zeta, f, g):
-    """Compute zeta and transition matrix t after N divsteps (multiplied by 2^N)."""
-    u, v, q, r = 1, 0, 0, 1 # start with identity matrix
-    for _ in range(N):
-        c1 = zeta >> 63
-        # Compute x, y, z as conditionally-negated versions of f, u, v.
-        x, y, z = (f ^ c1) - c1, (u ^ c1) - c1, (v ^ c1) - c1
-        c2 = -(g & 1)
-        # Conditionally add x, y, z to g, q, r.
-        g, q, r = g + (x & c2), q + (y & c2), r + (z & c2)
-        c1 &= c2                     # reusing c1 here for the earlier c3 variable
-        zeta = (zeta ^ c1) - 1       # inlining the unconditional zeta decrement here
-        # Conditionally add g, q, r to f, u, v.
-        f, u, v = f + (g & c1), u + (q & c1), v + (r & c1)
-        # When shifting g down, don't shift q, r, as we construct a transition matrix multiplied
-        # by 2^N. Instead, shift f's coefficients u and v up.
-        g, u, v = g >> 1, u << 1, v << 1
-    return zeta, (u, v, q, r)
-```
-
-- The functions to update *f* and *g*, and *d* and *e*, from section 2 and section 4, with the constant-time
-  changes to `update_de` from section 5:
-
-```python
-def update_fg(f, g, t):
-    """Multiply matrix t/2^N with [f, g]."""
-    u, v, q, r = t
-    cf, cg = u*f + v*g, q*f + r*g
-    return cf >> N, cg >> N
-
-def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
-    """Multiply matrix t/2^N with [d, e], modulo M."""
-    u, v, q, r = t
-    d_sign, e_sign = d >> 257, e >> 257
-    md, me = (u & d_sign) + (v & e_sign), (q & d_sign) + (r & e_sign)
-    cd, ce = (u*d + v*e) % 2**N, (q*d + r*e) % 2**N
-    md -= (Mi*cd + md) % 2**N
-    me -= (Mi*ce + me) % 2**N
-    cd, ce = u*d + v*e + M*md, q*d + r*e + M*me
-    return cd >> N, ce >> N
-```
-
-- The `normalize` function from section 4, made constant time as well:
-
-```python
-def normalize(sign, v, M):
-    """Compute sign*v mod M, where v in (-2*M,M); output in [0,M)."""
-    v_sign = v >> 257
-    # Conditionally add M to v.
-    v += M & v_sign
-    c = (sign - 1) >> 1
-    # Conditionally negate v.
-    v = (v ^ c) - c
-    v_sign = v >> 257
-    # Conditionally add M to v again.
-    v += M & v_sign
-    return v
-```
-
-- And finally the `modinv` function too, adapted to use *&zeta;* instead of *&delta;*, and using the fixed
-  iteration count from section 5:
-
-```python
-def modinv(M, Mi, x):
-    """Compute the modular inverse of x mod M, given Mi=1/M mod 2^N."""
-    zeta, f, g, d, e = -1, M, x, 0, 1
-    for _ in range((590 + N - 1) // N):
-        zeta, t = divsteps_n_matrix(zeta, f % 2**N, g % 2**N)
-        f, g = update_fg(f, g, t)
-        d, e = update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi)
-    return normalize(f, d, M)
-```
-
-- To get a variable time version, replace the `divsteps_n_matrix` function with one that uses the
-  divsteps loop from section 5, and a `modinv` version that calls it without the fixed iteration
-  count:
-
-```python
-NEGINV16 = [15, 5, 3, 9, 7, 13, 11, 1] # NEGINV16[n//2] = (-n)^-1 mod 16, for odd n
-def divsteps_n_matrix_var(eta, f, g):
-    """Compute eta and transition matrix t after N divsteps (multiplied by 2^N)."""
-    u, v, q, r = 1, 0, 0, 1
-    i = N
-    while True:
-        zeros = min(i, count_trailing_zeros(g))
-        eta, i = eta - zeros, i - zeros
-        g, u, v = g >> zeros, u << zeros, v << zeros
-        if i == 0:
-            break
-        if eta < 0:
-            eta, f, u, v, g, q, r = -eta, g, q, r, -f, -u, -v
-        limit = min(min(eta + 1, i), 4)
-        w = (g * NEGINV16[(f & 15) // 2]) % (2**limit)
-        g, q, r = g + w*f, q + w*u, r + w*v
-    return eta, (u, v, q, r)
-
-def modinv_var(M, Mi, x):
-    """Compute the modular inverse of x mod M, given Mi = 1/M mod 2^N."""
-    eta, f, g, d, e = -1, M, x, 0, 1
-    while g != 0:
-        eta, t = divsteps_n_matrix_var(eta, f % 2**N, g % 2**N)
-        f, g = update_fg(f, g, t)
-        d, e = update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi)
-    return normalize(f, d, Mi)
-```
-
-## 8. From GCDs to Jacobi symbol
-
-We can also use a similar approach to calculate Jacobi symbol *(x | M)* by keeping track of an
-extra variable *j*, for which at every step *(x | M) = j (g | f)*. As we update *f* and *g*, we
-make corresponding updates to *j* using
-[properties of the Jacobi symbol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobi_symbol#Properties):
-* *((g/2) | f)* is either *(g | f)* or *-(g | f)*, depending on the value of *f mod 8* (negating if it's *3* or *5*).
-* *(f | g)* is either *(g | f)* or *-(g | f)*, depending on *f mod 4* and *g mod 4* (negating if both are *3*).
-
-These updates depend only on the values of *f* and *g* modulo *4* or *8*, and can thus be applied
-very quickly, as long as we keep track of a few additional bits of *f* and *g*. Overall, this
-calculation is slightly simpler than the one for the modular inverse because we no longer need to
-keep track of *d* and *e*.
-
-However, one difficulty of this approach is that the Jacobi symbol *(a | n)* is only defined for
-positive odd integers *n*, whereas in the original safegcd algorithm, *f, g* can take negative
-values. We resolve this by using the following modified steps:
-
-```python
-        # Before
-        if delta > 0 and g & 1:
-            delta, f, g = 1 - delta, g, (g - f) // 2
-
-        # After
-        if delta > 0 and g & 1:
-            delta, f, g = 1 - delta, g, (g + f) // 2
-```
-
-The algorithm is still correct, since the changed divstep, called a "posdivstep" (see section 8.4
-and E.5 in the paper) preserves *gcd(f, g)*. However, there's no proof that the modified algorithm
-will converge. The justification for posdivsteps is completely empirical: in practice, it appears
-that the vast majority of nonzero inputs converge to *f=g=gcd(f<sub>0</sub>, g<sub>0</sub>)* in a
-number of steps proportional to their logarithm.
-
-Note that:
-- We require inputs to satisfy *gcd(x, M) = 1*, as otherwise *f=1* is not reached.
-- We require inputs *x &neq; 0*, because applying posdivstep with *g=0* has no effect.
-- We need to update the termination condition from *g=0* to *f=1*.
-
-We account for the possibility of nonconvergence by only performing a bounded number of
-posdivsteps, and then falling back to square-root based Jacobi calculation if a solution has not
-yet been found.
-
-The optimizations in sections 3-7 above are described in the context of the original divsteps, but
-in the C implementation we also adapt most of them (not including "avoiding modulus operations",
-since it's not necessary to track *d, e*, and "constant-time operation", since we never calculate
-Jacobi symbols for secret data) to the posdivsteps version.

external/secp256k1/examples/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-function(add_example name)
-  set(target_name ${name}_example)
-  add_executable(${target_name} ${name}.c)
-  target_include_directories(${target_name} PRIVATE
-    ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/include
-  )
-  target_link_libraries(${target_name}
-    secp256k1
-    $<$<PLATFORM_ID:Windows>:bcrypt>
-  )
-  set(test_name ${name}_example)
-  add_test(NAME secp256k1_${test_name} COMMAND ${target_name})
-endfunction()
-
-add_example(ecdsa)
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH)
-  add_example(ecdh)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG)
-  add_example(schnorr)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT)
-  add_example(ellswift)
-endif()
-
-if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG)
-  add_example(musig)
-endif()

external/secp256k1/examples/EXAMPLES_COPYING

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-Creative Commons Legal Code
-
-CC0 1.0 Universal
-
-    CREATIVE COMMONS CORPORATION IS NOT A LAW FIRM AND DOES NOT PROVIDE
-    LEGAL SERVICES. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT CREATE AN
-    ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. CREATIVE COMMONS PROVIDES THIS
-    INFORMATION ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CREATIVE COMMONS MAKES NO WARRANTIES
-    REGARDING THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS
-    PROVIDED HEREUNDER, AND DISCLAIMS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
-    THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED
-    HEREUNDER.
-
-Statement of Purpose
-
-The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
-exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator
-and subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
-authorship and/or a database (each, a "Work").
-
-Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for
-the purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and
-scientific works ("Commons") that the public can reliably and without fear
-of later claims of infringement build upon, modify, incorporate in other
-works, reuse and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever
-and for any purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes.
-These owners may contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free
-culture and the further production of creative, cultural and scientific
-works, or to gain reputation or greater distribution for their Work in
-part through the use and efforts of others.
-
-For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any
-expectation of additional consideration or compensation, the person
-associating CC0 with a Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she
-is an owner of Copyright and Related Rights in the Work, voluntarily
-elects to apply CC0 to the Work and publicly distribute the Work under its
-terms, with knowledge of his or her Copyright and Related Rights in the
-Work and the meaning and intended legal effect of CC0 on those rights.
-
-1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
-protected by copyright and related or neighboring rights ("Copyright and
-Related Rights"). Copyright and Related Rights include, but are not
-limited to, the following:
-
-  i. the right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, display,
-     communicate, and translate a Work;
- ii. moral rights retained by the original author(s) and/or performer(s);
-iii. publicity and privacy rights pertaining to a person's image or
-     likeness depicted in a Work;
- iv. rights protecting against unfair competition in regards to a Work,
-     subject to the limitations in paragraph 4(a), below;
-  v. rights protecting the extraction, dissemination, use and reuse of data
-     in a Work;
- vi. database rights (such as those arising under Directive 96/9/EC of the
-     European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal
-     protection of databases, and under any national implementation
-     thereof, including any amended or successor version of such
-     directive); and
-vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the
-     world based on applicable law or treaty, and any national
-     implementations thereof.
-
-2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention
-of, applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently,
-irrevocably and unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of
-Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights and associated claims and causes
-of action, whether now known or unknown (including existing as well as
-future claims and causes of action), in the Work (i) in all territories
-worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or
-treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future
-medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever,
-including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional
-purposes (the "Waiver"). Affirmer makes the Waiver for the benefit of each
-member of the public at large and to the detriment of Affirmer's heirs and
-successors, fully intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to
-revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or any other legal or
-equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work by the public
-as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
-
-3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason
-be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the
-Waiver shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into
-account Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the
-extent the Waiver is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected
-person a royalty-free, non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive,
-irrevocable and unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and
-Related Rights in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the
-maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future
-time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number
-of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without
-limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the
-"License"). The License shall be deemed effective as of the date CC0 was
-applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the License for any
-reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, such
-partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not invalidate the remainder
-of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby affirms that he or she
-will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining Copyright and Related
-Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims and causes of
-action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to Affirmer's
-express Statement of Purpose.
-
-4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
-
- a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
-    surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
- b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or
-    warranties of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied,
-    statutory or otherwise, including without limitation warranties of
-    title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non
-    infringement, or the absence of latent or other defects, accuracy, or
-    the present or absence of errors, whether or not discoverable, all to
-    the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
- c. Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons
-    that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without
-    limitation any person's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work.
-    Further, Affirmer disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary
-    consents, permissions or other rights required for any use of the
-    Work.
- d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
-    party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to
-    this CC0 or use of the Work.

