test(formal): model sidecar observation gate

# Conflicts:
#	src/xrpld/consensus/ConsensusParms.h

.clang-format

@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ DerivePointerAlignment: false
 DisableFormat:   false
 ExperimentalAutoDetectBinPacking: false
 ForEachMacros:   [ Q_FOREACH,  BOOST_FOREACH ]
-IncludeBlocks:   Regroup
 IncludeCategories:
   - Regex:           '^<(test)/'
     Priority:        0
@@ -54,12 +53,8 @@ IncludeCategories:
     Priority:        2
   - Regex:           '^<(boost)/'
     Priority:        3
-  - Regex:           '^.*/'
-    Priority:        4
-  - Regex:           '^.*\.h'
-    Priority:        5
   - Regex:           '.*'
-    Priority:        6
+    Priority:        4
 IncludeIsMainRegex: '$'
 IndentCaseLabels: true
 IndentFunctionDeclarationAfterType: false
@@ -94,4 +89,3 @@ SpacesInSquareBrackets: false
 Standard:        Cpp11
 TabWidth:        8
 UseTab:          Never
-QualifierAlignment: Right

.codecov.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,37 @@
+codecov:
+  require_ci_to_pass: true
+
+comment:
+  behavior: default
+  layout: reach,diff,flags,tree,reach
+  show_carryforward_flags: false
+
 coverage:
+  range: "60..80"
+  precision: 1
+  round: nearest
   status:
     project:
       default:
         target: 60%
         threshold: 2%
+    patch:
+      default:
+        target: auto
+        threshold: 2%
+    changes: false
+
+github_checks:
+  annotations: true
+
+parsers:
+  cobertura:
+    partials_as_hits: true
+    handle_missing_conditions : true
+
+slack_app: false
+
+ignore:
+  - "src/test/"
+  - "include/xrpl/beast/test/"
+  - "include/xrpl/beast/unit_test/"

.git-blame-ignore-revs

@@ -1,8 +1,25 @@
 # This feature requires Git >= 2.24
 # To use it by default in git blame:
 # git config blame.ignoreRevsFile .git-blame-ignore-revs
+# Format first-party source according to .clang-format
 50760c693510894ca368e90369b0cc2dabfd07f3
-e2384885f5f630c8f0ffe4bf21a169b433a16858
-241b9ddde9e11beb7480600fd5ed90e1ef109b21
-760f16f56835663d9286bd29294d074de26a7ba6
-0eebe6a5f4246fced516d52b83ec4e7f47373edd
+# Reintroduce Clang-Format & Levelization
+da1d20d6d5d862716125d60899b80fab5302954a
+# Consolidate external libraries
+da1d20d6d5d862716125d60899b80fab5302954a
+# Rename .hpp to .h
+0345a2645d0f5ad900f4fbbcaff96040d3a887fc
+# Format formerly .hpp files
+5a227dc719016e10045e17c9396ad401118044f1
+# Rewrite includes
+e61880699997398f5a746e6c4034edc7632661f5
+# Move CMake directory (#4997)
+e47b1c1b3b97c3f6d11858ee02f463596e29e7f0
+# Rearrange sources (#4997)
+bfafa2bb39e562901736d656806bd700c3699a2f
+# Rewrite includes (#4997)
+e61880699997398f5a746e6c4034edc7632661f5
+# Recompute loops (#4997)
+d25b5dcd568bb96c18e347d55fac10fe901a1bfb
+# Reformat code with clang-format-18
+02749feea88ce61c1f7eeb2d61a57d8ecf07ab11

.github/workflows/check-genesis-hooks.yml

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           # Download install.sh
           curl -o /tmp/wasienv-install.sh https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wasienv/wasienv/master/install.sh
-          
+
           # Replace /bin to /local/bin
           sed -i 's|/bin|/local/bin|g' /tmp/wasienv-install.sh
 

.github/workflows/clang-format.yml

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
         sudo apt-get update
         sudo apt-get install clang-format-${CLANG_VERSION}
     - name: Format first-party sources
-      run: find include src tests -type f \( -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.hpp' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.ipp' \) -exec clang-format-${CLANG_VERSION} -i {} +
+      run: find include src -type f \( -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.hpp' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.ipp' \) -exec clang-format-${CLANG_VERSION} -i {} +
     - name: Check for differences
       id: assert
       run: |

.github/workflows/formal-verification.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+name: Formal Verification (Lean)
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: ["feature-export-rng-lean"]
+  pull_request:
+    branches: ["**"]
+    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  lean-consensus:
+    name: Lean/C++ drift checks
+    runs-on: [self-hosted, macOS]
+    env:
+      BUILD_DIR: .build-formal
+      CMAKE_BUILD_DIR: .build-formal-cmake
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Add Homebrew to PATH
+        run: |
+          echo "/opt/homebrew/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+          echo "/opt/homebrew/sbin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+
+      - name: Install core tools
+        run: |
+          brew install coreutils
+          echo "Num proc: $(nproc)"
+
+      - name: Setup toolchain (mise)
+        uses: jdx/mise-action@v3.6.1
+        with:
+          cache: false
+          install: true
+          mise_toml: |
+            [tools]
+            cmake = "3.25.3"
+            python = "3.12"
+            pipx = "latest"
+            conan = "2"
+            ninja = "latest"
+
+      - name: Install tools via mise
+        run: |
+          mise install
+          mise reshim
+          echo "$HOME/.local/share/mise/shims" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+
+      - name: Install Lean toolchain
+        run: |
+          toolchain="$(cat formal_verification/lean-toolchain)"
+          curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/leanprover/elan/master/elan-init.sh \
+            | sh -s -- -y --default-toolchain "$toolchain"
+          echo "$HOME/.elan/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+          "$HOME/.elan/bin/lake" --version
+          "$HOME/.elan/bin/lean" --version
+
+      - name: Build Lean proofs
+        run: |
+          cd formal_verification
+          "$HOME/.elan/bin/lake" build XahauConsensus:static
+
+      - name: Detect compiler version
+        id: detect-compiler
+        run: |
+          compiler_version=$(clang --version | grep -oE 'version [0-9]+' | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
+          echo "compiler_version=${compiler_version}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "Detected Apple Clang version: ${compiler_version}"
+
+      - name: Configure Conan profile
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p ~/.conan2/profiles
+          cat > ~/.conan2/profiles/default <<EOF
+          [settings]
+          arch=armv8
+          build_type=Debug
+          compiler=apple-clang
+          compiler.cppstd=20
+          compiler.libcxx=libc++
+          compiler.version=${{ steps.detect-compiler.outputs.compiler_version }}
+          os=Macos
+
+          [conf]
+          tools.build:cxxflags=["-Wno-missing-template-arg-list-after-template-kw"]
+          EOF
+          conan profile show
+
+      - name: Export custom Conan recipes
+        run: |
+          conan export external/snappy --version 1.1.10 --user xahaud --channel stable
+          conan export external/soci --version 4.0.3 --user xahaud --channel stable
+          conan export external/wasmedge --version 0.11.2 --user xahaud --channel stable
+
+      - name: Install Conan dependencies
+        env:
+          CONAN_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: 180
+        run: |
+          conan install . \
+            --output-folder "$BUILD_DIR" \
+            --build missing \
+            --settings build_type=Debug \
+            -o '&:tests=True' \
+            -o '&:xrpld=True' \
+            -o '&:formal_verification=True'
+
+      - name: Configure formal build
+        run: |
+          cmake -S . -B "$CMAKE_BUILD_DIR" -G Ninja \
+            -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE="$PWD/$BUILD_DIR/build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake" \
+            -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug \
+            -Dtests=ON \
+            -Dxrpld=ON \
+            -Dformal_verification=ON
+
+      - name: Build formal-enabled rippled
+        run: |
+          cmake --build "$CMAKE_BUILD_DIR" --target rippled --parallel "$(nproc)"
+
+      - name: Run Lean/C++ drift checks
+        run: |
+          "$CMAKE_BUILD_DIR/rippled" --unittest=LeanConsensus --unittest-log

.gitignore

@@ -127,5 +127,12 @@ bld.rippled/
 generated
 .vscode
 
+# AI docs (local working documents)
+.ai-docs/
+
+# Local formal-methods workspace; kept as a separate repository and optionally
+# symlinked here for navigation.
+formal/lean/xahau_consensus
+
 # Suggested in-tree build directory
 /.build/

.testnet/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+output/
+__pycache__/
+scenarios/odd-cases/
+scenarios/suite-experiments.yml

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/consensus_entropy_crash.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+"""Scenario: ConsensusEntropy amendment crashes non-supporting node.
+
+Votes ConsensusEntropy accept on all nodes except n4, then waits for n4
+to crash as the amendment activates without its support.
+
+    x-testnet run --scenario-script consensus_entropy_crash.py
+"""
+
+from helpers import CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close()
+    ctx.feature(CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE, vetoed=False, exclude_nodes=[4])
+
+    log("Waiting for ConsensusEntropy to be voted for...")
+    await ctx.wait_for_feature(
+        CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE,
+        check=lambda s: not s.get("vetoed"),
+        exclude_nodes=[4],
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+    log("Waiting for n4 to crash...")
+    op = await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[4], timeout=600)
+
+    ctx.assert_log("unsupported amendments activated", since=op.started, nodes=[4])
+    ctx.assert_exit_status(0, nodes=[4])
+    log("PASS: n4 shut down due to unsupported amendment")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/entropy_with_transactions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+""":descr: entropy stays valid under transaction load"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, assert_valid_entropy
+
+variants = [
+    {"label": "light", "min_txns": 5, "max_txns": 10},
+    {"label": "heavy", "min_txns": 50, "max_txns": 60},
+    {"label": "super_heavy", "min_txns": 90, "max_txns": 120},
+]
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log, *, min_txns=5, max_txns=10, **_):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    gen = ctx.txn_generator(min_txns=min_txns, max_txns=max_txns)
+    await gen.start()
+    await gen.wait_until_ready()
+    log(f"Transaction generator ready ({min_txns}-{max_txns} txns/ledger)")
+
+    # Wait for pipeline warmup + a few txn-bearing ledgers.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(3, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(10, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Inspecting ledgers {start_seq + 1} → {end_seq}")
+
+    digests = set()
+    total_user_txns = 0
+
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        ce, user_txns = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, count = assert_valid_entropy(ce, seq, seen_digests=digests)
+        total_user_txns += len(user_txns)
+        log(
+            f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={count} "
+            f"user_txns={len(user_txns)} Digest={digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+
+    await gen.stop()
+
+    log(
+        f"Verified {end_seq - start_seq} ledgers: {total_user_txns} user txns, "
+        f"all entropy valid and unique"
+    )
+
+    if total_user_txns == 0:
+        raise AssertionError("No user transactions were included in any ledger")
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/fallback_without_unl_report.py

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+""":descr: healthy non-standalone testnet without UNLReport mints Tier 1 fallback"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, assert_consensus_fallback
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Non-standalone nodes require a ledger-anchored UNLReport before assigning
+    # validator_quorum / participant_aligned labels. Without it, the RNG pipeline
+    # may still collect commits/reveals, but injection must remain Tier 1.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(3, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+    log("Pipeline warmed up without UNLReport")
+
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(5, node_id=0, timeout=90)
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Inspecting ledgers {start_seq + 1} -> {end_seq}")
+
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, count = assert_consensus_fallback(ce, seq)
+        log(f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={count} Digest={digest[:16]}...")
+
+    log(f"Verified {end_seq - start_seq} ledgers: all consensus_fallback")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/participant_aligned_smoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+""":descr: 5/6 validator_quorum, 4/6 participant_aligned (tier 2), recovery
+
+Requires node_count: 6 (see suite.yml) — the smallest NON-degenerate Tier 2
+size. At n=6: tier2 floor = 4, validator quorum = 5, validation quorum = 5. So
+  6/6, 5/6 present -> validator_quorum  (EntropyTier=3)
+  4/6 present      -> participant_aligned (EntropyTier=2, count 4)   <-- the band
+  3/6 present      -> consensus_fallback (EntropyTier=1)
+n=5 has NO tier-2 band (tier2 == quorum == 4), which is why the existing
+degradation smoke at 5 nodes only ever sees tier 3 / fallback.
+
+KEY: the 4/6 window is BELOW the 80% validation quorum (5). The 4 survivors
+keep CLOSING ledgers that carry tier-2 entropy, but those ledgers do NOT
+validate until the network recovers — exactly the transition window Tier 2
+serves. So validated_ledger_index() stalls; we instead inspect a surviving
+node's CLOSED ledger (its LCL) directly, and cross-check the injection from the
+cohort's logs.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import (
+    require_entropy,
+    get_entropy_tx,
+    assert_participant_aligned,
+    assert_validator_quorum,
+)
+
+
+def _closed_entropy(result):
+    """(seq, ConsensusEntropy tx) from a ctx.ledger('closed', transactions=True)
+    result, or (None, None) if the fetch returned no usable ledger.
+
+    Enforces the per-ledger invariant that an entropy-enabled closed ledger
+    carries EXACTLY ONE ConsensusEntropy pseudo-tx (mirroring get_entropy_tx):
+    a duplicate or missing injection raises here with a clear error instead of
+    being silently skipped and resurfacing later as a generic 'no tier-2 ledger'.
+    """
+    if not result or not isinstance(result.get("ledger"), dict):
+        return None, None
+    led = result["ledger"]
+    try:
+        seq = int(led.get("ledger_index"))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None, None
+    ce = [
+        t
+        for t in led.get("transactions", [])
+        if isinstance(t, dict) and t.get("TransactionType") == "ConsensusEntropy"
+    ]
+    if len(ce) != 1:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Closed ledger {seq}: expected 1 ConsensusEntropy txn, got {len(ce)}"
+        )
+    return seq, ce[0]
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Baseline: healthy 6/6 produces validator_quorum entropy.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+
+    # --- 5/6: settles back to validator_quorum (5 present >= quorum 5) ---
+    val_before_drop = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    ctx.stop_node(5)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[5], timeout=30)
+    # Settle a few ledgers past the membership change. The ledger right at a
+    # validator drop can carry a transient consensus_fallback (tier 1, count 0,
+    # deterministic and by design) before the commit/reveal pipeline re-primes,
+    # so we do NOT assume any single post-drop ledger is already tier 3.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(4, node_id=0, timeout=90)
+
+    # 5/6 is at/above the 80% quorum (5), so steady state is validator_quorum.
+    # Scan the post-drop validated ledgers (all carry the 5-node cohort, so a
+    # tier-3 here has count == 5) and require at least one clean validator_quorum
+    # — EntropyTier=3, count >= quorum, non-zero digest — tolerating the
+    # transition fallback instead of depending on where the tip happened to land.
+    val_5of6 = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    t3_seq = None
+    for seq in range(val_5of6, val_before_drop, -1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        tier = ce.get("EntropyTier")
+        log(f"  5/6 ledger {seq}: tier={tier} count={ce.get('EntropyCount')}")
+        if tier == 3:
+            assert_validator_quorum(ce, seq, min_count=5)
+            t3_seq = seq
+            break
+    if t3_seq is None:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"5/6: no validator_quorum (tier 3) entropy in post-drop validated "
+            f"ledgers {val_before_drop + 1}..{val_5of6}"
+        )
+    log(f"5/6: validator_quorum at validated seq {t3_seq}")
+
+    #@@start test-participant-aligned-window
+    # --- 4/6: participant_aligned (Tier 2) degraded window ---
+    ctx.stop_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[4], timeout=30)
+
+    # ~12s window: confirm tier-2 INJECTION from the cohort's logs, and that the
+    # round is NOT the impossible/fallback path (which is what distinguishes the
+    # tier-2 band from the tier-1 fallback regime).
+    op = await ctx.sleep(12, name="tier2_window")
+    selected_t2 = ctx.search_logs(
+        r"RNG: entropy selected seq=\d+ tier=2 count=4",
+        within=op.window,
+        nodes=[0, 1, 2, 3],
+    )
+    log(f"4/6: 'entropy selected tier=2 count=4' logs: {selected_t2.count}")
+    if selected_t2.count == 0:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "4/6 window injected no participant_aligned (tier 2) entropy: no "
+            "'RNG: entropy selected ... tier=2 count=4' on the surviving cohort"
+        )
+    ctx.assert_not_log(
+        r"reason=impossible-entropy-gate", within=op.window, nodes=[0, 1, 2, 3]
+    )
+
+    # Verify the on-ledger EntropyTier=2 DIRECTLY: validation is stalled (4 < 5),
+    # so sample the surviving cohort's CLOSED ledger (its LCL — built but not yet
+    # validated). At least one must be participant_aligned with EntropyCount=4.
+    tier2_on_ledger = 0
+    last_seq = None
+    for _ in range(5):
+        seq, ce = _closed_entropy(
+            ctx.ledger("closed", transactions=True, node_id=0)
+        )
+        if ce is not None and seq is not None and seq != last_seq:
+            last_seq = seq
+            tier = ce.get("EntropyTier")
+            count = ce.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+            log(f"  closed ledger {seq}: tier={tier} count={count}")
+            if tier == 2:
+                assert_participant_aligned(ce, seq, expected_count=4)
+                tier2_on_ledger += 1
+        await ctx.sleep(3)
+
+    if tier2_on_ledger == 0:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "no closed participant_aligned (tier 2) ledger observed during the "
+            "4/6 window (tier 2 was injected per logs, but not seen on a closed "
+            "ledger)"
+        )
+    log(f"4/6: {tier2_on_ledger} participant_aligned closed ledger(s) verified")
+    #@@end test-participant-aligned-window
+
+    # --- Recovery: liveness — validation resumes once quorum is restored ---
+    ctx.start_node(4)
+    ctx.start_node(5)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+
+    val_recovered = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    if not val_recovered or val_recovered <= val_5of6:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Validated ledger did not advance after recovery "
+            f"({val_5of6} -> {val_recovered})"
+        )
+    log(f"Recovered: validated seq {val_5of6} -> {val_recovered}")
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_degradation_smoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+""":descr: 4/5 liveness, 3/5 fallback-entropy (consensus_fallback), recovery"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import ZERO_DIGEST, require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, entropy_fields
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Baseline: wait 1 ledger to confirm network is healthy.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+
+    # --- 4/5 liveness ---
+    ctx.stop_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[4], timeout=30)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+    log("4/5: liveness OK")
+
+    # Snapshot validated seq before dropping to 3/5.
+    val_before = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    # --- 3/5 degraded window ---
+    ctx.stop_node(3)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[3], timeout=30)
+
+    # 10s ≈ 3 rounds at 3s cadence.
+    await ctx.sleep(10)
+
+    val_after = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"3/5: validated ledger {val_before} → {val_after}")
+
+    # Accepted/built ledgers may still later appear as validated once the full
+    # network rejoins. For ConsensusEntropy the key invariant is that every
+    # ledger created during this sub-quorum window carries FALLBACK entropy
+    # (consensus_fallback: non-zero consensus-bound digest, count 0) — never
+    # validator-tier entropy.
+    degraded_fallback = 0
+    degraded_end = val_after or val_before
+    if val_before and degraded_end and degraded_end > val_before:
+        for seq in range(val_before + 1, degraded_end + 1):
+            ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+            digest, entropy_count, is_fallback = entropy_fields(ce)
+            tier = ce.get("EntropyTier")
+
+            # consensus_fallback (EntropyTier=1): explicit tier, count 0,
+            # deterministic NON-zero digest.
+            if tier != 1:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==1 "
+                    f"(consensus_fallback) during 3/5 window, got {tier} "
+                    f"(EntropyCount={entropy_count})"
+                )
+            if entropy_count != 0:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: fallback EntropyCount must be 0, got "
+                    f"{entropy_count}"
+                )
+            if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: fallback digest must be non-zero "
+                    f"(consensus_fallback), got {digest[:16]}..."
+                )
+            assert is_fallback  # tier==1 implies fallback
+
+            degraded_fallback += 1
+            log(
+                f"  Degraded ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={entropy_count} "
+                f"FALLBACK"
+            )
+
+    log(f"3/5 entropy summary: {degraded_fallback} fallback")
+
+    # Log checks tied to current transition mechanics:
+    # - commit-set SHAMap publication is the observable output of entering the
+    #   commit sidecar phase
+    # - ConvergingCommit transition is the gateway out of seq=0-only behavior
+    # - reason=impossible-entropy-gate is the explicit degraded-window fallback path
+    ctx.log_level("LedgerConsensus", "trace")
+    ctx.log_level("ConsensusExtensions", "trace")
+    op = await ctx.sleep(6, name="stall_window")
+
+    ctx.assert_not_log(
+        r"RNG: transitioned to ConvergingCommit", within=op.window, nodes=[0, 1, 2]
+    )
+    ctx.assert_not_log(
+        r"RNG: built commitSet SHAMap", within=op.window, nodes=[0, 1, 2]
+    )
+
+    gate_blocked = ctx.search_logs(
+        r"STALLDIAG: establish gate blocked reason=(pause|no-tx-consensus)",
+        within=op.window,
+        nodes=[0, 1, 2],
+    )
+    log(f"3/5: establish gate-blocked logs in 6s: {gate_blocked.count}")
+
+    impossible = ctx.search_logs(
+        r"RNG: skipping commit wait reason=impossible-entropy-gate",
+        within=op.window,
+        nodes=[0, 1, 2],
+    )
+    log(f"3/5: RNG impossible-entropy-gate skips in 6s: {impossible.count}")
+
+    # --- Recovery: restart nodes, verify ledger advancement ---
+    ctx.start_node(3)
+    ctx.start_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+
+    val_recovered = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    pre_recovery = max(v for v in [val_before, val_after] if v is not None)
+    log(f"Recovered: validated seq {pre_recovery} → {val_recovered}")
+
+    if not val_recovered or val_recovered <= pre_recovery:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Validated ledger did not advance after recovery "
+            f"({pre_recovery} → {val_recovered})"
+        )
+
+    # Inspect post-recovery ledgers separately from the degraded window above.
+    # Once the network is back at quorum, validator-tier entropy is expected
+    # again (transitional fallback ledgers are fine) and must be quorum-met.
+    fallback_count = 0
+    validator_count = 0
+    for seq in range(pre_recovery + 1, val_recovered + 1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, entropy_count, is_fallback = entropy_fields(ce)
+
+        if is_fallback:
+            fallback_count += 1
+        else:
+            validator_count += 1
+            if entropy_count < 4:
+                raise AssertionError(
+                    f"Ledger {seq}: validator entropy with sub-quorum "
+                    f"EntropyCount={entropy_count} (need >= 4)"
+                )
+
+        log(
+            f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={entropy_count} "
+            f"{'FALLBACK' if is_fallback else 'VALIDATOR'}"
+        )
+
+    log(
+        f"Entropy summary: {fallback_count} fallback, "
+        f"{validator_count} validator"
+    )
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_recovery_smoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+""":descr: drop 2 nodes (3/5 stall), restart both, verify recovery"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+    log("Baseline OK")
+
+    # Drop 2 nodes → validation stall.
+    ctx.stop_node(3)
+    ctx.stop_node(4)
+    await ctx.wait_for_nodes_down(nodes=[3, 4], timeout=30)
+
+    info = ctx.rpc.server_info(node_id=0)
+    val_before = info.get("info", {}).get("validated_ledger", {}).get("seq", 0)
+    log(f"Stalled at validated seq {val_before}")
+
+    # Let it sit for a few rounds in degraded state.
+    await ctx.sleep(6)
+
+    # Bring both nodes back.
+    ctx.start_node(3)
+    ctx.start_node(4)
+    log("Restarted n3 and n4, waiting for recovery...")
+
+    # Recovery: wait for ANY validated ledger advance on n0.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(node_id=0, timeout=60)
+
+    info = ctx.rpc.server_info(node_id=0)
+    val_after = info.get("info", {}).get("validated_ledger", {}).get("seq", 0)
+    log(f"Recovered: validated seq {val_before} → {val_after}")
+
+    if val_after <= val_before:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Validated ledger did not advance after recovery "
+            f"({val_before} → {val_after})"
+        )
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/entropy/steady_state_entropy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+""":descr: all 5 nodes healthy, every ledger has valid unique quorum-met entropy"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from helpers import require_entropy, get_entropy_tx, assert_valid_entropy
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    # Wait for RNG pipeline to warm up past bootstrap skip.
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(3, node_id=0, timeout=60)
+    log("Pipeline warmed up")
+
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(10, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Inspecting ledgers {start_seq + 1} → {end_seq}")
+
+    digests = set()
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        ce, _ = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        digest, count = assert_valid_entropy(ce, seq, seen_digests=digests)
+        log(f"  Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={count} Digest={digest[:16]}...")
+
+    log(f"Verified {end_seq - start_seq} ledgers: all quorum entropy, all unique")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export-suite.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+defaults:
+  network:
+    node_count: 5
+    launcher: tmux
+    find_ports: true
+    slave_delay: 0.2
+    features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    track_features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    unl_report: true
+    log_levels:
+      TxQ: info
+      Protocol: debug
+      Peer: debug
+      LedgerConsensus: debug
+      ConsensusExtensions: debug
+      NetworkOPs: info
+    env:
+      XAHAU_RESOURCE_PER_PORT: "1"
+    rc:
+      - rng_poll_ms=333
+
+tests:
+  # --- CE + Export (80% quorum, SHAMap convergence) ---
+  - name: steady_state_export_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/steady_state_export.py
+
+  - name: retriable_export_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/retriable_export.py
+
+  - name: export_degradation_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_degradation.py
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n3:no_export_sig=true
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true
+
+  - name: export_without_unl_report
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_without_unl_report.py
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+      unl_report: false
+
+  - name: export_no_veto_missing_observation
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_no_veto_missing_observation.py
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n4:no_export_sig_hash=true
+
+  # CE + Export: 1 node suppressed, 4/5 = 80% quorum, should succeed
+  - name: export_ce_one_node_down
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: true
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true
+
+  # --- Export only, no CE (80% active-view quorum) ---
+  - name: export_only_all_up
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: true
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+
+  - name: export_only_one_node_down
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: true
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true
+
+  - name: export_only_two_nodes_down
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py
+    params:
+      expect_success: false
+    network:
+      features:
+        - Export
+      track_features:
+        - Export
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=333
+        - n3:no_export_sig=true
+        - n4:no_export_sig=true

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_degradation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+""":descr: Submit ttEXPORT with 2 nodes suppressing export sigs, verify it
+retries via terRETRY_EXPORT until LLS expiry (insufficient signatures).
+
+Nodes 3 and 4 have runtime_config no_export_sig=true, so only 3/5 nodes
+provide export signatures. With 80% quorum = ceil(5*0.8) = 4 required,
+the export cannot reach quorum and should expire via tecEXPORT_EXPIRED.
+
+Flow:
+  1. Fund alice and bob
+  2. alice submits ttEXPORT with tight LLS
+  3. Export retries (only 3/5 sigs available, need 4)
+  4. Verify export expires with tecEXPORT_EXPIRED
+  5. Verify subsequent payment still works (sequence not permanently blocked)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import require_export, assert_shadow_ticket
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    log("Nodes 3,4 have runtime_config no_export_sig=true (3/5 sigs, need 4)")
+
+    #@@start test-export-below-quorum-expiry
+    # --- Submit ttEXPORT (should retry then expire -- only 3/5 sigs) ---
+    export_start = ctx.mark("export-degradation-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 6,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    export_end = ctx.mark("export-degradation-submit-end")
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    # With only 3/5 sigs and 80% quorum (4 required), export MUST fail
+    if engine_result == "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Export should NOT have succeeded with only 3/5 sigs "
+            "(need 4 for 80% quorum) -- check runtime_config no_export_sig"
+        )
+
+    # Should be tecEXPORT_EXPIRED (LLS reached without quorum). Be exact here:
+    # any other non-success means the retry/expiry boundary regressed.
+    if engine_result != "tecEXPORT_EXPIRED":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected tecEXPORT_EXPIRED below quorum, got {engine_result}"
+        )
+
+    log(f"Export failed as expected ({engine_result})")
+
+    retry_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: insufficient signatures .*result=terRETRY_EXPORT",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export insufficient-signature retries: {retry_logs.count}")
+
+    expired_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: last ledger expired .*result=tecEXPORT_EXPIRED",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export LLS expiry logs: {expired_logs.count}")
+
+    # No shadow ticket should exist (export never reached quorum)
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=False)
+    #@@end test-export-below-quorum-expiry
+
+    # --- Verify subsequent payment works regardless ---
+    log("Submitting payment from alice to bob...")
+    pay_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": bob.address,
+            "Amount": "1000000",
+            "Fee": "12",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+
+    pay_engine = pay_result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Payment result: {pay_engine}")
+
+    if pay_engine != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Payment failed after expired export: {pay_engine} "
+            f"-- sequence may be blocked"
+        )
+
+    log("Payment succeeded -- account not permanently blocked")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Shared helpers for Export scenario tests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from xahaud_scripts.testnet.config import _unl_report_index, feature_name_to_hash
+
+
+async def require_export(
+    ctx, log, *, require_unl_report=True, require_runtime_config=True
+):
+    """Wait for first ledger and assert Export is enabled.
+
+    Network-mode Export success requires a parent-ledger UNLReport-backed
+    active validator view. Most export scenarios seed that report in genesis;
+    assert it here so a success-path test cannot accidentally pass setup
+    without the condition Export::doApply requires. The no-UNLReport retry
+    scenario opts out deliberately.
+
+    The tracked export suite also uses XAHAUD_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG for polling
+    and fault-injection knobs. Default binaries reject the runtime_config RPC,
+    so check it up front rather than silently running without those knobs.
+    """
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(timeout=120)
+
+    if require_runtime_config:
+        result = ctx.rpc.runtime_config(0)
+        if not result or result.get("error"):
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Export suite requires a binary built with "
+                "xahaud_runtime_test_config=ON; runtime_config RPC returned "
+                f"{result}"
+            )
+        log("RuntimeConfig RPC active")
+
+    feature = ctx.feature_check(feature_name_to_hash("Export"), node_id=0)
+    if not feature or not feature.get("enabled", False):
+        raise AssertionError(f"Export not enabled: {feature}")
+    log("Export enabled")
+
+    if require_unl_report:
+        result = ctx.rpc.ledger_entry(0, _unl_report_index())
+        node = (result or {}).get("node", {})
+        active = node.get("ActiveValidators", [])
+        if node.get("LedgerEntryType") != "UNLReport" or not active:
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Export success scenario requires a ledger UNLReport with "
+                f"ActiveValidators, got: {result}"
+            )
+        log(f"UNLReport active validators: {len(active)}")
+
+
+def find_export_txns(ctx, seq):
+    """Find Export transactions in a ledger.
+
+    Returns list of Export transaction dicts.
+    """
+    result = ctx.ledger(seq, transactions=True)
+    if not result:
+        return []
+
+    txns = result.get("ledger", {}).get("transactions", [])
+    return [tx for tx in txns if tx.get("TransactionType") == "Export"]
+
+
+def dst_param(address):
+    """Encode an address as a HookParameter entry for the DST param."""
+    from xrpl.core.addresscodec import decode_classic_address
+
+    dst_hex = decode_classic_address(address).hex().upper()
+    return {
+        "HookParameter": {
+            "HookParameterName": "445354",  # "DST"
+            "HookParameterValue": dst_hex,
+        }
+    }
+
+
+def assert_hook_accepted(meta, log, *, expected_emits=1):
+    """Assert hook executed with ACCEPT and the expected emit count.
+
+    Checks sfHookExecutions in transaction metadata.
+    Returns the hook execution entry for further inspection.
+    """
+    hook_execs = meta.get("HookExecutions", [])
+    if not hook_execs:
+        raise AssertionError("No HookExecutions in metadata")
+
+    exec_entry = hook_execs[0].get("HookExecution", {})
+    hook_result = exec_entry.get("HookResult", -1)
+    emit_count = exec_entry.get("HookEmitCount", -1)
+    return_code = exec_entry.get("HookReturnCode", "")
+
+    log(f"  HookResult={hook_result} EmitCount={emit_count} ReturnCode={return_code}")
+
+    # HookResult 3 = ExitType::ACCEPT
+    if hook_result != 3:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Hook did not ACCEPT: HookResult={hook_result} "
+            f"ReturnCode={return_code}"
+        )
+
+    if emit_count != expected_emits:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected {expected_emits} emits, got {emit_count}"
+        )
+
+    # ReturnCode 0 = success; non-zero = ASSERT line number in hook
+    if return_code and str(return_code) != "0":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Hook returned error code {return_code} "
+            f"(likely ASSERT failure at that line)"
+        )
+
+    return exec_entry
+
+
+def assert_export_result(meta, log, *, require_signers=True):
+    """Assert ExportResult is present and well-formed in metadata.
+
+    Returns the ExportResult dict.
+    """
+    export_result = meta.get("ExportResult", {})
+    if not export_result:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult not found in metadata")
+
+    # Must have LedgerSequence and TransactionHash
+    if "LedgerSequence" not in export_result:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult missing LedgerSequence")
+    if "TransactionHash" not in export_result:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult missing TransactionHash")
+
+    # Must have the inner ExportedTxn object
+    inner = export_result.get("ExportedTxn", {})
+    if not inner:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportResult missing ExportedTxn (multisigned blob)")
+
+    log(f"  ExportResult: seq={export_result['LedgerSequence']} "
+        f"hash={export_result['TransactionHash'][:16]}...")
+
+    # Inner tx should have Account, Destination, TransactionType
+    if "Account" not in inner:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportedTxn missing Account")
+    if "TransactionType" not in inner:
+        raise AssertionError("ExportedTxn missing TransactionType")
+
+    # Should have empty SigningPubKey (multisigned)
+    if inner.get("SigningPubKey", "NOT_EMPTY") != "":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"ExportedTxn SigningPubKey should be empty, "
+            f"got '{inner.get('SigningPubKey')}'"
+        )
+
+    if require_signers:
+        signers = inner.get("Signers", [])
+        if not signers:
+            raise AssertionError("ExportedTxn has no Signers (multisig not applied)")
+        log(f"  Signers: {len(signers)} validator(s)")
+
+    return export_result
+
+
+def assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, account_address, log, *, expect_exists=True):
+    """Assert shadow ticket exists (or doesn't) for the account."""
+    obj_result = ctx.rpc.request(
+        0, "account_objects", {"account": account_address}
+    )
+    all_objects = (obj_result or {}).get("account_objects", [])
+    shadow_tickets = [
+        obj for obj in all_objects
+        if obj.get("LedgerEntryType") == "ShadowTicket"
+    ]
+    log(f"  Shadow tickets: {len(shadow_tickets)}")
+
+    if expect_exists and not shadow_tickets:
+        raise AssertionError("Expected shadow ticket but none found")
+    if not expect_exists and shadow_tickets:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected no shadow tickets but found {len(shadow_tickets)}"
+        )
+
+    return shadow_tickets

