test(formal): model sidecar observation gate

# Conflicts:
#	src/xrpld/consensus/ConsensusParms.h

.clang-format

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-Language: Cpp
+Language:        Cpp
 AccessModifierOffset: -4
 AlignAfterOpenBracket: AlwaysBreak
 AlignConsecutiveAssignments: false
@@ -19,52 +19,47 @@ AlwaysBreakTemplateDeclarations: true
 BinPackArguments: false
 BinPackParameters: false
 BraceWrapping:
-  AfterClass: true
+  AfterClass:      true
   AfterControlStatement: true
-  AfterEnum: false
-  AfterFunction: true
-  AfterNamespace: false
+  AfterEnum:       false
+  AfterFunction:   true
+  AfterNamespace:  false
   AfterObjCDeclaration: true
-  AfterStruct: true
-  AfterUnion: true
-  BeforeCatch: true
-  BeforeElse: true
-  IndentBraces: false
+  AfterStruct:     true
+  AfterUnion:      true
+  BeforeCatch:     true
+  BeforeElse:      true
+  IndentBraces:    false
 BreakBeforeBinaryOperators: false
 BreakBeforeBraces: Custom
 BreakBeforeTernaryOperators: true
 BreakConstructorInitializersBeforeComma: true
-ColumnLimit: 80
-CommentPragmas: "^ IWYU pragma:"
+ColumnLimit:     80
+CommentPragmas:  '^ IWYU pragma:'
 ConstructorInitializerAllOnOneLineOrOnePerLine: true
 ConstructorInitializerIndentWidth: 4
 ContinuationIndentWidth: 4
 Cpp11BracedListStyle: true
 DerivePointerAlignment: false
-DisableFormat: false
+DisableFormat:   false
 ExperimentalAutoDetectBinPacking: false
-ForEachMacros: [Q_FOREACH, BOOST_FOREACH]
-IncludeBlocks: Regroup
+ForEachMacros:   [ Q_FOREACH,  BOOST_FOREACH ]
 IncludeCategories:
-  - Regex: "^<(test)/"
-    Priority: 0
-  - Regex: "^<(xrpld)/"
-    Priority: 1
-  - Regex: "^<(xrpl)/"
-    Priority: 2
-  - Regex: "^<(boost)/"
-    Priority: 3
-  - Regex: "^.*/"
-    Priority: 4
-  - Regex: '^.*\.h'
-    Priority: 5
-  - Regex: ".*"
-    Priority: 6
-IncludeIsMainRegex: "$"
+  - Regex:           '^<(test)/'
+    Priority:        0
+  - Regex:           '^<(xrpld)/'
+    Priority:        1
+  - Regex:           '^<(xrpl)/'
+    Priority:        2
+  - Regex:           '^<(boost)/'
+    Priority:        3
+  - Regex:           '.*'
+    Priority:        4
+IncludeIsMainRegex: '$'
 IndentCaseLabels: true
 IndentFunctionDeclarationAfterType: false
 IndentRequiresClause: true
-IndentWidth: 4
+IndentWidth:     4
 IndentWrappedFunctionNames: false
 KeepEmptyLinesAtTheStartOfBlocks: false
 MaxEmptyLinesToKeep: 1
@@ -78,25 +73,19 @@ PenaltyBreakString: 1000
 PenaltyExcessCharacter: 1000000
 PenaltyReturnTypeOnItsOwnLine: 200
 PointerAlignment: Left
-ReflowComments: true
+ReflowComments:  true
 RequiresClausePosition: OwnLine
-SortIncludes: true
+SortIncludes:    true
 SpaceAfterCStyleCast: false
 SpaceBeforeAssignmentOperators: true
 SpaceBeforeParens: ControlStatements
 SpaceInEmptyParentheses: false
 SpacesBeforeTrailingComments: 2
-SpacesInAngles: false
+SpacesInAngles:  false
 SpacesInContainerLiterals: true
 SpacesInCStyleCastParentheses: false
 SpacesInParentheses: false
 SpacesInSquareBrackets: false
-Standard: Cpp11
-TabWidth: 8
-UseTab: Never
-QualifierAlignment: Right
----
-Language: JavaScript
----
-Language: Json
-IndentWidth: 2
+Standard:        Cpp11
+TabWidth:        8
+UseTab:          Never

.codecov.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,15 @@
+codecov:
+  require_ci_to_pass: true
+
+comment:
+  behavior: default
+  layout: reach,diff,flags,tree,reach
+  show_carryforward_flags: false
+
 coverage:
+  range: "60..80"
+  precision: 1
+  round: nearest
   status:
     project:
       default:
@@ -16,7 +27,7 @@ github_checks:
 parsers:
   cobertura:
     partials_as_hits: true
-    handle_missing_conditions: true
+    handle_missing_conditions : true
 
 slack_app: false
 

.git-blame-ignore-revs

@@ -23,5 +23,3 @@ e61880699997398f5a746e6c4034edc7632661f5
 d25b5dcd568bb96c18e347d55fac10fe901a1bfb
 # Reformat code with clang-format-18
 02749feea88ce61c1f7eeb2d61a57d8ecf07ab11
-# chore: Run prettier on all files (#5657) (rippled)
-97f0747e103f13e26e45b731731059b32f7679ac

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md

@@ -2,35 +2,30 @@
 name: Bug Report
 about: Create a report to help us improve rippled
 title: "[Title with short description] (Version: [rippled version])"
-labels: ""
-assignees: ""
----
+labels: ''
+assignees: ''
 
+---
 <!-- Please search existing issues to avoid creating duplicates.-->
 
 ## Issue Description
-
 <!--Provide a summary for your issue/bug.-->
 
 ## Steps to Reproduce
-
 <!--List in detail the exact steps to reproduce the unexpected behavior of the software.-->
 
 ## Expected Result
-
 <!--Explain in detail what behavior you expected to happen.-->
 
 ## Actual Result
-
 <!--Explain in detail what behavior actually happened.-->
 
 ## Environment
-
 <!--Please describe your environment setup (such as Ubuntu 18.04 with Boost 1.70).-->
 <!-- If you are using a formal release, please use the version returned by './rippled --version' as the version number-->
 <!-- If you are working off of develop, please add the git hash via 'git rev-parse HEAD'-->
 
 ## Supporting Files
-
 <!--If you have supporting files such as a log, feel free to post a link here using Github Gist.-->
 <!--Consider adding configuration files with private information removed via Github Gist. -->
+

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.md

@@ -3,23 +3,19 @@ name: Feature Request
 about: Suggest a new feature for the rippled project
 title: "[Title with short description] (Version: [rippled version])"
 labels: Feature Request
-assignees: ""
----
+assignees: ''
 
+---
 <!-- Please search existing issues to avoid creating duplicates.-->
 
 ## Summary
-
 <!-- Provide a summary to the feature request-->
 
 ## Motivation
-
 <!-- Why do we need this feature?-->
 
 ## Solution
-
 <!-- What is the solution?-->
 
 ## Paths Not Taken
-
 <!-- What other alternatives have been considered?-->

.github/workflows/check-genesis-hooks.yml

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           # Download install.sh
           curl -o /tmp/wasienv-install.sh https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wasienv/wasienv/master/install.sh
-          
+
           # Replace /bin to /local/bin
           sed -i 's|/bin|/local/bin|g' /tmp/wasienv-install.sh
 

.github/workflows/clang-format.yml

@@ -8,15 +8,6 @@ jobs:
     env:
       CLANG_VERSION: 18
     steps:
-      # For jobs running in containers, $GITHUB_WORKSPACE and ${{ github.workspace }} might not be the
-      # same directory. The actions/checkout step is *supposed* to checkout into $GITHUB_WORKSPACE and
-      # then add it to safe.directory (see instructions at https://github.com/actions/checkout)
-      # but that's apparently not happening for some container images. We can't be sure what is actually
-      # happening, so let's pre-emptively add both directories to safe.directory. There's a
-      # Github issue opened in 2022 and not resolved in 2025 https://github.com/actions/runner/issues/2058 ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
-    - run: |
-        git config --global --add safe.directory $GITHUB_WORKSPACE
-        git config --global --add safe.directory ${{ github.workspace }}
     - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - name: Install clang-format
       run: |
@@ -29,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
         sudo apt-get update
         sudo apt-get install clang-format-${CLANG_VERSION}
     - name: Format first-party sources
-      run: find include src tests -type f \( -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.hpp' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.ipp' \) -exec clang-format-${CLANG_VERSION} -i {} +
+      run: find include src -type f \( -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.hpp' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.ipp' \) -exec clang-format-${CLANG_VERSION} -i {} +
     - name: Check for differences
       id: assert
       run: |

.github/workflows/formal-verification.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+name: Formal Verification (Lean)
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: ["feature-export-rng-lean"]
+  pull_request:
+    branches: ["**"]
+    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  lean-consensus:
+    name: Lean/C++ drift checks
+    runs-on: [self-hosted, macOS]
+    env:
+      BUILD_DIR: .build-formal
+      CMAKE_BUILD_DIR: .build-formal-cmake
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Add Homebrew to PATH
+        run: |
+          echo "/opt/homebrew/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+          echo "/opt/homebrew/sbin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+
+      - name: Install core tools
+        run: |
+          brew install coreutils
+          echo "Num proc: $(nproc)"
+
+      - name: Setup toolchain (mise)
+        uses: jdx/mise-action@v3.6.1
+        with:
+          cache: false
+          install: true
+          mise_toml: |
+            [tools]
+            cmake = "3.25.3"
+            python = "3.12"
+            pipx = "latest"
+            conan = "2"
+            ninja = "latest"
+
+      - name: Install tools via mise
+        run: |
+          mise install
+          mise reshim
+          echo "$HOME/.local/share/mise/shims" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+
+      - name: Install Lean toolchain
+        run: |
+          toolchain="$(cat formal_verification/lean-toolchain)"
+          curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/leanprover/elan/master/elan-init.sh \
+            | sh -s -- -y --default-toolchain "$toolchain"
+          echo "$HOME/.elan/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+          "$HOME/.elan/bin/lake" --version
+          "$HOME/.elan/bin/lean" --version
+
+      - name: Build Lean proofs
+        run: |
+          cd formal_verification
+          "$HOME/.elan/bin/lake" build XahauConsensus:static
+
+      - name: Detect compiler version
+        id: detect-compiler
+        run: |
+          compiler_version=$(clang --version | grep -oE 'version [0-9]+' | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
+          echo "compiler_version=${compiler_version}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "Detected Apple Clang version: ${compiler_version}"
+
+      - name: Configure Conan profile
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p ~/.conan2/profiles
+          cat > ~/.conan2/profiles/default <<EOF
+          [settings]
+          arch=armv8
+          build_type=Debug
+          compiler=apple-clang
+          compiler.cppstd=20
+          compiler.libcxx=libc++
+          compiler.version=${{ steps.detect-compiler.outputs.compiler_version }}
+          os=Macos
+
+          [conf]
+          tools.build:cxxflags=["-Wno-missing-template-arg-list-after-template-kw"]
+          EOF
+          conan profile show
+
+      - name: Export custom Conan recipes
+        run: |
+          conan export external/snappy --version 1.1.10 --user xahaud --channel stable
+          conan export external/soci --version 4.0.3 --user xahaud --channel stable
+          conan export external/wasmedge --version 0.11.2 --user xahaud --channel stable
+
+      - name: Install Conan dependencies
+        env:
+          CONAN_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: 180
+        run: |
+          conan install . \
+            --output-folder "$BUILD_DIR" \
+            --build missing \
+            --settings build_type=Debug \
+            -o '&:tests=True' \
+            -o '&:xrpld=True' \
+            -o '&:formal_verification=True'
+
+      - name: Configure formal build
+        run: |
+          cmake -S . -B "$CMAKE_BUILD_DIR" -G Ninja \
+            -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE="$PWD/$BUILD_DIR/build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake" \
+            -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug \
+            -Dtests=ON \
+            -Dxrpld=ON \
+            -Dformal_verification=ON
+
+      - name: Build formal-enabled rippled
+        run: |
+          cmake --build "$CMAKE_BUILD_DIR" --target rippled --parallel "$(nproc)"
+
+      - name: Run Lean/C++ drift checks
+        run: |
+          "$CMAKE_BUILD_DIR/rippled" --unittest=LeanConsensus --unittest-log

.github/workflows/xahau-ga-macos.yml

@@ -122,6 +122,4 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Test
         run: |
-          cd ${{ env.build_dir }}
-          ./rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs $(nproc)
-          ctest -j $(nproc) --output-on-failure
+          ${{ env.build_dir }}/rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs $(nproc)

.github/workflows/xahau-ga-nix.yml

@@ -433,9 +433,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           # Ensure the binary exists before trying to run
           if [ -f "${{ env.build_dir }}/rippled" ]; then
-            cd ${{ env.build_dir }}
-            ./rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs $(nproc)
-            ctest -j $(nproc) --output-on-failure
+            ${{ env.build_dir }}/rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs $(nproc)
           else
              echo "Error: rippled executable not found in ${{ env.build_dir }}"
              exit 1

.gitignore

@@ -127,5 +127,12 @@ bld.rippled/
 generated
 .vscode
 
+# AI docs (local working documents)
+.ai-docs/
+
+# Local formal-methods workspace; kept as a separate repository and optionally
+# symlinked here for navigation.
+formal/lean/xahau_consensus
+
 # Suggested in-tree build directory
 /.build/

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # .pre-commit-config.yaml
 repos:
-  - repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-clang-format
-    rev: v18.1.8
-    hooks:
-      - id: clang-format
+- repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-clang-format
+  rev: v18.1.3
+  hooks:
+  - id: clang-format

.testnet/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+output/
+__pycache__/
+scenarios/odd-cases/
+scenarios/suite-experiments.yml

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/consensus_entropy_crash.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+"""Scenario: ConsensusEntropy amendment crashes non-supporting node.
+
+Votes ConsensusEntropy accept on all nodes except n4, then waits for n4
+to crash as the amendment activates without its support.
+
+    x-testnet run --scenario-script consensus_entropy_crash.py
+"""
+
+from helpers import CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close()
+    ctx.feature(CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE, vetoed=False, exclude_nodes=[4])
+
+    log("Waiting for ConsensusEntropy to be voted for...")
+    await ctx.wait_for_feature(
+        CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE,
+        check=lambda s: not s.get("vetoed"),
+        exclude_nodes=[4],
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+    log("Waiting for n4 to crash...")
+    op = await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[4], timeout=600)
+
+    ctx.assert_log("unsupported amendments activated", since=op.started, nodes=[4])
+    ctx.assert_exit_status(0, nodes=[4])
+    log("PASS: n4 shut down due to unsupported amendment")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/entropy_with_transactions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+""":descr: entropy stays valid under transaction load"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, assert_valid_entropy
+
+variants = [
+    {"label": "light", "min_txns": 5, "max_txns": 10},
+    {"label": "heavy", "min_txns": 50, "max_txns": 60},
+    {"label": "super_heavy", "min_txns": 90, "max_txns": 120},
+]
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log, *, min_txns=5, max_txns=10, **_):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    gen = ctx.txn_generator(min_txns=min_txns, max_txns=max_txns)
+    await gen.start()
+    await gen.wait_until_ready()
+    log(f"Transaction generator ready ({min_txns}-{max_txns} txns/ledger)")
+
+    # Wait for pipeline warmup + a few txn-bearing ledgers.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(3, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(10, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Inspecting ledgers {start_seq + 1} → {end_seq}")
+
+    digests = set()
+    total_user_txns = 0
+
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        ce, user_txns = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, count = assert_valid_entropy(ce, seq, seen_digests=digests)
+        total_user_txns += len(user_txns)
+        log(
+            f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={count} "
+            f"user_txns={len(user_txns)} Digest={digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+
+    await gen.stop()
+
+    log(
+        f"Verified {end_seq - start_seq} ledgers: {total_user_txns} user txns, "
+        f"all entropy valid and unique"
+    )
+
+    if total_user_txns == 0:
+        raise AssertionError("No user transactions were included in any ledger")
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/fallback_without_unl_report.py

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+""":descr: healthy non-standalone testnet without UNLReport mints Tier 1 fallback"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, assert_consensus_fallback
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Non-standalone nodes require a ledger-anchored UNLReport before assigning
+    # validator_quorum / participant_aligned labels. Without it, the RNG pipeline
+    # may still collect commits/reveals, but injection must remain Tier 1.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(3, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+    log("Pipeline warmed up without UNLReport")
+
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(5, node_id=0, timeout=90)
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Inspecting ledgers {start_seq + 1} -> {end_seq}")
+
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, count = assert_consensus_fallback(ce, seq)
+        log(f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={count} Digest={digest[:16]}...")
+
+    log(f"Verified {end_seq - start_seq} ledgers: all consensus_fallback")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/participant_aligned_smoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+""":descr: 5/6 validator_quorum, 4/6 participant_aligned (tier 2), recovery
+
+Requires node_count: 6 (see suite.yml) — the smallest NON-degenerate Tier 2
+size. At n=6: tier2 floor = 4, validator quorum = 5, validation quorum = 5. So
+  6/6, 5/6 present -> validator_quorum  (EntropyTier=3)
+  4/6 present      -> participant_aligned (EntropyTier=2, count 4)   <-- the band
+  3/6 present      -> consensus_fallback (EntropyTier=1)
+n=5 has NO tier-2 band (tier2 == quorum == 4), which is why the existing
+degradation smoke at 5 nodes only ever sees tier 3 / fallback.
+
+KEY: the 4/6 window is BELOW the 80% validation quorum (5). The 4 survivors
+keep CLOSING ledgers that carry tier-2 entropy, but those ledgers do NOT
+validate until the network recovers — exactly the transition window Tier 2
+serves. So validated_ledger_index() stalls; we instead inspect a surviving
+node's CLOSED ledger (its LCL) directly, and cross-check the injection from the
+cohort's logs.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import (
+    require_entropy,
+    get_entropy_tx,
+    assert_participant_aligned,
+    assert_validator_quorum,
+)
+
+
+def _closed_entropy(result):
+    """(seq, ConsensusEntropy tx) from a ctx.ledger('closed', transactions=True)
+    result, or (None, None) if the fetch returned no usable ledger.
+
+    Enforces the per-ledger invariant that an entropy-enabled closed ledger
+    carries EXACTLY ONE ConsensusEntropy pseudo-tx (mirroring get_entropy_tx):
+    a duplicate or missing injection raises here with a clear error instead of
+    being silently skipped and resurfacing later as a generic 'no tier-2 ledger'.
+    """
+    if not result or not isinstance(result.get("ledger"), dict):
+        return None, None
+    led = result["ledger"]
+    try:
+        seq = int(led.get("ledger_index"))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None, None
+    ce = [
+        t
+        for t in led.get("transactions", [])
+        if isinstance(t, dict) and t.get("TransactionType") == "ConsensusEntropy"
+    ]
+    if len(ce) != 1:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Closed ledger {seq}: expected 1 ConsensusEntropy txn, got {len(ce)}"
+        )
+    return seq, ce[0]
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Baseline: healthy 6/6 produces validator_quorum entropy.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+
+    # --- 5/6: settles back to validator_quorum (5 present >= quorum 5) ---
+    val_before_drop = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    ctx.stop_node(5)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[5], timeout=30)
+    # Settle a few ledgers past the membership change. The ledger right at a
+    # validator drop can carry a transient consensus_fallback (tier 1, count 0,
+    # deterministic and by design) before the commit/reveal pipeline re-primes,
+    # so we do NOT assume any single post-drop ledger is already tier 3.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(4, node_id=0, timeout=90)
+
+    # 5/6 is at/above the 80% quorum (5), so steady state is validator_quorum.
+    # Scan the post-drop validated ledgers (all carry the 5-node cohort, so a
+    # tier-3 here has count == 5) and require at least one clean validator_quorum
+    # — EntropyTier=3, count >= quorum, non-zero digest — tolerating the
+    # transition fallback instead of depending on where the tip happened to land.
+    val_5of6 = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    t3_seq = None
+    for seq in range(val_5of6, val_before_drop, -1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        tier = ce.get("EntropyTier")
+        log(f"  5/6 ledger {seq}: tier={tier} count={ce.get('EntropyCount')}")
+        if tier == 3:
+            assert_validator_quorum(ce, seq, min_count=5)
+            t3_seq = seq
+            break
+    if t3_seq is None:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"5/6: no validator_quorum (tier 3) entropy in post-drop validated "
+            f"ledgers {val_before_drop + 1}..{val_5of6}"
+        )
+    log(f"5/6: validator_quorum at validated seq {t3_seq}")
+
+    #@@start test-participant-aligned-window
+    # --- 4/6: participant_aligned (Tier 2) degraded window ---
+    ctx.stop_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[4], timeout=30)
+
+    # ~12s window: confirm tier-2 INJECTION from the cohort's logs, and that the
+    # round is NOT the impossible/fallback path (which is what distinguishes the
+    # tier-2 band from the tier-1 fallback regime).
+    op = await ctx.sleep(12, name="tier2_window")
+    selected_t2 = ctx.search_logs(
+        r"RNG: entropy selected seq=\d+ tier=2 count=4",
+        within=op.window,
+        nodes=[0, 1, 2, 3],
+    )
+    log(f"4/6: 'entropy selected tier=2 count=4' logs: {selected_t2.count}")
+    if selected_t2.count == 0:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "4/6 window injected no participant_aligned (tier 2) entropy: no "
+            "'RNG: entropy selected ... tier=2 count=4' on the surviving cohort"
+        )
+    ctx.assert_not_log(
+        r"reason=impossible-entropy-gate", within=op.window, nodes=[0, 1, 2, 3]
+    )
+
+    # Verify the on-ledger EntropyTier=2 DIRECTLY: validation is stalled (4 < 5),
+    # so sample the surviving cohort's CLOSED ledger (its LCL — built but not yet
+    # validated). At least one must be participant_aligned with EntropyCount=4.
+    tier2_on_ledger = 0
+    last_seq = None
+    for _ in range(5):
+        seq, ce = _closed_entropy(
+            ctx.ledger("closed", transactions=True, node_id=0)
+        )
+        if ce is not None and seq is not None and seq != last_seq:
+            last_seq = seq
+            tier = ce.get("EntropyTier")
+            count = ce.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+            log(f"  closed ledger {seq}: tier={tier} count={count}")
+            if tier == 2:
+                assert_participant_aligned(ce, seq, expected_count=4)
+                tier2_on_ledger += 1
+        await ctx.sleep(3)
+
+    if tier2_on_ledger == 0:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "no closed participant_aligned (tier 2) ledger observed during the "
+            "4/6 window (tier 2 was injected per logs, but not seen on a closed "
+            "ledger)"
+        )
+    log(f"4/6: {tier2_on_ledger} participant_aligned closed ledger(s) verified")
+    #@@end test-participant-aligned-window
+
+    # --- Recovery: liveness — validation resumes once quorum is restored ---
+    ctx.start_node(4)
+    ctx.start_node(5)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+
+    val_recovered = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    if not val_recovered or val_recovered <= val_5of6:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Validated ledger did not advance after recovery "
+            f"({val_5of6} -> {val_recovered})"
+        )
+    log(f"Recovered: validated seq {val_5of6} -> {val_recovered}")
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_degradation_smoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+""":descr: 4/5 liveness, 3/5 fallback-entropy (consensus_fallback), recovery"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import ZERO_DIGEST, require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, entropy_fields
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Baseline: wait 1 ledger to confirm network is healthy.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+
+    # --- 4/5 liveness ---
+    ctx.stop_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[4], timeout=30)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+    log("4/5: liveness OK")
+
+    # Snapshot validated seq before dropping to 3/5.
+    val_before = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    # --- 3/5 degraded window ---
+    ctx.stop_node(3)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[3], timeout=30)
+
+    # 10s ≈ 3 rounds at 3s cadence.
+    await ctx.sleep(10)
+
+    val_after = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"3/5: validated ledger {val_before} → {val_after}")
+
+    # Accepted/built ledgers may still later appear as validated once the full
+    # network rejoins. For ConsensusEntropy the key invariant is that every
+    # ledger created during this sub-quorum window carries FALLBACK entropy
+    # (consensus_fallback: non-zero consensus-bound digest, count 0) — never
+    # validator-tier entropy.
+    degraded_fallback = 0
+    degraded_end = val_after or val_before
+    if val_before and degraded_end and degraded_end > val_before:
+        for seq in range(val_before + 1, degraded_end + 1):
+            ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+            digest, entropy_count, is_fallback = entropy_fields(ce)
+            tier = ce.get("EntropyTier")
+
+            # consensus_fallback (EntropyTier=1): explicit tier, count 0,
+            # deterministic NON-zero digest.
+            if tier != 1:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==1 "
+                    f"(consensus_fallback) during 3/5 window, got {tier} "
+                    f"(EntropyCount={entropy_count})"
+                )
+            if entropy_count != 0:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: fallback EntropyCount must be 0, got "
+                    f"{entropy_count}"
+                )
+            if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: fallback digest must be non-zero "
+                    f"(consensus_fallback), got {digest[:16]}..."
+                )
+            assert is_fallback  # tier==1 implies fallback
+
+            degraded_fallback += 1
+            log(
+                f"  Degraded ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={entropy_count} "
+                f"FALLBACK"
+            )
+
+    log(f"3/5 entropy summary: {degraded_fallback} fallback")
+
+    # Log checks tied to current transition mechanics:
+    # - commit-set SHAMap publication is the observable output of entering the
+    #   commit sidecar phase
+    # - ConvergingCommit transition is the gateway out of seq=0-only behavior
+    # - reason=impossible-entropy-gate is the explicit degraded-window fallback path
+    ctx.log_level("LedgerConsensus", "trace")
+    ctx.log_level("ConsensusExtensions", "trace")
+    op = await ctx.sleep(6, name="stall_window")
+
+    ctx.assert_not_log(
+        r"RNG: transitioned to ConvergingCommit", within=op.window, nodes=[0, 1, 2]
+    )
+    ctx.assert_not_log(
+        r"RNG: built commitSet SHAMap", within=op.window, nodes=[0, 1, 2]
+    )
+
+    gate_blocked = ctx.search_logs(
+        r"STALLDIAG: establish gate blocked reason=(pause|no-tx-consensus)",
+        within=op.window,
+        nodes=[0, 1, 2],
+    )
+    log(f"3/5: establish gate-blocked logs in 6s: {gate_blocked.count}")
+
+    impossible = ctx.search_logs(
+        r"RNG: skipping commit wait reason=impossible-entropy-gate",
+        within=op.window,
+        nodes=[0, 1, 2],
+    )
+    log(f"3/5: RNG impossible-entropy-gate skips in 6s: {impossible.count}")
+
+    # --- Recovery: restart nodes, verify ledger advancement ---
+    ctx.start_node(3)
+    ctx.start_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+
+    val_recovered = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    pre_recovery = max(v for v in [val_before, val_after] if v is not None)
+    log(f"Recovered: validated seq {pre_recovery} → {val_recovered}")
+
+    if not val_recovered or val_recovered <= pre_recovery:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Validated ledger did not advance after recovery "
+            f"({pre_recovery} → {val_recovered})"
+        )
+
+    # Inspect post-recovery ledgers separately from the degraded window above.
+    # Once the network is back at quorum, validator-tier entropy is expected
+    # again (transitional fallback ledgers are fine) and must be quorum-met.
+    fallback_count = 0
+    validator_count = 0
+    for seq in range(pre_recovery + 1, val_recovered + 1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, entropy_count, is_fallback = entropy_fields(ce)
+
+        if is_fallback:
+            fallback_count += 1
+        else:
+            validator_count += 1
+            if entropy_count < 4:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: validator entropy with sub-quorum "
+                    f"EntropyCount={entropy_count} (need >= 4)"
+                )
+
+        log(
+            f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={entropy_count} "
+            f"{'FALLBACK' if is_fallback else 'VALIDATOR'}"
+        )
+
+    log(
+        f"Entropy summary: {fallback_count} fallback, "
+        f"{validator_count} validator"
+    )
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_recovery_smoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+""":descr: drop 2 nodes (3/5 stall), restart both, verify recovery"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+    log("Baseline OK")
+
+    # Drop 2 nodes → validation stall.
+    ctx.stop_node(3)
+    ctx.stop_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[3, 4], timeout=30)
+
+    info = ctx.rpc.server_info(node_id=0)
+    val_before = info.get("info", {}).get("validated_ledger", {}).get("seq", 0)
+    log(f"Stalled at validated seq {val_before}")
+
+    # Let it sit for a few rounds in degraded state.
+    await ctx.sleep(6)
+
+    # Bring both nodes back.
+    ctx.start_node(3)
+    ctx.start_node(4)
+    log("Restarted n3 and n4, waiting for recovery...")
+
+    # Recovery: wait for ANY validated ledger advance on n0.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(node_id=0, timeout=60)
+
+    info = ctx.rpc.server_info(node_id=0)
+    val_after = info.get("info", {}).get("validated_ledger", {}).get("seq", 0)
+    log(f"Recovered: validated seq {val_before} → {val_after}")
+
+    if val_after <= val_before:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Validated ledger did not advance after recovery "
+            f"({val_before} → {val_after})"
+        )
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/steady_state_entropy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+""":descr: all 5 nodes healthy, every ledger has valid unique quorum-met entropy"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, assert_valid_entropy
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Wait for RNG pipeline to warm up past bootstrap skip.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(3, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+    log("Pipeline warmed up")
+
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(10, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Inspecting ledgers {start_seq + 1} → {end_seq}")
+
+    digests = set()
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, count = assert_valid_entropy(ce, seq, seen_digests=digests)
+        log(f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={count} Digest={digest[:16]}...")
+
+    log(f"Verified {end_seq - start_seq} ledgers: all quorum entropy, all unique")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export-suite.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+defaults:
+  network:
+    node_count: 5
+    launcher: tmux
+    find_ports: true
+    slave_delay: 0.2
+    features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    track_features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    unl_report: true
+    log_levels:
+      TxQ: info
+      Protocol: debug
+      Peer: debug
+      LedgerConsensus: debug
+      ConsensusExtensions: debug
+      NetworkOPs: info
+    env:
+      XAHAU_RESOURCE_PER_PORT: "1"
+    rc:
+      - rng_poll_ms=333
+
+tests:
+  # --- CE + Export (80% quorum, SHAMap convergence) ---
+  - name: steady_state_export_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/steady_state_export.py
+
+  - name: retriable_export_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/retriable_export.py
+
+  - name: export_degradation_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_degradation.py
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n3:no_export_sig=true
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true
+
+  - name: export_without_unl_report
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_without_unl_report.py
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+      unl_report: false
+
+  - name: export_no_veto_missing_observation
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_no_veto_missing_observation.py
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n4:no_export_sig_hash=true
+
+  # CE + Export: 1 node suppressed, 4/5 = 80% quorum, should succeed
+  - name: export_ce_one_node_down
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: true
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true
+
+  # --- Export only, no CE (80% active-view quorum) ---
+  - name: export_only_all_up
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: true
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+
+  - name: export_only_one_node_down
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: true
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true
+
+  - name: export_only_two_nodes_down
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: false
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n3:no_export_sig=true
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_degradation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+""":descr: Submit ttEXPORT with 2 nodes suppressing export sigs, verify it
+retries via terRETRY_EXPORT until LLS expiry (insufficient signatures).
+
+Nodes 3 and 4 have runtime_config no_export_sig=true, so only 3/5 nodes
+provide export signatures. With 80% quorum = ceil(5*0.8) = 4 required,
+the export cannot reach quorum and should expire via tecEXPORT_EXPIRED.
+
+Flow:
+  1. Fund alice and bob
+  2. alice submits ttEXPORT with tight LLS
+  3. Export retries (only 3/5 sigs available, need 4)
+  4. Verify export expires with tecEXPORT_EXPIRED
+  5. Verify subsequent payment still works (sequence not permanently blocked)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import require_export, assert_shadow_ticket
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    log("Nodes 3,4 have runtime_config no_export_sig=true (3/5 sigs, need 4)")
+
+    #@@start test-export-below-quorum-expiry
+    # --- Submit ttEXPORT (should retry then expire -- only 3/5 sigs) ---
+    export_start = ctx.mark("export-degradation-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 6,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    export_end = ctx.mark("export-degradation-submit-end")
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    # With only 3/5 sigs and 80% quorum (4 required), export MUST fail
+    if engine_result == "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Export should NOT have succeeded with only 3/5 sigs "
+            "(need 4 for 80% quorum) -- check runtime_config no_export_sig"
+        )
+
+    # Should be tecEXPORT_EXPIRED (LLS reached without quorum). Be exact here:
+    # any other non-success means the retry/expiry boundary regressed.
+    if engine_result != "tecEXPORT_EXPIRED":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected tecEXPORT_EXPIRED below quorum, got {engine_result}"
+        )
+
+    log(f"Export failed as expected ({engine_result})")
+
+    retry_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: insufficient signatures .*result=terRETRY_EXPORT",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export insufficient-signature retries: {retry_logs.count}")
+
+    expired_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: last ledger expired .*result=tecEXPORT_EXPIRED",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export LLS expiry logs: {expired_logs.count}")
+
+    # No shadow ticket should exist (export never reached quorum)
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=False)
+    #@@end test-export-below-quorum-expiry
+
+    # --- Verify subsequent payment works regardless ---
+    log("Submitting payment from alice to bob...")
+    pay_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": bob.address,
+            "Amount": "1000000",
+            "Fee": "12",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+
+    pay_engine = pay_result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Payment result: {pay_engine}")
+
+    if pay_engine != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Payment failed after expired export: {pay_engine} "
+            f"-- sequence may be blocked"
+        )
+
+    log("Payment succeeded -- account not permanently blocked")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Shared helpers for Export scenario tests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from xahaud_scripts.testnet.config import _unl_report_index, feature_name_to_hash
+
+
+async def require_export(
+    ctx, log, *, require_unl_report=True, require_runtime_config=True
+):
+    """Wait for first ledger and assert Export is enabled.
+
+    Network-mode Export success requires a parent-ledger UNLReport-backed
+    active validator view. Most export scenarios seed that report in genesis;
+    assert it here so a success-path test cannot accidentally pass setup
+    without the condition Export::doApply requires. The no-UNLReport retry
+    scenario opts out deliberately.
+
+    The tracked export suite also uses XAHAUD_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG for polling
+    and fault-injection knobs. Default binaries reject the runtime_config RPC,
+    so check it up front rather than silently running without those knobs.
+    """
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(timeout=120)
+
+    if require_runtime_config:
+        result = ctx.rpc.runtime_config(0)
+        if not result or result.get("error"):
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Export suite requires a binary built with "
+                "xahaud_runtime_test_config=ON; runtime_config RPC returned "
+                f"{result}"
+            )
+        log("RuntimeConfig RPC active")
+
+    feature = ctx.feature_check(feature_name_to_hash("Export"), node_id=0)
+    if not feature or not feature.get("enabled", False):
+        raise AssertionError(f"Export not enabled: {feature}")
+    log("Export enabled")
+
+    if require_unl_report:
+        result = ctx.rpc.ledger_entry(0, _unl_report_index())
+        node = (result or {}).get("node", {})
+        active = node.get("ActiveValidators", [])
+        if node.get("LedgerEntryType") != "UNLReport" or not active:
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Export success scenario requires a ledger UNLReport with "
+                f"ActiveValidators, got: {result}"
+            )
+        log(f"UNLReport active validators: {len(active)}")
+
+
+def find_export_txns(ctx, seq):
+    """Find Export transactions in a ledger.
+
+    Returns list of Export transaction dicts.
+    """
+    result = ctx.ledger(seq, transactions=True)
+    if not result:
+        return []
+
+    txns = result.get("ledger", {}).get("transactions", [])
+    return [tx for tx in txns if tx.get("TransactionType") == "Export"]
+
+
+def dst_param(address):
+    """Encode an address as a HookParameter entry for the DST param."""
+    from xrpl.core.addresscodec import decode_classic_address
+
+    dst_hex = decode_classic_address(address).hex().upper()
+    return {
+        "HookParameter": {
+            "HookParameterName": "445354",  # "DST"
+            "HookParameterValue": dst_hex,
+        }
+    }
+
+
+def assert_hook_accepted(meta, log, *, expected_emits=1):
+    """Assert hook executed with ACCEPT and the expected emit count.
+
+    Checks sfHookExecutions in transaction metadata.
+    Returns the hook execution entry for further inspection.
+    """
+    hook_execs = meta.get("HookExecutions", [])
+    if not hook_execs:
+        raise AssertionError("No HookExecutions in metadata")
+
+    exec_entry = hook_execs[0].get("HookExecution", {})
+    hook_result = exec_entry.get("HookResult", -1)
+    emit_count = exec_entry.get("HookEmitCount", -1)
+    return_code = exec_entry.get("HookReturnCode", "")
+
+    log(f"  HookResult={hook_result} EmitCount={emit_count} ReturnCode={return_code}")
+
+    # HookResult 3 = ExitType::ACCEPT
+    if hook_result != 3:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Hook did not ACCEPT: HookResult={hook_result} "
+            f"ReturnCode={return_code}"
+        )
+
+    if emit_count != expected_emits:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected {expected_emits} emits, got {emit_count}"
+        )
+
+    # ReturnCode 0 = success; non-zero = ASSERT line number in hook
+    if return_code and str(return_code) != "0":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Hook returned error code {return_code} "
+            f"(likely ASSERT failure at that line)"
+        )
+
+    return exec_entry
+
+
+def assert_export_result(meta, log, *, require_signers=True):
+    """Assert ExportResult is present and well-formed in metadata.
+
+    Returns the ExportResult dict.
+    """
+    export_result = meta.get("ExportResult", {})
+    if not export_result:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult not found in metadata")
+
+    # Must have LedgerSequence and TransactionHash
+    if "LedgerSequence" not in export_result:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult missing LedgerSequence")
+    if "TransactionHash" not in export_result:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult missing TransactionHash")
+
+    # Must have the inner ExportedTxn object
+    inner = export_result.get("ExportedTxn", {})
+    if not inner:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult missing ExportedTxn (multisigned blob)")
+
+    log(f"  ExportResult: seq={export_result['LedgerSequence']} "
+        f"hash={export_result['TransactionHash'][:16]}...")
+
+    # Inner tx should have Account, Destination, TransactionType
+    if "Account" not in inner:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportedTxn missing Account")
+    if "TransactionType" not in inner:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportedTxn missing TransactionType")
+
+    # Should have empty SigningPubKey (multisigned)
+    if inner.get("SigningPubKey", "NOT_EMPTY") != "":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"ExportedTxn SigningPubKey should be empty, "
+            f"got '{inner.get('SigningPubKey')}'"
+        )
+
+    if require_signers:
+        signers = inner.get("Signers", [])
+        if not signers:
+            raise AssertionError("ExportedTxn has no Signers (multisig not applied)")
+        log(f"  Signers: {len(signers)} validator(s)")
+
+    return export_result
+
+
+def assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, account_address, log, *, expect_exists=True):
+    """Assert shadow ticket exists (or doesn't) for the account."""
+    obj_result = ctx.rpc.request(
+        0, "account_objects", {"account": account_address}
+    )
+    all_objects = (obj_result or {}).get("account_objects", [])
+    shadow_tickets = [
+        obj for obj in all_objects
+        if obj.get("LedgerEntryType") == "ShadowTicket"
+    ]
+    log(f"  Shadow tickets: {len(shadow_tickets)}")
+
+    if expect_exists and not shadow_tickets:
+        raise AssertionError("Expected shadow ticket but none found")
+    if not expect_exists and shadow_tickets:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected no shadow tickets but found {len(shadow_tickets)}"
+        )
+
+    return shadow_tickets

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_no_veto_missing_observation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+""":descr: Export succeeds when quorum sidecar material exists but one active
+validator withholds exportSigSetHash observation.
+
+Node 4 has runtime_config no_export_sig_hash=true. It still attaches export
+signatures, but it does not publish its exportSigSetHash in proposals. The
+remaining 4/5 active validators can still align on the same export sidecar
+hash, so the round must not retry/expire just because fullObservation is false.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import (
+    require_export,
+    assert_export_result,
+    assert_shadow_ticket,
+)
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    log("Node 4 withholds exportSigSetHash but still attaches export signatures")
+
+    export_start = ctx.mark("export-no-veto-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    export_end = ctx.mark("export-no-veto-submit-end")
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    meta = result.get("meta", {})
+
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+    if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Expected tesSUCCESS, got {engine_result}")
+
+    export_result = assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+    signers = export_result.get("ExportedTxn", {}).get("Signers", [])
+    if len(signers) < 4:
+        raise AssertionError(f"Expected at least 4 signers, got {len(signers)}")
+    log(f"Export signer count: {len(signers)}")
+
+    no_veto_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: missing exportSigSetHash observation ignored",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export no-veto missing-observation logs: {no_veto_logs.count}")
+
+    withhold_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: withholding exportSigSetHash",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export sidecar hash withholding logs: {withhold_logs.count}")
+
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+""":descr: Test Export quorum behavior. When enough active validators sign,
+the export should succeed whether or not CE is enabled. When fewer than the
+active-view quorum sign, the export should expire.
+
+Parameterized via `expect_success` kwarg from suite.yml.
+
+Flow:
+  1. Fund alice and bob
+  2. alice submits ttEXPORT
+  3. Verify result matches expectation (tesSUCCESS or tecEXPORT_EXPIRED)
+  4. Verify ExportResult + shadow ticket on success, absence on failure
+  5. Verify subsequent payment works regardless
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import (
+    require_export,
+    assert_export_result,
+    assert_shadow_ticket,
+)
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log, expect_success=True):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    outcome = "success" if expect_success else "failure (below quorum)"
+    log(f"Expecting export {outcome}")
+
+    # --- Submit ttEXPORT ---
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    meta = result.get("meta", {})
+
+    log(f"Export at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    if expect_success:
+        if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+            raise AssertionError(
+                f"Expected tesSUCCESS, got {engine_result}"
+            )
+
+        # Assert ExportResult is well-formed with signers
+        assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+
+        # Assert shadow ticket was created
+        assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+        log("Export succeeded as expected (active-view quorum reached)")
+    else:
+        if engine_result == "tesSUCCESS":
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Export should NOT have succeeded below active-view quorum"
+            )
+        if engine_result != "tecEXPORT_EXPIRED":
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Expected tecEXPORT_EXPIRED below active-view quorum, "
+                f"got {engine_result}"
+            )
+        log(f"Export failed as expected ({engine_result})")
+
+        # No shadow ticket should exist
+        assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=False)
+
+    # --- Verify subsequent payment works ---
+    log("Submitting payment from alice to bob...")
+    pay_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": bob.address,
+            "Amount": "1000000",
+            "Fee": "12",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+
+    pay_engine = pay_result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Payment result: {pay_engine}")
+
+    if pay_engine != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Payment failed: {pay_engine}")
+
+    log("Payment succeeded -- account not blocked")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_without_unl_report.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+""":descr: Export retries/expires without a ledger-anchored UNLReport view.
+
+All validators may sign, but network-mode Export must not assemble quorum
+material from a node-local trusted-config view. Without UNLReport, the export
+should retry until LastLedgerSequence and expire without creating a shadow
+ticket.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import require_export, assert_shadow_ticket
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log, require_unl_report=False)
+
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    log("UNLReport intentionally absent; export must not use local config view")
+
+    export_start = ctx.mark("export-without-unlreport-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 6,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    export_end = ctx.mark("export-without-unlreport-submit-end")
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    if engine_result == "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Export should not succeed without a ledger-anchored UNLReport view"
+        )
+
+    # Be exact: without a UNLReport view the export should retry until LLS and
+    # expire, not fail by some unrelated terminal code.
+    if engine_result != "tecEXPORT_EXPIRED":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Expected tecEXPORT_EXPIRED without UNLReport view, "
+            f"got {engine_result}"
+        )
+
+    warning_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: retrying without ledger-anchored validator view",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export no-UNLReport retry warnings: {warning_logs.count}")
+
+    retry_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: insufficient signatures .*result=terRETRY_EXPORT",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export retry logs: {retry_logs.count}")
+
+    expired_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: last ledger expired .*result=tecEXPORT_EXPIRED",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export expiry logs: {expired_logs.count}")
+
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=False)
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/retriable_export.py