external/secp256k1/examples/ecdh.c

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-/*************************************************************************
- * Written in 2020-2022 by Elichai Turkel                                *
- * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all    *
- * copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this  *
- * file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed     *
- * without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see       *
- * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
- *************************************************************************/
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <secp256k1.h>
-#include <secp256k1_ecdh.h>
-
-#include "examples_util.h"
-
-int main(void) {
-    unsigned char seckey1[32];
-    unsigned char seckey2[32];
-    unsigned char compressed_pubkey1[33];
-    unsigned char compressed_pubkey2[33];
-    unsigned char shared_secret1[32];
-    unsigned char shared_secret2[32];
-    unsigned char randomize[32];
-    int return_val;
-    size_t len;
-    secp256k1_pubkey pubkey1;
-    secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2;
-
-    /* Before we can call actual API functions, we need to create a "context". */
-    secp256k1_context* ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
-    if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel
-     * leakage See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more
-     * information about it. This should never fail. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /*** Key Generation ***/
-    if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
-    * order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
-    * with a properly functioning random number generator. */
-    if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) || !secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
-        printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey1, seckey1);
-    assert(return_val);
-    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, seckey2);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Serialize pubkey1 in a compressed form (33 bytes), should always return 1 */
-    len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey1);
-    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey1, &len, &pubkey1, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
-    assert(return_val);
-    /* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */
-    assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey1));
-
-    /* Serialize pubkey2 in a compressed form (33 bytes) */
-    len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey2);
-    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey2, &len, &pubkey2, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
-    assert(return_val);
-    /* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */
-    assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey2));
-
-    /*** Creating the shared secret ***/
-
-    /* Perform ECDH with seckey1 and pubkey2. Should never fail with a verified
-     * seckey and valid pubkey */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, shared_secret1, &pubkey2, seckey1, NULL, NULL);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Perform ECDH with seckey2 and pubkey1. Should never fail with a verified
-     * seckey and valid pubkey */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, shared_secret2, &pubkey1, seckey2, NULL, NULL);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Both parties should end up with the same shared secret */
-    return_val = memcmp(shared_secret1, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret1));
-    assert(return_val == 0);
-
-    printf("Secret Key1: ");
-    print_hex(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
-    printf("Compressed Pubkey1: ");
-    print_hex(compressed_pubkey1, sizeof(compressed_pubkey1));
-    printf("\nSecret Key2: ");
-    print_hex(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
-    printf("Compressed Pubkey2: ");
-    print_hex(compressed_pubkey2, sizeof(compressed_pubkey2));
-    printf("\nShared Secret: ");
-    print_hex(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
-
-    /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
-    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
-
-    /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
-     * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
-     * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
-     * swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
-     *
-     * Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
-     * will remove any writes that aren't used. */
-    secure_erase(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
-    secure_erase(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
-    secure_erase(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
-    secure_erase(shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret2));
-
-    return 0;
-}

external/secp256k1/examples/ecdsa.c

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-/*************************************************************************
- * Written in 2020-2022 by Elichai Turkel                                *
- * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all    *
- * copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this  *
- * file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed     *
- * without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see       *
- * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
- *************************************************************************/
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <secp256k1.h>
-
-#include "examples_util.h"
-
-int main(void) {
-    /* Instead of signing the message directly, we must sign a 32-byte hash.
-     * Here the message is "Hello, world!" and the hash function was SHA-256.
-     * An actual implementation should just call SHA-256, but this example
-     * hardcodes the output to avoid depending on an additional library.
-     * See https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/81115/if-someone-wanted-to-pretend-to-be-satoshi-by-posting-a-fake-signature-to-defrau/81116#81116 */
-    unsigned char msg_hash[32] = {
-        0x31, 0x5F, 0x5B, 0xDB, 0x76, 0xD0, 0x78, 0xC4,
-        0x3B, 0x8A, 0xC0, 0x06, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0x01, 0x64,
-        0x61, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0xCE, 0x77, 0xC8, 0x69, 0x34,
-        0x5B, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xC7, 0x58, 0x94, 0xED, 0xD3,
-    };
-    unsigned char seckey[32];
-    unsigned char randomize[32];
-    unsigned char compressed_pubkey[33];
-    unsigned char serialized_signature[64];
-    size_t len;
-    int is_signature_valid, is_signature_valid2;
-    int return_val;
-    secp256k1_pubkey pubkey;
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
-    /* Before we can call actual API functions, we need to create a "context". */
-    secp256k1_context* ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
-    if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel
-     * leakage See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more
-     * information about it. This should never fail. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /*** Key Generation ***/
-    if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
-    * order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
-    * with a properly functioning random number generator. */
-    if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey)) {
-        printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, seckey);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Serialize the pubkey in a compressed form(33 bytes). Should always return 1. */
-    len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey);
-    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
-    assert(return_val);
-    /* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */
-    assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey));
-
-    /*** Signing ***/
-
-    /* Generate an ECDSA signature `noncefp` and `ndata` allows you to pass a
-     * custom nonce function, passing `NULL` will use the RFC-6979 safe default.
-     * Signing with a valid context, verified secret key
-     * and the default nonce function should never fail. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg_hash, seckey, NULL, NULL);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Serialize the signature in a compact form. Should always return 1
-     * according to the documentation in secp256k1.h. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, serialized_signature, &sig);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-
-    /*** Verification ***/
-
-    /* Deserialize the signature. This will return 0 if the signature can't be parsed correctly. */
-    if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, serialized_signature)) {
-        printf("Failed parsing the signature\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Deserialize the public key. This will return 0 if the public key can't be parsed correctly. */
-    if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, compressed_pubkey, sizeof(compressed_pubkey))) {
-        printf("Failed parsing the public key\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Verify a signature. This will return 1 if it's valid and 0 if it's not. */
-    is_signature_valid = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg_hash, &pubkey);
-
-    printf("Is the signature valid? %s\n", is_signature_valid ? "true" : "false");
-    printf("Secret Key: ");
-    print_hex(seckey, sizeof(seckey));
-    printf("Public Key: ");
-    print_hex(compressed_pubkey, sizeof(compressed_pubkey));
-    printf("Signature: ");
-    print_hex(serialized_signature, sizeof(serialized_signature));
-
-    /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
-    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
-
-    /* Bonus example: if all we need is signature verification (and no key
-       generation or signing), we don't need to use a context created via
-       secp256k1_context_create(). We can simply use the static (i.e., global)
-       context secp256k1_context_static. See its description in
-       include/secp256k1.h for details. */
-    is_signature_valid2 = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(secp256k1_context_static,
-                                                 &sig, msg_hash, &pubkey);
-    assert(is_signature_valid2 == is_signature_valid);
-
-    /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
-     * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
-     * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
-     * swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
-     *
-     * Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
-     * will remove any writes that aren't used. */
-    secure_erase(seckey, sizeof(seckey));
-
-    return 0;
-}

external/secp256k1/examples/ellswift.c

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-/*************************************************************************
- * Written in 2024 by Sebastian Falbesoner                               *
- * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all    *
- * copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this  *
- * file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed     *
- * without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see       *
- * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
- *************************************************************************/
-
-/** This file demonstrates how to use the ElligatorSwift module to perform
- *  a key exchange according to BIP 324. Additionally, see the documentation
- *  in include/secp256k1_ellswift.h and doc/ellswift.md.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <secp256k1.h>
-#include <secp256k1_ellswift.h>
-
-#include "examples_util.h"
-
-int main(void) {
-    secp256k1_context* ctx;
-    unsigned char randomize[32];
-    unsigned char auxrand1[32];
-    unsigned char auxrand2[32];
-    unsigned char seckey1[32];
-    unsigned char seckey2[32];
-    unsigned char ellswift_pubkey1[64];
-    unsigned char ellswift_pubkey2[64];
-    unsigned char shared_secret1[32];
-    unsigned char shared_secret2[32];
-    int return_val;
-
-    /* Create a secp256k1 context */
-    ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
-    if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel
-     * leakage. See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more
-     * information about it. This should never fail. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /*** Generate secret keys ***/
-    if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
-    * order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
-    * with a properly functioning random number generator. */
-    if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) || !secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
-        printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Generate ElligatorSwift public keys. This should never fail with valid context and
-       verified secret keys. Note that providing additional randomness (fourth parameter) is
-       optional, but recommended. */
-    if (!fill_random(auxrand1, sizeof(auxrand1)) || !fill_random(auxrand2, sizeof(auxrand2))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey1, seckey1, auxrand1);
-    assert(return_val);
-    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey2, seckey2, auxrand2);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /*** Create the shared secret on each side ***/
-
-    /* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey1 and ellswift_pubkey2. Should never fail
-     * with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. Note that both parties pass both
-     * EllSwift pubkeys in the same order; the pubkey of the calling party is
-     * determined by the "party" boolean (sixth parameter). */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret1, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2,
-        seckey1, 0, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey2 and ellswift_pubkey1. Should never fail
-     * with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret2, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2,
-        seckey2, 1, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Both parties should end up with the same shared secret */
-    return_val = memcmp(shared_secret1, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret1));
-    assert(return_val == 0);
-
-    printf(  "     Secret Key1: ");
-    print_hex(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
-    printf(  "EllSwift Pubkey1: ");
-    print_hex(ellswift_pubkey1, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey1));
-    printf("\n     Secret Key2: ");
-    print_hex(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
-    printf(  "EllSwift Pubkey2: ");
-    print_hex(ellswift_pubkey2, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey2));
-    printf("\n   Shared Secret: ");
-    print_hex(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
-
-    /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
-    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
-
-    /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
-     * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
-     * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
-     * swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
-     *
-     * Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
-     * will remove any writes that aren't used. */
-    secure_erase(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
-    secure_erase(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
-    secure_erase(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
-    secure_erase(shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret2));
-
-    return 0;
-}

external/secp256k1/examples/examples_util.h

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-/*************************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Elichai Turkel                                *
- * Distributed under the CC0 software license, see the accompanying file *
- * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
- *************************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * This file is an attempt at collecting best practice methods for obtaining randomness with different operating systems.
- * It may be out-of-date. Consult the documentation of the operating system before considering to use the methods below.
- *
- * Platform randomness sources:
- * Linux   -> `getrandom(2)`(`sys/random.h`), if not available `/dev/urandom` should be used. http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrandom.2.html, https://linux.die.net/man/4/urandom
- * macOS   -> `getentropy(2)`(`sys/random.h`), if not available `/dev/urandom` should be used. https://www.unix.com/man-page/mojave/2/getentropy, https://opensource.apple.com/source/xnu/xnu-517.12.7/bsd/man/man4/random.4.auto.html
- * FreeBSD -> `getrandom(2)`(`sys/random.h`), if not available `kern.arandom` should be used. https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=getrandom, https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=random&sektion=4
- * OpenBSD -> `getentropy(2)`(`unistd.h`), if not available `/dev/urandom` should be used. https://man.openbsd.org/getentropy, https://man.openbsd.org/urandom
- * Windows -> `BCryptGenRandom`(`bcrypt.h`). https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptgenrandom
- */
-
-#if defined(_WIN32)
-/*
- * The defined WIN32_NO_STATUS macro disables return code definitions in
- * windows.h, which avoids "macro redefinition" MSVC warnings in ntstatus.h.
- */
-#define WIN32_NO_STATUS
-#include <windows.h>
-#undef WIN32_NO_STATUS
-#include <ntstatus.h>
-#include <bcrypt.h>
-#elif defined(__linux__) || defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__FreeBSD__)
-#include <sys/random.h>
-#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
-#include <unistd.h>
-#else
-#error "Couldn't identify the OS"
-#endif
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-
-/* Returns 1 on success, and 0 on failure. */
-static int fill_random(unsigned char* data, size_t size) {
-#if defined(_WIN32)
-    NTSTATUS res = BCryptGenRandom(NULL, data, size, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG);
-    if (res != STATUS_SUCCESS || size > ULONG_MAX) {
-        return 0;
-    } else {
-        return 1;
-    }
-#elif defined(__linux__) || defined(__FreeBSD__)
-    /* If `getrandom(2)` is not available you should fallback to /dev/urandom */
-    ssize_t res = getrandom(data, size, 0);
-    if (res < 0 || (size_t)res != size ) {
-        return 0;
-    } else {
-        return 1;
-    }
-#elif defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__OpenBSD__)
-    /* If `getentropy(2)` is not available you should fallback to either
-     * `SecRandomCopyBytes` or /dev/urandom */
-    int res = getentropy(data, size);
-    if (res == 0) {
-        return 1;
-    } else {
-        return 0;
-    }
-#endif
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static void print_hex(unsigned char* data, size_t size) {
-    size_t i;
-    printf("0x");
-    for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-        printf("%02x", data[i]);
-    }
-    printf("\n");
-}
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-// For SecureZeroMemory
-#include <Windows.h>
-#endif
-/* Cleanses memory to prevent leaking sensitive info. Won't be optimized out. */
-static void secure_erase(void *ptr, size_t len) {
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-    /* SecureZeroMemory is guaranteed not to be optimized out by MSVC. */
-    SecureZeroMemory(ptr, len);
-#elif defined(__GNUC__)
-    /* We use a memory barrier that scares the compiler away from optimizing out the memset.
-     *
-     * Quoting Adam Langley <agl@google.com> in commit ad1907fe73334d6c696c8539646c21b11178f20f
-     * in BoringSSL (ISC License):
-     *    As best as we can tell, this is sufficient to break any optimisations that
-     *    might try to eliminate "superfluous" memsets.
-     * This method used in memzero_explicit() the Linux kernel, too. Its advantage is that it is
-     * pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficiently,
-     * just not remove it entirely. See "Dead Store Elimination (Still) Considered Harmful" by
-     * Yang et al. (USENIX Security 2017) for more background.
-     */
-    memset(ptr, 0, len);
-    __asm__ __volatile__("" : : "r"(ptr) : "memory");
-#else
-    void *(*volatile const volatile_memset)(void *, int, size_t) = memset;
-    volatile_memset(ptr, 0, len);
-#endif
-}