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_no_veto_missing_observation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+""":descr: Export succeeds when quorum sidecar material exists but one active
+validator withholds exportSigSetHash observation.
+
+Node 4 has runtime_config no_export_sig_hash=true. It still attaches export
+signatures, but it does not publish its exportSigSetHash in proposals. The
+remaining 4/5 active validators can still align on the same export sidecar
+hash, so the round must not retry/expire just because fullObservation is false.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import (
+    require_export,
+    assert_export_result,
+    assert_shadow_ticket,
+)
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    log("Node 4 withholds exportSigSetHash but still attaches export signatures")
+
+    export_start = ctx.mark("export-no-veto-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    export_end = ctx.mark("export-no-veto-submit-end")
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    meta = result.get("meta", {})
+
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+    if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Expected tesSUCCESS, got {engine_result}")
+
+    export_result = assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+    signers = export_result.get("ExportedTxn", {}).get("Signers", [])
+    if len(signers) < 4:
+        raise AssertionError(f"Expected at least 4 signers, got {len(signers)}")
+    log(f"Export signer count: {len(signers)}")
+
+    no_veto_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: missing exportSigSetHash observation ignored",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export no-veto missing-observation logs: {no_veto_logs.count}")
+
+    withhold_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: withholding exportSigSetHash",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export sidecar hash withholding logs: {withhold_logs.count}")
+
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_quorum.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+""":descr: Test Export quorum behavior. When enough active validators sign,
+the export should succeed whether or not CE is enabled. When fewer than the
+active-view quorum sign, the export should expire.
+
+Parameterized via `expect_success` kwarg from suite.yml.
+
+Flow:
+  1. Fund alice and bob
+  2. alice submits ttEXPORT
+  3. Verify result matches expectation (tesSUCCESS or tecEXPORT_EXPIRED)
+  4. Verify ExportResult + shadow ticket on success, absence on failure
+  5. Verify subsequent payment works regardless
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import (
+    require_export,
+    assert_export_result,
+    assert_shadow_ticket,
+)
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log, expect_success=True):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    outcome = "success" if expect_success else "failure (below quorum)"
+    log(f"Expecting export {outcome}")
+
+    # --- Submit ttEXPORT ---
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    meta = result.get("meta", {})
+
+    log(f"Export at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    if expect_success:
+        if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+            raise AssertionError(
+                f"Expected tesSUCCESS, got {engine_result}"
+            )
+
+        # Assert ExportResult is well-formed with signers
+        assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+
+        # Assert shadow ticket was created
+        assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+        log("Export succeeded as expected (active-view quorum reached)")
+    else:
+        if engine_result == "tesSUCCESS":
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Export should NOT have succeeded below active-view quorum"
+            )
+        if engine_result != "tecEXPORT_EXPIRED":
+            raise AssertionError(
+                "Expected tecEXPORT_EXPIRED below active-view quorum, "
+                f"got {engine_result}"
+            )
+        log(f"Export failed as expected ({engine_result})")
+
+        # No shadow ticket should exist
+        assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=False)
+
+    # --- Verify subsequent payment works ---
+    log("Submitting payment from alice to bob...")
+    pay_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": bob.address,
+            "Amount": "1000000",
+            "Fee": "12",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+
+    pay_engine = pay_result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Payment result: {pay_engine}")
+
+    if pay_engine != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Payment failed: {pay_engine}")
+
+    log("Payment succeeded -- account not blocked")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/export_without_unl_report.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+""":descr: Export retries/expires without a ledger-anchored UNLReport view.
+
+All validators may sign, but network-mode Export must not assemble quorum
+material from a node-local trusted-config view. Without UNLReport, the export
+should retry until LastLedgerSequence and expire without creating a shadow
+ticket.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import require_export, assert_shadow_ticket
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log, require_unl_report=False)
+
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+    log("UNLReport intentionally absent; export must not use local config view")
+
+    export_start = ctx.mark("export-without-unlreport-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 8,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 6,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    export_end = ctx.mark("export-without-unlreport-submit-end")
+
+    final_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {final_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    if engine_result == "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Export should not succeed without a ledger-anchored UNLReport view"
+        )
+
+    # Be exact: without a UNLReport view the export should retry until LLS and
+    # expire, not fail by some unrelated terminal code.
+    if engine_result != "tecEXPORT_EXPIRED":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Expected tecEXPORT_EXPIRED without UNLReport view, "
+            f"got {engine_result}"
+        )
+
+    warning_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: retrying without ledger-anchored validator view",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export no-UNLReport retry warnings: {warning_logs.count}")
+
+    retry_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: insufficient signatures .*result=terRETRY_EXPORT",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export retry logs: {retry_logs.count}")
+
+    expired_logs = ctx.assert_log(
+        r"Export: last ledger expired .*result=tecEXPORT_EXPIRED",
+        since=export_start,
+        until=export_end,
+    )
+    log(f"Export expiry logs: {expired_logs.count}")
+
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=False)
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/retriable_export.py

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+""":descr: Submit ttEXPORT directly (no hook), verify it succeeds with
+ExportResult in metadata. Then submit a payment from the same account
+to verify sequence handling doesn't block subsequent transactions.
+
+Flow:
+  1. Fund alice and bob
+  2. alice submits ttEXPORT with inner payment -> tesSUCCESS (provisional)
+  3. Validators attach sigs via proposals -> quorum -> ExportResult in metadata
+  4. alice submits a Payment to bob -> should succeed (sequence not blocked)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import require_export, assert_export_result, assert_shadow_ticket
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    log(f"Current ledger: {current_seq}")
+
+    # --- 1. Submit ttEXPORT ---
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 15,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+    export_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export completed at ledger {export_seq}, result: {engine_result}")
+
+    if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Expected tesSUCCESS for export, got {engine_result}"
+        )
+
+    # Assert ExportResult is well-formed with signers
+    meta = result.get("meta", {})
+    assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+
+    # Assert shadow ticket was created
+    assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+    # --- 2. Submit Payment from same account ---
+    log("Submitting payment from alice to bob...")
+    pay_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": bob.address,
+            "Amount": "1000000",
+            "Fee": "12",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+
+    pay_engine = pay_result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Payment result: {pay_engine}")
+
+    if pay_engine != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Payment failed: {pay_engine}")
+
+    log(
+        f"Both transactions succeeded: "
+        f"Export at ledger {export_seq}, Payment at ledger {ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)}"
+    )
+    log("Sequence handling OK - export didn't block subsequent txns")
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/export/steady_state_export.py

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+""":descr: install xport hook, trigger export, verify emitted ttEXPORT lifecycle
+
+  1. Fund alice (hook holder), bob (trigger), carol (export destination)
+  2. Install xport hook on alice
+  3. bob pays alice with DST=carol → hook calls xport() → emits ttEXPORT
+  4. Emitted ttEXPORT enters open ledger, validators attach sigs via proposals
+  5. Verify Export transaction appears in a subsequent ledger
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from export_helpers import (
+    require_export,
+    find_export_txns,
+    dst_param,
+    assert_hook_accepted,
+    assert_export_result,
+    assert_shadow_ticket,
+)
+
+# C source for the xport hook — verbatim from src/test/app/Export_test_hooks.h
+# On Payment to the hook account, exports a 1 XAH payment to the DST param.
+XPORT_HOOK_C = r"""
+#include <stdint.h>
+extern int32_t _g(uint32_t id, uint32_t maxiter);
+extern int64_t accept(uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+extern int64_t rollback(uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+extern int64_t xport(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
+extern int64_t xport_reserve(uint32_t count);
+extern int64_t hook_account(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
+extern int64_t otxn_param(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t name_ptr, uint32_t name_len);
+extern int64_t otxn_type(void);
+extern int64_t ledger_seq(void);
+
+#define SBUF(x) (uint32_t)(x), sizeof(x)
+#define ASSERT(x) if (!(x)) rollback((uint32_t)#x, sizeof(#x), __LINE__)
+
+#define ttPAYMENT 0
+#define tfCANONICAL 0x80000000UL
+#define amAMOUNT 1
+#define amFEE 8
+#define atACCOUNT 1
+#define atDESTINATION 3
+
+#define ENCODE_TT(buf_out, tt) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x12U; buf_out[1] = (tt >> 8) & 0xFFU; buf_out[2] = tt & 0xFFU; buf_out += 3;
+
+#define ENCODE_FLAGS(buf_out, flags) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x22U; buf_out[1] = (flags >> 24) & 0xFFU; buf_out[2] = (flags >> 16) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (flags >> 8) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = flags & 0xFFU; buf_out += 5;
+
+#define ENCODE_SEQUENCE(buf_out, seq) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x24U; buf_out[1] = (seq >> 24) & 0xFFU; buf_out[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = seq & 0xFFU; buf_out += 5;
+
+#define ENCODE_FLS(buf_out, fls) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x20U; buf_out[1] = 0x1AU; buf_out[2] = (fls >> 24) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (fls >> 16) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = (fls >> 8) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[5] = fls & 0xFFU; buf_out += 6;
+
+#define ENCODE_LLS(buf_out, lls) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x20U; buf_out[1] = 0x1BU; buf_out[2] = (lls >> 24) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[3] = (lls >> 16) & 0xFFU; buf_out[4] = (lls >> 8) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[5] = lls & 0xFFU; buf_out += 6;
+
+#define ENCODE_DROPS(buf_out, drops, amt_type) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x60U + amt_type; buf_out[1] = 0x40U + ((drops >> 56) & 0x3FU); \
+    buf_out[2] = (drops >> 48) & 0xFFU; buf_out[3] = (drops >> 40) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[4] = (drops >> 32) & 0xFFU; buf_out[5] = (drops >> 24) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[6] = (drops >> 16) & 0xFFU; buf_out[7] = (drops >> 8) & 0xFFU; \
+    buf_out[8] = drops & 0xFFU; buf_out += 9;
+
+#define ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_EMPTY(buf_out) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x73U; buf_out[1] = 0x00U; buf_out += 2;
+
+#define ENCODE_ACCOUNT(buf_out, acc, acc_type) \
+    buf_out[0] = 0x80U + acc_type; buf_out[1] = 0x14U; \
+    for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i) buf_out[2+i] = acc[i]; buf_out += 22;
+
+#define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE 270U
+
+int64_t hook(uint32_t reserved) {
+    _g(1, 1);
+
+    if (otxn_type() != ttPAYMENT)
+        return accept(0, 0, 0);
+
+    ASSERT(xport_reserve(1) == 1);
+
+    uint8_t dst[20];
+    int64_t dst_len = otxn_param(SBUF(dst), "DST", 3);
+    ASSERT(dst_len == 20);
+
+    uint8_t acc[20];
+    ASSERT(hook_account(SBUF(acc)) == 20);
+
+    uint32_t cls = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();
+
+    uint8_t tx[PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE];
+    uint8_t* buf = tx;
+
+    ENCODE_TT(buf, ttPAYMENT);
+    ENCODE_FLAGS(buf, tfCANONICAL);
+    ENCODE_SEQUENCE(buf, 0);
+    ENCODE_FLS(buf, cls + 1);
+    ENCODE_LLS(buf, cls + 5);
+    // sfTicketSequence = UINT32 field 41 = 0x20 0x29
+    buf[0] = 0x20U; buf[1] = 0x29U;
+    buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = 0; buf[4] = 0; buf[5] = 1;
+    buf += 6;
+
+    uint64_t drops = 1000000;
+    ENCODE_DROPS(buf, drops, amAMOUNT);
+    ENCODE_DROPS(buf, 10, amFEE);
+
+    ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_EMPTY(buf);
+    ENCODE_ACCOUNT(buf, acc, atACCOUNT);
+    ENCODE_ACCOUNT(buf, dst, atDESTINATION);
+
+    uint8_t hash[32];
+    int64_t xport_result = xport(SBUF(hash), (uint32_t)tx, buf - tx);
+    ASSERT(xport_result == 32);
+
+    return accept(0, 0, 0);
+}
+"""
+
+
+async def scenario(ctx, log):
+    # Wait for network to start and amendments to activate
+    await require_export(ctx, log)
+
+    # --- Setup ---
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 10000, "carol": 1000})
+    log("Accounts funded")
+
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    carol = ctx.account("carol")
+
+    # Compile and install xport hook on alice
+    wasm = ctx.compile_hook(XPORT_HOOK_C, label="xport")
+    await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "SetHook",
+            "Hooks": [
+                {
+                    "Hook": {
+                        "CreateCode": wasm.hex().upper(),
+                        "HookOn": "0" * 64,
+                        "HookNamespace": "0" * 64,
+                        "HookApiVersion": 0,
+                        "Flags": 1,  # hsfOVERRIDE
+                    }
+                }
+            ],
+            "Fee": "100000000",
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+    )
+    log(
+        f"Hook installed on alice ({alice.address[:12]}...) "
+        f"ledger {ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)}"
+    )
+
+    # --- Trigger ---
+    # bob pays alice → hook calls xport() → emits ttEXPORT
+    trigger_result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Payment",
+            "Destination": alice.address,
+            "Amount": "100000000",
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "HookParameters": [dst_param(carol.address)],
+        },
+        ctx.account("bob").wallet,
+    )
+    trigger_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Export triggered at ledger {trigger_seq}")
+
+    # Assert hook fired with ACCEPT and emitted 1 tx
+    trigger_meta = trigger_result.get("meta", {})
+    assert_hook_accepted(trigger_meta, log, expected_emits=1)
+
+    # --- Verify: check each ledger close for the Export transaction ---
+    max_ledgers = 10
+    for i in range(max_ledgers):
+        await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(1, node_id=0, timeout=30)
+        seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+        exports = find_export_txns(ctx, seq)
+        if exports:
+            export_tx = exports[0]
+            meta = export_tx.get("meta", export_tx.get("metaData", {}))
+            result = meta.get("TransactionResult", "")
+            log(f"Ledger {seq}: Export txn found, result={result}")
+
+            if result != "tesSUCCESS":
+                raise AssertionError(f"Export did not succeed: {result}")
+
+            # Assert ExportResult is well-formed with signers and inner tx
+            assert_export_result(meta, log, require_signers=True)
+
+            # Assert shadow ticket was created
+            assert_shadow_ticket(ctx, alice.address, log, expect_exists=True)
+
+            log("PASS")
+            return
+        log(f"Ledger {seq}: no Export txn yet")
+
+    raise AssertionError(
+        f"No Export transaction found after {max_ledgers} ledger closes"
+    )

.testnet/scenarios/helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+"""Shared helpers for ConsensusEntropy scenario tests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from xahaud_scripts.testnet.config import feature_name_to_hash
+
+ZERO_DIGEST = "0" * 64
+CONSENSUS_ENTROPY_FEATURE = feature_name_to_hash("ConsensusEntropy")
+
+
+def feature_hash(name: str) -> str:
+    """Return the amendment hash accepted by feature RPC."""
+    return feature_name_to_hash(name)
+
+
+def feature_status(ctx, name: str, node_id=0):
+    """Query a feature by amendment hash; feature RPC names are ambiguous."""
+    return ctx.feature_check(feature_hash(name), node_id=node_id)
+
+
+def consensus_entropy_feature(ctx, node_id=0):
+    """Query ConsensusEntropy by amendment hash."""
+    return feature_status(ctx, "ConsensusEntropy", node_id=node_id)
+
+
+async def require_entropy(ctx, log):
+    """Wait for first ledger and assert ConsensusEntropy is enabled."""
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(timeout=120)
+    feature = consensus_entropy_feature(ctx, node_id=0)
+    if not feature or not feature.get("enabled", False):
+        raise AssertionError(f"ConsensusEntropy not enabled: {feature}")
+    log("ConsensusEntropy enabled")
+
+
+def get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq):
+    """Fetch ledger and return (ce_tx, user_txns) or raise."""
+    result = ctx.ledger(seq, transactions=True)
+    if not result:
+        raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: fetch failed")
+
+    ledger = result.get("ledger")
+    if not isinstance(ledger, dict):
+        raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: fetch returned no ledger: {result}")
+
+    txns = ledger.get("transactions", [])
+    ce = [tx for tx in txns if tx.get("TransactionType") == "ConsensusEntropy"]
+    user = [tx for tx in txns if tx.get("TransactionType") != "ConsensusEntropy"]
+
+    if len(ce) != 1:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected 1 ConsensusEntropy txn, got {len(ce)}"
+        )
+
+    return ce[0], user
+
+
+def entropy_fields(ce_tx):
+    """Return (digest, entropy_count, is_fallback) from a ConsensusEntropy tx.
+
+    consensus_fallback rounds carry a deterministic non-zero consensus-bound
+    digest with EntropyCount=0 and EntropyTier=1 (consensus_fallback).
+    Validator entropy has EntropyTier=3 (validator_quorum).
+
+    WARNING: is_fallback is ``tier != 3``, so it lumps participant_aligned
+    (Tier 2) in with fallback. It is only safe where no Tier 2 band exists
+    (e.g. 5-node networks, where tier2 == quorum). For band-aware scenarios use
+    the explicit assert_consensus_fallback / assert_participant_aligned /
+    assert_validator_quorum helpers, which check EntropyTier directly.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    entropy_count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier is not None:
+        is_fallback = tier != 3
+    else:
+        is_fallback = entropy_count == 0
+    return digest, entropy_count, is_fallback
+
+
+def assert_participant_aligned(ce_tx, seq, expected_count=None):
+    """Assert participant_aligned (Tier 2) entropy on a ConsensusEntropy tx.
+
+    Tier 2 is the sub-quorum band: the agreed reveal cohort is >= the
+    participant floor but < the 80% validator quorum, so it carries
+    EntropyTier=2 with a deterministic non-zero digest. NOTE entropy_fields()'s
+    is_fallback lumps tier 2 in with fallback (is_fallback = tier != 3), so the
+    tier must be checked EXPLICITLY here.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier != 2:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==2 (participant_aligned), "
+            f"got {tier} (EntropyCount={count})"
+        )
+    if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: participant_aligned digest must be non-zero, got "
+            f"{digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+    if expected_count is not None and count != expected_count:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: participant_aligned EntropyCount must be "
+            f"{expected_count} (the surviving cohort), got {count}"
+        )
+    return digest, count
+
+
+def assert_validator_quorum(ce_tx, seq, min_count=None):
+    """Assert validator_quorum (Tier 3) entropy on a ConsensusEntropy tx:
+    EntropyTier=3, a deterministic non-zero digest, and (optionally)
+    EntropyCount >= min_count (the active quorum). The count can EXCEED the
+    quorum (e.g. a still-full 6/6 ledger caught at a 6->5 transition), so check
+    >=, not ==.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier != 3:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==3 (validator_quorum), got "
+            f"{tier} (EntropyCount={count})"
+        )
+    if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: validator_quorum digest must be non-zero, got "
+            f"{digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+    if min_count is not None and count < min_count:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: validator_quorum EntropyCount={count} < quorum "
+            f"{min_count}"
+        )
+    return digest, count
+
+
+def assert_consensus_fallback(ce_tx, seq):
+    """Assert consensus_fallback (Tier 1) entropy on a ConsensusEntropy tx:
+    EntropyTier=1, EntropyCount=0, and a deterministic NON-zero digest.
+    """
+    digest = ce_tx.get("Digest", "")
+    count = ce_tx.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+    tier = ce_tx.get("EntropyTier", None)
+    if tier != 1:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: expected EntropyTier==1 (consensus_fallback), got "
+            f"{tier} (EntropyCount={count})"
+        )
+    if count != 0:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: consensus_fallback EntropyCount must be 0, got "
+            f"{count}"
+        )
+    if not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: consensus_fallback digest must be non-zero, got "
+            f"{digest[:16]}..."
+        )
+    return digest, count
+
+
+def assert_valid_entropy(ce_tx, seq, seen_digests=None):
+    """Assert quorum-met validator entropy. Optionally check uniqueness."""
+    digest, entropy_count, is_fallback = entropy_fields(ce_tx)
+
+    if is_fallback or not digest or digest == ZERO_DIGEST:
+        raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: fallback/empty Digest")
+
+    if entropy_count < 4:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"Ledger {seq}: EntropyCount={entropy_count} < 4 (sub-quorum)"
+        )
+
+    if seen_digests is not None:
+        if digest in seen_digests:
+            raise AssertionError(f"Ledger {seq}: duplicate Digest {digest[:16]}...")
+        seen_digests.add(digest)
+
+    return digest, entropy_count

.testnet/scenarios/latency-suite.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+defaults:
+  network:
+    node_count: 5
+    launcher: tmux
+    find_ports: true
+    slave_delay: 0.2
+    features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    track_features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+      - Export
+    unl_report: true
+    log_levels:
+      TxQ: info
+      Protocol: debug
+      Peer: debug
+      LedgerConsensus: debug
+      ConsensusExtensions: debug
+      NetworkOPs: info
+    env:
+      XAHAU_RESOURCE_PER_PORT: "1"
+    rc:
+      - rng_poll_ms=250
+tests:
+  - name: latency_baseline_ce
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: false
+
+  - name: latency_baseline_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+
+  - name: latency_proposal_delay_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - delay=100,jitter=25,msg=proposal
+
+  - name: latency_directed_pair_delay_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - n0->n2:delay=750,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n2->n0:delay=750,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+
+  - name: latency_slow_minority_export
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py
+    params:
+      warmup_ledgers: 3
+      ledgers: 8
+      submit_export: true
+      export_timeout: 120
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - n3->n0:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n3->n1:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n3->n2:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4->n0:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4->n1:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4->n2:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n0->n3:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n1->n3:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n2->n3:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n0->n4:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n1->n4:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n2->n4:delay=500,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+
+  - name: latency_export_no_veto_with_delay
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/export/export_no_veto_missing_observation.py
+    network:
+      rc:
+        - rng_poll_ms=250
+        - delay=300,jitter=100,msg=proposal
+        - n4:no_export_sig_hash=true

.testnet/scenarios/perf/ce_export_latency_probe.py

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+""":descr: measure CE/export behavior while RuntimeConfig injects latency/drop.
+
+The suite supplies runtime fault injection through network.rc. This scenario
+does not mutate RuntimeConfig itself; it observes what the launched network does
+under that condition and logs enough counters to compare variants.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections import Counter
+import json
+
+from export.export_helpers import assert_export_result, require_export
+from helpers import consensus_entropy_feature, get_entropy_tx
+
+
+async def _require_runtime_config(ctx, log):
+    result = ctx.rpc.runtime_config(0)
+    if not result or result.get("error"):
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "Latency probe requires a binary built with "
+            "xahaud_runtime_test_config=ON; runtime_config RPC returned "
+            f"{result}"
+        )
+    log("RuntimeConfig RPC active")
+
+
+async def _require_consensus_entropy(ctx, log):
+    feature = consensus_entropy_feature(ctx, node_id=0)
+    if not feature or not feature.get("enabled", False):
+        raise AssertionError(f"ConsensusEntropy not enabled: {feature}")
+    log("ConsensusEntropy enabled")
+
+
+def _log_runtime_config(ctx, log):
+    for node_id in range(ctx.node_count):
+        cfg = ctx.rpc.runtime_config(node_id)
+        if cfg is None:
+            raise AssertionError(f"runtime_config RPC failed on node {node_id}")
+        log(
+            f"runtime_config n{node_id}: "
+            f"{json.dumps(cfg, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'))}"
+        )
+
+
+async def _submit_direct_export(ctx, log, *, timeout):
+    await ctx.fund_accounts({"alice": 10000, "bob": 1000})
+    alice = ctx.account("alice")
+    bob = ctx.account("bob")
+    current_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    if current_seq is None:
+        raise AssertionError("validated ledger is not available before Export")
+
+    log(f"Submitting direct Export at validated ledger {current_seq}")
+    started = ctx.mark("latency-export-submit-start")
+    result = await ctx.submit_and_wait(
+        {
+            "TransactionType": "Export",
+            "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 12,
+            "Fee": "1000000",
+            "ExportedTxn": {
+                "TransactionType": "Payment",
+                "Account": alice.address,
+                "Destination": bob.address,
+                "Amount": "1000000",
+                "Fee": "10",
+                "Sequence": 0,
+                "TicketSequence": 1,
+                "FirstLedgerSequence": current_seq + 1,
+                "LastLedgerSequence": current_seq + 10,
+                "Flags": 2147483648,
+                "SigningPubKey": "",
+            },
+        },
+        alice.wallet,
+        timeout=timeout,
+    )
+    ended = ctx.mark("latency-export-submit-end")
+
+    elapsed = (ended.monotonic_ns - started.monotonic_ns) / 1_000_000_000
+    engine_result = result.get("engine_result", "")
+    log(f"Export result={engine_result} elapsed={elapsed:.3f}s")
+
+    if engine_result != "tesSUCCESS":
+        raise AssertionError(f"Expected Export tesSUCCESS, got {engine_result}")
+
+    export_result = assert_export_result(result.get("meta", {}), log)
+    signers = export_result.get("ExportedTxn", {}).get("Signers", [])
+    log(f"Export signer count={len(signers)}")
+    return started, ended
+
+
+def _summarize_logs(ctx, log, *, label, started, ended):
+    patterns = {
+        "rng_selected": r"RNG: entropy selected",
+        "rng_fallback": r"tier=1",
+        "rng_participant_aligned": r"tier=2",
+        "rng_validator_quorum": r"tier=3",
+        "export_retry": r"terRETRY_EXPORT",
+        "export_quorum_timeout": r"Export: exportSigSet quorum alignment timeout",
+        "export_missing_observation_ignored": (
+            r"Export: missing exportSigSetHash observation ignored"
+        ),
+    }
+    for name, pattern in patterns.items():
+        result = ctx.search_logs(pattern, since=started, until=ended, limit=500)
+        log(f"log_count {label}.{name}={result.count}")
+
+
+async def scenario(
+    ctx,
+    log,
+    *,
+    warmup_ledgers=3,
+    ledgers=8,
+    submit_export=False,
+    export_timeout=90,
+):
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledger_close(timeout=120)
+    await _require_runtime_config(ctx, log)
+    _log_runtime_config(ctx, log)
+    await _require_consensus_entropy(ctx, log)
+
+    if submit_export:
+        # require_export also asserts the UNLReport precondition for successful
+        # network-mode Export. Keep that explicit in perf runs so a missing
+        # report does not masquerade as a latency failure.
+        await require_export(ctx, log, require_runtime_config=False)
+
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(warmup_ledgers, node_id=0, timeout=120)
+    warm_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    log(f"Warmup complete at validated ledger {warm_seq}")
+
+    export_window = None
+    if submit_export:
+        export_window = await _submit_direct_export(
+            ctx, log, timeout=export_timeout
+        )
+
+    started = ctx.mark("latency-probe-start")
+    start_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+    await ctx.wait_for_ledgers(ledgers, node_id=0, timeout=max(120, ledgers * 30))
+    ended = ctx.mark("latency-probe-end")
+    end_seq = ctx.validated_ledger_index(0)
+
+    if start_seq is None or end_seq is None:
+        raise AssertionError("validated ledger index unavailable during probe")
+
+    elapsed = (ended.monotonic_ns - started.monotonic_ns) / 1_000_000_000
+    closed = max(0, end_seq - start_seq)
+    cadence = elapsed / closed if closed else 0.0
+    log(
+        f"Observed validated ledgers {start_seq + 1}..{end_seq} "
+        f"closed={closed} elapsed={elapsed:.3f}s cadence={cadence:.3f}s/ledger"
+    )
+
+    tiers: Counter[int] = Counter()
+    counts: Counter[int] = Counter()
+    missing_entropy = 0
+    for seq in range(start_seq + 1, end_seq + 1):
+        try:
+            ce, user_txns = get_entropy_tx(ctx, seq)
+        except AssertionError as exc:
+            missing_entropy += 1
+            log(f"  Ledger {seq}: no ConsensusEntropy tx ({exc})")
+            continue
+
+        tier = ce.get("EntropyTier", -1)
+        count = ce.get("EntropyCount", -1)
+        tiers[tier] += 1
+        counts[count] += 1
+        log(
+            f"  Ledger {seq}: tier={tier} count={count} "
+            f"user_txns={len(user_txns)} digest={ce.get('Digest', '')[:16]}..."
+        )
+
+    log(
+        "SUMMARY "
+        f"closed={closed} elapsed_s={elapsed:.3f} cadence_s={cadence:.3f} "
+        f"tiers={dict(sorted(tiers.items()))} "
+        f"counts={dict(sorted(counts.items()))} "
+        f"missing_entropy={missing_entropy}"
+    )
+
+    _summarize_logs(ctx, log, label="probe", started=started, ended=ended)
+    if export_window is not None:
+        _summarize_logs(
+            ctx,
+            log,
+            label="export",
+            started=export_window[0],
+            ended=export_window[1],
+        )
+
+    log("PASS")

.testnet/scenarios/suite.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+defaults:
+  network:
+    node_count: 5
+    launcher: tmux
+    find_ports: true
+    slave_delay: 0.2
+    features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+    track_features:
+      - ConsensusEntropy
+    unl_report: true
+    log_levels:
+      TxQ: info
+      Protocol: debug
+      Peer: debug
+      LedgerConsensus: debug
+      ConsensusExtensions: debug
+      NetworkOPs: info
+    env:
+      XAHAU_RESOURCE_PER_PORT: "1"
+    rc:
+      - rng_poll_ms=333
+
+tests:
+  - name: steady_state_entropy
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/steady_state_entropy.py
+
+  - name: fallback_without_unl_report
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/fallback_without_unl_report.py
+    network:
+      unl_report: false
+
+  - name: steady_state_entropy_fast_start
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/steady_state_entropy.py
+    network:
+      env:
+        XAHAUD_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG: '{"set":{"global":{"rng_poll_ms":333,"bootstrap_fast_start":true}}}'
+
+  - name: entropy_with_transactions
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/entropy_with_transactions.py
+
+  - name: quorum_recovery_smoke
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_recovery_smoke.py
+
+  - name: quorum_degradation_smoke
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/quorum_degradation_smoke.py
+    network:
+      log_levels:
+        LedgerConsensus: trace
+        ConsensusExtensions: trace
+
+  # Tier 2 (participant_aligned) needs 6 nodes: n=5 has no band (tier2 ==
+  # quorum). At 6, the 4/6 window is the participant_aligned band.
+  - name: participant_aligned_smoke
+    script: .testnet/scenarios/entropy/participant_aligned_smoke.py
+    network:
+      node_count: 6
+      log_levels:
+        LedgerConsensus: trace
+        ConsensusExtensions: trace
+
+  # Export scenarios: see export-suite.yml

API-CHANGELOG.md

@@ -83,17 +83,9 @@ The [commandline](https://xrpl.org/docs/references/http-websocket-apis/api-conve
 
 The `network_id` field was added in the `server_info` response in version 1.5.0 (2019), but it is not returned in [reporting mode](https://xrpl.org/rippled-server-modes.html#reporting-mode). However, use of reporting mode is now discouraged, in favor of using [Clio](https://github.com/XRPLF/clio) instead.
 
-## XRP Ledger server version 2.5.0
-
-As of 2025-04-04, version 2.5.0 is in development. You can use a pre-release version by building from source or [using the `nightly` package](https://xrpl.org/docs/infrastructure/installation/install-rippled-on-ubuntu).
-
-### Additions and bugfixes in 2.5.0
-
-- `channel_authorize`: If `signing_support` is not enabled in the config, the RPC is disabled.
-
 ## XRP Ledger server version 2.4.0
 
-[Version 2.4.0](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/2.4.0) was released on March 4, 2025.
+As of 2025-01-28, version 2.4.0 is in development. You can use a pre-release version by building from source or [using the `nightly` package](https://xrpl.org/docs/infrastructure/installation/install-rippled-on-ubuntu).
 