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+""":descr: Submit ttEXPORT directly (no hook), verify it succeeds with
+ExportResult in metadata. Then submit a payment from the same account
+to verify sequence handling doesn't block subsequent transactions.
+
+Flow:
+  1. Fund alice and bob
+  2. alice submits ttEXPORT with inner payment -> tesSUCCESS (provisional)
+  3. Validators attach sigs via proposals -> quorum -> ExportResult in metadata
+  4. alice submits a Payment to bob -> should succeed (sequence not blocked)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import require_export, assert_export_result, assert_shadow_ticket
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+
+    # --- 1. Submit ttEXPORT ---
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 15,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+    export_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {export_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected tesSUCCESS for export, got {engine_result}"
+        )
+
+    # Assert ExportResult is well-formed with signers
+    meta = result.get("meta", {})
+    assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+
+    # Assert shadow ticket was created
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+    # --- 2. Submit Payment from same account ---
+    log("Submitting payment from alice to bob...")
+    pay_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": bob.address,
+            "Amount": "1000000",
+            "Fee": "12",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+
+    pay_engine = pay_result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Payment result: {pay_engine}")
+
+    if pay_engine != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Payment failed: {pay_engine}")
+
+    log(
+        f"Both transactions succeeded: "
+        f"Export at ledger {export_seq}, Payment at ledger {ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)}"
+    )
+    log("Sequence handling OK - export didn't block subsequent txns")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/steady_state_export.py

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+""":descr: install xport hook, trigger export, verify emitted ttEXPORT lifecycle
+
+  1. Fund alice (hook holder), bob (trigger), carol (export destination)
+  2. Install xport hook on alice
+  3. bob pays alice with DST=carol → hook calls xport() → emits ttEXPORT
+  4. Emitted ttEXPORT enters open ledger, validators attach sigs via proposals
+  5. Verify Export transaction appears in a subsequent ledger
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import (
+    require_export,
+    find_export_txns,
+    dst_param,
+    assert_hook_accepted,
+    assert_export_result,
+    assert_shadow_ticket,
+)
+
+# C source for the xport hook — verbatim from src/test/app/Export_test_hooks.h
+# On Payment to the hook account, exports a 1 XAH payment to the DST param.
+XPORT_HOOK_C = r"""
+#include <stdint.h>
+extern int32_t _g(uint32_t id, uint32_t maxiter);
+extern int64_t accept(uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+extern int64_t rollback(uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+extern int64_t xport(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
+extern int64_t xport_reserve(uint32_t count);
+extern int64_t hook_account(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
+extern int64_t otxn_param(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t name_ptr, uint32_t name_len);
+extern int64_t otxn_type(void);
+extern int64_t ledger_seq(void);
+
+#define SBUF(x) (uint32_t)(x), sizeof(x)
+#define ASSERT(x) if (!(x)) rollback((uint32_t)#x, sizeof(#x), __LINE__)
+
+#define ttPAYMENT 0
+#define tfCANONICAL 0x80000000UL
+#define amAMOUNT 1
+#define amFEE 8
+#define atACCOUNT 1
+#define atDESTINATION 3
+
+#define ENCODE_TT(buf_out, tt) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x12U; buf_out[1] = (tt >> 8) & 0xFFU; buf_out[2] = tt & 0xFFU; buf_out += 3;
+
+#define ENCODE_FLAGS(buf_out, flags) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x22U; buf_out[1] = (flags >> 24) & 0xFFU; buf_out[2] = (flags >> 16) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (flags >> 8) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = flags & 0xFFU; buf_out += 5;
+
+#define ENCODE_SEQUENCE(buf_out, seq) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x24U; buf_out[1] = (seq >> 24) & 0xFFU; buf_out[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = seq & 0xFFU; buf_out += 5;
+
+#define ENCODE_FLS(buf_out, fls) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x20U; buf_out[1] = 0x1AU; buf_out[2] = (fls >> 24) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (fls >> 16) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = (fls >> 8) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[5] = fls & 0xFFU; buf_out += 6;
+
+#define ENCODE_LLS(buf_out, lls) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x20U; buf_out[1] = 0x1BU; buf_out[2] = (lls >> 24) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (lls >> 16) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = (lls >> 8) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[5] = lls & 0xFFU; buf_out += 6;
+
+#define ENCODE_DROPS(buf_out, drops, amt_type) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x60U + amt_type; buf_out[1] = 0x40U + ((drops >> 56) & 0x3FU); \
+    buf_out[2] = (drops >> 48) & 0xFFU; buf_out[3] = (drops >> 40) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[4] = (drops >> 32) & 0xFFU; buf_out[5] = (drops >> 24) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[6] = (drops >> 16) & 0xFFU; buf_out[7] = (drops >> 8) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[8] = drops & 0xFFU; buf_out += 9;
+
+#define ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_EMPTY(buf_out) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x73U; buf_out[1] = 0x00U; buf_out += 2;
+
+#define ENCODE_ACCOUNT(buf_out, acc, acc_type) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x80U + acc_type; buf_out[1] = 0x14U; \
+    for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i) buf_out[2+i] = acc[i]; buf_out += 22;
+
+#define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE 270U
+
+int64_t hook(uint32_t reserved) {
+    _g(1, 1);
+
+    if (otxn_type() != ttPAYMENT)
+        return accept(0, 0, 0);
+
+    ASSERT(xport_reserve(1) == 1);
+
+    uint8_t dst[20];
+    int64_t dst_len = otxn_param(SBUF(dst), "DST", 3);
+    ASSERT(dst_len == 20);
+
+    uint8_t acc[20];
+    ASSERT(hook_account(SBUF(acc)) == 20);
+
+    uint32_t cls = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();
+
+    uint8_t tx[PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE];
+    uint8_t* buf = tx;
+
+    ENCODE_TT(buf, ttPAYMENT);
+    ENCODE_FLAGS(buf, tfCANONICAL);
+    ENCODE_SEQUENCE(buf, 0);
+    ENCODE_FLS(buf, cls + 1);
+    ENCODE_LLS(buf, cls + 5);
+    // sfTicketSequence = UINT32 field 41 = 0x20 0x29
+    buf[0] = 0x20U; buf[1] = 0x29U;
+    buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = 0; buf[4] = 0; buf[5] = 1;
+    buf += 6;
+
+    uint64_t drops = 1000000;
+    ENCODE_DROPS(buf, drops, amAMOUNT);
+    ENCODE_DROPS(buf, 10, amFEE);
+
+    ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_EMPTY(buf);
+    ENCODE_ACCOUNT(buf, acc, atACCOUNT);
+    ENCODE_ACCOUNT(buf, dst, atDESTINATION);
+
+    uint8_t hash[32];
+    int64_t xport_result = xport(SBUF(hash), (uint32_t)tx, buf - tx);
+    ASSERT(xport_result == 32);
+
+    return accept(0, 0, 0);
+}
+"""
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    # Wait for network to start and amendments to activate
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 10000, "carol": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    carol = ctx.account("carol")
+
+    # Compile and install xport hook on alice
+    wasm = ctx.compile_hook(XPORT_HOOK_C, label="xport")
+    await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "SetHook",
+            "Hooks": [
+                {
+                    "Hook": {
+                        "CreateCode": wasm.hex().upper(),
+                        "HookOn": "0" * 64,
+                        "HookNamespace": "0" * 64,
+                        "HookApiVersion": 0,
+                        "Flags": 1,  # hsfOVERRIDE
+                    }
+                }
+            ],
+            "Fee": "100000000",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+    )
+    log(
+        f"Hook installed on alice ({alice.address[:12]}...) "
+        f"ledger {ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)}"
+    )
+
+    # --- Trigger ---
+    # bob pays alice → hook calls xport() → emits ttEXPORT
+    trigger_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": alice.address,
+            "Amount": "100000000",
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "HookParameters": [dst_param(carol.address)],
+        },
+        ctx.account("bob").wallet,
+    )
+    trigger_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Export triggered at ledger {trigger_seq}")
+
+    # Assert hook fired with ACCEPT and emitted 1 tx
+    trigger_meta = trigger_result.get("meta", {})
+    assert_hook_accepted(trigger_meta, log, expected_emits=1)
+
+    # --- Verify: check each ledger close for the Export transaction ---
+    max_ledgers = 10
+    for i in range(max_ledgers):
+        await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+        seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+        exports = find_export_txns(ctx, seq)
+        if exports:
+            export_tx = exports[0]
+            meta = export_tx.get("meta", export_tx.get("metaData", {}))
+            result = meta.get("TransactionResult", "")
+            log(f"Ledger {seq}: Export txn found, result={result}")
+
+            if result != "tesSUCCESS":
+                raise AssertionError(f"Export did not succeed: {result}")
+
+            # Assert ExportResult is well-formed with signers and inner tx
+            assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+
+            # Assert shadow ticket was created
+            assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+            log("PASS")
+            return
+        log(f"Ledger {seq}: no Export txn yet")
+
+    raise AssertionError(
+        f"No Export transaction found after {max_ledgers} ledger closes"
+    )

.testnet/scenarios/helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+"""Shared helpers for ConsensusEntropy scenario tests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from xahaud_scripts.testnet.config import feature_name_to_hash
+
+ZERO_DIGEST = "0" * 64
+CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE = feature_name_to_hash("ConsensusEntropy")
+
+
+def feature_hash(name: str) -> str:
+    """Return the amendment hash accepted by feature RPC."""
+    return feature_name_to_hash(name)
+
+
+def feature_status(ctx, name: str, node_id=0):
+    """Query a feature by amendment hash; feature RPC names are ambiguous."""
+    return ctx.feature_check(feature_hash(name), node_id=node_id)
+
+
+def consensus_entropy_feature(ctx, node_id=0):
+    """Query ConsensusEntropy by amendment hash."""
+    return feature_status(ctx, "ConsensusEntropy", node_id=node_id)
+
+
+async def require_entropy(ctx, log):
+    """Wait for first ledger and assert ConsensusEntropy is enabled."""
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(timeout=120)
+    feature = consensus_entropy_feature(ctx, node_id=0)
+    if not feature or not feature.get("enabled", False):
+        raise AssertionError(f"ConsensusEntropy not enabled: {feature}")
+    log("ConsensusEntropy enabled")
+
+
+def get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq):
+    """Fetch ledger and return (ce_tx, user_txns) or raise."""
+    result = ctx.ledger(seq, transactions=True)
+    if not result:
+        raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: fetch failed")
+
+    ledger = result.get("ledger")
+    if not isinstance(ledger, dict):
+        raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: fetch returned no ledger: {result}")
+
+    txns = ledger.get("transactions", [])
+    ce = [tx for tx in txns if tx.get("TransactionType") == "ConsensusEntropy"]
+    user = [tx for tx in txns if tx.get("TransactionType") != "ConsensusEntropy"]
+
+    if len(ce) != 1:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected 1 ConsensusEntropy txn, got {len(ce)}"
+        )
+
+    return ce[0], user
+
+
+def entropy_fields(ce_tx):
+    """Return (digest, entropy_count, is_fallback) from a ConsensusEntropy tx.
+
+    consensus_fallback rounds carry a deterministic non-zero consensus-bound
+    digest with EntropyCount=0 and EntropyTier=1 (consensus_fallback).
+    Validator entropy has EntropyTier=3 (validator_quorum).
+
+    WARNING: is_fallback is ``tier != 3``, so it lumps participant_aligned
+    (Tier 2) in with fallback. It is only safe where no Tier 2 band exists
+    (e.g. 5-node networks, where tier2 == quorum). For band-aware scenarios use
+    the explicit assert_consensus_fallback / assert_participant_aligned /
+    assert_validator_quorum helpers, which check EntropyTier directly.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    entropy_count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier is not None:
+        is_fallback = tier != 3
+    else:
+        is_fallback = entropy_count == 0
+    return digest, entropy_count, is_fallback
+
+
+def assert_participant_aligned(ce_tx, seq, expected_count=None):
+    """Assert participant_aligned (Tier 2) entropy on a ConsensusEntropy tx.
+
+    Tier 2 is the sub-quorum band: the agreed reveal cohort is >= the
+    participant floor but < the 80% validator quorum, so it carries
+    EntropyTier=2 with a deterministic non-zero digest. NOTE entropy_fields()'s
+    is_fallback lumps tier 2 in with fallback (is_fallback = tier != 3), so the
+    tier must be checked EXPLICITLY here.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier != 2:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==2 (participant_aligned), "
+            f"got {tier} (EntropyCount={count})"
+        )
+    if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: participant_aligned digest must be non-zero, got "
+            f"{digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+    if expected_count is not None and count != expected_count:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: participant_aligned EntropyCount must be "
+            f"{expected_count} (the surviving cohort), got {count}"
+        )
+    return digest, count
+
+
+def assert_validator_quorum(ce_tx, seq, min_count=None):
+    """Assert validator_quorum (Tier 3) entropy on a ConsensusEntropy tx:
+    EntropyTier=3, a deterministic non-zero digest, and (optionally)
+    EntropyCount >= min_count (the active quorum). The count can EXCEED the
+    quorum (e.g. a still-full 6/6 ledger caught at a 6->5 transition), so check
+    >=, not ==.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier != 3:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==3 (validator_quorum), got "
+            f"{tier} (EntropyCount={count})"
+        )
+    if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: validator_quorum digest must be non-zero, got "
+            f"{digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+    if min_count is not None and count < min_count:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: validator_quorum EntropyCount={count} < quorum "
+            f"{min_count}"
+        )
+    return digest, count
+
+
+def assert_consensus_fallback(ce_tx, seq):
+    """Assert consensus_fallback (Tier 1) entropy on a ConsensusEntropy tx:
+    EntropyTier=1, EntropyCount=0, and a deterministic NON-zero digest.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier != 1:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==1 (consensus_fallback), got "
+            f"{tier} (EntropyCount={count})"
+        )
+    if count != 0:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: consensus_fallback EntropyCount must be 0, got "
+            f"{count}"
+        )
+    if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: consensus_fallback digest must be non-zero, got "
+            f"{digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+    return digest, count
+
+
+def assert_valid_entropy(ce_tx, seq, seen_digests=None):
+    """Assert quorum-met validator entropy. Optionally check uniqueness."""
+    digest, entropy_count, is_fallback = entropy_fields(ce_tx)
+
+    if is_fallback or not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: fallback/empty Digest")
+
+    if entropy_count < 4:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={entropy_count} < 4 (sub-quorum)"
+        )
+
+    if seen_digests is not None:
+        if digest in seen_digests:
+            raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: duplicate Digest {digest[:16]}...")
+        seen_digests.add(digest)
+
+    return digest, entropy_count

.testnet/scenarios/latency-suite.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+defaults:
+  network:
+    node_count: 5
+    launcher: tmux
+    find_ports: true
+    slave_delay: 0.2
+    features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    track_features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    unl_report: true
+    log_levels:
+      TxQ: info
+      Protocol: debug
+      Peer: debug
+      LedgerConsensus: debug
+      ConsensusExtensions: debug
+      NetworkOPs: info
+    env:
+      XAHAU_RESOURCE_PER_PORT: "1"
+    rc:
+      - rng_poll_ms=250
+tests:
+  - name: latency_baseline_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: false
+
+  - name: latency_baseline_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+
+  - name: latency_proposal_delay_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - delay=100,jitter=25,msg=proposal
+
+  - name: latency_directed_pair_delay_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - n0->n2:delay=750,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n2->n0:delay=750,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+
+  - name: latency_slow_minority_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+      export_timeout: 120
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - n3->n0:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n3->n1:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n3->n2:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4->n0:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4->n1:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4->n2:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n0->n3:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n1->n3:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n2->n3:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n0->n4:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n1->n4:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n2->n4:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+
+  - name: latency_export_no_veto_with_delay
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_no_veto_missing_observation.py
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - delay=300,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4:no_export_sig_hash=true

.testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+""":descr: measure CE/export behavior while RuntimeConfig injects latency/drop.
+
+The suite supplies runtime fault injection through network.rc. This scenario
+does not mutate RuntimeConfig itself; it observes what the launched network does
+under that condition and logs enough counters to compare variants.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections import Counter
+import json
+
+from export.export_helpers import assert_export_result, require_export
+from helpers import consensus_entropy_feature, get_entropy_tx
+
+
+async def _require_runtime_config(ctx, log):
+    result = ctx.rpc.runtime_config(0)
+    if not result or result.get("error"):
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Latency probe requires a binary built with "
+            "xahaud_runtime_test_config=ON; runtime_config RPC returned "
+            f"{result}"
+        )
+    log("RuntimeConfig RPC active")
+
+
+async def _require_consensus_entropy(ctx, log):
+    feature = consensus_entropy_feature(ctx, node_id=0)
+    if not feature or not feature.get("enabled", False):
+        raise AssertionError(f"ConsensusEntropy not enabled: {feature}")
+    log("ConsensusEntropy enabled")
+
+
+def _log_runtime_config(ctx, log):
+    for node_id in range(ctx.node_count):
+        cfg = ctx.rpc.runtime_config(node_id)
+        if cfg is None:
+            raise AssertionError(f"runtime_config RPC failed on node {node_id}")
+        log(
+            f"runtime_config n{node_id}: "
+            f"{json.dumps(cfg, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'))}"
+        )
+
+
+async def _submit_direct_export(ctx, log, *, timeout):
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    if current_seq is None:
+        raise AssertionError("validated ledger is not available before Export")
+
+    log(f"Submitting direct Export at validated ledger {current_seq}")
+    started = ctx.mark("latency-export-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 12,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=timeout,
+    )
+    ended = ctx.mark("latency-export-submit-end")
+
+    elapsed = (ended.monotonic_ns - started.monotonic_ns) / 1_000_000_000
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export result={engine_result} elapsed={elapsed:.3f}s")
+
+    if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Expected Export tesSUCCESS, got {engine_result}")
+
+    export_result = assert_export_result(result.get("meta", {}), log)
+    signers = export_result.get("ExportedTxn", {}).get("Signers", [])
+    log(f"Export signer count={len(signers)}")
+    return started, ended
+
+
+def _summarize_logs(ctx, log, *, label, started, ended):
+    patterns = {
+        "rng_selected": r"RNG: entropy selected",
+        "rng_fallback": r"tier=1",
+        "rng_participant_aligned": r"tier=2",
+        "rng_validator_quorum": r"tier=3",
+        "export_retry": r"terRETRY_EXPORT",
+        "export_quorum_timeout": r"Export: exportSigSet quorum alignment timeout",
+        "export_missing_observation_ignored": (
+            r"Export: missing exportSigSetHash observation ignored"
+        ),
+    }
+    for name, pattern in patterns.items():
+        result = ctx.search_logs(pattern, since=started, until=ended, limit=500)
+        log(f"log_count {label}.{name}={result.count}")
+
+
+async def scenario(
+    ctx,
+    log,
+    *,
+    warmup_ledgers=3,
+    ledgers=8,
+    submit_export=False,
+    export_timeout=90,
+):
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(timeout=120)
+    await _require_runtime_config(ctx, log)
+    _log_runtime_config(ctx, log)
+    await _require_consensus_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    if submit_export:
+        # require_export also asserts the UNLReport precondition for successful
+        # network-mode Export. Keep that explicit in perf runs so a missing
+        # report does not masquerade as a latency failure.
+        await require_export(ctx, log, require_runtime_config=False)
+
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(warmup_ledgers, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+    warm_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Warmup complete at validated ledger {warm_seq}")
+
+    export_window = None
+    if submit_export:
+        export_window = await _submit_direct_export(
+            ctx, log, timeout=export_timeout
+        )
+
+    started = ctx.mark("latency-probe-start")
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(ledgers, node_id=0, timeout=max(120, ledgers * 30))
+    ended = ctx.mark("latency-probe-end")
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    if start_seq is None or end_seq is None:
+        raise AssertionError("validated ledger index unavailable during probe")
+
+    elapsed = (ended.monotonic_ns - started.monotonic_ns) / 1_000_000_000
+    closed = max(0, end_seq - start_seq)
+    cadence = elapsed / closed if closed else 0.0
+    log(
+        f"Observed validated ledgers {start_seq + 1}..{end_seq} "
+        f"closed={closed} elapsed={elapsed:.3f}s cadence={cadence:.3f}s/ledger"
+    )
+
+    tiers: Counter[int] = Counter()
+    counts: Counter[int] = Counter()
+    missing_entropy = 0
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        try:
+            ce, user_txns = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        except AssertionError as exc:
+            missing_entropy += 1
+            log(f"  Ledger {seq}: no ConsensusEntropy tx ({exc})")
+            continue
+
+        tier = ce.get("EntropyTier", -1)
+        count = ce.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+        tiers[tier] += 1
+        counts[count] += 1
+        log(
+            f"  Ledger {seq}: tier={tier} count={count} "
+            f"user_txns={len(user_txns)} digest={ce.get('Digest', '')[:16]}..."
+        )
+
+    log(
+        "SUMMARY "
+        f"closed={closed} elapsed_s={elapsed:.3f} cadence_s={cadence:.3f} "
+        f"tiers={dict(sorted(tiers.items()))} "
+        f"counts={dict(sorted(counts.items()))} "
+        f"missing_entropy={missing_entropy}"
+    )
+
+    _summarize_logs(ctx, log, label="probe", started=started, ended=ended)
+    if export_window is not None:
+        _summarize_logs(
+            ctx,
+            log,
+            label="export",
+            started=export_window[0],
+            ended=export_window[1],
+        )
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/suite.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+defaults:
+  network:
+    node_count: 5
+    launcher: tmux
+    find_ports: true
+    slave_delay: 0.2
+    features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+    track_features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+    unl_report: true
+    log_levels:
+      TxQ: info
+      Protocol: debug
+      Peer: debug
+      LedgerConsensus: debug
+      ConsensusExtensions: debug
+      NetworkOPs: info
+    env:
+      XAHAU_RESOURCE_PER_PORT: "1"
+    rc:
+      - rng_poll_ms=333
+
+tests:
+  - name: steady_state_entropy
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/steady_state_entropy.py
+
+  - name: fallback_without_unl_report
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/fallback_without_unl_report.py
+    network:
+      unl_report: false
+
+  - name: steady_state_entropy_fast_start
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/steady_state_entropy.py
+    network:
+      env:
+        XAHAUD_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG: '{"set":{"global":{"rng_poll_ms":333,"bootstrap_fast_start":true}}}'
+
+  - name: entropy_with_transactions
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/entropy_with_transactions.py
+
+  - name: quorum_recovery_smoke
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_recovery_smoke.py
+
+  - name: quorum_degradation_smoke
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_degradation_smoke.py
+    network:
+      log_levels:
+        LedgerConsensus: trace
+        ConsensusExtensions: trace
+
+  # Tier 2 (participant_aligned) needs 6 nodes: n=5 has no band (tier2 ==
+  # quorum). At 6, the 4/6 window is the participant_aligned band.
+  - name: participant_aligned_smoke
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/participant_aligned_smoke.py
+    network:
+      node_count: 6
+      log_levels:
+        LedgerConsensus: trace
+        ConsensusExtensions: trace
+
+  # Export scenarios: see export-suite.yml

API-CHANGELOG.md

@@ -83,17 +83,9 @@ The [commandline](https://xrpl.org/docs/references/http-websocket-apis/api-conve
 
 The `network_id` field was added in the `server_info` response in version 1.5.0 (2019), but it is not returned in [reporting mode](https://xrpl.org/rippled-server-modes.html#reporting-mode). However, use of reporting mode is now discouraged, in favor of using [Clio](https://github.com/XRPLF/clio) instead.
 
-## XRP Ledger server version 2.5.0
-
-As of 2025-04-04, version 2.5.0 is in development. You can use a pre-release version by building from source or [using the `nightly` package](https://xrpl.org/docs/infrastructure/installation/install-rippled-on-ubuntu).
-
-### Additions and bugfixes in 2.5.0
-
-- `channel_authorize`: If `signing_support` is not enabled in the config, the RPC is disabled.
-
 ## XRP Ledger server version 2.4.0
 
-[Version 2.4.0](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/2.4.0) was released on March 4, 2025.
+As of 2025-01-28, version 2.4.0 is in development. You can use a pre-release version by building from source or [using the `nightly` package](https://xrpl.org/docs/infrastructure/installation/install-rippled-on-ubuntu).
 
 ### Additions and bugfixes in 2.4.0
 

BUILD.md

@@ -84,9 +84,9 @@ If you are unfamiliar with Conan, then please read [this crash course](./docs/bu
 
 You'll need at least one Conan profile:
 
-```
-conan profile detect --force
-```
+   ```
+   conan profile detect --force
+   ```
 
 Update the compiler settings:
 
@@ -182,6 +182,16 @@ which allows you to statically link it with GCC, if you want.
    conan export external/snappy --version 1.1.10 --user xahaud --channel stable
    ```
 
+Export our [Conan recipe for RocksDB](./external/rocksdb).
+It does not override paths to dependencies when building with Visual Studio.
+
+   ```
+   # Conan 1.x
+   conan export external/rocksdb rocksdb/6.29.5@
+   # Conan 2.x
+   conan export --version 6.29.5 external/rocksdb
+   ```
+
 Export our [Conan recipe for SOCI](./external/soci).
 It patches their CMake to correctly import its dependencies.
 
@@ -195,6 +205,17 @@ It patches their CMake to correctly import its dependencies.
    conan export external/wasmedge --version 0.11.2 --user xahaud --channel stable
    ```
 
+Export our [Conan recipe for NuDB](./external/nudb).
+It fixes some source files to add missing `#include`s.
+
+
+   ```
+   # Conan 1.x
+   conan export external/nudb nudb/2.0.8@
+   # Conan 2.x
+   conan export --version 2.0.8 external/nudb
+   ```
+
 ### Build and Test
 
 1. Create a build directory and move into it.
@@ -215,60 +236,60 @@ It patches their CMake to correctly import its dependencies.
 
 2. Use conan to generate CMake files for every configuration you want to build:
 
-   ```
-   conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Release
-   conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Debug
-   ```
+    ```
+    conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Release
+    conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Debug
+    ```
 
-   To build Debug, in the next step, be sure to set `-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug`
+    To build Debug, in the next step, be sure to set `-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug`
 
-   For a single-configuration generator, e.g. `Unix Makefiles` or `Ninja`,
-   you only need to run this command once.
-   For a multi-configuration generator, e.g. `Visual Studio`, you may want to
-   run it more than once.
+    For a single-configuration generator, e.g. `Unix Makefiles` or `Ninja`,
+    you only need to run this command once.
+    For a multi-configuration generator, e.g. `Visual Studio`, you may want to
+    run it more than once.
 
-   Each of these commands should also have a different `build_type` setting.
-   A second command with the same `build_type` setting will overwrite the files
-   generated by the first. You can pass the build type on the command line with
-   `--settings build_type=$BUILD_TYPE` or in the profile itself,
-   under the section `[settings]` with the key `build_type`.
+    Each of these commands should also have a different `build_type` setting.
+    A second command with the same `build_type` setting will overwrite the files
+    generated by the first. You can pass the build type on the command line with
+    `--settings build_type=$BUILD_TYPE` or in the profile itself,
+    under the section `[settings]` with the key `build_type`.
 
-   If you are using a Microsoft Visual C++ compiler,
-   then you will need to ensure consistency between the `build_type` setting
-   and the `compiler.runtime` setting.
+    If you are using a Microsoft Visual C++ compiler,
+    then you will need to ensure consistency between the `build_type` setting
+    and the `compiler.runtime` setting.
 
-   When `build_type` is `Release`, `compiler.runtime` should be `MT`.
+    When `build_type` is `Release`, `compiler.runtime` should be `MT`.
 
-   When `build_type` is `Debug`, `compiler.runtime` should be `MTd`.
+    When `build_type` is `Debug`, `compiler.runtime` should be `MTd`.
 
-   ```
-   conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Release --settings compiler.runtime=MT
-   conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Debug --settings compiler.runtime=MTd
-   ```
+    ```
+    conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Release --settings compiler.runtime=MT
+    conan install .. --output-folder . --build missing --settings build_type=Debug --settings compiler.runtime=MTd
+    ```
 
 3. Configure CMake and pass the toolchain file generated by Conan, located at
    `$OUTPUT_FOLDER/build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake`.
 
-   Single-config generators:
+    Single-config generators:
 
-   Pass the CMake variable [`CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE`][build_type]
-   and make sure it matches the one of the `build_type` settings
-   you chose in the previous step.
+    Pass the CMake variable [`CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE`][build_type]
+    and make sure it matches the one of the `build_type` settings
+    you chose in the previous step.
 
-   For example, to build Debug, in the next command, replace "Release" with "Debug"
+    For example, to build Debug, in the next command, replace "Release" with "Debug"
 
-   ```
-   cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE:FILEPATH=build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release -Dxrpld=ON -Dtests=ON ..
-   ```
+    ```
+    cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE:FILEPATH=build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release -Dxrpld=ON -Dtests=ON ..
+    ```
 
 
-   Multi-config generators:
+    Multi-config generators:
 
-   ```
-   cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE:FILEPATH=build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake -Dxrpld=ON -Dtests=ON  ..
-   ```
+    ```
+    cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE:FILEPATH=build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake -Dxrpld=ON -Dtests=ON  ..
+    ```
 
-   **Note:** You can pass build options for `xahaud` in this step.
+    **Note:** You can pass build options for `xahaud` in this step.
 
 4. Build `xahaud`.
 
@@ -280,7 +301,7 @@ It patches their CMake to correctly import its dependencies.
    Single-config generators:
 
    ```
-   cmake --build . -j $(nproc)
+   cmake --build .
    ```
 
    Multi-config generators:
@@ -308,6 +329,7 @@ It patches their CMake to correctly import its dependencies.
    The location of `xahaud` in your build directory depends on your CMake
    generator. Pass `--help` to see the rest of the command line options.
 
+
 ## Coverage report
 
 The coverage report is intended for developers using compilers GCC
@@ -347,7 +369,7 @@ variable in `cmake`. The specific command line used to run the `gcovr` tool will
 displayed if the `CODE_COVERAGE_VERBOSE` variable is set.
 
 By default, the code coverage tool runs parallel unit tests with `--unittest-jobs`
-set to the number of available CPU cores. This may cause spurious test
+ set to the number of available CPU cores. This may cause spurious test
 errors on Apple. Developers can override the number of unit test jobs with
 the `coverage_test_parallelism` variable in `cmake`.
 
@@ -366,24 +388,24 @@ stored inside the build directory, as either of:
 - file named `coverage.`_extension_ , with a suitable extension for the report format, or
 - directory named `coverage`, with the `index.html` and other files inside, for the `html-details` or `html-nested` report formats.
 
+
 ## Options
 
-| Option     | Default Value | Description                                                                |
-| ---------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `assert`   | OFF           | Enable assertions.                                                         |
-| `coverage` | OFF           | Prepare the coverage report.                                               |
-| `san`      | N/A           | Enable a sanitizer with Clang. Choices are `thread` and `address`.         |
-| `tests`    | OFF           | Build tests.                                                               |
-| `unity`    | OFF           | Configure a unity build.                                                   |
-| `xrpld`    | OFF           | Build the xrpld (`rippled`) application, and not just the libxrpl library. |
-| `werr`     | OFF           | Treat compilation warnings as errors                                       |
-| `wextra`   | OFF           | Enable additional compilation warnings                                     |
+| Option | Default Value | Description |
+| --- | ---| ---|
+| `assert` | OFF | Enable assertions.
+| `coverage` | OFF | Prepare the coverage report. |
+| `san` | N/A | Enable a sanitizer with Clang. Choices are `thread` and `address`. |
+| `tests` | OFF | Build tests. |
+| `unity` | ON | Configure a unity build. |
+| `xrpld` | OFF | Build the xrpld (`rippled`) application, and not just the libxrpl library. |
 
 [Unity builds][5] may be faster for the first build
 (at the cost of much more memory) since they concatenate sources into fewer
 translation units. Non-unity builds may be faster for incremental builds,
 and can be helpful for detecting `#include` omissions.
 
+
 ## Troubleshooting
 
 
@@ -453,13 +475,13 @@ If you want to experiment with a new package, follow these steps:
 
 1. Search for the package on [Conan Center](https://conan.io/center/).
 2. Modify [`conanfile.py`](./conanfile.py):
-   - Add a version of the package to the `requires` property.
-   - Change any default options for the package by adding them to the
-     `default_options` property (with syntax `'$package:$option': $value`).
+    - Add a version of the package to the `requires` property.
+    - Change any default options for the package by adding them to the
+    `default_options` property (with syntax `'$package:$option': $value`).
 3. Modify [`CMakeLists.txt`](./CMakeLists.txt):
-   - Add a call to `find_package($package REQUIRED)`.
-   - Link a library from the package to the target `ripple_libs`
-     (search for the existing call to `target_link_libraries(ripple_libs INTERFACE ...)`).
+    - Add a call to `find_package($package REQUIRED)`.
+    - Link a library from the package to the target `ripple_libs`
+    (search for the existing call to `target_link_libraries(ripple_libs INTERFACE ...)`).
 4. Start coding! Don't forget to include whatever headers you need from the package.
 
 

Builds/levelization/README.md

@@ -25,28 +25,28 @@ more dependencies listed later.
 **tl;dr:** The modules listed first are more independent than the modules
 listed later.
 
-| Level / Tier | Module(s)                                                                                                |
-| ------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| 01           | ripple/beast ripple/unity                                                                                |
-| 02           | ripple/basics                                                                                            |
-| 03           | ripple/json ripple/crypto                                                                                |
-| 04           | ripple/protocol                                                                                          |
-| 05           | ripple/core ripple/conditions ripple/consensus ripple/resource ripple/server                             |
-| 06           | ripple/peerfinder ripple/ledger ripple/nodestore ripple/net                                              |
-| 07           | ripple/shamap ripple/overlay                                                                             |
-| 08           | ripple/app                                                                                               |
-| 09           | ripple/rpc                                                                                               |
-| 10           | ripple/perflog                                                                                           |
-| 11           | test/jtx test/beast test/csf                                                                             |
-| 12           | test/unit_test                                                                                           |
-| 13           | test/crypto test/conditions test/json test/resource test/shamap test/peerfinder test/basics test/overlay |
-| 14           | test                                                                                                     |
-| 15           | test/net test/protocol test/ledger test/consensus test/core test/server test/nodestore                   |
-| 16           | test/rpc test/app                                                                                        |
+| Level / Tier | Module(s)                                     |
+|--------------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| 01           | ripple/beast ripple/unity
+| 02           | ripple/basics
+| 03           | ripple/json ripple/crypto
+| 04           | ripple/protocol
+| 05           | ripple/core ripple/conditions ripple/consensus ripple/resource ripple/server
+| 06           | ripple/peerfinder ripple/ledger ripple/nodestore ripple/net
+| 07           | ripple/shamap ripple/overlay
+| 08           | ripple/app
+| 09           | ripple/rpc
+| 10           | ripple/perflog
+| 11           | test/jtx test/beast test/csf
+| 12           | test/unit_test
+| 13           | test/crypto test/conditions test/json test/resource test/shamap test/peerfinder test/basics test/overlay
+| 14           | test
+| 15           | test/net test/protocol test/ledger test/consensus test/core test/server test/nodestore
+| 16           | test/rpc test/app
 
-(Note that `test` levelization is _much_ less important and _much_ less
+(Note that `test` levelization is *much* less important and *much* less
 strictly enforced than `ripple` levelization, other than the requirement
-that `test` code should _never_ be included in `ripple` code.)
+that `test` code should *never* be included in `ripple` code.)
 
 ## Validation
 
@@ -59,48 +59,48 @@ the rippled source. The only caveat is that it runs much slower
 under Windows than in Linux. It hasn't yet been tested under MacOS.
 It generates many files of [results](results):
 
-- `rawincludes.txt`: The raw dump of the `#includes`
-- `paths.txt`: A second dump grouping the source module
+* `rawincludes.txt`: The raw dump of the `#includes`
+* `paths.txt`: A second dump grouping the source module
   to the destination module, deduped, and with frequency counts.
-- `includes/`: A directory where each file represents a module and
+* `includes/`: A directory where each file represents a module and
   contains a list of modules and counts that the module _includes_.
-- `includedby/`: Similar to `includes/`, but the other way around. Each
+* `includedby/`: Similar to `includes/`, but the other way around. Each
   file represents a module and contains a list of modules and counts
   that _include_ the module.
-- [`loops.txt`](results/loops.txt): A list of direct loops detected
+* [`loops.txt`](results/loops.txt): A list of direct loops detected
   between modules as they actually exist, as opposed to how they are
   desired as described above. In a perfect repo, this file will be
   empty.
   This file is committed to the repo, and is used by the [levelization
   Github workflow](../../.github/workflows/levelization.yml) to validate
   that nothing changed.
-- [`ordering.txt`](results/ordering.txt): A list showing relationships
+* [`ordering.txt`](results/ordering.txt): A list showing relationships
   between modules where there are no loops as they actually exist, as
   opposed to how they are desired as described above.
   This file is committed to the repo, and is used by the [levelization
   Github workflow](../../.github/workflows/levelization.yml) to validate
   that nothing changed.
-- [`levelization.yml`](../../.github/workflows/levelization.yml)
+* [`levelization.yml`](../../.github/workflows/levelization.yml)
   Github Actions workflow to test that levelization loops haven't
-  changed. Unfortunately, if changes are detected, it can't tell if
+  changed.  Unfortunately, if changes are detected, it can't tell if
   they are improvements or not, so if you have resolved any issues or
   done anything else to improve levelization, run `levelization.py`,
   and commit the updated results.
 
-The `loops.txt` and `ordering.txt` files relate the modules
+The  `loops.txt` and `ordering.txt` files relate the modules
 using comparison signs, which indicate the number of times each
 module is included in the other.
 
-- `A > B` means that A should probably be at a higher level than B,
+* `A > B` means that A should probably be at a higher level than B,
   because B is included in A significantly more than A is included in B.
   These results can be included in both `loops.txt` and `ordering.txt`.
   Because `ordering.txt`only includes relationships where B is not
   included in A at all, it will only include these types of results.
-- `A ~= B` means that A and B are included in each other a different
+* `A ~= B` means that A and B are included in each other a different
   number of times, but the values are so close that the script can't
   definitively say that one should be above the other. These results
   will only be included in `loops.txt`.
-- `A == B` means that A and B include each other the same number of
+* `A == B` means that A and B include each other the same number of
   times, so the script has no clue which should be higher. These results
   will only be included in `loops.txt`.
 
@@ -110,5 +110,5 @@ get those details locally.
 
 1. Run `levelization.py`
 2. Grep the modules in `paths.txt`.
-   - For example, if a cycle is found `A ~= B`, simply `grep -w
-A Builds/levelization/results/paths.txt | grep -w B`
+   * For example, if a cycle is found `A ~= B`, simply `grep -w
+     A Builds/levelization/results/paths.txt | grep -w B`

Builds/levelization/results/loops.txt

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.nodestore
   xrpld.app > xrpld.nodestore
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.overlay
-  xrpld.overlay > xrpld.app
+  xrpld.overlay == xrpld.app
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.peerfinder
-  xrpld.peerfinder ~= xrpld.app
+  xrpld.app > xrpld.peerfinder
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.rpc
   xrpld.rpc > xrpld.app
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Loop: xrpld.core xrpld.perflog
   xrpld.perflog == xrpld.core
 
 Loop: xrpld.net xrpld.rpc
-  xrpld.rpc ~= xrpld.net
+  xrpld.rpc > xrpld.net
 
 Loop: xrpld.overlay xrpld.rpc
   xrpld.rpc ~= xrpld.overlay

Builds/levelization/results/ordering.txt

@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ libxrpl.protocol > xrpl.hook
 libxrpl.protocol > xrpl.json
 libxrpl.protocol > xrpl.protocol
 libxrpl.resource > xrpl.basics
-libxrpl.resource > xrpl.json
 libxrpl.resource > xrpl.resource
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.basics
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.json
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.protocol
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.server
+test.app > test.shamap
 test.app > test.toplevel
 test.app > test.unit_test
 test.app > xrpl.basics
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ test.app > xrpld.ledger
 test.app > xrpld.nodestore
 test.app > xrpld.overlay
 test.app > xrpld.rpc
+test.app > xrpld.shamap
 test.app > xrpl.hook
 test.app > xrpl.json
 test.app > xrpl.protocol
@@ -58,10 +59,13 @@ test.csf > xrpl.basics
 test.csf > xrpld.consensus
 test.csf > xrpl.json
 test.csf > xrpl.protocol
+test.formal_verification > xrpld.app
+test.formal_verification > xrpld.consensus
 test.json > test.jtx
 test.json > xrpl.json
 test.jtx > xrpl.basics
 test.jtx > xrpld.app
+test.jtx > xrpld.consensus
 test.jtx > xrpld.core
 test.jtx > xrpld.ledger
 test.jtx > xrpld.net
@@ -142,7 +146,6 @@ test.shamap > xrpl.protocol
 test.toplevel > test.csf
 test.toplevel > xrpl.json
 test.unit_test > xrpl.basics
-tests.libxrpl > xrpl.basics
 xrpl.hook > xrpl.basics
 xrpl.hook > xrpl.protocol
 xrpl.json > xrpl.basics
@@ -171,6 +174,7 @@ xrpld.core > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.core > xrpl.json
 xrpld.core > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.ledger > xrpl.basics
+xrpld.ledger > xrpld.core
 xrpld.ledger > xrpl.json
 xrpld.ledger > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.net > xrpl.basics
@@ -195,6 +199,7 @@ xrpld.peerfinder > xrpld.core
 xrpld.peerfinder > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.perflog > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.perflog > xrpl.json
+xrpld.perflog > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.rpc > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.rpc > xrpld.core
 xrpld.rpc > xrpld.ledger

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -21,18 +21,6 @@ endif()
 project (xrpl)
 set(Boost_NO_BOOST_CMAKE ON)
 
-if(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "GNU")
-    # GCC-specific fixes
-    add_compile_options(-Wno-unknown-pragmas -Wno-subobject-linkage)
-    # -Wno-subobject-linkage can be removed when we upgrade GCC version to at least 13.3
-elseif(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "Clang")
-    # Clang-specific fixes
-    add_compile_options(-Wno-unknown-warning-option) # Ignore unknown warning options
-elseif(MSVC)
-    # MSVC-specific fixes
-    add_compile_options(/wd4068) # Ignore unknown pragmas
-endif()
-
 # make GIT_COMMIT_HASH define available to all sources
 find_package(Git)
 if(Git_FOUND)
@@ -109,11 +97,6 @@ set_target_properties(OpenSSL::SSL PROPERTIES
   INTERFACE_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 )
 set(SECP256K1_INSTALL TRUE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_BENCHMARK FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_TESTS FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_CTIME_TESTS FALSE)
-set(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXAMPLES FALSE)
 add_subdirectory(external/secp256k1)
 add_library(secp256k1::secp256k1 ALIAS secp256k1)
 add_subdirectory(external/ed25519-donna)
@@ -171,8 +154,3 @@ include(RippledCore)
 include(RippledInstall)
 include(RippledDocs)
 include(RippledValidatorKeys)
-
-if(tests)
-  include(CTest)
-  add_subdirectory(src/tests/libxrpl)
-endif()

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ We assume you are familiar with the general practice of [making
 contributions on GitHub][1]. This file includes only special
 instructions specific to this project.
 