external/secp256k1/examples/musig.c

@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
-/*************************************************************************
- * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all    *
- * copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this  *
- * file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed     *
- * without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see       *
- * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
- *************************************************************************/
-
-/** This file demonstrates how to use the MuSig module to create a
- *  3-of-3 multisignature. Additionally, see the documentation in
- *  include/secp256k1_musig.h and doc/musig.md.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <secp256k1.h>
-#include <secp256k1_extrakeys.h>
-#include <secp256k1_musig.h>
-#include <secp256k1_schnorrsig.h>
-
-#include "examples_util.h"
-
-struct signer_secrets {
-    secp256k1_keypair keypair;
-    secp256k1_musig_secnonce secnonce;
-};
-
-struct signer {
-    secp256k1_pubkey pubkey;
-    secp256k1_musig_pubnonce pubnonce;
-    secp256k1_musig_partial_sig partial_sig;
-};
-
- /* Number of public keys involved in creating the aggregate signature */
-#define N_SIGNERS 3
-/* Create a key pair, store it in signer_secrets->keypair and signer->pubkey */
-static int create_keypair(const secp256k1_context* ctx, struct signer_secrets *signer_secrets, struct signer *signer) {
-    unsigned char seckey[32];
-
-    if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 0;
-    }
-    /* Try to create a keypair with a valid context. This only fails if the
-     * secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's order). Note
-     * that the probability of this occurring is negligible with a properly
-     * functioning random number generator. */
-    if (!secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &signer_secrets->keypair, seckey)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (!secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &signer->pubkey, &signer_secrets->keypair)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    secure_erase(seckey, sizeof(seckey));
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* Tweak the pubkey corresponding to the provided keyagg cache, update the cache
- * and return the tweaked aggregate pk. */
-static int tweak(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *agg_pk, secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *cache) {
-    secp256k1_pubkey output_pk;
-    /* For BIP 32 tweaking the plain_tweak is set to a hash as defined in BIP
-     * 32. */
-    unsigned char plain_tweak[32] = "this could be a BIP32 tweak....";
-    /* For Taproot tweaking the xonly_tweak is set to the TapTweak hash as
-     * defined in BIP 341 */
-    unsigned char xonly_tweak[32] = "this could be a Taproot tweak..";
-
-
-    /* Plain tweaking which, for example, allows deriving multiple child
-     * public keys from a single aggregate key using BIP32 */
-    if (!secp256k1_musig_pubkey_ec_tweak_add(ctx, NULL, cache, plain_tweak)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    /* Note that we did not provide an output_pk argument, because the
-     * resulting pk is also saved in the cache and so if one is just interested
-     * in signing, the output_pk argument is unnecessary. On the other hand, if
-     * one is not interested in signing, the same output_pk can be obtained by
-     * calling `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_get` right after key aggregation to get
-     * the full pubkey and then call `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add`. */
-
-    /* Xonly tweaking which, for example, allows creating Taproot commitments */
-    if (!secp256k1_musig_pubkey_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk, cache, xonly_tweak)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    /* Note that if we wouldn't care about signing, we can arrive at the same
-     * output_pk by providing the untweaked public key to
-     * `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add` (after converting it to an xonly pubkey
-     * if necessary with `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey`). */
-
-    /* Now we convert the output_pk to an xonly pubkey to allow to later verify
-     * the Schnorr signature against it. For this purpose we can ignore the
-     * `pk_parity` output argument; we would need it if we would have to open
-     * the Taproot commitment. */
-    if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, agg_pk, NULL, &output_pk)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* Sign a message hash with the given key pairs and store the result in sig */
-static int sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, struct signer_secrets *signer_secrets, struct signer *signer, const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *cache, const unsigned char *msg32, unsigned char *sig64) {
-    int i;
-    const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *pubnonces[N_SIGNERS];
-    const secp256k1_musig_partial_sig *partial_sigs[N_SIGNERS];
-    /* The same for all signers */
-    secp256k1_musig_session session;
-    secp256k1_musig_aggnonce agg_pubnonce;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < N_SIGNERS; i++) {
-        unsigned char seckey[32];
-        unsigned char session_secrand[32];
-        /* Create random session ID. It is absolutely necessary that the session ID
-         * is unique for every call of secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen. Otherwise
-         * it's trivial for an attacker to extract the secret key! */
-        if (!fill_random(session_secrand, sizeof(session_secrand))) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if (!secp256k1_keypair_sec(ctx, seckey, &signer_secrets[i].keypair)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        /* Initialize session and create secret nonce for signing and public
-         * nonce to send to the other signers. */
-        if (!secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen(ctx, &signer_secrets[i].secnonce, &signer[i].pubnonce, session_secrand, seckey, &signer[i].pubkey, msg32, NULL, NULL)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        pubnonces[i] = &signer[i].pubnonce;
-
-        secure_erase(seckey, sizeof(seckey));
-    }
-
-    /* Communication round 1: Every signer sends their pubnonce to the
-     * coordinator. The coordinator runs secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg and sends
-     * agg_pubnonce to each signer */
-    if (!secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(ctx, &agg_pubnonce, pubnonces, N_SIGNERS)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* Every signer creates a partial signature */
-    for (i = 0; i < N_SIGNERS; i++) {
-        /* Initialize the signing session by processing the aggregate nonce */
-        if (!secp256k1_musig_nonce_process(ctx, &session, &agg_pubnonce, msg32, cache)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        /* partial_sign will clear the secnonce by setting it to 0. That's because
-         * you must _never_ reuse the secnonce (or use the same session_secrand to
-         * create a secnonce). If you do, you effectively reuse the nonce and
-         * leak the secret key. */
-        if (!secp256k1_musig_partial_sign(ctx, &signer[i].partial_sig, &signer_secrets[i].secnonce, &signer_secrets[i].keypair, cache, &session)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        partial_sigs[i] = &signer[i].partial_sig;
-    }
-    /* Communication round 2: Every signer sends their partial signature to the
-     * coordinator, who verifies the partial signatures and aggregates them. */
-    for (i = 0; i < N_SIGNERS; i++) {
-        /* To check whether signing was successful, it suffices to either verify
-         * the aggregate signature with the aggregate public key using
-         * secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify, or verify all partial signatures of all
-         * signers individually. Verifying the aggregate signature is cheaper but
-         * verifying the individual partial signatures has the advantage that it
-         * can be used to determine which of the partial signatures are invalid
-         * (if any), i.e., which of the partial signatures cause the aggregate
-         * signature to be invalid and thus the protocol run to fail. It's also
-         * fine to first verify the aggregate sig, and only verify the individual
-         * sigs if it does not work.
-         */
-        if (!secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_verify(ctx, &signer[i].partial_sig, &signer[i].pubnonce, &signer[i].pubkey, cache, &session)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-    return secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_agg(ctx, sig64, &session, partial_sigs, N_SIGNERS);
-}
-
-int main(void) {
-    secp256k1_context* ctx;
-    int i;
-    struct signer_secrets signer_secrets[N_SIGNERS];
-    struct signer signers[N_SIGNERS];
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkeys_ptr[N_SIGNERS];
-    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey agg_pk;
-    secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache cache;
-    unsigned char msg[32] = "this_could_be_the_hash_of_a_msg";
-    unsigned char sig[64];
-
-    /* Create a secp256k1 context */
-    ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
-    printf("Creating key pairs......");
-    fflush(stdout);
-    for (i = 0; i < N_SIGNERS; i++) {
-        if (!create_keypair(ctx, &signer_secrets[i], &signers[i])) {
-            printf("FAILED\n");
-            return 1;
-        }
-        pubkeys_ptr[i] = &signers[i].pubkey;
-    }
-    printf("ok\n");
-
-    /* The aggregate public key produced by secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg depends
-     * on the order of the provided public keys. If there is no canonical order
-     * of the signers, the individual public keys can optionally be sorted with
-     * secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort to ensure that the aggregate public key is
-     * independent of the order of signers. */
-    printf("Sorting public keys.....");
-    fflush(stdout);
-    if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort(ctx, pubkeys_ptr, N_SIGNERS)) {
-        printf("FAILED\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    printf("ok\n");
-
-    printf("Combining public keys...");
-    fflush(stdout);
-    /* If you just want to aggregate and not sign, you can call
-     * secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg with the keyagg_cache argument set to NULL
-     * while providing a non-NULL agg_pk argument. */
-    if (!secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(ctx, NULL, &cache, pubkeys_ptr, N_SIGNERS)) {
-        printf("FAILED\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    printf("ok\n");
-    printf("Tweaking................");
-    fflush(stdout);
-    /* Optionally tweak the aggregate key */
-    if (!tweak(ctx, &agg_pk, &cache)) {
-        printf("FAILED\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    printf("ok\n");
-    printf("Signing message.........");
-    fflush(stdout);
-    if (!sign(ctx, signer_secrets, signers, &cache, msg, sig)) {
-        printf("FAILED\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    printf("ok\n");
-    printf("Verifying signature.....");
-    fflush(stdout);
-    if (!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig, msg, 32, &agg_pk)) {
-        printf("FAILED\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    printf("ok\n");
-
-    /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
-     * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
-     * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
-     * swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite secret key material with zeros.
-     *
-     * Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
-     * will remove any writes that aren't used. */
-    for (i = 0; i < N_SIGNERS; i++) {
-        secure_erase(&signer_secrets[i], sizeof(signer_secrets[i]));
-    }
-    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
-    return 0;
-}

external/secp256k1/examples/schnorr.c

@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-/*************************************************************************
- * Written in 2020-2022 by Elichai Turkel                                *
- * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all    *
- * copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this  *
- * file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed     *
- * without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see       *
- * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
- *************************************************************************/
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <secp256k1.h>
-#include <secp256k1_extrakeys.h>
-#include <secp256k1_schnorrsig.h>
-
-#include "examples_util.h"
-
-int main(void) {
-    unsigned char msg[] = {'H', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'o', ' ', 'W', 'o', 'r', 'l', 'd', '!'};
-    unsigned char msg_hash[32];
-    unsigned char tag[] = {'m', 'y', '_', 'f', 'a', 'n', 'c', 'y', '_', 'p', 'r', 'o', 't', 'o', 'c', 'o', 'l'};
-    unsigned char seckey[32];
-    unsigned char randomize[32];
-    unsigned char auxiliary_rand[32];
-    unsigned char serialized_pubkey[32];
-    unsigned char signature[64];
-    int is_signature_valid, is_signature_valid2;
-    int return_val;
-    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey;
-    secp256k1_keypair keypair;
-    /* Before we can call actual API functions, we need to create a "context". */
-    secp256k1_context* ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
-    if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel
-     * leakage See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more
-     * information about it. This should never fail. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /*** Key Generation ***/
-    if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* Try to create a keypair with a valid context. This only fails if the
-     * secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's order). Note
-     * that the probability of this occurring is negligible with a properly
-     * functioning random number generator. */
-    if (!secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, seckey)) {
-        printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Extract the X-only public key from the keypair. We pass NULL for
-     * `pk_parity` as the parity isn't needed for signing or verification.
-     * `secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub` supports returning the parity for
-     * other use cases such as tests or verifying Taproot tweaks.
-     * This should never fail with a valid context and public key. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pubkey, NULL, &keypair);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Serialize the public key. Should always return 1 for a valid public key. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, serialized_pubkey, &pubkey);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /*** Signing ***/
-
-    /* Instead of signing (possibly very long) messages directly, we sign a
-     * 32-byte hash of the message in this example.
-     *
-     * We use secp256k1_tagged_sha256 to create this hash. This function expects
-     * a context-specific "tag", which restricts the context in which the signed
-     * messages should be considered valid. For example, if protocol A mandates
-     * to use the tag "my_fancy_protocol" and protocol B mandates to use the tag
-     * "my_boring_protocol", then signed messages from protocol A will never be
-     * valid in protocol B (and vice versa), even if keys are reused across
-     * protocols. This implements "domain separation", which is considered good
-     * practice. It avoids attacks in which users are tricked into signing a
-     * message that has intended consequences in the intended context (e.g.,
-     * protocol A) but would have unintended consequences if it were valid in
-     * some other context (e.g., protocol B). */
-    return_val = secp256k1_tagged_sha256(ctx, msg_hash, tag, sizeof(tag), msg, sizeof(msg));
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Generate 32 bytes of randomness to use with BIP-340 schnorr signing. */
-    if (!fill_random(auxiliary_rand, sizeof(auxiliary_rand))) {
-        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Generate a Schnorr signature.
-     *
-     * We use the secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32 function that provides a simple
-     * interface for signing 32-byte messages (which in our case is a hash of
-     * the actual message). BIP-340 recommends passing 32 bytes of randomness
-     * to the signing function to improve security against side-channel attacks.
-     * Signing with a valid context, a 32-byte message, a verified keypair, and
-     * any 32 bytes of auxiliary random data should never fail. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(ctx, signature, msg_hash, &keypair, auxiliary_rand);
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /*** Verification ***/
-
-    /* Deserialize the public key. This will return 0 if the public key can't
-     * be parsed correctly */
-    if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, serialized_pubkey)) {
-        printf("Failed parsing the public key\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /* Compute the tagged hash on the received messages using the same tag as the signer. */
-    return_val = secp256k1_tagged_sha256(ctx, msg_hash, tag, sizeof(tag), msg, sizeof(msg));
-    assert(return_val);
-
-    /* Verify a signature. This will return 1 if it's valid and 0 if it's not. */
-    is_signature_valid = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, signature, msg_hash, 32, &pubkey);
-
-
-    printf("Is the signature valid? %s\n", is_signature_valid ? "true" : "false");
-    printf("Secret Key: ");
-    print_hex(seckey, sizeof(seckey));
-    printf("Public Key: ");
-    print_hex(serialized_pubkey, sizeof(serialized_pubkey));
-    printf("Signature: ");
-    print_hex(signature, sizeof(signature));
-
-    /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
-    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
-
-    /* Bonus example: if all we need is signature verification (and no key
-       generation or signing), we don't need to use a context created via
-       secp256k1_context_create(). We can simply use the static (i.e., global)
-       context secp256k1_context_static. See its description in
-       include/secp256k1.h for details. */
-    is_signature_valid2 = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(secp256k1_context_static,
-                                                      signature, msg_hash, 32, &pubkey);
-    assert(is_signature_valid2 == is_signature_valid);
-
-    /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
-     * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
-     * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
-     * swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
-     *
-     * Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
-     * will remove any writes that aren't used. */
-    secure_erase(seckey, sizeof(seckey));
-    return 0;
-}