 ### Additions and bugfixes in 2.4.0
 

BUILD.md

@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ It fixes some source files to add missing `#include`s.
    Single-config generators:
 
    ```
-   cmake --build . -j $(nproc)
+   cmake --build .
    ```
 
    Multi-config generators:

Builds/levelization/results/loops.txt

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.nodestore
   xrpld.app > xrpld.nodestore
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.overlay
-  xrpld.overlay ~= xrpld.app
+  xrpld.overlay == xrpld.app
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.peerfinder
-  xrpld.peerfinder ~= xrpld.app
+  xrpld.app > xrpld.peerfinder
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.rpc
   xrpld.rpc > xrpld.app
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Loop: xrpld.core xrpld.perflog
   xrpld.perflog == xrpld.core
 
 Loop: xrpld.net xrpld.rpc
-  xrpld.rpc ~= xrpld.net
+  xrpld.rpc > xrpld.net
 
 Loop: xrpld.overlay xrpld.rpc
   xrpld.rpc ~= xrpld.overlay

Builds/levelization/results/ordering.txt

@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ libxrpl.protocol > xrpl.hook
 libxrpl.protocol > xrpl.json
 libxrpl.protocol > xrpl.protocol
 libxrpl.resource > xrpl.basics
-libxrpl.resource > xrpl.json
 libxrpl.resource > xrpl.resource
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.basics
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.json
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.protocol
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.server
+test.app > test.shamap
 test.app > test.toplevel
 test.app > test.unit_test
 test.app > xrpl.basics
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ test.app > xrpld.ledger
 test.app > xrpld.nodestore
 test.app > xrpld.overlay
 test.app > xrpld.rpc
+test.app > xrpld.shamap
 test.app > xrpl.hook
 test.app > xrpl.json
 test.app > xrpl.protocol
@@ -58,10 +59,13 @@ test.csf > xrpl.basics
 test.csf > xrpld.consensus
 test.csf > xrpl.json
 test.csf > xrpl.protocol
+test.formal_verification > xrpld.app
+test.formal_verification > xrpld.consensus
 test.json > test.jtx
 test.json > xrpl.json
 test.jtx > xrpl.basics
 test.jtx > xrpld.app
+test.jtx > xrpld.consensus
 test.jtx > xrpld.core
 test.jtx > xrpld.ledger
 test.jtx > xrpld.net
@@ -170,6 +174,7 @@ xrpld.core > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.core > xrpl.json
 xrpld.core > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.ledger > xrpl.basics
+xrpld.ledger > xrpld.core
 xrpld.ledger > xrpl.json
 xrpld.ledger > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.net > xrpl.basics
@@ -194,6 +199,7 @@ xrpld.peerfinder > xrpld.core
 xrpld.peerfinder > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.perflog > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.perflog > xrpl.json
+xrpld.perflog > xrpl.protocol
 xrpld.rpc > xrpl.basics
 xrpld.rpc > xrpld.core
 xrpld.rpc > xrpld.ledger

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -21,18 +21,6 @@ endif()
 project (xrpl)
 set(Boost_NO_BOOST_CMAKE ON)
 
-if(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "GNU")
-    # GCC-specific fixes
-    add_compile_options(-Wno-unknown-pragmas -Wno-subobject-linkage)
-    # -Wno-subobject-linkage can be removed when we upgrade GCC version to at least 13.3
-elseif(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "Clang")
-    # Clang-specific fixes
-    add_compile_options(-Wno-unknown-warning-option) # Ignore unknown warning options
-elseif(MSVC)
-    # MSVC-specific fixes
-    add_compile_options(/wd4068) # Ignore unknown pragmas
-endif()
-
 # make GIT_COMMIT_HASH define available to all sources
 find_package(Git)
 if(Git_FOUND)

README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Note:** Throughout this README, references to "we" or "our" pertain to the community and contributors involved in the Xahau network. It does not imply a legal entity or a specific collection of individuals.
 
-[Xahau](https://xahau.network/) is a decentralized cryptographic ledger that builds upon the robust foundation of the XRP Ledger. It inherits the XRP Ledger's Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus algorithm and enhances it with additional features and functionalities. Developers and users familiar with the XRP Ledger will find that most documentation and tutorials available on [xrpl.org](https://xrpl.org) are relevant and applicable to Xahau, including those related to running validators and managing validator keys. For Xahau specific documentation you can visit our [documentation](https://xahau.network/)
+[Xahau](https://xahau.network/) is a decentralized cryptographic ledger that builds upon the robust foundation of the XRP Ledger. It inherits the XRP Ledger's Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus algorithm under the normal XRPL assumptions about configured validator-list overlap, timing, and fault bounds, and enhances it with additional features and functionalities. Developers and users familiar with the XRP Ledger will find that most documentation and tutorials available on [xrpl.org](https://xrpl.org) are relevant and applicable to Xahau, including those related to running validators and managing validator keys. For Xahau specific documentation you can visit our [documentation](https://xahau.network/)
 
 ## XAH
 XAH is the public, counterparty-free asset native to Xahau and functions primarily as network gas. Transactions submitted to the Xahau network must supply an appropriate amount of XAH, to be burnt by the network as a fee, in order to be successfully included in a validated ledger. In addition, XAH also acts as a bridge currency within the Xahau DEX. XAH is traded on the open-market and is available for anyone to access. Xahau was created in 2023 with a supply of 600 million units of XAH.

build-core.sh

@@ -95,8 +95,16 @@ if [[ "$4" == "" ]]; then
   echo "Non GH, local building, no Action runner magic"
 else
   # GH Action, runner
-  cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
-  cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
+    if [[ "$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)" == "release" ]]; then
+        echo "building on the release branch... placing it in builds/candidate"
+        mkdir /data/builds/candidate
+        cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
+        cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
+    else
+        echo "building non-release branch, placing it in builds root"
+        cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
+        cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
+    fi  
   echo "Published build to: http://build.xahau.tech/"
   echo $(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
 fi

cmake/CodeCoverage.cmake

@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@
 #     - replace both functions setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr_* with a single setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr
 #     - add support for all gcovr output formats
 #
+# 2024-04-03, Bronek Kozicki
+#     - add support for output formats: jacoco, clover, lcov
+#
 # USAGE:
 #
 # 1. Copy this file into your cmake modules path.
@@ -256,10 +259,10 @@ endif()
 #     BASE_DIRECTORY "../"                   # Base directory for report
 #                                            #  (defaults to PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR)
 #     FORMAT "cobertura"                     # Output format, one of:
-#                                            #  xml cobertura sonarqube json-summary
-#                                            #  json-details coveralls csv txt
-#                                            #  html-single html-nested html-details
-#                                            #  (xml is an alias to cobertura;
+#                                            #  xml cobertura sonarqube jacoco clover
+#                                            #  json-summary json-details coveralls csv
+#                                            #  txt html-single html-nested html-details
+#                                            #  lcov (xml is an alias to cobertura;
 #                                            #  if no format is set, defaults to xml)
 #     EXCLUDE "src/dir1/*" "src/dir2/*"      # Patterns to exclude (can be relative
 #                                            #  to BASE_DIRECTORY, with CMake 3.4+)
@@ -308,6 +311,8 @@ function(setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr)
             set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.txt)
         elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "csv")
             set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.csv)
+        elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "lcov")
+            set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.lcov)
         else()
             set(GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE ${Coverage_NAME}.xml)
         endif()
@@ -320,6 +325,14 @@ function(setup_target_for_coverage_gcovr)
         set(Coverage_FORMAT cobertura) # overwrite xml
     elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "sonarqube")
         list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --sonarqube "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
+    elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "jacoco")
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --jacoco "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --jacoco-pretty )
+    elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "clover")
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --clover "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --clover-pretty )
+    elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "lcov")
+        list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --lcov "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
     elseif(Coverage_FORMAT STREQUAL "json-summary")
         list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --json-summary "${GCOVR_OUTPUT_FILE}" )
         list(APPEND GCOVR_ADDITIONAL_ARGS --json-summary-pretty)

cmake/RippledCore.cmake

@@ -160,13 +160,17 @@ target_link_modules(xrpl PUBLIC
 #     $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include>
 #     $<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include>)
 
+if(formal_verification AND NOT xrpld)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification requires xrpld=ON")
+endif()
+
 if(xrpld)
   add_executable(rippled)
   if(tests)
     target_compile_definitions(rippled PUBLIC ENABLE_TESTS)
-    target_compile_definitions(rippled PRIVATE
-                                       UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE=${UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE}
-    )
+  endif()
+  if(xahaud_runtime_test_config)
+    target_compile_definitions(rippled PUBLIC XAHAUD_ENABLE_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG=1)
   endif()
   target_include_directories(rippled
     PRIVATE
@@ -183,6 +187,21 @@ if(xrpld)
       "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/src/test/*.cpp"
     )
     target_sources(rippled PRIVATE ${sources})
+
+    set(HOOKS_TEST_DIR "" CACHE PATH "External hook Env-test directory")
+    if(NOT HOOKS_TEST_DIR AND DEFINED ENV{HOOKS_TEST_DIR})
+      set(HOOKS_TEST_DIR "$ENV{HOOKS_TEST_DIR}")
+    endif()
+    if(HOOKS_TEST_DIR)
+      file(GLOB_RECURSE hook_test_sources CONFIGURE_DEPENDS
+        "${HOOKS_TEST_DIR}/*_test.cpp"
+      )
+      if(hook_test_sources)
+        message(STATUS "Including external hook Env tests from ${HOOKS_TEST_DIR}")
+        target_sources(rippled PRIVATE ${hook_test_sources})
+        target_include_directories(rippled PRIVATE "${HOOKS_TEST_DIR}")
+      endif()
+    endif()
   endif()
 
   target_link_libraries(rippled
@@ -196,6 +215,7 @@ if(xrpld)
     # This is likely not strictly necessary, but listed explicitly as a good practice.
     m
   )
+  include(XahaudFormalVerification)
   exclude_if_included(rippled)
   # define a macro for tests that might need to
   # be exluded or run differently in CI environment

cmake/RippledInterface.cmake

@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ target_compile_definitions (opts
     $<$<BOOL:${beast_no_unit_test_inline}>:BEAST_NO_UNIT_TEST_INLINE=1>
     $<$<BOOL:${beast_disable_autolink}>:BEAST_DONT_AUTOLINK_TO_WIN32_LIBRARIES=1>
     $<$<BOOL:${single_io_service_thread}>:RIPPLE_SINGLE_IO_SERVICE_THREAD=1>
+    # Enhanced logging is enabled for Debug builds, or explicitly via
+    # -DBEAST_ENHANCED_LOGGING=ON for other build types.
+    $<$<OR:$<CONFIG:Debug>,$<BOOL:${BEAST_ENHANCED_LOGGING}>>:BEAST_ENHANCED_LOGGING=1>
     $<$<BOOL:${voidstar}>:ENABLE_VOIDSTAR>)
 target_compile_options (opts
   INTERFACE

cmake/RippledSanity.cmake

@@ -2,7 +2,22 @@
    convenience variables and sanity checks
 #]===================================================================]
 
-get_property(is_multiconfig GLOBAL PROPERTY GENERATOR_IS_MULTI_CONFIG)
+include(ProcessorCount)
+
+if (NOT ep_procs)
+  ProcessorCount(ep_procs)
+  if (ep_procs GREATER 1)
+    # never use more than half of cores for EP builds
+    math (EXPR ep_procs "${ep_procs} / 2")
+    message (STATUS "Using ${ep_procs} cores for ExternalProject builds.")
+  endif ()
+endif ()
+get_property (is_multiconfig GLOBAL PROPERTY GENERATOR_IS_MULTI_CONFIG)
+if (is_multiconfig STREQUAL "NOTFOUND")
+  if (${CMAKE_GENERATOR} STREQUAL "Xcode" OR ${CMAKE_GENERATOR} MATCHES "^Visual Studio")
+    set (is_multiconfig TRUE)
+  endif ()
+endif ()
 
 set (CMAKE_CONFIGURATION_TYPES "Debug;Release" CACHE STRING "" FORCE)
 if (NOT is_multiconfig)

cmake/RippledSettings.cmake

@@ -11,12 +11,21 @@ option(assert "Enables asserts, even in release builds" OFF)
 option(xrpld "Build xrpld" ON)
 
 option(tests "Build tests" ON)
-if(tests)
-  # This setting allows making a separate workflow to test fees other than default 10
-  if(NOT UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE)
-    set(UNIT_TEST_REFERENCE_FEE "10" CACHE STRING "")
-  endif()
-endif()
+
+option(xahaud_runtime_test_config
+  "Enable XAHAUD_RUNTIME_TEST_CONFIG env and runtime_config RPC fault-injection controls"
+  OFF)
+# Conan 2 local opt-in:
+# [conf]
+# tools.cmake.cmaketoolchain:extra_variables={"xahaud_runtime_test_config":"ON"}
+
+option(formal_verification
+  "Enable Lean-backed formal-verification cross-check tests"
+  OFF)
+# Default off: this pulls the Lean runtime and the vendored formal model into
+# the test binary. Conan/local opt-in mirrors the runtime-test-config pattern:
+# [conf]
+# tools.cmake.cmaketoolchain:extra_variables={"formal_verification":"ON"}
 
 option(unity "Creates a build using UNITY support in cmake. This is the default" ON)
 if(unity)

cmake/XahaudFormalVerification.cmake

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+if(NOT formal_verification)
+  return()
+endif()
+
+if(NOT xrpld)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification requires xrpld=ON")
+endif()
+
+if(NOT tests)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification requires tests=ON")
+endif()
+
+if(CMAKE_CROSSCOMPILING)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification currently supports native builds only")
+endif()
+
+if(WIN32)
+  message(FATAL_ERROR "formal_verification currently supports Unix-like native builds only")
+endif()
+
+set(XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR
+  "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/formal_verification"
+  CACHE PATH
+  "Lean formal-verification project used by formal_verification=ON")
+
+include(XahaudLean)
+xahaud_require_lean_toolchain("${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}")
+
+set(XAHAU_FORMAL_ARCHIVE
+  "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/.lake/build/lib/libxahau__consensus_XahauConsensus.a")
+
+file(GLOB_RECURSE XAHAU_FORMAL_SOURCES CONFIGURE_DEPENDS
+  "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/*.lean")
+
+# Lake currently writes package artifacts under the Lean workspace's .lake/
+# directory. Keep this option native/test-only until the build is moved to a
+# copied CMake-binary-dir workspace or Lake grows a stable external build-dir
+# interface we can rely on here.
+#
+# This target deliberately invokes Lake whenever the formal-enabled `rippled`
+# target is built. Lake still performs its own incremental rebuild, but CMake
+# must not trust a source-tree `.lake` archive purely by timestamp.
+add_custom_target(xahaud_formal_verification_lean
+  COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" build XahauConsensus:static
+  WORKING_DIRECTORY "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}"
+  DEPENDS
+    "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/lakefile.toml"
+    "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/lean-toolchain"
+    "${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}/lake-manifest.json"
+    ${XAHAU_FORMAL_SOURCES}
+  BYPRODUCTS "${XAHAU_FORMAL_ARCHIVE}"
+  COMMENT "Building Lean formal-verification archive"
+  VERBATIM)
+
+add_dependencies(rippled xahaud_formal_verification_lean)
+target_compile_definitions(rippled PRIVATE XAHAUD_ENABLE_FORMAL_VERIFICATION=1)
+target_include_directories(rippled PRIVATE "${LEAN_INCLUDE_DIR}")
+target_link_libraries(rippled "${XAHAU_FORMAL_ARCHIVE}" "${LEAN_SHARED_LIBRARY}")
+
+if(UNIX)
+  set_property(TARGET rippled APPEND PROPERTY BUILD_RPATH "${LEAN_SYSROOT}/lib/lean")
+endif()
+
+message(STATUS "Formal verification enabled: ${XAHAU_FORMAL_VERIFICATION_DIR}")
+message(STATUS "Lean ${LEAN_EXPECTED_VERSION} sysroot: ${LEAN_SYSROOT}")

cmake/XahaudLean.cmake

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+include_guard(GLOBAL)
+
+function(xahaud_require_lean_toolchain project_dir)
+  if(NOT EXISTS "${project_dir}/lean-toolchain")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR "Lean project is missing lean-toolchain: ${project_dir}")
+  endif()
+
+  file(READ "${project_dir}/lean-toolchain" lean_toolchain)
+  string(STRIP "${lean_toolchain}" lean_toolchain)
+  if(NOT lean_toolchain MATCHES "^leanprover/lean4:v([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+([-+._A-Za-z0-9]+)?)$")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Unsupported lean-toolchain format `${lean_toolchain}` in ${project_dir}")
+  endif()
+  set(expected_lean_version "${CMAKE_MATCH_1}")
+
+  find_program(LAKE_EXECUTABLE
+    NAMES lake
+    HINTS "$ENV{HOME}/.elan/bin")
+  if(NOT LAKE_EXECUTABLE)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "formal_verification=ON requires Lake on PATH or in ~/.elan/bin. "
+      "Install elan, then run `lake build` once in ${project_dir}.")
+  endif()
+
+  execute_process(
+    COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" env lean --version
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY "${project_dir}"
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE lean_version_output
+    ERROR_VARIABLE lean_version_error
+    OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    ERROR_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    RESULT_VARIABLE lean_version_result)
+  if(NOT lean_version_result EQUAL 0)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not run `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} env lean --version`: "
+      "${lean_version_error}")
+  endif()
+  if(NOT lean_version_output MATCHES "^Lean \\(version ([^,)]+)[,)]")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not parse Lean version from `${lean_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+  set(actual_lean_version "${CMAKE_MATCH_1}")
+  if(NOT actual_lean_version STREQUAL expected_lean_version)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Lean version mismatch for formal_verification=ON. "
+      "Expected ${expected_lean_version} from ${project_dir}/lean-toolchain, "
+      "but `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} env lean --version` returned "
+      "`${lean_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+
+  execute_process(
+    COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" --version
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY "${project_dir}"
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE lake_version_output
+    ERROR_VARIABLE lake_version_error
+    OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    ERROR_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    RESULT_VARIABLE lake_version_result)
+  if(NOT lake_version_result EQUAL 0)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not run `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} --version`: ${lake_version_error}")
+  endif()
+  if(NOT lake_version_output MATCHES "Lean version ([^)]+)\\)")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not parse Lake's Lean version from `${lake_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+  set(lake_lean_version "${CMAKE_MATCH_1}")
+  if(NOT lake_lean_version STREQUAL expected_lean_version)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Lake version mismatch for formal_verification=ON. "
+      "Expected Lean ${expected_lean_version} from ${project_dir}/lean-toolchain, "
+      "but `${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} --version` returned `${lake_version_output}`")
+  endif()
+
+  if(NOT EXISTS "${project_dir}/lakefile.toml")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "formal_verification=ON requires ${project_dir}/lakefile.toml")
+  endif()
+
+  execute_process(
+    COMMAND "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" env printenv LEAN_SYSROOT
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY "${project_dir}"
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE lean_sysroot
+    ERROR_VARIABLE lean_sysroot_error
+    OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    ERROR_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
+    RESULT_VARIABLE lean_sysroot_result)
+  if(NOT lean_sysroot_result EQUAL 0 OR NOT lean_sysroot)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Could not determine Lean sysroot via "
+      "`${LAKE_EXECUTABLE} env printenv LEAN_SYSROOT`: ${lean_sysroot_error}")
+  endif()
+
+  set(lean_include_dir "${lean_sysroot}/include")
+  if(NOT EXISTS "${lean_include_dir}/lean/lean.h")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR "Lean header not found: ${lean_include_dir}/lean/lean.h")
+  endif()
+
+  find_library(lean_shared_library
+    NAMES leanshared libleanshared
+    PATHS "${lean_sysroot}/lib/lean"
+    NO_DEFAULT_PATH)
+  if(NOT lean_shared_library)
+    message(FATAL_ERROR
+      "Lean shared runtime not found under ${lean_sysroot}/lib/lean")
+  endif()
+
+  set(LAKE_EXECUTABLE "${LAKE_EXECUTABLE}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_SYSROOT "${lean_sysroot}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_INCLUDE_DIR "${lean_include_dir}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_SHARED_LIBRARY "${lean_shared_library}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+  set(LEAN_EXPECTED_VERSION "${expected_lean_version}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+endfunction()

conanfile.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-from conan import ConanFile, __version__ as conan_version
+from conan import ConanFile
+from conan.errors import ConanInvalidConfiguration
 from conan.tools.cmake import CMake, CMakeToolchain, cmake_layout
 import re
 
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         'assertions': [True, False],
         'coverage': [True, False],
         'fPIC': [True, False],
+        'formal_verification': [True, False],
         'jemalloc': [True, False],
         'rocksdb': [True, False],
         'shared': [True, False],
@@ -26,12 +28,14 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
     }
 
     requires = [
+        'date/3.0.3',
         'grpc/1.50.1',
         'libarchive/3.7.6',
         'magic_enum/0.9.5',
         'nudb/2.0.8',
         'openssl/3.6.0',
         'soci/4.0.3@xahaud/stable',
+        'xxhash/0.8.2',
         'zlib/1.3.1',
     ]
 
@@ -43,6 +47,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         'assertions': False,
         'coverage': False,
         'fPIC': True,
+        'formal_verification': False,
         'jemalloc': False,
         'rocksdb': True,
         'shared': False,
@@ -108,25 +113,29 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         if self.settings.compiler == 'apple-clang':
             self.options['boost/*'].visibility = 'global'
 
+    def validate(self):
+        if self.options.formal_verification and (
+            not self.options.tests or not self.options.xrpld
+        ):
+            raise ConanInvalidConfiguration(
+                'formal_verification=True requires tests=True and xrpld=True'
+            )
+
     def requirements(self):
-        # Conan 2 requires transitive headers to be specified
-        transitive_headers_opt = {'transitive_headers': True} if conan_version.split('.')[0] == '2' else {}
         # Force sqlite3 version to avoid conflicts with soci
         self.requires('sqlite3/3.47.0', override=True)
-        # Force our custom snappy build to avoid Conan CMakeDeps stdc++ heuristic bug
+        # Force our custom snappy build for all dependencies
         self.requires('snappy/1.1.10@xahaud/stable', override=True)
         # Force boost version for all dependencies to avoid conflicts
-        self.requires('boost/1.86.0', force=True, **transitive_headers_opt)
-        self.requires('date/3.0.3', **transitive_headers_opt)
+        self.requires('boost/1.86.0', override=True)
         self.requires('lz4/1.10.0', force=True)
 
         if self.options.with_wasmedge:
-            self.requires('wasmedge/0.11.2@xahaud/stable', **transitive_headers_opt)
+            self.requires('wasmedge/0.11.2@xahaud/stable')
         if self.options.jemalloc:
-            self.requires('jemalloc/5.3.0', **transitive_headers_opt)
+            self.requires('jemalloc/5.3.0')
         if self.options.rocksdb:
-            self.requires('rocksdb/9.7.3', **transitive_headers_opt)
-        self.requires('xxhash/0.8.2', **transitive_headers_opt)
+            self.requires('rocksdb/6.29.5')
 
     exports_sources = (
         'CMakeLists.txt',
@@ -134,6 +143,18 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         'cfg/*',
         'cmake/*',
         'external/*',
+        'formal_verification/*.json',
+        'formal_verification/*.lean',
+        'formal_verification/*.md',
+        'formal_verification/*.toml',
+        'formal_verification/lean-toolchain',
+        'formal_verification/XahauConsensus/*.lean',
+        '!formal_verification/.lake',
+        '!formal_verification/.lake/*',
+        '!formal_verification/.lake/**',
+        '!formal_verification/**/.lake',
+        '!formal_verification/**/.lake/*',
+        '!formal_verification/**/.lake/**',
         'include/*',
         'src/*',
     )
@@ -150,6 +171,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         tc.variables['tests'] = self.options.tests
         tc.variables['assert'] = self.options.assertions
         tc.variables['coverage'] = self.options.coverage
+        tc.variables['formal_verification'] = self.options.formal_verification
         tc.variables['jemalloc'] = self.options.jemalloc
         tc.variables['rocksdb'] = self.options.rocksdb
         tc.variables['BUILD_SHARED_LIBS'] = self.options.shared
@@ -165,6 +187,11 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         cmake.build()
 
     def package(self):
+        if self.options.formal_verification:
+            raise ConanInvalidConfiguration(
+                'formal_verification=True is a local/CI test build option and '
+                'is not supported for Conan packages'
+            )
         cmake = CMake(self)
         cmake.verbose = True
         cmake.install()

docs/build/environment.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ direction.
 
 ```
 apt update
-apt install --yes curl git libssl-dev pipx python3.10-dev python3-pip make g++-11 libprotobuf-dev protobuf-compiler
+apt install --yes curl git libssl-dev python3.10-dev python3-pip make g++-11 libprotobuf-dev protobuf-compiler
 
 curl --location --remote-name \
   "https://github.com/Kitware/CMake/releases/download/v3.25.1/cmake-3.25.1.tar.gz"
@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ make --jobs $(nproc)
 make install
 cd ..
 
-pipx install 'conan<2'
-pipx ensurepath
+pip3 install 'conan<2'
 ```
 
 [1]: https://github.com/thejohnfreeman/rippled-docker/blob/master/ubuntu-22.04/install.sh

examples/example/src/example.cpp

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
-#include <xrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.h>
-
 #include <cstdio>
 
-int
-main(int argc, char const** argv)
-{
+#include <xrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char const** argv) {
     std::printf("%s\n", ripple::BuildInfo::getVersionString().c_str());
     return 0;
 }

external/rocksdb/conandata.yml

@@ -1,12 +1,27 @@
 sources:
-  "9.7.3":
-    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v9.7.3.tar.gz"
-    sha256: "acfabb989cbfb5b5c4d23214819b059638193ec33dad2d88373c46448d16d38b"
+  "6.29.5":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v6.29.5.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "ddbf84791f0980c0bbce3902feb93a2c7006f6f53bfd798926143e31d4d756f0"
+  "6.27.3":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v6.27.3.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "ee29901749b9132692b26f0a6c1d693f47d1a9ed8e3771e60556afe80282bf58"
+  "6.20.3":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v6.20.3.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "c6502c7aae641b7e20fafa6c2b92273d935d2b7b2707135ebd9a67b092169dca"
+  "8.8.1":
+    url: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/archive/refs/tags/v8.8.1.tar.gz"
+    sha256: "056c7e21ad8ae36b026ac3b94b9d6e0fcc60e1d937fc80330921e4181be5c36e"
 patches:
-  "9.7.3":
-    - patch_file: "patches/9.x.x-0001-exclude-thirdparty.patch"
+  "6.29.5":
+    - patch_file: "patches/6.29.5-0001-add-include-cstdint-for-gcc-13.patch"
+      patch_description: "Fix build with gcc 13 by including cstdint"
+      patch_type: "portability"
+      patch_source: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/11118"
+    - patch_file: "patches/6.29.5-0002-exclude-thirdparty.patch"
       patch_description: "Do not include thirdparty.inc"
       patch_type: "portability"
-    - patch_file: "patches/9.7.3-0001-memory-leak.patch"
-      patch_description: "Fix a leak of obsolete blob files left open until DB::Close()"
+  "6.27.3":
+    - patch_file: "patches/6.27.3-0001-add-include-cstdint-for-gcc-13.patch"
+      patch_description: "Fix build with gcc 13 by including cstdint"
       patch_type: "portability"
+      patch_source: "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/11118"

external/rocksdb/conanfile.py

@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ required_conan_version = ">=1.53.0"
 
 class RocksDBConan(ConanFile):
     name = "rocksdb"
-    description = "A library that provides an embeddable, persistent key-value store for fast storage"
+    homepage = "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb"
     license = ("GPL-2.0-only", "Apache-2.0")
     url = "https://github.com/conan-io/conan-center-index"
-    homepage = "https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb"
+    description = "A library that provides an embeddable, persistent key-value store for fast storage"
     topics = ("database", "leveldb", "facebook", "key-value")
     package_type = "library"
     settings = "os", "arch", "compiler", "build_type"
@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ class RocksDBConan(ConanFile):
     @property
     def _compilers_minimum_version(self):
         return {} if self._min_cppstd == "11" else {
-            "apple-clang": "10",
-            "clang": "7",
-            "gcc": "7",
-            "msvc": "191",
-            "Visual Studio": "15",
-        }
+                "apple-clang": "10",
+                "clang": "7",
+                "gcc": "7",
+                "msvc": "191",
+                "Visual Studio": "15",
+            }
 
     def export_sources(self):
         export_conandata_patches(self)
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ class RocksDBConan(ConanFile):
         check_min_vs(self, "191")
 
         if self.version == "6.20.3" and \
-                self.settings.os == "Linux" and \
-                self.settings.compiler == "gcc" and \
-                Version(self.settings.compiler.version) < "5":
+           self.settings.os == "Linux" and \
+           self.settings.compiler == "gcc" and \
+           Version(self.settings.compiler.version) < "5":
             raise ConanInvalidConfiguration("Rocksdb 6.20.3 is not compilable with gcc <5.") # See https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/3522
 
     def source(self):
@@ -163,8 +163,6 @@ class RocksDBConan(ConanFile):
         if self.options.with_jemalloc:
             deps.set_property("jemalloc", "cmake_file_name", "JeMalloc")
             deps.set_property("jemalloc", "cmake_target_name", "JeMalloc::JeMalloc")
-        if self.options.with_zstd:
-            deps.set_property("zstd", "cmake_target_name", "zstd::zstd")
         deps.generate()
 
     def build(self):

external/rocksdb/patches/6.29.5-0001-add-include-cstdint-for-gcc-13.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+--- a/include/rocksdb/utilities/checkpoint.h
++++ b/include/rocksdb/utilities/checkpoint.h
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
+ #pragma once
+ #ifndef ROCKSDB_LITE
+ 
++#include <cstdint>
+ #include <string>
+ #include <vector>
+ #include "rocksdb/status.h"
+--- a/table/block_based/data_block_hash_index.h
++++ b/table/block_based/data_block_hash_index.h
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
+ 
+ #pragma once
+ 
++#include <cstdint>
+ #include <string>
+ #include <vector>
+ 
+--- a/util/string_util.h
++++ b/util/string_util.h
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+ 
+ #pragma once
+ 
++#include <cstdint>
+ #include <sstream>
+ #include <string>
+ #include <unordered_map>

external/rocksdb/patches/6.29.5-0002-exclude-thirdparty.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
+index ec59d4491..35577c998 100644
+--- a/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -101 +100,0 @@ if(MSVC)
+-  option(WITH_GFLAGS "build with GFlags" OFF)
+@@ -103,2 +102,2 @@ if(MSVC)
+-  include(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/thirdparty.inc)
+-else()
++endif()
++
+@@ -117 +116 @@ else()
+-  if(MINGW)
++  if(MINGW OR MSVC)
+@@ -183 +181,0 @@ else()
+-endif()