+
 ## Before you start
 
 In general, contributions should be developed in your personal
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ your verifying key. Please set up [signature verification][signing].
 [signing]:
     https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/managing-commit-signature-verification/about-commit-signature-verification
 
+
 ## Major contributions
 
 If your contribution is a major feature or breaking change, then you
@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ responsibility of the XLS author to update the draft to match the final
 implementation when its corresponding pull request is merged, unless the
 author delegates that responsibility to others.
 
+
 ## Before making a pull request
 
 Changes that alter transaction processing must be guarded by an
@@ -72,17 +75,16 @@ Changes should be usually squashed down into a single commit.
 Some larger or more complicated change sets make more sense,
 and are easier to review if organized into multiple logical commits.
 Either way, all commits should fit the following criteria:
-
-- Changes should be presented in a single commit or a logical
+* Changes should be presented in a single commit or a logical
   sequence of commits.
   Specifically, chronological commits that simply
   reflect the history of how the author implemented
   the change, "warts and all", are not useful to
   reviewers.
-- Every commit should have a [good message](#good-commit-messages).
+* Every commit should have a [good message](#good-commit-messages).
   to explain a specific aspects of the change.
-- Every commit should be signed.
-- Every commit should be well-formed (builds successfully,
+* Every commit should be signed.
+* Every commit should be well-formed (builds successfully,
   unit tests passing), as this helps to resolve merge
   conflicts, and makes it easier to use `git bisect`
   to find bugs.
@@ -94,14 +96,13 @@ Refer to
 for general rules on writing a good commit message.
 
 tl;dr
-
 > 1. Separate subject from body with a blank line.
 > 2. Limit the subject line to 50 characters.
->    - [...]shoot for 50 characters, but consider 72 the hard limit.
+>    * [...]shoot for 50 characters, but consider 72 the hard limit.
 > 3. Capitalize the subject line.
 > 4. Do not end the subject line with a period.
 > 5. Use the imperative mood in the subject line.
->    - A properly formed Git commit subject line should always be able
+>    * A properly formed Git commit subject line should always be able
 >      to complete the following sentence: "If applied, this commit will
 >      _your subject line here_".
 > 6. Wrap the body at 72 characters.
@@ -109,17 +110,16 @@ tl;dr
 
 In addition to those guidelines, please add one of the following
 prefixes to the subject line if appropriate.
-
-- `fix:` - The primary purpose is to fix an existing bug.
-- `perf:` - The primary purpose is performance improvements.
-- `refactor:` - The changes refactor code without affecting
+* `fix:` - The primary purpose is to fix an existing bug.
+* `perf:` - The primary purpose is performance improvements.
+* `refactor:` - The changes refactor code without affecting
   functionality.
-- `test:` - The changes _only_ affect unit tests.
-- `docs:` - The changes _only_ affect documentation. This can
+* `test:` - The changes _only_ affect unit tests.
+* `docs:` - The changes _only_ affect documentation. This can
   include code comments in addition to `.md` files like this one.
-- `build:` - The changes _only_ affect the build process,
+* `build:` - The changes _only_ affect the build process,
   including CMake and/or Conan settings.
-- `chore:` - Other tasks that don't affect the binary, but don't fit
+* `chore:` - Other tasks that don't affect the binary, but don't fit
   any of the other cases. e.g. formatting, git settings, updating
   Github Actions jobs.
 
@@ -169,11 +169,11 @@ meets a few criteria:
 2. All CI checks must be complete and passed. (One-off failures may
    be acceptable if they are related to a known issue.)
 3. The PR must have a [good commit message](#good-commit-messages).
-   - If the PR started with a good commit message, and it doesn't
+   * If the PR started with a good commit message, and it doesn't
      need to be updated, the author can indicate that in a comment.
-   - Any contributor, preferably the author, can leave a comment
+   * Any contributor, preferably the author, can leave a comment
      suggesting a commit message.
-   - If the author squashes and rebases the code in preparation for
+   * If the author squashes and rebases the code in preparation for
      merge, they should also ensure the commit message(s) are updated
      as well.
 4. The PR branch must be up to date with the base branch (usually
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ This is a non-exhaustive list of recommended style guidelines. These are
 not always strictly enforced and serve as a way to keep the codebase
 coherent rather than a set of _thou shalt not_ commandments.
 
+
 ## Formatting
 
 All code must conform to `clang-format` version 10,
@@ -348,7 +349,6 @@ To download the patch file:
 5. Commit and push.
 
 You can install a pre-commit hook to automatically run `clang-format` before every commit:
-
 ```
 pip3 install pre-commit
 pre-commit install
@@ -379,51 +379,49 @@ locations, where the reporting of contract violations on the Antithesis
 platform is either not possible or not useful.
 
 For this reason:
-
-- The locations where `assert` or `assert(false)` contracts should continue to be used:
-  - `constexpr` functions
-  - unit tests i.e. files under `src/test`
-  - unit tests-related modules (files under `beast/test` and `beast/unit_test`)
-- Outside of the listed locations, do not use `assert`; use `XRPL_ASSERT` instead,
+* The locations where `assert` or `assert(false)` contracts should continue to be used:
+  * `constexpr` functions
+  * unit tests i.e. files under `src/test`
+  * unit tests-related modules (files under `beast/test` and `beast/unit_test`)
+* Outside of the listed locations, do not use `assert`; use `XRPL_ASSERT` instead,
   giving it unique name, with the short description of the contract.
-- Outside of the listed locations, do not use `assert(false)`; use
+* Outside of the listed locations, do not use `assert(false)`; use
   `UNREACHABLE` instead, giving it unique name, with the description of the
   condition being violated
-- The contract name should start with a full name (including scope) of the
-  function, optionally a named lambda, followed by a colon `:` and a brief
+* The contract name should start with a full name (including scope) of the
+  function, optionally a named lambda, followed by a colon ` : ` and a brief
   (typically at most five words) description. `UNREACHABLE` contracts
   can use slightly longer descriptions. If there are multiple overloads of the
   function, use common sense to balance both brevity and unambiguity of the
   function name. NOTE: the purpose of name is to provide stable means of
   unique identification of every contract; for this reason try to avoid elements
   which can change in some obvious refactors or when reinforcing the condition.
-- Contract description typically (except for `UNREACHABLE`) should describe the
+* Contract description typically (except for `UNREACHABLE`) should describe the
   _expected_ condition, as in "I assert that _expected_ is true".
-- Contract description for `UNREACHABLE` should describe the _unexpected_
+* Contract description for `UNREACHABLE` should describe the _unexpected_
   situation which caused the line to have been reached.
-- Example good name for an
+* Example good name for an
   `UNREACHABLE` macro `"Json::operator==(Value, Value) : invalid type"`; example
   good name for an `XRPL_ASSERT` macro `"Json::Value::asCString : valid type"`.
-- Example **bad** name
+* Example **bad** name
   `"RFC1751::insert(char* s, int x, int start, int length) : length is greater than or equal zero"`
   (missing namespace, unnecessary full function signature, description too verbose).
   Good name: `"ripple::RFC1751::insert : minimum length"`.
-- In **few** well-justified cases a non-standard name can be used, in which case a
+* In **few** well-justified cases a non-standard name can be used, in which case a
   comment should be placed to explain the rationale (example in `contract.cpp`)
-- Do **not** rename a contract without a good reason (e.g. the name no longer
+* Do **not** rename a contract without a good reason (e.g. the name no longer
   reflects the location or the condition being checked)
-- Do not use `std::unreachable`
-- Do not put contracts where they can be violated by an external condition
+* Do not use `std::unreachable`
+* Do not put contracts where they can be violated by an external condition
   (e.g. timing, data payload before mandatory validation etc.) as this creates
   bogus bug reports (and causes crashes of Debug builds)
 
 ## Unit Tests
-
 To execute all unit tests:
 
-`rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs=<number of cores>`
+```rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs=<number of cores>```
 
-(Note: Using multiple cores on a Mac M1 can cause spurious test failures. The
+(Note: Using multiple cores on a Mac M1 can cause spurious test failures. The 
 cause is still under investigation. If you observe this problem, try specifying fewer jobs.)
 
 To run a specific set of test suites:
@@ -431,11 +429,10 @@ To run a specific set of test suites:
 ```
 rippled --unittest TestSuiteName
 ```
-
 Note: In this example, all tests with prefix `TestSuiteName` will be run, so if
-`TestSuiteName1` and `TestSuiteName2` both exist, then both tests will run.
-Alternatively, if the unit test name finds an exact match, it will stop
-doing partial matches, i.e. if a unit test with a title of `TestSuiteName`
+`TestSuiteName1` and `TestSuiteName2` both exist, then both tests will run. 
+Alternatively, if the unit test name finds an exact match, it will stop 
+doing partial matches, i.e. if a unit test with a title of `TestSuiteName` 
 exists, then no other unit test will be executed, apart from `TestSuiteName`.
 
 ## Avoid
@@ -451,6 +448,7 @@ exists, then no other unit test will be executed, apart from `TestSuiteName`.
    explanatory comments.
 8. Importing new libraries unless there is a very good reason to do so.
 
+
 ## Seek to
 
 9. Extend functionality of existing code rather than creating new code.
@@ -465,12 +463,14 @@ exists, then no other unit test will be executed, apart from `TestSuiteName`.
 14. Provide as many comments as you feel that a competent programmer
     would need to understand what your code does.
 
+
 # Maintainers
 
 Maintainers are ecosystem participants with elevated access to the repository.
 They are able to push new code, make decisions on when a release should be
 made, etc.
 
+
 ## Adding and removing
 
 New maintainers can be proposed by two existing maintainers, subject to a vote
@@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ A minimum of 60% agreement and 50% participation are required.
 The XRP Ledger Foundation will have the ability, for cause, to remove an
 existing maintainer without a vote.
 
+
 ## Current Maintainers
 
 * [Richard Holland](https://github.com/RichardAH) (XRPL Labs + INFTF)

LICENSE.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-ISC License
+ISC License 
 
 Copyright (c) 2011, Arthur Britto, David Schwartz, Jed McCaleb, Vinnie Falco, Bob Way, Eric Lombrozo, Nikolaos D. Bougalis, Howard Hinnant.
 Copyright (c) 2012-2020, the XRP Ledger developers.
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+

README.md

@@ -2,14 +2,12 @@
 
 **Note:** Throughout this README, references to "we" or "our" pertain to the community and contributors involved in the Xahau network. It does not imply a legal entity or a specific collection of individuals.
 
-[Xahau](https://xahau.network/) is a decentralized cryptographic ledger that builds upon the robust foundation of the XRP Ledger. It inherits the XRP Ledger's Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus algorithm and enhances it with additional features and functionalities. Developers and users familiar with the XRP Ledger will find that most documentation and tutorials available on [xrpl.org](https://xrpl.org) are relevant and applicable to Xahau, including those related to running validators and managing validator keys. For Xahau specific documentation you can visit our [documentation](https://xahau.network/)
+[Xahau](https://xahau.network/) is a decentralized cryptographic ledger that builds upon the robust foundation of the XRP Ledger. It inherits the XRP Ledger's Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus algorithm under the normal XRPL assumptions about configured validator-list overlap, timing, and fault bounds, and enhances it with additional features and functionalities. Developers and users familiar with the XRP Ledger will find that most documentation and tutorials available on [xrpl.org](https://xrpl.org) are relevant and applicable to Xahau, including those related to running validators and managing validator keys. For Xahau specific documentation you can visit our [documentation](https://xahau.network/)
 
 ## XAH
-
 XAH is the public, counterparty-free asset native to Xahau and functions primarily as network gas. Transactions submitted to the Xahau network must supply an appropriate amount of XAH, to be burnt by the network as a fee, in order to be successfully included in a validated ledger. In addition, XAH also acts as a bridge currency within the Xahau DEX. XAH is traded on the open-market and is available for anyone to access. Xahau was created in 2023 with a supply of 600 million units of XAH.
 
 ## xahaud
-
 The server software that powers Xahau is called `xahaud` and is available in this repository under the permissive [ISC open-source license](LICENSE.md). The `xahaud` server software is written primarily in C++ and runs on a variety of platforms. The `xahaud` server software can run in several modes depending on its configuration.
 
 ### Build from Source

SECURITY.md

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 For more details on operating the Xahau server securely, please visit https://docs.xahau.network/infrastructure/building-xahau.
 
+
 # Security Policy
 
 ## Supported Versions

bin/physical.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+set -o errexit
+
+marker_base=f62f74da10c5936c64bd16cd509a8b68f1464e41
+marker_commit=${1:-${marker_base}}
+
+if [ $(git merge-base ${marker_commit} ${marker_base}) != ${marker_base} ]; then
+  echo "first marker commit not an ancestor: ${marker_commit}"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ $(git merge-base ${marker_commit} HEAD) != $(git rev-parse --verify ${marker_commit}) ]; then
+  echo "given marker commit not an ancestor: ${marker_commit}"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ -e Builds/CMake ]; then
+  echo move CMake
+  git mv Builds/CMake cmake
+  git add --update .
+  git commit -m 'Move CMake directory' --author 'Pretty Printer <cpp@ripple.com>'
+fi
+
+if [ -e src/ripple ]; then
+
+  echo move protocol buffers
+  mkdir -p include/xrpl
+  if [ -e src/ripple/proto ]; then
+    git mv src/ripple/proto include/xrpl
+  fi
+
+  extract_list() {
+    git show ${marker_commit}:Builds/CMake/RippledCore.cmake | \
+    awk "/END ${1}/ { p = 0 } p && /src\/ripple/; /BEGIN ${1}/ { p = 1 }" | \
+    sed -e 's#src/ripple/##' -e 's#[^a-z]\+$##'
+  }
+
+  move_files() {
+    oldroot="$1"; shift
+    newroot="$1"; shift
+    detail="$1"; shift
+    files=("$@")
+    for file in ${files[@]}; do
+      if [ ! -e ${oldroot}/${file} ]; then
+        continue
+      fi
+      dir=$(dirname ${file})
+      if [ $(basename ${dir}) == 'details' ]; then
+        dir=$(dirname ${dir})
+      fi
+      if [ $(basename ${dir}) == 'impl' ]; then
+        dir="$(dirname ${dir})/${detail}"
+      fi
+      mkdir -p ${newroot}/${dir}
+      git mv ${oldroot}/${file} ${newroot}/${dir}
+    done
+  }
+
+  echo move libxrpl headers
+  files=$(extract_list 'LIBXRPL HEADERS')
+  files+=(
+    basics/SlabAllocator.h
+
+    beast/asio/io_latency_probe.h
+    beast/container/aged_container.h
+    beast/container/aged_container_utility.h
+    beast/container/aged_map.h
+    beast/container/aged_multimap.h
+    beast/container/aged_multiset.h
+    beast/container/aged_set.h
+    beast/container/aged_unordered_map.h
+    beast/container/aged_unordered_multimap.h
+    beast/container/aged_unordered_multiset.h
+    beast/container/aged_unordered_set.h
+    beast/container/detail/aged_associative_container.h
+    beast/container/detail/aged_container_iterator.h
+    beast/container/detail/aged_ordered_container.h
+    beast/container/detail/aged_unordered_container.h
+    beast/container/detail/empty_base_optimization.h
+    beast/core/LockFreeStack.h
+    beast/insight/Collector.h
+    beast/insight/Counter.h
+    beast/insight/CounterImpl.h
+    beast/insight/Event.h
+    beast/insight/EventImpl.h
+    beast/insight/Gauge.h
+    beast/insight/GaugeImpl.h
+    beast/insight/Group.h
+    beast/insight/Groups.h
+    beast/insight/Hook.h
+    beast/insight/HookImpl.h
+    beast/insight/Insight.h
+    beast/insight/Meter.h
+    beast/insight/MeterImpl.h
+    beast/insight/NullCollector.h
+    beast/insight/StatsDCollector.h
+    beast/test/fail_counter.h
+    beast/test/fail_stream.h
+    beast/test/pipe_stream.h
+    beast/test/sig_wait.h
+    beast/test/string_iostream.h
+    beast/test/string_istream.h
+    beast/test/string_ostream.h
+    beast/test/test_allocator.h
+    beast/test/yield_to.h
+    beast/utility/hash_pair.h
+    beast/utility/maybe_const.h
+    beast/utility/temp_dir.h
+
+    # included by only json/impl/json_assert.h
+    json/json_errors.h
+
+    protocol/PayChan.h
+    protocol/RippleLedgerHash.h
+    protocol/messages.h
+    protocol/st.h
+  )
+  files+=(
+    basics/README.md
+    crypto/README.md
+    json/README.md
+    protocol/README.md
+    resource/README.md
+  )
+  move_files src/ripple include/xrpl detail ${files[@]}
+
+  echo move libxrpl sources
+  files=$(extract_list 'LIBXRPL SOURCES')
+  move_files src/ripple src/libxrpl "" ${files[@]}
+
+  echo check leftovers
+  dirs=$(cd include/xrpl; ls -d */)
+  dirs=$(cd src/ripple; ls -d ${dirs} 2>/dev/null || true)
+  files="$(cd src/ripple; find ${dirs} -type f)"
+  if [ -n "${files}" ]; then
+    echo "leftover files:"
+    echo ${files}
+    exit
+  fi
+
+  echo remove empty directories
+  empty_dirs="$(cd src/ripple; find ${dirs} -depth -type d)"
+  for dir in ${empty_dirs[@]}; do
+    if [ -e ${dir} ]; then
+      rmdir ${dir}
+    fi
+  done
+
+  echo move xrpld sources
+  files=$(
+    extract_list 'XRPLD SOURCES'
+    cd src/ripple
+    find * -regex '.*\.\(h\|ipp\|md\|pu\|uml\|png\)'
+  )
+  move_files src/ripple src/xrpld detail ${files[@]}
+
+  files="$(cd src/ripple; find . -type f)"
+  if [ -n "${files}" ]; then
+    echo "leftover files:"
+    echo ${files}
+    exit
+  fi
+
+fi
+
+rm -rf src/ripple
+
+echo rename .hpp to .h
+find include src -name '*.hpp' -exec bash -c 'f="{}"; git mv "${f}" "${f%hpp}h"' \;
+
+echo move PerfLog.h
+if [ -e include/xrpl/basics/PerfLog.h ]; then
+  git mv include/xrpl/basics/PerfLog.h src/xrpld/perflog
+fi
+
+# Make sure all protobuf includes have the correct prefix.
+protobuf_replace='s:^#include\s*["<].*org/xrpl\([^">]\+\)[">]:#include <xrpl/proto/org/xrpl\1>:'
+# Make sure first-party includes use angle brackets and .h extension.
+ripple_replace='s:include\s*["<]ripple/\(.*\)\.h\(pp\)\?[">]:include <ripple/\1.h>:'
+beast_replace='s:include\s*<beast/:include <xrpl/beast/:'
+# Rename impl directories to detail.
+impl_rename='s:\(<xrpl.*\)/impl\(/details\)\?/:\1/detail/:'
+
+echo rewrite includes in libxrpl
+find include/xrpl src/libxrpl -type f -exec sed -i \
+  -e "${protobuf_replace}" \
+  -e "${ripple_replace}" \
+  -e "${beast_replace}" \
+  -e 's:^#include <ripple/:#include <xrpl/:' \
+  -e "${impl_rename}" \
+  {} +
+
+echo rewrite includes in xrpld
+# # https://www.baeldung.com/linux/join-multiple-lines
+libxrpl_dirs="$(cd include/xrpl; ls -d1 */ | sed 's:/$::')"
+# libxrpl_dirs='a\nb\nc\n'
+readarray -t libxrpl_dirs <<< "${libxrpl_dirs}"
+# libxrpl_dirs=(a b c)
+libxrpl_dirs=$(printf -v txt '%s\\|' "${libxrpl_dirs[@]}"; echo "${txt%\\|}")
+# libxrpl_dirs='a\|b\|c'
+find src/xrpld src/test -type f -exec sed -i \
+  -e "${protobuf_replace}" \
+  -e "${ripple_replace}" \
+  -e "${beast_replace}" \
+  -e "s:^#include <ripple/basics/PerfLog.h>:#include <xrpld/perflog/PerfLog.h>:" \
+  -e "s:^#include <ripple/\(${libxrpl_dirs}\)/:#include <xrpl/\1/:" \
+  -e 's:^#include <ripple/:#include <xrpld/:' \
+  -e "${impl_rename}" \
+  {} +
+
+git commit -m 'Rearrange sources' --author 'Pretty Printer <cpp@ripple.com>'
+find include src -type f \( -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.ipp' \) -exec clang-format-10 -i {} +
+git add --update .
+git commit -m 'Rewrite includes' --author 'Pretty Printer <cpp@ripple.com>'
+./Builds/levelization/levelization.sh
+git add --update .
+git commit -m 'Recompute loops' --author 'Pretty Printer <cpp@ripple.com>'

build-core.sh

@@ -95,8 +95,16 @@ if [[ "$4" == "" ]]; then
   echo "Non GH, local building, no Action runner magic"
 else
   # GH Action, runner
-  cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
-  cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
+    if [[ "$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)" == "release" ]]; then
+        echo "building on the release branch... placing it in builds/candidate"
+        mkdir /data/builds/candidate
+        cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
+        cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
+    else
+        echo "building non-release branch, placing it in builds root"
+        cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
+        cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
+    fi  
   echo "Published build to: http://build.xahau.tech/"
   echo $(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
 fi

cmake/CodeCoverage.cmake

@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@
 #     - replace both functions setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr_* with a single setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr
 #     - add support for all gcovr output formats
 #
+# 2024-04-03, Bronek Kozicki
+#     - add support for output formats: jacoco, clover, lcov
+#
 # USAGE:
 #
 # 1. Copy this file into your cmake modules path.
@@ -256,10 +259,10 @@ endif()
 #     BASE_DIRECTORY "../"                   # Base directory for report
 #                                            #  (defaults to PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR)
 #     FORMAT "cobertura"                     # Output format, one of:
-#                                            #  xml cobertura sonarqube json-summary
-#                                            #  json-details coveralls csv txt
-#                                            #  html-single html-nested html-details
-#                                            #  (xml is an alias to cobertura;
+#                                            #  xml cobertura sonarqube jacoco clover
+#                                            #  json-summary json-details coveralls csv
+#                                            #  txt html-single html-nested html-details
+#                                            #  lcov (xml is an alias to cobertura;
 #                                            #  if no format is set, defaults to xml)
 #     EXCLUDE "src/dir1/*" "src/dir2/*"      # Patterns to exclude (can be relative
 #                                            #  to BASE_DIRECTORY, with CMake 3.4+)
@@ -308,6 +311,8 @@ function(setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr)
             set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.txt)
         elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "csv")
             set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.csv)
+        elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "lcov")
+            set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.lcov)
         else()
             set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.xml)
         endif()
@@ -320,6 +325,14 @@ function(setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr)
         set(Coverage_FORMAT cobertura) # overwrite xml
     elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "sonarqube")
         list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --sonarqube "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
+    elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "jacoco")
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --jacoco "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --jacoco-pretty )
+    elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "clover")
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --clover "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --clover-pretty )
+    elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "lcov")
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --lcov "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
     elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "json-summary")
         list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --json-summary "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
         list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --json-summary-pretty)

cmake/RippledCompiler.cmake

@@ -93,16 +93,27 @@ if (MSVC)
       -errorreport:none
       -machine:X64)
 else ()
+  # HACK : because these need to come first, before any warning demotion
+  string (APPEND CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS " -Wall -Wdeprecated")
+  if (wextra)
+    string (APPEND CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS " -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter")
+  endif ()
+  # not MSVC
   target_compile_options (common
     INTERFACE
-      -Wall
-      -Wdeprecated
-      $<$<BOOL:${is_clang}>:-Wno-deprecated-declarations>
-      $<$<BOOL:${wextra}>:-Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter>
       $<$<BOOL:${werr}>:-Werror>
-      -fstack-protector
+      $<$<COMPILE_LANGUAGE:CXX>:
+        -frtti
+        -Wnon-virtual-dtor
+      >
       -Wno-sign-compare
-      -Wno-unused-but-set-variable
+      -Wno-char-subscripts
+      -Wno-format
+      -Wno-unused-local-typedefs
+      $<$<BOOL:${is_gcc}>:
+        -Wno-unused-but-set-variable
+        -Wno-deprecated
+      >
       $<$<NOT:$<CONFIG:Debug>>:-fno-strict-aliasing>
       # tweak gcc optimization for debug
       $<$<AND:$<BOOL:${is_gcc}>,$<CONFIG:Debug>>:-O0>

cmake/RippledCore.cmake

@@ -160,13 +160,17 @@ target_link_modules(xrpl PUBLIC
 #     $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include>
 #     $<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include>)
 
+if(formal_verification AND NOT xrpld)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification requires xrpld=ON")
+endif()
+
 if(xrpld)
   add_executable(rippled)
   if(tests)
     target_compile_definitions(rippled PUBLIC ENABLE_TESTS)
-    target_compile_definitions(rippled PRIVATE
-                                       UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE=${UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE}
-    )
+  endif()
+  if(xahaud_runtime_test_config)
+    target_compile_definitions(rippled PUBLIC XAHAUD_ENABLE_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG=1)
   endif()
   target_include_directories(rippled
     PRIVATE
@@ -183,6 +187,21 @@ if(xrpld)
       "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/src/test/*.cpp"
     )
     target_sources(rippled PRIVATE ${sources})
+
+    set(HOOKS_TEST_DIR "" CACHE PATH "External hook Env-test directory")
+    if(NOT HOOKS_TEST_DIR AND DEFINED ENV{HOOKS_TEST_DIR})
+      set(HOOKS_TEST_DIR "$ENV{HOOKS_TEST_DIR}")
+    endif()
+    if(HOOKS_TEST_DIR)
+      file(GLOB_RECURSE hook_test_sources CONFIGURE_DEPENDS
+        "${HOOKS_TEST_DIR}/*_test.cpp"
+      )
+      if(hook_test_sources)
+        message(STATUS "Including external hook Env tests from ${HOOKS_TEST_DIR}")
+        target_sources(rippled PRIVATE ${hook_test_sources})
+        target_include_directories(rippled PRIVATE "${HOOKS_TEST_DIR}")
+      endif()
+    endif()
   endif()
 
   target_link_libraries(rippled
@@ -196,6 +215,7 @@ if(xrpld)
     # This is likely not strictly necessary, but listed explicitly as a good practice.
     m
   )
+  include(XahaudFormalVerification)
   exclude_if_included(rippled)
   # define a macro for tests that might need to
   # be exluded or run differently in CI environment

cmake/RippledInterface.cmake

@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ target_compile_definitions (opts
     $<$<BOOL:${beast_no_unit_test_inline}>:BEAST_NO_UNIT_TEST_INLINE=1>
     $<$<BOOL:${beast_disable_autolink}>:BEAST_DONT_AUTOLINK_TO_WIN32_LIBRARIES=1>
     $<$<BOOL:${single_io_service_thread}>:RIPPLE_SINGLE_IO_SERVICE_THREAD=1>
+    # Enhanced logging is enabled for Debug builds, or explicitly via
+    # -DBEAST_ENHANCED_LOGGING=ON for other build types.
+    $<$<OR:$<CONFIG:Debug>,$<BOOL:${BEAST_ENHANCED_LOGGING}>>:BEAST_ENHANCED_LOGGING=1>
     $<$<BOOL:${voidstar}>:ENABLE_VOIDSTAR>)
 target_compile_options (opts
   INTERFACE

cmake/RippledSanity.cmake

@@ -2,7 +2,22 @@
    convenience variables and sanity checks
 #]===================================================================]
 
-get_property(is_multiconfig GLOBAL PROPERTY GENERATOR_IS_MULTI_CONFIG)
+include(ProcessorCount)
+
+if (NOT ep_procs)
+  ProcessorCount(ep_procs)
+  if (ep_procs GREATER 1)
+    # never use more than half of cores for EP builds
+    math (EXPR ep_procs "${ep_procs} / 2")
+    message (STATUS "Using ${ep_procs} cores for ExternalProject builds.")
+  endif ()
+endif ()
+get_property (is_multiconfig GLOBAL PROPERTY GENERATOR_IS_MULTI_CONFIG)
+if (is_multiconfig STREQUAL "NOTFOUND")
+  if (${CMAKE_GENERATOR} STREQUAL "Xcode" OR ${CMAKE_GENERATOR} MATCHES "^Visual Studio")
+    set (is_multiconfig TRUE)
+  endif ()
+endif ()
 
 set (CMAKE_CONFIGURATION_TYPES "Debug;Release" CACHE STRING "" FORCE)
 if (NOT is_multiconfig)

cmake/RippledSettings.cmake

@@ -11,14 +11,23 @@ option(assert "Enables asserts, even in release builds" OFF)
 option(xrpld "Build xrpld" ON)
 
 option(tests "Build tests" ON)
-if(tests)
-  # This setting allows making a separate workflow to test fees other than default 10
-  if(NOT UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE)
-    set(UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE "10" CACHE STRING "")
-  endif()
-endif()
 
-option(unity "Creates a build using UNITY support in cmake." OFF)
+option(xahaud_runtime_test_config
+  "Enable XAHAUD_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG env and runtime_config RPC fault-injection controls"
+  OFF)
+# Conan 2 local opt-in:
+# [conf]
+# tools.cmake.cmaketoolchain:extra_variables={"xahaud_runtime_test_config":"ON"}
+
+option(formal_verification
+  "Enable Lean-backed formal-verification cross-check tests"
+  OFF)
+# Default off: this pulls the Lean runtime and the vendored formal model into
+# the test binary. Conan/local opt-in mirrors the runtime-test-config pattern:
+# [conf]
+# tools.cmake.cmaketoolchain:extra_variables={"formal_verification":"ON"}
+
+option(unity "Creates a build using UNITY support in cmake. This is the default" ON)
 if(unity)
   if(NOT is_ci)
     set(CMAKE_UNITY_BUILD_BATCH_SIZE 15 CACHE STRING "")

cmake/XahaudFormalVerification.cmake

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+if(NOT formal_verification)
+  return()
+endif()
+
+if(NOT xrpld)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification requires xrpld=ON")
+endif()
+
+if(NOT tests)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification requires tests=ON")
+endif()
+
+if(CMAKE_CROSSCOMPILING)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification currently supports native builds only")
+endif()
+
+if(WIN32)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification currently supports Unix-like native builds only")
+endif()
+
+set(XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR
+  "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/formal_verification"
+  CACHE PATH
+  "Lean formal-verification project used by formal_verification=ON")
+
+include(XahaudLean)
+xahaud_require_lean_toolchain("${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}")
+
+set(XAHAU_FORMAL_ARCHIVE
+  "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/.lake/build/lib/libxahau__consensus_XahauConsensus.a")
+
+file(GLOB_RECURSE XAHAU_FORMAL_SOURCES CONFIGURE_DEPENDS
+  "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/*.lean")
+
+# Lake currently writes package artifacts under the Lean workspace's .lake/
+# directory. Keep this option native/test-only until the build is moved to a
+# copied CMake-binary-dir workspace or Lake grows a stable external build-dir
+# interface we can rely on here.
+#
+# This target deliberately invokes Lake whenever the formal-enabled `rippled`
+# target is built. Lake still performs its own incremental rebuild, but CMake
+# must not trust a source-tree `.lake` archive purely by timestamp.
+add_custom_target(xahaud_formal_verification_lean
+  COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" build XahauConsensus:static
+  WORKING_DIRECTORY "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}"
+  DEPENDS
+    "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/lakefile.toml"
+    "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/lean-toolchain"
+    "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/lake-manifest.json"
+    ${XAHAU_FORMAL_SOURCES}
+  BYPRODUCTS "${XAHAU_FORMAL_ARCHIVE}"
+  COMMENT "Building Lean formal-verification archive"
+  VERBATIM)
+
+add_dependencies(rippled xahaud_formal_verification_lean)
+target_compile_definitions(rippled PRIVATE XAHAUD_ENABLE_FORMAL_VERIFICATION=1)
+target_include_directories(rippled PRIVATE "${LEAN_INCLUDE_DIR}")
+target_link_libraries(rippled "${XAHAU_FORMAL_ARCHIVE}" "${LEAN_SHARED_LIBRARY}")
+
+if(UNIX)
+  set_property(TARGET rippled APPEND PROPERTY BUILD_RPATH "${LEAN_SYSROOT}/lib/lean")
+endif()
+
+message(STATUS "Formal verification enabled: ${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}")
+message(STATUS "Lean ${LEAN_EXPECTED_VERSION} sysroot: ${LEAN_SYSROOT}")

cmake/XahaudLean.cmake

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+include_guard(GLOBAL)
+
+function(xahaud_require_lean_toolchain project_dir)
+  if(NOT EXISTS "${project_dir}/lean-toolchain")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR "Lean project is missing lean-toolchain: ${project_dir}")
+  endif()
+
+  file(READ "${project_dir}/lean-toolchain" lean_toolchain)
+  string(STRIP "${lean_toolchain}" lean_toolchain)
+  if(NOT lean_toolchain MATCHES "^leanprover/lean4:v([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+([-+._A-Za-z0-9]+)?)$")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Unsupported lean-toolchain format `${lean_toolchain}` in ${project_dir}")
+  endif()
+  set(expected_lean_version "${CMAKE_MATCH_1}")
+
+  find_program(LAKE_EXECUTABLE
+    NAMES lake
+    HINTS "$ENV{HOME}/.elan/bin")
+  if(NOT LAKE_EXECUTABLE)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "formal_verification=ON requires Lake on PATH or in ~/.elan/bin. "
+      "Install elan, then run `lake build` once in ${project_dir}.")
+  endif()
+
+  execute_process(
+    COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" env lean --version
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY "${project_dir}"
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE lean_version_output
+    ERROR_VARIABLE lean_version_error
+    OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    ERROR_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    RESULT_VARIABLE lean_version_result)
+  if(NOT lean_version_result EQUAL 0)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not run `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} env lean --version`: "
+      "${lean_version_error}")
+  endif()
+  if(NOT lean_version_output MATCHES "^Lean \\(version ([^,)]+)[,)]")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not parse Lean version from `${lean_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+  set(actual_lean_version "${CMAKE_MATCH_1}")
+  if(NOT actual_lean_version STREQUAL expected_lean_version)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Lean version mismatch for formal_verification=ON. "
+      "Expected ${expected_lean_version} from ${project_dir}/lean-toolchain, "
+      "but `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} env lean --version` returned "
+      "`${lean_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+
+  execute_process(
+    COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" --version
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY "${project_dir}"
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE lake_version_output
+    ERROR_VARIABLE lake_version_error
+    OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    ERROR_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    RESULT_VARIABLE lake_version_result)
+  if(NOT lake_version_result EQUAL 0)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not run `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} --version`: ${lake_version_error}")
+  endif()
+  if(NOT lake_version_output MATCHES "Lean version ([^)]+)\\)")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not parse Lake's Lean version from `${lake_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+  set(lake_lean_version "${CMAKE_MATCH_1}")
+  if(NOT lake_lean_version STREQUAL expected_lean_version)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Lake version mismatch for formal_verification=ON. "
+      "Expected Lean ${expected_lean_version} from ${project_dir}/lean-toolchain, "
+      "but `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} --version` returned `${lake_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+
+  if(NOT EXISTS "${project_dir}/lakefile.toml")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "formal_verification=ON requires ${project_dir}/lakefile.toml")
+  endif()
+
+  execute_process(
+    COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" env printenv LEAN_SYSROOT
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY "${project_dir}"
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE lean_sysroot
+    ERROR_VARIABLE lean_sysroot_error
+    OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    ERROR_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    RESULT_VARIABLE lean_sysroot_result)
+  if(NOT lean_sysroot_result EQUAL 0 OR NOT lean_sysroot)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not determine Lean sysroot via "
+      "`${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} env printenv LEAN_SYSROOT`: ${lean_sysroot_error}")
+  endif()
+
+  set(lean_include_dir "${lean_sysroot}/include")
+  if(NOT EXISTS "${lean_include_dir}/lean/lean.h")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR "Lean header not found: ${lean_include_dir}/lean/lean.h")
+  endif()
+
+  find_library(lean_shared_library
+    NAMES leanshared libleanshared
+    PATHS "${lean_sysroot}/lib/lean"
+    NO_DEFAULT_PATH)
+  if(NOT lean_shared_library)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Lean shared runtime not found under ${lean_sysroot}/lib/lean")
+  endif()
+
+  set(LAKE_EXECUTABLE "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_SYSROOT "${lean_sysroot}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_INCLUDE_DIR "${lean_include_dir}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_SHARED_LIBRARY "${lean_shared_library}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_EXPECTED_VERSION "${expected_lean_version}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+endfunction()

cmake/deps/Boost.cmake

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ find_package(Boost 1.86 REQUIRED
   COMPONENTS
     chrono
     container
+    context
     coroutine
     date_time
     filesystem
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ endif()
 
 target_link_libraries(ripple_boost
   INTERFACE
-    Boost::headers
+    Boost::boost
     Boost::chrono
     Boost::container
     Boost::coroutine

cmake/xrpl_add_test.cmake

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-include(isolate_headers)
-
-function(xrpl_add_test name)
-  set(target ${PROJECT_NAME}.test.${name})
-
-  file(GLOB_RECURSE sources CONFIGURE_DEPENDS
-  "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/${name}/*.cpp"
-  "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/${name}.cpp"
-  )
-  add_executable(${target} EXCLUDE_FROM_ALL ${ARGN} ${sources})
-
-  isolate_headers(
-    ${target}
-    "${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}"
-    "${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/tests/${name}"
-    PRIVATE
-  )
-
-  # Make sure the test isn't optimized away in unity builds
-  set_target_properties(${target} PROPERTIES
-    UNITY_BUILD_MODE GROUP
-    UNITY_BUILD_BATCH_SIZE 0)  # Adjust as needed
-
-  add_test(NAME ${target} COMMAND ${target})
-  set_tests_properties(
-    ${target} PROPERTIES
-    FIXTURES_REQUIRED ${target}_fixture
-  )
-
-  add_test(
-    NAME ${target}.build
-    COMMAND
-      ${CMAKE_COMMAND}
-      --build ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}
-      --config $<CONFIG>
-      --target ${target}
-  )
-  set_tests_properties(${target}.build PROPERTIES
-    FIXTURES_SETUP ${target}_fixture
-  )
-endfunction()

conan/profiles/default

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-{% set os = detect_api.detect_os() %}
-{% set arch = detect_api.detect_arch() %}
-{% set compiler, version, compiler_exe = detect_api.detect_default_compiler() %}
-{% set compiler_version = version %}
-{% if os == "Linux" %}
-{% set compiler_version = detect_api.default_compiler_version(compiler, version) %}
-{% endif %}
-
-[settings]
-os={{ os }}
-arch={{ arch }}
-build_type=Debug
-compiler={{compiler}}
-compiler.version={{ compiler_version }}
-compiler.cppstd=20
-{% if os == "Windows" %}
-compiler.runtime=static
-{% else %}
-compiler.libcxx={{detect_api.detect_libcxx(compiler, version, compiler_exe)}}
-{% endif %}
-
-[conf]
-{% if compiler == "clang" and compiler_version >= 19 %}
-tools.build:cxxflags=['-Wno-missing-template-arg-list-after-template-kw']
-{% endif %}
-{% if compiler == "apple-clang" and compiler_version >= 17 %}
-tools.build:cxxflags=['-Wno-missing-template-arg-list-after-template-kw']
-{% endif %}
-{% if compiler == "clang" and compiler_version == 16 %}
-tools.build:cxxflags=['-DBOOST_ASIO_DISABLE_CONCEPTS']
-{% endif %}
-{% if compiler == "gcc" and compiler_version < 13 %}
-tools.build:cxxflags=['-Wno-restrict']
-{% endif %}
-
-[tool_requires]
-!cmake/*: cmake/[>=3 <4]

conanfile.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-from conan import ConanFile, __version__ as conan_version
+from conan import ConanFile
+from conan.errors import ConanInvalidConfiguration
 from conan.tools.cmake import CMake, CMakeToolchain, cmake_layout
 import re
 
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         'assertions': [True, False],
         'coverage': [True, False],
         'fPIC': [True, False],
+        'formal_verification': [True, False],
         'jemalloc': [True, False],
         'rocksdb': [True, False],
         'shared': [True, False],
@@ -26,19 +28,17 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
     }
 
     requires = [
+        'date/3.0.3',
         'grpc/1.50.1',
-        'libarchive/3.8.1',
+        'libarchive/3.7.6',
         'magic_enum/0.9.5',
-        'nudb/2.0.9',
+        'nudb/2.0.8',
         'openssl/3.6.0',
         'soci/4.0.3@xahaud/stable',
+        'xxhash/0.8.2',
         'zlib/1.3.1',
     ]
 
-    test_requires = [
-        'doctest/2.4.11',
-    ]
-
     tool_requires = [
         'protobuf/3.21.12',
     ]
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         'assertions': False,
         'coverage': False,
         'fPIC': True,
+        'formal_verification': False,
         'jemalloc': False,
         'rocksdb': True,
         'shared': False,
@@ -94,13 +95,12 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
     }
 
     def set_version(self):
-        if self.version is None:
-            path = f'{self.recipe_folder}/src/libxrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.cpp'
-            regex = r'versionString\s?=\s?\"(.*)\"'
-            with open(path, encoding='utf-8') as file:
-                matches = (re.search(regex, line) for line in file)
-                match = next(m for m in matches if m)
-                self.version = match.group(1)
+        path = f'{self.recipe_folder}/src/libxrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.cpp'
+        regex = r'versionString\s?=\s?\"(.*)\"'
+        with open(path, 'r') as file:
+            matches = (re.search(regex, line) for line in file)
+            match = next(m for m in matches if m)
+            self.version = match.group(1)
 
     def build_requirements(self):
         # These provide build tools (protoc, grpc plugins) that run during build
@@ -113,31 +113,48 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         if self.settings.compiler == 'apple-clang':
             self.options['boost/*'].visibility = 'global'
 
+    def validate(self):
+        if self.options.formal_verification and (
+            not self.options.tests or not self.options.xrpld
+        ):
+            raise ConanInvalidConfiguration(
+                'formal_verification=True requires tests=True and xrpld=True'
+            )
+
     def requirements(self):
-        # Conan 2 requires transitive headers to be specified
-        transitive_headers_opt = {'transitive_headers': True} if conan_version.split('.')[0] == '2' else {}
         # Force sqlite3 version to avoid conflicts with soci
-        self.requires('sqlite3/3.49.1', override=True)
-        # Force our custom snappy build to avoid Conan CMakeDeps stdc++ heuristic bug
+        self.requires('sqlite3/3.47.0', override=True)
+        # Force our custom snappy build for all dependencies
         self.requires('snappy/1.1.10@xahaud/stable', override=True)
         # Force boost version for all dependencies to avoid conflicts
-        self.requires('boost/1.86.0', force=True, **transitive_headers_opt)
-        self.requires('date/3.0.4', **transitive_headers_opt)
+        self.requires('boost/1.86.0', override=True)
         self.requires('lz4/1.10.0', force=True)
 
         if self.options.with_wasmedge:
-            self.requires('wasmedge/0.11.2@xahaud/stable', **transitive_headers_opt)
+            self.requires('wasmedge/0.11.2@xahaud/stable')
         if self.options.jemalloc:
-            self.requires('jemalloc/5.3.0', **transitive_headers_opt)
+            self.requires('jemalloc/5.3.0')
         if self.options.rocksdb:
-            self.requires('rocksdb/10.0.1')
-        self.requires('xxhash/0.8.3', **transitive_headers_opt)
+            self.requires('rocksdb/6.29.5')
 
     exports_sources = (
         'CMakeLists.txt',
+        'bin/getRippledInfo',
         'cfg/*',
         'cmake/*',
         'external/*',
+        'formal_verification/*.json',
+        'formal_verification/*.lean',
+        'formal_verification/*.md',
+        'formal_verification/*.toml',
+        'formal_verification/lean-toolchain',
+        'formal_verification/XahauConsensus/*.lean',
+        '!formal_verification/.lake',
+        '!formal_verification/.lake/*',
+        '!formal_verification/.lake/**',
+        '!formal_verification/**/.lake',
+        '!formal_verification/**/.lake/*',
+        '!formal_verification/**/.lake/**',
         'include/*',
         'src/*',
     )
@@ -154,6 +171,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         tc.variables['tests'] = self.options.tests
         tc.variables['assert'] = self.options.assertions
         tc.variables['coverage'] = self.options.coverage
+        tc.variables['formal_verification'] = self.options.formal_verification
         tc.variables['jemalloc'] = self.options.jemalloc
         tc.variables['rocksdb'] = self.options.rocksdb
         tc.variables['BUILD_SHARED_LIBS'] = self.options.shared
@@ -169,6 +187,11 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         cmake.build()
 
     def package(self):
+        if self.options.formal_verification:
+            raise ConanInvalidConfiguration(
+                'formal_verification=True is a local/CI test build option and '
+                'is not supported for Conan packages'
+            )
         cmake = CMake(self)
         cmake.verbose = True
         cmake.install()
@@ -185,17 +208,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         # `include/`, not `include/ripple/proto/`.
         libxrpl.includedirs = ['include', 'include/ripple/proto']
         libxrpl.requires = [
-            'boost::headers',
-            'boost::chrono',
-            'boost::container',
-            'boost::coroutine',
-            'boost::date_time',
-            'boost::filesystem',
-            'boost::json',
-            'boost::program_options',
-            'boost::regex',
-            'boost::system',
-            'boost::thread',
+            'boost::boost',
             'date::date',
             'grpc::grpc++',
             'libarchive::libarchive',

docs/build/environment.md

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ platforms: Linux, macOS, or Windows.
 
 [BUILD.md]: ../../BUILD.md
 
+
 ## Linux
 
 Package ecosystems vary across Linux distributions,
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ direction.
 