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h

@@ -1,899 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_H
-#define SECP256K1_H
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-
-/** Unless explicitly stated all pointer arguments must not be NULL.
- *
- * The following rules specify the order of arguments in API calls:
- *
- * 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined
- *    output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments.
- * 2. Array lengths always immediately follow the argument whose length
- *    they describe, even if this violates rule 1.
- * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated
- *    later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, secret nonces,
- *    messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks.
- * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less
- *    complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers,
- *    counts, flags, booleans.
- * 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to.
- */
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds context information
- *
- *  The primary purpose of context objects is to store randomization data for
- *  enhanced protection against side-channel leakage. This protection is only
- *  effective if the context is randomized after its creation. See
- *  secp256k1_context_create for creation of contexts and
- *  secp256k1_context_randomize for randomization.
- *
- *  A secondary purpose of context objects is to store pointers to callback
- *  functions that the library will call when certain error states arise. See
- *  secp256k1_context_set_error_callback as well as
- *  secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback for details. Future library versions
- *  may use context objects for additional purposes.
- *
- *  A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads
- *  simultaneously, but API calls that take a non-const pointer to a context
- *  need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for
- *  secp256k1_context_destroy, secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy,
- *  and secp256k1_context_randomize.
- *
- *  Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case
- *  you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key.
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
- *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
- *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
- *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission,
- *  use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. To
- *  compare keys, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_pubkey {
-    unsigned char data[64];
-} secp256k1_pubkey;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
- *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
- *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
- *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or
- *  comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and
- *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_ecdsa_signature {
-    unsigned char data[64];
-} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature;
-
-/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce.
- *
- * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail.
- * Out:     nonce32:   pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function.
- * In:      msg32:     the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL)
- *          key32:     pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL)
- *          algo16:    pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature
- *                     algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility).
- *          data:      Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through.
- *          attempt:   how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce.
- *                     This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values
- *                     are required to result in a different nonce.
- *
- * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of
- * the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt.
- */
-typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)(
-    unsigned char *nonce32,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const unsigned char *key32,
-    const unsigned char *algo16,
-    void *data,
-    unsigned int attempt
-);
-
-# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ)
-#  if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__)
-#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \
- ((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min))
-#  else
-#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0
-#  endif
-# endif
-
-/*  When this header is used at build-time the SECP256K1_BUILD define needs to be set
- *  to correctly setup export attributes and nullness checks.  This is normally done
- *  by secp256k1.c but to guard against this header being included before secp256k1.c
- *  has had a chance to set the define (e.g. via test harnesses that just includes
- *  secp256k1.c) we set SECP256K1_NO_BUILD when this header is processed without the
- *  BUILD define so this condition can be caught.
- */
-#ifndef SECP256K1_BUILD
-# define SECP256K1_NO_BUILD
-#endif
-
-/* Symbol visibility. */
-#if defined(_WIN32)
-  /* GCC for Windows (e.g., MinGW) accepts the __declspec syntax
-   * for MSVC compatibility. A __declspec declaration implies (but is not
-   * exactly equivalent to) __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))), and so we
-   * actually want __declspec even on GCC, see "Microsoft Windows Function
-   * Attributes" in the GCC manual and the recommendations in
-   * https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/Visibility. */
-# if defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)
-#  if defined(DLL_EXPORT) || defined(SECP256K1_DLL_EXPORT)
-    /* Building libsecp256k1 as a DLL.
-     * 1. If using Libtool, it defines DLL_EXPORT automatically.
-     * 2. In other cases, SECP256K1_DLL_EXPORT must be defined. */
-#   define SECP256K1_API extern __declspec (dllexport)
-#  else
-    /* Building libsecp256k1 as a static library on Windows.
-     * No declspec is needed, and so we would want the non-Windows-specific
-     * logic below take care of this case. However, this may result in setting
-     * __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))), which is supposed to be a noop
-     * on Windows but may trigger warnings when compiling with -flto due to a
-     * bug in GCC, see
-     * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=116478 . */
-#   define SECP256K1_API extern
-#  endif
-  /* The user must define SECP256K1_STATIC when consuming libsecp256k1 as a static
-   * library on Windows. */
-# elif !defined(SECP256K1_STATIC)
-   /* Consuming libsecp256k1 as a DLL. */
-#  define SECP256K1_API extern __declspec (dllimport)
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef SECP256K1_API
-/* All cases not captured by the Windows-specific logic. */
-# if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)
-   /* Building libsecp256k1 using GCC or compatible. */
-#  define SECP256K1_API extern __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
-# else
-   /* Fall back to standard C's extern. */
-#  define SECP256K1_API extern
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/* Warning attributes
- * NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out
- * some paranoid null checks. */
-# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
-#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__))
-# else
-#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
-# endif
-# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
-#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)  __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x)))
-# else
-#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)
-# endif
-
-/* Attribute for marking functions, types, and variables as deprecated */
-#if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__has_attribute)
-# if __has_attribute(__deprecated__)
-#  define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg) __attribute__ ((__deprecated__(_msg)))
-# else
-#  define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg)
-# endif
-#else
-# define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg)
-#endif
-
-/* All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1)
-/* The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (1 << 10)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8)
-
-/** Context flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create, secp256k1_context_preallocated_size, and
- *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create. */
-#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT)
-
-/** Deprecated context flags. These flags are treated equivalent to SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE. */
-#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY)
-#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN)
-
-/* Testing flag. Do not use. */
-#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY)
-
-/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize. */
-#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION)
-#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION)
-
-/** Prefix byte used to tag various encoded curvepoints for specific purposes */
-#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN 0x02
-#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD 0x03
-#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED 0x04
-#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_EVEN 0x06
-#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD 0x07
-
-/** A built-in constant secp256k1 context object with static storage duration, to be
- *  used in conjunction with secp256k1_selftest.
- *
- *  This context object offers *only limited functionality* , i.e., it cannot be used
- *  for API functions that perform computations involving secret keys, e.g., signing
- *  and public key generation. If this restriction applies to a specific API function,
- *  it is mentioned in its documentation. See secp256k1_context_create if you need a
- *  full context object that supports all functionality offered by the library.
- *
- *  It is highly recommended to call secp256k1_selftest before using this context.
- */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_static;
-
-/** Deprecated alias for secp256k1_context_static. */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_no_precomp
-SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_context_static instead");
-
-/** Perform basic self tests (to be used in conjunction with secp256k1_context_static)
- *
- *  This function performs self tests that detect some serious usage errors and
- *  similar conditions, e.g., when the library is compiled for the wrong endianness.
- *  This is a last resort measure to be used in production. The performed tests are
- *  very rudimentary and are not intended as a replacement for running the test
- *  binaries.
- *
- *  It is highly recommended to call this before using secp256k1_context_static.
- *  It is not necessary to call this function before using a context created with
- *  secp256k1_context_create (or secp256k1_context_preallocated_create), which will
- *  take care of performing the self tests.
- *
- *  If the tests fail, this function will call the default error handler to abort the
- *  program (see secp256k1_context_set_error_callback).
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_selftest(void);
-
-
-/** Create a secp256k1 context object (in dynamically allocated memory).
- *
- *  This function uses malloc to allocate memory. It is guaranteed that malloc is
- *  called at most once for every call of this function. If you need to avoid dynamic
- *  memory allocation entirely, see secp256k1_context_static and the functions in
- *  secp256k1_preallocated.h.
- *
- *  Returns: pointer to a newly created context object.
- *  In:      flags: Always set to SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (see below).
- *
- *  The only valid non-deprecated flag in recent library versions is
- *  SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, which will create a context sufficient for all functionality
- *  offered by the library. All other (deprecated) flags will be treated as equivalent
- *  to the SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE flag. Though the flags parameter primarily exists for
- *  historical reasons, future versions of the library may introduce new flags.
- *
- *  If the context is intended to be used for API functions that perform computations
- *  involving secret keys, e.g., signing and public key generation, then it is highly
- *  recommended to call secp256k1_context_randomize on the context before calling
- *  those API functions. This will provide enhanced protection against side-channel
- *  leakage, see secp256k1_context_randomize for details.
- *
- *  Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction and
- *  randomization can take non-negligible time.
- */
-SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_create(
-    unsigned int flags
-) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Copy a secp256k1 context object (into dynamically allocated memory).
- *
- *  This function uses malloc to allocate memory. It is guaranteed that malloc is
- *  called at most once for every call of this function. If you need to avoid dynamic
- *  memory allocation entirely, see the functions in secp256k1_preallocated.h.
- *
- *  Cloning secp256k1_context_static is not possible, and should not be emulated by
- *  the caller (e.g., using memcpy). Create a new context instead.
- *
- *  Returns: pointer to a newly created context object.
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context to copy (not secp256k1_context_static).
- */
-SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_clone(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object (created in dynamically allocated memory).
- *
- *  The context pointer may not be used afterwards.
- *
- *  The context to destroy must have been created using secp256k1_context_create
- *  or secp256k1_context_clone. If the context has instead been created using
- *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create or secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone, the
- *  behaviour is undefined. In that case, secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy must
- *  be used instead.
- *
- *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context to destroy, constructed using
- *               secp256k1_context_create or secp256k1_context_clone
- *               (i.e., not secp256k1_context_static).
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy(
-    secp256k1_context *ctx
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to
- *  an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned
- *  explicitly in the header.
- *
- *  The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a
- *  specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with
- *  the case that this code itself is broken.
- *
- *  On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about
- *  such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable.
- *  When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not
- *  to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are
- *  undefined.
- *
- *  When this function has not been called (or called with fn==NULL), then the
- *  default handler will be used. The library provides a default handler which
- *  writes the message to stderr and calls abort. This default handler can be
- *  replaced at link time if the preprocessor macro
- *  USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS is defined, which is the case if the build
- *  has been configured with --enable-external-default-callbacks. Then the
- *  following two symbols must be provided to link against:
- *   - void secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn(const char *message, void *data);
- *   - void secp256k1_default_error_callback_fn(const char *message, void *data);
- *  The library can call these default handlers even before a proper callback data
- *  pointer could have been set using secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback or
- *  secp256k1_context_set_error_callback, e.g., when the creation of a context
- *  fails. In this case, the corresponding default handler will be called with
- *  the data pointer argument set to NULL.
- *
- *  Args: ctx:  pointer to a context object.
- *  In:   fun:  pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is
- *              passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer.
- *              (NULL restores the default handler.)
- *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above, must be NULL for the default handler.
- *
- *  See also secp256k1_context_set_error_callback.
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(
-    secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    void (*fun)(const char *message, void *data),
-    const void *data
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check
- *  fails.
- *
- *  The default callback writes an error message to stderr and calls abort
- *  to abort the program.
- *
- *  This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation,
- *  memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can
- *  otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere
- *  incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback
- *  for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including
- *  crashing.
- *
- *  Args: ctx:  pointer to a context object.
- *  In:   fun:  pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs,
- *              taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores the
- *              default handler, see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback
- *              for details).
- *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above, must be NULL for the default handler.
- *
- *  See also secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback.
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(
-    secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    void (*fun)(const char *message, void *data),
-    const void *data
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid.
- *           0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid.
- *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:  pubkey:   pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a
- *                  parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined.
- *  In:   input:    pointer to a serialized public key
- *        inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input
- *
- *  This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or
- *  0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header
- *  byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *input,
-    size_t inputlen
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:    output:     pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if
- *                      compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key
- *                      in.
- *  In/Out: outputlen:  pointer to an integer which is initially set to the
- *                      size of output, and is overwritten with the written
- *                      size.
- *  In:     pubkey:     pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an
- *                      initialized public key.
- *          flags:      SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in
- *                      compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *output,
-    size_t *outputlen,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    unsigned int flags
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Compare two public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order
- *
- *  Returns: <0 if the first public key is less than the second
- *           >0 if the first public key is greater than the second
- *           0 if the two public keys are equal
- *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object
- *  In:   pubkey1:  first public key to compare
- *        pubkey2:  second public key to compare
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey1,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey2
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Sort public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.
- *
- *  Args:     ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  In:   pubkeys: array of pointers to pubkeys to sort
- *      n_pubkeys: number of elements in the pubkeys array
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey **pubkeys,
-    size_t n_pubkeys
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
-
-/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object
- *  Out:  sig:      pointer to a signature object
- *  In:   input64:  pointer to the 64-byte array to parse
- *
- *  The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a
- *  32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the
- *  encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding.
- *
- *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or
- *  S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail verification for
- *  any message and public key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *input64
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object
- *  Out:  sig:      pointer to a signature object
- *  In:   input:    pointer to the signature to be parsed
- *        inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input
- *
- *  This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the
- *  encoded numbers are out of range.
- *
- *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the
- *  encoded numbers are out of range, signature verification with it is
- *  guaranteed to fail for every message and public key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *input,
-    size_t inputlen
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise
- *  Args:   ctx:       pointer to a context object
- *  Out:    output:    pointer to an array to store the DER serialization
- *  In/Out: outputlen: pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer
- *                     should be set to the length of output. After the call
- *                     it will be set to the length of the serialization (even
- *                     if 0 was returned).
- *  In:     sig:       pointer to an initialized signature object
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *output,
-    size_t *outputlen,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format.
- *
- *  Returns: 1
- *  Args:   ctx:       pointer to a context object
- *  Out:    output64:  pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization
- *  In:     sig:       pointer to an initialized signature object
- *
- *  See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *output64,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Verify an ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: correct signature
- *           0: incorrect or unparsable signature
- *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object
- *  In:      sig:       the signature being verified.
- *           msghash32: the 32-byte message hash being verified.
- *                      The verifier must make sure to apply a cryptographic
- *                      hash function to the message by itself and not accept an
- *                      msghash32 value directly. Otherwise, it would be easy to
- *                      create a "valid" signature without knowledge of the
- *                      secret key. See also
- *                      https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/81116/35586 for more
- *                      background on this topic.
- *           pubkey:    pointer to an initialized public key to verify with.
- *
- * To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S
- * form are accepted.
- *
- * If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this
- * rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to
- * verification, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures.
- *
- * For details, see the comments for that function.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *msghash32,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was.
- *  Args: ctx:    pointer to a context object
- *  Out:  sigout: pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form,
- *                or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if
- *                you're only interested in whether the input was already
- *                normalized).
- *  In:   sigin:  pointer to a signature to check/normalize (can be identical to sigout)
- *
- *  With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same
- *  message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This
- *  is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping'
- *  the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature.
- *
- *  Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems
- *  where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can
- *  cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers
- *  to use a normalized form.
- *
- *  The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when
- *  variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify,
- *  making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because
- *  anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this
- *  property anyway.
- *
- *  The lower S value is always between 0x1 and
- *  0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0,
- *  inclusive.
- *
- *  No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but
- *  there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction,
- *  is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also
- *  accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this
- *  property is required for an application.
- *
- *  The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the
- *  lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case
- *  signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property,
- *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function.
- * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of
- * extra entropy.
- */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979;
-
-/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
-
-/** Create an ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: signature created
- *           0: the nonce generation function failed, or the secret key was invalid.
- *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  Out:     sig:       pointer to an array where the signature will be placed.
- *  In:      msghash32: the 32-byte message hash being signed.
- *           seckey:    pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
- *           noncefp:   pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL,
- *                      secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used.
- *           ndata:     pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function
- *                      (can be NULL). If it is non-NULL and
- *                      secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used, then ndata must be a
- *                      pointer to 32-bytes of additional data.
- *
- * The created signature is always in lower-S form. See
- * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *msghash32,
-    const unsigned char *seckey,
-    secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
-    const void *ndata
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Verify an elliptic curve secret key.
- *
- *  A secret key is valid if it is not 0 and less than the secp256k1 curve order
- *  when interpreted as an integer (most significant byte first). The
- *  probability of choosing a 32-byte string uniformly at random which is an
- *  invalid secret key is negligible. However, if it does happen it should
- *  be assumed that the randomness source is severely broken and there should
- *  be no retry.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: secret key is valid
- *           0: secret key is invalid
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  In:      seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const unsigned char *seckey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
-
-/** Compute the public key for a secret key.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores.
- *           0: secret was invalid, try again.
- *  Args:    ctx:    pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  Out:     pubkey: pointer to the created public key.
- *  In:      seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *seckey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Negates a secret key in place.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the given secret key is invalid according to
- *           secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify. 1 otherwise
- *  Args:   ctx:    pointer to a context object
- *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to the 32-byte secret key to be negated. If the
- *                  secret key is invalid according to
- *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0 and
- *                  seckey will be set to some unspecified value.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
-
-/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in
- *  future versions. */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2)
-  SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate instead");
-
-/** Negates a public key in place.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always
- *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object
- *  In/Out: pubkey:     pointer to the public key to be negated.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
-
-/** Tweak a secret key by adding tweak to it.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting secret key would be
- *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the secret key). 1
- *           otherwise.
- *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.
- *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is
- *                  invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this
- *                  function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified
- *                  value if this function returns 0.
- *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid according to
- *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero bytes. For uniformly
- *                  random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of being invalid is
- *                  negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in
- *  future versions. */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3)
-  SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add instead");
-
-/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting public key would be
- *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the corresponding
- *           secret key). 1 otherwise.
- *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.
- *  In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an
- *                  invalid value if this function returns 0.
- *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid according to
- *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero bytes. For uniformly
- *                  random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of being invalid is
- *                  negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Tweak a secret key by multiplying it by a tweak.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.
- *  Args:   ctx:    pointer to a context object.
- *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is
- *                  invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this
- *                  function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified
- *                  value if this function returns 0.
- *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to
- *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For
- *                  uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid
- *                  is negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in
- *  future versions. */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3)
-  SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul instead");
-
-/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.
- *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.
- *  In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an
- *                  invalid value if this function returns 0.
- *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to
- *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For
- *                  uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid
- *                  is negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Randomizes the context to provide enhanced protection against side-channel leakage.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: randomization successful
- *           0: error
- *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  In:      seed32:    pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state).
- *
- * While secp256k1 code is written and tested to be constant-time no matter what
- * secret values are, it is possible that a compiler may output code which is not,
- * and also that the CPU may not emit the same radio frequencies or draw the same
- * amount of power for all values. Randomization of the context shields against
- * side-channel observations which aim to exploit secret-dependent behaviour in
- * certain computations which involve secret keys.
- *
- * It is highly recommended to call this function on contexts returned from
- * secp256k1_context_create or secp256k1_context_clone (or from the corresponding
- * functions in secp256k1_preallocated.h) before using these contexts to call API
- * functions that perform computations involving secret keys, e.g., signing and
- * public key generation. It is possible to call this function more than once on
- * the same context, and doing so before every few computations involving secret
- * keys is recommended as a defense-in-depth measure. Randomization of the static
- * context secp256k1_context_static is not supported.
- *
- * Currently, the random seed is mainly used for blinding multiplications of a
- * secret scalar with the elliptic curve base point. Multiplications of this
- * kind are performed by exactly those API functions which are documented to
- * require a context that is not secp256k1_context_static. As a rule of thumb,
- * these are all functions which take a secret key (or a keypair) as an input.
- * A notable exception to that rule is the ECDH module, which relies on a different
- * kind of elliptic curve point multiplication and thus does not benefit from
- * enhanced protection against side-channel leakage currently.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize(
-    secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const unsigned char *seed32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-/** Add a number of public keys together.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid.
- *           0: the sum of the public keys is not valid.
- *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:    out:        pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key.
- *  In:     ins:        pointer to array of pointers to public keys.
- *          n:          the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *out,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey * const *ins,
-    size_t n
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Compute a tagged hash as defined in BIP-340.
- *
- *  This is useful for creating a message hash and achieving domain separation
- *  through an application-specific tag. This function returns
- *  SHA256(SHA256(tag)||SHA256(tag)||msg). Therefore, tagged hash
- *  implementations optimized for a specific tag can precompute the SHA256 state
- *  after hashing the tag hashes.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:  hash32: pointer to a 32-byte array to store the resulting hash
- *  In:      tag: pointer to an array containing the tag
- *        taglen: length of the tag array
- *           msg: pointer to an array containing the message
- *        msglen: length of the message array
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_tagged_sha256(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *hash32,
-    const unsigned char *tag,
-    size_t taglen,
-    const unsigned char *msg,
-    size_t msglen
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_H */