external/rocksdb/patches/9.7.3-0001-memory-leak.patch

@@ -1,319 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/HISTORY.md b/HISTORY.md
-index 36d472229..05ad1a202 100644
---- a/HISTORY.md
-+++ b/HISTORY.md
-@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
- # Rocksdb Change Log
- > NOTE: Entries for next release do not go here. Follow instructions in `unreleased_history/README.txt`
- 
-+## 9.7.4 (10/31/2024)
-+### Bug Fixes
-+* Fix a leak of obsolete blob files left open until DB::Close(). This bug was introduced in version 9.4.0.
-+
- ## 9.7.3 (10/16/2024)
- ### Behavior Changes
- * OPTIONS file to be loaded by remote worker is now preserved so that it does not get purged by the primary host. A similar technique as how we are preserving new SST files from getting purged is used for this. min_options_file_numbers_ is tracked like pending_outputs_ is tracked.
-diff --git a/db/blob/blob_file_cache.cc b/db/blob/blob_file_cache.cc
-index 5f340aadf..1b9faa238 100644
---- a/db/blob/blob_file_cache.cc
-+++ b/db/blob/blob_file_cache.cc
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ Status BlobFileCache::GetBlobFileReader(
-   assert(blob_file_reader);
-   assert(blob_file_reader->IsEmpty());
- 
-+  // NOTE: sharing same Cache with table_cache
-   const Slice key = GetSliceForKey(&blob_file_number);
- 
-   assert(cache_);
-@@ -98,4 +99,13 @@ Status BlobFileCache::GetBlobFileReader(
-   return Status::OK();
- }
- 
-+void BlobFileCache::Evict(uint64_t blob_file_number) {
-+  // NOTE: sharing same Cache with table_cache
-+  const Slice key = GetSliceForKey(&blob_file_number);
-+
-+  assert(cache_);
-+
-+  cache_.get()->Erase(key);
-+}
-+
- }  // namespace ROCKSDB_NAMESPACE
-diff --git a/db/blob/blob_file_cache.h b/db/blob/blob_file_cache.h
-index 740e67ada..6858d012b 100644
---- a/db/blob/blob_file_cache.h
-+++ b/db/blob/blob_file_cache.h
-@@ -36,6 +36,15 @@ class BlobFileCache {
-                            uint64_t blob_file_number,
-                            CacheHandleGuard<BlobFileReader>* blob_file_reader);
- 
-+  // Called when a blob file is obsolete to ensure it is removed from the cache
-+  // to avoid effectively leaking the open file and assicated memory
-+  void Evict(uint64_t blob_file_number);
-+
-+  // Used to identify cache entries for blob files (not normally useful)
-+  static const Cache::CacheItemHelper* GetHelper() {
-+    return CacheInterface::GetBasicHelper();
-+  }
-+
-  private:
-   using CacheInterface =
-       BasicTypedCacheInterface<BlobFileReader, CacheEntryRole::kMisc>;
-diff --git a/db/column_family.h b/db/column_family.h
-index e4b7adde8..86637736a 100644
---- a/db/column_family.h
-+++ b/db/column_family.h
-@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ class ColumnFamilyData {
-                          SequenceNumber earliest_seq);
- 
-   TableCache* table_cache() const { return table_cache_.get(); }
-+  BlobFileCache* blob_file_cache() const { return blob_file_cache_.get(); }
-   BlobSource* blob_source() const { return blob_source_.get(); }
- 
-   // See documentation in compaction_picker.h
-diff --git a/db/db_impl/db_impl.cc b/db/db_impl/db_impl.cc
-index 261593423..06573ac2e 100644
---- a/db/db_impl/db_impl.cc
-+++ b/db/db_impl/db_impl.cc
-@@ -659,8 +659,9 @@ Status DBImpl::CloseHelper() {
-   // We need to release them before the block cache is destroyed. The block
-   // cache may be destroyed inside versions_.reset(), when column family data
-   // list is destroyed, so leaving handles in table cache after
--  // versions_.reset() may cause issues.
--  // Here we clean all unreferenced handles in table cache.
-+  // versions_.reset() may cause issues. Here we clean all unreferenced handles
-+  // in table cache, and (for certain builds/conditions) assert that no obsolete
-+  // files are hanging around unreferenced (leak) in the table/blob file cache.
-   // Now we assume all user queries have finished, so only version set itself
-   // can possibly hold the blocks from block cache. After releasing unreferenced
-   // handles here, only handles held by version set left and inside
-@@ -668,6 +669,9 @@ Status DBImpl::CloseHelper() {
-   // time a handle is released, we erase it from the cache too. By doing that,
-   // we can guarantee that after versions_.reset(), table cache is empty
-   // so the cache can be safely destroyed.
-+#ifndef NDEBUG
-+  TEST_VerifyNoObsoleteFilesCached(/*db_mutex_already_held=*/true);
-+#endif  // !NDEBUG
-   table_cache_->EraseUnRefEntries();
- 
-   for (auto& txn_entry : recovered_transactions_) {
-@@ -3227,6 +3231,8 @@ Status DBImpl::MultiGetImpl(
-       s = Status::Aborted();
-       break;
-     }
-+    // This could be a long-running operation
-+    ROCKSDB_THREAD_YIELD_HOOK();
-   }
- 
-   // Post processing (decrement reference counts and record statistics)
-diff --git a/db/db_impl/db_impl.h b/db/db_impl/db_impl.h
-index 5e4fa310b..ccc0abfa7 100644
---- a/db/db_impl/db_impl.h
-+++ b/db/db_impl/db_impl.h
-@@ -1241,9 +1241,14 @@ class DBImpl : public DB {
-   static Status TEST_ValidateOptions(const DBOptions& db_options) {
-     return ValidateOptions(db_options);
-   }
--
- #endif  // NDEBUG
- 
-+  // In certain configurations, verify that the table/blob file cache only
-+  // contains entries for live files, to check for effective leaks of open
-+  // files. This can only be called when purging of obsolete files has
-+  // "settled," such as during parts of DB Close().
-+  void TEST_VerifyNoObsoleteFilesCached(bool db_mutex_already_held) const;
-+
-   // persist stats to column family "_persistent_stats"
-   void PersistStats();
- 
-diff --git a/db/db_impl/db_impl_debug.cc b/db/db_impl/db_impl_debug.cc
-index 790a50d7a..67f5b4aaf 100644
---- a/db/db_impl/db_impl_debug.cc
-+++ b/db/db_impl/db_impl_debug.cc
-@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
- 
- #ifndef NDEBUG
- 
-+#include "db/blob/blob_file_cache.h"
- #include "db/column_family.h"
- #include "db/db_impl/db_impl.h"
- #include "db/error_handler.h"
-@@ -328,5 +329,49 @@ size_t DBImpl::TEST_EstimateInMemoryStatsHistorySize() const {
-   InstrumentedMutexLock l(&const_cast<DBImpl*>(this)->stats_history_mutex_);
-   return EstimateInMemoryStatsHistorySize();
- }
-+
-+void DBImpl::TEST_VerifyNoObsoleteFilesCached(
-+    bool db_mutex_already_held) const {
-+  // This check is somewhat expensive and obscure to make a part of every
-+  // unit test in every build variety. Thus, we only enable it for ASAN builds.
-+  if (!kMustFreeHeapAllocations) {
-+    return;
-+  }
-+
-+  std::optional<InstrumentedMutexLock> l;
-+  if (db_mutex_already_held) {
-+    mutex_.AssertHeld();
-+  } else {
-+    l.emplace(&mutex_);
-+  }
-+
-+  std::vector<uint64_t> live_files;
-+  for (auto cfd : *versions_->GetColumnFamilySet()) {
-+    if (cfd->IsDropped()) {
-+      continue;
-+    }
-+    // Sneakily add both SST and blob files to the same list
-+    cfd->current()->AddLiveFiles(&live_files, &live_files);
-+  }
-+  std::sort(live_files.begin(), live_files.end());
-+
-+  auto fn = [&live_files](const Slice& key, Cache::ObjectPtr, size_t,
-+                          const Cache::CacheItemHelper* helper) {
-+    if (helper != BlobFileCache::GetHelper()) {
-+      // Skip non-blob files for now
-+      // FIXME: diagnose and fix the leaks of obsolete SST files revealed in
-+      // unit tests.
-+      return;
-+    }
-+    // See TableCache and BlobFileCache
-+    assert(key.size() == sizeof(uint64_t));
-+    uint64_t file_number;
-+    GetUnaligned(reinterpret_cast<const uint64_t*>(key.data()), &file_number);
-+    // Assert file is in sorted live_files
-+    assert(
-+        std::binary_search(live_files.begin(), live_files.end(), file_number));
-+  };
-+  table_cache_->ApplyToAllEntries(fn, {});
-+}
- }  // namespace ROCKSDB_NAMESPACE
- #endif  // NDEBUG
-diff --git a/db/db_iter.cc b/db/db_iter.cc
-index e02586377..bf4749eb9 100644
---- a/db/db_iter.cc
-+++ b/db/db_iter.cc
-@@ -540,6 +540,8 @@ bool DBIter::FindNextUserEntryInternal(bool skipping_saved_key,
-     } else {
-       iter_.Next();
-     }
-+    // This could be a long-running operation due to tombstones, etc.
-+    ROCKSDB_THREAD_YIELD_HOOK();
-   } while (iter_.Valid());
- 
-   valid_ = false;
-diff --git a/db/table_cache.cc b/db/table_cache.cc
-index 71fc29c32..8a5be75e8 100644
---- a/db/table_cache.cc
-+++ b/db/table_cache.cc
-@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ Status TableCache::GetTableReader(
- }
- 
- Cache::Handle* TableCache::Lookup(Cache* cache, uint64_t file_number) {
-+  // NOTE: sharing same Cache with BlobFileCache
-   Slice key = GetSliceForFileNumber(&file_number);
-   return cache->Lookup(key);
- }
-@@ -179,6 +180,7 @@ Status TableCache::FindTable(
-     size_t max_file_size_for_l0_meta_pin, Temperature file_temperature) {
-   PERF_TIMER_GUARD_WITH_CLOCK(find_table_nanos, ioptions_.clock);
-   uint64_t number = file_meta.fd.GetNumber();
-+  // NOTE: sharing same Cache with BlobFileCache
-   Slice key = GetSliceForFileNumber(&number);
-   *handle = cache_.Lookup(key);
-   TEST_SYNC_POINT_CALLBACK("TableCache::FindTable:0",
-diff --git a/db/version_builder.cc b/db/version_builder.cc
-index ed8ab8214..c98f53f42 100644
---- a/db/version_builder.cc
-+++ b/db/version_builder.cc
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
- #include <vector>
- 
- #include "cache/cache_reservation_manager.h"
-+#include "db/blob/blob_file_cache.h"
- #include "db/blob/blob_file_meta.h"
- #include "db/dbformat.h"
- #include "db/internal_stats.h"
-@@ -744,12 +745,9 @@ class VersionBuilder::Rep {
-       return Status::Corruption("VersionBuilder", oss.str());
-     }
- 
--    // Note: we use C++11 for now but in C++14, this could be done in a more
--    // elegant way using generalized lambda capture.
--    VersionSet* const vs = version_set_;
--    const ImmutableCFOptions* const ioptions = ioptions_;
--
--    auto deleter = [vs, ioptions](SharedBlobFileMetaData* shared_meta) {
-+    auto deleter = [vs = version_set_, ioptions = ioptions_,
-+                    bc = cfd_ ? cfd_->blob_file_cache()
-+                              : nullptr](SharedBlobFileMetaData* shared_meta) {
-       if (vs) {
-         assert(ioptions);
-         assert(!ioptions->cf_paths.empty());
-@@ -758,6 +756,9 @@ class VersionBuilder::Rep {
-         vs->AddObsoleteBlobFile(shared_meta->GetBlobFileNumber(),
-                                 ioptions->cf_paths.front().path);
-       }
-+      if (bc) {
-+        bc->Evict(shared_meta->GetBlobFileNumber());
-+      }
- 
-       delete shared_meta;
-     };
-@@ -766,7 +767,7 @@ class VersionBuilder::Rep {
-         blob_file_number, blob_file_addition.GetTotalBlobCount(),
-         blob_file_addition.GetTotalBlobBytes(),
-         blob_file_addition.GetChecksumMethod(),
--        blob_file_addition.GetChecksumValue(), deleter);
-+        blob_file_addition.GetChecksumValue(), std::move(deleter));
- 
-     mutable_blob_file_metas_.emplace(
-         blob_file_number, MutableBlobFileMetaData(std::move(shared_meta)));
-diff --git a/db/version_set.h b/db/version_set.h
-index 9336782b1..024f869e7 100644
---- a/db/version_set.h
-+++ b/db/version_set.h
-@@ -1514,7 +1514,6 @@ class VersionSet {
-   void GetLiveFilesMetaData(std::vector<LiveFileMetaData>* metadata);
- 
-   void AddObsoleteBlobFile(uint64_t blob_file_number, std::string path) {
--    // TODO: Erase file from BlobFileCache?
-     obsolete_blob_files_.emplace_back(blob_file_number, std::move(path));
-   }
- 
-diff --git a/include/rocksdb/version.h b/include/rocksdb/version.h
-index 2a19796b8..0afa2cab1 100644
---- a/include/rocksdb/version.h
-+++ b/include/rocksdb/version.h
-@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
- // minor or major version number planned for release.
- #define ROCKSDB_MAJOR 9
- #define ROCKSDB_MINOR 7
--#define ROCKSDB_PATCH 3
-+#define ROCKSDB_PATCH 4
- 
- // Do not use these. We made the mistake of declaring macros starting with
- // double underscore. Now we have to live with our choice. We'll deprecate these
-diff --git a/port/port.h b/port/port.h
-index 13aa56d47..141716e5b 100644
---- a/port/port.h
-+++ b/port/port.h
-@@ -19,3 +19,19 @@
- #elif defined(OS_WIN)
- #include "port/win/port_win.h"
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef OS_LINUX
-+// A temporary hook into long-running RocksDB threads to support modifying their
-+// priority etc. This should become a public API hook once the requirements
-+// are better understood.
-+extern "C" void RocksDbThreadYield() __attribute__((__weak__));
-+#define ROCKSDB_THREAD_YIELD_HOOK() \
-+  {                                 \
-+    if (RocksDbThreadYield) {       \
-+      RocksDbThreadYield();         \
-+    }                               \
-+  }
-+#else
-+#define ROCKSDB_THREAD_YIELD_HOOK() \
-+  {}
-+#endif

external/rocksdb/patches/9.x.x-0001-exclude-thirdparty.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
-index 93b884d..b715cb6 100644
---- a/CMakeLists.txt
-+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
-@@ -106,14 +106,9 @@ endif()
- include(CMakeDependentOption)
-
- if(MSVC)
--  option(WITH_GFLAGS "build with GFlags" OFF)
-   option(WITH_XPRESS "build with windows built in compression" OFF)
--  option(ROCKSDB_SKIP_THIRDPARTY "skip thirdparty.inc" OFF)
--
--  if(NOT ROCKSDB_SKIP_THIRDPARTY)
--    include(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/thirdparty.inc)
--  endif()
--else()
-+endif()
-+if(TRUE)
-   if(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES "FreeBSD" AND NOT CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES "kFreeBSD")
-     # FreeBSD has jemalloc as default malloc
-     # but it does not have all the jemalloc files in include/...
-@@ -126,7 +121,7 @@ else()
-     endif()
-   endif()
-
--  if(MINGW)
-+  if(MSVC OR MINGW)
-     option(WITH_GFLAGS "build with GFlags" OFF)
-   else()
-     option(WITH_GFLAGS "build with GFlags" ON)

formal_verification/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/.lake

formal_verification/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+# xahau_consensus
+
+Lean proofs for small Xahau consensus invariants.
+
+This package is intentionally narrow. It does **not** try to verify the C++
+implementation directly. It mirrors small formulas and decision ladders from
+the consensus-extension code so the safety arguments can be checked as theorems
+instead of repeatedly re-derived in review notes.
+
+Current modules:
+
+- `XahauConsensus.Threshold`
+  - mirrors `calculateParticipantThreshold`
+  - proves the Tier-2 intersection inequality:
+    `count + floor(count / 5) < 2 * participantThreshold count`
+  - proves the threshold is minimal for that strict inequality
+  - proves the original-view threshold remains safe when nUNL shrinks the
+    effective view
+  - includes the `original=10`, `effective=8` regression example showing why
+    using the effective view for the Tier-2 floor is forkable
+  - proves `participantThreshold count <= quorumThreshold count` for
+    non-empty views
+  - distinguishes raw formula helpers from the live safety-wrapped gate
+    thresholds used by `ConsensusExtensions`
+- `XahauConsensus.ThresholdFacts`
+  - records small-network values and band-empty/band-present examples
+  - proves exact multiple-of-five behavior
+  - proves threshold monotonicity facts
+- `XahauConsensus.SixtyPercent`
+  - defines a naive `ceil(60%)` threshold
+  - proves naive 60% is unsafe at exact multiples of five
+  - proves the live derived floor is one higher there and restores strict
+    intersection safety
+- `XahauConsensus.Intersection`
+  - proves the abstract cardinality argument behind quorum intersection
+  - shows two threshold-sized cohorts must overlap above the fault bound
+    whenever `n + f < 2t`
+  - specializes that argument to the live participant threshold, including
+    nUNL-shrunk effective views
+- `XahauConsensus.HonestOverlap`
+  - bridges overlap arithmetic to the consensus claim that two cohorts share at
+    least one honest validator
+  - specializes that bridge to the participant threshold and `floor(n/5)` fault
+    bound
+- `XahauConsensus.ViewUniverse`
+  - proves original-view anchoring remains safe under nUNL shrink
+  - separates strict safety from threshold reachability
+  - defines cross-view participant-band presence/absence
+  - shows effective-view thresholds can be unsafe against the original fault
+    bound
+  - shows trusted-superset counting universes erode the intersection margin
+- `XahauConsensus.NunlCap`
+  - models the protocol's ceil-25% nUNL disablement cap
+  - proves 8/6 and 10/8 band collapse examples
+  - records that 10 at max cap has effective view 7, below the original
+    participant floor
+  - records the important counterexample: original `20`, effective `15` does
+    **not** make validator quorum meet the original participant floor
+- `XahauConsensus.SidecarAlignment`
+  - models aligned participant counting for sidecar hashes
+  - proves non-active peers and non-active local publication cannot pad the
+    alignment count
+  - proves changing nonmember reports cannot change quorum alignment
+- `XahauConsensus.EntropySelector`
+  - models the tier-label ladder from `ConsensusExtensions::selectEntropy`
+  - proves non-UNLReport views select fallback
+  - proves the quorum / participant / fallback bands select the expected tier
+- `XahauConsensus.SelectorDeterminism`
+  - models labeled digest output
+  - proves digest payload bytes do not affect the label when consensus metadata
+    is fixed
+  - records examples where changing view provenance or view sizes changes labels
+- `XahauConsensus.ExportGate`
+  - models export's quorum-aligned success rule
+  - models export's sidecar-gate outcome as `proceed` or `retryOrExpire`, with
+    no deterministic fallback signature set
+  - proves missing minority observation does not block a quorum-aligned export
+  - proves `fullObservation` alone cannot change the export decision
+- `XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum`
+  - proves two 80% export quorums overlap above the standard Byzantine bound
+    in nonempty active universes
+  - proves export quorum overlap remains above the original-view Byzantine
+    bound when nUNL shrinkage is within the protocol cap
+  - proves Byzantine validators at the standard bound cannot veto quorum
+  - records concrete overlap margins for 5/10/20-validator universes
+- `XahauConsensus.FinsetIntersection`
+  - uses Mathlib finite sets to prove the cardinality premise behind the
+    arithmetic intersection theorems
+  - specializes that bridge for Tier-2 cohorts, nUNL-shrunk cohorts, and export
+    80% quorums
+- `XahauConsensus.Invariants`
+  - restates cross-module design contracts in one place
+  - pins the live safety-wrapped threshold relationship
+  - proves the cross-view entropy gate is exactly the selector's non-fallback
+    boundary
+  - pins non-UNLReport fallback and export full-observation independence
+
+Run:
+
+```sh
+~/.elan/bin/lake build
+```
+
+## Optional C++ cross-checks
+
+The xahaud CMake build can also compile a Lean-backed unit-test path, but it is
+off by default and is not part of normal release builds:
+
+Install Lean through `elan` first. The CMake integration intentionally keeps the
+tooling rule simple: when `formal_verification=ON`, it looks for `lake` on
+`PATH` or in `~/.elan/bin`, asks that Lake environment to run `lean --version`,
+verifies the exact version specified by this package's `lean-toolchain`, then
+asks Lake for `LEAN_SYSROOT` and checks that `lean.h` and `libleanshared`
+exist.
+
+```sh
+conan install . --output-folder=build-formal --build=missing \
+  -s build_type=Release \
+  -o '&:tests=True' \
+  -o '&:xrpld=True' \
+  -o '&:formal_verification=True'
+
+cmake -S . -B build-formal-cmake \
+  -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=$PWD/build-formal/build/generators/conan_toolchain.cmake \
+  -Dtests=ON \
+  -Dxrpld=ON \
+  -Dformal_verification=ON
+
+cmake --build build-formal-cmake --target rippled
+./build-formal-cmake/rippled --unittest=LeanConsensus
+```
+
+This path currently supports native test builds only. It builds
+`XahauConsensus:static`, links the resulting Lean archive and runtime into the
+test binary, and runs C++ drift tests over selected scalar formulas and helper
+predicates. Some checks compare directly to named production helpers; others are
+review-oriented safety predicates computed from those helpers. The exported
+surface is intentionally scalar and reviewable:
+
+- Byzantine bound, participant threshold, and validator quorum threshold.
+- The safety-wrapped zero-view thresholds used by the live gates.
+- The cross-view entropy gate threshold, with effective and original view
+  denominators kept separate.
+- The entropy tier selector policy for `(fromUNLReport, participantCount,
+  effectiveView, originalView)`.
+- Sidecar aligned-participant counting, full-observation, quorum-aligned
+  predicates, and active-view mask-counting samples.
+- Export's quorum-only sidecar-gate proceed predicate, where `fullObservation`
+  is diagnostic rather than success-gating; a small final-apply snapshot model
+  makes explicit that gate proceed is not the same as closed-ledger
+  `Export::doApply` success.
+- NegativeUNL cap/effective-view arithmetic.
+- View-universe safety predicates and naive-60% regression anchors.
+
+This is still a model-to-code cross-check, not a proof that the C++ implements
+the Lean model. Its value is narrower and practical: if a production formula,
+decision ladder, or helper predicate changes without the formal model changing
+too, the gated unit test fails. The formal CMake target invokes Lake on each
+formal-enabled `rippled` build and lets Lake decide whether its own artifacts
+are current; CMake does not trust an existing source-tree archive by timestamp.
+Lake still writes build artifacts under the Lean workspace's `.lake/`
+directory, and the Conan recipe intentionally excludes that directory from
+exported sources, so keep this option as a local/CI confidence build rather
+than a release packaging input. The Conan recipe rejects
+`formal_verification=True` unless `tests=True` and `xrpld=True`, and refuses to
+package formal-enabled builds.

formal_verification/ROADMAP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Xahau Lean Roadmap
+
+This package should stay focused on invariants that are compact enough to be
+reviewable and stable enough to mirror from C++.
+
+Good targets:
+
+1. Threshold arithmetic
+   - Tier-2 participant threshold formula
+   - quorum threshold relation
+   - nUNL original-view anchoring
+   - small-network boundary examples
+2. Sidecar alignment
+   - active-view-only counting
+   - quorum-aligned predicate
+   - full-observation as diagnostic vs success precondition where applicable
+3. Entropy selector
+   - non-UNLReport fallback
+   - tier ladder from agreed participant count
+   - no local pending-state dependency in the tier decision
+4. Export gate
+   - quorum-aligned success without full observation
+   - no deterministic fallback value
+   - retry/expire as liveness behavior, not ledger-content substitution
+
+Poor targets for this package:
+
+- direct verification of C++ implementation details
+- wall-clock timing and network scheduling liveness
+- full ledger execution semantics
+
+Those belong in C++ tests, CSF/testnet scenarios, or a dedicated temporal model.

formal_verification/XahauConsensus.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-- This module serves as the root of the `XahauConsensus` library.
+-- Import modules here that should be built as part of the library.
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+import XahauConsensus.ThresholdFacts
+import XahauConsensus.SixtyPercent
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+import XahauConsensus.HonestOverlap
+import XahauConsensus.ViewUniverse
+import XahauConsensus.NunlCap
+import XahauConsensus.SidecarAlignment
+import XahauConsensus.SidecarObservation
+import XahauConsensus.EntropySelector
+import XahauConsensus.SelectorDeterminism
+import XahauConsensus.ExportGate
+import XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum
+import XahauConsensus.FinsetIntersection
+import XahauConsensus.Invariants
+import XahauConsensus.FFI

