fix(hook): crash on the transaction after removing a HookName (#890)

* fix(hook): Read sfHookName via isFieldPresent instead of operator[]

SetHook removes a hook's name with makeFieldAbsent on an untemplated
sfHooks entry, which leaves an STI_NOTPRESENT placeholder for
sfHookName. STObject::at(~sfHookName) then fails the dynamic_cast,
dereferences the null template and asserts (null deref in release).

Every other optional field of an sfHooks entry is already read with
isFieldPresent/getField*, which treats the placeholder as absent.
Align the three sfHookName readers with that convention:

- Transactor::calculateHookChainFee
- Transactor::executeHookChain
- ClaimReward::preclaim (fix20260929 path)

hook::canHook now takes std::optional<Blob> so callers can pass the
copied value without a dangling Slice.

Add regression tests that remove a hook name with a HookName-only
SetHook update and then submit the next transaction (Invoke and
ClaimReward). Both crashed before this change.

* claude fixes

---------

Co-authored-by: Richard Holland <[email protected]>

.github/workflows/xahau-ga-nix.yml

@@ -97,8 +97,6 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
     container:
       image: ubuntu:24.04
-      # [DO NOT MERGE] diagnostic: allow gdb/eu-stack to attach to hung test children
-      options: --cap-add=SYS_PTRACE
       volumes:
         - /home/runner/.conan-cache:/.conan-cache
         - /home/runner/.ccache-cache:/github/home/.ccache-cache
@@ -305,98 +303,9 @@ jobs:
           # Coverage builds are slower due to instrumentation; use fewer parallel jobs to avoid flakiness.
           # Use *_FLAGS_DEBUG so the build action's stdlib flag (e.g. -stdlib=libc++) in CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS isn't clobbered.
           cmake-args: '-Dcoverage=ON -Dcoverage_tool=${{ matrix.coverage_tool }} -Dcoverage_format=${{ matrix.coverage_format }} -Dcoverage_test_parallelism=$(($(nproc)/2)) -DCODE_COVERAGE_VERBOSE=ON -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_DEBUG="-g -O0" -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG="-g -O0"'
-          cmake-target: 'rippled'
+          cmake-target: 'coverage'
           ccache_max_size: '100G'
 