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDH_H
-#define SECP256K1_ECDH_H
-
-#include "secp256k1.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** A pointer to a function that hashes an EC point to obtain an ECDH secret
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if the point was successfully hashed.
- *           0 will cause secp256k1_ecdh to fail and return 0.
- *           Other return values are not allowed, and the behaviour of
- *           secp256k1_ecdh is undefined for other return values.
- *  Out:     output:     pointer to an array to be filled by the function
- *  In:      x32:        pointer to a 32-byte x coordinate
- *           y32:        pointer to a 32-byte y coordinate
- *           data:       arbitrary data pointer that is passed through
- */
-typedef int (*secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function)(
-  unsigned char *output,
-  const unsigned char *x32,
-  const unsigned char *y32,
-  void *data
-);
-
-/** An implementation of SHA256 hash function that applies to compressed public key.
- * Populates the output parameter with 32 bytes. */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256;
-
-/** A default ECDH hash function (currently equal to secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256).
- * Populates the output parameter with 32 bytes. */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_default;
-
-/** Compute an EC Diffie-Hellman secret in constant time
- *
- *  Returns: 1: exponentiation was successful
- *           0: scalar was invalid (zero or overflow) or hashfp returned 0
- *  Args:    ctx:        pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:     output:     pointer to an array to be filled by hashfp.
- *  In:      pubkey:     pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an initialized public key.
- *           seckey:     a 32-byte scalar with which to multiply the point.
- *           hashfp:     pointer to a hash function. If NULL,
- *                       secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256 is used
- *                       (in which case, 32 bytes will be written to output).
- *           data:       arbitrary data pointer that is passed through to hashfp
- *                       (can be NULL for secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdh(
-  const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-  unsigned char *output,
-  const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-  const unsigned char *seckey,
-  secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function hashfp,
-  void *data
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDH_H */

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_ellswift.h

@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_ELLSWIFT_H
-#define SECP256K1_ELLSWIFT_H
-
-#include "secp256k1.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* This module provides an implementation of ElligatorSwift as well as a
- * version of x-only ECDH using it (including compatibility with BIP324).
- *
- * ElligatorSwift is described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/759 by
- * Chavez-Saab, Rodriguez-Henriquez, and Tibouchi. It permits encoding
- * uniformly chosen public keys as 64-byte arrays which are indistinguishable
- * from uniformly random arrays.
- *
- * Let f be the function from pairs of field elements to point X coordinates,
- * defined as follows (all operations modulo p = 2^256 - 2^32 - 977)
- * f(u,t):
- * - Let C = 0xa2d2ba93507f1df233770c2a797962cc61f6d15da14ecd47d8d27ae1cd5f852,
- *   a square root of -3.
- * - If u=0, set u=1 instead.
- * - If t=0, set t=1 instead.
- * - If u^3 + t^2 + 7 = 0, multiply t by 2.
- * - Let X = (u^3 + 7 - t^2) / (2 * t)
- * - Let Y = (X + t) / (C * u)
- * - Return the first in [u + 4 * Y^2, (-X/Y - u) / 2, (X/Y - u) / 2] that is an
- *   X coordinate on the curve (at least one of them is, for any u and t).
- *
- * Then an ElligatorSwift encoding of x consists of the 32-byte big-endian
- * encodings of field elements u and t concatenated, where f(u,t) = x.
- * The encoding algorithm is described in the paper, and effectively picks a
- * uniformly random pair (u,t) among those which encode x.
- *
- * If the Y coordinate is relevant, it is given the same parity as t.
- *
- * Changes w.r.t. the paper:
- * - The u=0, t=0, and u^3+t^2+7=0 conditions result in decoding to the point
- *   at infinity in the paper. Here they are remapped to finite points.
- * - The paper uses an additional encoding bit for the parity of y. Here the
- *   parity of t is used (negating t does not affect the decoded x coordinate,
- *   so this is possible).
- *
- * For mathematical background about the scheme, see the doc/ellswift.md file.
- */
-
-/** A pointer to a function used by secp256k1_ellswift_xdh to hash the shared X
- *  coordinate along with the encoded public keys to a uniform shared secret.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if a shared secret was successfully computed.
- *           0 will cause secp256k1_ellswift_xdh to fail and return 0.
- *           Other return values are not allowed, and the behaviour of
- *           secp256k1_ellswift_xdh is undefined for other return values.
- *  Out:     output:     pointer to an array to be filled by the function
- *  In:      x32:        pointer to the 32-byte serialized X coordinate
- *                       of the resulting shared point (will not be NULL)
- *           ell_a64:    pointer to the 64-byte encoded public key of party A
- *                       (will not be NULL)
- *           ell_b64:    pointer to the 64-byte encoded public key of party B
- *                       (will not be NULL)
- *           data:       arbitrary data pointer that is passed through
- */
-typedef int (*secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function)(
-    unsigned char *output,
-    const unsigned char *x32,
-    const unsigned char *ell_a64,
-    const unsigned char *ell_b64,
-    void *data
-);
-
-/** An implementation of an secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function which uses
- *  SHA256(prefix64 || ell_a64 || ell_b64 || x32), where prefix64 is the 64-byte
- *  array pointed to by data. */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_prefix;
-
-/** An implementation of an secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function compatible with
- *  BIP324. It returns H_tag(ell_a64 || ell_b64 || x32), where H_tag is the
- *  BIP340 tagged hash function with tag "bip324_ellswift_xonly_ecdh". Equivalent
- *  to secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_prefix with prefix64 set to
- *  SHA256("bip324_ellswift_xonly_ecdh")||SHA256("bip324_ellswift_xonly_ecdh").
- *  The data argument is ignored. */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324;
-
-/** Construct a 64-byte ElligatorSwift encoding of a given pubkey.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *  Args:    ctx:        pointer to a context object
- *  Out:     ell64:      pointer to a 64-byte array to be filled
- *  In:      pubkey:     pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an
- *                       initialized public key
- *           rnd32:      pointer to 32 bytes of randomness
- *
- * It is recommended that rnd32 consists of 32 uniformly random bytes, not
- * known to any adversary trying to detect whether public keys are being
- * encoded, though 16 bytes of randomness (padded to an array of 32 bytes,
- * e.g., with zeros) suffice to make the result indistinguishable from
- * uniform. The randomness in rnd32 must not be a deterministic function of
- * the pubkey (it can be derived from the private key, though).
- *
- * It is not guaranteed that the computed encoding is stable across versions
- * of the library, even if all arguments to this function (including rnd32)
- * are the same.
- *
- * This function runs in variable time.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ellswift_encode(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *ell64,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *rnd32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Decode a 64-bytes ElligatorSwift encoded public key.
- *
- *  Returns: always 1
- *  Args:    ctx:        pointer to a context object
- *  Out:     pubkey:     pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey that will be filled
- *  In:      ell64:      pointer to a 64-byte array to decode
- *
- * This function runs in variable time.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ellswift_decode(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *ell64
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Compute an ElligatorSwift public key for a secret key.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key was stored.
- *           0: secret was invalid, try again.
- *  Args:    ctx:        pointer to a context object
- *  Out:     ell64:      pointer to a 64-byte array to receive the ElligatorSwift
- *                       public key
- *  In:      seckey32:   pointer to a 32-byte secret key
- *           auxrnd32:   (optional) pointer to 32 bytes of randomness
- *
- * Constant time in seckey and auxrnd32, but not in the resulting public key.
- *
- * It is recommended that auxrnd32 contains 32 uniformly random bytes, though
- * it is optional (and does result in encodings that are indistinguishable from
- * uniform even without any auxrnd32). It differs from the (mandatory) rnd32
- * argument to secp256k1_ellswift_encode in this regard.
- *
- * This function can be used instead of calling secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create
- * followed by secp256k1_ellswift_encode. It is safer, as it uses the secret
- * key as entropy for the encoding (supplemented with auxrnd32, if provided).
- *
- * Like secp256k1_ellswift_encode, this function does not guarantee that the
- * computed encoding is stable across versions of the library, even if all
- * arguments (including auxrnd32) are the same.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ellswift_create(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *ell64,
-    const unsigned char *seckey32,
-    const unsigned char *auxrnd32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Given a private key, and ElligatorSwift public keys sent in both directions,
- *  compute a shared secret using x-only Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
- *
- *  Returns: 1: shared secret was successfully computed
- *           0: secret was invalid or hashfp returned 0
- *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:     output:    pointer to an array to be filled by hashfp.
- *  In:      ell_a64:   pointer to the 64-byte encoded public key of party A
- *                      (will not be NULL)
- *           ell_b64:   pointer to the 64-byte encoded public key of party B
- *                      (will not be NULL)
- *           seckey32:  pointer to our 32-byte secret key
- *           party:     boolean indicating which party we are: zero if we are
- *                      party A, non-zero if we are party B. seckey32 must be
- *                      the private key corresponding to that party's ell_?64.
- *                      This correspondence is not checked.
- *           hashfp:    pointer to a hash function.
- *           data:      arbitrary data pointer passed through to hashfp.
- *
- * Constant time in seckey32.
- *
- * This function is more efficient than decoding the public keys, and performing
- * ECDH on them.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(
-  const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-  unsigned char *output,
-  const unsigned char *ell_a64,
-  const unsigned char *ell_b64,
-  const unsigned char *seckey32,
-  int party,
-  secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function hashfp,
-  void *data
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_ELLSWIFT_H */