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/EntropySelector.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+inductive EntropyTier where
+  | consensusFallback
+  | participantAligned
+  | validatorQuorum
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- Minimal model of `ConsensusExtensions::selectEntropy`'s network,
+non-failed, non-empty tier ladder.
+
+The real C++ also computes a digest. This model deliberately focuses on the
+part that can fork by labeling the same agreed set differently: the tier
+decision from `(fromUNLReport, participantCount, effectiveView, originalView)`.
+It does not model the standalone development shortcut, timeout-driven
+`entropyFailed_` downgrade, or empty-map fallback; those paths all bypass or
+downgrade this ladder rather than producing a stronger non-fallback label.
+-/
+def selectEntropyTier
+    (fromUNLReport : Bool)
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) : EntropyTier :=
+  if !fromUNLReport then
+    EntropyTier.consensusFallback
+  else if participantCount >= safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView then
+    EntropyTier.validatorQuorum
+  else if participantCount >= safeParticipantThreshold originalView then
+    EntropyTier.participantAligned
+  else
+    EntropyTier.consensusFallback
+
+/-- Non-standalone nodes must fail closed to fallback until the validator view
+is ledger-anchored by a UNLReport. -/
+theorem no_unl_report_selects_fallback
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    selectEntropyTier false participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.consensusFallback := by
+  rfl
+
+/-- At or above the effective-view quorum threshold, the ladder selects the
+strongest entropy tier. -/
+theorem quorum_count_selects_validator_quorum
+    {participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat}
+    (hQuorum : safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView <= participantCount) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.validatorQuorum := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier
+  simp [hQuorum]
+
+/-- Below validator quorum but at or above the original-view participant floor,
+the ladder selects Tier 2. -/
+theorem participant_band_selects_tier2
+    {participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat}
+    (hBelowQuorum : participantCount < safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView)
+    (hParticipant : safeParticipantThreshold originalView <= participantCount) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.participantAligned := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier
+  simp [Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelowQuorum, hParticipant]
+
+/-- Below both thresholds, the ladder falls back. -/
+theorem below_participant_floor_selects_fallback
+    {participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat}
+    (hBelowQuorum : participantCount < safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView)
+    (hBelowParticipant : participantCount < safeParticipantThreshold originalView) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.consensusFallback := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier
+  simp [
+    Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelowQuorum,
+    Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelowParticipant]
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/ExportGate.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- Minimal model of the sidecar export gate.
+
+`alignedParticipants` is the number of participants observed on the export
+sidecar, `quorumThreshold` is the required aligned count, and
+`fullObservation` records whether every participant was observed. The C++ gate
+must use quorum alignment for success; full observation is only diagnostic.
+-/
+structure ExportGate where
+  alignedParticipants : Nat
+  quorumThreshold : Nat
+  fullObservation : Bool
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- Export sidecar-gate outcome. This is not the final `Export::doApply`
+result: closed-ledger apply re-validates the frozen agreed signature snapshot
+before it can create a shadow ticket. -/
+inductive ExportOutcome where
+  | proceed
+  | retryOrExpire
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- The success predicate used by export: enough participants are aligned. -/
+def ExportGate.quorumAligned (gate : ExportGate) : Bool :=
+  decide (gate.quorumThreshold <= gate.alignedParticipants)
+
+/-- Export proceeds exactly when quorum alignment is met. -/
+def ExportGate.proceed (gate : ExportGate) : Bool :=
+  gate.quorumAligned
+
+/-- Export's externally visible decision shape. -/
+def ExportGate.outcome (gate : ExportGate) : ExportOutcome :=
+  if gate.proceed then ExportOutcome.proceed else ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire
+
+/-- Minimal model of the additional closed-ledger apply preconditions.
+
+The sidecar gate only proves that one `exportSigSetHash` had quorum alignment.
+Network-mode `Export::doApply` then independently requires a ledger-anchored
+validator view, no convergence failure for the round, a frozen agreed sidecar
+map, a parseable/valid signature set, and enough verified signers in that map.
+The model intentionally excludes cryptography and metadata construction; it
+exists to prevent reading `ExportGate.proceed` as final apply success.
+-/
+structure ExportApplySnapshot where
+  fromUNLReport : Bool
+  convergenceFailed : Bool
+  agreedSetPresent : Bool
+  agreedSetValid : Bool
+  signerCount : Nat
+  quorumThreshold : Nat
+  deriving DecidableEq, Repr
+
+/-- Closed-ledger apply can use only a valid, frozen agreed sidecar snapshot. -/
+def ExportApplySnapshot.validAgreedSnapshot
+    (snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot) : Bool :=
+  snapshot.fromUNLReport &&
+    !snapshot.convergenceFailed &&
+    snapshot.agreedSetPresent &&
+    snapshot.agreedSetValid &&
+    decide (snapshot.quorumThreshold <= snapshot.signerCount)
+
+/-- Minimal network-mode apply decision: valid agreed snapshot applies; all
+other cases retry or expire. -/
+def ExportApplySnapshot.outcome
+    (snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot) : ExportOutcome :=
+  if snapshot.validAgreedSnapshot then
+    ExportOutcome.proceed
+  else
+    ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire
+
+theorem apply_success_iff_valid_agreed_snapshot
+    (snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot) :
+    snapshot.outcome = ExportOutcome.proceed ↔
+      snapshot.validAgreedSnapshot = true := by
+  unfold ExportApplySnapshot.outcome
+  by_cases h : snapshot.validAgreedSnapshot <;> simp [h]
+
+/-- Gate success alone is not final apply success. For example, the sidecar
+gate may have quorum alignment while the final apply path has no frozen agreed
+sidecar map available and therefore retries. -/
+theorem gate_proceed_does_not_imply_apply_success :
+    ∃ gate : ExportGate, ∃ snapshot : ExportApplySnapshot,
+      ExportGate.proceed gate = true ∧
+        ExportApplySnapshot.outcome snapshot =
+          ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire := by
+  refine ⟨
+    ExportGate.mk 4 4 false,
+    ExportApplySnapshot.mk true false false true 4 4,
+    ?_,
+    ?_⟩ <;> rfl
+
+/-- A missing minority, represented by `fullObservation = false`, does not
+prevent export when the quorum threshold is met. -/
+theorem missing_minority_does_not_prevent_proceed
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (hQuorum : quorumThreshold <= alignedParticipants) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).proceed = true := by
+  unfold ExportGate.proceed ExportGate.quorumAligned
+  simp [hQuorum]
+
+theorem missing_minority_proceeds
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (hQuorum : quorumThreshold <= alignedParticipants) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).outcome =
+      ExportOutcome.proceed := by
+  unfold ExportGate.outcome
+  simp [missing_minority_does_not_prevent_proceed hQuorum]
+
+/-- Export must not proceed below the aligned-participant quorum threshold. -/
+theorem below_quorum_does_not_proceed
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (fullObservation : Bool)
+    (hBelow : alignedParticipants < quorumThreshold) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold fullObservation).proceed =
+      false := by
+  unfold ExportGate.proceed ExportGate.quorumAligned
+  simp [Nat.not_le_of_gt hBelow]
+
+/-- Below quorum, export retries or expires. There is no deterministic fallback
+signature set analogous to RNG's Tier 1 fallback digest. -/
+theorem below_quorum_retries_or_expires
+    {alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat}
+    (fullObservation : Bool)
+    (hBelow : alignedParticipants < quorumThreshold) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold fullObservation).outcome =
+      ExportOutcome.retryOrExpire := by
+  unfold ExportGate.outcome
+  simp [below_quorum_does_not_proceed fullObservation hBelow]
+
+/-- Flipping only the diagnostic `fullObservation` field cannot change the
+export decision. -/
+theorem changing_fullObservation_alone_does_not_change_proceed
+    (alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold true).proceed =
+      (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).proceed := by
+  rfl
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/ExportQuorum.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+import XahauConsensus.NunlCap
+import XahauConsensus.ThresholdFacts
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Nat-cardinality arithmetic for export sidecar quorum uniqueness.
+
+The model deliberately stays at the level used by `Intersection.lean`:
+
+* `n` is the active validator universe size.
+* `a` and `b` are the numbers of validators supporting two export sidecar
+  hashes in that same universe.
+* `overlap` is the size of the intersection between those two support sets.
+* `faultyOverlap + honestOverlap = overlap` splits that intersection.
+
+No `Finset` structure is needed here; callers supply the usual
+inclusion-exclusion cardinality inequality `a + b <= n + overlap`.
+-/
+
+theorem disabled_le_cap_mul_four_le
+    {originalView disabled : Nat}
+    (hCap : disabled <= disabledCap originalView) :
+    disabled * 4 <= originalView + 3 := by
+  unfold disabledCap ceilDiv at hCap
+  have hFour : 0 < 4 := by decide
+  simp at hCap
+  have hMul :=
+    (Nat.le_div_iff_mul_le hFour).mp hCap
+  omega
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_mul_five_ge_four_mul (n : Nat) :
+    4 * n <= 5 * quorumThreshold n := by
+  unfold quorumThreshold
+  have hHundred : 0 < 100 := by decide
+  have hDiv :
+      (n * 80 + 99) / 100 <= (n * 80 + 99) / 100 :=
+    Nat.le_refl _
+  have hBound :=
+    (Nat.div_le_iff_le_mul hHundred).mp hDiv
+  omega
+
+theorem byzantineBound_mul_five_le (n : Nat) :
+    byzantineBound n * 5 <= n := by
+  unfold byzantineBound
+  exact Nat.div_mul_le_self n 5
+
+/-- Two 80% export quorums in one active universe overlap by at least
+`2 * quorumThreshold n - n`. -/
+theorem two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+    {n a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold n <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold n <= b) :
+    2 * quorumThreshold n - n <= overlap := by
+  omega
+
+/-- The 80% quorum threshold is intersection-safe against the standard
+`floor(n / 5)` fault bound for every nonempty active universe. -/
+theorem quorumThreshold_intersection_safe
+    {n : Nat} (hPositive : 0 < n) :
+    n + byzantineBound n < 2 * quorumThreshold n := by
+  unfold quorumThreshold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+/-- The unconditional version is false: the empty active universe has raw
+quorum threshold zero, so there is no strict intersection margin. -/
+theorem quorumThreshold_empty_not_intersection_safe :
+    ¬ 0 + byzantineBound 0 < 2 * quorumThreshold 0 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Two export sidecar hashes both clearing 80% quorum in the same nonempty
+active universe must have overlap larger than the standard fault bound. -/
+theorem export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    {n a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hPositive : 0 < n)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold n <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold n <= b) :
+    byzantineBound n < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (quorumThreshold_intersection_safe hPositive)
+
+/-- If the overlap between two quorum-clearing export hashes is split into
+faulty and honest validators, and at most `floor(n / 5)` validators in that
+overlap are faulty, then the overlap contains an honest validator. -/
+theorem export_hash_quorums_force_honest_overlap
+    {n a b overlap faultyOverlap honestOverlap : Nat}
+    (hPositive : 0 < n)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold n <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold n <= b)
+    (hSplit : overlap = faultyOverlap + honestOverlap)
+    (hFaulty : faultyOverlap <= byzantineBound n) :
+    0 < honestOverlap := by
+  have hOverlap :
+      byzantineBound n < overlap :=
+    export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+      hPositive
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  omega
+
+/-- Export quorum intersection remains above the original-view Byzantine bound
+when nUNL shrinkage is within the protocol's ceil-25% cap. -/
+theorem export_quorum_intersection_safe_under_nunl_cap
+    {originalView effectiveView disabled : Nat}
+    (hEffective : effectiveView = originalView - disabled)
+    (hCap : disabled <= disabledCap originalView)
+    (hPositive : 0 < effectiveView) :
+    effectiveView + byzantineBound originalView <
+      2 * quorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  have hCapBound :
+      disabled * 4 <= originalView + 3 :=
+    disabled_le_cap_mul_four_le hCap
+  have hQuorumBound :
+      4 * effectiveView <= 5 * quorumThreshold effectiveView :=
+    quorumThreshold_mul_five_ge_four_mul effectiveView
+  have hByzBound :
+      byzantineBound originalView * 5 <= originalView :=
+    byzantineBound_mul_five_le originalView
+  omega
+
+/-- Two export sidecar hashes both clearing 80% quorum in an nUNL-shrunk
+effective view must still overlap above the original-view Byzantine bound,
+provided the shrinkage stays within the protocol cap. -/
+theorem export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_original_byzantine_under_nunl_cap
+    {originalView effectiveView disabled a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hEffective : effectiveView = originalView - disabled)
+    (hCap : disabled <= disabledCap originalView)
+    (hPositive : 0 < effectiveView)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= effectiveView + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= b) :
+    byzantineBound originalView < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (export_quorum_intersection_safe_under_nunl_cap
+      hEffective
+      hCap
+      hPositive)
+
+/-- A Byzantine minority at the standard bound cannot veto export quorum:
+after removing `floor(n / 5)` validators, enough validators remain to meet the
+80% quorum threshold. -/
+theorem byzantineBound_cannot_veto_quorum (n : Nat) :
+    byzantineBound n + quorumThreshold n <= n := by
+  unfold byzantineBound quorumThreshold
+  omega
+
+/-- Equivalent no-veto form using subtraction. -/
+theorem quorumThreshold_le_universe_minus_byzantineBound (n : Nat) :
+    quorumThreshold n <= n - byzantineBound n := by
+  have hNoVeto := byzantineBound_cannot_veto_quorum n
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete regression anchor: in a 5-validator active universe, two 80%
+export quorums overlap in at least three validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_five_overlap_at_least_three
+    {a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 5 + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold 5 <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold 5 <= b) :
+    3 <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold 5 - 5 <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  have hExact : 2 * quorumThreshold 5 - 5 = 3 := by
+    native_decide
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete regression anchor: in a 10-validator active universe, two 80%
+export quorums overlap in at least six validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_ten_overlap_at_least_six
+    {a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 10 + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold 10 <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold 10 <= b) :
+    6 <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold 10 - 10 <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  have hExact : 2 * quorumThreshold 10 - 10 = 6 := by
+    native_decide
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete regression anchor: in a 20-validator active universe, two 80%
+export quorums overlap in at least twelve validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_twenty_overlap_at_least_twelve
+    {a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 20 + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold 20 <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold 20 <= b) :
+    12 <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold 20 - 20 <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  have hExact : 2 * quorumThreshold 20 - 20 = 12 := by
+    native_decide
+  omega
+
+/-- On exact multiples of five, two 80% export quorums overlap in at least
+`3 * k` validators. -/
+theorem export_quorum_five_mul_overlap_at_least_three_mul
+    {k a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 5 * k + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= b) :
+    3 * k <= overlap := by
+  have hLower :
+      2 * quorumThreshold (5 * k) - 5 * k <= overlap :=
+    two_export_quorums_overlap_lower_bound
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  rw [quorumThreshold_five_mul] at hLower
+  omega
+
+/-- On exact multiples of five, quorum overlap strictly exceeds the standard
+fault bound by at least `2 * k`. For `k = 0` this is only a non-strict
+difference statement; strict safety is provided by
+`export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine` for nonempty universes. -/
+theorem export_quorum_five_mul_overlap_margin
+    {k a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= 5 * k + overlap)
+    (hA : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= a)
+    (hB : quorumThreshold (5 * k) <= b) :
+    byzantineBound (5 * k) + 2 * k <= overlap := by
+  have hOverlap :
+      3 * k <= overlap :=
+    export_quorum_five_mul_overlap_at_least_three_mul
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  rw [byzantineBound_five_mul]
+  omega
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/FFI.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+import XahauConsensus.Invariants
+import XahauConsensus.NunlCap
+import XahauConsensus.SidecarAlignment
+import XahauConsensus.ViewUniverse
+import XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum
+import XahauConsensus.SixtyPercent
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-! Scalar C ABI exports used by the optional C++ drift tests.
+
+These functions intentionally expose only plain integer formulas. The broader
+Lean project proves properties about these definitions; the C++ tests then
+check that selected production formulas and helper predicates still compute the
+same values.
+-/
+
+-- @@start ffi-scalar-export-surface
+@[export xahau_byzantine_bound]
+def xahauByzantineBound (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (byzantineBound count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_participant_threshold]
+def xahauParticipantThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (participantThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_quorum_threshold]
+def xahauQuorumThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (quorumThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_safe_quorum_threshold]
+def xahauSafeQuorumThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (safeQuorumThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_safe_participant_threshold]
+def xahauSafeParticipantThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (safeParticipantThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_entropy_gate_threshold_for_view]
+def xahauEntropyGateThresholdForView
+    (effectiveView originalView : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView.toNat originalView.toNat).toUInt64
+
+def entropyTierCode : EntropyTier → UInt8
+  | EntropyTier.consensusFallback => 1
+  | EntropyTier.participantAligned => 2
+  | EntropyTier.validatorQuorum => 3
+
+@[export xahau_select_entropy_tier]
+def xahauSelectEntropyTier
+    (fromUNLReport participantCount effectiveView originalView : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  entropyTierCode <|
+    selectEntropyTier
+      (fromUNLReport != 0)
+      participantCount.toNat
+      effectiveView.toNat
+      originalView.toNat
+
+@[export xahau_aligned_participants]
+def xahauAlignedParticipants
+    (aligned localIsMember localPublished : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (alignedParticipants
+      aligned.toNat
+      (localIsMember != 0)
+      (localPublished != 0)).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_quorum_aligned]
+def xahauQuorumAligned
+    (threshold aligned localIsMember localPublished : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if quorumAligned
+      threshold.toNat
+      aligned.toNat
+      (localIsMember != 0)
+      (localPublished != 0) then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_full_observation]
+def xahauFullObservation (peersSeen txConverged : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if fullObservation peersSeen.toNat txConverged.toNat then 1 else 0
+
+@[export xahau_export_gate_proceed]
+def xahauExportGateProceed
+    (alignedParticipants quorumThreshold fullObservation : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if (ExportGate.mk
+        alignedParticipants.toNat
+        quorumThreshold.toNat
+        (fullObservation != 0)).proceed then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+
+@[export xahau_strict_intersection_safe]
+def xahauStrictIntersectionSafe
+    (activeView byzantineUniverse threshold : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if activeView.toNat + byzantineBound byzantineUniverse.toNat <
+      2 * threshold.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_nonvacuous_strict_intersection_safe]
+def xahauNonvacuousStrictIntersectionSafe
+    (activeView byzantineUniverse threshold : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if threshold.toNat <= activeView.toNat ∧
+      activeView.toNat + byzantineBound byzantineUniverse.toNat <
+        2 * threshold.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_participant_band_nonempty]
+def xahauParticipantBandNonempty
+    (effectiveView originalView : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if participantThreshold originalView.toNat < quorumThreshold effectiveView.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_export_quorum_overlap_lower_bound]
+def xahauExportQuorumOverlapLowerBound (activeView : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (2 * quorumThreshold activeView.toNat - activeView.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_export_quorum_safe_under_nunl_cap]
+def xahauExportQuorumSafeUnderNunlCap
+    (originalView effectiveView disabled : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if effectiveView.toNat = originalView.toNat - disabled.toNat ∧
+      disabled.toNat <= disabledCap originalView.toNat ∧
+      0 < effectiveView.toNat ∧
+      effectiveView.toNat + byzantineBound originalView.toNat <
+        2 * quorumThreshold effectiveView.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+private def maskBit (mask : UInt64) (peer : Nat) : Bool :=
+  ((mask.toNat / (2 ^ peer)) % 2) == 1
+
+@[export xahau_active_aligned_count_mask]
+def xahauActiveAlignedCountMask
+    (count activeMask alignedMask : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (activeAlignedCount
+      (maskBit activeMask)
+      (maskBit alignedMask)
+      count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_quorum_aligned_mask]
+def xahauQuorumAlignedMask
+    (threshold count activeMask alignedMask localIsMember localPublished : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  let aligned :=
+    activeAlignedCount
+      (maskBit activeMask)
+      (maskBit alignedMask)
+      count.toNat
+  if quorumAligned
+      threshold.toNat
+      aligned
+      (localIsMember != 0)
+      (localPublished != 0) then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_naive_sixty_percent_threshold]
+def xahauNaiveSixtyPercentThreshold (count : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (naiveSixtyPercentThreshold count.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_naive_sixty_percent_is_safe]
+def xahauNaiveSixtyPercentIsSafe (count : UInt64) : UInt8 :=
+  if count.toNat + byzantineBound count.toNat <
+      2 * naiveSixtyPercentThreshold count.toNat then
+    1
+  else
+    0
+
+@[export xahau_disabled_cap]
+def xahauDisabledCap (originalView : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (disabledCap originalView.toNat).toUInt64
+
+@[export xahau_effective_view]
+def xahauEffectiveView (originalView disabled : UInt64) : UInt64 :=
+  (effectiveView originalView.toNat disabled.toNat).toUInt64
+-- @@end ffi-scalar-export-surface
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/FinsetIntersection.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Card
+import XahauConsensus.ExportQuorum
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Finite-set bridge for the quorum-intersection arithmetic.
+
+The arithmetic modules prove useful facts from the premise
+`a + b <= n + overlap`. This module discharges that premise for actual finite
+cohorts `A` and `B` that are both subsets of a common validator universe `U`.
+-/
+
+open Finset
+
+/-- Inclusion-exclusion bridge: two finite cohorts inside one universe satisfy
+the cardinality premise used by `Intersection.lean`. -/
+theorem finset_cardinality_bound
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {U A B : Finset α}
+    (hA : A ⊆ U)
+    (hB : B ⊆ U) :
+    A.card + B.card <= U.card + (A ∩ B).card := by
+  have hUnionSubset : A ∪ B ⊆ U := by
+    intro x hx
+    rcases Finset.mem_union.mp hx with hxA | hxB
+    · exact hA hxA
+    · exact hB hxB
+  have hUnionCard : (A ∪ B).card <= U.card :=
+    Finset.card_le_card hUnionSubset
+  have hInclusion :
+      (A ∪ B).card + (A ∩ B).card = A.card + B.card :=
+    Finset.card_union_add_card_inter A B
+  omega
+
+/-- Set-level Tier-2 form: two participant-threshold cohorts in the same
+validator universe overlap above the Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem finset_participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {U A B : Finset α}
+    (hAUniverse : A ⊆ U)
+    (hBUniverse : B ⊆ U)
+    (hAThreshold : participantThreshold U.card <= A.card)
+    (hBThreshold : participantThreshold U.card <= B.card) :
+    byzantineBound U.card < (A ∩ B).card := by
+  exact participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    (finset_cardinality_bound hAUniverse hBUniverse)
+    hAThreshold
+    hBThreshold
+
+/-- nUNL/set-level form: two original-view participant-threshold cohorts in a
+shrunk effective universe still overlap above the original Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem finset_participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine_under_shrink
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {Original Effective A B : Finset α}
+    (hEffectiveSubset : Effective ⊆ Original)
+    (hAUniverse : A ⊆ Effective)
+    (hBUniverse : B ⊆ Effective)
+    (hAThreshold : participantThreshold Original.card <= A.card)
+    (hBThreshold : participantThreshold Original.card <= B.card) :
+    byzantineBound Original.card < (A ∩ B).card := by
+  have hShrink : Effective.card <= Original.card :=
+    Finset.card_le_card hEffectiveSubset
+  exact participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine_under_shrink
+    hShrink
+    (finset_cardinality_bound hAUniverse hBUniverse)
+    hAThreshold
+    hBThreshold
+
+/-- Set-level export form: two 80% export sidecar quorums in the same nonempty
+active universe overlap above the standard Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem finset_export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    [DecidableEq α]
+    {U A B : Finset α}
+    (hNonempty : 0 < U.card)
+    (hAUniverse : A ⊆ U)
+    (hBUniverse : B ⊆ U)
+    (hAThreshold : quorumThreshold U.card <= A.card)
+    (hBThreshold : quorumThreshold U.card <= B.card) :
+    byzantineBound U.card < (A ∩ B).card := by
+  exact export_hash_quorums_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    hNonempty
+    (finset_cardinality_bound hAUniverse hBUniverse)
+    hAThreshold
+    hBThreshold
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/HonestOverlap.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Intersection
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Bridge from cardinality arithmetic to the consensus-language statement:
+if cohort overlap is larger than the maximum faulty overlap, then the overlap
+contains at least one honest validator.
+-/
+
+/-- If the overlap is larger than the number of faulty validators in it, then
+some honest validator remains in the overlap. -/
+theorem honest_overlap_exists
+    {overlap faultyInOverlap : Nat}
+    (hFaultyLtOverlap : faultyInOverlap < overlap) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  omega
+
+/-- If total faulty validators are bounded by `faultBound`, and the overlap is
+larger than `faultBound`, then the overlap contains an honest validator. -/
+theorem honest_overlap_exists_of_fault_bound
+    {overlap faultyInOverlap faultBound : Nat}
+    (hFaultyBound : faultyInOverlap <= faultBound)
+    (hOverlapGtFaultBound : faultBound < overlap) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  omega
+
+/-- Direct bridge from the abstract two-cohort intersection theorem: two
+threshold-sized cohorts under the strict safety inequality have honest overlap,
+provided faulty validators in the overlap are bounded by `f`.
+-/
+theorem honest_overlap_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    {n a b overlap threshold faultBound faultyInOverlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + overlap)
+    (hA : threshold <= a)
+    (hB : threshold <= b)
+    (hSafety : n + faultBound < 2 * threshold)
+    (hFaultyBound : faultyInOverlap <= faultBound) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  have hOverlapGtFaultBound :
+      faultBound < overlap :=
+    overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+      hSafety
+  exact honest_overlap_exists_of_fault_bound
+    hFaultyBound
+    hOverlapGtFaultBound
+
+/-- Direct participant-threshold form: two Tier-2-sized cohorts in the same
+view have honest overlap under the `floor(n/5)` Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem honest_overlap_of_participant_threshold_cohorts
+    {count a b overlap faultyInOverlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= count + overlap)
+    (hA : participantThreshold count <= a)
+    (hB : participantThreshold count <= b)
+    (hFaultyBound : faultyInOverlap <= byzantineBound count) :
+    0 < overlap - faultyInOverlap := by
+  have hOverlapGtBound :
+      byzantineBound count < overlap :=
+    participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+      hCardinality
+      hA
+      hB
+  exact honest_overlap_exists_of_fault_bound
+    hFaultyBound
+    hOverlapGtBound
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/Intersection.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Abstract cardinality arithmetic for quorum intersection arguments.
+
+The variables are plain natural-number cardinalities:
+
+* `n`: universe size
+* `a`, `b`: cohort sizes
+* `o`: overlap size
+* `t`: quorum threshold
+* `f`: tolerated faulty overlap
+
+The shape `a + b <= n + o` captures the inclusion-exclusion upper bound
+without committing to a concrete `Finset` model.
+-/
+
+/-- If two threshold-sized cohorts fit in an `n`-sized universe only by
+overlapping by `o`, and `n + f < 2 * t`, then the overlap is larger than the
+fault bound `f`. -/
+theorem overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    {n a b o t f : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + o)
+    (hA : t <= a)
+    (hB : t <= b)
+    (hSafety : n + f < 2 * t) :
+    f < o := by
+  omega
+
+/-- Reviewer-facing contrapositive form: if the overlap is no larger than the
+fault bound, then under the strict safety inequality the two cohorts cannot
+both meet threshold. -/
+theorem not_both_threshold_cohorts_of_overlap_le_fault
+    {n a b o t f : Nat}
+    (hOverlap : o <= f)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + o)
+    (hSafety : n + f < 2 * t) :
+    ¬ (t <= a ∧ t <= b) := by
+  intro hBoth
+  have hStrict :
+      f < o :=
+    overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+      hCardinality hBoth.1 hBoth.2 hSafety
+  omega
+
+/-- Equivalent disjunctive form of the reviewer fact: with insufficient
+overlap, at least one candidate cohort must be below threshold. -/
+theorem overlap_le_fault_forces_cohort_below_threshold
+    {n a b o t f : Nat}
+    (hOverlap : o <= f)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= n + o)
+    (hSafety : n + f < 2 * t) :
+    a < t ∨ b < t := by
+  have hNotBoth :
+      ¬ (t <= a ∧ t <= b) :=
+    not_both_threshold_cohorts_of_overlap_le_fault
+      hOverlap hCardinality hSafety
+  omega
+
+/-- Direct Tier-2 form: two cohorts at the participant threshold in the same
+original-view universe must overlap by more than the tolerated Byzantine bound.
+-/
+theorem participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine
+    {count a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= count + overlap)
+    (hA : participantThreshold count <= a)
+    (hB : participantThreshold count <= b) :
+    byzantineBound count < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (participantThreshold_intersection_safe count)
+
+/-- nUNL form: when the effective universe shrinks, the original-view
+participant threshold still forces overlap above the original Byzantine bound.
+-/
+theorem participant_threshold_cohorts_overlap_gt_byzantine_under_shrink
+    {originalView effectiveView a b overlap : Nat}
+    (hShrink : effectiveView <= originalView)
+    (hCardinality : a + b <= effectiveView + overlap)
+    (hA : participantThreshold originalView <= a)
+    (hB : participantThreshold originalView <= b) :
+    byzantineBound originalView < overlap := by
+  exact overlap_gt_fault_of_two_threshold_cohorts
+    hCardinality
+    hA
+    hB
+    (participantThreshold_safe_under_effective_shrink
+      originalView
+      effectiveView
+      hShrink)
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/Invariants.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+import XahauConsensus.EntropySelector
+import XahauConsensus.ExportGate
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Small cross-module invariants that state the design contract in one place.
+
+These do not verify C++ directly. They pin the consensus arguments that the C++
+is intended to implement.
+-/
+
+/-- Same-count band fact: with both thresholds computed from one view size,
+Tier 2 is never stricter than validator quorum. Production nUNL rounds use
+cross-view thresholds instead; see `entropyGateThresholdForView`. -/
+theorem same_count_tier2_not_stricter_than_validator_quorum (count : Nat) :
+    safeParticipantThreshold count <= safeQuorumThreshold count :=
+  safeParticipantThreshold_le_safeQuorumThreshold count
+
+/-- Same-view shorthand: the live entropy gate is the weaker of Tier 2 and
+validator quorum, so it is never above validator quorum. -/
+def entropyGateThresholdModel (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  min (safeQuorumThreshold count) (safeParticipantThreshold count)
+
+theorem entropy_gate_le_validator_quorum (count : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdModel count <= safeQuorumThreshold count := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdModel
+  exact Nat.min_le_left _ _
+
+theorem entropy_gate_le_participant_threshold (count : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdModel count <= safeParticipantThreshold count := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdModel
+  exact Nat.min_le_right _ _
+
+/-- Production shape: validator quorum is over the effective post-nUNL view,
+while Tier 2 is over the original pre-nUNL view. -/
+def entropyGateThresholdForView (effectiveView originalView : Nat) : Nat :=
+  min (safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView) (safeParticipantThreshold originalView)
+
+theorem entropy_gate_for_view_le_validator_quorum
+    (effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView originalView <=
+      safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdForView
+  exact Nat.min_le_left _ _
+
+theorem entropy_gate_for_view_le_participant_threshold
+    (effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView originalView <=
+      safeParticipantThreshold originalView := by
+  unfold entropyGateThresholdForView
+  exact Nat.min_le_right _ _
+
+/-- The entropy gate is exactly the selector's non-fallback boundary: reaching
+the lower of the validator-quorum and participant-aligned thresholds is enough
+to select a non-fallback tier, and below it the selector falls back. -/
+theorem selectEntropyTier_nonfallback_iff_entropy_gate
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    selectEntropyTier true participantCount effectiveView originalView ≠
+        EntropyTier.consensusFallback ↔
+      entropyGateThresholdForView effectiveView originalView <=
+        participantCount := by
+  unfold selectEntropyTier entropyGateThresholdForView
+  by_cases hQuorum : safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView <= participantCount
+  · constructor
+    · intro _
+      exact Nat.le_trans (Nat.min_le_left _ _) hQuorum
+    · intro _
+      simp [hQuorum]
+  · by_cases hParticipant :
+      safeParticipantThreshold originalView <= participantCount
+    · constructor
+      · intro _
+        exact Nat.le_trans (Nat.min_le_right _ _) hParticipant
+      · intro _
+        simp [hQuorum, hParticipant]
+    · constructor
+      · intro hNonfallback
+        simp [hQuorum, hParticipant] at hNonfallback
+      · intro hGate
+        have hBelowQuorum :
+            participantCount < safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView :=
+          Nat.lt_of_not_ge hQuorum
+        have hBelowParticipant :
+            participantCount < safeParticipantThreshold originalView :=
+          Nat.lt_of_not_ge hParticipant
+        have hBelowGate :
+            participantCount <
+              min (safeQuorumThreshold effectiveView)
+                (safeParticipantThreshold originalView) :=
+          (Nat.lt_min).mpr ⟨hBelowQuorum, hBelowParticipant⟩
+        exact False.elim (Nat.not_lt_of_ge hGate hBelowGate)
+
+/-- Until the view is ledger-anchored, entropy tier labeling fails closed. -/
+theorem non_unl_report_cannot_mint_nonfallback
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    selectEntropyTier false participantCount effectiveView originalView =
+      EntropyTier.consensusFallback :=
+  no_unl_report_selects_fallback participantCount effectiveView originalView
+
+/-- Export success is a quorum-alignment property, not a full-observation
+property. -/
+theorem export_success_independent_of_full_observation
+    (alignedParticipants quorumThreshold : Nat) :
+    (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold true).proceed =
+      (ExportGate.mk alignedParticipants quorumThreshold false).proceed :=
+  changing_fullObservation_alone_does_not_change_proceed
+    alignedParticipants
+    quorumThreshold
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/NunlCap.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Arithmetic facts for nUNL-capped view shrinkage.
+
+The examples here intentionally use the original view for the participant
+floor and the effective post-nUNL view for validator quorum.  That is the
+cross-view comparison that matters when disabled validators collapse the space
+between the Tier-2 participant floor and the Tier-3 validator-quorum floor.
+-/
+
+/-- Integer ceiling division, defined defensively for `d = 0`. -/
+def ceilDiv (n d : Nat) : Nat :=
+  if d = 0 then 0 else (n + d - 1) / d
+
+/-- The protocol's ceil-25% nUNL disablement cap for an original validator view. -/
+def disabledCap (originalView : Nat) : Nat :=
+  ceilDiv originalView 4
+
+/-- The post-nUNL effective validator view after `disabled` validators drop. -/
+def effectiveView (originalView disabled : Nat) : Nat :=
+  originalView - disabled
+
+theorem ceilDiv_zero_right (n : Nat) : ceilDiv n 0 = 0 := by
+  simp [ceilDiv]
+
+theorem ceilDiv_four_eight : ceilDiv 8 4 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem ceilDiv_four_ten : ceilDiv 10 4 = 3 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem ceilDiv_four_twenty : ceilDiv 20 4 = 5 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem disabledCap_eight : disabledCap 8 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem disabledCap_ten : disabledCap 10 = 3 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem disabledCap_twenty : disabledCap 20 = 5 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem effectiveView_eight_at_disabledCap :
+    effectiveView 8 (disabledCap 8) = 6 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem effectiveView_ten_at_disabledCap :
+    effectiveView 10 (disabledCap 10) = 7 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem effectiveView_twenty_at_disabledCap :
+    effectiveView 20 (disabledCap 20) = 15 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 8 with two disabled validators collapses the participant/quorum band. -/
+theorem band_collapse_original8_effective6 :
+    quorumThreshold 6 = participantThreshold 8 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original8_effective6_meets_participant_floor :
+    participantThreshold 8 <= quorumThreshold 6 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 10 with two disabled validators collapses the participant/quorum band. -/
+theorem band_collapse_original10_effective8 :
+    quorumThreshold 8 = participantThreshold 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original10_effective8_meets_participant_floor :
+    participantThreshold 10 <= quorumThreshold 8 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 10 at the full ceil-25% cap leaves effective view 7, below the participant floor. -/
+theorem quorum_original10_effective7_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold 7 < participantThreshold 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem max_cap_original10_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold (effectiveView 10 (disabledCap 10)) <
+      participantThreshold 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- At original 20, the full ceil-25% cap leaves effective view 15, which is too small. -/
+theorem quorum_original20_effective15_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold 15 < participantThreshold 20 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original20_effective15_does_not_meet_participant_floor :
+    ¬ participantThreshold 20 <= quorumThreshold 15 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Original 20 with four disabled validators collapses the participant/quorum band. -/
+theorem band_collapse_original20_effective16 :
+    quorumThreshold 16 = participantThreshold 20 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorum_original20_effective16_meets_participant_floor :
+    participantThreshold 20 <= quorumThreshold 16 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- The ceil-25% cap does not by itself guarantee collapse at size 20. -/
+theorem max_cap_original20_below_participant_floor :
+    quorumThreshold (effectiveView 20 (disabledCap 20)) <
+      participantThreshold 20 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/--
+General cross-view comparison: an effective-view quorum satisfies the
+original-view participant floor whenever that quorum clears the original
+intersection boundary.
+-/
+theorem quorumThreshold_meets_participantThreshold_of_intersection_premise
+    {originalView effectiveView : Nat}
+    (h :
+      originalView + byzantineBound originalView <
+        2 * quorumThreshold effectiveView) :
+    participantThreshold originalView <= quorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  exact participantThreshold_minimal originalView (quorumThreshold effectiveView) h
+
+/--
+Once the effective-view quorum threshold meets the original-view participant
+floor, any validator count meeting validator quorum also meets the participant
+floor anchored to the original view.
+-/
+theorem validators_meet_participant_floor_of_meet_quorum
+    {originalView effectiveView validators : Nat}
+    (hBand : participantThreshold originalView <= quorumThreshold effectiveView)
+    (hQuorum : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= validators) :
+    participantThreshold originalView <= validators :=
+  Nat.le_trans hBand hQuorum
+
+/-- If cross-view quorum is no higher than the participant floor, the in-between band is empty. -/
+theorem cross_view_participant_band_empty
+    {originalView effectiveView : Nat}
+    (hCollapse : quorumThreshold effectiveView <= participantThreshold originalView) :
+    ¬ ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold originalView <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  intro hExists
+  rcases hExists with ⟨participants, hParticipant, hBelowQuorum⟩
+  omega
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/SelectorDeterminism.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+import XahauConsensus.EntropySelector
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- A minimal digest model: the payload is opaque to the selector, while the
+label is the entropy tier chosen from the consensus metadata. -/
+structure LabeledDigest (α : Type) where
+  payload : α
+  label : EntropyTier
+  deriving Repr
+
+def labelDigest
+    (fromUNLReport : Bool)
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat)
+    (payload : α) : LabeledDigest α :=
+  { payload
+    label :=
+      selectEntropyTier
+        fromUNLReport
+        participantCount
+        effectiveView
+        originalView }
+
+/-- The digest payload itself does not affect the selected tier. The label is
+entirely determined by the consensus metadata. -/
+theorem payload_does_not_affect_tier
+    {α : Type}
+    {payloadA payloadB : α}
+    (fromUNLReport : Bool)
+    (participantCount effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    (labelDigest
+        fromUNLReport
+        participantCount
+        effectiveView
+        originalView
+        payloadA).label =
+      (labelDigest
+        fromUNLReport
+        participantCount
+        effectiveView
+        originalView
+        payloadB).label := by
+  rfl
+
+/-- Without a UNLReport anchor the same count and views can receive a different
+label. -/
+theorem label_can_differ_when_fromUNLReport_differs :
+    (labelDigest true 8 10 10 0).label ≠
+      (labelDigest false 8 10 10 0).label := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Changing the effective validator view can change the digest label. -/
+theorem label_can_differ_when_effective_view_differs :
+    (labelDigest true 7 8 10 0).label ≠
+      (labelDigest true 7 10 10 0).label := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Changing the original validator view can change the digest label. -/
+theorem label_can_differ_when_original_view_differs :
+    (labelDigest true 6 10 8 0).label ≠
+      (labelDigest true 6 10 10 0).label := by
+  native_decide
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/SidecarAlignment.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- Count a local boolean contribution as the `Nat` value used in threshold
+comparisons. -/
+def localPublishedCount (localPublished : Bool) : Nat :=
+  if localPublished then 1 else 0
+
+/-- The proof-level participant count behind sidecar alignment.
+
+`aligned` is the count of aligned remote active-view participants; a local
+publication contributes one more participant. -/
+def alignedParticipants
+    (aligned : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) : Nat :=
+  aligned + localPublishedCount (localIsMember && localPublished)
+
+/-- Sidecar quorum predicate, kept boolean to mirror the implementation check. -/
+def quorumAligned
+    (threshold aligned : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) : Bool :=
+  decide (threshold <= alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished)
+
+/-- Full sidecar observation means every converged transaction has been seen. -/
+def fullObservation (peersSeen txConverged : Nat) : Bool :=
+  peersSeen == txConverged
+
+/-- Count aligned peers from a finite peer prefix, filtering through the active
+view before any alignment bit contributes. -/
+def activeAlignedCount
+    (inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool) : Nat → Nat
+  | 0 => 0
+  | peer + 1 =>
+      activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer +
+        localPublishedCount (inActiveView peer && peerAligned peer)
+
+theorem localPublishedCount_true :
+    localPublishedCount true = 1 := by
+  rfl
+
+theorem localPublishedCount_false :
+    localPublishedCount false = 0 := by
+  rfl
+
+theorem localPublishedCount_le_one (published : Bool) :
+    localPublishedCount published <= 1 := by
+  cases published <;> simp [localPublishedCount]
+
+/-- Core participant-count equation: aligned remotes plus the local published
+contribution. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_eq_aligned_plus_localPublished
+    (aligned : Nat) (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished =
+      aligned + localPublishedCount (localIsMember && localPublished) := by
+  rfl
+
+/-- A non-active local node cannot pad the participant count. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_local_nonmember
+    (aligned : Nat) (localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned false localPublished = aligned := by
+  cases localPublished <;> rfl
+
+/-- An active local node contributes exactly when it published the sidecar hash. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_local_member
+    (aligned : Nat) (localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned true localPublished =
+      aligned + localPublishedCount localPublished := by
+  cases localPublished <;> rfl
+
+/-- The local node can add at most one participant to the remote aligned count. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_le_aligned_succ
+    (aligned : Nat) (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished <= aligned + 1 := by
+  cases localIsMember <;> cases localPublished <;>
+    simp [alignedParticipants, localPublishedCount]
+
+/-- The boolean quorum predicate is exactly the threshold comparison over
+`alignedParticipants`. -/
+theorem quorumAligned_iff_threshold_le_alignedParticipants
+    (threshold aligned : Nat) (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    quorumAligned threshold aligned localIsMember localPublished = true ↔
+      threshold <= alignedParticipants aligned localIsMember localPublished := by
+  unfold quorumAligned
+  simp
+
+/-- The boolean full-observation predicate is exactly equality of the observed
+and converged counts. -/
+theorem fullObservation_iff_peersSeen_eq_txConverged
+    (peersSeen txConverged : Nat) :
+    fullObservation peersSeen txConverged = true ↔
+      peersSeen = txConverged := by
+  unfold fullObservation
+  simp
+
+/-- A peer outside the active view contributes zero, even if its sidecar
+alignment bit is set. -/
+theorem activeAlignedCount_succ_nonmember
+    {inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool} {peer : Nat}
+    (hNonmember : inActiveView peer = false) :
+    activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned (peer + 1) =
+      activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer := by
+  simp [activeAlignedCount, hNonmember, localPublishedCount]
+
+/-- A prefix of `n` peer positions can contribute at most `n` aligned active
+remote participants. -/
+theorem activeAlignedCount_le_prefix
+    (inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool) (n : Nat) :
+    activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned n <= n := by
+  induction n with
+  | zero =>
+      simp [activeAlignedCount]
+  | succ n ih =>
+      cases hAligned : inActiveView n && peerAligned n
+      · simp [activeAlignedCount, hAligned, localPublishedCount]
+        exact Nat.le_trans ih (Nat.le_succ n)
+      · simp [activeAlignedCount, hAligned, localPublishedCount]
+        exact ih
+
+/-- With the optional local contribution included, the participant count is
+bounded by the inspected remote prefix plus one. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_le_prefix_succ
+    (inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool)
+    (n : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) :
+    alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished <= n + 1 := by
+  have hRemote := activeAlignedCount_le_prefix inActiveView peerAligned n
+  cases localIsMember <;> cases localPublished <;>
+    simp [alignedParticipants, localPublishedCount]
+  · exact Nat.le_trans hRemote (Nat.le_succ n)
+  · exact Nat.le_trans hRemote (Nat.le_succ n)
+  · exact Nat.le_trans hRemote (Nat.le_succ n)
+  · exact hRemote
+
+/-- Adding a nonmember peer to the inspected prefix cannot increase
+`alignedParticipants`. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_succ_nonmember
+    {inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool} {peer : Nat}
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool)
+    (hNonmember : inActiveView peer = false) :
+    alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned (peer + 1))
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [alignedParticipants, activeAlignedCount_succ_nonmember hNonmember]
+
+/-- Consequently, a nonmember peer cannot change the quorum-aligned result. -/
+theorem quorumAligned_succ_nonmember
+    {inActiveView peerAligned : Nat → Bool} {peer threshold : Nat}
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool)
+    (hNonmember : inActiveView peer = false) :
+    quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned (peer + 1))
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView peerAligned peer)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [
+    quorumAligned,
+    alignedParticipants_succ_nonmember
+      localIsMember
+      localPublished
+      hNonmember]
+
+/-- Active-view filtering: only member peers' alignment bits can affect the
+aligned remote count. -/
+theorem activeAlignedCount_ext_on_members
+    {n : Nat} {inActiveView alignedA alignedB : Nat → Bool}
+    (hSameOnMembers :
+      ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+        alignedA peer = alignedB peer) :
+    activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedA n =
+      activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedB n := by
+  induction n with
+  | zero =>
+      rfl
+  | succ n ih =>
+      have hPrefix :
+          ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+            alignedA peer = alignedB peer := by
+        intro peer hLt hMember
+        exact hSameOnMembers peer (Nat.lt_trans hLt (Nat.lt_succ_self n)) hMember
+      have hAt :
+          localPublishedCount (inActiveView n && alignedA n) =
+            localPublishedCount (inActiveView n && alignedB n) := by
+        cases hMember : inActiveView n
+        · simp [localPublishedCount]
+        · have hEq := hSameOnMembers n (Nat.lt_succ_self n) hMember
+          simp [hEq, localPublishedCount]
+      simp [activeAlignedCount, ih hPrefix, hAt]
+
+/-- Changing sidecar alignment reports for nonmembers cannot change the final
+participant count. -/
+theorem alignedParticipants_ext_on_members
+    {n : Nat} {inActiveView alignedA alignedB : Nat → Bool}
+    {localIsMember : Bool}
+    {localPublished : Bool}
+    (hSameOnMembers :
+      ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+        alignedA peer = alignedB peer) :
+    alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedA n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      alignedParticipants
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedB n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [
+    alignedParticipants,
+    activeAlignedCount_ext_on_members hSameOnMembers]
+
+/-- Changing sidecar alignment reports for nonmembers cannot turn quorum on or
+off. -/
+theorem quorumAligned_ext_on_members
+    {n threshold : Nat} {inActiveView alignedA alignedB : Nat → Bool}
+    {localIsMember : Bool}
+    {localPublished : Bool}
+    (hSameOnMembers :
+      ∀ peer, peer < n → inActiveView peer = true →
+        alignedA peer = alignedB peer) :
+    quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedA n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished =
+      quorumAligned threshold
+        (activeAlignedCount inActiveView alignedB n)
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished := by
+  simp [
+    quorumAligned,
+    alignedParticipants_ext_on_members hSameOnMembers]
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/SidecarObservation.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+import XahauConsensus.SidecarAlignment
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- Minimal model of the RNG entropy sidecar accept gate.
+
+The C++ gate accepts validator-derived entropy only when the local view has a
+quorum-aligned sidecar hash and full local observation of tx-converged peers.
+This model deliberately excludes the sidecar-map contents; those are covered by
+the accepted-hash discipline in `selectEntropy`.
+-/
+def entropyObservationGate
+    (threshold aligned : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool)
+    (peersSeen txConverged : Nat) : Bool :=
+  quorumAligned threshold aligned localIsMember localPublished &&
+    fullObservation peersSeen txConverged
+
+/-- A quorum-only variant for comparison. This is not a claim that the C++ must
+use this policy; it is a small model used to isolate what the full-observation
+term contributes to the decision. -/
+def entropyQuorumOnlyGate
+    (threshold aligned : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool) : Bool :=
+  quorumAligned threshold aligned localIsMember localPublished
+
+theorem entropyObservationGate_iff_quorum_and_full
+    (threshold aligned : Nat)
+    (localIsMember localPublished : Bool)
+    (peersSeen txConverged : Nat) :
+    entropyObservationGate
+        threshold
+        aligned
+        localIsMember
+        localPublished
+        peersSeen
+        txConverged = true ↔
+      quorumAligned threshold aligned localIsMember localPublished = true ∧
+        fullObservation peersSeen txConverged = true := by
+  unfold entropyObservationGate
+  simp
+
+/-- `fullObservation` is local equality of two observed counts. If the same node
+has already seen `seen` advertised sidecar hashes, then merely learning about
+one more tx-converged peer that has not advertised flips full observation from
+true to false. -/
+theorem fullObservation_flips_when_unadvertised_peer_is_seen (seen : Nat) :
+    fullObservation seen seen = true ∧
+      fullObservation seen (seen + 1) = false := by
+  constructor
+  · unfold fullObservation
+    simp
+  · unfold fullObservation
+    simp
+
+/-- Concrete counterexample for the RNG gate.
+
+Both local views have the same quorum-aligned sidecar hash: three aligned remote
+participants plus the local validator meet threshold four. The only difference
+is whether the observer has seen a fourth tx-converged peer that did not
+advertise an entropy sidecar hash.
+
+The first view has `peersSeen = txConverged = 3` and accepts. The second has
+`peersSeen = 3`, `txConverged = 4` and does not. This captures the subtle point:
+`fullObservation` is not global completeness and does not by itself synchronize
+accept-vs-fallback decisions across nodes.
+-/
+theorem same_quorum_alignment_fullObservation_can_change_accept :
+    entropyObservationGate 4 3 true true 3 3 = true ∧
+      entropyObservationGate 4 3 true true 3 4 = false := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- In the same counterexample, a quorum-only gate would make the same decision
+for both observers. This theorem is descriptive only: it isolates the source of
+the branch difference; it does not model the liveness/timing costs of changing
+the production gate. -/
+theorem same_quorum_alignment_quorumOnly_same_decision :
+    entropyQuorumOnlyGate 4 3 true true = true ∧
+      entropyQuorumOnlyGate 4 3 true true = true := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Quorum alignment and full observation are independent predicates: a view can
+have quorum alignment while still lacking full observation. -/
+theorem quorumAligned_does_not_imply_fullObservation :
+    quorumAligned 4 3 true true = true ∧
+      fullObservation 3 4 = false := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Full observation also does not imply quorum alignment. A node can have seen
+all tx-converged peers in its local view while too few participants align with
+its sidecar hash. -/
+theorem fullObservation_does_not_imply_quorumAligned :
+    fullObservation 3 3 = true ∧
+      quorumAligned 4 2 true true = false := by
+  native_decide
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/SixtyPercent.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Review-oriented facts about the tempting `ceil(60%)` participant threshold.
+
+The live `participantThreshold` is one higher than naive 60% at exact
+multiples of five. That extra vote is what turns equality at the
+Byzantine-overlap boundary into strict intersection safety.
+-/
+
+/-- A naive `ceil(0.6 * count)` threshold. -/
+def naiveSixtyPercentThreshold (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  (count * 60 + 99) / 100
+
+theorem naiveSixtyPercentThreshold_five_mul (k : Nat) :
+    naiveSixtyPercentThreshold (5 * k) = 3 * k := by
+  unfold naiveSixtyPercentThreshold
+  omega
+
+theorem participantThreshold_five_mul_eq_naiveSixtyPercentThreshold_succ
+    (k : Nat) :
+    participantThreshold (5 * k) =
+      naiveSixtyPercentThreshold (5 * k) + 1 := by
+  unfold participantThreshold byzantineBound naiveSixtyPercentThreshold
+  omega
+
+/-- At exact multiples of five, naive 60% only reaches the unsafe boundary. -/
+theorem naiveSixtyPercentThreshold_five_mul_hits_intersection_boundary
+    (k : Nat) :
+    2 * naiveSixtyPercentThreshold (5 * k) =
+      5 * k + byzantineBound (5 * k) := by
+  unfold naiveSixtyPercentThreshold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+theorem naiveSixtyPercentThreshold_five_mul_not_intersection_safe
+    (k : Nat) :
+    ¬ 5 * k + byzantineBound (5 * k) <
+      2 * naiveSixtyPercentThreshold (5 * k) := by
+  rw [naiveSixtyPercentThreshold_five_mul_hits_intersection_boundary k]
+  omega
+
+theorem participantThreshold_five_mul_intersection_safe (k : Nat) :
+    5 * k + byzantineBound (5 * k) <
+      2 * participantThreshold (5 * k) := by
+  exact participantThreshold_intersection_safe (5 * k)
+
+/-- At exact multiples of five, the live threshold clears the boundary by two. -/
+theorem participantThreshold_five_mul_intersection_margin (k : Nat) :
+    2 * participantThreshold (5 * k) =
+      (5 * k + byzantineBound (5 * k)) + 2 := by
+  unfold participantThreshold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/Threshold.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-- C++: `count / 5`, the conservative Byzantine bound used by
+`calculateParticipantThreshold`. -/
+def byzantineBound (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  count / 5
+
+/-- C++: `calculateParticipantThreshold(count)`.
+
+This is the smallest integer `t` satisfying `2 * t > count + floor(count / 5)`.
+-/
+def participantThreshold (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  (count + byzantineBound count) / 2 + 1
+
+/-- C++: `calculateQuorumThreshold(count)`, i.e. `ceil(0.8 * count)`. -/
+def quorumThreshold (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  (count * 80 + 99) / 100
+
+/-- C++: `ConsensusExtensions::quorumThreshold()`.
+
+The raw formula gives `0` for an empty view, but the live consensus-extension
+gate requires at least one aligned participant for safety.
+-/
+def safeQuorumThreshold (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  if count = 0 then 1 else quorumThreshold count
+
+/-- C++: `ConsensusExtensions::tier2Threshold()`.
+
+`participantThreshold 0` already returns `1`; this wrapper makes the
+zero-view safety rule explicit and mirrors the C++ method shape.
+-/
+def safeParticipantThreshold (count : Nat) : Nat :=
+  if count = 0 then 1 else participantThreshold count
+
+/-- The Tier-2 threshold strictly exceeds the Byzantine-overlap boundary.
+
+This is the load-bearing equivocation invariant behind participant-aligned
+entropy: two cohorts of this size in a `count`-sized universe overlap in more
+than `floor(count / 5)` validators.
+-/
+theorem participantThreshold_intersection_safe (count : Nat) :
+    count + byzantineBound count < 2 * participantThreshold count := by
+  unfold participantThreshold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+/-- Anchoring the Tier-2 threshold to the original pre-nUNL view remains safe
+when the effective post-nUNL view shrinks.
+
+This is the arithmetic reason `originalViewSize` is the right denominator:
+smaller effective universes only increase the intersection margin.
+-/
+theorem participantThreshold_safe_under_effective_shrink
+    (originalView effectiveView : Nat)
+    (hShrink : effectiveView <= originalView) :
+    effectiveView + byzantineBound originalView <
+      2 * participantThreshold originalView := by
+  have hSafe := participantThreshold_intersection_safe originalView
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete regression example: if `originalView = 10` and `effectiveView = 8`,
+using the effective view's participant threshold (`5`) leaves the overlap equal
+to the original-view Byzantine bound (`2`), not strictly greater than it.
+
+This is why the C++ must not replace `originalViewSize` with `size()` for the
+Tier-2 floor.
+-/
+theorem effective_threshold_regression_hits_boundary_example :
+    2 * participantThreshold 8 <= 8 + byzantineBound 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem threshold_minimal_for_boundary (boundary threshold : Nat) :
+    boundary < 2 * threshold → boundary / 2 + 1 <= threshold := by
+  omega
+
+theorem below_threshold_not_safe_for_boundary (boundary threshold : Nat) :
+    threshold < boundary / 2 + 1 → 2 * threshold <= boundary := by
+  omega
+
+/-- `participantThreshold` is the smallest threshold satisfying the strict
+intersection-safety inequality. -/
+theorem participantThreshold_minimal (count threshold : Nat) :
+    count + byzantineBound count < 2 * threshold →
+      participantThreshold count <= threshold := by
+  intro hSafe
+  unfold participantThreshold
+  exact threshold_minimal_for_boundary
+    (count + byzantineBound count)
+    threshold
+    hSafe
+
+/-- Anything below `participantThreshold` fails the strict intersection-safety
+inequality. -/
+theorem below_participantThreshold_not_safe (count threshold : Nat) :
+    threshold < participantThreshold count →
+      2 * threshold <= count + byzantineBound count := by
+  intro hBelow
+  unfold participantThreshold at hBelow
+  exact below_threshold_not_safe_for_boundary
+    (count + byzantineBound count)
+    threshold
+    hBelow
+
+/-- The participant threshold never exceeds the 80% validator-quorum threshold.
+
+This is useful because Tier 2 should form a band below Tier 3, not a stricter
+condition than validator quorum.
+-/
+theorem participantThreshold_le_quorumThreshold (count : Nat) :
+    0 < count → participantThreshold count <= quorumThreshold count := by
+  intro hCount
+  unfold participantThreshold quorumThreshold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+/-- With the live safety wrappers, the participant threshold never exceeds the
+validator-quorum threshold, including the empty-view edge case. -/
+theorem safeParticipantThreshold_le_safeQuorumThreshold (count : Nat) :
+    safeParticipantThreshold count <= safeQuorumThreshold count := by
+  unfold safeParticipantThreshold safeQuorumThreshold
+  by_cases hZero : count = 0
+  · simp [hZero]
+  · have hPositive : 0 < count := Nat.pos_of_ne_zero hZero
+    simp [hZero, participantThreshold_le_quorumThreshold count hPositive]
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/ThresholdFacts.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+import XahauConsensus.Threshold
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Additional arithmetic facts about the Xahau consensus thresholds.
+
+These lemmas are deliberately small and review-oriented: they expose concrete
+edge cases, exact multiples-of-five behavior, participant/quorum band facts,
+and monotonicity of the threshold functions.
+-/
+
+theorem byzantineBound_zero : byzantineBound 0 = 0 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_zero : participantThreshold 0 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_zero : quorumThreshold 0 = 0 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem safeQuorumThreshold_zero : safeQuorumThreshold 0 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem safeParticipantThreshold_zero : safeParticipantThreshold 0 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem byzantineBound_one : byzantineBound 1 = 0 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_one : participantThreshold 1 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_one : quorumThreshold 1 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem safeQuorumThreshold_one : safeQuorumThreshold 1 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem safeParticipantThreshold_one : safeParticipantThreshold 1 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_two : participantThreshold 2 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_two : quorumThreshold 2 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_three : participantThreshold 3 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_three : quorumThreshold 3 = 3 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_four : participantThreshold 4 = 3 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_four : quorumThreshold 4 = 4 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem byzantineBound_five : byzantineBound 5 = 1 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_five : participantThreshold 5 = 4 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_five : quorumThreshold 5 = 4 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem byzantineBound_ten : byzantineBound 10 = 2 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_ten : participantThreshold 10 = 7 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_ten : quorumThreshold 10 = 8 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem byzantineBound_twenty : byzantineBound 20 = 4 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_twenty : participantThreshold 20 = 13 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_twenty : quorumThreshold 20 = 16 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem byzantineBound_five_mul (k : Nat) :
+    byzantineBound (5 * k) = k := by
+  unfold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+theorem participantThreshold_five_mul (k : Nat) :
+    participantThreshold (5 * k) = 3 * k + 1 := by
+  unfold participantThreshold byzantineBound
+  omega
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_five_mul (k : Nat) :
+    quorumThreshold (5 * k) = 4 * k := by
+  unfold quorumThreshold
+  omega
+
+/-- On exact multiples of five, the strict safety margin is exactly two. -/
+theorem participantThreshold_five_mul_margin (k : Nat) :
+    2 * participantThreshold (5 * k) =
+      (5 * k + byzantineBound (5 * k)) + 2 := by
+  rw [participantThreshold_five_mul, byzantineBound_five_mul]
+  omega
+
+/-- One below the multiple-of-five participant threshold reaches only equality
+with the unsafe boundary, so the strict safety inequality fails. -/
+theorem below_participantThreshold_five_mul_hits_boundary (k : Nat) :
+    2 * (participantThreshold (5 * k) - 1) =
+      5 * k + byzantineBound (5 * k) := by
+  rw [participantThreshold_five_mul, byzantineBound_five_mul]
+  omega
+
+theorem participantThreshold_five_mul_lt_quorumThreshold_five_mul
+    {k : Nat} (h : 1 < k) :
+    participantThreshold (5 * k) < quorumThreshold (5 * k) := by
+  rw [participantThreshold_five_mul, quorumThreshold_five_mul]
+  omega
+
+theorem participantThreshold_five_eq_quorumThreshold_five :
+    participantThreshold 5 = quorumThreshold 5 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participantThreshold_ten_lt_quorumThreshold_ten :
+    participantThreshold 10 < quorumThreshold 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_nonempty {count : Nat}
+    (h : participantThreshold count < quorumThreshold count) :
+    ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold count <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold count := by
+  exact ⟨participantThreshold count, Nat.le_refl _, h⟩
+
+theorem participant_band_empty {count : Nat}
+    (h : quorumThreshold count <= participantThreshold count) :
+    ¬ ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold count <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold count := by
+  intro hExists
+  rcases hExists with ⟨participants, hParticipant, hBelowQuorum⟩
+  omega
+
+theorem participant_band_empty_zero :
+    ¬ ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold 0 <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold 0 := by
+  apply participant_band_empty
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_empty_one :
+    ¬ ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold 1 <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold 1 := by
+  apply participant_band_empty
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_empty_two :
+    ¬ ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold 2 <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold 2 := by
+  apply participant_band_empty
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_empty_five :
+    ¬ ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold 5 <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold 5 := by
+  apply participant_band_empty
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_nonempty_three :
+    ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold 3 <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold 3 := by
+  apply participant_band_nonempty
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_nonempty_four :
+    ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold 4 <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold 4 := by
+  apply participant_band_nonempty
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_nonempty_ten :
+    ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold 10 <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold 10 := by
+  apply participant_band_nonempty
+  native_decide
+
+theorem participant_band_nonempty_five_mul {k : Nat} (h : 1 < k) :
+    ∃ participants,
+      participantThreshold (5 * k) <= participants ∧
+        participants < quorumThreshold (5 * k) := by
+  exact participant_band_nonempty
+    (participantThreshold_five_mul_lt_quorumThreshold_five_mul h)
+
+theorem byzantineBound_mono {a b : Nat} (h : a <= b) :
+    byzantineBound a <= byzantineBound b := by
+  unfold byzantineBound
+  exact Nat.div_le_div_right h
+
+theorem participantThreshold_mono {a b : Nat} (h : a <= b) :
+    participantThreshold a <= participantThreshold b := by
+  unfold participantThreshold
+  apply Nat.succ_le_succ
+  apply Nat.div_le_div_right
+  have hByzantine := byzantineBound_mono h
+  omega
+
+theorem quorumThreshold_mono {a b : Nat} (h : a <= b) :
+    quorumThreshold a <= quorumThreshold b := by
+  unfold quorumThreshold
+  apply Nat.div_le_div_right
+  omega
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/XahauConsensus/ViewUniverse.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+import XahauConsensus.ThresholdFacts
+
+namespace XahauConsensus
+
+/-!
+Concrete arithmetic examples for the distinction between the active effective
+view, the original pre-nUNL view, and any larger trusted counting universe.
+
+The safety shape is deliberately Nat-only: two cohorts of size `threshold` in
+an `activeView` overlap strictly beyond the Byzantine bound charged to
+`byzantineUniverse` when
+
+  `activeView + byzantineBound byzantineUniverse < 2 * threshold`.
+-/
+
+def strictIntersectionSafe
+    (activeView byzantineUniverse threshold : Nat) : Prop :=
+  activeView + byzantineBound byzantineUniverse < 2 * threshold
+
+/-- Strict intersection safety plus reachability of the threshold inside the
+active view. This separates "safe if it happens" from "possible to happen". -/
+def nonvacuousStrictIntersectionSafe
+    (activeView byzantineUniverse threshold : Nat) : Prop :=
+  threshold <= activeView ∧ strictIntersectionSafe activeView byzantineUniverse threshold
+
+/-- Cross-view Tier-2 band: participant floor is anchored to the original view,
+validator quorum to the effective view. -/
+def participantBandNonempty
+    (effectiveView originalView : Nat) : Prop :=
+  ∃ participants,
+    participantThreshold originalView <= participants ∧
+      participants < quorumThreshold effectiveView
+
+theorem participantBandNonempty_iff
+    (effectiveView originalView : Nat) :
+    participantBandNonempty effectiveView originalView ↔
+      participantThreshold originalView < quorumThreshold effectiveView := by
+  constructor
+  · intro h
+    rcases h with ⟨participants, hParticipant, hBelowQuorum⟩
+    omega
+  · intro h
+    exact ⟨participantThreshold originalView, Nat.le_refl _, h⟩
+
+/-- The original-view participant threshold remains safe when nUNL shrinks the
+active effective view. -/
+theorem original_threshold_safe_under_nunl_shrink
+    {originalView effectiveView : Nat}
+    (hShrink : effectiveView <= originalView) :
+    strictIntersectionSafe
+      effectiveView
+      originalView
+      (participantThreshold originalView) := by
+  unfold strictIntersectionSafe
+  exact participantThreshold_safe_under_effective_shrink
+    originalView
+    effectiveView
+    hShrink
+
+theorem original_threshold_nonvacuous_under_nunl_shrink
+    {originalView effectiveView : Nat}
+    (hShrink : effectiveView <= originalView)
+    (hReachable : participantThreshold originalView <= effectiveView) :
+    nonvacuousStrictIntersectionSafe
+      effectiveView
+      originalView
+      (participantThreshold originalView) := by
+  constructor
+  · exact hReachable
+  · exact original_threshold_safe_under_nunl_shrink hShrink
+
+/-- The original-view threshold is also safe if the Byzantine counting universe
+is no larger than the original view. -/
+theorem original_threshold_safe_for_no_larger_counting_universe
+    {originalView effectiveView countingUniverse : Nat}
+    (hShrink : effectiveView <= originalView)
+    (hCounting : countingUniverse <= originalView) :
+    strictIntersectionSafe
+      effectiveView
+      countingUniverse
+      (participantThreshold originalView) := by
+  unfold strictIntersectionSafe
+  have hOriginal :=
+    participantThreshold_safe_under_effective_shrink
+      originalView
+      effectiveView
+      hShrink
+  have hBound := byzantineBound_mono hCounting
+  omega
+
+/-- Any threshold at or below the overlap boundary is not strictly safe. -/
+theorem not_strictIntersectionSafe_of_threshold_le_boundary
+    {activeView byzantineUniverse threshold : Nat}
+    (hBoundary : 2 * threshold <= activeView + byzantineBound byzantineUniverse) :
+    ¬ strictIntersectionSafe activeView byzantineUniverse threshold := by
+  unfold strictIntersectionSafe
+  omega
+
+/-- If the effective-view threshold is below what the original Byzantine bound
+requires, it cannot prove strict intersection safety against that original
+bound. -/
+theorem effective_threshold_not_safe_against_original_bound
+    {originalView effectiveView : Nat}
+    (hBelow :
+      participantThreshold effectiveView <
+        (effectiveView + byzantineBound originalView) / 2 + 1) :
+    ¬ strictIntersectionSafe
+      effectiveView
+      originalView
+      (participantThreshold effectiveView) := by
+  apply not_strictIntersectionSafe_of_threshold_le_boundary
+  exact below_threshold_not_safe_for_boundary
+    (effectiveView + byzantineBound originalView)
+    (participantThreshold effectiveView)
+    hBelow
+
+/-- A larger trusted counting universe increases the Byzantine side of the
+boundary, eroding the strict-intersection margin. -/
+theorem original_boundary_le_trusted_superset_boundary
+    {originalView effectiveView trustedUniverse : Nat}
+    (hSuperset : originalView <= trustedUniverse) :
+    effectiveView + byzantineBound originalView <=
+      effectiveView + byzantineBound trustedUniverse := by
+  have hBound := byzantineBound_mono hSuperset
+  omega
+
+/-- Concrete nUNL example: `originalView = 10`, `effectiveView = 8`, and the
+original threshold still clears the original Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem original_ten_effective_eight_original_threshold_safe :
+    strictIntersectionSafe 8 10 (participantThreshold 10) := by
+  unfold strictIntersectionSafe
+  native_decide
+
+theorem original_ten_effective_eight_participant_band_empty :
+    ¬ participantBandNonempty 8 10 := by
+  rw [participantBandNonempty_iff]
+  native_decide
+
+theorem original_ten_effective_eight_original_threshold_reachable :
+    nonvacuousStrictIntersectionSafe 8 10 (participantThreshold 10) := by
+  apply original_threshold_nonvacuous_under_nunl_shrink
+  · native_decide
+  · native_decide
+
+/-- Concrete regression: for `originalView = 10` and `effectiveView = 8`, the
+effective threshold does not strictly clear the original Byzantine bound. -/
+theorem original_ten_effective_eight_effective_threshold_not_safe :
+    ¬ strictIntersectionSafe 8 10 (participantThreshold 8) := by
+  apply not_strictIntersectionSafe_of_threshold_le_boundary
+  native_decide
+
+/-- The same failure as a direct boundary comparison, useful when reviewing the
+raw arithmetic. -/
+theorem original_ten_effective_eight_effective_threshold_hits_boundary :
+    2 * participantThreshold 8 <= 8 + byzantineBound 10 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Larger concrete nUNL example with the original threshold anchored at
+`20`. -/
+theorem original_twenty_effective_sixteen_original_threshold_safe :
+    strictIntersectionSafe 16 20 (participantThreshold 20) := by
+  unfold strictIntersectionSafe
+  native_decide
+
+theorem original_twenty_effective_sixteen_participant_band_empty :
+    ¬ participantBandNonempty 16 20 := by
+  rw [participantBandNonempty_iff]
+  native_decide
+
+theorem original_twenty_effective_fifteen_participant_band_empty :
+    ¬ participantBandNonempty 15 20 := by
+  rw [participantBandNonempty_iff]
+  native_decide
+
+theorem original_twenty_effective_fifteen_original_threshold_reachable :
+    nonvacuousStrictIntersectionSafe 15 20 (participantThreshold 20) := by
+  apply original_threshold_nonvacuous_under_nunl_shrink
+  · native_decide
+  · native_decide
+
+/-- With `originalView = 20` and `effectiveView = 16`, using the effective
+threshold again reaches the unsafe boundary. -/
+theorem original_twenty_effective_sixteen_effective_threshold_not_safe :
+    ¬ strictIntersectionSafe 16 20 (participantThreshold 16) := by
+  apply not_strictIntersectionSafe_of_threshold_le_boundary
+  native_decide
+
+/-- Counting Byzantine stake over a trusted universe of `20` instead of the
+original view of `10` erodes the margin all the way to equality. -/
+theorem trusted_superset_twenty_erodes_original_ten_margin_to_boundary :
+    2 * participantThreshold 10 = 10 + byzantineBound 20 := by
+  native_decide
+
+/-- The equality above means the original threshold for `10` is not strictly
+safe if Byzantine weight is counted over the larger trusted universe `20`. -/
+theorem trusted_superset_twenty_original_ten_threshold_not_safe :
+    ¬ strictIntersectionSafe 10 20 (participantThreshold 10) := by
+  apply not_strictIntersectionSafe_of_threshold_le_boundary
+  native_decide
+
+end XahauConsensus