 ```
 apt update
-apt install --yes curl git libssl-dev pipx python3.10-dev python3-pip make g++-11 libprotobuf-dev protobuf-compiler
+apt install --yes curl git libssl-dev python3.10-dev python3-pip make g++-11 libprotobuf-dev protobuf-compiler
 
 curl --location --remote-name \
   "https://github.com/Kitware/CMake/releases/download/v3.25.1/cmake-3.25.1.tar.gz"
@@ -34,8 +35,7 @@ make --jobs $(nproc)
 make install
 cd ..
 
-pipx install 'conan<2'
-pipx ensurepath
+pip3 install 'conan<2'
 ```
 
 [1]: https://github.com/thejohnfreeman/rippled-docker/blob/master/ubuntu-22.04/install.sh

examples/example/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ project(
   LANGUAGES CXX
 )
 
-find_package(xrpl CONFIG REQUIRED)
+find_package(xrpl REQUIRED)
 
 add_executable(example)
 target_sources(example PRIVATE src/example.cpp)

examples/example/conanfile.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+from conan import ConanFile, conan_version
+from conan.tools.cmake import CMake, cmake_layout
+
+class Example(ConanFile):
+
+    def set_name(self):
+        if self.name is None:
+            self.name = 'example'
+
+    def set_version(self):
+        if self.version is None:
+            self.version = '0.1.0'
+
+    license = 'ISC'
+    author = 'John Freeman <jfreeman08@gmail.com>'
+
+    settings = 'os', 'compiler', 'build_type', 'arch'
+    options = {'shared': [True, False], 'fPIC': [True, False]}
+    default_options = {
+        'shared': False,
+        'fPIC': True,
+        'xrpl:xrpld': False,
+    }
+
+    requires = ['xrpl/2.2.0-rc1@jfreeman/nodestore']
+    generators = ['CMakeDeps', 'CMakeToolchain']
+
+    exports_sources = [
+        'CMakeLists.txt',
+        'cmake/*',
+        'external/*',
+        'include/*',
+        'src/*',
+    ]
+
+    # For out-of-source build.
+    # https://docs.conan.io/en/latest/reference/build_helpers/cmake.html#configure
+    no_copy_source = True
+
+    def layout(self):
+        cmake_layout(self)
+
+    def config_options(self):
+        if self.settings.os == 'Windows':
+            del self.options.fPIC
+
+    def build(self):
+        cmake = CMake(self)
+        cmake.configure(variables={'BUILD_TESTING': 'NO'})
+        cmake.build()
+
+    def package(self):
+        cmake = CMake(self)
+        cmake.install()
+
+    def package_info(self):
+        path = f'{self.package_folder}/share/{self.name}/cpp_info.py'
+        with open(path, 'r') as file:
+            exec(file.read(), {}, {'self': self.cpp_info})

examples/example/src/example.cpp

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
-#include <xrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.h>
-
 #include <cstdio>
 
-int
-main(int argc, char const** argv)
-{
+#include <xrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char const** argv) {
     std::printf("%s\n", ripple::BuildInfo::getVersionString().c_str());
     return 0;
 }

external/README.md

@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ The subdirectories in this directory contain either copies or Conan recipes
 of external libraries used by rippled.
 The Conan recipes include patches we have not yet pushed upstream.
 
-| Folder           | Upstream                                                       | Description                                                                                  |
-| :--------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `antithesis-sdk` | [Project](https://github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-cpp/) | [Antithesis](https://antithesis.com/docs/using_antithesis/sdk/cpp/overview.html) SDK for C++ |
-| `ed25519-donna`  | [Project](https://github.com/floodyberry/ed25519-donna)        | [Ed25519](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/) digital signatures                                       |
-| `secp256k1`      | [Project](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1)           | ECDSA digital signatures using the **secp256k1** curve                                       |
+| Folder          | Upstream                                     | Description |
+|:----------------|:---------------------------------------------|:------------|
+| `antithesis-sdk`| [Project](https://github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-cpp/) | [Antithesis](https://antithesis.com/docs/using_antithesis/sdk/cpp/overview.html) SDK for C++ |
+| `ed25519-donna` | [Project](https://github.com/floodyberry/ed25519-donna) | [Ed25519](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/) digital signatures |
+| `rocksdb`       | [Recipe](https://github.com/conan-io/conan-center-index/tree/master/recipes/rocksdb) | Fast key/value database. (Supports rotational disks better than NuDB.) |
+| `secp256k1`     | [Project](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1)    | ECDSA digital signatures using the **secp256k1** curve |
+| `snappy`        | [Recipe](https://github.com/conan-io/conan-center-index/tree/master/recipes/snappy)  | "Snappy" lossless compression algorithm. |
+| `soci`          | [Recipe](https://github.com/conan-io/conan-center-index/tree/master/recipes/soci)    | Abstraction layer for database access. |

external/antithesis-sdk/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.18)
+cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.25)
 
 # Note, version set explicitly by rippled project
 project(antithesis-sdk-cpp VERSION 0.4.4 LANGUAGES CXX)

external/antithesis-sdk/README.md

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 # Antithesis C++ SDK
 
 This library provides methods for C++ programs to configure the [Antithesis](https://antithesis.com) platform. It contains three kinds of functionality:
-
-- Assertion macros that allow you to define test properties about your software or workload.
-- Randomness functions for requesting both structured and unstructured randomness from the Antithesis platform.
-- Lifecycle functions that inform the Antithesis environment that particular test phases or milestones have been reached.
+* Assertion macros that allow you to define test properties about your software or workload.
+* Randomness functions for requesting both structured and unstructured randomness from the Antithesis platform.
+* Lifecycle functions that inform the Antithesis environment that particular test phases or milestones have been reached.
 
 For general usage guidance see the [Antithesis C++ SDK Documentation](https://antithesis.com/docs/using_antithesis/sdk/cpp/overview/)

external/ed25519-donna/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@ add_library(ed25519 STATIC
 )
 add_library(ed25519::ed25519 ALIAS ed25519)
 target_link_libraries(ed25519 PUBLIC OpenSSL::SSL)
-if(NOT MSVC)
-  target_compile_options(ed25519 PRIVATE -Wno-implicit-fallthrough)
-endif()
 
 include(GNUInstallDirs)
 

external/ed25519-donna/README.md

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-[ed25519](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/) is an
-[Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algortithm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_DSA),
-developed by [Dan Bernstein](http://cr.yp.to/djb.html),
-[Niels Duif](http://www.nielsduif.nl/),
-[Tanja Lange](http://hyperelliptic.org/tanja),
-[Peter Schwabe](http://www.cryptojedi.org/users/peter/),
+[ed25519](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/) is an 
+[Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algortithm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_DSA), 
+developed by [Dan Bernstein](http://cr.yp.to/djb.html), 
+[Niels Duif](http://www.nielsduif.nl/), 
+[Tanja Lange](http://hyperelliptic.org/tanja), 
+[Peter Schwabe](http://www.cryptojedi.org/users/peter/), 
 and [Bo-Yin Yang](http://www.iis.sinica.edu.tw/pages/byyang/).
 
-This project provides performant, portable 32-bit & 64-bit implementations. All implementations are
+This project provides performant, portable 32-bit & 64-bit implementations. All implementations are 
 of course constant time in regard to secret data.
 
 #### Performance
@@ -52,35 +52,35 @@ are made.
 
 #### Compilation
 
-No configuration is needed **if you are compiling against OpenSSL**.
+No configuration is needed **if you are compiling against OpenSSL**. 
 
 ##### Hash Options
 
 If you are not compiling aginst OpenSSL, you will need a hash function.
 
-To use a simple/**slow** implementation of SHA-512, use `-DED25519_REFHASH` when compiling `ed25519.c`.
+To use a simple/**slow** implementation of SHA-512, use `-DED25519_REFHASH` when compiling `ed25519.c`. 
 This should never be used except to verify the code works when OpenSSL is not available.
 
-To use a custom hash function, use `-DED25519_CUSTOMHASH` when compiling `ed25519.c` and put your
+To use a custom hash function, use `-DED25519_CUSTOMHASH` when compiling `ed25519.c` and put your 
 custom hash implementation in ed25519-hash-custom.h. The hash must have a 512bit digest and implement
 
-    struct ed25519_hash_context;
+	struct ed25519_hash_context;
 
-    void ed25519_hash_init(ed25519_hash_context *ctx);
-    void ed25519_hash_update(ed25519_hash_context *ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen);
-    void ed25519_hash_final(ed25519_hash_context *ctx, uint8_t *hash);
-    void ed25519_hash(uint8_t *hash, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen);
+	void ed25519_hash_init(ed25519_hash_context *ctx);
+	void ed25519_hash_update(ed25519_hash_context *ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen);
+	void ed25519_hash_final(ed25519_hash_context *ctx, uint8_t *hash);
+	void ed25519_hash(uint8_t *hash, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen);
 
 ##### Random Options
 
 If you are not compiling aginst OpenSSL, you will need a random function for batch verification.
 
-To use a custom random function, use `-DED25519_CUSTOMRANDOM` when compiling `ed25519.c` and put your
+To use a custom random function, use `-DED25519_CUSTOMRANDOM` when compiling `ed25519.c` and put your 
 custom hash implementation in ed25519-randombytes-custom.h. The random function must implement:
 
-    void ED25519_FN(ed25519_randombytes_unsafe) (void *p, size_t len);
+	void ED25519_FN(ed25519_randombytes_unsafe) (void *p, size_t len);
 
-Use `-DED25519_TEST` when compiling `ed25519.c` to use a deterministically seeded, non-thread safe CSPRNG
+Use `-DED25519_TEST` when compiling `ed25519.c` to use a deterministically seeded, non-thread safe CSPRNG 
 variant of Bob Jenkins [ISAAC](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISAAC_%28cipher%29)
 
 ##### Minor options
@@ -91,79 +91,80 @@ Use `-DED25519_FORCE_32BIT` to force the use of 32 bit routines even when compil
 
 ##### 32-bit
 
-    gcc ed25519.c -m32 -O3 -c
+	gcc ed25519.c -m32 -O3 -c
 
 ##### 64-bit
 
-    gcc ed25519.c -m64 -O3 -c
+	gcc ed25519.c -m64 -O3 -c
 
 ##### SSE2
 
-    gcc ed25519.c -m32 -O3 -c -DED25519_SSE2 -msse2
-    gcc ed25519.c -m64 -O3 -c -DED25519_SSE2
+	gcc ed25519.c -m32 -O3 -c -DED25519_SSE2 -msse2
+	gcc ed25519.c -m64 -O3 -c -DED25519_SSE2
 
 clang and icc are also supported
 
+
 #### Usage
 
 To use the code, link against `ed25519.o -mbits` and:
 
-    #include "ed25519.h"
+	#include "ed25519.h"
 
 Add `-lssl -lcrypto` when using OpenSSL (Some systems don't need -lcrypto? It might be trial and error).
 
 To generate a private key, simply generate 32 bytes from a secure
 cryptographic source:
 
-    ed25519_secret_key sk;
-    randombytes(sk, sizeof(ed25519_secret_key));
+	ed25519_secret_key sk;
+	randombytes(sk, sizeof(ed25519_secret_key));
 
 To generate a public key:
 
-    ed25519_public_key pk;
-    ed25519_publickey(sk, pk);
+	ed25519_public_key pk;
+	ed25519_publickey(sk, pk);
 
 To sign a message:
 
-    ed25519_signature sig;
-    ed25519_sign(message, message_len, sk, pk, signature);
+	ed25519_signature sig;
+	ed25519_sign(message, message_len, sk, pk, signature);
 
 To verify a signature:
 
-    int valid = ed25519_sign_open(message, message_len, pk, signature) == 0;
+	int valid = ed25519_sign_open(message, message_len, pk, signature) == 0;
 
 To batch verify signatures:
 
-    const unsigned char *mp[num] = {message1, message2..}
-    size_t ml[num] = {message_len1, message_len2..}
-    const unsigned char *pkp[num] = {pk1, pk2..}
-    const unsigned char *sigp[num] = {signature1, signature2..}
-    int valid[num]
+	const unsigned char *mp[num] = {message1, message2..}
+	size_t ml[num] = {message_len1, message_len2..}
+	const unsigned char *pkp[num] = {pk1, pk2..}
+	const unsigned char *sigp[num] = {signature1, signature2..}
+	int valid[num]
 
-    /* valid[i] will be set to 1 if the individual signature was valid, 0 otherwise */
-    int all_valid = ed25519_sign_open_batch(mp, ml, pkp, sigp, num, valid) == 0;
+	/* valid[i] will be set to 1 if the individual signature was valid, 0 otherwise */
+	int all_valid = ed25519_sign_open_batch(mp, ml, pkp, sigp, num, valid) == 0;
 
-**Note**: Batch verification uses `ed25519_randombytes_unsafe`, implemented in
-`ed25519-randombytes.h`, to generate random scalars for the verification code.
+**Note**: Batch verification uses `ed25519_randombytes_unsafe`, implemented in 
+`ed25519-randombytes.h`, to generate random scalars for the verification code. 
 The default implementation now uses OpenSSLs `RAND_bytes`.
 
 Unlike the [SUPERCOP](http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html) version, signatures are
-not appended to messages, and there is no need for padding in front of messages.
-Additionally, the secret key does not contain a copy of the public key, so it is
+not appended to messages, and there is no need for padding in front of messages. 
+Additionally, the secret key does not contain a copy of the public key, so it is 
 32 bytes instead of 64 bytes, and the public key must be provided to the signing
 function.
 
 ##### Curve25519
 
-Curve25519 public keys can be generated thanks to
-[Adam Langley](http://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/05/10/fastercurve25519.html)
+Curve25519 public keys can be generated thanks to 
+[Adam Langley](http://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/05/10/fastercurve25519.html) 
 leveraging Ed25519's precomputed basepoint scalar multiplication.
 
-    curved25519_key sk, pk;
-    randombytes(sk, sizeof(curved25519_key));
-    curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint(pk, sk);
+	curved25519_key sk, pk;
+	randombytes(sk, sizeof(curved25519_key));
+	curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint(pk, sk);
 
-Note the name is curved25519, a combination of curve and ed25519, to prevent
+Note the name is curved25519, a combination of curve and ed25519, to prevent 
 name clashes. Performance is slightly faster than short message ed25519
 signing due to both using the same code for the scalar multiply.
 
@@ -179,4 +180,4 @@ with extreme values to ensure they function correctly. SSE2 is now supported.
 
 #### Papers
 
-[Available on the Ed25519 website](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/papers.html)
+[Available on the Ed25519 website](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/papers.html)

external/ed25519-donna/fuzz/README.md

@@ -1,78 +1,78 @@
 This code fuzzes ed25519-donna (and optionally ed25519-donna-sse2) against the ref10 implementations of
-[curve25519](https://github.com/floodyberry/supercop/tree/master/crypto_scalarmult/curve25519/ref10) and
+[curve25519](https://github.com/floodyberry/supercop/tree/master/crypto_scalarmult/curve25519/ref10) and 
 [ed25519](https://github.com/floodyberry/supercop/tree/master/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref10).
 
 Curve25519 tests that generating a public key from a secret key
 
 # Building
 
-## \*nix + PHP
+## *nix + PHP
 
 `php build-nix.php (required parameters) (optional parameters)`
 
 Required parameters:
 
-- `--function=[curve25519,ed25519]`
-- `--bits=[32,64]`
+* `--function=[curve25519,ed25519]`
+* `--bits=[32,64]`
 
 Optional parameters:
 
-- `--with-sse2`
+* `--with-sse2`
 
-  Also fuzz against ed25519-donna-sse2
+    Also fuzz against ed25519-donna-sse2
+* `--with-openssl`
 
-- `--with-openssl`
+    Build with OpenSSL's SHA-512.
 
-  Build with OpenSSL's SHA-512.
+    Default: Reference SHA-512 implementation (slow!)
 
-  Default: Reference SHA-512 implementation (slow!)
+* `--compiler=[gcc,clang,icc]`
 
-- `--compiler=[gcc,clang,icc]`
+    Default: gcc
 
-  Default: gcc
+* `--no-asm`
 
-- `--no-asm`
+    Do not use platform specific assembler
 
-  Do not use platform specific assembler
 
 example:
-
-    php build-nix.php --bits=64 --function=ed25519 --with-sse2 --compiler=icc
+    
+    php build-nix.php --bits=64 --function=ed25519 --with-sse2 --compiler=icc 
 
 ## Windows
 
 Create a project with access to the ed25519 files.
 
-If you are not using OpenSSL, add the `ED25519_REFHASH` define to the projects
+If you are not using OpenSSL, add the `ED25519_REFHASH` define to the projects 
 "Properties/Preprocessor/Preprocessor Definitions" option
 
 Add the following files to the project:
 
-- `fuzz/curve25519-ref10.c`
-- `fuzz/ed25519-ref10.c`
-- `fuzz/ed25519-donna.c`
-- `fuzz/ed25519-donna-sse2.c` (optional)
-- `fuzz-[curve25519/ed25519].c` (depending on which you want to fuzz)
+* `fuzz/curve25519-ref10.c`
+* `fuzz/ed25519-ref10.c`
+* `fuzz/ed25519-donna.c`
+* `fuzz/ed25519-donna-sse2.c` (optional)
+* `fuzz-[curve25519/ed25519].c` (depending on which you want to fuzz)
 
-If you are also fuzzing against ed25519-donna-sse2, add the `ED25519_SSE2` define for `fuzz-[curve25519/ed25519].c` under
+If you are also fuzzing against ed25519-donna-sse2, add the `ED25519_SSE2` define for `fuzz-[curve25519/ed25519].c` under 
 its "Properties/Preprocessor/Preprocessor Definitions" option.
 
 # Running
 
-If everything agrees, the program will only output occasional status dots (every 0x1000 passes)
+If everything agrees, the program will only output occasional status dots (every 0x1000 passes) 
 and a 64bit progress count (every 0x20000 passes):
 
     fuzzing:  ref10 curved25519 curved25519-sse2
-
+    
     ................................ [0000000000020000]
     ................................ [0000000000040000]
     ................................ [0000000000060000]
     ................................ [0000000000080000]
     ................................ [00000000000a0000]
     ................................ [00000000000c0000]
-
+ 
 If any of the implementations do not agree with the ref10 implementation, the program will dump
-the random data that was used, the data generated by the ref10 implementation, and diffs of the
+the random data that was used, the data generated by the ref10 implementation, and diffs of the 
 ed25519-donna data against the ref10 data.
 
 ## Example errors
@@ -83,21 +83,21 @@ These are example error dumps (with intentionally introduced errors).
 
 Random data:
 
-- sk, or Secret Key
-- m, or Message
+* sk, or Secret Key
+* m, or Message
 
 Generated data:
 
-- pk, or Public Key
-- sig, or Signature
-- valid, or if the signature of the message is valid with the public key
+* pk, or Public Key
+* sig, or Signature
+* valid, or if the signature of the message is valid with the public key
 
 Dump:
 
     sk:
     0x3b,0xb7,0x17,0x7a,0x66,0xdc,0xb7,0x9a,0x90,0x25,0x07,0x99,0x96,0xf3,0x92,0xef,
     0x78,0xf8,0xad,0x6c,0x35,0x87,0x81,0x67,0x03,0xe6,0x95,0xba,0x06,0x18,0x7c,0x9c,
-
+    
     m:
     0x7c,0x8d,0x3d,0xe1,0x92,0xee,0x7a,0xb8,0x4d,0xc9,0xfb,0x02,0x34,0x1e,0x5a,0x91,
     0xee,0x01,0xa6,0xb8,0xab,0x37,0x3f,0x3d,0x6d,0xa2,0x47,0xe3,0x27,0x93,0x7c,0xb7,
@@ -107,66 +107,67 @@ Dump:
     0x63,0x14,0xe0,0x81,0x52,0xec,0xcd,0xcf,0x70,0x54,0x7d,0xa3,0x49,0x8b,0xf0,0x89,
     0x70,0x07,0x12,0x2a,0xd9,0xaa,0x16,0x01,0xb2,0x16,0x3a,0xbb,0xfc,0xfa,0x13,0x5b,
     0x69,0x83,0x92,0x70,0x95,0x76,0xa0,0x8e,0x16,0x79,0xcc,0xaa,0xb5,0x7c,0xf8,0x7a,
-
+    
     ref10:
     pk:
     0x71,0xb0,0x5e,0x62,0x1b,0xe3,0xe7,0x36,0x91,0x8b,0xc0,0x13,0x36,0x0c,0xc9,0x04,
     0x16,0xf5,0xff,0x48,0x0c,0x83,0x6b,0x88,0x53,0xa2,0xc6,0x0f,0xf7,0xac,0x42,0x04,
-
+    
     sig:
     0x3e,0x05,0xc5,0x37,0x16,0x0b,0x29,0x30,0x89,0xa3,0xe7,0x83,0x08,0x16,0xdd,0x96,
     0x02,0xfa,0x0d,0x44,0x2c,0x43,0xaa,0x80,0x93,0x04,0x58,0x22,0x09,0xbf,0x11,0xa5,
     0xcc,0xa5,0x3c,0x9f,0xa0,0xa4,0x64,0x5a,0x4a,0xdb,0x20,0xfb,0xc7,0x9b,0xfd,0x3f,
     0x08,0xae,0xc4,0x3c,0x1e,0xd8,0xb6,0xb4,0xd2,0x6d,0x80,0x92,0xcb,0x71,0xf3,0x02,
-
+    
     valid: yes
-
+    
     ed25519-donna:
     pk diff:
     ____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,
     ____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,
-
+    
     sig diff:
     0x2c,0xb9,0x25,0x14,0xd0,0x94,0xeb,0xfe,0x46,0x02,0xc2,0xe8,0xa3,0xeb,0xbf,0xb5,
     0x72,0x84,0xbf,0xc1,0x8a,0x32,0x30,0x99,0xf7,0x58,0xfe,0x06,0xa8,0xdc,0xdc,0xab,
     0xb5,0x57,0x03,0x33,0x87,0xce,0x54,0x55,0x6a,0x69,0x8a,0xc4,0xb7,0x2a,0xed,0x97,
     0xb4,0x68,0xe7,0x52,0x7a,0x07,0x55,0x3b,0xa2,0x94,0xd6,0x5e,0xa1,0x61,0x80,0x08,
-
+    
     valid: no
 
-In this case, the generated public key matches, but the generated signature is completely
+In this case, the generated public key matches, but the generated signature is completely 
 different and does not validate.
 
 ### Curve25519
 
 Random data:
 
-- sk, or Secret Key
+* sk, or Secret Key
 
 Generated data:
 
-- pk, or Public Key
+* pk, or Public Key
 
 Dump:
 
     sk:
     0x44,0xec,0x0b,0x0e,0xa2,0x0e,0x9c,0x5b,0x8c,0xce,0x7b,0x1d,0x68,0xae,0x0f,0x9e,
     0x81,0xe2,0x04,0x76,0xda,0x87,0xa4,0x9e,0xc9,0x4f,0x3b,0xf9,0xc3,0x89,0x63,0x70,
-
-
+    
+    
     ref10:
     0x24,0x55,0x55,0xc0,0xf9,0x80,0xaf,0x02,0x43,0xee,0x8c,0x7f,0xc1,0xad,0x90,0x95,
     0x57,0x91,0x14,0x2e,0xf2,0x14,0x22,0x80,0xdd,0x4e,0x3c,0x85,0x71,0x84,0x8c,0x62,
-
-
+    
+    
     curved25519 diff:
     0x12,0xd1,0x61,0x2b,0x16,0xb3,0xd8,0x29,0xf8,0xa3,0xba,0x70,0x4e,0x49,0x4f,0x43,
     0xa1,0x3c,0x6b,0x42,0x11,0x61,0xcc,0x30,0x87,0x73,0x46,0xfb,0x85,0xc7,0x9a,0x35,
-
-
+    
+    
     curved25519-sse2 diff:
     ____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,
     ____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,____,
 
-In this case, curved25519 is totally wrong, while curved25519-sse2 matches the reference
-implementation.
+
+In this case, curved25519 is totally wrong, while curved25519-sse2 matches the reference 
+implementation.

external/nudb/conandata.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+sources:
+  "2.0.8":
+    url: "https://github.com/CPPAlliance/NuDB/archive/2.0.8.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "9b71903d8ba111cd893ab064b9a8b6ac4124ed8bd6b4f67250205bc43c7f13a8"
+patches:
+  "2.0.8":
+    - patch_file: "patches/2.0.8-0001-add-include-stdexcept-for-msvc.patch"
+      patch_description: "Fix build for MSVC by including stdexcept"
+      patch_type: "portability"
+      patch_source: "https://github.com/cppalliance/NuDB/pull/100/files"

external/nudb/conanfile.py

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+import os
+
+from conan import ConanFile
+from conan.tools.build import check_min_cppstd
+from conan.tools.files import apply_conandata_patches, copy, export_conandata_patches, get
+from conan.tools.layout import basic_layout
+
+required_conan_version = ">=1.52.0"
+
+
+class NudbConan(ConanFile):
+    name = "nudb"
+    description = "A fast key/value insert-only database for SSD drives in C++11"
+    license = "BSL-1.0"
+    url = "https://github.com/conan-io/conan-center-index"
+    homepage = "https://github.com/CPPAlliance/NuDB"
+    topics = ("header-only", "KVS", "insert-only")
+
+    package_type = "header-library"
+    settings = "os", "arch", "compiler", "build_type"
+    no_copy_source = True
+
+    @property
+    def _min_cppstd(self):
+        return 11
+
+    def export_sources(self):
+        export_conandata_patches(self)
+
+    def layout(self):
+        basic_layout(self, src_folder="src")
+
+    def requirements(self):
+        self.requires("boost/1.83.0")
+
+    def package_id(self):
+        self.info.clear()
+
+    def validate(self):
+        if self.settings.compiler.cppstd:
+            check_min_cppstd(self, self._min_cppstd)
+
+    def source(self):
+        get(self, **self.conan_data["sources"][self.version], strip_root=True)
+
+    def build(self):
+        apply_conandata_patches(self)
+
+    def package(self):
+        copy(self, "LICENSE*",
+             dst=os.path.join(self.package_folder, "licenses"),
+             src=self.source_folder)
+        copy(self, "*",
+             dst=os.path.join(self.package_folder, "include"),
+             src=os.path.join(self.source_folder, "include"))
+
+    def package_info(self):
+        self.cpp_info.bindirs = []
+        self.cpp_info.libdirs = []
+
+        self.cpp_info.set_property("cmake_target_name", "NuDB")
+        self.cpp_info.set_property("cmake_target_aliases", ["NuDB::nudb"])
+        self.cpp_info.set_property("cmake_find_mode", "both")
+
+        self.cpp_info.components["core"].set_property("cmake_target_name", "nudb")
+        self.cpp_info.components["core"].names["cmake_find_package"] = "nudb"
+        self.cpp_info.components["core"].names["cmake_find_package_multi"] = "nudb"
+        self.cpp_info.components["core"].requires = ["boost::thread", "boost::system"]
+
+        # TODO: to remove in conan v2 once cmake_find_package_* generators removed
+        self.cpp_info.names["cmake_find_package"] = "NuDB"
+        self.cpp_info.names["cmake_find_package_multi"] = "NuDB"

external/nudb/patches/2.0.8-0001-add-include-stdexcept-for-msvc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff --git a/include/nudb/detail/stream.hpp b/include/nudb/detail/stream.hpp
+index 6c07bf1..e0ce8ed 100644
+--- a/include/nudb/detail/stream.hpp
++++ b/include/nudb/detail/stream.hpp
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <cstdint>
+ #include <cstring>
+ #include <memory>
++#include <stdexcept>
+ 
+ namespace nudb {
+ namespace detail {
+diff --git a/include/nudb/impl/context.ipp b/include/nudb/impl/context.ipp
+index beb7058..ffde0b3 100644
+--- a/include/nudb/impl/context.ipp
++++ b/include/nudb/impl/context.ipp
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #define NUDB_IMPL_CONTEXT_IPP
+ 
+ #include <nudb/detail/store_base.hpp>
++#include <stdexcept>
+ 
+ namespace nudb {
+ 

external/rocksdb/conandata.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+sources:
+  "6.29.5":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v6.29.5.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "ddbf84791f0980c0bbce3902feb93a2c7006f6f53bfd798926143e31d4d756f0"
+  "6.27.3":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v6.27.3.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "ee29901749b9132692b26f0a6c1d693f47d1a9ed8e3771e60556afe80282bf58"
+  "6.20.3":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v6.20.3.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "c6502c7aae641b7e20fafa6c2b92273d935d2b7b2707135ebd9a67b092169dca"
+  "8.8.1":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v8.8.1.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "056c7e21ad8ae36b026ac3b94b9d6e0fcc60e1d937fc80330921e4181be5c36e"
+patches:
+  "6.29.5":
+    - patch_file: "patches/6.29.5-0001-add-include-cstdint-for-gcc-13.patch"
+      patch_description: "Fix build with gcc 13 by including cstdint"
+      patch_type: "portability"
+      patch_source: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/11118"
+    - patch_file: "patches/6.29.5-0002-exclude-thirdparty.patch"
+      patch_description: "Do not include thirdparty.inc"
+      patch_type: "portability"
+  "6.27.3":
+    - patch_file: "patches/6.27.3-0001-add-include-cstdint-for-gcc-13.patch"
+      patch_description: "Fix build with gcc 13 by including cstdint"
+      patch_type: "portability"
+      patch_source: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/11118"

external/rocksdb/conanfile.py

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+import os
+import glob
+import shutil
+
+from conan import ConanFile
+from conan.errors import ConanInvalidConfiguration
+from conan.tools.build import check_min_cppstd
+from conan.tools.cmake import CMake, CMakeDeps, CMakeToolchain, cmake_layout
+from conan.tools.files import apply_conandata_patches, collect_libs, copy, export_conandata_patches, get, rm, rmdir
+from conan.tools.microsoft import check_min_vs, is_msvc, is_msvc_static_runtime
+from conan.tools.scm import Version
+
+required_conan_version = ">=1.53.0"
+
+
+class RocksDBConan(ConanFile):
+    name = "rocksdb"
+    homepage = "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb"
+    license = ("GPL-2.0-only", "Apache-2.0")
+    url = "https://github.com/conan-io/conan-center-index"
+    description = "A library that provides an embeddable, persistent key-value store for fast storage"
+    topics = ("database", "leveldb", "facebook", "key-value")
+    package_type = "library"
+    settings = "os", "arch", "compiler", "build_type"
+    options = {
+        "shared": [True, False],
+        "fPIC": [True, False],
+        "lite": [True, False],
+        "with_gflags": [True, False],
+        "with_snappy": [True, False],
+        "with_lz4": [True, False],
+        "with_zlib": [True, False],
+        "with_zstd": [True, False],
+        "with_tbb": [True, False],
+        "with_jemalloc": [True, False],
+        "enable_sse": [False, "sse42", "avx2"],
+        "use_rtti": [True, False],
+    }
+    default_options = {
+        "shared": False,
+        "fPIC": True,
+        "lite": False,
+        "with_snappy": False,
+        "with_lz4": False,
+        "with_zlib": False,
+        "with_zstd": False,
+        "with_gflags": False,
+        "with_tbb": False,
+        "with_jemalloc": False,
+        "enable_sse": False,
+        "use_rtti": False,
+    }
+
+    @property
+    def _min_cppstd(self):
+        return "11" if Version(self.version) < "8.8.1" else "17"
+
+    @property
+    def _compilers_minimum_version(self):
+        return {} if self._min_cppstd == "11" else {
+                "apple-clang": "10",
+                "clang": "7",
+                "gcc": "7",
+                "msvc": "191",
+                "Visual Studio": "15",
+            }
+
+    def export_sources(self):
+        export_conandata_patches(self)
+
+    def config_options(self):
+        if self.settings.os == "Windows":
+            del self.options.fPIC
+        if self.settings.arch != "x86_64":
+            del self.options.with_tbb
+        if self.settings.build_type == "Debug":
+            self.options.use_rtti = True  # Rtti are used in asserts for debug mode...
+
+    def configure(self):
+        if self.options.shared:
+            self.options.rm_safe("fPIC")
+
+    def layout(self):
+        cmake_layout(self, src_folder="src")
+
+    def requirements(self):
+        if self.options.with_gflags:
+            self.requires("gflags/2.2.2")
+        if self.options.with_snappy:
+            self.requires("snappy/1.1.10")
+        if self.options.with_lz4:
+            self.requires("lz4/1.10.0")
+        if self.options.with_zlib:
+            self.requires("zlib/[>=1.2.11 <2]")
+        if self.options.with_zstd:
+            self.requires("zstd/1.5.6")
+        if self.options.get_safe("with_tbb"):
+            self.requires("onetbb/2021.12.0")
+        if self.options.with_jemalloc:
+            self.requires("jemalloc/5.3.0")
+
+    def validate(self):
+        if self.settings.compiler.get_safe("cppstd"):
+            check_min_cppstd(self, self._min_cppstd)
+
+        minimum_version = self._compilers_minimum_version.get(str(self.settings.compiler), False)
+        if minimum_version and Version(self.settings.compiler.version) < minimum_version:
+            raise ConanInvalidConfiguration(
+                f"{self.ref} requires C++{self._min_cppstd}, which your compiler does not support."
+            )
+
+        if self.settings.arch not in ["x86_64", "ppc64le", "ppc64", "mips64", "armv8"]:
+            raise ConanInvalidConfiguration("Rocksdb requires 64 bits")
+
+        check_min_vs(self, "191")
+
+        if self.version == "6.20.3" and \
+           self.settings.os == "Linux" and \
+           self.settings.compiler == "gcc" and \
+           Version(self.settings.compiler.version) < "5":
+            raise ConanInvalidConfiguration("Rocksdb 6.20.3 is not compilable with gcc <5.") # See https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/3522
+
+    def source(self):
+        get(self, **self.conan_data["sources"][self.version], strip_root=True)
+
+    def generate(self):
+        tc = CMakeToolchain(self)
+        tc.variables["FAIL_ON_WARNINGS"] = False
+        tc.variables["WITH_TESTS"] = False
+        tc.variables["WITH_TOOLS"] = False
+        tc.variables["WITH_CORE_TOOLS"] = False
+        tc.variables["WITH_BENCHMARK_TOOLS"] = False
+        tc.variables["WITH_FOLLY_DISTRIBUTED_MUTEX"] = False
+        if is_msvc(self):
+            tc.variables["WITH_MD_LIBRARY"] = not is_msvc_static_runtime(self)
+        tc.variables["ROCKSDB_INSTALL_ON_WINDOWS"] = self.settings.os == "Windows"
+        tc.variables["ROCKSDB_LITE"] = self.options.lite
+        tc.variables["WITH_GFLAGS"] = self.options.with_gflags
+        tc.variables["WITH_SNAPPY"] = self.options.with_snappy
+        tc.variables["WITH_LZ4"] = self.options.with_lz4
+        tc.variables["WITH_ZLIB"] = self.options.with_zlib
+        tc.variables["WITH_ZSTD"] = self.options.with_zstd
+        tc.variables["WITH_TBB"] = self.options.get_safe("with_tbb", False)
+        tc.variables["WITH_JEMALLOC"] = self.options.with_jemalloc
+        tc.variables["ROCKSDB_BUILD_SHARED"] = self.options.shared
+        tc.variables["ROCKSDB_LIBRARY_EXPORTS"] = self.settings.os == "Windows" and self.options.shared
+        tc.variables["ROCKSDB_DLL" ] = self.settings.os == "Windows" and self.options.shared
+        tc.variables["USE_RTTI"] = self.options.use_rtti
+        if not bool(self.options.enable_sse):
+            tc.variables["PORTABLE"] = True
+            tc.variables["FORCE_SSE42"] = False
+        elif self.options.enable_sse == "sse42":
+            tc.variables["PORTABLE"] = True
+            tc.variables["FORCE_SSE42"] = True
+        elif self.options.enable_sse == "avx2":
+            tc.variables["PORTABLE"] = False
+            tc.variables["FORCE_SSE42"] = False
+        # not available yet in CCI
+        tc.variables["WITH_NUMA"] = False
+        tc.generate()
+
+        deps = CMakeDeps(self)
+        if self.options.with_jemalloc:
+            deps.set_property("jemalloc", "cmake_file_name", "JeMalloc")
+            deps.set_property("jemalloc", "cmake_target_name", "JeMalloc::JeMalloc")
+        deps.generate()
+
+    def build(self):
+        apply_conandata_patches(self)
+        cmake = CMake(self)
+        cmake.configure()
+        cmake.build()
+
+    def _remove_static_libraries(self):
+        rm(self, "rocksdb.lib", os.path.join(self.package_folder, "lib"))
+        for lib in glob.glob(os.path.join(self.package_folder, "lib", "*.a")):
+            if not lib.endswith(".dll.a"):
+                os.remove(lib)
+
+    def _remove_cpp_headers(self):
+        for path in glob.glob(os.path.join(self.package_folder, "include", "rocksdb", "*")):
+            if path != os.path.join(self.package_folder, "include", "rocksdb", "c.h"):
+                if os.path.isfile(path):
+                    os.remove(path)
+                else:
+                    shutil.rmtree(path)
+
+    def package(self):
+        copy(self, "COPYING", src=self.source_folder, dst=os.path.join(self.package_folder, "licenses"))
+        copy(self, "LICENSE*", src=self.source_folder, dst=os.path.join(self.package_folder, "licenses"))
+        cmake = CMake(self)
+        cmake.install()
+        if self.options.shared:
+            self._remove_static_libraries()
+            self._remove_cpp_headers() # Force stable ABI for shared libraries
+        rmdir(self, os.path.join(self.package_folder, "lib", "cmake"))
+        rmdir(self, os.path.join(self.package_folder, "lib", "pkgconfig"))
+
+    def package_info(self):
+        cmake_target = "rocksdb-shared" if self.options.shared else "rocksdb"
+        self.cpp_info.set_property("cmake_file_name", "RocksDB")
+        self.cpp_info.set_property("cmake_target_name", f"RocksDB::{cmake_target}")
+        # TODO: back to global scope in conan v2 once cmake_find_package* generators removed
+        self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].libs = collect_libs(self)
+        if self.settings.os == "Windows":
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].system_libs = ["shlwapi", "rpcrt4"]
+            if self.options.shared:
+                self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].defines = ["ROCKSDB_DLL"]
+        elif self.settings.os in ["Linux", "FreeBSD"]:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].system_libs = ["pthread", "m"]
+        if self.options.lite:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].defines.append("ROCKSDB_LITE")
+
+        # TODO: to remove in conan v2 once cmake_find_package* generators removed
+        self.cpp_info.names["cmake_find_package"] = "RocksDB"
+        self.cpp_info.names["cmake_find_package_multi"] = "RocksDB"
+        self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].names["cmake_find_package"] = cmake_target
+        self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].names["cmake_find_package_multi"] = cmake_target
+        self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].set_property("cmake_target_name", f"RocksDB::{cmake_target}")
+        if self.options.with_gflags:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].requires.append("gflags::gflags")
+        if self.options.with_snappy:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].requires.append("snappy::snappy")
+        if self.options.with_lz4:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].requires.append("lz4::lz4")
+        if self.options.with_zlib:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].requires.append("zlib::zlib")
+        if self.options.with_zstd:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].requires.append("zstd::zstd")
+        if self.options.get_safe("with_tbb"):
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].requires.append("onetbb::onetbb")
+        if self.options.with_jemalloc:
+            self.cpp_info.components["librocksdb"].requires.append("jemalloc::jemalloc")

external/rocksdb/patches/6.29.5-0001-add-include-cstdint-for-gcc-13.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+--- a/include/rocksdb/utilities/checkpoint.h
++++ b/include/rocksdb/utilities/checkpoint.h
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
+ #pragma once
+ #ifndef ROCKSDB_LITE
+ 
++#include <cstdint>
+ #include <string>
+ #include <vector>
+ #include "rocksdb/status.h"
+--- a/table/block_based/data_block_hash_index.h
++++ b/table/block_based/data_block_hash_index.h
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
+ 
+ #pragma once
+ 
++#include <cstdint>
+ #include <string>
+ #include <vector>
+ 
+--- a/util/string_util.h
++++ b/util/string_util.h
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+ 
+ #pragma once
+ 
++#include <cstdint>
+ #include <sstream>
+ #include <string>
+ #include <unordered_map>

external/rocksdb/patches/6.29.5-0002-exclude-thirdparty.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
+index ec59d4491..35577c998 100644
+--- a/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -101 +100,0 @@ if(MSVC)
+-  option(WITH_GFLAGS "build with GFlags" OFF)
+@@ -103,2 +102,2 @@ if(MSVC)
+-  include(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/thirdparty.inc)
+-else()
++endif()
++
+@@ -117 +116 @@ else()
+-  if(MINGW)
++  if(MINGW OR MSVC)
+@@ -183 +181,0 @@ else()
+-endif()

external/secp256k1/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,189 +8,153 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 ## [0.6.0] - 2024-11-04
 
 #### Added
-
-- New module `musig` implements the MuSig2 multisignature scheme according to the [BIP 327 specification](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki). See:
-  - Header file `include/secp256k1_musig.h` which defines the new API.
-  - Document `doc/musig.md` for further notes on API usage.
-  - Usage example `examples/musig.c`.
-- New CMake variable `SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS` for appending linker flags to the build command.
+ - New module `musig` implements the MuSig2 multisignature scheme according to the [BIP 327 specification](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki). See:
+   - Header file `include/secp256k1_musig.h` which defines the new API.
+   - Document `doc/musig.md` for further notes on API usage.
+   - Usage example `examples/musig.c`.
+ - New CMake variable `SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS` for appending linker flags to the build command.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- API functions now use a significantly more robust method to clear secrets from the stack before returning. However, secret clearing remains a best-effort security measure and cannot guarantee complete removal.
-- Any type `secp256k1_foo` can now be forward-declared using `typedef struct secp256k1_foo secp256k1_foo;` (or also `struct secp256k1_foo;` in C++).
-- Organized CMake build artifacts into dedicated directories (`bin/` for executables, `lib/` for libraries) to improve build output structure and Windows shared library compatibility.
+ - API functions now use a significantly more robust method to clear secrets from the stack before returning. However, secret clearing remains a best-effort security measure and cannot guarantee complete removal.
+ - Any type `secp256k1_foo` can now be forward-declared using `typedef struct secp256k1_foo secp256k1_foo;` (or also `struct secp256k1_foo;` in C++).
+ - Organized CMake build artifacts into dedicated directories (`bin/` for executables, `lib/` for libraries) to improve build output structure and Windows shared library compatibility.
 
 #### Removed
-
-- Removed the `secp256k1_scratch_space` struct and its associated functions `secp256k1_scratch_space_create` and `secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy` because the scratch space was unused in the API.
+ - Removed the `secp256k1_scratch_space` struct and its associated functions `secp256k1_scratch_space_create` and `secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy` because the scratch space was unused in the API.
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 The symbols `secp256k1_scratch_space_create` and `secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy` were removed.
 Otherwise, the library maintains backward compatibility with versions 0.3.x through 0.5.x.
 
 ## [0.5.1] - 2024-08-01
 
 #### Added
-
-- Added usage example for an ElligatorSwift key exchange.
+ - Added usage example for an ElligatorSwift key exchange.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- The default size of the precomputed table for signing was changed from 22 KiB to 86 KiB. The size can be changed with the configure option `--ecmult-gen-kb` (`SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` for CMake).
-- "auto" is no longer an accepted value for the `--with-ecmult-window` and `--with-ecmult-gen-kb` configure options (this also applies to `SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE` and `SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` in CMake). To achieve the same configuration as previously provided by the "auto" value, omit setting the configure option explicitly.
+ - The default size of the precomputed table for signing was changed from 22 KiB to 86 KiB. The size can be changed with the configure option `--ecmult-gen-kb` (`SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` for CMake).
+ - "auto" is no longer an accepted value for the `--with-ecmult-window` and `--with-ecmult-gen-kb` configure options (this also applies to  `SECP256K1_ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE` and `SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` in CMake). To achieve the same configuration as previously provided by the "auto" value, omit setting the configure option explicitly.
 
 #### Fixed
-
-- Fixed compilation when the extrakeys module is disabled.
+ - Fixed compilation when the extrakeys module is disabled.
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 The ABI is backward compatible with versions 0.5.0, 0.4.x and 0.3.x.
 
 ## [0.5.0] - 2024-05-06
 
 #### Added
-
-- New function `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort` that sorts public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order.
+ - New function `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort` that sorts public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- The implementation of the point multiplication algorithm used for signing and public key generation was changed, resulting in improved performance for those operations.
-  - The related configure option `--ecmult-gen-precision` was replaced with `--ecmult-gen-kb` (`SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` for CMake).
-  - This changes the supported precomputed table sizes for these operations. The new supported sizes are 2 KiB, 22 KiB, or 86 KiB (while the old supported sizes were 32 KiB, 64 KiB, or 512 KiB).
+ - The implementation of the point multiplication algorithm used for signing and public key generation was changed, resulting in improved performance for those operations.
+   - The related configure option `--ecmult-gen-precision` was replaced with `--ecmult-gen-kb` (`SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_KB` for CMake).
+   - This changes the supported precomputed table sizes for these operations. The new supported sizes are 2 KiB, 22 KiB, or 86 KiB (while the old supported sizes were 32 KiB, 64 KiB, or 512 KiB).
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 The ABI is backward compatible with versions 0.4.x and 0.3.x.
 
 ## [0.4.1] - 2023-12-21
 
 #### Changed
-
-- The point multiplication algorithm used for ECDH operations (module `ecdh`) was replaced with a slightly faster one.
-- Optional handwritten x86_64 assembly for field operations was removed because modern C compilers are able to output more efficient assembly. This change results in a significant speedup of some library functions when handwritten x86_64 assembly is enabled (`--with-asm=x86_64` in GNU Autotools, `-DSECP256K1_ASM=x86_64` in CMake), which is the default on x86_64. Benchmarks with GCC 10.5.0 show a 10% speedup for `secp256k1_ecdsa_verify` and `secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify`.
+ - The point multiplication algorithm used for ECDH operations (module `ecdh`) was replaced with a slightly faster one.
+ - Optional handwritten x86_64 assembly for field operations was removed because modern C compilers are able to output more efficient assembly. This change results in a significant speedup of some library functions when handwritten x86_64 assembly is enabled (`--with-asm=x86_64` in GNU Autotools, `-DSECP256K1_ASM=x86_64` in CMake), which is the default on x86_64. Benchmarks with GCC 10.5.0 show a 10% speedup for `secp256k1_ecdsa_verify` and `secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify`.
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 The ABI is backward compatible with versions 0.4.0 and 0.3.x.
 
 ## [0.4.0] - 2023-09-04
 
 #### Added
-
-- New module `ellswift` implements ElligatorSwift encoding for public keys and x-only Diffie-Hellman key exchange for them.
-  ElligatorSwift permits representing secp256k1 public keys as 64-byte arrays which cannot be distinguished from uniformly random. See:
-  - Header file `include/secp256k1_ellswift.h` which defines the new API.
-  - Document `doc/ellswift.md` which explains the mathematical background of the scheme.
-  - The [paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/759) on which the scheme is based.
-- We now test the library with unreleased development snapshots of GCC and Clang. This gives us an early chance to catch miscompilations and constant-time issues introduced by the compiler (such as those that led to the previous two releases).
+ - New module `ellswift` implements ElligatorSwift encoding for public keys and x-only Diffie-Hellman key exchange for them.
+   ElligatorSwift permits representing secp256k1 public keys as 64-byte arrays which cannot be distinguished from uniformly random. See:
+   - Header file `include/secp256k1_ellswift.h` which defines the new API.
+   - Document `doc/ellswift.md` which explains the mathematical background of the scheme.
+   - The [paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/759) on which the scheme is based.
+ - We now test the library with unreleased development snapshots of GCC and Clang. This gives us an early chance to catch miscompilations and constant-time issues introduced by the compiler (such as those that led to the previous two releases).
 
 #### Fixed
-
-- Fixed symbol visibility in Windows DLL builds, where three internal library symbols were wrongly exported.
+ - Fixed symbol visibility in Windows DLL builds, where three internal library symbols were wrongly exported.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- When consuming libsecp256k1 as a static library on Windows, the user must now define the `SECP256K1_STATIC` macro before including `secp256k1.h`.
+ - When consuming libsecp256k1 as a static library on Windows, the user must now define the `SECP256K1_STATIC` macro before including `secp256k1.h`.
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 This release is backward compatible with the ABI of 0.3.0, 0.3.1, and 0.3.2. Symbol visibility is now believed to be handled properly on supported platforms and is now considered to be part of the ABI. Please report any improperly exported symbols as a bug.
 
 ## [0.3.2] - 2023-05-13
-
 We strongly recommend updating to 0.3.2 if you use or plan to use GCC >=13 to compile libsecp256k1. When in doubt, check the GCC version using `gcc -v`.
 
 #### Security
-
-- Module `ecdh`: Fix "constant-timeness" issue with GCC 13.1 (and potentially future versions of GCC) that could leave applications using libsecp256k1's ECDH module vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. The fix avoids secret-dependent control flow during ECDH computations when libsecp256k1 is compiled with GCC 13.1.
+ - Module `ecdh`: Fix "constant-timeness" issue with GCC 13.1 (and potentially future versions of GCC) that could leave applications using libsecp256k1's ECDH module vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. The fix avoids secret-dependent control flow during ECDH computations when libsecp256k1 is compiled with GCC 13.1.
 
 #### Fixed
-
-- Fixed an old bug that permitted compilers to potentially output bad assembly code on x86_64. In theory, it could lead to a crash or a read of unrelated memory, but this has never been observed on any compilers so far.
+ - Fixed an old bug that permitted compilers to potentially output bad assembly code on x86_64. In theory, it could lead to a crash or a read of unrelated memory, but this has never been observed on any compilers so far.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- Various improvements and changes to CMake builds. CMake builds remain experimental.
-  - Made API versioning consistent with GNU Autotools builds.
-  - Switched to `BUILD_SHARED_LIBS` variable for controlling whether to build a static or a shared library.
-  - Added `SECP256K1_INSTALL` variable for the controlling whether to install the build artefacts.
-- Renamed asm build option `arm` to `arm32`. Use `--with-asm=arm32` instead of `--with-asm=arm` (GNU Autotools), and `-DSECP256K1_ASM=arm32` instead of `-DSECP256K1_ASM=arm` (CMake).
+ - Various improvements and changes to CMake builds. CMake builds remain experimental.
+   - Made API versioning consistent with GNU Autotools builds.
+   - Switched to `BUILD_SHARED_LIBS` variable for controlling whether to build a static or a shared library.
+   - Added `SECP256K1_INSTALL` variable for the controlling whether to install the build artefacts.
+ - Renamed asm build option `arm` to `arm32`. Use `--with-asm=arm32` instead of `--with-asm=arm` (GNU Autotools), and `-DSECP256K1_ASM=arm32` instead of `-DSECP256K1_ASM=arm` (CMake).
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 The ABI is compatible with versions 0.3.0 and 0.3.1.
 
 ## [0.3.1] - 2023-04-10
-
 We strongly recommend updating to 0.3.1 if you use or plan to use Clang >=14 to compile libsecp256k1, e.g., Xcode >=14 on macOS has Clang >=14. When in doubt, check the Clang version using `clang -v`.
 
 #### Security
-
-- Fix "constant-timeness" issue with Clang >=14 that could leave applications using libsecp256k1 vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. The fix avoids secret-dependent control flow and secret-dependent memory accesses in conditional moves of memory objects when libsecp256k1 is compiled with Clang >=14.
+ - Fix "constant-timeness" issue with Clang >=14 that could leave applications using libsecp256k1 vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. The fix avoids secret-dependent control flow and secret-dependent memory accesses in conditional moves of memory objects when libsecp256k1 is compiled with Clang >=14.
 
 #### Added
-
-- Added tests against [Project Wycheproof's](https://github.com/google/wycheproof/) set of ECDSA test vectors (Bitcoin "low-S" variant), a fixed set of test cases designed to trigger various edge cases.
+  - Added tests against [Project Wycheproof's](https://github.com/google/wycheproof/) set of ECDSA test vectors (Bitcoin "low-S" variant), a fixed set of test cases designed to trigger various edge cases.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- Increased minimum required CMake version to 3.13. CMake builds remain experimental.
+ - Increased minimum required CMake version to 3.13. CMake builds remain experimental.
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 The ABI is compatible with version 0.3.0.
 
 ## [0.3.0] - 2023-03-08
 
 #### Added
-
-- Added experimental support for CMake builds. Traditional GNU Autotools builds (`./configure` and `make`) remain fully supported.
-- Usage examples: Added a recommended method for securely clearing sensitive data, e.g., secret keys, from memory.
-- Tests: Added a new test binary `noverify_tests`. This binary runs the tests without some additional checks present in the ordinary `tests` binary and is thereby closer to production binaries. The `noverify_tests` binary is automatically run as part of the `make check` target.
+ - Added experimental support for CMake builds. Traditional GNU Autotools builds (`./configure` and `make`) remain fully supported.
+ - Usage examples: Added a recommended method for securely clearing sensitive data, e.g., secret keys, from memory.
+ - Tests: Added a new test binary `noverify_tests`. This binary runs the tests without some additional checks present in the ordinary `tests` binary and is thereby closer to production binaries. The `noverify_tests` binary is automatically run as part of the `make check` target.
 
 #### Fixed
-
-- Fixed declarations of API variables for MSVC (`__declspec(dllimport)`). This fixes MSVC builds of programs which link against a libsecp256k1 DLL dynamically and use API variables (and not only API functions). Unfortunately, the MSVC linker now will emit warning `LNK4217` when trying to link against libsecp256k1 statically. Pass `/ignore:4217` to the linker to suppress this warning.
+ - Fixed declarations of API variables for MSVC (`__declspec(dllimport)`). This fixes MSVC builds of programs which link against a libsecp256k1 DLL dynamically and use API variables (and not only API functions). Unfortunately, the MSVC linker now will emit warning `LNK4217` when trying to link against libsecp256k1 statically. Pass `/ignore:4217` to the linker to suppress this warning.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- Forbade cloning or destroying `secp256k1_context_static`. Create a new context instead of cloning the static context. (If this change breaks your code, your code is probably wrong.)
-- Forbade randomizing (copies of) `secp256k1_context_static`. Randomizing a copy of `secp256k1_context_static` did not have any effect and did not provide defense-in-depth protection against side-channel attacks. Create a new context if you want to benefit from randomization.
+ - Forbade cloning or destroying `secp256k1_context_static`. Create a new context instead of cloning the static context. (If this change breaks your code, your code is probably wrong.)
+ - Forbade randomizing (copies of) `secp256k1_context_static`. Randomizing a copy of `secp256k1_context_static` did not have any effect and did not provide defense-in-depth protection against side-channel attacks. Create a new context if you want to benefit from randomization.
 
 #### Removed
-
-- Removed the configuration header `src/libsecp256k1-config.h`. We recommend passing flags to `./configure` or `cmake` to set configuration options (see `./configure --help` or `cmake -LH`). If you cannot or do not want to use one of the supported build systems, pass configuration flags such as `-DSECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG` manually to the compiler (see the file `configure.ac` for supported flags).
+ - Removed the configuration header `src/libsecp256k1-config.h`. We recommend passing flags to `./configure` or `cmake` to set configuration options (see `./configure --help` or `cmake -LH`). If you cannot or do not want to use one of the supported build systems, pass configuration flags such as `-DSECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG` manually to the compiler (see the file `configure.ac` for supported flags).
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
-Due to changes in the API regarding `secp256k1_context_static` described above, the ABI is _not_ compatible with previous versions.
+Due to changes in the API regarding `secp256k1_context_static` described above, the ABI is *not* compatible with previous versions.
 
 ## [0.2.0] - 2022-12-12
 
 #### Added
-
-- Added usage examples for common use cases in a new `examples/` directory.
-- Added `secp256k1_selftest`, to be used in conjunction with `secp256k1_context_static`.
-- Added support for 128-bit wide multiplication on MSVC for x86_64 and arm64, giving roughly a 20% speedup on those platforms.
+ - Added usage examples for common use cases in a new `examples/` directory.
+ - Added `secp256k1_selftest`, to be used in conjunction with `secp256k1_context_static`.
+ - Added support for 128-bit wide multiplication on MSVC for x86_64 and arm64, giving roughly a 20% speedup on those platforms.
 
 #### Changed
-
-- Enabled modules `schnorrsig`, `extrakeys` and `ecdh` by default in `./configure`.
-- The `secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979` nonce function, used by default by `secp256k1_ecdsa_sign`, now reduces the message hash modulo the group order to match the specification. This only affects improper use of ECDSA signing API.
+ - Enabled modules `schnorrsig`, `extrakeys` and `ecdh` by default in `./configure`.
+ - The `secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979` nonce function, used by default by `secp256k1_ecdsa_sign`, now reduces the message hash modulo the group order to match the specification. This only affects improper use of ECDSA signing API.
 
 #### Deprecated
-
-- Deprecated context flags `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY` and `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN`. Use `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE` instead.
-- Renamed `secp256k1_context_no_precomp` to `secp256k1_context_static`.
-- Module `schnorrsig`: renamed `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign` to `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32`.
+ - Deprecated context flags `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY` and `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN`. Use `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE` instead.
+ - Renamed `secp256k1_context_no_precomp` to `secp256k1_context_static`.
+ - Module `schnorrsig`: renamed `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign` to `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32`.
 
 #### ABI Compatibility
-
 Since this is the first release, we do not compare application binary interfaces.
-However, there are earlier unreleased versions of libsecp256k1 that are _not_ ABI compatible with this version.
+However, there are earlier unreleased versions of libsecp256k1 that are *not* ABI compatible with this version.
 
 ## [0.1.0] - 2013-03-05 to 2021-12-25
 

external/secp256k1/CMakePresets.json

@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "cmakeMinimumRequired": {
-    "major": 3,
-    "minor": 21,
-    "patch": 0
-  },
+  "cmakeMinimumRequired": {"major": 3, "minor": 21, "patch": 0}, 
   "version": 3,
   "configurePresets": [
     {

external/secp256k1/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ The libsecp256k1 project welcomes contributions in the form of new functionality
 It is the responsibility of the contributors to convince the maintainers that the proposed functionality is within the project's scope, high-quality and maintainable.
 Contributors are recommended to provide the following in addition to the new code:
 
-- **Specification:**
-  A specification can help significantly in reviewing the new code as it provides documentation and context.
-  It may justify various design decisions, give a motivation and outline security goals.
-  If the specification contains pseudocode, a reference implementation or test vectors, these can be used to compare with the proposed libsecp256k1 code.
-- **Security Arguments:**
-  In addition to a defining the security goals, it should be argued that the new functionality meets these goals.
-  Depending on the nature of the new functionality, a wide range of security arguments are acceptable, ranging from being "obviously secure" to rigorous proofs of security.
-- **Relevance Arguments:**
-  The relevance of the new functionality for the Bitcoin ecosystem should be argued by outlining clear use cases.
+* **Specification:**
+    A specification can help significantly in reviewing the new code as it provides documentation and context.