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h

@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H
-#define SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H
-
-#include "secp256k1.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid "x-only" public key.
- *  An x-only pubkey encodes a point whose Y coordinate is even. It is
- *  serialized using only its X coordinate (32 bytes). See BIP-340 for more
- *  information about x-only pubkeys.
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
- *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
- *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
- *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, use
- *  use secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse. To
- *  compare keys, use secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_cmp.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_xonly_pubkey {
-    unsigned char data[64];
-} secp256k1_xonly_pubkey;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a keypair consisting of a secret and a
- *  public key.
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
- *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
- *  however guaranteed to be 96 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_keypair {
-    unsigned char data[96];
-} secp256k1_keypair;
-
-/** Parse a 32-byte sequence into a xonly_pubkey object.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid.
- *           0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid.
- *
- *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a
- *               parsed version of input. If not, it's set to an invalid value.
- *  In: input32: pointer to a serialized xonly_pubkey.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *input32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize an xonly_pubkey object into a 32-byte sequence.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *
- *  Args:     ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  Out: output32: pointer to a 32-byte array to place the serialized key in.
- *  In:    pubkey: pointer to a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey containing an initialized public key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *output32,
-    const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Compare two x-only public keys using lexicographic order
- *
- *  Returns: <0 if the first public key is less than the second
- *           >0 if the first public key is greater than the second
- *           0 if the two public keys are equal
- *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object.
- *  In:   pubkey1:  first public key to compare
- *        pubkey2:  second public key to compare
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_cmp(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pk1,
-    const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pk2
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Converts a secp256k1_pubkey into a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *
- *  Args:         ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  Out: xonly_pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key object for placing the converted public key.
- *          pk_parity: Ignored if NULL. Otherwise, pointer to an integer that
- *                     will be set to 1 if the point encoded by xonly_pubkey is
- *                     the negation of the pubkey and set to 0 otherwise.
- *  In:        pubkey: pointer to a public key that is converted.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *xonly_pubkey,
-    int *pk_parity,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Tweak an x-only public key by adding the generator multiplied with tweak32
- *  to it.
- *
- *  Note that the resulting point can not in general be represented by an x-only
- *  pubkey because it may have an odd Y coordinate. Instead, the output_pubkey
- *  is a normal secp256k1_pubkey.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting public key would be
- *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the corresponding
- *           secret key). 1 otherwise.
- *
- *  Args:           ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:  output_pubkey: pointer to a public key to store the result. Will be set
- *                       to an invalid value if this function returns 0.
- *  In: internal_pubkey: pointer to an x-only pubkey to apply the tweak to.
- *              tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid
- *                       according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero
- *                       bytes. For uniformly random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of
- *                       being invalid is negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *output_pubkey,
-    const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Checks that a tweaked pubkey is the result of calling
- *  secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add with internal_pubkey and tweak32.
- *
- *  The tweaked pubkey is represented by its 32-byte x-only serialization and
- *  its pk_parity, which can both be obtained by converting the result of
- *  tweak_add to a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey.
- *
- *  Note that this alone does _not_ verify that the tweaked pubkey is a
- *  commitment. If the tweak is not chosen in a specific way, the tweaked pubkey
- *  can easily be the result of a different internal_pubkey and tweak.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the tweaked pubkey is not the
- *           result of tweaking the internal_pubkey with tweak32. 1 otherwise.
- *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  In: tweaked_pubkey32: pointer to a serialized xonly_pubkey.
- *     tweaked_pk_parity: the parity of the tweaked pubkey (whose serialization
- *                        is passed in as tweaked_pubkey32). This must match the
- *                        pk_parity value that is returned when calling
- *                        secp256k1_xonly_pubkey with the tweaked pubkey, or
- *                        this function will fail.
- *       internal_pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key object to apply the tweak to.
- *               tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const unsigned char *tweaked_pubkey32,
-    int tweaked_pk_parity,
-    const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
-
-/** Compute the keypair for a valid secret key.
- *
- *  See the documentation of `secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify` for more information
- *  about the validity of secret keys.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: secret key is valid
- *           0: secret key is invalid
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  Out: keypair: pointer to the created keypair.
- *  In:   seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_create(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_keypair *keypair,
-    const unsigned char *seckey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Get the secret key from a keypair.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte buffer for the secret key.
- *  In: keypair: pointer to a keypair.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_sec(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Get the public key from a keypair.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object, set to the keypair public key.
- *  In: keypair: pointer to a keypair.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_pub(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Get the x-only public key from a keypair.
- *
- *  This is the same as calling secp256k1_keypair_pub and then
- *  secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  Out: pubkey: pointer to an xonly_pubkey object, set to the keypair
- *               public key after converting it to an xonly_pubkey.
- *    pk_parity: Ignored if NULL. Otherwise, pointer to an integer that will be set to the
- *               pk_parity argument of secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey.
- *  In: keypair: pointer to a keypair.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey,
-    int *pk_parity,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Tweak a keypair by adding tweak32 to the secret key and updating the public
- *  key accordingly.
- *
- *  Calling this function and then secp256k1_keypair_pub results in the same
- *  public key as calling secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub and then
- *  secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting keypair would be
- *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the keypair's
- *           secret key). 1 otherwise.
- *
- *  Args:       ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  In/Out: keypair: pointer to a keypair to apply the tweak to. Will be set to
- *                   an invalid value if this function returns 0.
- *  In:     tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid according to
- *                   secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero bytes. For uniformly
- *                   random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of being invalid is
- *                   negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_keypair *keypair,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H */