formal_verification/lake-manifest.json

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+{"version": "1.2.0",
+ "packagesDir": ".lake/packages",
+ "packages":
+ [{"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/mathlib4.git",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "",
+   "rev": "fabf563a7c95a166b8d7b6efca11c8b4dc9d911f",
+   "name": "mathlib",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "v4.31.0",
+   "inherited": false,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.lean"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/plausible",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "63045536fe95024e6c18fc7b48e03f506701c5bc",
+   "name": "plausible",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "main",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/LeanSearchClient",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "c5d5b8fe6e5158def25cd28eb94e4141ad97c843",
+   "name": "LeanSearchClient",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "main",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/import-graph",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "5c7542ed018c78194f1e2b903eaf6a792b74c03d",
+   "name": "importGraph",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "main",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/ProofWidgets4",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "24b0d9dc081c5423f8eec7e866c441e5184f29d9",
+   "name": "proofwidgets",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "main",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.lean"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/aesop",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "e3cb2f741431ce31bf73549fb52316a57368b06f",
+   "name": "aesop",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "master",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/quote4",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "f46324995fca5f0483b742e4eb4daec7f4ee50d2",
+   "name": "Qq",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "master",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/batteries",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "fa08db58b30eb033edcdab331bba000827f9f785",
+   "name": "batteries",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "main",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover/lean4-cli",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover",
+   "rev": "92564e5770e4d09f2d86dfbf8ada1e9c715b384c",
+   "name": "Cli",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "v4.31.0",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"}],
+ "name": "xahau_consensus",
+ "lakeDir": ".lake",
+ "fixedToolchain": false}

formal_verification/lakefile.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+name = "xahau_consensus"
+version = "0.1.0"
+defaultTargets = ["XahauConsensus"]
+
+[[require]]
+name = "mathlib"
+git = "https://github.com/leanprover-community/mathlib4.git"
+rev = "v4.31.0"
+
+[[lean_lib]]
+name = "XahauConsensus"

formal_verification/lean-toolchain

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+leanprover/lean4:v4.31.0

hook/error.h

@@ -47,5 +47,8 @@
 #define MEM_OVERLAP -43
 #define TOO_MANY_STATE_MODIFICATIONS -44
 #define TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES -45
+#define EXPORT_FAILURE -46
+#define TOO_MANY_EXPORTED_TXN -47
+#define TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY -48
 #define HOOK_ERROR_CODES
 #endif //HOOK_ERROR_CODES

hook/extern.h

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 // Generated using generate_extern.sh
 #include <stdint.h>
 #ifndef HOOK_EXTERN
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
 
 extern int32_t __attribute__((noduplicate))
 _g(uint32_t guard_id, uint32_t maxiter);
@@ -336,5 +339,43 @@ prepare(
     uint32_t read_ptr,
     uint32_t read_len);
 
+extern int64_t
+xport_reserve(uint32_t count);
+
+extern int64_t
+xport(
+    uint32_t write_ptr,
+    uint32_t write_len,
+    uint32_t read_ptr,
+    uint32_t read_len);
+
+extern int64_t
+xport_cancel(uint32_t ticket_seq);
+
+/*
+    Consensus entropy APIs.
+
+    min_tier is a fail-closed floor:
+      1 = consensus_fallback, 2 = participant_aligned, 3 = validator_quorum.
+    min_count is the minimum validator/reveal count the caller accepts.
+
+    If the most recent finalized entropy object does not satisfy both floors,
+    these APIs return TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY. Open-ledger and simulate execution
+    are provisional previews over the entropy currently visible to the node;
+    final ordered ledger execution may see a different entropy object.
+*/
+extern int64_t
+dice(uint32_t sides, uint32_t min_tier, uint32_t min_count);
+
+extern int64_t
+random(
+    uint32_t write_ptr,
+    uint32_t write_len,
+    uint32_t min_tier,
+    uint32_t min_count);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 #define HOOK_EXTERN
 #endif  // HOOK_EXTERN

hook/generate_error.sh

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ENUM_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/../include/xrpl/hook/Enum.h"
 echo '// For documentation please see: https://xrpl-hooks.readme.io/reference/'
 echo '// Generated using generate_error.sh'
 echo '#ifndef HOOK_ERROR_CODES'
-sed -n '/enum hook_return_code/,/};/p' "$ENUM_FILE" |
+sed -n '/enum class hook_return_code/,/};/p' "$ENUM_FILE" |
     awk '
         function ltrim(s) { sub(/^[[:space:]]+/, "", s); return s }
         function rtrim(s) { sub(/[[:space:]]+$/, "", s); return s }
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ sed -n '/enum hook_return_code/,/};/p' "$ENUM_FILE" |
 
         {
             line = $0
-            if (line ~ /enum[[:space:]]+hook_return_code/)
+            if (line ~ /enum[[:space:]]+class[[:space:]]+hook_return_code/)
                 next
             if (line ~ /^[[:space:]]*\{/)
                 next

hook/generate_extern.sh

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ APPLY_HOOK="$SCRIPT_DIR/../include/xrpl/hook/hook_api.macro"
     echo '// Generated using generate_extern.sh'
     echo '#include <stdint.h>'
     echo '#ifndef HOOK_EXTERN'
+    echo '#ifdef __cplusplus'
+    echo 'extern "C" {'
+    echo '#endif'
     echo
     awk '
         function trim(s) {
@@ -38,6 +41,21 @@ APPLY_HOOK="$SCRIPT_DIR/../include/xrpl/hook/hook_api.macro"
                     # Insert __attribute__((noduplicate)) before _g
                     sub(/[[:space:]]+_g/, " __attribute__((noduplicate)) _g", line);
                 }
+
+                if (line ~ /[[:space:]]+dice[[:space:]]*\(/) {
+                    print "/*";
+                    print "    Consensus entropy APIs.";
+                    print "";
+                    print "    min_tier is a fail-closed floor:";
+                    print "      1 = consensus_fallback, 2 = participant_aligned, 3 = validator_quorum.";
+                    print "    min_count is the minimum validator/reveal count the caller accepts.";
+                    print "";
+                    print "    If the most recent finalized entropy object does not satisfy both floors,";
+                    print "    these APIs return TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY. Open-ledger and simulate execution";
+                    print "    are provisional previews over the entropy currently visible to the node;";
+                    print "    final ordered ledger execution may see a different entropy object.";
+                    print "*/";
+                }
                 
                 # printf("\n");
                 
@@ -46,6 +64,9 @@ APPLY_HOOK="$SCRIPT_DIR/../include/xrpl/hook/hook_api.macro"
         }
     ' "$APPLY_HOOK"
 
+    echo '#ifdef __cplusplus'
+    echo '}'
+    echo '#endif'
     echo '#define HOOK_EXTERN'
     echo '#endif  // HOOK_EXTERN'
 } | (

hook/genesis/build_xahau_h.sh

@@ -100,14 +100,14 @@ update_hook_array() {
     echo -e "${BLUE}==> Updating ${hook_name}...${NC}"
 
     # Check if hook already exists
-    if grep -q "static std::vector<uint8_t> const ${hook_name} = {" "${XAHAU_H}"; then
+    if grep -q "static const std::vector<uint8_t> ${hook_name} = {" "${XAHAU_H}"; then
         echo -e "${YELLOW}    Replacing existing ${hook_name}${NC}"
 
         # Use awk to replace the array content
         awk -v hook="${hook_name}" -v hex="${hex_array}" '
         BEGIN { in_array=0 }
         {
-            if ($0 ~ "static std::vector<uint8_t> const " hook " = {") {
+            if ($0 ~ "static const std::vector<uint8_t> " hook " = {") {
                 print $0
                 print hex
                 in_array=1
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ update_hook_array() {
         {
             if ($0 ~ /#endif.*XAHAU_GENESIS_HOOKS/) {
                 print ""
-                print "static std::vector<uint8_t> const " hook " = {"
+                print "static const std::vector<uint8_t> " hook " = {"
                 print hex
                 print "};"
                 print ""
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ echo -e "${GREEN}    Formatting completed${NC}"
 echo -e "${BLUE}==> Verifying changes...${NC}"
 for hook_entry in "${HOOK_FILES[@]}"; do
     hook_name="${hook_entry%%:*}"
-    if grep -q "static std::vector<uint8_t> const ${hook_name} = {" "${XAHAU_H}"; then
+    if grep -q "static const std::vector<uint8_t> ${hook_name} = {" "${XAHAU_H}"; then
         echo -e "${GREEN}    ✓ ${hook_name} found in xahau.h${NC}"
     else
         echo -e "${RED}    ✗ ${hook_name} NOT found in xahau.h${NC}" >&2

hook/genesis/headers/macro.h

@@ -607,31 +607,37 @@ int out_len = 0;\
 #define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE 248U
 #endif
 