+    It may justify various design decisions, give a motivation and outline security goals.
+    If the specification contains pseudocode, a reference implementation or test vectors, these can be used to compare with the proposed libsecp256k1 code.
+* **Security Arguments:**
+    In addition to a defining the security goals, it should be argued that the new functionality meets these goals.
+    Depending on the nature of the new functionality, a wide range of security arguments are acceptable, ranging from being "obviously secure" to rigorous proofs of security.
+* **Relevance Arguments:**
+    The relevance of the new functionality for the Bitcoin ecosystem should be argued by outlining clear use cases.
 
 These are not the only factors taken into account when considering to add new functionality.
 The proposed new libsecp256k1 code must be of high quality, including API documentation and tests, as well as featuring a misuse-resistant API design.
@@ -44,36 +44,36 @@ The Contributor Workflow & Peer Review in libsecp256k1 are similar to Bitcoin Co
 
 In addition, libsecp256k1 tries to maintain the following coding conventions:
 
-- No runtime heap allocation (e.g., no `malloc`) unless explicitly requested by the caller (via `secp256k1_context_create` or `secp256k1_scratch_space_create`, for example). Moreover, it should be possible to use the library without any heap allocations.
-- The tests should cover all lines and branches of the library (see [Test coverage](#coverage)).
-- Operations involving secret data should be tested for being constant time with respect to the secrets (see [src/ctime_tests.c](src/ctime_tests.c)).
-- Local variables containing secret data should be cleared explicitly to try to delete secrets from memory.
-- Use `secp256k1_memcmp_var` instead of `memcmp` (see [#823](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/823)).
-- As a rule of thumb, the default values for configuration options should target standard desktop machines and align with Bitcoin Core's defaults, and the tests should mostly exercise the default configuration (see [#1549](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/1549#issuecomment-2200559257)).
+* No runtime heap allocation (e.g., no `malloc`) unless explicitly requested by the caller (via `secp256k1_context_create` or `secp256k1_scratch_space_create`, for example). Moreover, it should be possible to use the library without any heap allocations.
+* The tests should cover all lines and branches of the library (see [Test coverage](#coverage)).
+* Operations involving secret data should be tested for being constant time with respect to the secrets (see [src/ctime_tests.c](src/ctime_tests.c)).
+* Local variables containing secret data should be cleared explicitly to try to delete secrets from memory.
+* Use `secp256k1_memcmp_var` instead of `memcmp` (see [#823](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/823)).
+* As a rule of thumb, the default values for configuration options should target standard desktop machines and align with Bitcoin Core's defaults, and the tests should mostly exercise the default configuration (see [#1549](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/1549#issuecomment-2200559257)).
 
 #### Style conventions
 
-- Commits should be atomic and diffs should be easy to read. For this reason, do not mix any formatting fixes or code moves with actual code changes. Make sure each individual commit is hygienic: that it builds successfully on its own without warnings, errors, regressions, or test failures.
-- New code should adhere to the style of existing, in particular surrounding, code. Other than that, we do not enforce strict rules for code formatting.
-- The code conforms to C89. Most notably, that means that only `/* ... */` comments are allowed (no `//` line comments). Moreover, any declarations in a `{ ... }` block (e.g., a function) must appear at the beginning of the block before any statements. When you would like to declare a variable in the middle of a block, you can open a new block:
-  ```C
-  void secp256k_foo(void) {
-      unsigned int x;              /* declaration */
-      int y = 2*x;                 /* declaration */
-      x = 17;                      /* statement */
-      {
-          int a, b;                /* declaration */
-          a = x + y;               /* statement */
-          secp256k_bar(x, &b);     /* statement */
-      }
-  }
-  ```
-- Use `unsigned int` instead of just `unsigned`.
-- Use `void *ptr` instead of `void* ptr`.
-- Arguments of the publicly-facing API must have a specific order defined in [include/secp256k1.h](include/secp256k1.h).
-- User-facing comment lines in headers should be limited to 80 chars if possible.
-- All identifiers in file scope should start with `secp256k1_`.
-- Avoid trailing whitespace.
+* Commits should be atomic and diffs should be easy to read. For this reason, do not mix any formatting fixes or code moves with actual code changes. Make sure each individual commit is hygienic: that it builds successfully on its own without warnings, errors, regressions, or test failures.
+* New code should adhere to the style of existing, in particular surrounding, code. Other than that, we do not enforce strict rules for code formatting.
+* The code conforms to C89. Most notably, that means that only `/* ... */` comments are allowed (no `//` line comments). Moreover, any declarations in a `{ ... }` block (e.g., a function) must appear at the beginning of the block before any statements. When you would like to declare a variable in the middle of a block, you can open a new block:
+    ```C
+    void secp256k_foo(void) {
+        unsigned int x;              /* declaration */
+        int y = 2*x;                 /* declaration */
+        x = 17;                      /* statement */
+        {
+            int a, b;                /* declaration */
+            a = x + y;               /* statement */
+            secp256k_bar(x, &b);     /* statement */
+        }
+    }
+    ```
+* Use `unsigned int` instead of just `unsigned`.
+* Use `void *ptr` instead of `void* ptr`.
+* Arguments of the publicly-facing API must have a specific order defined in [include/secp256k1.h](include/secp256k1.h).
+* User-facing comment lines in headers should be limited to 80 chars if possible.
+* All identifiers in file scope should start with `secp256k1_`.
+* Avoid trailing whitespace.
 
 ### Tests
 
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ To create a HTML report with coloured and annotated source code:
 #### Exhaustive tests
 
 There are tests of several functions in which a small group replaces secp256k1.
-These tests are _exhaustive_ since they provide all elements and scalars of the small group as input arguments (see [src/tests_exhaustive.c](src/tests_exhaustive.c)).
+These tests are *exhaustive* since they provide all elements and scalars of the small group as input arguments (see [src/tests_exhaustive.c](src/tests_exhaustive.c)).
 
 ### Benchmarks
 

external/secp256k1/README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-# libsecp256k1
+libsecp256k1
+============
 
 ![Dependencies: None](https://img.shields.io/badge/dependencies-none-success)
 [![irc.libera.chat #secp256k1](https://img.shields.io/badge/irc.libera.chat-%23secp256k1-success)](https://web.libera.chat/#secp256k1)
@@ -8,59 +9,60 @@ High-performance high-assurance C library for digital signatures and other crypt
 This library is intended to be the highest quality publicly available library for cryptography on the secp256k1 curve. However, the primary focus of its development has been for usage in the Bitcoin system and usage unlike Bitcoin's may be less well tested, verified, or suffer from a less well thought out interface. Correct usage requires some care and consideration that the library is fit for your application's purpose.
 
 Features:
+* secp256k1 ECDSA signing/verification and key generation.
+* Additive and multiplicative tweaking of secret/public keys.
+* Serialization/parsing of secret keys, public keys, signatures.
+* Constant time, constant memory access signing and public key generation.
+* Derandomized ECDSA (via RFC6979 or with a caller provided function.)
+* Very efficient implementation.
+* Suitable for embedded systems.
+* No runtime dependencies.
+* Optional module for public key recovery.
+* Optional module for ECDH key exchange.
+* Optional module for Schnorr signatures according to [BIP-340](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki).
+* Optional module for ElligatorSwift key exchange according to [BIP-324](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0324.mediawiki).
+* Optional module for MuSig2 Schnorr multi-signatures according to [BIP-327](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki).
 
-- secp256k1 ECDSA signing/verification and key generation.
-- Additive and multiplicative tweaking of secret/public keys.
-- Serialization/parsing of secret keys, public keys, signatures.
-- Constant time, constant memory access signing and public key generation.
-- Derandomized ECDSA (via RFC6979 or with a caller provided function.)
-- Very efficient implementation.
-- Suitable for embedded systems.
-- No runtime dependencies.
-- Optional module for public key recovery.
-- Optional module for ECDH key exchange.
-- Optional module for Schnorr signatures according to [BIP-340](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki).
-- Optional module for ElligatorSwift key exchange according to [BIP-324](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0324.mediawiki).
-- Optional module for MuSig2 Schnorr multi-signatures according to [BIP-327](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki).
+Implementation details
+----------------------
 
-## Implementation details
+* General
+  * No runtime heap allocation.
+  * Extensive testing infrastructure.
+  * Structured to facilitate review and analysis.
+  * Intended to be portable to any system with a C89 compiler and uint64_t support.
+  * No use of floating types.
+  * Expose only higher level interfaces to minimize the API surface and improve application security. ("Be difficult to use insecurely.")
+* Field operations
+  * Optimized implementation of arithmetic modulo the curve's field size (2^256 - 0x1000003D1).
+    * Using 5 52-bit limbs
+    * Using 10 26-bit limbs (including hand-optimized assembly for 32-bit ARM, by Wladimir J. van der Laan).
+      * This is an experimental feature that has not received enough scrutiny to satisfy the standard of quality of this library but is made available for testing and review by the community.
+* Scalar operations
+  * Optimized implementation without data-dependent branches of arithmetic modulo the curve's order.
+    * Using 4 64-bit limbs (relying on __int128 support in the compiler).
+    * Using 8 32-bit limbs.
+* Modular inverses (both field elements and scalars) based on [safegcd](https://gcd.cr.yp.to/index.html) with some modifications, and a variable-time variant (by Peter Dettman).
+* Group operations
+  * Point addition formula specifically simplified for the curve equation (y^2 = x^3 + 7).
+  * Use addition between points in Jacobian and affine coordinates where possible.
+  * Use a unified addition/doubling formula where necessary to avoid data-dependent branches.
+  * Point/x comparison without a field inversion by comparison in the Jacobian coordinate space.
+* Point multiplication for verification (a*P + b*G).
+  * Use wNAF notation for point multiplicands.
+  * Use a much larger window for multiples of G, using precomputed multiples.
+  * Use Shamir's trick to do the multiplication with the public key and the generator simultaneously.
+  * Use secp256k1's efficiently-computable endomorphism to split the P multiplicand into 2 half-sized ones.
+* Point multiplication for signing
+  * Use a precomputed table of multiples of powers of 16 multiplied with the generator, so general multiplication becomes a series of additions.
+  * Intended to be completely free of timing sidechannels for secret-key operations (on reasonable hardware/toolchains)
+    * Access the table with branch-free conditional moves so memory access is uniform.
+    * No data-dependent branches
+  * Optional runtime blinding which attempts to frustrate differential power analysis.
+  * The precomputed tables add and eventually subtract points for which no known scalar (secret key) is known, preventing even an attacker with control over the secret key used to control the data internally.
 
-- General
-  - No runtime heap allocation.
-  - Extensive testing infrastructure.
-  - Structured to facilitate review and analysis.
-  - Intended to be portable to any system with a C89 compiler and uint64_t support.
-  - No use of floating types.
-  - Expose only higher level interfaces to minimize the API surface and improve application security. ("Be difficult to use insecurely.")
-- Field operations
-  - Optimized implementation of arithmetic modulo the curve's field size (2^256 - 0x1000003D1).
-    - Using 5 52-bit limbs
-    - Using 10 26-bit limbs (including hand-optimized assembly for 32-bit ARM, by Wladimir J. van der Laan).
-      - This is an experimental feature that has not received enough scrutiny to satisfy the standard of quality of this library but is made available for testing and review by the community.
-- Scalar operations
-  - Optimized implementation without data-dependent branches of arithmetic modulo the curve's order.
-    - Using 4 64-bit limbs (relying on \_\_int128 support in the compiler).
-    - Using 8 32-bit limbs.
-- Modular inverses (both field elements and scalars) based on [safegcd](https://gcd.cr.yp.to/index.html) with some modifications, and a variable-time variant (by Peter Dettman).
-- Group operations
-  - Point addition formula specifically simplified for the curve equation (y^2 = x^3 + 7).
-  - Use addition between points in Jacobian and affine coordinates where possible.
-  - Use a unified addition/doubling formula where necessary to avoid data-dependent branches.
-  - Point/x comparison without a field inversion by comparison in the Jacobian coordinate space.
-- Point multiplication for verification (a*P + b*G).
-  - Use wNAF notation for point multiplicands.
-  - Use a much larger window for multiples of G, using precomputed multiples.
-  - Use Shamir's trick to do the multiplication with the public key and the generator simultaneously.
-  - Use secp256k1's efficiently-computable endomorphism to split the P multiplicand into 2 half-sized ones.
-- Point multiplication for signing
-  - Use a precomputed table of multiples of powers of 16 multiplied with the generator, so general multiplication becomes a series of additions.
-  - Intended to be completely free of timing sidechannels for secret-key operations (on reasonable hardware/toolchains)
-    - Access the table with branch-free conditional moves so memory access is uniform.
-    - No data-dependent branches
-  - Optional runtime blinding which attempts to frustrate differential power analysis.
-  - The precomputed tables add and eventually subtract points for which no known scalar (secret key) is known, preventing even an attacker with control over the secret key used to control the data internally.
-
-## Building with Autotools
+Building with Autotools
+-----------------------
 
     $ ./autogen.sh
     $ ./configure
@@ -70,7 +72,8 @@ Features:
 
 To compile optional modules (such as Schnorr signatures), you need to run `./configure` with additional flags (such as `--enable-module-schnorrsig`). Run `./configure --help` to see the full list of available flags.
 
-## Building with CMake (experimental)
+Building with CMake (experimental)
+----------------------------------
 
 To maintain a pristine source tree, CMake encourages to perform an out-of-source build by using a separate dedicated build tree.
 
@@ -106,19 +109,18 @@ In "Developer Command Prompt for VS 2022":
     >cmake -G "Visual Studio 17 2022" -A x64 -S . -B build
     >cmake --build build --config RelWithDebInfo
 
-## Usage examples
-
+Usage examples
+-----------
 Usage examples can be found in the [examples](examples) directory. To compile them you need to configure with `--enable-examples`.
-
-- [ECDSA example](examples/ecdsa.c)
-- [Schnorr signatures example](examples/schnorr.c)
-- [Deriving a shared secret (ECDH) example](examples/ecdh.c)
-- [ElligatorSwift key exchange example](examples/ellswift.c)
+  * [ECDSA example](examples/ecdsa.c)
+  * [Schnorr signatures example](examples/schnorr.c)
+  * [Deriving a shared secret (ECDH) example](examples/ecdh.c)
+  * [ElligatorSwift key exchange example](examples/ellswift.c)
 
 To compile the Schnorr signature and ECDH examples, you also need to configure with `--enable-module-schnorrsig` and `--enable-module-ecdh`.
 
-## Benchmark
-
+Benchmark
+------------
 If configured with `--enable-benchmark` (which is the default), binaries for benchmarking the libsecp256k1 functions will be present in the root directory after the build.
 
 To print the benchmark result to the command line:
@@ -129,10 +131,12 @@ To create a CSV file for the benchmark result :
 
     $ ./bench_name | sed '2d;s/ \{1,\}//g' > bench_name.csv
 
-## Reporting a vulnerability
+Reporting a vulnerability
+------------
 
 See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)
 
-## Contributing to libsecp256k1
+Contributing to libsecp256k1
+------------
 
 See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)

external/secp256k1/SECURITY.md

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ To report security issues send an email to secp256k1-security@bitcoincore.org (n
 
 The following keys may be used to communicate sensitive information to developers:
 
-| Name          | Fingerprint                                       |
-| ------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
-| Pieter Wuille | 133E AC17 9436 F14A 5CF1 B794 860F EB80 4E66 9320 |
-| Jonas Nick    | 36C7 1A37 C9D9 88BD E825 08D9 B1A7 0E4F 8DCD 0366 |
-| Tim Ruffing   | 09E0 3F87 1092 E40E 106E 902B 33BC 86AB 80FF 5516 |
+| Name | Fingerprint |
+|------|-------------|
+| Pieter Wuille | 133E AC17 9436 F14A 5CF1  B794 860F EB80 4E66 9320 |
+| Jonas Nick | 36C7 1A37 C9D9 88BD E825  08D9 B1A7 0E4F 8DCD 0366 |
+| Tim Ruffing | 09E0 3F87 1092 E40E 106E  902B 33BC 86AB 80FF 5516 |
 
 You can import a key by running the following command with that individual’s fingerprint: `gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --recv-keys "<fingerprint>"` Ensure that you put quotes around fingerprints containing spaces.

external/secp256k1/doc/ellswift.md

@@ -5,17 +5,17 @@ construction in the
 ["SwiftEC: Shallue–van de Woestijne Indifferentiable Function To Elliptic Curves"](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/759)
 paper by Jorge Chávez-Saab, Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez, and Mehdi Tibouchi.
 
-- [1. Introduction](#1-introduction)
-- [2. The decoding function](#2-the-decoding-function)
-  - [2.1 Decoding for `secp256k1`](#21-decoding-for-secp256k1)
-- [3. The encoding function](#3-the-encoding-function)
-  - [3.1 Switching to _v, w_ coordinates](#31-switching-to-v-w-coordinates)
-  - [3.2 Avoiding computing all inverses](#32-avoiding-computing-all-inverses)
-  - [3.3 Finding the inverse](#33-finding-the-inverse)
-  - [3.4 Dealing with special cases](#34-dealing-with-special-cases)
-  - [3.5 Encoding for `secp256k1`](#35-encoding-for-secp256k1)
-- [4. Encoding and decoding full _(x, y)_ coordinates](#4-encoding-and-decoding-full-x-y-coordinates)
-  - [4.1 Full _(x, y)_ coordinates for `secp256k1`](#41-full-x-y-coordinates-for-secp256k1)
+* [1. Introduction](#1-introduction)
+* [2. The decoding function](#2-the-decoding-function)
+  + [2.1 Decoding for `secp256k1`](#21-decoding-for-secp256k1)
+* [3. The encoding function](#3-the-encoding-function)
+  + [3.1 Switching to *v, w* coordinates](#31-switching-to-v-w-coordinates)
+  + [3.2 Avoiding computing all inverses](#32-avoiding-computing-all-inverses)
+  + [3.3 Finding the inverse](#33-finding-the-inverse)
+  + [3.4 Dealing with special cases](#34-dealing-with-special-cases)
+  + [3.5 Encoding for `secp256k1`](#35-encoding-for-secp256k1)
+* [4. Encoding and decoding full *(x, y)* coordinates](#4-encoding-and-decoding-full-x-y-coordinates)
+  + [4.1 Full *(x, y)* coordinates for `secp256k1`](#41-full-x-y-coordinates-for-secp256k1)
 
 ## 1. Introduction
 
@@ -34,14 +34,13 @@ are taken modulo $p$), and then evaluating $F_u(t)$, which for every $u$ and $t$
 x-coordinate on the curve. The functions $F_u$ will be defined in [Section 2](#2-the-decoding-function).
 
 **Encoding** a given $x$ coordinate is conceptually done as follows:
+* Loop:
+  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
+  * Compute the set $L = F_u^{-1}(x)$ of $t$ values for which $F_u(t) = x$, which may have up to *8* elements.
+  * With probability $1 - \dfrac{\\#L}{8}$, restart the loop.
+  * Select a uniformly random $t \in L$ and return $(u, t).$
 
-- Loop:
-  - Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  - Compute the set $L = F_u^{-1}(x)$ of $t$ values for which $F_u(t) = x$, which may have up to _8_ elements.
-  - With probability $1 - \dfrac{\\#L}{8}$, restart the loop.
-  - Select a uniformly random $t \in L$ and return $(u, t).$
-
-This is the _ElligatorSwift_ algorithm, here given for just x-coordinates. An extension to full
+This is the *ElligatorSwift* algorithm, here given for just x-coordinates. An extension to full
 $(x, y)$ points will be given in [Section 4](#4-encoding-and-decoding-full-x-y-coordinates).
 The algorithm finds a uniformly random $(u, t)$ among (almost all) those
 for which $F_u(t) = x.$ Section 3.2 in the paper proves that the number of such encodings for
@@ -51,40 +50,37 @@ almost all x-coordinates on the curve (all but at most 39) is close to two times
 ## 2. The decoding function
 
 First some definitions:
-
-- $\mathbb{F}$ is the finite field of size $q$, of characteristic 5 or more, and $q \equiv 1 \mod 3.$
-  - For `secp256k1`, $q = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977$, which satisfies that requirement.
-- Let $E$ be the elliptic curve of points $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}^2$ for which $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$, with $a$ and $b$
+* $\mathbb{F}$ is the finite field of size $q$, of characteristic 5 or more, and $q \equiv 1 \mod 3.$
+  * For `secp256k1`, $q = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977$, which satisfies that requirement.
+* Let $E$ be the elliptic curve of points $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}^2$ for which $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$, with $a$ and $b$
   public constants, for which $\Delta_E = -16(4a^3 + 27b^2)$ is a square, and at least one of $(-b \pm \sqrt{-3 \Delta_E} / 36)/2$ is a square.
-  This implies that the order of $E$ is either odd, or a multiple of _4_.
+  This implies that the order of $E$ is either odd, or a multiple of *4*.
   If $a=0$, this condition is always fulfilled.
-  - For `secp256k1`, $a=0$ and $b=7.$
-- Let the function $g(x) = x^3 + ax + b$, so the $E$ curve equation is also $y^2 = g(x).$
-- Let the function $h(x) = 3x^3 + 4a.$
-- Define $V$ as the set of solutions $(x_1, x_2, x_3, z)$ to $z^2 = g(x_1)g(x_2)g(x_3).$
-- Define $S_u$ as the set of solutions $(X, Y)$ to $X^2 + h(u)Y^2 = -g(u)$ and $Y \neq 0.$
-- $P_u$ is a function from $\mathbb{F}$ to $S_u$ that will be defined below.
-- $\psi_u$ is a function from $S_u$ to $V$ that will be defined below.
+  * For `secp256k1`, $a=0$ and $b=7.$
+* Let the function $g(x) = x^3 + ax + b$, so the $E$ curve equation is also $y^2 = g(x).$
+* Let the function $h(x) = 3x^3 + 4a.$
+* Define $V$ as the set of solutions $(x_1, x_2, x_3, z)$ to $z^2 = g(x_1)g(x_2)g(x_3).$
+* Define $S_u$ as the set of solutions $(X, Y)$ to $X^2 + h(u)Y^2 = -g(u)$ and $Y \neq 0.$
+* $P_u$ is a function from $\mathbb{F}$ to $S_u$ that will be defined below.
+* $\psi_u$ is a function from $S_u$ to $V$ that will be defined below.
 
 **Note**: In the paper:
-
-- $F_u$ corresponds to $F_{0,u}$ there.
-- $P_u(t)$ is called $P$ there.
-- All $S_u$ sets together correspond to $S$ there.
-- All $\psi_u$ functions together (operating on elements of $S$) correspond to $\psi$ there.
+* $F_u$ corresponds to $F_{0,u}$ there.
+* $P_u(t)$ is called $P$ there.
+* All $S_u$ sets together correspond to $S$ there.
+* All $\psi_u$ functions together (operating on elements of $S$) correspond to $\psi$ there.
 
 Note that for $V$, the left hand side of the equation $z^2$ is square, and thus the right
 hand must also be square. As multiplying non-squares results in a square in $\mathbb{F}$,
 out of the three right-hand side factors an even number must be non-squares.
-This implies that exactly _1_ or exactly _3_ out of
+This implies that exactly *1* or exactly *3* out of
 $\\{g(x_1), g(x_2), g(x_3)\\}$ must be square, and thus that for any $(x_1,x_2,x_3,z) \in V$,
 at least one of $\\{x_1, x_2, x_3\\}$ must be a valid x-coordinate on $E.$ There is one exception
 to this, namely when $z=0$, but even then one of the three values is a valid x-coordinate.
 
 **Define** the decoding function $F_u(t)$ as:
-
-- Let $(x_1, x_2, x_3, z) = \psi_u(P_u(t)).$
-- Return the first element $x$ of $(x_3, x_2, x_1)$ which is a valid x-coordinate on $E$ (i.e., $g(x)$ is square).
+* Let $(x_1, x_2, x_3, z) = \psi_u(P_u(t)).$
+* Return the first element $x$ of $(x_3, x_2, x_1)$ which is a valid x-coordinate on $E$ (i.e., $g(x)$ is square).
 
 $P_u(t) = (X(u, t), Y(u, t))$, where:
 
@@ -102,13 +98,12 @@ Y(u, t) & = & \left\\{\begin{array}{ll}
 $$
 
 $P_u(t)$ is defined:
-
-- For $a=0$, unless:
-  - $u = 0$ or $t = 0$ (division by zero)
-  - $g(u) = -t^2$ (would give $Y=0$).
-- For $a \neq 0$, unless:
-  - $X_0(u) = 0$ or $h(u)t^2 = -1$ (division by zero)
-  - $Y_0(u) (1 - h(u)t^2) = 2X_0(u)t$ (would give $Y=0$).
+* For $a=0$, unless:
+  * $u = 0$ or $t = 0$ (division by zero)
+  * $g(u) = -t^2$ (would give $Y=0$).
+* For $a \neq 0$, unless:
+  * $X_0(u) = 0$ or $h(u)t^2 = -1$ (division by zero)
+  * $Y_0(u) (1 - h(u)t^2) = 2X_0(u)t$ (would give $Y=0$).
 
 The functions $X_0(u)$ and $Y_0(u)$ are defined in Appendix A of the paper, and depend on various properties of $E.$
 
@@ -128,22 +123,20 @@ $$
 Put together and specialized for $a=0$ curves, decoding $(u, t)$ to an x-coordinate is:
 
 **Define** $F_u(t)$ as:
-
-- Let $X = \dfrac{u^3 + b - t^2}{2t}.$
-- Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t}{u\sqrt{-3}}.$
-- Return the first $x$ in $(u + 4Y^2, \dfrac{-X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2}, \dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
+* Let $X = \dfrac{u^3 + b - t^2}{2t}.$
+* Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t}{u\sqrt{-3}}.$
+* Return the first $x$ in $(u + 4Y^2, \dfrac{-X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2}, \dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
 
 To make sure that every input decodes to a valid x-coordinate, we remap the inputs in case
 $P_u$ is not defined (when $u=0$, $t=0$, or $g(u) = -t^2$):
 
 **Define** $F_u(t)$ as:
-
-- Let $u'=u$ if $u \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise (guaranteeing $u' \neq 0$).
-- Let $t'=t$ if $t \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise (guaranteeing $t' \neq 0$).
-- Let $t''=t'$ if $g(u') \neq -t'^2$; $2t'$ otherwise (guaranteeing $t'' \neq 0$ and $g(u') \neq -t''^2$).
-- Let $X = \dfrac{u'^3 + b - t''^2}{2t''}.$
-- Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t''}{u'\sqrt{-3}}.$
-- Return the first $x$ in $(u' + 4Y^2, \dfrac{-X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u'}{2}, \dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u'}{2})$ for which $x^3 + b$ is square.
+* Let $u'=u$ if $u \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise (guaranteeing $u' \neq 0$).
+* Let $t'=t$ if $t \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise (guaranteeing $t' \neq 0$).
+* Let $t''=t'$ if $g(u') \neq -t'^2$; $2t'$ otherwise (guaranteeing $t'' \neq 0$ and $g(u') \neq -t''^2$).
+* Let $X = \dfrac{u'^3 + b - t''^2}{2t''}.$
+* Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t''}{u'\sqrt{-3}}.$
+* Return the first $x$ in $(u' + 4Y^2, \dfrac{-X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u'}{2}, \dfrac{X}{2Y} - \dfrac{u'}{2})$ for which $x^3 + b$ is square.
 
 The choices here are not strictly necessary. Just returning a fixed constant in any of the undefined cases would suffice,
 but the approach here is simple enough and gives fairly uniform output even in these cases.
@@ -157,11 +150,10 @@ in `secp256k1_ellswift_xswiftec_var` (which outputs the actual x-coordinate).
 ## 3. The encoding function
 
 To implement $F_u^{-1}(x)$, the function to find the set of inverses $t$ for which $F_u(t) = x$, we have to reverse the process:
-
-- Find all the $(X, Y) \in S_u$ that could have given rise to $x$, through the $x_1$, $x_2$, or $x_3$ formulas in $\psi_u.$
-- Map those $(X, Y)$ solutions to $t$ values using $P_u^{-1}(X, Y).$
-- For each of the found $t$ values, verify that $F_u(t) = x.$
-- Return the remaining $t$ values.
+* Find all the $(X, Y) \in S_u$ that could have given rise to $x$, through the $x_1$, $x_2$, or $x_3$ formulas in $\psi_u.$
+* Map those $(X, Y)$ solutions to $t$ values using $P_u^{-1}(X, Y).$
+* For each of the found $t$ values, verify that $F_u(t) = x.$
+* Return the remaining $t$ values.
 
 The function $P_u^{-1}$, which finds $t$ given $(X, Y) \in S_u$, is significantly simpler than $P_u:$
 
@@ -193,14 +185,13 @@ precedence over both. Because of this, the $g(-u-x)$ being square test for $x_1$
 values round-trip back to the input $x$ correctly. This is the reason for choosing the $(x_3, x_2, x_1)$ precedence order in the decoder;
 any order which does not place $x_3$ first requires more complicated round-trip checks in the encoder.
 
-### 3.1 Switching to _v, w_ coordinates
+### 3.1 Switching to *v, w* coordinates
 
 Before working out the formulas for all this, we switch to different variables for $S_u.$ Let $v = (X/Y - u)/2$, and
 $w = 2Y.$ Or in the other direction, $X = w(u/2 + v)$ and $Y = w/2:$
-
-- $S_u'$ becomes the set of $(v, w)$ for which $w^2 (u^2 + uv + v^2 + a) = -g(u)$ and $w \neq 0.$
-- For $a=0$ curves, $P_u^{-1}$ can be stated for $(v,w)$ as $P_u^{'-1}(v, w) = w\left(\frac{\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v\right).$
-- $\psi_u$ can be stated for $(v, w)$ as $\psi_u'(v, w) = (x_1, x_2, x_3, z)$, where
+* $S_u'$ becomes the set of $(v, w)$ for which $w^2 (u^2 + uv + v^2 + a) = -g(u)$ and $w \neq 0.$
+* For $a=0$ curves, $P_u^{-1}$ can be stated for $(v,w)$ as $P_u^{'-1}(v, w) = w\left(\frac{\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v\right).$
+* $\psi_u$ can be stated for $(v, w)$ as $\psi_u'(v, w) = (x_1, x_2, x_3, z)$, where
 
 $$
 \begin{array}{lcl}
@@ -213,37 +204,34 @@ $$
 
 We can now write the expressions for finding $(v, w)$ given $x$ explicitly, by solving each of the $\\{x_1, x_2, x_3\\}$
 expressions for $v$ or $w$, and using the $S_u'$ equation to find the other variable:
-
-- Assuming $x = x_1$, we find $v = x$ and $w = \pm\sqrt{-g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)}$ (two solutions).
-- Assuming $x = x_2$, we find $v = -u-x$ and $w = \pm\sqrt{-g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)}$ (two solutions).
-- Assuming $x = x_3$, we find $w = \pm\sqrt{x-u}$ and $v = -u/2 \pm \sqrt{-w^2(4g(u) + w^2h(u))}/(2w^2)$ (four solutions).
+* Assuming $x = x_1$, we find $v = x$ and $w = \pm\sqrt{-g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)}$ (two solutions).
+* Assuming $x = x_2$, we find $v = -u-x$ and $w = \pm\sqrt{-g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)}$ (two solutions).
+* Assuming $x = x_3$, we find $w = \pm\sqrt{x-u}$ and $v = -u/2 \pm \sqrt{-w^2(4g(u) + w^2h(u))}/(2w^2)$ (four solutions).
 
 ### 3.2 Avoiding computing all inverses
 
-The _ElligatorSwift_ algorithm as stated in Section 1 requires the computation of $L = F_u^{-1}(x)$ (the
+The *ElligatorSwift* algorithm as stated in Section 1 requires the computation of $L = F_u^{-1}(x)$ (the
 set of all $t$ such that $(u, t)$ decode to $x$) in full. This is unnecessary.
 
 Observe that the procedure of restarting with probability $(1 - \frac{\\#L}{8})$ and otherwise returning a
 uniformly random element from $L$ is actually equivalent to always padding $L$ with $\bot$ values up to length 8,
 picking a uniformly random element from that, restarting whenever $\bot$ is picked:
 
-**Define** _ElligatorSwift(x)_ as:
-
-- Loop:
-  - Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  - Compute the set $L = F_u^{-1}(x).$
-  - Let $T$ be the 8-element vector consisting of the elements of $L$, plus $8 - \\#L$ times $\\{\bot\\}.$
-  - Select a uniformly random $t \in T.$
-  - If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
+**Define** *ElligatorSwift(x)* as:
+* Loop:
+  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
+  * Compute the set $L = F_u^{-1}(x).$
+  * Let $T$ be the 8-element vector consisting of the elements of $L$, plus $8 - \\#L$ times $\\{\bot\\}.$
+  * Select a uniformly random $t \in T.$
+  * If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
 
 Now notice that the order of elements in $T$ does not matter, as all we do is pick a uniformly
 random element in it, so we do not need to have all $\bot$ values at the end.
 As we have 8 distinct formulas for finding $(v, w)$ (taking the variants due to $\pm$ into account),
 we can associate every index in $T$ with exactly one of those formulas, making sure that:
-
-- Formulas that yield no solutions (due to division by zero or non-existing square roots) or invalid solutions are made to return $\bot.$
-- For the $x_1$ and $x_2$ cases, if $g(-u-x)$ is a square, $\bot$ is returned instead (the round-trip check).
-- In case multiple formulas would return the same non- $\bot$ result, all but one of those must be turned into $\bot$ to avoid biasing those.
+* Formulas that yield no solutions (due to division by zero or non-existing square roots) or invalid solutions are made to return $\bot.$
+* For the $x_1$ and $x_2$ cases, if $g(-u-x)$ is a square, $\bot$ is returned instead (the round-trip check).
+* In case multiple formulas would return the same non- $\bot$ result, all but one of those must be turned into $\bot$ to avoid biasing those.
 
 The last condition above only occurs with negligible probability for cryptographically-sized curves, but is interesting
 to take into account as it allows exhaustive testing in small groups. See [Section 3.4](#34-dealing-with-special-cases)
@@ -252,13 +240,12 @@ for an analysis of all the negligible cases.
 If we define $T = (G_{0,u}(x), G_{1,u}(x), \ldots, G_{7,u}(x))$, with each $G_{i,u}$ matching one of the formulas,
 the loop can be simplified to only compute one of the inverses instead of all of them:
 
-**Define** _ElligatorSwift(x)_ as:
-
-- Loop:
-  - Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  - Pick a uniformly random integer $c$ in $[0,8).$
-  - Let $t = G_{c,u}(x).$
-  - If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
+**Define** *ElligatorSwift(x)* as:
+* Loop:
+  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
+  * Pick a uniformly random integer $c$ in $[0,8).$
+  * Let $t = G_{c,u}(x).$
+  * If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
 
 This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_xelligatorswift_var`.
 
@@ -269,19 +256,18 @@ Those are then repeated as $c=4$ through $c=7$ for the other sign of $w$ (noting
 Ignoring the negligible cases, we get:
 
 **Define** $G_{c,u}(x)$ as:
-
-- If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$ (for $x_1$ and $x_2$ formulas):
-  - If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot$ (as $x_3$ would be valid and take precedence).
-  - If $c \in \\{0, 4\\}$ (the $x_1$ formula) let $v = x$, otherwise let $v = -u-x$ (the $x_2$ formula)
-  - Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)$ (using $s = w^2$ in what follows).
-- Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$ (for $x_3$ formulas):
-  - Let $s = x-u.$
-  - Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}.$
-  - Let $v = (r/s - u)/2$ if $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$; $(-r/s - u)/2$ otherwise.
-- Let $w = \sqrt{s}.$
-- Depending on $c:$
-  - If $c \in \\{0, 1, 2, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
-  - If $c \in \\{4, 5, 6, 7\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
+* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$ (for $x_1$ and $x_2$ formulas):
+  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot$ (as $x_3$ would be valid and take precedence).
+  * If $c \in \\{0, 4\\}$ (the $x_1$ formula) let $v = x$, otherwise let $v = -u-x$ (the $x_2$ formula)
+  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + uv + v^2 + a)$ (using $s = w^2$ in what follows).
+* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$ (for $x_3$ formulas):
+  * Let $s = x-u.$
+  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}.$
+  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2$ if $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$; $(-r/s - u)/2$ otherwise.
+* Let $w = \sqrt{s}.$
+* Depending on $c:$
+  * If $c \in \\{0, 1, 2, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
+  * If $c \in \\{4, 5, 6, 7\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
 
 Whenever a square root of a non-square is taken, $\bot$ is returned; for both square roots this happens with roughly
 50% on random inputs. Similarly, when a division by 0 would occur, $\bot$ is returned as well; this will only happen
@@ -298,21 +284,20 @@ transformation. Furthermore, that transformation has no effect on $s$ in the fir
 as $u^2 + ux + x^2 + a = u^2 + u(-u-x) + (-u-x)^2 + a.$ Thus we can extract it out and move it down:
 
 **Define** $G_{c,u}(x)$ as:
-
-- If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
-  - If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
-  - Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a).$
-  - Let $v = x.$
-- Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
-  - Let $s = x-u.$
-  - Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}.$
-  - Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-- Let $w = \sqrt{s}.$
-- Depending on $c:$
-  - If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
-  - If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w).$
-  - If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
-  - If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, -w).$
+* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
+  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
+  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a).$
+  * Let $v = x.$
+* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
+  * Let $s = x-u.$
+  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}.$
+  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
+* Let $w = \sqrt{s}.$
+* Depending on $c:$
+  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
+  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w).$
+  * If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
+  * If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, -w).$
 
 This shows there will always be exactly 0, 4, or 8 $t$ values for a given $(u, x)$ input.
 There can be 0, 1, or 2 $(v, w)$ pairs before invoking $P_u^{'-1}$, and each results in 4 distinct $t$ values.
@@ -325,60 +310,58 @@ we analyse them here. They generally fall into two categories: cases in which th
 do not decode back to $x$ (or at least cannot guarantee that they do), and cases in which the encoder might produce the same
 $t$ value for multiple $c$ inputs (thereby biasing that encoding):
 
-- In the branch for $x_1$ and $x_2$ (where $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$):
-  - When $g(u) = 0$, we would have $s=w=Y=0$, which is not on $S_u.$ This is only possible on even-ordered curves.
+* In the branch for $x_1$ and $x_2$ (where $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$):
+  * When $g(u) = 0$, we would have $s=w=Y=0$, which is not on $S_u.$ This is only possible on even-ordered curves.
     Excluding this also removes the one condition under which the simplified check for $x_3$ on the curve
     fails (namely when $g(x_1)=g(x_2)=0$ but $g(x_3)$ is not square).
     This does exclude some valid encodings: when both $g(u)=0$ and $u^2+ux+x^2+a=0$ (also implying $g(x)=0$),
     the $S_u'$ equation degenerates to $0 = 0$, and many valid $t$ values may exist. Yet, these cannot be targeted uniformly by the
     encoder anyway as there will generally be more than 8.
-  - When $g(x) = 0$, the same $t$ would be produced as in the $x_3$ branch (where $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$) which we give precedence
+  * When $g(x) = 0$, the same $t$ would be produced as in the $x_3$ branch (where $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$) which we give precedence
     as it can deal with $g(u)=0$.
     This is again only possible on even-ordered curves.
-- In the branch for $x_3$ (where $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$):
-  - When $s=0$, a division by zero would occur.
-  - When $v = -u-v$ and $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$, the same $t$ would be returned as in the $c \in \\{2, 6\\}$ cases.
+* In the branch for $x_3$ (where $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}$):
+  * When $s=0$, a division by zero would occur.
+  * When $v = -u-v$ and $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$, the same $t$ would be returned as in the $c \in \\{2, 6\\}$ cases.
     It is equivalent to checking whether $r=0$.
     This cannot occur in the $x_1$ or $x_2$ branches, as it would trigger the $g(-u-x)$ is square condition.
     A similar concern for $w = -w$ does not exist, as $w=0$ is already impossible in both branches: in the first
     it requires $g(u)=0$ which is already outlawed on even-ordered curves and impossible on others; in the second it would trigger division by zero.
-- Curve-specific special cases also exist that need to be rejected, because they result in $(u,t)$ which is invalid to the decoder, or because of division by zero in the encoder:
-  - For $a=0$ curves, when $u=0$ or when $t=0$. The latter can only be reached by the encoder when $g(u)=0$, which requires an even-ordered curve.
-  - For $a \neq 0$ curves, when $X_0(u)=0$, when $h(u)t^2 = -1$, or when $w(u + 2v) = 2X_0(u)$ while also either $w \neq 2Y_0(u)$ or $h(u)=0$.
+* Curve-specific special cases also exist that need to be rejected, because they result in $(u,t)$ which is invalid to the decoder, or because of division by zero in the encoder:
+  * For $a=0$ curves, when $u=0$ or when $t=0$. The latter can only be reached by the encoder when $g(u)=0$, which requires an even-ordered curve.
+  * For $a \neq 0$ curves, when $X_0(u)=0$, when $h(u)t^2 = -1$, or when $w(u + 2v) = 2X_0(u)$ while also either $w \neq 2Y_0(u)$ or $h(u)=0$.
 
 **Define** a version of $G_{c,u}(x)$ which deals with all these cases:
-
-- If $a=0$ and $u=0$, return $\bot.$
-- If $a \neq 0$ and $X_0(u)=0$, return $\bot.$
-- If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
-  - If $g(u) = 0$ or $g(x) = 0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
-  - If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
-  - Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a)$ (cannot cause division by zero).
-  - Let $v = x.$
-- Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
-  - Let $s = x-u.$
-  - Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-  - If $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$ and $r=0$, return $\bot.$
-  - If $s = 0$, return $\bot.$
-  - Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-- Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-- If $a \neq 0$ and $w(u+2v) = 2X_0(u)$ and either $w \neq 2Y_0(u)$ or $h(u) = 0$, return $\bot.$
-- Depending on $c:$
-  - If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
-  - If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w).$
-  - If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
-  - If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, -w).$
-- If $a=0$ and $t=0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
-- If $a \neq 0$ and $h(u)t^2 = -1$, return $\bot.$
-- Return $t.$
+* If $a=0$ and $u=0$, return $\bot.$
+* If $a \neq 0$ and $X_0(u)=0$, return $\bot.$
+* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
+  * If $g(u) = 0$ or $g(x) = 0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
+  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
+  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a)$ (cannot cause division by zero).
+  * Let $v = x.$
+* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
+  * Let $s = x-u.$
+  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
+  * If $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$ and $r=0$, return $\bot.$
+  * If $s = 0$, return $\bot.$
+  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
+* Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
+* If $a \neq 0$ and $w(u+2v) = 2X_0(u)$ and either $w \neq 2Y_0(u)$ or $h(u) = 0$, return $\bot.$
+* Depending on $c:$
+  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(v, w).$
+  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w).$
+  * If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(v, -w).$
+  * If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}$, let $t = P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, -w).$
+* If $a=0$ and $t=0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
+* If $a \neq 0$ and $h(u)t^2 = -1$, return $\bot.$
+* Return $t.$
 
 Given any $u$, using this algorithm over all $x$ and $c$ values, every $t$ value will be reached exactly once,
 for an $x$ for which $F_u(t) = x$ holds, except for these cases that will not be reached:
-
-- All cases where $P_u(t)$ is not defined:
-  - For $a=0$ curves, when $u=0$, $t=0$, or $g(u) = -t^2.$
-  - For $a \neq 0$ curves, when $h(u)t^2 = -1$, $X_0(u) = 0$, or $Y_0(u) (1 - h(u) t^2) = 2X_0(u)t.$
-- When $g(u)=0$, the potentially many $t$ values that decode to an $x$ satisfying $g(x)=0$ using the $x_2$ formula. These were excluded by the $g(u)=0$ condition in the $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$ branch.
+* All cases where $P_u(t)$ is not defined:
+  * For $a=0$ curves, when $u=0$, $t=0$, or $g(u) = -t^2.$
+  * For $a \neq 0$ curves, when $h(u)t^2 = -1$, $X_0(u) = 0$, or $Y_0(u) (1 - h(u) t^2) = 2X_0(u)t.$
+* When $g(u)=0$, the potentially many $t$ values that decode to an $x$ satisfying $g(x)=0$ using the $x_2$ formula. These were excluded by the $g(u)=0$ condition in the $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}$ branch.
 
 These cases form a negligible subset of all $(u, t)$ for cryptographically sized curves.
 
@@ -387,42 +370,40 @@ These cases form a negligible subset of all $(u, t)$ for cryptographically sized
 Specialized for odd-ordered $a=0$ curves:
 
 **Define** $G_{c,u}(x)$ as:
-
-- If $u=0$, return $\bot.$
-- If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
-  - If $(-u-x)^3 + b$ is square, return $\bot$
-  - Let $s = -(u^3 + b)/(u^2 + ux + x^2)$ (cannot cause division by 0).
-  - Let $v = x.$
-- Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
-  - Let $s = x-u.$
-  - Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4(u^3 + b) + 3su^2)}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-  - If $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$ and $r=0$, return $\bot.$
-  - If $s = 0$, return $\bot.$
-  - Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-- Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-- Depending on $c:$
-  - If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $w(\frac{\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v).$
-  - If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $w(\frac{\sqrt{-3}+1}{2}u + v).$
-  - If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}:$ return $w(\frac{-\sqrt{-3}+1}{2}u + v).$
-  - If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}:$ return $w(\frac{-\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v).$
+* If $u=0$, return $\bot.$
+* If $c \in \\{0, 1, 4, 5\\}:$
+  * If $(-u-x)^3 + b$ is square, return $\bot$
+  * Let $s = -(u^3 + b)/(u^2 + ux + x^2)$ (cannot cause division by 0).
+  * Let $v = x.$
+* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3, 6, 7\\}:$
+  * Let $s = x-u.$
+  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4(u^3 + b) + 3su^2)}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
+  * If $c \in \\{3, 7\\}$ and $r=0$, return $\bot.$
+  * If $s = 0$, return $\bot.$
+  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
+* Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
+* Depending on $c:$
+  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $w(\frac{\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v).$
+  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $w(\frac{\sqrt{-3}+1}{2}u + v).$
+  * If $c \in \\{4, 6\\}:$ return $w(\frac{-\sqrt{-3}+1}{2}u + v).$
+  * If $c \in \\{5, 7\\}:$ return $w(\frac{-\sqrt{-3}-1}{2}u - v).$
 
 This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_xswiftec_inv_var`.
 
 And the x-only ElligatorSwift encoding algorithm is still:
 
-**Define** _ElligatorSwift(x)_ as:
-
-- Loop:
-  - Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
-  - Pick a uniformly random integer $c$ in $[0,8).$
-  - Let $t = G_{c,u}(x).$
-  - If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
+**Define** *ElligatorSwift(x)* as:
+* Loop:
+  * Pick a uniformly random field element $u.$
+  * Pick a uniformly random integer $c$ in $[0,8).$
+  * Let $t = G_{c,u}(x).$
+  * If $t \neq \bot$, return $(u, t)$; restart loop otherwise.
 
 Note that this logic does not take the remapped $u=0$, $t=0$, and $g(u) = -t^2$ cases into account; it just avoids them.
 While it is not impossible to make the encoder target them, this would increase the maximum number of $t$ values for a given $(u, x)$
 combination beyond 8, and thereby slow down the ElligatorSwift loop proportionally, for a negligible gain in uniformity.
 
-## 4. Encoding and decoding full _(x, y)_ coordinates
+## 4. Encoding and decoding full *(x, y)* coordinates
 
 So far we have only addressed encoding and decoding x-coordinates, but in some cases an encoding
 for full points with $(x, y)$ coordinates is desirable. It is possible to encode this information
@@ -441,32 +422,30 @@ four distinct $P_u^{'-1}$ calls in the definition of $G_{u,c}.$
 
 To encode the sign of $y$ in the sign of $Y:$
 
-**Define** _Decode(u, t)_ for full $(x, y)$ as:
-
-- Let $(X, Y) = P_u(t).$
-- Let $x$ be the first value in $(u + 4Y^2, \frac{-X}{2Y} - \frac{u}{2}, \frac{X}{2Y} - \frac{u}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
-- Let $y = \sqrt{g(x)}.$
-- If $sign(y) = sign(Y)$, return $(x, y)$; otherwise return $(x, -y).$
+**Define** *Decode(u, t)* for full $(x, y)$ as:
+* Let $(X, Y) = P_u(t).$
+* Let $x$ be the first value in $(u + 4Y^2, \frac{-X}{2Y} - \frac{u}{2}, \frac{X}{2Y} - \frac{u}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
+* Let $y = \sqrt{g(x)}.$
+* If $sign(y) = sign(Y)$, return $(x, y)$; otherwise return $(x, -y).$
 
 And encoding would be done using a $G_{c,u}(x, y)$ function defined as:
 
 **Define** $G_{c,u}(x, y)$ as:
-
-- If $c \in \\{0, 1\\}:$
-  - If $g(u) = 0$ or $g(x) = 0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
-  - If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
-  - Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a)$ (cannot cause division by zero).
-  - Let $v = x.$
-- Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3\\}:$
-  - Let $s = x-u.$
-  - Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-  - If $c = 3$ and $r = 0$, return $\bot.$
-  - Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
-- Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
-- Let $w' = w$ if $sign(w/2) = sign(y)$; $-w$ otherwise.
-- Depending on $c:$
-  - If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w').$
-  - If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w').$
+* If $c \in \\{0, 1\\}:$
+  * If $g(u) = 0$ or $g(x) = 0$, return $\bot$ (even curves only).
+  * If $g(-u-x)$ is square, return $\bot.$
+  * Let $s = -g(u)/(u^2 + ux + x^2 + a)$ (cannot cause division by zero).
+  * Let $v = x.$
+* Otherwise, when $c \in \\{2, 3\\}:$
+  * Let $s = x-u.$
+  * Let $r = \sqrt{-s(4g(u) + sh(u))}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
+  * If $c = 3$ and $r = 0$, return $\bot.$
+  * Let $v = (r/s - u)/2.$
+* Let $w = \sqrt{s}$; return $\bot$ if not square.
+* Let $w' = w$ if $sign(w/2) = sign(y)$; $-w$ otherwise.
+* Depending on $c:$
+  * If $c \in \\{0, 2\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(v, w').$
+  * If $c \in \\{1, 3\\}:$ return $P_u^{'-1}(-u-v, w').$
 
 Note that $c$ now only ranges $[0,4)$, as the sign of $w'$ is decided based on that of $y$, rather than on $c.$
 This change makes some valid encodings unreachable: when $y = 0$ and $sign(Y) \neq sign(0)$.
@@ -475,23 +454,22 @@ In the above logic, $sign$ can be implemented in several ways, such as parity of
 of the input field element (for prime-sized fields) or the quadratic residuosity (for fields where
 $-1$ is not square). The choice does not matter, as long as it only takes on two possible values, and for $x \neq 0$ it holds that $sign(x) \neq sign(-x)$.
 
-### 4.1 Full _(x, y)_ coordinates for `secp256k1`
+### 4.1 Full *(x, y)* coordinates for `secp256k1`
 
 For $a=0$ curves, there is another option. Note that for those,
 the $P_u(t)$ function translates negations of $t$ to negations of (both) $X$ and $Y.$ Thus, we can use $sign(t)$ to
 encode the y-coordinate directly. Combined with the earlier remapping to guarantee all inputs land on the curve, we get
 as decoder:
 
-**Define** _Decode(u, t)_ as:
-
-- Let $u'=u$ if $u \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise.
-- Let $t'=t$ if $t \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise.
-- Let $t''=t'$ if $u'^3 + b + t'^2 \neq 0$; $2t'$ otherwise.
-- Let $X = \dfrac{u'^3 + b - t''^2}{2t''}.$
-- Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t''}{u'\sqrt{-3}}.$
-- Let $x$ be the first element of $(u' + 4Y^2, \frac{-X}{2Y} - \frac{u'}{2}, \frac{X}{2Y} - \frac{u'}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
-- Let $y = \sqrt{g(x)}.$
-- Return $(x, y)$ if $sign(y) = sign(t)$; $(x, -y)$ otherwise.
+**Define** *Decode(u, t)* as:
+* Let $u'=u$ if $u \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise.
+* Let $t'=t$ if $t \neq 0$; $1$ otherwise.
+* Let $t''=t'$ if $u'^3 + b + t'^2 \neq 0$; $2t'$ otherwise.
+* Let $X = \dfrac{u'^3 + b - t''^2}{2t''}.$
+* Let $Y = \dfrac{X + t''}{u'\sqrt{-3}}.$
+* Let $x$ be the first element of $(u' + 4Y^2, \frac{-X}{2Y} - \frac{u'}{2}, \frac{X}{2Y} - \frac{u'}{2})$ for which $g(x)$ is square.
+* Let $y = \sqrt{g(x)}.$
+* Return $(x, y)$ if $sign(y) = sign(t)$; $(x, -y)$ otherwise.
 
 This is implemented in `secp256k1_ellswift_swiftec_var`. The used $sign(x)$ function is the parity of $x$ when represented as in integer in $[0,q).$
 

external/secp256k1/doc/musig.md

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-# Notes on the musig module API
+Notes on the musig module API
+===========================
 
 The following sections contain additional notes on the API of the musig module (`include/secp256k1_musig.h`).
 A usage example can be found in `examples/musig.c`.

external/secp256k1/doc/release-process.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 This document outlines the process for releasing versions of the form `$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH`.
 
-We distinguish between two types of releases: _regular_ and _maintenance_ releases.
+We distinguish between two types of releases: *regular* and *maintenance* releases.
 Regular releases are releases of a new major or minor version as well as patches of the most recent release.
 Maintenance releases, on the other hand, are required for patches of older releases.
 
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ This process also assumes that there will be no minor releases for old major rel
 We aim to cut a regular release every 3-4 months, approximately twice as frequent as major Bitcoin Core releases. Every second release should be published one month before the feature freeze of the next major Bitcoin Core release, allowing sufficient time to update the library in Core.
 
 ## Sanity checks
-
 Perform these checks when reviewing the release PR (see below):
 
 1. Ensure `make distcheck` doesn't fail.
@@ -43,15 +42,15 @@ Perform these checks when reviewing the release PR (see below):
 ## Regular release
 
 1. Open a PR to the master branch with a commit (using message `"release: prepare for $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example) that
-   - finalizes the release notes in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md) by
-     - adding a section for the release (make sure that the version number is a link to a diff between the previous and new version),
-     - removing the `[Unreleased]` section header,
-     - ensuring that the release notes are not missing entries (check the `needs-changelog` label on github), and
-     - including an entry for `### ABI Compatibility` if it doesn't exist,
-   - sets `_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE` to `true` in `configure.ac`, and,
-   - if this is not a patch release,
-     - updates `_PKG_VERSION_*` and `_LIB_VERSION_*` in `configure.ac`, and
-     - updates `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_*` in `CMakeLists.txt`.
+   * finalizes the release notes in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md) by
+       * adding a section for the release (make sure that the version number is a link to a diff between the previous and new version),
+       * removing the `[Unreleased]` section header,
+       * ensuring that the release notes are not missing entries (check the `needs-changelog` label on github), and
+       * including an entry for `### ABI Compatibility` if it doesn't exist,
+   * sets `_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE` to `true` in `configure.ac`, and,
+   * if this is not a patch release,
+       * updates `_PKG_VERSION_*` and `_LIB_VERSION_*`  in `configure.ac`, and
+       * updates `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_*` in `CMakeLists.txt`.
 2. Perform the [sanity checks](#sanity-checks) on the PR branch.
 3. After the PR is merged, tag the commit, and push the tag:
    ```
@@ -60,12 +59,11 @@ Perform these checks when reviewing the release PR (see below):
    git push git@github.com:bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH
    ```
 4. Open a PR to the master branch with a commit (using message `"release cleanup: bump version after $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example) that
-   - sets `_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE` to `false` and increments `_PKG_VERSION_PATCH` and `_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `configure.ac`,
-   - increments the `$PATCH` component of `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `CMakeLists.txt`, and
-   - adds an `[Unreleased]` section header to the [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
+   * sets `_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE` to `false` and increments `_PKG_VERSION_PATCH` and `_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `configure.ac`,
+   * increments the `$PATCH` component of `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `CMakeLists.txt`, and
+   * adds an `[Unreleased]` section header to the [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
 
    If other maintainers are not present to approve the PR, it can be merged without ACKs.
-
 5. Create a new GitHub release with a link to the corresponding entry in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
 6. Send an announcement email to the bitcoin-dev mailing list.
 
@@ -79,9 +77,9 @@ Note that bug fixes need to be backported only to releases for which no compatib
    git push git@github.com:bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git $MAJOR.$MINOR
    ```
 2. Open a pull request to the `$MAJOR.$MINOR` branch that
-   - includes the bug fixes,
-   - finalizes the release notes similar to a regular release,
-   - increments `_PKG_VERSION_PATCH` and `_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `configure.ac`
+   * includes the bug fixes,
+   * finalizes the release notes similar to a regular release,
+   * increments `_PKG_VERSION_PATCH` and `_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `configure.ac`
      and the `$PATCH` component of `project(libsecp256k1 VERSION ...)` and `${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION` in `CMakeLists.txt`
      (with commit message `"release: bump versions for $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example).
 3. Perform the [sanity checks](#sanity-checks) on the PR branch.
@@ -91,6 +89,6 @@ Note that bug fixes need to be backported only to releases for which no compatib
    git tag -s v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH -m "libsecp256k1 $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"
    git push git@github.com:bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git v$MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH
    ```
-5. Create a new GitHub release with a link to the corresponding entry in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
-6. Send an announcement email to the bitcoin-dev mailing list.
-7. Open PR to the master branch that includes a commit (with commit message `"release notes: add $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example) that adds release notes to [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
+6. Create a new GitHub release with a link to the corresponding entry in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
+7. Send an announcement email to the bitcoin-dev mailing list.
+8. Open PR to the master branch that includes a commit (with commit message `"release notes: add $MAJOR.$MINOR.$PATCH"`, for example) that adds release notes to [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).

external/secp256k1/doc/safegcd_implementation.md

@@ -29,67 +29,65 @@ def gcd(f, g):
     return abs(f)
 ```
 