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_musig.h

@@ -1,588 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_MUSIG_H
-#define SECP256K1_MUSIG_H
-
-#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-/** This module implements BIP 327 "MuSig2 for BIP340-compatible
- *  Multi-Signatures"
- *  (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki)
- *  v1.0.0. You can find an example demonstrating the musig module in
- *  examples/musig.c.
- *
- *  The module also supports BIP 341 ("Taproot") public key tweaking.
- *
- *  It is recommended to read the documentation in this include file carefully.
- *  Further notes on API usage can be found in doc/musig.md
- *
- *  Since the first version of MuSig is essentially replaced by MuSig2, we use
- *  MuSig, musig and MuSig2 synonymously unless noted otherwise.
- */
-
-/** Opaque data structures
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside the opaque data structures is
- *  implementation defined and not guaranteed to be portable between different
- *  platforms or versions. With the exception of `secp256k1_musig_secnonce`, the
- *  data structures can be safely copied/moved. If you need to convert to a
- *  format suitable for storage, transmission, or comparison, use the
- *  corresponding serialization and parsing functions.
- */
-
-/** Opaque data structure that caches information about public key aggregation.
- *
- *  Guaranteed to be 197 bytes in size. No serialization and parsing functions
- *  (yet).
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache {
-    unsigned char data[197];
-} secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's _secret_ nonce.
- *
- *  Guaranteed to be 132 bytes in size.
- *
- *  WARNING: This structure MUST NOT be copied or read or written to directly. A
- *  signer who is online throughout the whole process and can keep this
- *  structure in memory can use the provided API functions for a safe standard
- *  workflow.
- *
- *  Copying this data structure can result in nonce reuse which will leak the
- *  secret signing key.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_musig_secnonce {
-    unsigned char data[132];
-} secp256k1_musig_secnonce;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's public nonce.
- *
- *  Guaranteed to be 132 bytes in size. Serialized and parsed with
- *  `musig_pubnonce_serialize` and `musig_pubnonce_parse`.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_musig_pubnonce {
-    unsigned char data[132];
-} secp256k1_musig_pubnonce;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds an aggregate public nonce.
- *
- *  Guaranteed to be 132 bytes in size. Serialized and parsed with
- *  `musig_aggnonce_serialize` and `musig_aggnonce_parse`.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_musig_aggnonce {
-    unsigned char data[132];
-} secp256k1_musig_aggnonce;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a MuSig session.
- *
- *  This structure is not required to be kept secret for the signing protocol to
- *  be secure. Guaranteed to be 133 bytes in size. No serialization and parsing
- *  functions (yet).
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_musig_session {
-    unsigned char data[133];
-} secp256k1_musig_session;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a partial MuSig signature.
- *
- *  Guaranteed to be 36 bytes in size. Serialized and parsed with
- *  `musig_partial_sig_serialize` and `musig_partial_sig_parse`.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_musig_partial_sig {
-    unsigned char data[36];
-} secp256k1_musig_partial_sig;
-
-/** Parse a signer's public nonce.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the nonce could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:   nonce: pointer to a nonce object
- *  In:     in66: pointer to the 66-byte nonce to be parsed
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_pubnonce_parse(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *nonce,
-    const unsigned char *in66
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize a signer's public nonce
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:   out66: pointer to a 66-byte array to store the serialized nonce
- *  In:    nonce: pointer to the nonce
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_musig_pubnonce_serialize(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *out66,
-    const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *nonce
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Parse an aggregate public nonce.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the nonce could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:   nonce: pointer to a nonce object
- *  In:     in66: pointer to the 66-byte nonce to be parsed
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_aggnonce_parse(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_aggnonce *nonce,
-    const unsigned char *in66
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize an aggregate public nonce
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:   out66: pointer to a 66-byte array to store the serialized nonce
- *  In:    nonce: pointer to the nonce
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_musig_aggnonce_serialize(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *out66,
-    const secp256k1_musig_aggnonce *nonce
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Parse a MuSig partial signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:     sig: pointer to a signature object
- *  In:     in32: pointer to the 32-byte signature to be parsed
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_parse(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_partial_sig *sig,
-    const unsigned char *in32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize a MuSig partial signature
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:   out32: pointer to a 32-byte array to store the serialized signature
- *  In:      sig: pointer to the signature
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_serialize(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *out32,
-    const secp256k1_musig_partial_sig *sig
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Computes an aggregate public key and uses it to initialize a keyagg_cache
- *
- *  Different orders of `pubkeys` result in different `agg_pk`s.
- *
- *  Before aggregating, the pubkeys can be sorted with `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort`
- *  which ensures the same `agg_pk` result for the same multiset of pubkeys.
- *  This is useful to do before `pubkey_agg`, such that the order of pubkeys
- *  does not affect the aggregate public key.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
- *  Args:        ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:      agg_pk: the MuSig-aggregated x-only public key. If you do not need it,
- *                    this arg can be NULL.
- *      keyagg_cache: if non-NULL, pointer to a musig_keyagg_cache struct that
- *                    is required for signing (or observing the signing session
- *                    and verifying partial signatures).
- *   In:     pubkeys: input array of pointers to public keys to aggregate. The order
- *                    is important; a different order will result in a different
- *                    aggregate public key.
- *         n_pubkeys: length of pubkeys array. Must be greater than 0.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *agg_pk,
-    secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey * const *pubkeys,
-    size_t n_pubkeys
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Obtain the aggregate public key from a keyagg_cache.
- *
- *  This is only useful if you need the non-xonly public key, in particular for
- *  plain (non-xonly) tweaking or batch-verifying multiple key aggregations
- *  (not implemented).
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
- *  Args:        ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:      agg_pk: the MuSig-aggregated public key.
- *  In: keyagg_cache: pointer to a `musig_keyagg_cache` struct initialized by
- *                    `musig_pubkey_agg`
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_pubkey_get(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *agg_pk,
-    const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Apply plain "EC" tweaking to a public key in a given keyagg_cache by adding
- *  the generator multiplied with `tweak32` to it. This is useful for deriving
- *  child keys from an aggregate public key via BIP 32 where `tweak32` is set to
- *  a hash as defined in BIP 32.
- *
- *  Callers are responsible for deriving `tweak32` in a way that does not reduce
- *  the security of MuSig (for example, by following BIP 32).
- *
- *  The tweaking method is the same as `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add`. So after
- *  the following pseudocode buf and buf2 have identical contents (absent
- *  earlier failures).
- *
- *  secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(..., keyagg_cache, pubkeys, ...)
- *  secp256k1_musig_pubkey_get(..., agg_pk, keyagg_cache)
- *  secp256k1_musig_pubkey_ec_tweak_add(..., output_pk, tweak32, keyagg_cache)
- *  secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(..., buf, ..., output_pk, ...)
- *  secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(..., agg_pk, tweak32)
- *  secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(..., buf2, ..., agg_pk, ...)
- *
- *  This function is required if you want to _sign_ for a tweaked aggregate key.
- *  If you are only computing a public key but not intending to create a
- *  signature for it, use `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add` instead.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
- *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:   output_pubkey: pointer to a public key to store the result. Will be set
- *                        to an invalid value if this function returns 0. If you
- *                        do not need it, this arg can be NULL.
- *  In/Out: keyagg_cache: pointer to a `musig_keyagg_cache` struct initialized by
- *                       `musig_pubkey_agg`
- *  In:          tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. The tweak is valid if it passes
- *                        `secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify` and is not equal to the
- *                        secret key corresponding to the public key represented
- *                        by keyagg_cache or its negation. For uniformly random
- *                        32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid is
- *                        negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_pubkey_ec_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *output_pubkey,
-    secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Apply x-only tweaking to a public key in a given keyagg_cache by adding the
- *  generator multiplied with `tweak32` to it. This is useful for creating
- *  Taproot outputs where `tweak32` is set to a TapTweak hash as defined in BIP
- *  341.
- *
- *  Callers are responsible for deriving `tweak32` in a way that does not reduce
- *  the security of MuSig (for example, by following Taproot BIP 341).
- *
- *  The tweaking method is the same as `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add`. So in
- *  the following pseudocode xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check (absent earlier
- *  failures) returns 1.
- *
- *  secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(..., agg_pk, keyagg_cache, pubkeys, ...)
- *  secp256k1_musig_pubkey_xonly_tweak_add(..., output_pk, keyagg_cache, tweak32)
- *  secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(..., buf, output_pk)
- *  secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(..., buf, ..., agg_pk, tweak32)
- *
- *  This function is required if you want to _sign_ for a tweaked aggregate key.
- *  If you are only computing a public key but not intending to create a
- *  signature for it, use `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add` instead.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
- *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:   output_pubkey: pointer to a public key to store the result. Will be set
- *                        to an invalid value if this function returns 0. If you
- *                        do not need it, this arg can be NULL.
- *  In/Out: keyagg_cache: pointer to a `musig_keyagg_cache` struct initialized by
- *                       `musig_pubkey_agg`
- *  In:          tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. The tweak is valid if it passes
- *                        `secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify` and is not equal to the
- *                        secret key corresponding to the public key represented
- *                        by keyagg_cache or its negation. For uniformly random
- *                        32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid is
- *                        negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_pubkey_xonly_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *output_pubkey,
-    secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache,
-    const unsigned char *tweak32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Starts a signing session by generating a nonce
- *
- *  This function outputs a secret nonce that will be required for signing and a
- *  corresponding public nonce that is intended to be sent to other signers.
- *
- *  MuSig differs from regular Schnorr signing in that implementers _must_ take
- *  special care to not reuse a nonce. This can be ensured by following these rules:
- *
- *  1. Each call to this function must have a UNIQUE session_secrand32 that must
- *     NOT BE REUSED in subsequent calls to this function and must be KEPT
- *     SECRET (even from other signers).
- *  2. If you already know the seckey, message or aggregate public key
- *     cache, they can be optionally provided to derive the nonce and increase
- *     misuse-resistance. The extra_input32 argument can be used to provide
- *     additional data that does not repeat in normal scenarios, such as the
- *     current time.
- *  3. Avoid copying (or serializing) the secnonce. This reduces the possibility
- *     that it is used more than once for signing.
- *
- *  If you don't have access to good randomness for session_secrand32, but you
- *  have access to a non-repeating counter, then see
- *  secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter.
- *
- *  Remember that nonce reuse will leak the secret key!
- *  Note that using the same seckey for multiple MuSig sessions is fine.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid and 1 otherwise
- *  Args:         ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static)
- *  Out:     secnonce: pointer to a structure to store the secret nonce
- *           pubnonce: pointer to a structure to store the public nonce
- *  In/Out:
- *  session_secrand32: a 32-byte session_secrand32 as explained above. Must be unique to this
- *                     call to secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen and must be uniformly
- *                     random. If the function call is successful, the
- *                     session_secrand32 buffer is invalidated to prevent reuse.
- *  In:
- *             seckey: the 32-byte secret key that will later be used for signing, if
- *                     already known (can be NULL)
- *             pubkey: public key of the signer creating the nonce. The secnonce
- *                     output of this function cannot be used to sign for any
- *                     other public key. While the public key should correspond
- *                     to the provided seckey, a mismatch will not cause the
- *                     function to return 0.
- *              msg32: the 32-byte message that will later be signed, if already known
- *                     (can be NULL)
- *       keyagg_cache: pointer to the keyagg_cache that was used to create the aggregate
- *                     (and potentially tweaked) public key if already known
- *                     (can be NULL)
- *      extra_input32: an optional 32-byte array that is input to the nonce
- *                     derivation function (can be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_secnonce *secnonce,
-    secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *pubnonce,
-    unsigned char *session_secrand32,
-    const unsigned char *seckey,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache,
-    const unsigned char *extra_input32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6);
-
-
-/** Alternative way to generate a nonce and start a signing session
- *
- *  This function outputs a secret nonce that will be required for signing and a
- *  corresponding public nonce that is intended to be sent to other signers.
- *
- *  This function differs from `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen` by accepting a
- *  non-repeating counter value instead of a secret random value. This requires
- *  that a secret key is provided to `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter`
- *  (through the keypair argument), as opposed to `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen`
- *  where the seckey argument is optional.
- *
- *  MuSig differs from regular Schnorr signing in that implementers _must_ take
- *  special care to not reuse a nonce. This can be ensured by following these rules:
- *
- *  1. The nonrepeating_cnt argument must be a counter value that never repeats,
- *     i.e., you must never call `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter` twice with
- *     the same keypair and nonrepeating_cnt value. For example, this implies
- *     that if the same keypair is used with `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter`
- *     on multiple devices, none of the devices should have the same counter
- *     value as any other device.
- *  2. If the seckey, message or aggregate public key cache is already available
- *     at this stage, any of these can be optionally provided, in which case
- *     they will be used in the derivation of the nonce and increase
- *     misuse-resistance. The extra_input32 argument can be used to provide
- *     additional data that does not repeat in normal scenarios, such as the
- *     current time.
- *  3. Avoid copying (or serializing) the secnonce. This reduces the possibility
- *     that it is used more than once for signing.
- *
- *  Remember that nonce reuse will leak the secret key!
- *  Note that using the same keypair for multiple MuSig sessions is fine.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid and 1 otherwise
- *  Args:         ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static)
- *  Out:     secnonce: pointer to a structure to store the secret nonce
- *           pubnonce: pointer to a structure to store the public nonce
- *  In:
- *   nonrepeating_cnt: the value of a counter as explained above. Must be
- *                     unique to this call to secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen.
- *            keypair: keypair of the signer creating the nonce. The secnonce
- *                     output of this function cannot be used to sign for any
- *                     other keypair.
- *              msg32: the 32-byte message that will later be signed, if already known
- *                     (can be NULL)
- *       keyagg_cache: pointer to the keyagg_cache that was used to create the aggregate
- *                     (and potentially tweaked) public key if already known
- *                     (can be NULL)
- *      extra_input32: an optional 32-byte array that is input to the nonce
- *                     derivation function (can be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_secnonce *secnonce,
-    secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *pubnonce,
-    uint64_t nonrepeating_cnt,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache,
-    const unsigned char *extra_input32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
-
-/** Aggregates the nonces of all signers into a single nonce
- *
- *  This can be done by an untrusted party to reduce the communication
- *  between signers. Instead of everyone sending nonces to everyone else, there
- *  can be one party receiving all nonces, aggregating the nonces with this
- *  function and then sending only the aggregate nonce back to the signers.
- *
- *  If the aggregator does not compute the aggregate nonce correctly, the final
- *  signature will be invalid.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
- *  Args:           ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:       aggnonce: pointer to an aggregate public nonce object for
- *                       musig_nonce_process
- *  In:       pubnonces: array of pointers to public nonces sent by the
- *                       signers
- *          n_pubnonces: number of elements in the pubnonces array. Must be
- *                       greater than 0.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_aggnonce *aggnonce,
-    const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce * const *pubnonces,
-    size_t n_pubnonces
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Takes the aggregate nonce and creates a session that is required for signing
- *  and verification of partial signatures.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
- *  Args:          ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:       session: pointer to a struct to store the session
- *  In:       aggnonce: pointer to an aggregate public nonce object that is the
- *                      output of musig_nonce_agg
- *              msg32:  the 32-byte message to sign
- *       keyagg_cache:  pointer to the keyagg_cache that was used to create the
- *                      aggregate (and potentially tweaked) pubkey
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_nonce_process(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_session *session,
-    const secp256k1_musig_aggnonce *aggnonce,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
-
-/** Produces a partial signature
- *
- *  This function overwrites the given secnonce with zeros and will abort if given a
- *  secnonce that is all zeros. This is a best effort attempt to protect against nonce
- *  reuse. However, this is of course easily defeated if the secnonce has been
- *  copied (or serialized). Remember that nonce reuse will leak the secret key!
- *
- *  For signing to succeed, the secnonce provided to this function must have
- *  been generated for the provided keypair. This means that when signing for a
- *  keypair consisting of a seckey and pubkey, the secnonce must have been
- *  created by calling musig_nonce_gen with that pubkey. Otherwise, the
- *  illegal_callback is called.
- *
- *  This function does not verify the output partial signature, deviating from
- *  the BIP 327 specification. It is recommended to verify the output partial
- *  signature with `secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_verify` to prevent random or
- *  adversarially provoked computation errors.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the provided secnonce has already
- *           been used for signing, 1 otherwise
- *  Args:         ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:  partial_sig: pointer to struct to store the partial signature
- *  In/Out:  secnonce: pointer to the secnonce struct created in
- *                     musig_nonce_gen that has been never used in a
- *                     partial_sign call before and has been created for the
- *                     keypair
- *  In:       keypair: pointer to keypair to sign the message with
- *       keyagg_cache: pointer to the keyagg_cache that was output when the
- *                     aggregate public key for this session
- *            session: pointer to the session that was created with
- *                     musig_nonce_process
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_musig_partial_sign(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_musig_partial_sig *partial_sig,
-    secp256k1_musig_secnonce *secnonce,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair,
-    const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache,
-    const secp256k1_musig_session *session
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6);
-
-/** Verifies an individual signer's partial signature
- *
- *  The signature is verified for a specific signing session. In order to avoid
- *  accidentally verifying a signature from a different or non-existing signing
- *  session, you must ensure the following:
- *    1. The `keyagg_cache` argument is identical to the one used to create the
- *       `session` with `musig_nonce_process`.
- *    2. The `pubkey` argument must be identical to the one sent by the signer
- *       before aggregating it with `musig_pubkey_agg` to create the
- *       `keyagg_cache`.
- *    3. The `pubnonce` argument must be identical to the one sent by the signer
- *       before aggregating it with `musig_nonce_agg` and using the result to
- *       create the `session` with `musig_nonce_process`.
- *
- *  It is not required to call this function in regular MuSig sessions, because
- *  if any partial signature does not verify, the final signature will not
- *  verify either, so the problem will be caught. However, this function
- *  provides the ability to identify which specific partial signature fails
- *  verification.
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the partial signature does not
- *           verify, 1 otherwise
- *  Args         ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  In:  partial_sig: pointer to partial signature to verify, sent by
- *                    the signer associated with `pubnonce` and `pubkey`
- *          pubnonce: public nonce of the signer in the signing session
- *            pubkey: public key of the signer in the signing session
- *      keyagg_cache: pointer to the keyagg_cache that was output when the
- *                    aggregate public key for this signing session
- *           session: pointer to the session that was created with
- *                    `musig_nonce_process`
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_verify(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const secp256k1_musig_partial_sig *partial_sig,
-    const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *pubnonce,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *keyagg_cache,
-    const secp256k1_musig_session *session
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6);
-
-/** Aggregates partial signatures
- *
- *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise (which does NOT mean
- *           the resulting signature verifies).
- *  Args:         ctx: pointer to a context object
- *  Out:        sig64: complete (but possibly invalid) Schnorr signature
- *  In:       session: pointer to the session that was created with
- *                     musig_nonce_process
- *       partial_sigs: array of pointers to partial signatures to aggregate
- *             n_sigs: number of elements in the partial_sigs array. Must be
- *                     greater than 0.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_agg(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *sig64,
-    const secp256k1_musig_session *session,
-    const secp256k1_musig_partial_sig * const *partial_sigs,
-    size_t n_sigs
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_preallocated.h