-#define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE(buf_out_master, drops_amount_raw, to_address, dest_tag_raw, src_tag_raw)\
-    {\
-        uint8_t* buf_out = buf_out_master;\
-        uint8_t acc[20];\
-        uint64_t drops_amount = (drops_amount_raw);\
-        uint32_t dest_tag = (dest_tag_raw);\
-        uint32_t src_tag = (src_tag_raw);\
-        uint32_t cls = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();\
-        hook_account(SBUF(acc));\
-        _01_02_ENCODE_TT                   (buf_out, ttPAYMENT                      );      /* uint16  | size   3 */ \
-        _02_02_ENCODE_FLAGS                (buf_out, tfCANONICAL                    );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_03_ENCODE_TAG_SRC              (buf_out, src_tag                        );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_04_ENCODE_SEQUENCE             (buf_out, 0                              );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_14_ENCODE_TAG_DST              (buf_out, dest_tag                       );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_26_ENCODE_FLS                  (buf_out, cls + 1                        );      /* uint32  | size   6 */ \
-        _02_27_ENCODE_LLS                  (buf_out, cls + 5                        );      /* uint32  | size   6 */ \
-        _06_01_ENCODE_DROPS_AMOUNT         (buf_out, drops_amount                   );      /* amount  | size   9 */ \
-        uint8_t* fee_ptr = buf_out;\
-        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE            (buf_out, 0                              );      /* amount  | size   9 */ \
-        _07_03_ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_NULL  (buf_out                                 );      /* pk      | size  35 */ \
-        _08_01_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_SRC          (buf_out, acc                            );      /* account | size  22 */ \
-        _08_03_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_DST          (buf_out, to_address                     );      /* account | size  22 */ \
-        int64_t edlen = etxn_details((uint32_t)buf_out, PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE);       /* emitdet | size 1?? */ \
-        int64_t fee = etxn_fee_base(buf_out_master, PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE);                                    \ 
-        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE            (fee_ptr, fee                            );                               \
+#define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE(                                              \
+    buf_out_master, drops_amount_raw, to_address, dest_tag_raw, src_tag_raw) \
+    {                                                                        \
+        uint8_t* buf_out = buf_out_master;                                   \
+        uint8_t acc[20];                                                     \
+        uint64_t drops_amount = (drops_amount_raw);                          \
+        uint32_t dest_tag = (dest_tag_raw);                                  \
+        uint32_t src_tag = (src_tag_raw);                                    \
+        uint32_t cls = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();                               \
+        hook_account(SBUF(acc));                                             \
+        _01_02_ENCODE_TT(buf_out, ttPAYMENT);      /* uint16  | size   3 */  \
+        _02_02_ENCODE_FLAGS(buf_out, tfCANONICAL); /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_03_ENCODE_TAG_SRC(buf_out, src_tag);   /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_04_ENCODE_SEQUENCE(buf_out, 0);        /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_14_ENCODE_TAG_DST(buf_out, dest_tag);  /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_26_ENCODE_FLS(buf_out, cls + 1);       /* uint32  | size   6 */  \
+        _02_27_ENCODE_LLS(buf_out, cls + 5);       /* uint32  | size   6 */  \
+        _06_01_ENCODE_DROPS_AMOUNT(                                          \
+            buf_out, drops_amount); /* amount  | size   9 */                 \
+        uint8_t* fee_ptr = buf_out;                                          \
+        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE(buf_out, 0);        /* amount  | size   9 */ \
+        _07_03_ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_NULL(buf_out); /* pk      | size  35 */ \
+        _08_01_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_SRC(buf_out, acc);    /* account | size  22 */ \
+        _08_03_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_DST(                                           \
+            buf_out, to_address); /* account | size  22 */                   \
+        int64_t edlen = etxn_details(                                        \
+            (uint32_t)buf_out,                                               \
+            PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE); /* emitdet | size 1?? */           \
+        int64_t fee =                                                        \
+            etxn_fee_base(buf_out_master, PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_SIZE);      \
+        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE(fee_ptr, fee);                               \
     }
 
 #ifdef HAS_CALLBACK
@@ -639,33 +645,35 @@ int out_len = 0;\
 #else
 #define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_TRUSTLINE_SIZE 287
 #endif
-#define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_TRUSTLINE(buf_out_master, tlamt, to_address, dest_tag_raw, src_tag_raw)\
-    {\
-        uint8_t* buf_out = buf_out_master;\
-        uint8_t acc[20];\
-        uint32_t dest_tag = (dest_tag_raw);\
-        uint32_t src_tag = (src_tag_raw);\
-        uint32_t cls = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();\
-        hook_account(SBUF(acc));\
-        _01_02_ENCODE_TT                   (buf_out, ttPAYMENT                      );      /* uint16  | size   3 */ \
-        _02_02_ENCODE_FLAGS                (buf_out, tfCANONICAL                    );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_03_ENCODE_TAG_SRC              (buf_out, src_tag                        );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_04_ENCODE_SEQUENCE             (buf_out, 0                              );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_14_ENCODE_TAG_DST              (buf_out, dest_tag                       );      /* uint32  | size   5 */ \
-        _02_26_ENCODE_FLS                  (buf_out, cls + 1                        );      /* uint32  | size   6 */ \
-        _02_27_ENCODE_LLS                  (buf_out, cls + 5                        );      /* uint32  | size   6 */ \
-        _06_01_ENCODE_TL_AMOUNT            (buf_out, tlamt                          );      /* amount  | size  48 */ \
-        uint8_t* fee_ptr = buf_out;\
-        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE            (buf_out, 0                              );      /* amount  | size   9 */ \
-        _07_03_ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_NULL  (buf_out                                 );      /* pk      | size  35 */ \
-        _08_01_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_SRC          (buf_out, acc                            );      /* account | size  22 */ \
-        _08_03_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_DST          (buf_out, to_address                     );      /* account | size  22 */ \
-        etxn_details((uint32_t)buf_out, PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_TRUSTLINE_SIZE);             /* emitdet | size 1?? */  \
-        int64_t fee = etxn_fee_base(buf_out_master, PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_TRUSTLINE_SIZE);                          \ 
-        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE            (fee_ptr, fee                            );                               \
+#define PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_TRUSTLINE(                                    \
+    buf_out_master, tlamt, to_address, dest_tag_raw, src_tag_raw)            \
+    {                                                                        \
+        uint8_t* buf_out = buf_out_master;                                   \
+        uint8_t acc[20];                                                     \
+        uint32_t dest_tag = (dest_tag_raw);                                  \
+        uint32_t src_tag = (src_tag_raw);                                    \
+        uint32_t cls = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();                               \
+        hook_account(SBUF(acc));                                             \
+        _01_02_ENCODE_TT(buf_out, ttPAYMENT);      /* uint16  | size   3 */  \
+        _02_02_ENCODE_FLAGS(buf_out, tfCANONICAL); /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_03_ENCODE_TAG_SRC(buf_out, src_tag);   /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_04_ENCODE_SEQUENCE(buf_out, 0);        /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_14_ENCODE_TAG_DST(buf_out, dest_tag);  /* uint32  | size   5 */  \
+        _02_26_ENCODE_FLS(buf_out, cls + 1);       /* uint32  | size   6 */  \
+        _02_27_ENCODE_LLS(buf_out, cls + 5);       /* uint32  | size   6 */  \
+        _06_01_ENCODE_TL_AMOUNT(buf_out, tlamt);   /* amount  | size  48 */  \
+        uint8_t* fee_ptr = buf_out;                                          \
+        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE(buf_out, 0);        /* amount  | size   9 */ \
+        _07_03_ENCODE_SIGNING_PUBKEY_NULL(buf_out); /* pk      | size  35 */ \
+        _08_01_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_SRC(buf_out, acc);    /* account | size  22 */ \
+        _08_03_ENCODE_ACCOUNT_DST(                                           \
+            buf_out, to_address); /* account | size  22 */                   \
+        etxn_details(                                                        \
+            (uint32_t)buf_out,                                               \
+            PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_TRUSTLINE_SIZE); /* emitdet | size 1?? */ \
+        int64_t fee = etxn_fee_base(                                         \
+            buf_out_master, PREPARE_PAYMENT_SIMPLE_TRUSTLINE_SIZE);          \
+        _06_08_ENCODE_DROPS_FEE(fee_ptr, fee);                               \
     }
 
-
-
 #endif
-

hook/hookapi.h

@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@
 
 #include "error.h"
 #include "extern.h"
-#include "macro.h"
 #include "sfcodes.h"
+#include "macro.h"
 #include "tts.h"
 
 #include "ls_flags.h"

hook/ls_flags.h

@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ enum ltACCOUNT_ROOT {
 enum ltOFFER {
     lsfPassive = 0x00010000,
     lsfSell = 0x00020000,
-    lsfHybrid = 0x00040000,
 };
 enum ltRIPPLE_STATE {
     lsfLowReserve = 0x00010000,
@@ -72,8 +71,5 @@ enum ltMPTOKEN {
 enum ltCREDENTIAL {
     lsfAccepted = 0x00010000,
 };
-enum ltVAULT {
-    lsfVaultPrivate = 0x00010000,
-};
 
 #endif // HOOKLSFLAGS_INCLUDED

hook/sfcodes.h

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
 #define sfUNLModifyDisabling ((16U << 16U) + 17U)
 #define sfHookResult ((16U << 16U) + 18U)
 #define sfWasLockingChainSend ((16U << 16U) + 19U)
-#define sfWithdrawalPolicy ((16U << 16U) + 20U)
+#define sfSidecarType ((16U << 16U) + 20U)
+#define sfEntropyTier ((16U << 16U) + 21U)
 #define sfLedgerEntryType ((1U << 16U) + 1U)
 #define sfTransactionType ((1U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfSignerWeight ((1U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -23,6 +24,8 @@
 #define sfHookApiVersion ((1U << 16U) + 20U)
 #define sfHookStateScale ((1U << 16U) + 21U)
 #define sfLedgerFixType ((1U << 16U) + 22U)
+#define sfHookExportCount ((1U << 16U) + 98U)
+#define sfEntropyCount ((1U << 16U) + 99U)
 #define sfNetworkID ((2U << 16U) + 1U)
 #define sfFlags ((2U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfSourceTag ((2U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -73,7 +76,6 @@
 #define sfLockCount ((2U << 16U) + 49U)
 #define sfFirstNFTokenSequence ((2U << 16U) + 50U)
 #define sfOracleDocumentID ((2U << 16U) + 51U)
-#define sfPermissionValue ((2U << 16U) + 52U)
 #define sfStartTime ((2U << 16U) + 93U)
 #define sfRepeatCount ((2U << 16U) + 94U)
 #define sfDelaySeconds ((2U << 16U) + 95U)
@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@
 #define sfRewardTime ((2U << 16U) + 98U)
 #define sfRewardLgrFirst ((2U << 16U) + 99U)
 #define sfRewardLgrLast ((2U << 16U) + 100U)
+#define sfCancelTicketSequence ((2U << 16U) + 101U)
 #define sfIndexNext ((3U << 16U) + 1U)
 #define sfIndexPrevious ((3U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfBookNode ((3U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -117,7 +120,6 @@
 #define sfTakerGetsCurrency ((17U << 16U) + 3U)
 #define sfTakerGetsIssuer ((17U << 16U) + 4U)
 #define sfMPTokenIssuanceID ((21U << 16U) + 1U)
-#define sfShareMPTID ((21U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfLedgerHash ((5U << 16U) + 1U)
 #define sfParentHash ((5U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfTransactionHash ((5U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -155,8 +157,6 @@
 #define sfEscrowID ((5U << 16U) + 35U)
 #define sfURITokenID ((5U << 16U) + 36U)
 #define sfDomainID ((5U << 16U) + 37U)
-#define sfVaultID ((5U << 16U) + 38U)
-#define sfParentBatchID ((5U << 16U) + 39U)
 #define sfHookOnOutgoing ((5U << 16U) + 93U)
 #define sfHookOnIncoming ((5U << 16U) + 94U)
 #define sfCron ((5U << 16U) + 95U)
@@ -164,11 +164,8 @@
 #define sfEmittedTxnID ((5U << 16U) + 97U)
 #define sfGovernanceMarks ((5U << 16U) + 98U)
 #define sfGovernanceFlags ((5U << 16U) + 99U)
+#define sfEntropyDigest ((5U << 16U) + 100U)
 #define sfNumber ((9U << 16U) + 1U)
-#define sfAssetsAvailable ((9U << 16U) + 2U)
-#define sfAssetsMaximum ((9U << 16U) + 3U)
-#define sfAssetsTotal ((9U << 16U) + 4U)
-#define sfLossUnrealized ((9U << 16U) + 5U)
 #define sfAmount ((6U << 16U) + 1U)
 #define sfBalance ((6U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfLimitAmount ((6U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -230,6 +227,7 @@
 #define sfProvider ((7U << 16U) + 30U)
 #define sfMPTokenMetadata ((7U << 16U) + 31U)
 #define sfCredentialType ((7U << 16U) + 32U)
+#define sfHookName ((7U << 16U) + 97U)
 #define sfRemarkValue ((7U << 16U) + 98U)
 #define sfRemarkName ((7U << 16U) + 99U)
 #define sfAccount ((8U << 16U) + 1U)
@@ -242,7 +240,6 @@
 #define sfNFTokenMinter ((8U << 16U) + 9U)
 #define sfEmitCallback ((8U << 16U) + 10U)
 #define sfHolder ((8U << 16U) + 11U)
-#define sfDelegate ((8U << 16U) + 12U)
 #define sfHookAccount ((8U << 16U) + 16U)
 #define sfOtherChainSource ((8U << 16U) + 18U)
 #define sfOtherChainDestination ((8U << 16U) + 19U)
@@ -281,7 +278,6 @@
 #define sfNFToken ((14U << 16U) + 12U)
 #define sfEmitDetails ((14U << 16U) + 13U)
 #define sfHook ((14U << 16U) + 14U)
-#define sfPermission ((14U << 16U) + 15U)
 #define sfSigner ((14U << 16U) + 16U)
 #define sfMajority ((14U << 16U) + 18U)
 #define sfDisabledValidator ((14U << 16U) + 19U)
@@ -298,9 +294,7 @@
 #define sfXChainCreateAccountAttestationCollectionElement ((14U << 16U) + 31U)
 #define sfPriceData ((14U << 16U) + 32U)
 #define sfCredential ((14U << 16U) + 33U)
-#define sfRawTransaction ((14U << 16U) + 34U)
-#define sfBatchSigner ((14U << 16U) + 35U)
-#define sfBook ((14U << 16U) + 36U)
+#define sfExportedTxn ((14U << 16U) + 90U)
 #define sfAmountEntry ((14U << 16U) + 91U)
 #define sfMintURIToken ((14U << 16U) + 92U)
 #define sfHookEmission ((14U << 16U) + 93U)
@@ -310,6 +304,7 @@
 #define sfRemark ((14U << 16U) + 97U)
 #define sfHighReward ((14U << 16U) + 98U)
 #define sfLowReward ((14U << 16U) + 99U)
+#define sfExportResult ((14U << 16U) + 100U)
 #define sfSigners ((15U << 16U) + 3U)
 #define sfSignerEntries ((15U << 16U) + 4U)
 #define sfTemplate ((15U << 16U) + 5U)
@@ -320,7 +315,6 @@
 #define sfNFTokens ((15U << 16U) + 10U)
 #define sfHooks ((15U << 16U) + 11U)
 #define sfVoteSlots ((15U << 16U) + 12U)
-#define sfAdditionalBooks ((15U << 16U) + 13U)
 #define sfMajorities ((15U << 16U) + 16U)
 #define sfDisabledValidators ((15U << 16U) + 17U)
 #define sfHookExecutions ((15U << 16U) + 18U)
@@ -333,9 +327,6 @@
 #define sfAuthorizeCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 26U)
 #define sfUnauthorizeCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 27U)
 #define sfAcceptedCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 28U)
-#define sfPermissions ((15U << 16U) + 29U)
-#define sfRawTransactions ((15U << 16U) + 30U)
-#define sfBatchSigners ((15U << 16U) + 31U)
 #define sfAmounts ((15U << 16U) + 92U)
 #define sfHookEmissions ((15U << 16U) + 93U)
 #define sfImportVLKeys ((15U << 16U) + 94U)

hook/tts.h

@@ -61,14 +61,7 @@
 #define ttNFTOKEN_MODIFY 70
 #define ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET 71
 #define ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE 72
-#define ttDELEGATE_SET 73
-#define ttVAULT_CREATE 74
-#define ttVAULT_SET 75
-#define ttVAULT_DELETE 76
-#define ttVAULT_DEPOSIT 77
-#define ttVAULT_WITHDRAW 78
-#define ttVAULT_CLAWBACK 79
-#define ttBATCH 80
+#define ttEXPORT 91
 #define ttCRON 92
 #define ttCRON_SET 93
 #define ttREMARKS_SET 94
@@ -82,3 +75,4 @@
 #define ttUNL_MODIFY 102
 #define ttEMIT_FAILURE 103
 #define ttUNL_REPORT 104
+#define ttCONSENSUS_ENTROPY 105

hook/tx_flags.h

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
 
 enum UniversalFlags : uint32_t {
     tfFullyCanonicalSig = 0x80000000,
-    tfInnerBatchTxn = 0x40000000,
 };
 
 enum AccountSetFlags : uint32_t {
@@ -41,7 +40,6 @@ enum OfferCreateFlags : uint32_t {
     tfImmediateOrCancel = 0x00020000,
     tfFillOrKill = 0x00040000,
     tfSell = 0x00080000,
-    tfHybrid = 0x00100000,
 };
 
 enum PaymentFlags : uint32_t {
@@ -118,9 +116,7 @@ enum BridgeModifyFlags : uint32_t {
     tfClearAccountCreateAmount = 0x00010000,
 };
 
-enum BatchFlags : uint32_t {
-    tfAllOrNothing = 0x00010000,
-    tfOnlyOne = 0x00020000,
-    tfUntilFailure = 0x00040000,
-    tfIndependent = 0x00080000,
+enum ConsensusEntropyFlags : uint32_t {
+    tfEntropyCommit = 0x00000001,  // entry is a commitment in commitSet
+    tfEntropyReveal = 0x00000002,  // entry is a reveal in entropySet
 };

include/xrpl/basics/BasicConfig.h

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <optional>
+#include <ostream>
 #include <string>
 #include <unordered_map>
 #include <vector>
@@ -367,7 +368,7 @@ get(Section const& section,
 }
 
 inline std::string
-get(Section const& section, std::string const& name, char const* defaultValue)
+get(Section const& section, std::string const& name, const char* defaultValue)
 {
     try
     {

include/xrpl/basics/Buffer.h

@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@
 
 #include <xrpl/basics/Slice.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-
 #include <cstdint>
 #include <cstring>
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
 
 namespace ripple {
 

include/xrpl/basics/CompressionAlgorithms.h

@@ -21,11 +21,9 @@
 #define RIPPLED_COMPRESSIONALGORITHMS_H_INCLUDED
 
 #include <xrpl/basics/contract.h>
-
-#include <lz4.h>
-
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <cstdint>
+#include <lz4.h>
 #include <stdexcept>
 #include <vector>
 
@@ -55,7 +53,7 @@ lz4Compress(void const* in, std::size_t inSize, BufferFactory&& bf)
     auto compressed = bf(outCapacity);
 
     auto compressedSize = LZ4_compress_default(
-        reinterpret_cast<char const*>(in),
+        reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in),
         reinterpret_cast<char*>(compressed),
         inSize,
         outCapacity);
@@ -89,7 +87,7 @@ lz4Decompress(
         Throw<std::runtime_error>("lz4Decompress: integer overflow (output)");
 
     if (LZ4_decompress_safe(
-            reinterpret_cast<char const*>(in),
+            reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in),
             reinterpret_cast<char*>(decompressed),
             inSize,
             decompressedSize) != decompressedSize)

include/xrpl/basics/CountedObject.h

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
 #define RIPPLE_BASICS_COUNTEDOBJECT_H_INCLUDED
 
 #include <xrpl/beast/type_name.h>
-
 #include <atomic>
 #include <string>
 #include <utility>

include/xrpl/basics/Expected.h

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
 
 #include <boost/outcome.hpp>
 
+#include <concepts>
 #include <stdexcept>
+#include <type_traits>
 
 namespace ripple {
 
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ public:
     {
     }
 
-    constexpr E const&
+    constexpr const E&
     value() const&
     {
         return val_;
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ public:
         return std::move(val_);
     }
 
-    constexpr E const&&
+    constexpr const E&&
     value() const&&
     {
         return std::move(val_);

include/xrpl/basics/IntrusivePointer.h

@@ -1,515 +0,0 @@
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/*
-    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
-    Copyright (c) 2023 Ripple Labs Inc.
-
-    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
-    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-
-    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
-    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-*/
-//==============================================================================
-
-#ifndef RIPPLE_BASICS_INTRUSIVEPOINTER_H_INCLUDED
-#define RIPPLE_BASICS_INTRUSIVEPOINTER_H_INCLUDED
-
-#include <concepts>
-#include <cstdint>
-#include <type_traits>
-#include <utility>
-
-namespace ripple {
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** Tag to create an intrusive pointer from another intrusive pointer by using a
-    static cast. This is useful to create an intrusive pointer to a derived
-    class from an intrusive pointer to a base class.
-*/
-struct StaticCastTagSharedIntrusive
-{
-};
-
-/** Tag to create an intrusive pointer from another intrusive pointer by using a
-    dynamic cast. This is useful to create an intrusive pointer to a derived
-    class from an intrusive pointer to a base class. If the cast fails an empty
-    (null) intrusive pointer is created.
-*/
-struct DynamicCastTagSharedIntrusive
-{
-};
-
-/** When creating or adopting a raw pointer, controls whether the strong count
-    is incremented or not. Use this tag to increment the strong count.
-*/
-struct SharedIntrusiveAdoptIncrementStrongTag
-{
-};
-
-/** When creating or adopting a raw pointer, controls whether the strong count
-    is incremented or not. Use this tag to leave the strong count unchanged.
-*/
-struct SharedIntrusiveAdoptNoIncrementTag
-{
-};
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-//
-
-template <class T>
-concept CAdoptTag = std::is_same_v<T, SharedIntrusiveAdoptIncrementStrongTag> ||
-    std::is_same_v<T, SharedIntrusiveAdoptNoIncrementTag>;
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** A shared intrusive pointer class that supports weak pointers.
-
-    This is meant to be used for SHAMapInnerNodes, but may be useful for other
-    cases. Since the reference counts are stored on the pointee, the pointee is
-    not destroyed until both the strong _and_ weak pointer counts go to zero.
-    When the strong pointer count goes to zero, the "partialDestructor" is
-    called. This can be used to destroy as much of the object as possible while
-    still retaining the reference counts. For example, for SHAMapInnerNodes the
-    children may be reset in that function. Note that std::shared_poiner WILL
-    run the destructor when the strong count reaches zero, but may not free the
-    memory used by the object until the weak count reaches zero. In rippled, we
-    typically allocate shared pointers with the `make_shared` function. When
-    that is used, the memory is not reclaimed until the weak count reaches zero.
-*/
-template <class T>
-class SharedIntrusive
-{
-public:
-    SharedIntrusive() = default;
-
-    template <CAdoptTag TAdoptTag>
-    SharedIntrusive(T* p, TAdoptTag) noexcept;
-
-    SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive const& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-    // TODO: convertible_to isn't quite right. That include a static castable.
-    // Find the right concept.
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive&& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    SharedIntrusive&
-    operator=(SharedIntrusive const& rhs);
-
-    bool
-    operator!=(std::nullptr_t) const;
-
-    bool
-    operator==(std::nullptr_t) const;
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedIntrusive&
-    operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    SharedIntrusive&
-    operator=(SharedIntrusive&& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedIntrusive&
-    operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    /** Adopt the raw pointer. The strong reference may or may not be
-        incremented, depending on the TAdoptTag
-     */
-    template <CAdoptTag TAdoptTag = SharedIntrusiveAdoptIncrementStrongTag>
-    void
-    adopt(T* p);
-
-    ~SharedIntrusive();
-
-    /** Create a new SharedIntrusive by statically casting the pointer
-        controlled by the rhs param.
-    */
-    template <class TT>
-    SharedIntrusive(
-        StaticCastTagSharedIntrusive,
-        SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    /** Create a new SharedIntrusive by statically casting the pointer
-       controlled by the rhs param.
-    */
-    template <class TT>
-    SharedIntrusive(StaticCastTagSharedIntrusive, SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    /** Create a new SharedIntrusive by dynamically casting the pointer
-       controlled by the rhs param.
-    */
-    template <class TT>
-    SharedIntrusive(
-        DynamicCastTagSharedIntrusive,
-        SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    /** Create a new SharedIntrusive by dynamically casting the pointer
-       controlled by the rhs param.
-    */
-    template <class TT>
-    SharedIntrusive(DynamicCastTagSharedIntrusive, SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    T&
-    operator*() const noexcept;
-
-    T*
-    operator->() const noexcept;
-
-    explicit
-    operator bool() const noexcept;
-
-    /** Set the pointer to null, decrement the strong count, and run the
-        appropriate release action.
-      */
-    void
-    reset();
-
-    /** Get the raw pointer */
-    T*
-    get() const;
-
-    /** Return the strong count */
-    std::size_t
-    use_count() const;
-
-    template <class TT, class... Args>
-    friend SharedIntrusive<TT>
-    make_SharedIntrusive(Args&&... args);
-
-    template <class TT>
-    friend class SharedIntrusive;
-
-    template <class TT>
-    friend class SharedWeakUnion;
-
-    template <class TT>
-    friend class WeakIntrusive;
-
-private:
-    /** Return the raw pointer held by this object. */
-    T*
-    unsafeGetRawPtr() const;
-
-    /** Exchange the current raw pointer held by this object with the given
-        pointer. Decrement the strong count of the raw pointer previously held
-        by this object and run the appropriate release action.
-     */
-    void
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(T* next);
-
-    /** Set the raw pointer directly. This is wrapped in a function so the class
-        can support both atomic and non-atomic pointers in a future patch.
-     */
-    void
-    unsafeSetRawPtr(T* p);
-
-    /** Exchange the raw pointer directly.
-        This sets the raw pointer to the given value and returns the previous
-        value. This is wrapped in a function so the class can support both
-        atomic and non-atomic pointers in a future patch.
-     */
-    T*
-    unsafeExchange(T* p);
-
-    /** pointer to the type with an intrusive count */
-    T* ptr_{nullptr};
-};
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** A weak intrusive pointer class for the SharedIntrusive pointer class.
-
-Note that this weak pointer class asks differently from normal weak pointer
-classes. When the strong pointer count goes to zero, the "partialDestructor"
-is called. See the comment on SharedIntrusive for a fuller explanation.
-*/
-template <class T>
-class WeakIntrusive
-{
-public:
-    WeakIntrusive() = default;
-
-    WeakIntrusive(WeakIntrusive const& rhs);
-
-    WeakIntrusive(WeakIntrusive&& rhs);
-
-    WeakIntrusive(SharedIntrusive<T> const& rhs);
-
-    // There is no move constructor from a strong intrusive ptr because
-    // moving would be move expensive than copying in this case (the strong
-    // ref would need to be decremented)
-    WeakIntrusive(SharedIntrusive<T> const&& rhs) = delete;
-
-    // Since there are no current use cases for copy assignment in
-    // WeakIntrusive, we delete this operator to simplify the implementation. If
-    // a need arises in the future, we can reintroduce it with proper
-    // consideration."
-    WeakIntrusive&
-    operator=(WeakIntrusive const&) = delete;
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    WeakIntrusive&
-    operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    /** Adopt the raw pointer and increment the weak count. */
-    void
-    adopt(T* ptr);
-
-    ~WeakIntrusive();
-
-    /** Get a strong pointer from the weak pointer, if possible. This will
-       only return a seated pointer if the strong count on the raw pointer
-       is non-zero before locking.
-     */
-    SharedIntrusive<T>
-    lock() const;
-
-    /** Return true if the strong count is zero. */
-    bool
-    expired() const;
-
-    /** Set the pointer to null and decrement the weak count.
-
-    Note: This may run the destructor if the strong count is zero.
-    */
-    void
-    reset();
-
-private:
-    T* ptr_ = nullptr;
-
-    /** Decrement the weak count. This does _not_ set the raw pointer to
-    null.
-
-    Note: This may run the destructor if the strong count is zero.
-    */
-    void
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-};
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** A combination of a strong and a weak intrusive pointer stored in the
-    space of a single pointer.
-
-    This class is similar to a `std::variant<SharedIntrusive,WeakIntrusive>`
-    with some optimizations. In particular, it uses a low-order bit to
-    determine if the raw pointer represents a strong pointer or a weak
-    pointer. It can also be quickly switched between its strong pointer and
-    weak pointer representations. This class is useful for storing intrusive
-    pointers in tagged caches.
-  */
-
-template <class T>
-class SharedWeakUnion
-{
-    // Tagged pointer. Low bit determines if this is a strong or a weak
-    // pointer. The low bit must be masked to zero when converting back to a
-    // pointer. If the low bit is '1', this is a weak pointer.
-    static_assert(
-        alignof(T) >= 2,
-        "Bad alignment: Combo pointer requires low bit to be zero");
-
-public:
-    SharedWeakUnion() = default;
-
-    SharedWeakUnion(SharedWeakUnion const& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakUnion(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    SharedWeakUnion(SharedWeakUnion&& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakUnion(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    SharedWeakUnion&
-    operator=(SharedWeakUnion const& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakUnion&
-    operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakUnion&
-    operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    ~SharedWeakUnion();
-
-    /** Return a strong pointer if this is already a strong pointer (i.e.
-       don't lock the weak pointer. Use the `lock` method if that's what's
-       needed)
-     */
-    SharedIntrusive<T>
-    getStrong() const;
-
-    /** Return true if this is a strong pointer and the strong pointer is
-        seated.
-     */
-    explicit
-    operator bool() const noexcept;
-
-    /** Set the pointer to null, decrement the appropriate ref count, and
-       run the appropriate release action.
-     */
-    void
-    reset();
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, return the raw pointer. Otherwise
-       return null.
-     */
-    T*
-    get() const;
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, return the strong count. Otherwise
-     * return 0
-     */
-    std::size_t
-    use_count() const;
-
-    /** Return true if there is a non-zero strong count. */
-    bool
-    expired() const;
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, return the strong pointer. Otherwise
-        attempt to lock the weak pointer.
-     */
-    SharedIntrusive<T>
-    lock() const;
-
-    /** Return true is this represents a strong pointer. */
-    bool
-    isStrong() const;
-
-    /** Return true is this represents a weak pointer. */
-    bool
-    isWeak() const;
-
-    /** If this is a weak pointer, attempt to convert it to a strong
-       pointer.
-
-        @return true if successfully converted to a strong pointer (or was
-                already a strong pointer). Otherwise false.
-      */
-    bool
-    convertToStrong();
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, attempt to convert it to a weak
-       pointer.
-
-        @return false if the pointer is null. Otherwise return true.
-      */
-    bool
-    convertToWeak();
-
-private:
-    // Tagged pointer. Low bit determines if this is a strong or a weak
-    // pointer. The low bit must be masked to zero when converting back to a
-    // pointer. If the low bit is '1', this is a weak pointer.
-    std::uintptr_t tp_{0};
-    static constexpr std::uintptr_t tagMask = 1;
-    static constexpr std::uintptr_t ptrMask = ~tagMask;
-
-private:
-    /** Return the raw pointer held by this object.
-     */
-    T*
-    unsafeGetRawPtr() const;
-
-    enum class RefStrength { strong, weak };
-    /** Set the raw pointer and tag bit directly.
-     */
-    void
-    unsafeSetRawPtr(T* p, RefStrength rs);
-
-    /** Set the raw pointer and tag bit to all zeros (strong null pointer).
-     */
-    void unsafeSetRawPtr(std::nullptr_t);
-
-    /** Decrement the appropriate ref count, and run the appropriate release
-        action. Note: this does _not_ set the raw pointer to null.
-     */
-    void
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-};
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** Create a shared intrusive pointer.
-
-    Note: unlike std::shared_ptr, where there is an advantage of allocating
-    the pointer and control block together, there is no benefit for intrusive
-    pointers.
-*/
-template <class TT, class... Args>
-SharedIntrusive<TT>
-make_SharedIntrusive(Args&&... args)
-{
-    auto p = new TT(std::forward<Args>(args)...);
-
-    static_assert(
-        noexcept(SharedIntrusive<TT>(
-            std::declval<TT*>(),
-            std::declval<SharedIntrusiveAdoptNoIncrementTag>())),
-        "SharedIntrusive constructor should not throw or this can leak "
-        "memory");
-
-    return SharedIntrusive<TT>(p, SharedIntrusiveAdoptNoIncrementTag{});
-}
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-namespace intr_ptr {
-template <class T>
-using SharedPtr = SharedIntrusive<T>;
-
-template <class T>
-using WeakPtr = WeakIntrusive<T>;
-
-template <class T>
-using SharedWeakUnionPtr = SharedWeakUnion<T>;
-
-template <class T, class... A>
-SharedPtr<T>
-make_shared(A&&... args)
-{
-    return make_SharedIntrusive<T>(std::forward<A>(args)...);
-}
-
-template <class T, class TT>
-SharedPtr<T>
-static_pointer_cast(TT const& v)
-{
-    return SharedPtr<T>(StaticCastTagSharedIntrusive{}, v);
-}
-
-template <class T, class TT>
-SharedPtr<T>
-dynamic_pointer_cast(TT const& v)
-{
-    return SharedPtr<T>(DynamicCastTagSharedIntrusive{}, v);
-}
-}  // namespace intr_ptr
-}  // namespace ripple
-#endif