-It computes the greatest common divisor of an odd integer _f_ and any integer _g_. Its inner loop
-keeps rewriting the variables _f_ and _g_ alongside a state variable _δ_ that starts at _1_, until
-_g=0_ is reached. At that point, _|f|_ gives the GCD. Each of the transitions in the loop is called a
+It computes the greatest common divisor of an odd integer *f* and any integer *g*. Its inner loop
+keeps rewriting the variables *f* and *g* alongside a state variable *δ* that starts at *1*, until
+*g=0* is reached. At that point, *|f|* gives the GCD. Each of the transitions in the loop is called a
 "division step" (referred to as divstep in what follows).
 
-For example, _gcd(21, 14)_ would be computed as:
-
-- Start with _δ=1 f=21 g=14_
-- Take the third branch: _δ=2 f=21 g=7_
-- Take the first branch: _δ=-1 f=7 g=-7_
-- Take the second branch: _δ=0 f=7 g=0_
-- The answer _|f| = 7_.
+For example, *gcd(21, 14)* would be computed as:
+- Start with *δ=1 f=21 g=14*
+- Take the third branch: *δ=2 f=21 g=7*
+- Take the first branch: *δ=-1 f=7 g=-7*
+- Take the second branch: *δ=0 f=7 g=0*
+- The answer *|f| = 7*.
 
 Why it works:
-
 - Divsteps can be decomposed into two steps (see paragraph 8.2 in the paper):
-  - (a) If _g_ is odd, replace _(f,g)_ with _(g,g-f)_ or (f,g+f), resulting in an even _g_.
-  - (b) Replace _(f,g)_ with _(f,g/2)_ (where _g_ is guaranteed to be even).
+  - (a) If *g* is odd, replace *(f,g)* with *(g,g-f)* or (f,g+f), resulting in an even *g*.
+  - (b) Replace *(f,g)* with *(f,g/2)* (where *g* is guaranteed to be even).
 - Neither of those two operations change the GCD:
-  - For (a), assume _gcd(f,g)=c_, then it must be the case that _f=a c_ and _g=b c_ for some integers _a_
-    and _b_. As _(g,g-f)=(b c,(b-a)c)_ and _(f,f+g)=(a c,(a+b)c)_, the result clearly still has
-    common factor _c_. Reasoning in the other direction shows that no common factor can be added by
+  - For (a), assume *gcd(f,g)=c*, then it must be the case that *f=a c* and *g=b c* for some integers *a*
+    and *b*. As *(g,g-f)=(b c,(b-a)c)* and *(f,f+g)=(a c,(a+b)c)*, the result clearly still has
+    common factor *c*. Reasoning in the other direction shows that no common factor can be added by
     doing so either.
-  - For (b), we know that _f_ is odd, so _gcd(f,g)_ clearly has no factor _2_, and we can remove
-    it from _g_.
-- The algorithm will eventually converge to _g=0_. This is proven in the paper (see theorem G.3).
-- It follows that eventually we find a final value _f'_ for which _gcd(f,g) = gcd(f',0)_. As the
-  gcd of _f'_ and _0_ is _|f'|_ by definition, that is our answer.
+  - For (b), we know that *f* is odd, so *gcd(f,g)* clearly has no factor *2*, and we can remove
+    it from *g*.
+- The algorithm will eventually converge to *g=0*. This is proven in the paper (see theorem G.3).
+- It follows that eventually we find a final value *f'* for which *gcd(f,g) = gcd(f',0)*. As the
+  gcd of *f'* and *0* is *|f'|* by definition, that is our answer.
 
 Compared to more [traditional GCD algorithms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclidean_algorithm), this one has the property of only ever looking at
 the low-order bits of the variables to decide the next steps, and being easy to make
-constant-time (in more low-level languages than Python). The _δ_ parameter is necessary to
+constant-time (in more low-level languages than Python). The *δ* parameter is necessary to
 guide the algorithm towards shrinking the numbers' magnitudes without explicitly needing to look
 at high order bits.
 
 Properties that will become important later:
-
-- Performing more divsteps than needed is not a problem, as _f_ does not change anymore after _g=0_.
-- Only even numbers are divided by _2_. This means that when reasoning about it algebraically we
+- Performing more divsteps than needed is not a problem, as *f* does not change anymore after *g=0*.
+- Only even numbers are divided by *2*. This means that when reasoning about it algebraically we
   do not need to worry about rounding.
-- At every point during the algorithm's execution the next _N_ steps only depend on the bottom _N_
-  bits of _f_ and _g_, and on _δ_.
+- At every point during the algorithm's execution the next *N* steps only depend on the bottom *N*
+  bits of *f* and *g*, and on *δ*.
+
 
 ## 2. From GCDs to modular inverses
 
-We want an algorithm to compute the inverse _a_ of _x_ modulo _M_, i.e. the number a such that _a x=1
-mod M_. This inverse only exists if the GCD of _x_ and _M_ is _1_, but that is always the case if _M_ is
-prime and _0 < x < M_. In what follows, assume that the modular inverse exists.
+We want an algorithm to compute the inverse *a* of *x* modulo *M*, i.e. the number a such that *a&thinsp;x=1
+mod M*. This inverse only exists if the GCD of *x* and *M* is *1*, but that is always the case if *M* is
+prime and *0 < x < M*. In what follows, assume that the modular inverse exists.
 It turns out this inverse can be computed as a side effect of computing the GCD by keeping track
 of how the internal variables can be written as linear combinations of the inputs at every step
 (see the [extended Euclidean algorithm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm)).
-Since the GCD is _1_, such an algorithm will compute numbers _a_ and _b_ such that a&thinsp;x + b&thinsp;M = 1*.
+Since the GCD is *1*, such an algorithm will compute numbers *a* and *b* such that a&thinsp;x + b&thinsp;M = 1*.
 Taking that expression *mod M* gives *a&thinsp;x mod M = 1*, and we see that *a* is the modular inverse of *x
-mod M\*.
+mod M*.
 