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_PREALLOCATED_H
-#define SECP256K1_PREALLOCATED_H
-
-#include "secp256k1.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* The module provided by this header file is intended for settings in which it
- * is not possible or desirable to rely on dynamic memory allocation. It provides
- * functions for creating, cloning, and destroying secp256k1 context objects in a
- * contiguous fixed-size block of memory provided by the caller.
- *
- * Context objects created by functions in this module can be used like contexts
- * objects created by functions in secp256k1.h, i.e., they can be passed to any
- * API function that expects a context object (see secp256k1.h for details). The
- * only exception is that context objects created by functions in this module
- * must be destroyed using secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy (in this
- * module) instead of secp256k1_context_destroy (in secp256k1.h).
- *
- * It is guaranteed that functions in this module will not call malloc or its
- * friends realloc, calloc, and free.
- */
-
-/** Determine the memory size of a secp256k1 context object to be created in
- *  caller-provided memory.
- *
- *  The purpose of this function is to determine how much memory must be provided
- *  to secp256k1_context_preallocated_create.
- *
- *  Returns: the required size of the caller-provided memory block
- *  In:      flags:    which parts of the context to initialize.
- */
-SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(
-    unsigned int flags
-) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Create a secp256k1 context object in caller-provided memory.
- *
- *  The caller must provide a pointer to a rewritable contiguous block of memory
- *  of size at least secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags) bytes, suitably
- *  aligned to hold an object of any type.
- *
- *  The block of memory is exclusively owned by the created context object during
- *  the lifetime of this context object, which begins with the call to this
- *  function and ends when a call to secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy
- *  (which destroys the context object again) returns. During the lifetime of the
- *  context object, the caller is obligated not to access this block of memory,
- *  i.e., the caller may not read or write the memory, e.g., by copying the memory
- *  contents to a different location or trying to create a second context object
- *  in the memory. In simpler words, the prealloc pointer (or any pointer derived
- *  from it) should not be used during the lifetime of the context object.
- *
- *  Returns: pointer to newly created context object.
- *  In:      prealloc: pointer to a rewritable contiguous block of memory of
- *                     size at least secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags)
- *                     bytes, as detailed above.
- *           flags:    which parts of the context to initialize.
- *
- *  See secp256k1_context_create (in secp256k1.h) for further details.
- *
- *  See also secp256k1_context_randomize (in secp256k1.h)
- *  and secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy.
- */
-SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(
-    void *prealloc,
-    unsigned int flags
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Determine the memory size of a secp256k1 context object to be copied into
- *  caller-provided memory.
- *
- *  Returns: the required size of the caller-provided memory block.
- *  In:      ctx: pointer to a context to copy.
- */
-SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Copy a secp256k1 context object into caller-provided memory.
- *
- *  The caller must provide a pointer to a rewritable contiguous block of memory
- *  of size at least secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags) bytes, suitably
- *  aligned to hold an object of any type.
- *
- *  The block of memory is exclusively owned by the created context object during
- *  the lifetime of this context object, see the description of
- *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create for details.
- *
- *  Cloning secp256k1_context_static is not possible, and should not be emulated by
- *  the caller (e.g., using memcpy). Create a new context instead.
- *
- *  Returns: pointer to a newly created context object.
- *  Args:    ctx:      pointer to a context to copy (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  In:      prealloc: pointer to a rewritable contiguous block of memory of
- *                     size at least secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags)
- *                     bytes, as detailed above.
- */
-SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    void *prealloc
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object that has been created in
- *  caller-provided memory.
- *
- *  The context pointer may not be used afterwards.
- *
- *  The context to destroy must have been created using
- *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create or secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone.
- *  If the context has instead been created using secp256k1_context_create or
- *  secp256k1_context_clone, the behaviour is undefined. In that case,
- *  secp256k1_context_destroy must be used instead.
- *
- *  If required, it is the responsibility of the caller to deallocate the block
- *  of memory properly after this function returns, e.g., by calling free on the
- *  preallocated pointer given to secp256k1_context_preallocated_create or
- *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone.
- *
- *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context to destroy, constructed using
- *               secp256k1_context_preallocated_create or
- *               secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone
- *               (i.e., not secp256k1_context_static).
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy(
-    secp256k1_context *ctx
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_PREALLOCATED_H */

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h

@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H
-#define SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H
-
-#include "secp256k1.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed ECDSA signature,
- *  supporting pubkey recovery.
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
- *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
- *  however guaranteed to be 65 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
- *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use
- *  the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and
- *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions.
- *
- *  Furthermore, it is guaranteed that identical signatures (including their
- *  recoverability) will have identical representation, so they can be
- *  memcmp'ed.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature {
-    unsigned char data[65];
-} secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature;
-
-/** Parse a compact ECDSA signature (64 bytes + recovery id).
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise
- *  Args: ctx:     pointer to a context object
- *  Out:  sig:     pointer to a signature object
- *  In:   input64: pointer to a 64-byte compact signature
- *        recid:   the recovery id (0, 1, 2 or 3)
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *input64,
-    int recid
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Convert a recoverable signature into a normal signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1
- *  Args: ctx:    pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:  sig:    pointer to a normal signature.
- *  In:   sigin:  pointer to a recoverable signature.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sigin
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact format (64 bytes + recovery id).
- *
- *  Returns: 1
- *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:  output64: pointer to a 64-byte array of the compact signature.
- *        recid:    pointer to an integer to hold the recovery id.
- *  In:   sig:      pointer to an initialized signature object.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *output64,
-    int *recid,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Create a recoverable ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: signature created
- *           0: the nonce generation function failed, or the secret key was invalid.
- *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  Out:     sig:       pointer to an array where the signature will be placed.
- *  In:      msghash32: the 32-byte message hash being signed.
- *           seckey:    pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
- *           noncefp:   pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL,
- *                      secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used.
- *           ndata:     pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function
- *                      (can be NULL for secp256k1_nonce_function_default).
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *msghash32,
-    const unsigned char *seckey,
-    secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
-    const void *ndata
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Recover an ECDSA public key from a signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: public key successfully recovered (which guarantees a correct signature).
- *           0: otherwise.
- *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object.
- *  Out:     pubkey:    pointer to the recovered public key.
- *  In:      sig:       pointer to initialized signature that supports pubkey recovery.
- *           msghash32: the 32-byte message hash assumed to be signed.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *msghash32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H */

external/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H
-#define SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H
-
-#include "secp256k1.h"
-#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** This module implements a variant of Schnorr signatures compliant with
- *  Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 340 "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1"
- *  (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki).
- */
-
-/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce.
- *
- *  Same as secp256k1_nonce function with the exception of accepting an
- *  additional pubkey argument and not requiring an attempt argument. The pubkey
- *  argument can protect signature schemes with key-prefixed challenge hash
- *  inputs against reusing the nonce when signing with the wrong precomputed
- *  pubkey.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to
- *           return an error.
- *  Out:  nonce32: pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function
- *  In:       msg: the message being verified. Is NULL if and only if msglen
- *                 is 0.
- *         msglen: the length of the message
- *          key32: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL)
- *     xonly_pk32: the 32-byte serialized xonly pubkey corresponding to key32
- *                 (will not be NULL)
- *           algo: pointer to an array describing the signature
- *                 algorithm (will not be NULL)
- *        algolen: the length of the algo array
- *           data: arbitrary data pointer that is passed through
- *
- *  Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of
- *  the message, the key, the pubkey, the algorithm description, and data.
- */
-typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened)(
-    unsigned char *nonce32,
-    const unsigned char *msg,
-    size_t msglen,
-    const unsigned char *key32,
-    const unsigned char *xonly_pk32,
-    const unsigned char *algo,
-    size_t algolen,
-    void *data
-);
-
-/** An implementation of the nonce generation function as defined in Bitcoin
- *  Improvement Proposal 340 "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1"
- *  (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki).
- *
- *  If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of
- *  auxiliary random data as defined in BIP-340. If the data pointer is NULL,
- *  the nonce derivation procedure follows BIP-340 by setting the auxiliary
- *  random data to zero. The algo argument must be non-NULL, otherwise the
- *  function will fail and return 0. The hash will be tagged with algo.
- *  Therefore, to create BIP-340 compliant signatures, algo must be set to
- *  "BIP0340/nonce" and algolen to 13.
- */
-SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340;
-
-/** Data structure that contains additional arguments for schnorrsig_sign_custom.
- *
- *  A schnorrsig_extraparams structure object can be initialized correctly by
- *  setting it to SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_EXTRAPARAMS_INIT.
- *
- *  Members:
- *      magic: set to SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_EXTRAPARAMS_MAGIC at initialization
- *             and has no other function than making sure the object is
- *             initialized.
- *    noncefp: pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL,
- *             secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 is used
- *      ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function
- *             (can be NULL). If it is non-NULL and
- *             secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 is used, then ndata must be a
- *             pointer to 32-byte auxiliary randomness as per BIP-340.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_schnorrsig_extraparams {
-    unsigned char magic[4];
-    secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened noncefp;
-    void *ndata;
-} secp256k1_schnorrsig_extraparams;
-
-#define SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_EXTRAPARAMS_MAGIC { 0xda, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0x8c }
-#define SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_EXTRAPARAMS_INIT {\
-    SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_EXTRAPARAMS_MAGIC,\
-    NULL,\
-    NULL\
-}
-
-/** Create a Schnorr signature.
- *
- *  Does _not_ strictly follow BIP-340 because it does not verify the resulting
- *  signature. Instead, you can manually use secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify and
- *  abort if it fails.
- *
- *  This function only signs 32-byte messages. If you have messages of a
- *  different size (or the same size but without a context-specific tag
- *  prefix), it is recommended to create a 32-byte message hash with
- *  secp256k1_tagged_sha256 and then sign the hash. Tagged hashing allows
- *  providing an context-specific tag for domain separation. This prevents
- *  signatures from being valid in multiple contexts by accident.
- *
- *  Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  Out:   sig64: pointer to a 64-byte array to store the serialized signature.
- *  In:    msg32: the 32-byte message being signed.
- *       keypair: pointer to an initialized keypair.
- *    aux_rand32: 32 bytes of fresh randomness. While recommended to provide
- *                this, it is only supplemental to security and can be NULL. A
- *                NULL argument is treated the same as an all-zero one. See
- *                BIP-340 "Default Signing" for a full explanation of this
- *                argument and for guidance if randomness is expensive.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *sig64,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair,
-    const unsigned char *aux_rand32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Same as secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in
- *  future versions. */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *sig64,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair,
-    const unsigned char *aux_rand32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4)
-  SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32 instead");
-
-/** Create a Schnorr signature with a more flexible API.
- *
- *  Same arguments as secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign except that it allows signing
- *  variable length messages and accepts a pointer to an extraparams object that
- *  allows customizing signing by passing additional arguments.
- *
- *  Equivalent to secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(..., aux_rand32) if msglen is 32
- *  and extraparams is initialized as follows:
- *  ```
- *  secp256k1_schnorrsig_extraparams extraparams = SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_EXTRAPARAMS_INIT;
- *  extraparams.ndata = (unsigned char*)aux_rand32;
- *  ```
- *
- *  Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
- *  Out:  sig64: pointer to a 64-byte array to store the serialized signature.
- *  In:     msg: the message being signed. Can only be NULL if msglen is 0.
- *       msglen: length of the message.
- *      keypair: pointer to an initialized keypair.
- *  extraparams: pointer to an extraparams object (can be NULL).
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign_custom(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    unsigned char *sig64,
-    const unsigned char *msg,
-    size_t msglen,
-    const secp256k1_keypair *keypair,
-    secp256k1_schnorrsig_extraparams *extraparams
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
-
-/** Verify a Schnorr signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: correct signature
- *           0: incorrect signature
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object.
- *  In:    sig64: pointer to the 64-byte signature to verify.
- *           msg: the message being verified. Can only be NULL if msglen is 0.
- *        msglen: length of the message
- *        pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key to verify with
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(
-    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
-    const unsigned char *sig64,
-    const unsigned char *msg,
-    size_t msglen,
-    const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H */

external/secp256k1/libsecp256k1.pc.in

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-prefix=@prefix@
-exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
-libdir=@libdir@
-includedir=@includedir@
-
-Name: libsecp256k1
-Description: Optimized C library for EC operations on curve secp256k1
-URL: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1
-Version: @PACKAGE_VERSION@
-Cflags: -I${includedir}
-Libs: -L${libdir} -lsecp256k1
-