include/xrpl/basics/IntrusivePointer.ipp

@@ -1,740 +0,0 @@
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/*
-    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
-    Copyright (c) 2023 Ripple Labs Inc.
-
-    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
-    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-
-    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
-    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-*/
-//==============================================================================
-
-#ifndef RIPPLE_BASICS_INTRUSIVEPOINTER_IPP_INCLUDED
-#define RIPPLE_BASICS_INTRUSIVEPOINTER_IPP_INCLUDED
-
-#include <xrpl/basics/IntrusivePointer.h>
-#include <xrpl/basics/IntrusiveRefCounts.h>
-
-#include <utility>
-
-namespace ripple {
-
-template <class T>
-template <CAdoptTag TAdoptTag>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(T* p, TAdoptTag) noexcept : ptr_{p}
-{
-    if constexpr (std::is_same_v<
-                      TAdoptTag,
-                      SharedIntrusiveAdoptIncrementStrongTag>)
-    {
-        if (p)
-            p->addStrongRef();
-    }
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive const& rhs)
-    : ptr_{[&] {
-        auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-        if (p)
-            p->addStrongRef();
-        return p;
-    }()}
-{
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-    requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs)
-    : ptr_{[&] {
-        auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-        if (p)
-            p->addStrongRef();
-        return p;
-    }()}
-{
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive&& rhs)
-    : ptr_{rhs.unsafeExchange(nullptr)}
-{
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-    requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs)
-    : ptr_{rhs.unsafeExchange(nullptr)}
-{
-}
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>&
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator=(SharedIntrusive const& rhs)
-{
-    if (this == &rhs)
-        return *this;
-    auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p)
-        p->addStrongRef();
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(p);
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-// clang-format off
-requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-// clang-format on
-SharedIntrusive<T>&
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs)
-{
-    if constexpr (std::is_same_v<T, TT>)
-    {
-        // This case should never be hit. The operator above will run instead.
-        // (The normal operator= is needed or it will be marked `deleted`)
-        if (this == &rhs)
-            return *this;
-    }
-    auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p)
-        p->addStrongRef();
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(p);
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>&
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator=(SharedIntrusive&& rhs)
-{
-    if (this == &rhs)
-        return *this;
-
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(rhs.unsafeExchange(nullptr));
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-// clang-format off
-requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-// clang-format on
-SharedIntrusive<T>&
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs)
-{
-    static_assert(
-        !std::is_same_v<T, TT>,
-        "This overload should not be instantiated for T == TT");
-
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(rhs.unsafeExchange(nullptr));
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator!=(std::nullptr_t) const
-{
-    return this->get() != nullptr;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator==(std::nullptr_t) const
-{
-    return this->get() == nullptr;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <CAdoptTag TAdoptTag>
-void
-SharedIntrusive<T>::adopt(T* p)
-{
-    if constexpr (std::is_same_v<
-                      TAdoptTag,
-                      SharedIntrusiveAdoptIncrementStrongTag>)
-    {
-        if (p)
-            p->addStrongRef();
-    }
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(p);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::~SharedIntrusive()
-{
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(nullptr);
-};
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(
-    StaticCastTagSharedIntrusive,
-    SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs)
-    : ptr_{[&] {
-        auto p = static_cast<T*>(rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr());
-        if (p)
-            p->addStrongRef();
-        return p;
-    }()}
-{
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(
-    StaticCastTagSharedIntrusive,
-    SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs)
-    : ptr_{static_cast<T*>(rhs.unsafeExchange(nullptr))}
-{
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(
-    DynamicCastTagSharedIntrusive,
-    SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs)
-    : ptr_{[&] {
-        auto p = dynamic_cast<T*>(rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr());
-        if (p)
-            p->addStrongRef();
-        return p;
-    }()}
-{
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::SharedIntrusive(
-    DynamicCastTagSharedIntrusive,
-    SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs)
-{
-    // This can be simplified without the `exchange`, but the `exchange` is kept
-    // in anticipation of supporting atomic operations.
-    auto toSet = rhs.unsafeExchange(nullptr);
-    if (toSet)
-    {
-        ptr_ = dynamic_cast<T*>(toSet);
-        if (!ptr_)
-            // need to set the pointer back or will leak
-            rhs.unsafeExchange(toSet);
-    }
-}
-
-template <class T>
-T&
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator*() const noexcept
-{
-    return *unsafeGetRawPtr();
-}
-
-template <class T>
-T*
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator->() const noexcept
-{
-    return unsafeGetRawPtr();
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>::operator bool() const noexcept
-{
-    return bool(unsafeGetRawPtr());
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-SharedIntrusive<T>::reset()
-{
-    unsafeReleaseAndStore(nullptr);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-T*
-SharedIntrusive<T>::get() const
-{
-    return unsafeGetRawPtr();
-}
-
-template <class T>
-std::size_t
-SharedIntrusive<T>::use_count() const
-{
-    if (auto p = unsafeGetRawPtr())
-        return p->use_count();
-    return 0;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-T*
-SharedIntrusive<T>::unsafeGetRawPtr() const
-{
-    return ptr_;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-SharedIntrusive<T>::unsafeSetRawPtr(T* p)
-{
-    ptr_ = p;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-T*
-SharedIntrusive<T>::unsafeExchange(T* p)
-{
-    return std::exchange(ptr_, p);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-SharedIntrusive<T>::unsafeReleaseAndStore(T* next)
-{
-    auto prev = unsafeExchange(next);
-    if (!prev)
-        return;
-
-    using enum ReleaseStrongRefAction;
-    auto action = prev->releaseStrongRef();
-    switch (action)
-    {
-        case noop:
-            break;
-        case destroy:
-            delete prev;
-            break;
-        case partialDestroy:
-            prev->partialDestructor();
-            partialDestructorFinished(&prev);
-            // prev is null and may no longer be used
-            break;
-    }
-}
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-template <class T>
-WeakIntrusive<T>::WeakIntrusive(WeakIntrusive const& rhs) : ptr_{rhs.ptr_}
-{
-    if (ptr_)
-        ptr_->addWeakRef();
-}
-
-template <class T>
-WeakIntrusive<T>::WeakIntrusive(WeakIntrusive&& rhs) : ptr_{rhs.ptr_}
-{
-    rhs.ptr_ = nullptr;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-WeakIntrusive<T>::WeakIntrusive(SharedIntrusive<T> const& rhs)
-    : ptr_{rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr()}
-{
-    if (ptr_)
-        ptr_->addWeakRef();
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-// clang-format off
-requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-// clang-format on
-WeakIntrusive<T>&
-WeakIntrusive<T>::operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs)
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-    auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p)
-        p->addWeakRef();
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-WeakIntrusive<T>::adopt(T* ptr)
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-    if (ptr)
-        ptr->addWeakRef();
-    ptr_ = ptr;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-WeakIntrusive<T>::~WeakIntrusive()
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>
-WeakIntrusive<T>::lock() const
-{
-    if (ptr_ && ptr_->checkoutStrongRefFromWeak())
-    {
-        return SharedIntrusive<T>{ptr_, SharedIntrusiveAdoptNoIncrementTag{}};
-    }
-    return {};
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-WeakIntrusive<T>::expired() const
-{
-    return (!ptr_ || ptr_->expired());
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-WeakIntrusive<T>::reset()
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-    ptr_ = nullptr;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-WeakIntrusive<T>::unsafeReleaseNoStore()
-{
-    if (!ptr_)
-        return;
-
-    using enum ReleaseWeakRefAction;
-    auto action = ptr_->releaseWeakRef();
-    switch (action)
-    {
-        case noop:
-            break;
-        case destroy:
-            delete ptr_;
-            break;
-    }
-}
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-template <class T>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::SharedWeakUnion(SharedWeakUnion const& rhs) : tp_{rhs.tp_}
-{
-    auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (!p)
-        return;
-
-    if (rhs.isStrong())
-        p->addStrongRef();
-    else
-        p->addWeakRef();
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-    requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::SharedWeakUnion(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs)
-{
-    auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p)
-        p->addStrongRef();
-    unsafeSetRawPtr(p, RefStrength::strong);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::SharedWeakUnion(SharedWeakUnion&& rhs) : tp_{rhs.tp_}
-{
-    rhs.unsafeSetRawPtr(nullptr);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-    requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::SharedWeakUnion(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs)
-{
-    auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p)
-        unsafeSetRawPtr(p, RefStrength::strong);
-    rhs.unsafeSetRawPtr(nullptr);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>&
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::operator=(SharedWeakUnion const& rhs)
-{
-    if (this == &rhs)
-        return *this;
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-
-    if (auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr())
-    {
-        if (rhs.isStrong())
-        {
-            p->addStrongRef();
-            unsafeSetRawPtr(p, RefStrength::strong);
-        }
-        else
-        {
-            p->addWeakRef();
-            unsafeSetRawPtr(p, RefStrength::weak);
-        }
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        unsafeSetRawPtr(nullptr);
-    }
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-// clang-format off
-requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-// clang-format on
-SharedWeakUnion<T>&
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT> const& rhs)
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-    auto p = rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p)
-        p->addStrongRef();
-    unsafeSetRawPtr(p, RefStrength::strong);
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-template <class TT>
-// clang-format off
-requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-// clang-format on
-SharedWeakUnion<T>&
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::operator=(SharedIntrusive<TT>&& rhs)
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-    unsafeSetRawPtr(rhs.unsafeGetRawPtr(), RefStrength::strong);
-    rhs.unsafeSetRawPtr(nullptr);
-    return *this;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::~SharedWeakUnion()
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-};
-
-// Return a strong pointer if this is already a strong pointer (i.e. don't
-// lock the weak pointer. Use the `lock` method if that's what's needed)
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::getStrong() const
-{
-    SharedIntrusive<T> result;
-    auto p = unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p && isStrong())
-    {
-        result.template adopt<SharedIntrusiveAdoptIncrementStrongTag>(p);
-    }
-    return result;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::operator bool() const noexcept
-{
-    return bool(get());
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::reset()
-{
-    unsafeReleaseNoStore();
-    unsafeSetRawPtr(nullptr);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-T*
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::get() const
-{
-    return isStrong() ? unsafeGetRawPtr() : nullptr;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-std::size_t
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::use_count() const
-{
-    if (auto p = get())
-        return p->use_count();
-    return 0;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::expired() const
-{
-    auto p = unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    return (!p || p->expired());
-}
-
-template <class T>
-SharedIntrusive<T>
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::lock() const
-{
-    SharedIntrusive<T> result;
-    auto p = unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (!p)
-        return result;
-
-    if (isStrong())
-    {
-        result.template adopt<SharedIntrusiveAdoptIncrementStrongTag>(p);
-        return result;
-    }
-
-    if (p->checkoutStrongRefFromWeak())
-    {
-        result.template adopt<SharedIntrusiveAdoptNoIncrementTag>(p);
-        return result;
-    }
-    return result;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::isStrong() const
-{
-    return !(tp_ & tagMask);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::isWeak() const
-{
-    return tp_ & tagMask;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::convertToStrong()
-{
-    if (isStrong())
-        return true;
-
-    auto p = unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (p && p->checkoutStrongRefFromWeak())
-    {
-        [[maybe_unused]] auto action = p->releaseWeakRef();
-        XRPL_ASSERT(
-            (action == ReleaseWeakRefAction::noop),
-            "ripple::SharedWeakUnion::convertToStrong : "
-            "action is noop");
-        unsafeSetRawPtr(p, RefStrength::strong);
-        return true;
-    }
-    return false;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-bool
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::convertToWeak()
-{
-    if (isWeak())
-        return true;
-
-    auto p = unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (!p)
-        return false;
-
-    using enum ReleaseStrongRefAction;
-    auto action = p->addWeakReleaseStrongRef();
-    switch (action)
-    {
-        case noop:
-            break;
-        case destroy:
-            // We just added a weak ref. How could we destroy?
-            UNREACHABLE(
-                "ripple::SharedWeakUnion::convertToWeak : destroying freshly "
-                "added ref");
-            delete p;
-            unsafeSetRawPtr(nullptr);
-            return true;  // Should never happen
-        case partialDestroy:
-            // This is a weird case. We just converted the last strong
-            // pointer to a weak pointer.
-            p->partialDestructor();
-            partialDestructorFinished(&p);
-            // p is null and may no longer be used
-            break;
-    }
-    unsafeSetRawPtr(p, RefStrength::weak);
-    return true;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-T*
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::unsafeGetRawPtr() const
-{
-    return reinterpret_cast<T*>(tp_ & ptrMask);
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::unsafeSetRawPtr(T* p, RefStrength rs)
-{
-    tp_ = reinterpret_cast<std::uintptr_t>(p);
-    if (tp_ && rs == RefStrength::weak)
-        tp_ |= tagMask;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::unsafeSetRawPtr(std::nullptr_t)
-{
-    tp_ = 0;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-void
-SharedWeakUnion<T>::unsafeReleaseNoStore()
-{
-    auto p = unsafeGetRawPtr();
-    if (!p)
-        return;
-
-    if (isStrong())
-    {
-        using enum ReleaseStrongRefAction;
-        auto strongAction = p->releaseStrongRef();
-        switch (strongAction)
-        {
-            case noop:
-                break;
-            case destroy:
-                delete p;
-                break;
-            case partialDestroy:
-                p->partialDestructor();
-                partialDestructorFinished(&p);
-                // p is null and may no longer be used
-                break;
-        }
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        using enum ReleaseWeakRefAction;
-        auto weakAction = p->releaseWeakRef();
-        switch (weakAction)
-        {
-            case noop:
-                break;
-            case destroy:
-                delete p;
-                break;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-}  // namespace ripple
-#endif

include/xrpl/basics/IntrusiveRefCounts.h

@@ -1,502 +0,0 @@
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/*
-    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
-    Copyright (c) 2023 Ripple Labs Inc.
-
-    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
-    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-
-    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
-    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-*/
-//==============================================================================
-
-#ifndef RIPPLE_BASICS_INTRUSIVEREFCOUNTS_H_INCLUDED
-#define RIPPLE_BASICS_INTRUSIVEREFCOUNTS_H_INCLUDED
-
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-
-#include <atomic>
-#include <cstdint>
-
-namespace ripple {
-
-/** Action to perform when releasing a strong pointer.
-
-    noop: Do nothing. For example, a `noop` action will occur when a count is
-    decremented to a non-zero value.
-
-    partialDestroy: Run the `partialDestructor`. This action will happen when a
-    strong count is decremented to zero and the weak count is non-zero.
-
-    destroy: Run the destructor. This action will occur when either the strong
-    count or weak count is decremented and the other count is also zero.
- */
-enum class ReleaseStrongRefAction { noop, partialDestroy, destroy };
-
-/** Action to perform when releasing a weak pointer.
-
-    noop: Do nothing. For example, a `noop` action will occur when a count is
-    decremented to a non-zero value.
-
-    destroy: Run the destructor. This action will occur when either the strong
-    count or weak count is decremented and the other count is also zero.
- */
-enum class ReleaseWeakRefAction { noop, destroy };
-
-/** Implement the strong count, weak count, and bit flags for an intrusive
-    pointer.
-
-    A class can satisfy the requirements of a ripple::IntrusivePointer by
-    inheriting from this class.
-  */
-struct IntrusiveRefCounts
-{
-    virtual ~IntrusiveRefCounts() noexcept;
-
-    // This must be `noexcept` or the make_SharedIntrusive function could leak
-    // memory.
-    void
-    addStrongRef() const noexcept;
-
-    void
-    addWeakRef() const noexcept;
-
-    ReleaseStrongRefAction
-    releaseStrongRef() const;
-
-    // Same as:
-    // {
-    //   addWeakRef();
-    //   return releaseStrongRef;
-    // }
-    // done as one atomic operation
-    ReleaseStrongRefAction
-    addWeakReleaseStrongRef() const;
-
-    ReleaseWeakRefAction
-    releaseWeakRef() const;
-
-    // Returns true is able to checkout a strong ref. False otherwise
-    bool
-    checkoutStrongRefFromWeak() const noexcept;
-
-    bool
-    expired() const noexcept;
-
-    std::size_t
-    use_count() const noexcept;
-
-    // This function MUST be called after a partial destructor finishes running.
-    // Calling this function may cause other threads to delete the object
-    // pointed to by `o`, so `o` should never be used after calling this
-    // function. The parameter will be set to a `nullptr` after calling this
-    // function to emphasize that it should not be used.
-    // Note: This is intentionally NOT called at the end of `partialDestructor`.
-    // The reason for this is if new classes are written to support this smart
-    // pointer class, they need to write their own `partialDestructor` function
-    // and ensure `partialDestructorFinished` is called at the end. Putting this
-    // call inside the smart pointer class itself is expected to be less error
-    // prone.
-    // Note: The "two-star" programming is intentional. It emphasizes that `o`
-    // may be deleted and the unergonomic API is meant to signal the special
-    // nature of this function call to callers.
-    // Note: This is a template to support incompletely defined classes.
-    template <class T>
-    friend void
-    partialDestructorFinished(T** o);
-
-private:
-    // TODO: We may need to use a uint64_t for both counts. This will reduce the
-    // memory savings. We need to audit the code to make sure 16 bit counts are
-    // enough for strong pointers and 14 bit counts are enough for weak
-    // pointers. Use type aliases to make it easy to switch types.
-    using CountType = std::uint16_t;
-    static constexpr size_t StrongCountNumBits = sizeof(CountType) * 8;
-    static constexpr size_t WeakCountNumBits = StrongCountNumBits - 2;
-    using FieldType = std::uint32_t;
-    static constexpr size_t FieldTypeBits = sizeof(FieldType) * 8;
-    static constexpr FieldType one = 1;
-
-    /** `refCounts` consists of four fields that are treated atomically:
-
-         1. Strong count. This is a count of the number of shared pointers that
-         hold a reference to this object. When the strong counts goes to zero,
-         if the weak count is zero, the destructor is run. If the weak count is
-         non-zero when the strong count goes to zero then the partialDestructor
-         is run.
-
-         2. Weak count. This is a count of the number of weak pointer that hold
-         a reference to this object. When the weak count goes to zero and the
-         strong count is also zero, then the destructor is run.
-
-         3. Partial destroy started bit. This bit is set if the
-         `partialDestructor` function has been started (or is about to be
-         started). This is used to prevent the destructor from running
-         concurrently with the partial destructor. This can easily happen when
-         the last strong pointer release its reference in one thread and starts
-         the partialDestructor, while in another thread the last weak pointer
-         goes out of scope and starts the destructor while the partialDestructor
-         is still running. Both a start and finished bit is needed to handle a
-         corner-case where the last strong pointer goes out of scope, then then
-         last `weakPointer` goes out of scope, but this happens before the
-         `partialDestructor` bit is set. It would be possible to use a single
-         bit if it could also be set atomically when the strong count goes to
-         zero and the weak count is non-zero, but that would add complexity (and
-         likely slow down common cases as well).
-
-         4. Partial destroy finished bit. This bit is set when the
-         `partialDestructor` has finished running. See (3) above for more
-         information.
-
-         */
-
-    mutable std::atomic<FieldType> refCounts{strongDelta};
-
-    /**  Amount to change the strong count when adding or releasing a reference
-
-         Note: The strong count is stored in the low `StrongCountNumBits` bits
-       of refCounts
-      */
-    static constexpr FieldType strongDelta = 1;
-
-    /**  Amount to change the weak count when adding or releasing a reference
-
-         Note: The weak count is stored in the high `WeakCountNumBits` bits of
-         refCounts
-      */
-    static constexpr FieldType weakDelta = (one << StrongCountNumBits);
-
-    /**  Flag that is set when the partialDestroy function has started running
-         (or is about to start running).
-
-         See description of the `refCounts` field for a fuller description of
-         this field.
-      */
-    static constexpr FieldType partialDestroyStartedMask =
-        (one << (FieldTypeBits - 1));
-
-    /**  Flag that is set when the partialDestroy function has finished running
-
-         See description of the `refCounts` field for a fuller description of
-         this field.
-      */
-    static constexpr FieldType partialDestroyFinishedMask =
-        (one << (FieldTypeBits - 2));
-
-    /** Mask that will zero out all the `count` bits and leave the tag bits
-        unchanged.
-      */
-    static constexpr FieldType tagMask =
-        partialDestroyStartedMask | partialDestroyFinishedMask;
-
-    /** Mask that will zero out the `tag` bits and leave the count bits
-        unchanged.
-      */
-    static constexpr FieldType valueMask = ~tagMask;
-
-    /** Mask that will zero out everything except the strong count.
-     */
-    static constexpr FieldType strongMask =
-        ((one << StrongCountNumBits) - 1) & valueMask;
-
-    /** Mask that will zero out everything except the weak count.
-     */
-    static constexpr FieldType weakMask =
-        (((one << WeakCountNumBits) - 1) << StrongCountNumBits) & valueMask;
-
-    /** Unpack the count and tag fields from the packed atomic integer form. */
-    struct RefCountPair
-    {
-        CountType strong;
-        CountType weak;
-        /**  The `partialDestroyStartedBit` is set to on when the partial
-             destroy function is started. It is not a boolean; it is a uint32
-             with all bits zero with the possible exception of the
-             `partialDestroyStartedMask` bit. This is done so it can be directly
-             masked into the `combinedValue`.
-         */
-        FieldType partialDestroyStartedBit{0};
-        /**  The `partialDestroyFinishedBit` is set to on when the partial
-             destroy function has finished.
-         */
-        FieldType partialDestroyFinishedBit{0};
-        RefCountPair(FieldType v) noexcept;
-        RefCountPair(CountType s, CountType w) noexcept;
-
-        /** Convert back to the packed integer form. */
-        FieldType
-        combinedValue() const noexcept;
-
-        static constexpr CountType maxStrongValue =
-            static_cast<CountType>((one << StrongCountNumBits) - 1);
-        static constexpr CountType maxWeakValue =
-            static_cast<CountType>((one << WeakCountNumBits) - 1);
-        /**  Put an extra margin to detect when running up against limits.
-             This is only used in debug code, and is useful if we reduce the
-             number of bits in the strong and weak counts (to 16 and 14 bits).
-         */
-        static constexpr CountType checkStrongMaxValue = maxStrongValue - 32;
-        static constexpr CountType checkWeakMaxValue = maxWeakValue - 32;
-    };
-};
-
-inline void
-IntrusiveRefCounts::addStrongRef() const noexcept
-{
-    refCounts.fetch_add(strongDelta, std::memory_order_acq_rel);
-}
-
-inline void
-IntrusiveRefCounts::addWeakRef() const noexcept
-{
-    refCounts.fetch_add(weakDelta, std::memory_order_acq_rel);
-}
-
-inline ReleaseStrongRefAction
-IntrusiveRefCounts::releaseStrongRef() const
-{
-    // Subtract `strongDelta` from refCounts. If this releases the last strong
-    // ref, set the `partialDestroyStarted` bit. It is important that the ref
-    // count and the `partialDestroyStartedBit` are changed atomically (hence
-    // the loop and `compare_exchange` op). If this didn't need to be done
-    // atomically, the loop could be replaced with a `fetch_sub` and a
-    // conditional `fetch_or`. This loop will almost always run once.
-
-    using enum ReleaseStrongRefAction;
-    auto prevIntVal = refCounts.load(std::memory_order_acquire);
-    while (1)
-    {
-        RefCountPair const prevVal{prevIntVal};
-        XRPL_ASSERT(
-            (prevVal.strong >= strongDelta),
-            "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::releaseStrongRef : previous ref "
-            "higher than new");
-        auto nextIntVal = prevIntVal - strongDelta;
-        ReleaseStrongRefAction action = noop;
-        if (prevVal.strong == 1)
-        {
-            if (prevVal.weak == 0)
-            {
-                action = destroy;
-            }
-            else
-            {
-                nextIntVal |= partialDestroyStartedMask;
-                action = partialDestroy;
-            }
-        }
-
-        if (refCounts.compare_exchange_weak(
-                prevIntVal, nextIntVal, std::memory_order_acq_rel))
-        {
-            // Can't be in partial destroy because only decrementing the strong
-            // count to zero can start a partial destroy, and that can't happen
-            // twice.
-            XRPL_ASSERT(
-                (action == noop) || !(prevIntVal & partialDestroyStartedMask),
-                "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::releaseStrongRef : not in partial "
-                "destroy");
-            return action;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-inline ReleaseStrongRefAction
-IntrusiveRefCounts::addWeakReleaseStrongRef() const
-{
-    using enum ReleaseStrongRefAction;
-
-    static_assert(weakDelta > strongDelta);
-    auto constexpr delta = weakDelta - strongDelta;
-    auto prevIntVal = refCounts.load(std::memory_order_acquire);
-    // This loop will almost always run once. The loop is needed to atomically
-    // change the counts and flags (the count could be atomically changed, but
-    // the flags depend on the current value of the counts).
-    //
-    // Note: If this becomes a perf bottleneck, the `partialDestoryStartedMask`
-    // may be able to be set non-atomically. But it is easier to reason about
-    // the code if the flag is set atomically.
-    while (1)
-    {
-        RefCountPair const prevVal{prevIntVal};
-        // Converted the last strong pointer to a weak pointer.
-        //
-        // Can't be in partial destroy because only decrementing the
-        // strong count to zero can start a partial destroy, and that
-        // can't happen twice.
-        XRPL_ASSERT(
-            (!prevVal.partialDestroyStartedBit),
-            "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::addWeakReleaseStrongRef : not in "
-            "partial destroy");
-
-        auto nextIntVal = prevIntVal + delta;
-        ReleaseStrongRefAction action = noop;
-        if (prevVal.strong == 1)
-        {
-            if (prevVal.weak == 0)
-            {
-                action = noop;
-            }
-            else
-            {
-                nextIntVal |= partialDestroyStartedMask;
-                action = partialDestroy;
-            }
-        }
-        if (refCounts.compare_exchange_weak(
-                prevIntVal, nextIntVal, std::memory_order_acq_rel))
-        {
-            XRPL_ASSERT(
-                (!(prevIntVal & partialDestroyStartedMask)),
-                "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::addWeakReleaseStrongRef : not "
-                "started partial destroy");
-            return action;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-inline ReleaseWeakRefAction
-IntrusiveRefCounts::releaseWeakRef() const
-{
-    auto prevIntVal = refCounts.fetch_sub(weakDelta, std::memory_order_acq_rel);
-    RefCountPair prev = prevIntVal;
-    if (prev.weak == 1 && prev.strong == 0)
-    {
-        if (!prev.partialDestroyStartedBit)
-        {
-            // This case should only be hit if the partialDestroyStartedBit is
-            // set non-atomically (and even then very rarely). The code is kept
-            // in case we need to set the flag non-atomically for perf reasons.
-            refCounts.wait(prevIntVal, std::memory_order_acquire);
-            prevIntVal = refCounts.load(std::memory_order_acquire);
-            prev = RefCountPair{prevIntVal};
-        }
-        if (!prev.partialDestroyFinishedBit)
-        {
-            // partial destroy MUST finish before running a full destroy (when
-            // using weak pointers)
-            refCounts.wait(prevIntVal - weakDelta, std::memory_order_acquire);
-        }
-        return ReleaseWeakRefAction::destroy;
-    }
-    return ReleaseWeakRefAction::noop;
-}
-
-inline bool
-IntrusiveRefCounts::checkoutStrongRefFromWeak() const noexcept
-{
-    auto curValue = RefCountPair{1, 1}.combinedValue();
-    auto desiredValue = RefCountPair{2, 1}.combinedValue();
-
-    while (!refCounts.compare_exchange_weak(
-        curValue, desiredValue, std::memory_order_acq_rel))
-    {
-        RefCountPair const prev{curValue};
-        if (!prev.strong)
-            return false;
-
-        desiredValue = curValue + strongDelta;
-    }
-    return true;
-}
-
-inline bool
-IntrusiveRefCounts::expired() const noexcept
-{
-    RefCountPair const val = refCounts.load(std::memory_order_acquire);
-    return val.strong == 0;
-}
-
-inline std::size_t
-IntrusiveRefCounts::use_count() const noexcept
-{
-    RefCountPair const val = refCounts.load(std::memory_order_acquire);
-    return val.strong;
-}
-
-inline IntrusiveRefCounts::~IntrusiveRefCounts() noexcept
-{
-#ifndef NDEBUG
-    auto v = refCounts.load(std::memory_order_acquire);
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        (!(v & valueMask)),
-        "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::~IntrusiveRefCounts : count must be zero");
-    auto t = v & tagMask;
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        (!t || t == tagMask),
-        "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::~IntrusiveRefCounts : valid tag");
-#endif
-}
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-inline IntrusiveRefCounts::RefCountPair::RefCountPair(
-    IntrusiveRefCounts::FieldType v) noexcept
-    : strong{static_cast<CountType>(v & strongMask)}
-    , weak{static_cast<CountType>((v & weakMask) >> StrongCountNumBits)}
-    , partialDestroyStartedBit{v & partialDestroyStartedMask}
-    , partialDestroyFinishedBit{v & partialDestroyFinishedMask}
-{
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        (strong < checkStrongMaxValue && weak < checkWeakMaxValue),
-        "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::RefCountPair(FieldType) : inputs inside "
-        "range");
-}
-
-inline IntrusiveRefCounts::RefCountPair::RefCountPair(
-    IntrusiveRefCounts::CountType s,
-    IntrusiveRefCounts::CountType w) noexcept
-    : strong{s}, weak{w}
-{
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        (strong < checkStrongMaxValue && weak < checkWeakMaxValue),
-        "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::RefCountPair(CountType, CountType) : "
-        "inputs inside range");
-}
-
-inline IntrusiveRefCounts::FieldType
-IntrusiveRefCounts::RefCountPair::combinedValue() const noexcept
-{
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        (strong < checkStrongMaxValue && weak < checkWeakMaxValue),
-        "ripple::IntrusiveRefCounts::RefCountPair::combinedValue : inputs "
-        "inside range");
-    return (static_cast<IntrusiveRefCounts::FieldType>(weak)
-            << IntrusiveRefCounts::StrongCountNumBits) |
-        static_cast<IntrusiveRefCounts::FieldType>(strong) |
-        partialDestroyStartedBit | partialDestroyFinishedBit;
-}
-
-template <class T>
-inline void
-partialDestructorFinished(T** o)
-{
-    T& self = **o;
-    IntrusiveRefCounts::RefCountPair p =
-        self.refCounts.fetch_or(IntrusiveRefCounts::partialDestroyFinishedMask);
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        (!p.partialDestroyFinishedBit && p.partialDestroyStartedBit &&
-         !p.strong),
-        "ripple::partialDestructorFinished : not a weak ref");
-    if (!p.weak)
-    {
-        // There was a weak count before the partial destructor ran (or we would
-        // have run the full destructor) and now there isn't a weak count. Some
-        // thread is waiting to run the destructor.
-        self.refCounts.notify_one();
-    }
-    // Set the pointer to null to emphasize that the object shouldn't be used
-    // after calling this function as it may be destroyed in another thread.
-    *o = nullptr;
-}
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-}  // namespace ripple
-#endif

include/xrpl/basics/LocalValue.h

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
 #define RIPPLE_BASICS_LOCALVALUE_H_INCLUDED
 
 #include <boost/thread/tss.hpp>
-
 #include <memory>
 #include <unordered_map>
 

include/xrpl/basics/Log.h

@@ -22,10 +22,8 @@
 
 #include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-
 #include <boost/beast/core/string.hpp>
 #include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
-
 #include <fstream>
 #include <map>
 #include <memory>

include/xrpl/basics/Resolver.h

@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@
 #ifndef RIPPLE_BASICS_RESOLVER_H_INCLUDED
 #define RIPPLE_BASICS_RESOLVER_H_INCLUDED
 
-#include <xrpl/beast/net/IPEndpoint.h>
-
 #include <functional>
 #include <vector>
 
+#include <xrpl/beast/net/IPEndpoint.h>
+
 namespace ripple {
 
 class Resolver

include/xrpl/basics/ResolverAsio.h

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 
 #include <xrpl/basics/Resolver.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-
 #include <boost/asio/io_service.hpp>
 
 namespace ripple {

include/xrpl/basics/SharedWeakCachePointer.h

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/*
-    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
-    Copyright (c) 2023 Ripple Labs Inc.
-
-    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
-    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-
-    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
-    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-*/
-//==============================================================================
-
-#ifndef RIPPLE_BASICS_SHAREDWEAKCACHEPOINTER_H_INCLUDED
-#define RIPPLE_BASICS_SHAREDWEAKCACHEPOINTER_H_INCLUDED
-
-#include <memory>
-#include <variant>
-
-namespace ripple {
-
-/** A combination of a std::shared_ptr and a std::weak_pointer.
-
-
-This class is a wrapper to a `std::variant<std::shared_ptr,std::weak_ptr>`
-This class is useful for storing intrusive pointers in tagged caches using less
-memory than storing both pointers directly.
-*/
-
-template <class T>
-class SharedWeakCachePointer
-{
-public:
-    SharedWeakCachePointer() = default;
-
-    SharedWeakCachePointer(SharedWeakCachePointer const& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakCachePointer(std::shared_ptr<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    SharedWeakCachePointer(SharedWeakCachePointer&& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakCachePointer(std::shared_ptr<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    SharedWeakCachePointer&
-    operator=(SharedWeakCachePointer const& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakCachePointer&
-    operator=(std::shared_ptr<TT> const& rhs);
-
-    template <class TT>
-        requires std::convertible_to<TT*, T*>
-    SharedWeakCachePointer&
-    operator=(std::shared_ptr<TT>&& rhs);
-
-    ~SharedWeakCachePointer();
-
-    /** Return a strong pointer if this is already a strong pointer (i.e. don't
-        lock the weak pointer. Use the `lock` method if that's what's needed)
-     */
-    std::shared_ptr<T> const&
-    getStrong() const;
-
-    /** Return true if this is a strong pointer and the strong pointer is
-        seated.
-     */
-    explicit
-    operator bool() const noexcept;
-
-    /** Set the pointer to null, decrement the appropriate ref count, and run
-        the appropriate release action.
-     */
-    void
-    reset();
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, return the raw pointer. Otherwise return
-        null.
-     */
-    T*
-    get() const;
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, return the strong count. Otherwise return 0
-     */
-    std::size_t
-    use_count() const;
-
-    /** Return true if there is a non-zero strong count. */
-    bool
-    expired() const;
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, return the strong pointer. Otherwise
-        attempt to lock the weak pointer.
-     */
-    std::shared_ptr<T>
-    lock() const;
-
-    /** Return true is this represents a strong pointer. */
-    bool
-    isStrong() const;
-
-    /** Return true is this represents a weak pointer. */
-    bool
-    isWeak() const;
-
-    /** If this is a weak pointer, attempt to convert it to a strong pointer.
-
-        @return true if successfully converted to a strong pointer (or was
-                already a strong pointer). Otherwise false.
-      */
-    bool
-    convertToStrong();
-
-    /** If this is a strong pointer, attempt to convert it to a weak pointer.
-
-        @return false if the pointer is null. Otherwise return true.
-      */
-    bool
-    convertToWeak();
-
-private:
-    std::variant<std::shared_ptr<T>, std::weak_ptr<T>> combo_;
-};
-}  // namespace ripple
-#endif