 A similar approach can be used to calculate modular inverses using the divsteps-based GCD
-algorithm shown above, if the modulus _M_ is odd. To do so, compute _gcd(f=M,g=x)_, while keeping
-track of extra variables _d_ and _e_, for which at every step _d = f/x (mod M)_ and _e = g/x (mod M)_.
-_f/x_ here means the number which multiplied with _x_ gives _f mod M_. As _f_ and _g_ are initialized to _M_
-and _x_ respectively, _d_ and _e_ just start off being _0_ (_M/x mod M = 0/x mod M = 0_) and _1_ (_x/x mod M
-= 1_).
+algorithm shown above, if the modulus *M* is odd. To do so, compute *gcd(f=M,g=x)*, while keeping
+track of extra variables *d* and *e*, for which at every step *d = f/x (mod M)* and *e = g/x (mod M)*.
+*f/x* here means the number which multiplied with *x* gives *f mod M*. As *f* and *g* are initialized to *M*
+and *x* respectively, *d* and *e* just start off being *0* (*M/x mod M = 0/x mod M = 0*) and *1* (*x/x mod M
+= 1*).
 
 ```python
 def div2(M, x):
@@ -121,16 +119,17 @@ def modinv(M, x):
     return (d * f) % M
 ```
 
-Also note that this approach to track _d_ and _e_ throughout the computation to determine the inverse
+Also note that this approach to track *d* and *e* throughout the computation to determine the inverse
 is different from the paper. There (see paragraph 12.1 in the paper) a transition matrix for the
 entire computation is determined (see section 3 below) and the inverse is computed from that.
 The approach here avoids the need for 2x2 matrix multiplications of various sizes, and appears to
 be faster at the level of optimization we're able to do in C.
 
+
 ## 3. Batching multiple divsteps
 
-Every divstep can be expressed as a matrix multiplication, applying a transition matrix _(1/2 t)_
-to both vectors _[f, g]_ and _[d, e]_ (see paragraph 8.1 in the paper):
+Every divstep can be expressed as a matrix multiplication, applying a transition matrix *(1/2 t)*
+to both vectors *[f, g]* and *[d, e]* (see paragraph 8.1 in the paper):
 
 ```
   t = [ u,  v ]
@@ -143,15 +142,15 @@ to both vectors _[f, g]_ and _[d, e]_ (see paragraph 8.1 in the paper):
   [ out_e ]               [ in_e ]
 ```
 
-where _(u, v, q, r)_ is _(0, 2, -1, 1)_, _(2, 0, 1, 1)_, or _(2, 0, 0, 1)_, depending on which branch is
-taken. As above, the resulting _f_ and _g_ are always integers.
+where *(u, v, q, r)* is *(0, 2, -1, 1)*, *(2, 0, 1, 1)*, or *(2, 0, 0, 1)*, depending on which branch is
+taken. As above, the resulting *f* and *g* are always integers.
 
 Performing multiple divsteps corresponds to a multiplication with the product of all the
 individual divsteps' transition matrices. As each transition matrix consists of integers
-divided by _2_, the product of these matrices will consist of integers divided by _2<sup>N</sup>_ (see also
-theorem 9.2 in the paper). These divisions are expensive when updating _d_ and _e_, so we delay
-them: we compute the integer coefficients of the combined transition matrix scaled by _2<sup>N</sup>_, and
-do one division by _2<sup>N</sup>_ as a final step:
+divided by *2*, the product of these matrices will consist of integers divided by *2<sup>N</sup>* (see also
+theorem 9.2 in the paper). These divisions are expensive when updating *d* and *e*, so we delay
+them: we compute the integer coefficients of the combined transition matrix scaled by *2<sup>N</sup>*, and
+do one division by *2<sup>N</sup>* as a final step:
 
 ```python
 def divsteps_n_matrix(delta, f, g):
@@ -167,13 +166,13 @@ def divsteps_n_matrix(delta, f, g):
     return delta, (u, v, q, r)
 ```
 
-As the branches in the divsteps are completely determined by the bottom _N_ bits of _f_ and _g_, this
+As the branches in the divsteps are completely determined by the bottom *N* bits of *f* and *g*, this
 function to compute the transition matrix only needs to see those bottom bits. Furthermore all
-intermediate results and outputs fit in _(N+1)_-bit numbers (unsigned for _f_ and _g_; signed for _u_, _v_,
-_q_, and _r_) (see also paragraph 8.3 in the paper). This means that an implementation using 64-bit
-integers could set _N=62_ and compute the full transition matrix for 62 steps at once without any
+intermediate results and outputs fit in *(N+1)*-bit numbers (unsigned for *f* and *g*; signed for *u*, *v*,
+*q*, and *r*) (see also paragraph 8.3 in the paper). This means that an implementation using 64-bit
+integers could set *N=62* and compute the full transition matrix for 62 steps at once without any
 big integer arithmetic at all. This is the reason why this algorithm is efficient: it only needs
-to update the full-size _f_, _g_, _d_, and _e_ numbers once every _N_ steps.
+to update the full-size *f*, *g*, *d*, and *e* numbers once every *N* steps.
 
 We still need functions to compute:
 
@@ -185,8 +184,8 @@ We still need functions to compute:
   [ out_e ]   (        [ q,  r ])   [ in_e ]
 ```
 
-Because the divsteps transformation only ever divides even numbers by two, the result of _t&thinsp;[f,g]_ is always even. When _t_ is a composition of _N_ divsteps, it follows that the resulting _f_
-and _g_ will be multiple of _2<sup>N</sup>_, and division by _2<sup>N</sup>_ is simply shifting them down:
+Because the divsteps transformation only ever divides even numbers by two, the result of *t&thinsp;[f,g]* is always even. When *t* is a composition of *N* divsteps, it follows that the resulting *f*
+and *g* will be multiple of *2<sup>N</sup>*, and division by *2<sup>N</sup>* is simply shifting them down:
 
 ```python
 def update_fg(f, g, t):
@@ -200,8 +199,8 @@ def update_fg(f, g, t):
     return cf >> N, cg >> N
 ```
 
-The same is not true for _d_ and _e_, and we need an equivalent of the `div2` function for division by _2<sup>N</sup> mod M_.
-This is easy if we have precomputed _1/M mod 2<sup>N</sup>_ (which always exists for odd _M_):
+The same is not true for *d* and *e*, and we need an equivalent of the `div2` function for division by *2<sup>N</sup> mod M*.
+This is easy if we have precomputed *1/M mod 2<sup>N</sup>* (which always exists for odd *M*):
 
 ```python
 def div2n(M, Mi, x):
@@ -225,7 +224,7 @@ def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
     return div2n(M, Mi, cd), div2n(M, Mi, ce)
 ```
 
-With all of those, we can write a version of `modinv` that performs _N_ divsteps at once:
+With all of those, we can write a version of `modinv` that performs *N* divsteps at once:
 
 ```python3
 def modinv(M, Mi, x):
@@ -243,19 +242,20 @@ def modinv(M, Mi, x):
     return (d * f) % M
 ```
 
-This means that in practice we'll always perform a multiple of _N_ divsteps. This is not a problem
-because once _g=0_, further divsteps do not affect _f_, _g_, _d_, or _e_ anymore (only _&delta;_ keeps
+This means that in practice we'll always perform a multiple of *N* divsteps. This is not a problem
+because once *g=0*, further divsteps do not affect *f*, *g*, *d*, or *e* anymore (only *&delta;* keeps
 increasing). For variable time code such excess iterations will be mostly optimized away in later
 sections.
 
+
 ## 4. Avoiding modulus operations
 
-So far, there are two places where we compute a remainder of big numbers modulo _M_: at the end of
-`div2n` in every `update_de`, and at the very end of `modinv` after potentially negating _d_ due to the
-sign of _f_. These are relatively expensive operations when done generically.
+So far, there are two places where we compute a remainder of big numbers modulo *M*: at the end of
+`div2n` in every `update_de`, and at the very end of `modinv` after potentially negating *d* due to the
+sign of *f*. These are relatively expensive operations when done generically.
 
-To deal with the modulus operation in `div2n`, we simply stop requiring _d_ and _e_ to be in range
-_[0,M)_ all the time. Let's start by inlining `div2n` into `update_de`, and dropping the modulus
+To deal with the modulus operation in `div2n`, we simply stop requiring *d* and *e* to be in range
+*[0,M)* all the time. Let's start by inlining `div2n` into `update_de`, and dropping the modulus
 operation at the end:
 
 ```python
@@ -272,15 +272,15 @@ def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
     return cd >> N, ce >> N
 ```
 
-Let's look at bounds on the ranges of these numbers. It can be shown that _|u|+|v|_ and _|q|+|r|_
-never exceed _2<sup>N</sup>_ (see paragraph 8.3 in the paper), and thus a multiplication with _t_ will have
-outputs whose absolute values are at most _2<sup>N</sup>_ times the maximum absolute input value. In case the
-inputs _d_ and _e_ are in _(-M,M)_, which is certainly true for the initial values _d=0_ and _e=1_ assuming
-_M > 1_, the multiplication results in numbers in range _(-2<sup>N</sup>M,2<sup>N</sup>M)_. Subtracting less than _2<sup>N</sup>_
-times _M_ to cancel out _N_ bits brings that up to _(-2<sup>N+1</sup>M,2<sup>N</sup>M)_, and
-dividing by _2<sup>N</sup>_ at the end takes it to _(-2M,M)_. Another application of `update_de` would take that
-to _(-3M,2M)_, and so forth. This progressive expansion of the variables' ranges can be
-counteracted by incrementing _d_ and _e_ by _M_ whenever they're negative:
+Let's look at bounds on the ranges of these numbers. It can be shown that *|u|+|v|* and *|q|+|r|*
+never exceed *2<sup>N</sup>* (see paragraph 8.3 in the paper), and thus a multiplication with *t* will have
+outputs whose absolute values are at most *2<sup>N</sup>* times the maximum absolute input value. In case the
+inputs *d* and *e* are in *(-M,M)*, which is certainly true for the initial values *d=0* and *e=1* assuming
+*M > 1*, the multiplication results in numbers in range *(-2<sup>N</sup>M,2<sup>N</sup>M)*. Subtracting less than *2<sup>N</sup>*
+times *M* to cancel out *N* bits brings that up to *(-2<sup>N+1</sup>M,2<sup>N</sup>M)*, and
+dividing by *2<sup>N</sup>* at the end takes it to *(-2M,M)*. Another application of `update_de` would take that
+to *(-3M,2M)*, and so forth. This progressive expansion of the variables' ranges can be
+counteracted by incrementing *d* and *e* by *M* whenever they're negative:
 
 ```python
     ...
@@ -293,12 +293,12 @@ counteracted by incrementing _d_ and _e_ by _M_ whenever they're negative:
     ...
 ```
 
-With inputs in _(-2M,M)_, they will first be shifted into range _(-M,M)_, which means that the
-output will again be in _(-2M,M)_, and this remains the case regardless of how many `update_de`
+With inputs in *(-2M,M)*, they will first be shifted into range *(-M,M)*, which means that the
+output will again be in *(-2M,M)*, and this remains the case regardless of how many `update_de`
 invocations there are. In what follows, we will try to make this more efficient.
 
-Note that increasing _d_ by _M_ is equal to incrementing _cd_ by _u&thinsp;M_ and _ce_ by _q&thinsp;M_. Similarly,
-increasing _e_ by _M_ is equal to incrementing _cd_ by _v&thinsp;M_ and _ce_ by _r&thinsp;M_. So we could instead write:
+Note that increasing *d* by *M* is equal to incrementing *cd* by *u&thinsp;M* and *ce* by *q&thinsp;M*. Similarly,
+increasing *e* by *M* is equal to incrementing *cd* by *v&thinsp;M* and *ce* by *r&thinsp;M*. So we could instead write:
 
 ```python
     ...
@@ -318,10 +318,10 @@ increasing _e_ by _M_ is equal to incrementing _cd_ by _v&thinsp;M_ and _ce_ by
     ...
 ```
 
-Now note that we have two steps of corrections to _cd_ and _ce_ that add multiples of _M_: this
+Now note that we have two steps of corrections to *cd* and *ce* that add multiples of *M*: this
 increment, and the decrement that cancels out bottom bits. The second one depends on the first
-one, but they can still be efficiently combined by only computing the bottom bits of _cd_ and _ce_
-at first, and using that to compute the final _md_, _me_ values:
+one, but they can still be efficiently combined by only computing the bottom bits of *cd* and *ce*
+at first, and using that to compute the final *md*, *me* values:
 
 ```python
 def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
@@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ def update_de(d, e, t, M, Mi):
     return cd >> N, ce >> N
 ```
 
-One last optimization: we can avoid the _md&thinsp;M_ and _me&thinsp;M_ multiplications in the bottom bits of _cd_
-and _ce_ by moving them to the _md_ and _me_ correction:
+One last optimization: we can avoid the *md&thinsp;M* and *me&thinsp;M* multiplications in the bottom bits of *cd*
+and *ce* by moving them to the *md* and *me* correction:
 
 ```python
     ...
@@ -362,10 +362,10 @@ and _ce_ by moving them to the _md_ and _me_ correction:
     ...
 ```
 
-The resulting function takes _d_ and _e_ in range _(-2M,M)_ as inputs, and outputs values in the same
-range. That also means that the _d_ value at the end of `modinv` will be in that range, while we want
-a result in _[0,M)_. To do that, we need a normalization function. It's easy to integrate the
-conditional negation of _d_ (based on the sign of _f_) into it as well:
+The resulting function takes *d* and *e* in range *(-2M,M)* as inputs, and outputs values in the same
+range. That also means that the *d* value at the end of `modinv` will be in that range, while we want
+a result in *[0,M)*. To do that, we need a normalization function. It's easy to integrate the
+conditional negation of *d* (based on the sign of *f*) into it as well:
 
 ```python
 def normalize(sign, v, M):
@@ -391,21 +391,22 @@ And calling it in `modinv` is simply:
    return normalize(f, d, M)
 ```
 
+
 ## 5. Constant-time operation
 
 The primary selling point of the algorithm is fast constant-time operation. What code flow still
 depends on the input data so far?
 
-- the number of iterations of the while _g &ne; 0_ loop in `modinv`
+- the number of iterations of the while *g &ne; 0* loop in `modinv`
 - the branches inside `divsteps_n_matrix`
 - the sign checks in `update_de`
 - the sign checks in `normalize`
 
 To make the while loop in `modinv` constant time it can be replaced with a constant number of
-iterations. The paper proves (Theorem 11.2) that _741_ divsteps are sufficient for any _256_-bit
-inputs, and [safegcd-bounds](https://github.com/sipa/safegcd-bounds) shows that the slightly better bound _724_ is
-sufficient even. Given that every loop iteration performs _N_ divsteps, it will run a total of
-_&lceil;724/N&rceil;_ times.
+iterations. The paper proves (Theorem 11.2) that *741* divsteps are sufficient for any *256*-bit
+inputs, and [safegcd-bounds](https://github.com/sipa/safegcd-bounds) shows that the slightly better bound *724* is
+sufficient even. Given that every loop iteration performs *N* divsteps, it will run a total of
+*&lceil;724/N&rceil;* times.
 
 To deal with the branches in `divsteps_n_matrix` we will replace them with constant-time bitwise
 operations (and hope the C compiler isn't smart enough to turn them back into branches; see
@@ -424,10 +425,10 @@ divstep can be written instead as (compare to the inner loop of `gcd` in section
 ```
 
 To convert the above to bitwise operations, we rely on a trick to negate conditionally: per the
-definition of negative numbers in two's complement, (_-v == ~v + 1_) holds for every number _v_. As
-_-1_ in two's complement is all _1_ bits, bitflipping can be expressed as xor with _-1_. It follows
-that _-v == (v ^ -1) - (-1)_. Thus, if we have a variable _c_ that takes on values _0_ or _-1_, then
-_(v ^ c) - c_ is _v_ if _c=0_ and _-v_ if _c=-1_.
+definition of negative numbers in two's complement, (*-v == ~v + 1*) holds for every number *v*. As
+*-1* in two's complement is all *1* bits, bitflipping can be expressed as xor with *-1*. It follows
+that *-v == (v ^ -1) - (-1)*. Thus, if we have a variable *c* that takes on values *0* or *-1*, then
+*(v ^ c) - c* is *v* if *c=0* and *-v* if *c=-1*.
 
 Using this we can write:
 
@@ -443,13 +444,13 @@ in constant-time form as:
     x = (f ^ c1) - c1
 ```
 
-To use that trick, we need a helper mask variable _c1_ that resolves the condition _&delta;>0_ to _-1_
-(if true) or _0_ (if false). We compute _c1_ using right shifting, which is equivalent to dividing by
-the specified power of _2_ and rounding down (in Python, and also in C under the assumption of a typical two's complement system; see
-`assumptions.h` for tests that this is the case). Right shifting by _63_ thus maps all
-numbers in range _[-2<sup>63</sup>,0)_ to _-1_, and numbers in range _[0,2<sup>63</sup>)_ to _0_.
+To use that trick, we need a helper mask variable *c1* that resolves the condition *&delta;>0* to *-1*
+(if true) or *0* (if false). We compute *c1* using right shifting, which is equivalent to dividing by
+the specified power of *2* and rounding down (in Python, and also in C under the assumption of a typical two's complement system; see
+`assumptions.h` for tests that this is the case). Right shifting by *63* thus maps all
+numbers in range *[-2<sup>63</sup>,0)* to *-1*, and numbers in range *[0,2<sup>63</sup>)* to *0*.
 
-Using the facts that _x&0=0_ and _x&(-1)=x_ (on two's complement systems again), we can write:
+Using the facts that *x&0=0* and *x&(-1)=x* (on two's complement systems again), we can write:
 
 ```python
     if g & 1:
@@ -497,8 +498,8 @@ becomes:
 ```
 
 It turns out that this can be implemented more efficiently by applying the substitution
-_&eta;=-&delta;_. In this representation, negating _&delta;_ corresponds to negating _&eta;_, and incrementing
-_&delta;_ corresponds to decrementing _&eta;_. This allows us to remove the negation in the _c1_
+*&eta;=-&delta;*. In this representation, negating *&delta;* corresponds to negating *&eta;*, and incrementing
+*&delta;* corresponds to decrementing *&eta;*. This allows us to remove the negation in the *c1*
 computation:
 
 ```python
@@ -518,12 +519,12 @@ computation:
     g >>= 1
 ```
 
-A variant of divsteps with better worst-case performance can be used instead: starting _&delta;_ at
-_1/2_ instead of _1_. This reduces the worst case number of iterations to _590_ for _256_-bit inputs
-(which can be shown using convex hull analysis). In this case, the substitution _&zeta;=-(&delta;+1/2)_
-is used instead to keep the variable integral. Incrementing _&delta;_ by _1_ still translates to
-decrementing _&zeta;_ by _1_, but negating _&delta;_ now corresponds to going from _&zeta;_ to _-(&zeta;+1)_, or
-_~&zeta;_. Doing that conditionally based on _c3_ is simply:
+A variant of divsteps with better worst-case performance can be used instead: starting *&delta;* at
+*1/2* instead of *1*. This reduces the worst case number of iterations to *590* for *256*-bit inputs
+(which can be shown using convex hull analysis). In this case, the substitution *&zeta;=-(&delta;+1/2)*
+is used instead to keep the variable integral. Incrementing *&delta;* by *1* still translates to
+decrementing *&zeta;* by *1*, but negating *&delta;* now corresponds to going from *&zeta;* to *-(&zeta;+1)*, or
+*~&zeta;*. Doing that conditionally based on *c3* is simply:
 
 ```python
     ...
@@ -533,12 +534,13 @@ _~&zeta;_. Doing that conditionally based on _c3_ is simply:
 ```
 
 By replacing the loop in `divsteps_n_matrix` with a variant of the divstep code above (extended to
-also apply all _f_ operations to _u_, _v_ and all _g_ operations to _q_, _r_), a constant-time version of
+also apply all *f* operations to *u*, *v* and all *g* operations to *q*, *r*), a constant-time version of
 `divsteps_n_matrix` is obtained. The full code will be in section 7.
 
 These bit fiddling tricks can also be used to make the conditional negations and additions in
 `update_de` and `normalize` constant-time.
 
+
 ## 6. Variable-time optimizations
 
 In section 5, we modified the `divsteps_n_matrix` function (and a few others) to be constant time.
@@ -548,7 +550,7 @@ faster non-constant time `divsteps_n_matrix` function.
 
 To do so, first consider yet another way of writing the inner loop of divstep operations in
 `gcd` from section 1. This decomposition is also explained in the paper in section 8.2. We use
-the original version with initial _&delta;=1_ and _&eta;=-&delta;_ here.
+the original version with initial *&delta;=1* and *&eta;=-&delta;* here.
 
 ```python
 for _ in range(N):
@@ -560,7 +562,7 @@ for _ in range(N):
     g >>= 1
 ```
 
-Whenever _g_ is even, the loop only shifts _g_ down and decreases _&eta;_. When _g_ ends in multiple zero
+Whenever *g* is even, the loop only shifts *g* down and decreases *&eta;*. When *g* ends in multiple zero
 bits, these iterations can be consolidated into one step. This requires counting the bottom zero
 bits efficiently, which is possible on most platforms; it is abstracted here as the function
 `count_trailing_zeros`.
@@ -593,20 +595,20 @@ while True:
     # g is even now, and the eta decrement and g shift will happen in the next loop.
 ```
 
-We can now remove multiple bottom _0_ bits from _g_ at once, but still need a full iteration whenever
-there is a bottom _1_ bit. In what follows, we will get rid of multiple _1_ bits simultaneously as
+We can now remove multiple bottom *0* bits from *g* at once, but still need a full iteration whenever
+there is a bottom *1* bit. In what follows, we will get rid of multiple *1* bits simultaneously as
 well.
 
-Observe that as long as _&eta; &geq; 0_, the loop does not modify _f_. Instead, it cancels out bottom
-bits of _g_ and shifts them out, and decreases _&eta;_ and _i_ accordingly - interrupting only when _&eta;_
-becomes negative, or when _i_ reaches _0_. Combined, this is equivalent to adding a multiple of _f_ to
-_g_ to cancel out multiple bottom bits, and then shifting them out.
+Observe that as long as *&eta; &geq; 0*, the loop does not modify *f*. Instead, it cancels out bottom
+bits of *g* and shifts them out, and decreases *&eta;* and *i* accordingly - interrupting only when *&eta;*
+becomes negative, or when *i* reaches *0*. Combined, this is equivalent to adding a multiple of *f* to
+*g* to cancel out multiple bottom bits, and then shifting them out.
 
-It is easy to find what that multiple is: we want a number _w_ such that _g+w&thinsp;f_ has a few bottom
-zero bits. If that number of bits is _L_, we want _g+w&thinsp;f mod 2<sup>L</sup> = 0_, or _w = -g/f mod 2<sup>L</sup>_. Since _f_
-is odd, such a _w_ exists for any _L_. _L_ cannot be more than _i_ steps (as we'd finish the loop before
-doing more) or more than _&eta;+1_ steps (as we'd run `eta, f, g = -eta, g, -f` at that point), but
-apart from that, we're only limited by the complexity of computing _w_.
+It is easy to find what that multiple is: we want a number *w* such that *g+w&thinsp;f* has a few bottom
+zero bits. If that number of bits is *L*, we want *g+w&thinsp;f mod 2<sup>L</sup> = 0*, or *w = -g/f mod 2<sup>L</sup>*. Since *f*
+is odd, such a *w* exists for any *L*. *L* cannot be more than *i* steps (as we'd finish the loop before
+doing more) or more than *&eta;+1* steps (as we'd run `eta, f, g = -eta, g, -f` at that point), but
+apart from that, we're only limited by the complexity of computing *w*.
 
 This code demonstrates how to cancel up to 4 bits per step:
 
@@ -640,25 +642,26 @@ some can be found in Hacker's Delight second edition by Henry S. Warren, Jr. pag
 Here we need the negated modular inverse, which is a simple transformation of those:
 
 - Instead of a 3-bit table:
-  - _-f_ or _f ^ 6_
+  - *-f* or *f ^ 6*
 - Instead of a 4-bit table:
-  - _1 - f(f + 1)_
-  - _-(f + (((f + 1) & 4) << 1))_
-- For larger tables the following technique can be used: if _w=-1/f mod 2<sup>L</sup>_, then _w(w&thinsp;f+2)_ is
-  _-1/f mod 2<sup>2L</sup>_. This allows extending the previous formulas (or tables). In particular we
+  - *1 - f(f + 1)*
+  - *-(f + (((f + 1) & 4) << 1))*
+- For larger tables the following technique can be used: if *w=-1/f mod 2<sup>L</sup>*, then *w(w&thinsp;f+2)* is
+  *-1/f mod 2<sup>2L</sup>*. This allows extending the previous formulas (or tables). In particular we
   have this 6-bit function (based on the 3-bit function above):
-  - _f(f<sup>2</sup> - 2)_
+  - *f(f<sup>2</sup> - 2)*
 
-This loop, again extended to also handle _u_, _v_, _q_, and _r_ alongside _f_ and _g_, placed in
+This loop, again extended to also handle *u*, *v*, *q*, and *r* alongside *f* and *g*, placed in
 `divsteps_n_matrix`, gives a significantly faster, but non-constant time version.
 
+
 ## 7. Final Python version
 
 All together we need the following functions:
 
 - A way to compute the transition matrix in constant time, using the `divsteps_n_matrix` function
   from section 2, but with its loop replaced by a variant of the constant-time divstep from
-  section 5, extended to handle _u_, _v_, _q_, _r_:
+  section 5, extended to handle *u*, *v*, *q*, *r*:
 
 ```python
 def divsteps_n_matrix(zeta, f, g):
@@ -681,7 +684,7 @@ def divsteps_n_matrix(zeta, f, g):
     return zeta, (u, v, q, r)
 ```
 
-- The functions to update _f_ and _g_, and _d_ and _e_, from section 2 and section 4, with the constant-time
+- The functions to update *f* and *g*, and *d* and *e*, from section 2 and section 4, with the constant-time
   changes to `update_de` from section 5:
 
 ```python
@@ -720,7 +723,7 @@ def normalize(sign, v, M):
     return v
 ```
 
-- And finally the `modinv` function too, adapted to use _&zeta;_ instead of _&delta;_, and using the fixed
+- And finally the `modinv` function too, adapted to use *&zeta;* instead of *&delta;*, and using the fixed
   iteration count from section 5:
 
 ```python
@@ -769,21 +772,20 @@ def modinv_var(M, Mi, x):
 
 ## 8. From GCDs to Jacobi symbol
 
-We can also use a similar approach to calculate Jacobi symbol _(x | M)_ by keeping track of an
-extra variable _j_, for which at every step _(x | M) = j (g | f)_. As we update _f_ and _g_, we
-make corresponding updates to _j_ using
+We can also use a similar approach to calculate Jacobi symbol *(x | M)* by keeping track of an
+extra variable *j*, for which at every step *(x | M) = j (g | f)*. As we update *f* and *g*, we
+make corresponding updates to *j* using
 [properties of the Jacobi symbol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobi_symbol#Properties):
+* *((g/2) | f)* is either *(g | f)* or *-(g | f)*, depending on the value of *f mod 8* (negating if it's *3* or *5*).
+* *(f | g)* is either *(g | f)* or *-(g | f)*, depending on *f mod 4* and *g mod 4* (negating if both are *3*).
 
-- _((g/2) | f)_ is either _(g | f)_ or _-(g | f)_, depending on the value of _f mod 8_ (negating if it's _3_ or _5_).
-- _(f | g)_ is either _(g | f)_ or _-(g | f)_, depending on _f mod 4_ and _g mod 4_ (negating if both are _3_).
-
-These updates depend only on the values of _f_ and _g_ modulo _4_ or _8_, and can thus be applied
-very quickly, as long as we keep track of a few additional bits of _f_ and _g_. Overall, this
+These updates depend only on the values of *f* and *g* modulo *4* or *8*, and can thus be applied
+very quickly, as long as we keep track of a few additional bits of *f* and *g*. Overall, this
 calculation is slightly simpler than the one for the modular inverse because we no longer need to
-keep track of _d_ and _e_.
+keep track of *d* and *e*.
 
-However, one difficulty of this approach is that the Jacobi symbol _(a | n)_ is only defined for
-positive odd integers _n_, whereas in the original safegcd algorithm, _f, g_ can take negative
+However, one difficulty of this approach is that the Jacobi symbol *(a | n)* is only defined for
+positive odd integers *n*, whereas in the original safegcd algorithm, *f, g* can take negative
 values. We resolve this by using the following modified steps:
 
 ```python
@@ -797,16 +799,15 @@ values. We resolve this by using the following modified steps:
 ```
 
 The algorithm is still correct, since the changed divstep, called a "posdivstep" (see section 8.4
-and E.5 in the paper) preserves _gcd(f, g)_. However, there's no proof that the modified algorithm
+and E.5 in the paper) preserves *gcd(f, g)*. However, there's no proof that the modified algorithm
 will converge. The justification for posdivsteps is completely empirical: in practice, it appears
-that the vast majority of nonzero inputs converge to _f=g=gcd(f<sub>0</sub>, g<sub>0</sub>)_ in a
+that the vast majority of nonzero inputs converge to *f=g=gcd(f<sub>0</sub>, g<sub>0</sub>)* in a
 number of steps proportional to their logarithm.
 
 Note that:
-
-- We require inputs to satisfy _gcd(x, M) = 1_, as otherwise _f=1_ is not reached.
-- We require inputs _x &neq; 0_, because applying posdivstep with _g=0_ has no effect.
-- We need to update the termination condition from _g=0_ to _f=1_.
+- We require inputs to satisfy *gcd(x, M) = 1*, as otherwise *f=1* is not reached.
+- We require inputs *x &neq; 0*, because applying posdivstep with *g=0* has no effect.
+- We need to update the termination condition from *g=0* to *f=1*.
 
 We account for the possibility of nonconvergence by only performing a bounded number of
 posdivsteps, and then falling back to square-root based Jacobi calculation if a solution has not
@@ -814,5 +815,5 @@ yet been found.
 
 The optimizations in sections 3-7 above are described in the context of the original divsteps, but
 in the C implementation we also adapt most of them (not including "avoiding modulus operations",
-since it's not necessary to track _d, e_, and "constant-time operation", since we never calculate
+since it's not necessary to track *d, e*, and "constant-time operation", since we never calculate
 Jacobi symbols for secret data) to the posdivsteps version.

formal_verification/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/.lake

formal_verification/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+# xahau_consensus
+
+Lean proofs for small Xahau consensus invariants.
+
+This package is intentionally narrow. It does **not** try to verify the C++
+implementation directly. It mirrors small formulas and decision ladders from
+the consensus-extension code so the safety arguments can be checked as theorems
+instead of repeatedly re-derived in review notes.
+
+Current modules:
+
+- `XahauConsensus.Threshold`
+  - mirrors `calculateParticipantThreshold`
+  - proves the Tier-2 intersection inequality:
+    `count + floor(count / 5) < 2 * participantThreshold count`
+  - proves the threshold is minimal for that strict inequality
+  - proves the original-view threshold remains safe when nUNL shrinks the
+    effective view
+  - includes the `original=10`, `effective=8` regression example showing why
+    using the effective view for the Tier-2 floor is forkable
+  - proves `participantThreshold count <= quorumThreshold count` for
+    non-empty views
+  - distinguishes raw formula helpers from the live safety-wrapped gate
+    thresholds used by `ConsensusExtensions`
+- `XahauConsensus.ThresholdFacts`
+  - records small-network values and band-empty/band-present examples
+  - proves exact multiple-of-five behavior
+  - proves threshold monotonicity facts
+- `XahauConsensus.SixtyPercent`
+  - defines a naive `ceil(60%)` threshold
+  - proves naive 60% is unsafe at exact multiples of five
+  - proves the live derived floor is one higher there and restores strict
+    intersection safety
+- `XahauConsensus.Intersection`
+  - proves the abstract cardinality argument behind quorum intersection
+  - shows two threshold-sized cohorts must overlap above the fault bound
+    whenever `n + f < 2t`
+  - specializes that argument to the live participant threshold, including
+    nUNL-shrunk effective views
+- `XahauConsensus.HonestOverlap`
+  - bridges overlap arithmetic to the consensus claim that two cohorts share at
+    least one honest validator
+  - specializes that bridge to the participant threshold and `floor(n/5)` fault
+    bound
+- `XahauConsensus.ViewUniverse`
+  - proves original-view anchoring remains safe under nUNL shrink
+  - separates strict safety from threshold reachability
+  - defines cross-view participant-band presence/absence
+  - shows effective-view thresholds can be unsafe against the original fault
+    bound
+  - shows trusted-superset counting universes erode the intersection margin
+- `XahauConsensus.NunlCap`
+  - models the protocol's ceil-25% nUNL disablement cap
+  - proves 8/6 and 10/8 band collapse examples
+  - records that 10 at max cap has effective view 7, below the original
+    participant floor
+  - records the important counterexample: original `20`, effective `15` does
+    **not** make validator quorum meet the original participant floor
+- `XahauConsensus.SidecarAlignment`
+  - models aligned participant counting for sidecar hashes
+  - proves non-active peers and non-active local publication cannot pad the
+    alignment count
+  - proves changing nonmember reports cannot change quorum alignment
+- `XahauConsensus.EntropySelector`
+  - models the tier-label ladder from `ConsensusExtensions::selectEntropy`
+  - proves non-UNLReport views select fallback
+  - proves the quorum / participant / fallback bands select the expected tier
+- `XahauConsensus.SelectorDeterminism`
+  - models labeled digest output
+  - proves digest payload bytes do not affect the label when consensus metadata
+    is fixed
+  - records examples where changing view provenance or view sizes changes labels
+- `XahauConsensus.ExportGate`
+  - models export's quorum-aligned success rule
+  - models export's sidecar-gate outcome as `proceed` or `retryOrExpire`, with
+    no deterministic fallback signature set
+  - proves missing minority observation does not block a quorum-aligned export
+  - proves `fullObservation` alone cannot change the export decision
+- `XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum`
+  - proves two 80% export quorums overlap above the standard Byzantine bound
+    in nonempty active universes
+  - proves export quorum overlap remains above the original-view Byzantine
+    bound when nUNL shrinkage is within the protocol cap
+  - proves Byzantine validators at the standard bound cannot veto quorum
+  - records concrete overlap margins for 5/10/20-validator universes
+- `XahauConsensus.FinsetIntersection`
+  - uses Mathlib finite sets to prove the cardinality premise behind the
+    arithmetic intersection theorems
+  - specializes that bridge for Tier-2 cohorts, nUNL-shrunk cohorts, and export
+    80% quorums
+- `XahauConsensus.Invariants`
+  - restates cross-module design contracts in one place
+  - pins the live safety-wrapped threshold relationship
+  - proves the cross-view entropy gate is exactly the selector's non-fallback
+    boundary
+  - pins non-UNLReport fallback and export full-observation independence
+
+Run:
+
+```sh
+~/.elan/bin/lake build
+```
+
+## Optional C++ cross-checks
+
+The xahaud CMake build can also compile a Lean-backed unit-test path, but it is
+off by default and is not part of normal release builds:
+
+Install Lean through `elan` first. The CMake integration intentionally keeps the
+tooling rule simple: when `formal_verification=ON`, it looks for `lake` on
+`PATH` or in `~/.elan/bin`, asks that Lake environment to run `lean --version`,
+verifies the exact version specified by this package's `lean-toolchain`, then
+asks Lake for `LEAN_SYSROOT` and checks that `lean.h` and `libleanshared`
+exist.
+
+```sh
+conan install . --output-folder=build-formal --build=missing \
+  -s build_type=Release \
+  -o '&:tests=True' \
+  -o '&:xrpld=True' \
+  -o '&:formal_verification=True'
+
+cmake -S . -B build-formal-cmake \
+  -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=$PWD/build-formal/build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake \
+  -Dtests=ON \
+  -Dxrpld=ON \
+  -Dformal_verification=ON
+
+cmake --build build-formal-cmake --target rippled
+./build-formal-cmake/rippled --unittest=LeanConsensus
+```
+
+This path currently supports native test builds only. It builds
+`XahauConsensus:static`, links the resulting Lean archive and runtime into the
+test binary, and runs C++ drift tests over selected scalar formulas and helper
+predicates. Some checks compare directly to named production helpers; others are
+review-oriented safety predicates computed from those helpers. The exported
+surface is intentionally scalar and reviewable:
+
+- Byzantine bound, participant threshold, and validator quorum threshold.
+- The safety-wrapped zero-view thresholds used by the live gates.
+- The cross-view entropy gate threshold, with effective and original view
+  denominators kept separate.
+- The entropy tier selector policy for `(fromUNLReport, participantCount,
+  effectiveView, originalView)`.
+- Sidecar aligned-participant counting, full-observation, quorum-aligned
+  predicates, and active-view mask-counting samples.
+- Export's quorum-only sidecar-gate proceed predicate, where `fullObservation`
+  is diagnostic rather than success-gating; a small final-apply snapshot model
+  makes explicit that gate proceed is not the same as closed-ledger
+  `Export::doApply` success.
+- NegativeUNL cap/effective-view arithmetic.
+- View-universe safety predicates and naive-60% regression anchors.
+
+This is still a model-to-code cross-check, not a proof that the C++ implements
+the Lean model. Its value is narrower and practical: if a production formula,
+decision ladder, or helper predicate changes without the formal model changing
+too, the gated unit test fails. The formal CMake target invokes Lake on each
+formal-enabled `rippled` build and lets Lake decide whether its own artifacts
+are current; CMake does not trust an existing source-tree archive by timestamp.
+Lake still writes build artifacts under the Lean workspace's `.lake/`
+directory, and the Conan recipe intentionally excludes that directory from
+exported sources, so keep this option as a local/CI confidence build rather
+than a release packaging input. The Conan recipe rejects
+`formal_verification=True` unless `tests=True` and `xrpld=True`, and refuses to
+package formal-enabled builds.

formal_verification/ROADMAP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Xahau Lean Roadmap
+
+This package should stay focused on invariants that are compact enough to be
+reviewable and stable enough to mirror from C++.
+
+Good targets:
+
+1. Threshold arithmetic
+   - Tier-2 participant threshold formula
+   - quorum threshold relation
+   - nUNL original-view anchoring
+   - small-network boundary examples
+2. Sidecar alignment
+   - active-view-only counting
+   - quorum-aligned predicate
+   - full-observation as diagnostic vs success precondition where applicable
+3. Entropy selector
+   - non-UNLReport fallback
+   - tier ladder from agreed participant count
+   - no local pending-state dependency in the tier decision
+4. Export gate
+   - quorum-aligned success without full observation
+   - no deterministic fallback value
+   - retry/expire as liveness behavior, not ledger-content substitution
+
+Poor targets for this package:
+
+- direct verification of C++ implementation details
+- wall-clock timing and network scheduling liveness
+- full ledger execution semantics
+
+Those belong in C++ tests, CSF/testnet scenarios, or a dedicated temporal model.

formal_verification/XahauConsensus.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-- This module serves as the root of the `XahauConsensus` library.
+-- Import modules here that should be built as part of the library.
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+import XahauConsensus.ThresholdFacts
+import XahauConsensus.SixtyPercent
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+import XahauConsensus.HonestOverlap
+import XahauConsensus.ViewUniverse
+import XahauConsensus.NunlCap
+import XahauConsensus.SidecarAlignment
+import XahauConsensus.SidecarObservation
+import XahauConsensus.EntropySelector
+import XahauConsensus.SelectorDeterminism
+import XahauConsensus.ExportGate
+import XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum
+import XahauConsensus.FinsetIntersection
+import XahauConsensus.Invariants
+import XahauConsensus.FFI

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/EntropySelector.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+inductive EntropyTier where
+  | consensusFallback
+  | participantAligned
+  | validatorQuorum
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- Minimal model of `ConsensusExtensions::selectEntropy`'s network,
+non-failed, non-empty tier ladder.
+
+The real C++ also computes a digest. This model deliberately focuses on the
+part that can fork by labeling the same agreed set differently: the tier
+decision from `(fromUNLReport, participantCount, effectiveView, originalView)`.
+It does not model the standalone development shortcut, timeout-driven
+`entropyFailed_` downgrade, or empty-map fallback; those paths all bypass or
+downgrade this ladder rather than producing a stronger non-fallback label.
+-/
+def selectEntropyTier
+    (fromUNLReport : Bool)
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) : EntropyTier :=
+  if !fromUNLReport then
+    EntropyTier.consensusFallback
+  else if participantCount >= safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView then
+    EntropyTier.validatorQuorum
+  else if participantCount >= safeParticipantThreshold originalView then
+    EntropyTier.participantAligned
+  else
+    EntropyTier.consensusFallback
+
+/-- Non-standalone nodes must fail closed to fallback until the validator view
+is ledger-anchored by a UNLReport. -/
+theorem no_unl_report_selects_fallback
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    selectEntropyTier false participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.consensusFallback := by
+  rfl
+
+/-- At or above the effective-view quorum threshold, the ladder selects the
+strongest entropy tier. -/
+theorem quorum_count_selects_validator_quorum
+    {participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat}
+    (hQuorum : safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView <= participantCount) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.validatorQuorum := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier
+  simp [hQuorum]
+
+/-- Below validator quorum but at or above the original-view participant floor,
+the ladder selects Tier 2. -/
+theorem participant_band_selects_tier2
+    {participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat}
+    (hBelowQuorum : participantCount < safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView)
+    (hParticipant : safeParticipantThreshold originalView <= participantCount) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.participantAligned := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier
+  simp [Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelowQuorum, hParticipant]
+
+/-- Below both thresholds, the ladder falls back. -/
+theorem below_participant_floor_selects_fallback
+    {participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat}
+    (hBelowQuorum : participantCount < safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView)
+    (hBelowParticipant : participantCount < safeParticipantThreshold originalView) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.consensusFallback := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier
+  simp [
+    Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelowQuorum,
+    Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelowParticipant]
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/ExportGate.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- Minimal model of the sidecar export gate.
+
+`alignedParticipants` is the number of participants observed on the export
+sidecar, `quorumThreshold` is the required aligned count, and
+`fullObservation` records whether every participant was observed. The C++ gate
+must use quorum alignment for success; full observation is only diagnostic.
+-/
+structure ExportGate where
+  alignedParticipants : Nat
+  quorumThreshold : Nat
+  fullObservation : Bool
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- Export sidecar-gate outcome. This is not the final `Export::doApply`
+result: closed-ledger apply re-validates the frozen agreed signature snapshot
+before it can create a shadow ticket. -/
+inductive ExportOutcome where
+  | proceed
+  | retryOrExpire
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- The success predicate used by export: enough participants are aligned. -/
+def ExportGate.quorumAligned (gate : ExportGate) : Bool :=
+  decide (gate.quorumThreshold <= gate.alignedParticipants)
+
+/-- Export proceeds exactly when quorum alignment is met. -/
+def ExportGate.proceed (gate : ExportGate) : Bool :=
+  gate.quorumAligned
+
+/-- Export's externally visible decision shape. -/
+def ExportGate.outcome (gate : ExportGate) : ExportOutcome :=
+  if gate.proceed then ExportOutcome.proceed else ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire
+
+/-- Minimal model of the additional closed-ledger apply preconditions.
+
+The sidecar gate only proves that one `exportSigSetHash` had quorum alignment.
+Network-mode `Export::doApply` then independently requires a ledger-anchored
+validator view, no convergence failure for the round, a frozen agreed sidecar
+map, a parseable/valid signature set, and enough verified signers in that map.
+The model intentionally excludes cryptography and metadata construction; it
+exists to prevent reading `ExportGate.proceed` as final apply success.
+-/
+structure ExportApplySnapshot where
+  fromUNLReport : Bool
+  convergenceFailed : Bool
+  agreedSetPresent : Bool
+  agreedSetValid : Bool
+  signerCount : Nat
+  quorumThreshold : Nat
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- Closed-ledger apply can use only a valid, frozen agreed sidecar snapshot. -/
+def ExportApplySnapshot.validAgreedSnapshot
+    (snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot) : Bool :=
+  snapshot.fromUNLReport &&
+    !snapshot.convergenceFailed &&
+    snapshot.agreedSetPresent &&
+    snapshot.agreedSetValid &&
+    decide (snapshot.quorumThreshold <= snapshot.signerCount)
+
+/-- Minimal network-mode apply decision: valid agreed snapshot applies; all
+other cases retry or expire. -/
+def ExportApplySnapshot.outcome
+    (snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot) : ExportOutcome :=
+  if snapshot.validAgreedSnapshot then
+    ExportOutcome.proceed
+  else
+    ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire
+
+theorem apply_success_iff_valid_agreed_snapshot
+    (snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot) :
+    snapshot.outcome = ExportOutcome.proceed ↔
+      snapshot.validAgreedSnapshot = true := by
+  unfold ExportApplySnapshot.outcome
+  by_cases h : snapshot.validAgreedSnapshot <;> simp [h]
+
+/-- Gate success alone is not final apply success. For example, the sidecar
+gate may have quorum alignment while the final apply path has no frozen agreed
+sidecar map available and therefore retries. -/
+theorem gate_proceed_does_not_imply_apply_success :
+    ∃ gate : ExportGate, ∃ snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot,
+      ExportGate.proceed gate = true ∧
+        ExportApplySnapshot.outcome snapshot =
+          ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire := by
+  refine ⟨
+    ExportGate.mk 4 4 false,
+    ExportApplySnapshot.mk true false false true 4 4,
+    ?_,
+    ?_⟩ <;> rfl
+
+/-- A missing minority, represented by `fullObservation = false`, does not
+prevent export when the quorum threshold is met. -/
+theorem missing_minority_does_not_prevent_proceed
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (hQuorum : quorumThreshold <= alignedParticipants) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).proceed = true := by
+  unfold ExportGate.proceed ExportGate.quorumAligned
+  simp [hQuorum]
+
+theorem missing_minority_proceeds
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (hQuorum : quorumThreshold <= alignedParticipants) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).outcome =
+      ExportOutcome.proceed := by
+  unfold ExportGate.outcome
+  simp [missing_minority_does_not_prevent_proceed hQuorum]
+
+/-- Export must not proceed below the aligned-participant quorum threshold. -/
+theorem below_quorum_does_not_proceed
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (fullObservation : Bool)
+    (hBelow : alignedParticipants < quorumThreshold) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold fullObservation).proceed =
+      false := by
+  unfold ExportGate.proceed ExportGate.quorumAligned
+  simp [Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelow]
+
+/-- Below quorum, export retries or expires. There is no deterministic fallback
+signature set analogous to RNG's Tier 1 fallback digest. -/
+theorem below_quorum_retries_or_expires
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (fullObservation : Bool)
+    (hBelow : alignedParticipants < quorumThreshold) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold fullObservation).outcome =
+      ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire := by
+  unfold ExportGate.outcome
+  simp [below_quorum_does_not_proceed fullObservation hBelow]
+
+/-- Flipping only the diagnostic `fullObservation` field cannot change the
+export decision. -/
+theorem changing_fullObservation_alone_does_not_change_proceed
+    (alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold true).proceed =
+      (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).proceed := by
+  rfl
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/ExportQuorum.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+import XahauConsensus.NunlCap
+import XahauConsensus.ThresholdFacts
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Nat-cardinality arithmetic for export sidecar quorum uniqueness.
+
+The model deliberately stays at the level used by `Intersection.lean`:
+
+* `n` is the active validator universe size.
+* `a` and `b` are the numbers of validators supporting two export sidecar
+  hashes in that same universe.
+* `overlap` is the size of the intersection between those two support sets.
+* `faultyOverlap + honestOverlap = overlap` splits that intersection.
+
+No `Finset` structure is needed here; callers supply the usual
+inclusion-exclusion cardinality inequality `a + b <= n + overlap`.
+-/
+
+theorem disabled_le_cap_mul_four_le
+    {originalView disabled : Nat}
+    (hCap : disabled <= disabledCap originalView) :
+    disabled * 4 <= originalView + 3 := by
+  unfold disabledCap ceilDiv at hCap
+  have hFour : 0 < 4 := by decide
+  simp at hCap
+  have hMul :=
+    (Nat.le_div_iff_mul_le hFour).mp hCap
+  omega
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_mul_five_ge_four_mul (n : Nat) :
+    4 * n <= 5 * quorumThreshold n := by
+  unfold quorumThreshold
+  have hHundred : 0 < 100 := by decide
+  have hDiv :
+      (n * 80 + 99) / 100 <= (n * 80 + 99) / 100 :=
+    Nat.le_refl _
+  have hBound :=
+    (Nat.div_le_iff_le_mul hHundred).mp hDiv
+  omega
+
+theorem byzantineBound_mul_five_le (n : Nat) :
+    byzantineBound n * 5 <= n := by
+  unfold byzantineBound
+  exact Nat.div_mul_le_self n 5
+
+/-- Two 80% export quorums in one active universe overlap by at least
+`2 * quorumThreshold n - n`. -/
+theorem two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+    {n a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold n <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold n <= b) :
+    2 * quorumThreshold n - n <= overlap := by
+  omega
+
+/-- The 80% quorum threshold is intersection-safe against the standard
+`floor(n / 5)` fault bound for every nonempty active universe. -/
+theorem quorumThreshold_intersection_safe
+    {n : Nat} (hPositive : 0 < n) :
+    n + byzantineBound n < 2 * quorumThreshold n := by
+  unfold quorumThreshold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+/-- The unconditional version is false: the empty active universe has raw
+quorum threshold zero, so there is no strict intersection margin. -/
+theorem quorumThreshold_empty_not_intersection_safe :
+    ¬ 0 + byzantineBound 0 < 2 * quorumThreshold 0 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Two export sidecar hashes both clearing 80% quorum in the same nonempty
+active universe must have overlap larger than the standard fault bound. -/
+theorem export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    {n a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hPositive : 0 < n)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold n <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold n <= b) :
+    byzantineBound n < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (quorumThreshold_intersection_safe hPositive)
+
+/-- If the overlap between two quorum-clearing export hashes is split into
+faulty and honest validators, and at most `floor(n / 5)` validators in that
+overlap are faulty, then the overlap contains an honest validator. -/
+theorem export_hash_quorums_force_honest_overlap
+    {n a b overlap faultyOverlap honestOverlap : Nat}
+    (hPositive : 0 < n)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold n <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold n <= b)
+    (hSplit : overlap = faultyOverlap + honestOverlap)
+    (hFaulty : faultyOverlap <= byzantineBound n) :
+    0 < honestOverlap := by
+  have hOverlap :
+      byzantineBound n < overlap :=
+    export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+      hPositive
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  omega
+
+/-- Export quorum intersection remains above the original-view Byzantine bound
+when nUNL shrinkage is within the protocol's ceil-25% cap. -/
+theorem export_quorum_intersection_safe_under_nunl_cap
+    {originalView effectiveView disabled : Nat}
+    (hEffective : effectiveView = originalView - disabled)
+    (hCap : disabled <= disabledCap originalView)
+    (hPositive : 0 < effectiveView) :
+    effectiveView + byzantineBound originalView <
+      2 * quorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  have hCapBound :
+      disabled * 4 <= originalView + 3 :=
+    disabled_le_cap_mul_four_le hCap
+  have hQuorumBound :
+      4 * effectiveView <= 5 * quorumThreshold effectiveView :=
+    quorumThreshold_mul_five_ge_four_mul effectiveView
+  have hByzBound :
+      byzantineBound originalView * 5 <= originalView :=
+    byzantineBound_mul_five_le originalView
+  omega
+
+/-- Two export sidecar hashes both clearing 80% quorum in an nUNL-shrunk
+effective view must still overlap above the original-view Byzantine bound,
+provided the shrinkage stays within the protocol cap. -/
+theorem export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_original_byzantine_under_nunl_cap
+    {originalView effectiveView disabled a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hEffective : effectiveView = originalView - disabled)
+    (hCap : disabled <= disabledCap originalView)
+    (hPositive : 0 < effectiveView)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= effectiveView + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= b) :
+    byzantineBound originalView < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (export_quorum_intersection_safe_under_nunl_cap
+      hEffective
+      hCap
+      hPositive)
+
+/-- A Byzantine minority at the standard bound cannot veto export quorum:
+after removing `floor(n / 5)` validators, enough validators remain to meet the
+80% quorum threshold. -/
+theorem byzantineBound_cannot_veto_quorum (n : Nat) :
+    byzantineBound n + quorumThreshold n <= n := by
+  unfold byzantineBound quorumThreshold
+  omega
+
+/-- Equivalent no-veto form using subtraction. -/
+theorem quorumThreshold_le_universe_minus_byzantineBound (n : Nat) :
+    quorumThreshold n <= n - byzantineBound n := by
+  have hNoVeto := byzantineBound_cannot_veto_quorum n
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete regression anchor: in a 5-validator active universe, two 80%
+export quorums overlap in at least three validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_five_overlap_at_least_three
+    {a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 5 + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold 5 <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold 5 <= b) :
+    3 <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold 5 - 5 <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  have hExact : 2 * quorumThreshold 5 - 5 = 3 := by
+    native_decide
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete regression anchor: in a 10-validator active universe, two 80%
+export quorums overlap in at least six validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_ten_overlap_at_least_six
+    {a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 10 + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold 10 <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold 10 <= b) :
+    6 <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold 10 - 10 <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  have hExact : 2 * quorumThreshold 10 - 10 = 6 := by
+    native_decide
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete regression anchor: in a 20-validator active universe, two 80%
+export quorums overlap in at least twelve validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_twenty_overlap_at_least_twelve
+    {a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 20 + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold 20 <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold 20 <= b) :
+    12 <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold 20 - 20 <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  have hExact : 2 * quorumThreshold 20 - 20 = 12 := by
+    native_decide
+  omega
+
+/-- On exact multiples of five, two 80% export quorums overlap in at least
+`3 * k` validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_five_mul_overlap_at_least_three_mul
+    {k a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 5 * k + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= b) :
+    3 * k <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold (5 * k) - 5 * k <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  rw [quorumThreshold_five_mul] at hLower
+  omega
+
+/-- On exact multiples of five, quorum overlap strictly exceeds the standard
+fault bound by at least `2 * k`. For `k = 0` this is only a non-strict
+difference statement; strict safety is provided by
+`export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine` for nonempty universes. -/
+theorem export_quorum_five_mul_overlap_margin
+    {k a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 5 * k + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= b) :
+    byzantineBound (5 * k) + 2 * k <= overlap := by
+  have hOverlap :
+      3 * k <= overlap :=
+    export_quorum_five_mul_overlap_at_least_three_mul
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  rw [byzantineBound_five_mul]
+  omega
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/FFI.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+import XahauConsensus.Invariants
+import XahauConsensus.NunlCap
+import XahauConsensus.SidecarAlignment
+import XahauConsensus.ViewUniverse
+import XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum
+import XahauConsensus.SixtyPercent
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-! Scalar C ABI exports used by the optional C++ drift tests.
+
+These functions intentionally expose only plain integer formulas. The broader
+Lean project proves properties about these definitions; the C++ tests then
+check that selected production formulas and helper predicates still compute the
+same values.
+-/
+
+-- @@start ffi-scalar-export-surface
+@[export xahau_byzantine_bound]
+def xahauByzantineBound (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (byzantineBound count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_participant_threshold]
+def xahauParticipantThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (participantThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_quorum_threshold]
+def xahauQuorumThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (quorumThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_safe_quorum_threshold]
+def xahauSafeQuorumThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (safeQuorumThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_safe_participant_threshold]
+def xahauSafeParticipantThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (safeParticipantThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_entropy_gate_threshold_for_view]
+def xahauEntropyGateThresholdForView
+    (effectiveView originalView : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView.toNat originalView.toNat).toUInt64
+
+def entropyTierCode : EntropyTier → UInt8
+  | EntropyTier.consensusFallback => 1
+  | EntropyTier.participantAligned => 2
+  | EntropyTier.validatorQuorum => 3
+
+@[export xahau_select_entropy_tier]
+def xahauSelectEntropyTier
+    (fromUNLReport participantCount effectiveView originalView : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  entropyTierCode <|
+    selectEntropyTier
+      (fromUNLReport != 0)
+      participantCount.toNat
+      effectiveView.toNat
+      originalView.toNat
+
+@[export xahau_aligned_participants]
+def xahauAlignedParticipants
+    (aligned localIsMember localPublished : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (alignedParticipants
+      aligned.toNat
+      (localIsMember != 0)
+      (localPublished != 0)).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_quorum_aligned]
+def xahauQuorumAligned
+    (threshold aligned localIsMember localPublished : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if quorumAligned
+      threshold.toNat
+      aligned.toNat
+      (localIsMember != 0)
+      (localPublished != 0) then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_full_observation]
+def xahauFullObservation (peersSeen txConverged : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if fullObservation peersSeen.toNat txConverged.toNat then 1 else 0
+
+@[export xahau_export_gate_proceed]
+def xahauExportGateProceed
+    (alignedParticipants quorumThreshold fullObservation : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if (ExportGate.mk
+        alignedParticipants.toNat
+        quorumThreshold.toNat
+        (fullObservation != 0)).proceed then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+
+@[export xahau_strict_intersection_safe]
+def xahauStrictIntersectionSafe
+    (activeView byzantineUniverse threshold : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if activeView.toNat + byzantineBound byzantineUniverse.toNat <
+      2 * threshold.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_nonvacuous_strict_intersection_safe]
+def xahauNonvacuousStrictIntersectionSafe
+    (activeView byzantineUniverse threshold : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if threshold.toNat <= activeView.toNat ∧
+      activeView.toNat + byzantineBound byzantineUniverse.toNat <
+        2 * threshold.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_participant_band_nonempty]
+def xahauParticipantBandNonempty
+    (effectiveView originalView : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if participantThreshold originalView.toNat < quorumThreshold effectiveView.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_export_quorum_overlap_lower_bound]
+def xahauExportQuorumOverlapLowerBound (activeView : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (2 * quorumThreshold activeView.toNat - activeView.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_export_quorum_safe_under_nunl_cap]
+def xahauExportQuorumSafeUnderNunlCap
+    (originalView effectiveView disabled : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if effectiveView.toNat = originalView.toNat - disabled.toNat ∧
+      disabled.toNat <= disabledCap originalView.toNat ∧
+      0 < effectiveView.toNat ∧
+      effectiveView.toNat + byzantineBound originalView.toNat <
+        2 * quorumThreshold effectiveView.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+private def maskBit (mask : UInt64) (peer : Nat) : Bool :=
+  ((mask.toNat / (2 ^ peer)) % 2) == 1
+
+@[export xahau_active_aligned_count_mask]
+def xahauActiveAlignedCountMask
+    (count activeMask alignedMask : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (activeAlignedCount
+      (maskBit activeMask)
+      (maskBit alignedMask)
+      count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_quorum_aligned_mask]
+def xahauQuorumAlignedMask
+    (threshold count activeMask alignedMask localIsMember localPublished : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  let aligned :=
+    activeAlignedCount
+      (maskBit activeMask)
+      (maskBit alignedMask)
+      count.toNat
+  if quorumAligned
+      threshold.toNat
+      aligned
+      (localIsMember != 0)
+      (localPublished != 0) then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_naive_sixty_percent_threshold]
+def xahauNaiveSixtyPercentThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (naiveSixtyPercentThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_naive_sixty_percent_is_safe]
+def xahauNaiveSixtyPercentIsSafe (count : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if count.toNat + byzantineBound count.toNat <
+      2 * naiveSixtyPercentThreshold count.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_disabled_cap]
+def xahauDisabledCap (originalView : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (disabledCap originalView.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_effective_view]
+def xahauEffectiveView (originalView disabled : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (effectiveView originalView.toNat disabled.toNat).toUInt64
+-- @@end ffi-scalar-export-surface
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/FinsetIntersection.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Card
+import XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Finite-set bridge for the quorum-intersection arithmetic.
+
+The arithmetic modules prove useful facts from the premise
+`a + b <= n + overlap`. This module discharges that premise for actual finite
+cohorts `A` and `B` that are both subsets of a common validator universe `U`.
+-/
+
+open Finset
+
+/-- Inclusion-exclusion bridge: two finite cohorts inside one universe satisfy
+the cardinality premise used by `Intersection.lean`. -/
+theorem finset_cardinality_bound
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {U A B : Finset α}
+    (hA : A ⊆ U)
+    (hB : B ⊆ U) :
+    A.card + B.card <= U.card + (A ∩ B).card := by
+  have hUnionSubset : A ∪ B ⊆ U := by
+    intro x hx
+    rcases Finset.mem_union.mp hx with hxA | hxB
+    · exact hA hxA
+    · exact hB hxB
+  have hUnionCard : (A ∪ B).card <= U.card :=
+    Finset.card_le_card hUnionSubset
+  have hInclusion :
+      (A ∪ B).card + (A ∩ B).card = A.card + B.card :=
+    Finset.card_union_add_card_inter A B
+  omega
+
+/-- Set-level Tier-2 form: two participant-threshold cohorts in the same
+validator universe overlap above the Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem finset_participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {U A B : Finset α}
+    (hAUniverse : A ⊆ U)
+    (hBUniverse : B ⊆ U)
+    (hAThreshold : participantThreshold U.card <= A.card)
+    (hBThreshold : participantThreshold U.card <= B.card) :
+    byzantineBound U.card < (A ∩ B).card := by
+  exact participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    (finset_cardinality_bound hAUniverse hBUniverse)
+    hAThreshold
+    hBThreshold
+
+/-- nUNL/set-level form: two original-view participant-threshold cohorts in a
+shrunk effective universe still overlap above the original Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem finset_participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine_under_shrink
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {Original Effective A B : Finset α}
+    (hEffectiveSubset : Effective ⊆ Original)
+    (hAUniverse : A ⊆ Effective)
+    (hBUniverse : B ⊆ Effective)
+    (hAThreshold : participantThreshold Original.card <= A.card)
+    (hBThreshold : participantThreshold Original.card <= B.card) :
+    byzantineBound Original.card < (A ∩ B).card := by
+  have hShrink : Effective.card <= Original.card :=
+    Finset.card_le_card hEffectiveSubset
+  exact participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine_under_shrink
+    hShrink
+    (finset_cardinality_bound hAUniverse hBUniverse)
+    hAThreshold
+    hBThreshold
+
+/-- Set-level export form: two 80% export sidecar quorums in the same nonempty
+active universe overlap above the standard Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem finset_export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {U A B : Finset α}
+    (hNonempty : 0 < U.card)
+    (hAUniverse : A ⊆ U)
+    (hBUniverse : B ⊆ U)
+    (hAThreshold : quorumThreshold U.card <= A.card)
+    (hBThreshold : quorumThreshold U.card <= B.card) :
+    byzantineBound U.card < (A ∩ B).card := by
+  exact export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    hNonempty
+    (finset_cardinality_bound hAUniverse hBUniverse)
+    hAThreshold
+    hBThreshold
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/HonestOverlap.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Bridge from cardinality arithmetic to the consensus-language statement:
+if cohort overlap is larger than the maximum faulty overlap, then the overlap
+contains at least one honest validator.
+-/
+
+/-- If the overlap is larger than the number of faulty validators in it, then
+some honest validator remains in the overlap. -/
+theorem honest_overlap_exists
+    {overlap faultyInOverlap : Nat}
+    (hFaultyLtOverlap : faultyInOverlap < overlap) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  omega
+
+/-- If total faulty validators are bounded by `faultBound`, and the overlap is
+larger than `faultBound`, then the overlap contains an honest validator. -/
+theorem honest_overlap_exists_of_fault_bound
+    {overlap faultyInOverlap faultBound : Nat}
+    (hFaultyBound : faultyInOverlap <= faultBound)
+    (hOverlapGtFaultBound : faultBound < overlap) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  omega
+
+/-- Direct bridge from the abstract two-cohort intersection theorem: two
+threshold-sized cohorts under the strict safety inequality have honest overlap,
+provided faulty validators in the overlap are bounded by `f`.
+-/
+theorem honest_overlap_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    {n a b overlap threshold faultBound faultyInOverlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : threshold <= a)
+    (hB : threshold <= b)
+    (hSafety : n + faultBound < 2 * threshold)
+    (hFaultyBound : faultyInOverlap <= faultBound) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  have hOverlapGtFaultBound :
+      faultBound < overlap :=
+    overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+      hSafety
+  exact honest_overlap_exists_of_fault_bound
+    hFaultyBound
+    hOverlapGtFaultBound
+
+/-- Direct participant-threshold form: two Tier-2-sized cohorts in the same
+view have honest overlap under the `floor(n/5)` Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem honest_overlap_of_participant_threshold_cohorts
+    {count a b overlap faultyInOverlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= count + overlap)
+    (hA : participantThreshold count <= a)
+    (hB : participantThreshold count <= b)
+    (hFaultyBound : faultyInOverlap <= byzantineBound count) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  have hOverlapGtBound :
+      byzantineBound count < overlap :=
+    participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  exact honest_overlap_exists_of_fault_bound
+    hFaultyBound
+    hOverlapGtBound
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/Intersection.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Abstract cardinality arithmetic for quorum intersection arguments.
+
+The variables are plain natural-number cardinalities:
+
+* `n`: universe size
+* `a`, `b`: cohort sizes
+* `o`: overlap size
+* `t`: quorum threshold
+* `f`: tolerated faulty overlap
+
+The shape `a + b <= n + o` captures the inclusion-exclusion upper bound
+without committing to a concrete `Finset` model.
+-/
+
+/-- If two threshold-sized cohorts fit in an `n`-sized universe only by
+overlapping by `o`, and `n + f < 2 * t`, then the overlap is larger than the
+fault bound `f`. -/
+theorem overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    {n a b o t f : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + o)
+    (hA : t <= a)
+    (hB : t <= b)
+    (hSafety : n + f < 2 * t) :
+    f < o := by
+  omega
+
+/-- Reviewer-facing contrapositive form: if the overlap is no larger than the
+fault bound, then under the strict safety inequality the two cohorts cannot
+both meet threshold. -/
+theorem not_both_threshold_cohorts_of_overlap_le_fault
+    {n a b o t f : Nat}
+    (hOverlap : o <= f)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + o)
+    (hSafety : n + f < 2 * t) :
+    ¬ (t <= a ∧ t <= b) := by
+  intro hBoth
+  have hStrict :
+      f < o :=
+    overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+      hCardinality hBoth.1 hBoth.2 hSafety
+  omega
+
+/-- Equivalent disjunctive form of the reviewer fact: with insufficient
+overlap, at least one candidate cohort must be below threshold. -/
+theorem overlap_le_fault_forces_cohort_below_threshold
+    {n a b o t f : Nat}
+    (hOverlap : o <= f)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + o)
+    (hSafety : n + f < 2 * t) :
+    a < t ∨ b < t := by
+  have hNotBoth :
+      ¬ (t <= a ∧ t <= b) :=
+    not_both_threshold_cohorts_of_overlap_le_fault
+      hOverlap hCardinality hSafety
+  omega
+
+/-- Direct Tier-2 form: two cohorts at the participant threshold in the same
+original-view universe must overlap by more than the tolerated Byzantine bound.
+-/
+theorem participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    {count a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= count + overlap)
+    (hA : participantThreshold count <= a)
+    (hB : participantThreshold count <= b) :
+    byzantineBound count < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (participantThreshold_intersection_safe count)
+
+/-- nUNL form: when the effective universe shrinks, the original-view
+participant threshold still forces overlap above the original Byzantine bound.
+-/
+theorem participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine_under_shrink
+    {originalView effectiveView a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hShrink : effectiveView <= originalView)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= effectiveView + overlap)
+    (hA : participantThreshold originalView <= a)
+    (hB : participantThreshold originalView <= b) :
+    byzantineBound originalView < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (participantThreshold_safe_under_effective_shrink
+      originalView
+      effectiveView
+      hShrink)
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/Invariants.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+import XahauConsensus.EntropySelector
+import XahauConsensus.ExportGate
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Small cross-module invariants that state the design contract in one place.
+
+These do not verify C++ directly. They pin the consensus arguments that the C++
+is intended to implement.
+-/
+
+/-- Same-count band fact: with both thresholds computed from one view size,
+Tier 2 is never stricter than validator quorum. Production nUNL rounds use
+cross-view thresholds instead; see `entropyGateThresholdForView`. -/
+theorem same_count_tier2_not_stricter_than_validator_quorum (count : Nat) :
+    safeParticipantThreshold count <= safeQuorumThreshold count :=
+  safeParticipantThreshold_le_safeQuorumThreshold count
+
+/-- Same-view shorthand: the live entropy gate is the weaker of Tier 2 and
+validator quorum, so it is never above validator quorum. -/
+def entropyGateThresholdModel (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  min (safeQuorumThreshold count) (safeParticipantThreshold count)
+
+theorem entropy_gate_le_validator_quorum (count : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdModel count <= safeQuorumThreshold count := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdModel
+  exact Nat.min_le_left _ _
+
+theorem entropy_gate_le_participant_threshold (count : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdModel count <= safeParticipantThreshold count := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdModel
+  exact Nat.min_le_right _ _
+
+/-- Production shape: validator quorum is over the effective post-nUNL view,
+while Tier 2 is over the original pre-nUNL view. -/
+def entropyGateThresholdForView (effectiveView originalView : Nat) : Nat :=
+  min (safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView) (safeParticipantThreshold originalView)
+
+theorem entropy_gate_for_view_le_validator_quorum
+    (effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView originalView <=
+      safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdForView
+  exact Nat.min_le_left _ _
+
+theorem entropy_gate_for_view_le_participant_threshold
+    (effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView originalView <=
+      safeParticipantThreshold originalView := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdForView
+  exact Nat.min_le_right _ _
+
+/-- The entropy gate is exactly the selector's non-fallback boundary: reaching
+the lower of the validator-quorum and participant-aligned thresholds is enough
+to select a non-fallback tier, and below it the selector falls back. -/
+theorem selectEntropyTier_nonfallback_iff_entropy_gate
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView ≠
+        EntropyTier.consensusFallback ↔
+      entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView originalView <=
+        participantCount := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier entropyGateThresholdForView
+  by_cases hQuorum : safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView <= participantCount
+  · constructor
+    · intro _
+      exact Nat.le_trans (Nat.min_le_left _ _) hQuorum
+    · intro _
+      simp [hQuorum]
+  · by_cases hParticipant :
+      safeParticipantThreshold originalView <= participantCount
+    · constructor
+      · intro _
+        exact Nat.le_trans (Nat.min_le_right _ _) hParticipant
+      · intro _
+        simp [hQuorum, hParticipant]
+    · constructor
+      · intro hNonfallback
+        simp [hQuorum, hParticipant] at hNonfallback
+      · intro hGate
+        have hBelowQuorum :
+            participantCount < safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView :=
+          Nat.lt_of_not_ge hQuorum
+        have hBelowParticipant :
+            participantCount < safeParticipantThreshold originalView :=
+          Nat.lt_of_not_ge hParticipant
+        have hBelowGate :
+            participantCount <
+              min (safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView)
+                (safeParticipantThreshold originalView) :=
+          (Nat.lt_min).mpr ⟨hBelowQuorum, hBelowParticipant⟩
+        exact False.elim (Nat.not_lt_of_ge hGate hBelowGate)
+
+/-- Until the view is ledger-anchored, entropy tier labeling fails closed. -/
+theorem non_unl_report_cannot_mint_nonfallback
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    selectEntropyTier false participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.consensusFallback :=
+  no_unl_report_selects_fallback participantCount effectiveView originalView
+
+/-- Export success is a quorum-alignment property, not a full-observation
+property. -/
+theorem export_success_independent_of_full_observation
+    (alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold true).proceed =
+      (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).proceed :=
+  changing_fullObservation_alone_does_not_change_proceed
+    alignedParticipants
+    quorumThreshold
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/NunlCap.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Arithmetic facts for nUNL-capped view shrinkage.
+
+The examples here intentionally use the original view for the participant
+floor and the effective post-nUNL view for validator quorum.  That is the
+cross-view comparison that matters when disabled validators collapse the space
+between the Tier-2 participant floor and the Tier-3 validator-quorum floor.
+-/
+
+/-- Integer ceiling division, defined defensively for `d = 0`. -/
+def ceilDiv (n d : Nat) : Nat :=
+  if d = 0 then 0 else (n + d - 1) / d
+
+/-- The protocol's ceil-25% nUNL disablement cap for an original validator view. -/
+def disabledCap (originalView : Nat) : Nat :=
+  ceilDiv originalView 4
+
+/-- The post-nUNL effective validator view after `disabled` validators drop. -/
+def effectiveView (originalView disabled : Nat) : Nat :=
+  originalView - disabled
+
+theorem ceilDiv_zero_right (n : Nat) : ceilDiv n 0 = 0 := by
+  simp [ceilDiv]
+
+theorem ceilDiv_four_eight : ceilDiv 8 4 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem ceilDiv_four_ten : ceilDiv 10 4 = 3 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem ceilDiv_four_twenty : ceilDiv 20 4 = 5 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem disabledCap_eight : disabledCap 8 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem disabledCap_ten : disabledCap 10 = 3 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem disabledCap_twenty : disabledCap 20 = 5 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem effectiveView_eight_at_disabledCap :
+    effectiveView 8 (disabledCap 8) = 6 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem effectiveView_ten_at_disabledCap :
+    effectiveView 10 (disabledCap 10) = 7 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem effectiveView_twenty_at_disabledCap :
+    effectiveView 20 (disabledCap 20) = 15 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 8 with two disabled validators collapses the participant/quorum band. -/
+theorem band_collapse_original8_effective6 :
+    quorumThreshold 6 = participantThreshold 8 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original8_effective6_meets_participant_floor :
+    participantThreshold 8 <= quorumThreshold 6 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 10 with two disabled validators collapses the participant/quorum band. -/
+theorem band_collapse_original10_effective8 :
+    quorumThreshold 8 = participantThreshold 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original10_effective8_meets_participant_floor :
+    participantThreshold 10 <= quorumThreshold 8 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 10 at the full ceil-25% cap leaves effective view 7, below the participant floor. -/
+theorem quorum_original10_effective7_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold 7 < participantThreshold 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem max_cap_original10_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold (effectiveView 10 (disabledCap 10)) <
+      participantThreshold 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- At original 20, the full ceil-25% cap leaves effective view 15, which is too small. -/
+theorem quorum_original20_effective15_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold 15 < participantThreshold 20 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original20_effective15_does_not_meet_participant_floor :
+    ¬ participantThreshold 20 <= quorumThreshold 15 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 20 with four disabled validators collapses the participant/quorum band. -/
+theorem band_collapse_original20_effective16 :
+    quorumThreshold 16 = participantThreshold 20 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original20_effective16_meets_participant_floor :
+    participantThreshold 20 <= quorumThreshold 16 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- The ceil-25% cap does not by itself guarantee collapse at size 20. -/
+theorem max_cap_original20_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold (effectiveView 20 (disabledCap 20)) <
+      participantThreshold 20 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/--
+General cross-view comparison: an effective-view quorum satisfies the
+original-view participant floor whenever that quorum clears the original
+intersection boundary.
+-/
+theorem quorumThreshold_meets_participantThreshold_of_intersection_premise
+    {originalView effectiveView : Nat}
+    (h :
+      originalView + byzantineBound originalView <
+        2 * quorumThreshold effectiveView) :
+    participantThreshold originalView <= quorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  exact participantThreshold_minimal originalView (quorumThreshold effectiveView) h
+
+/--
+Once the effective-view quorum threshold meets the original-view participant
+floor, any validator count meeting validator quorum also meets the participant
+floor anchored to the original view.
+-/
+theorem validators_meet_participant_floor_of_meet_quorum
+    {originalView effectiveView validators : Nat}
+    (hBand : participantThreshold originalView <= quorumThreshold effectiveView)
+    (hQuorum : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= validators) :
+    participantThreshold originalView <= validators :=
+  Nat.le_trans hBand hQuorum
+
+/-- If cross-view quorum is no higher than the participant floor, the in-between band is empty. -/
+theorem cross_view_participant_band_empty
+    {originalView effectiveView : Nat}
+    (hCollapse : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= participantThreshold originalView) :
+    ¬ ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold originalView <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  intro hExists
+  rcases hExists with ⟨participants, hParticipant, hBelowQuorum⟩
+  omega
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/SelectorDeterminism.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+import XahauConsensus.EntropySelector
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- A minimal digest model: the payload is opaque to the selector, while the
+label is the entropy tier chosen from the consensus metadata. -/
+structure LabeledDigest (α : Type) where
+  payload : α
+  label : EntropyTier
+  deriving Repr
+
+def labelDigest
+    (fromUNLReport : Bool)
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat)
+    (payload : α) : LabeledDigest α :=
+  { payload
+    label :=
+      selectEntropyTier
+        fromUNLReport
+        participantCount
+        effectiveView
+        originalView }
+
+/-- The digest payload itself does not affect the selected tier. The label is
+entirely determined by the consensus metadata. -/
+theorem payload_does_not_affect_tier
+    {α : Type}
+    {payloadA payloadB : α}
+    (fromUNLReport : Bool)
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    (labelDigest
+        fromUNLReport
+        participantCount
+        effectiveView
+        originalView
+        payloadA).label =
+      (labelDigest
+        fromUNLReport
+        participantCount
+        effectiveView
+        originalView
+        payloadB).label := by
+  rfl
+
+/-- Without a UNLReport anchor the same count and views can receive a different
+label. -/
+theorem label_can_differ_when_fromUNLReport_differs :
+    (labelDigest true 8 10 10 0).label ≠
+      (labelDigest false 8 10 10 0).label := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Changing the effective validator view can change the digest label. -/
+theorem label_can_differ_when_effective_view_differs :
+    (labelDigest true 7 8 10 0).label ≠
+      (labelDigest true 7 10 10 0).label := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Changing the original validator view can change the digest label. -/
+theorem label_can_differ_when_original_view_differs :
+    (labelDigest true 6 10 8 0).label ≠
+      (labelDigest true 6 10 10 0).label := by
+  native_decide
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/SidecarAlignment.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- Count a local boolean contribution as the `Nat` value used in threshold
+comparisons. -/
+def localPublishedCount (localPublished : Bool) : Nat :=
+  if localPublished then 1 else 0
+
+/-- The proof-level participant count behind sidecar alignment.
+
+`aligned` is the count of aligned remote active-view participants; a local
+publication contributes one more participant. -/
+def alignedParticipants
+    (aligned : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) : Nat :=
+  aligned + localPublishedCount (localIsMember && localPublished)
+
+/-- Sidecar quorum predicate, kept boolean to mirror the implementation check. -/
+def quorumAligned
+    (threshold aligned : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) : Bool :=
+  decide (threshold <= alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished)
+
+/-- Full sidecar observation means every converged transaction has been seen. -/
+def fullObservation (peersSeen txConverged : Nat) : Bool :=
+  peersSeen == txConverged
+
+/-- Count aligned peers from a finite peer prefix, filtering through the active
+view before any alignment bit contributes. -/
+def activeAlignedCount
+    (inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool) : Nat → Nat
+  | 0 => 0
+  | peer + 1 =>
+      activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer +
+        localPublishedCount (inActiveView peer && peerAligned peer)
+
+theorem localPublishedCount_true :
+    localPublishedCount true = 1 := by
+  rfl
+
+theorem localPublishedCount_false :
+    localPublishedCount false = 0 := by
+  rfl
+
+theorem localPublishedCount_le_one (published : Bool) :
+    localPublishedCount published <= 1 := by
+  cases published <;> simp [localPublishedCount]
+
+/-- Core participant-count equation: aligned remotes plus the local published
+contribution. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_eq_aligned_plus_localPublished
+    (aligned : Nat) (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished =
+      aligned + localPublishedCount (localIsMember && localPublished) := by
+  rfl
+
+/-- A non-active local node cannot pad the participant count. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_local_nonmember
+    (aligned : Nat) (localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned false localPublished = aligned := by
+  cases localPublished <;> rfl
+
+/-- An active local node contributes exactly when it published the sidecar hash. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_local_member
+    (aligned : Nat) (localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned true localPublished =
+      aligned + localPublishedCount localPublished := by
+  cases localPublished <;> rfl
+
+/-- The local node can add at most one participant to the remote aligned count. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_le_aligned_succ
+    (aligned : Nat) (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished <= aligned + 1 := by
+  cases localIsMember <;> cases localPublished <;>
+    simp [alignedParticipants, localPublishedCount]
+
+/-- The boolean quorum predicate is exactly the threshold comparison over
+`alignedParticipants`. -/
+theorem quorumAligned_iff_threshold_le_alignedParticipants
+    (threshold aligned : Nat) (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    quorumAligned threshold aligned localIsMember localPublished = true ↔
+      threshold <= alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished := by
+  unfold quorumAligned
+  simp
+
+/-- The boolean full-observation predicate is exactly equality of the observed
+and converged counts. -/
+theorem fullObservation_iff_peersSeen_eq_txConverged
+    (peersSeen txConverged : Nat) :
+    fullObservation peersSeen txConverged = true ↔
+      peersSeen = txConverged := by
+  unfold fullObservation
+  simp
+
+/-- A peer outside the active view contributes zero, even if its sidecar
+alignment bit is set. -/
+theorem activeAlignedCount_succ_nonmember
+    {inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool} {peer : Nat}
+    (hNonmember : inActiveView peer = false) :
+    activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned (peer + 1) =
+      activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer := by
+  simp [activeAlignedCount, hNonmember, localPublishedCount]
+
+/-- A prefix of `n` peer positions can contribute at most `n` aligned active
+remote participants. -/
+theorem activeAlignedCount_le_prefix
+    (inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool) (n : Nat) :
+    activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned n <= n := by
+  induction n with
+  | zero =>
+      simp [activeAlignedCount]
+  | succ n ih =>
+      cases hAligned : inActiveView n && peerAligned n
+      · simp [activeAlignedCount, hAligned, localPublishedCount]
+        exact Nat.le_trans ih (Nat.le_succ n)
+      · simp [activeAlignedCount, hAligned, localPublishedCount]
+        exact ih
+
+/-- With the optional local contribution included, the participant count is
+bounded by the inspected remote prefix plus one. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_le_prefix_succ
+    (inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool)
+    (n : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished <= n + 1 := by
+  have hRemote := activeAlignedCount_le_prefix inActiveView peerAligned n
+  cases localIsMember <;> cases localPublished <;>
+    simp [alignedParticipants, localPublishedCount]
+  · exact Nat.le_trans hRemote (Nat.le_succ n)
+  · exact Nat.le_trans hRemote (Nat.le_succ n)
+  · exact Nat.le_trans hRemote (Nat.le_succ n)
+  · exact hRemote
+
+/-- Adding a nonmember peer to the inspected prefix cannot increase
+`alignedParticipants`. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_succ_nonmember
+    {inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool} {peer : Nat}
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool)
+    (hNonmember : inActiveView peer = false) :
+    alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned (peer + 1))
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [alignedParticipants, activeAlignedCount_succ_nonmember hNonmember]
+
+/-- Consequently, a nonmember peer cannot change the quorum-aligned result. -/
+theorem quorumAligned_succ_nonmember
+    {inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool} {peer threshold : Nat}
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool)
+    (hNonmember : inActiveView peer = false) :
+    quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned (peer + 1))
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [
+    quorumAligned,
+    alignedParticipants_succ_nonmember
+      localIsMember
+      localPublished
+      hNonmember]
+
+/-- Active-view filtering: only member peers' alignment bits can affect the
+aligned remote count. -/
+theorem activeAlignedCount_ext_on_members
+    {n : Nat} {inActiveView alignedA alignedB : Nat → Bool}
+    (hSameOnMembers :
+      ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+        alignedA peer = alignedB peer) :
+    activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedA n =
+      activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedB n := by
+  induction n with
+  | zero =>
+      rfl
+  | succ n ih =>
+      have hPrefix :
+          ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+            alignedA peer = alignedB peer := by
+        intro peer hLt hMember
+        exact hSameOnMembers peer (Nat.lt_trans hLt (Nat.lt_succ_self n)) hMember
+      have hAt :
+          localPublishedCount (inActiveView n && alignedA n) =
+            localPublishedCount (inActiveView n && alignedB n) := by
+        cases hMember : inActiveView n
+        · simp [localPublishedCount]
+        · have hEq := hSameOnMembers n (Nat.lt_succ_self n) hMember
+          simp [hEq, localPublishedCount]
+      simp [activeAlignedCount, ih hPrefix, hAt]
+
+/-- Changing sidecar alignment reports for nonmembers cannot change the final
+participant count. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_ext_on_members
+    {n : Nat} {inActiveView alignedA alignedB : Nat → Bool}
+    {localIsMember : Bool}
+    {localPublished : Bool}
+    (hSameOnMembers :
+      ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+        alignedA peer = alignedB peer) :
+    alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedA n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedB n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [
+    alignedParticipants,
+    activeAlignedCount_ext_on_members hSameOnMembers]
+
+/-- Changing sidecar alignment reports for nonmembers cannot turn quorum on or
+off. -/
+theorem quorumAligned_ext_on_members
+    {n threshold : Nat} {inActiveView alignedA alignedB : Nat → Bool}
+    {localIsMember : Bool}
+    {localPublished : Bool}
+    (hSameOnMembers :
+      ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+        alignedA peer = alignedB peer) :
+    quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedA n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedB n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [
+    quorumAligned,
+    alignedParticipants_ext_on_members hSameOnMembers]
+
+end XahauConsensus