-      # [DO NOT MERGE] Diagnostic: run the coverage test pass directly (not via
-      # the ninja `coverage` target, which buffers all output until exit) so
-      # every line gets a live timestamp, sample host/process state every 60s,
-      # and dump thread stacks of every rippled process at 12/25 min and on a
-      # 90 min deadline instead of sitting for the 6h job timeout.
-      - name: Run tests (coverage, diagnostic)
-        if: matrix.job_type == 'coverage'
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          apt-get install -y procps elfutils gdb > /dev/null
-          cd ${{ env.build_dir }}
-          rm -rf coverage-profraw && mkdir coverage-profraw
-          JOBS=$(($(nproc)/2))
-          echo "nproc=$(nproc) jobs=$JOBS loadavg=$(cat /proc/loadavg)"
-          free -m; df -h . /dev/shm /tmp; ulimit -a; cat /proc/pressure/cpu /proc/pressure/memory /proc/pressure/io 2>/dev/null || true
-
-          cat > /tmp/flag.py <<'EOF'
-          import gdb
-          for t in gdb.selected_inferior().threads():
-              t.switch()
-              f = gdb.newest_frame()
-              while f:
-                  if f.name() and 'ApplicationImp::run' in f.name():
-                      f.select()
-                      print("thread", t.num, "in ApplicationImp::run, isTimeToStop =", gdb.parse_and_eval("this->isTimeToStop"))
-                      break
-                  f = f.older()
-          EOF
-          dump_stacks() {
-            echo "===== STACK DUMP ($1) $(date -u +%T)"
-            for p in $(pgrep -x rippled); do
-              echo "--- pid $p state=$(awk '/^State/{print $2}' /proc/$p/status) wchan=$(cat /proc/$p/wchan 2>/dev/null) cmd=$(tr '\0' ' ' < /proc/$p/cmdline | cut -c1-100)"
-              timeout 120 eu-stack -p $p 2>&1 | head -300 || true
-              st=$(awk '/^State/{print $2}' /proc/$p/status 2>/dev/null)
-              if [ "$st" = "S" ] && [ "$p" != "$RP" ]; then
-                timeout 900 gdb -p $p -batch -ex 'set pagination off' -ex 'source /tmp/flag.py' -ex 'thread apply all bt 30' 2>&1 \
-                  | grep -vE '^\[New LWP|^\[Thread debugging|^Using host|^warning:|^Reading symbols|^Download' | head -800 || true
-              fi
-            done
-          }
-
-          # Stress the suite whose Env lifetimes are shortest: the hang sits in
-          # Env::~AppBundle (thread.join on ApplicationImp::run) and shows up
-          # within a few iterations when it is present.
-          for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do
-            st=$SECONDS
-            if LLVM_PROFILE_FILE=/tmp/stress-%p.profraw timeout -s KILL 240 ./rippled --unittest=ripple.app.HookAPI --unittest-jobs 1 > /tmp/stress_$i.log 2>&1; then
-              echo "stress iter $i ok $((SECONDS-st))s: $(grep -oE '[0-9]+ cases, [0-9]+ tests total, [0-9]+ failures' /tmp/stress_$i.log)"
-            else
-              echo "stress iter $i FAILED/HUNG rc=$? after $((SECONDS-st))s; last lines:"; tail -3 /tmp/stress_$i.log
-            fi
-          done
-          rm -f /tmp/stress-*.profraw
-
-          ( while true; do
-              echo "===== sample $(date -u +%T) loadavg=$(cut -d' ' -f1-3 /proc/loadavg) psi_cpu=$(grep -o 'avg60=[0-9.]*' /proc/pressure/cpu 2>/dev/null | head -1) psi_mem=$(grep -o 'avg60=[0-9.]*' /proc/pressure/memory 2>/dev/null | head -1) psi_io=$(grep -o 'avg60=[0-9.]*' /proc/pressure/io 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
-              free -m | sed -n 2,3p
-              ps -eo pid,ppid,stat,etimes,pcpu,rss,wchan:28,args --sort=-pcpu | grep -E 'PID|rippled' | grep -v grep | head -14 | cut -c1-150
-              sleep 60
-            done ) &
-          MON=$!
-
-          LLVM_PROFILE_FILE="$PWD/coverage-profraw/rippled-%m-%p.profraw" \
-            stdbuf -oL -eL ./rippled --unittest --unittest-jobs $JOBS --unittest-log &
-          RP=$!
-          START=$SECONDS; D20=0; D40=0; rc=0
-          while kill -0 $RP 2>/dev/null; do
-            el=$((SECONDS-START))
-            if [ $D20 = 0 ] && [ $el -ge 720 ]; then D20=1; dump_stacks "12min"; fi
-            if [ $D40 = 0 ] && [ $el -ge 1500 ]; then D40=1; dump_stacks "25min"; fi
-            if [ $el -ge 3600 ]; then
-              dump_stacks "60min deadline"
-              echo "===== DEADLINE: killing rippled processes"
-              pkill -KILL -x rippled || true
-              break
-            fi
-            sleep 10
-          done
-          wait $RP || rc=$?
-          kill $MON 2>/dev/null || true
-          echo "rippled unittest exit code: $rc after $((SECONDS-START))s"
-          ls -la coverage-profraw | head -20
-
-          llvm-profdata-${{ matrix.compiler_version }} merge -sparse -o coverage.profdata coverage-profraw/*.profraw
-          llvm-cov-${{ matrix.compiler_version }} export -instr-profile=coverage.profdata -format=lcov \
-            -ignore-filename-regex="src/test|include/xrpl/beast/test|include/xrpl/beast/unit_test|$PWD/pb-xrpl.libpb" \
-            ./rippled > coverage.lcov
-          exit $rc
-
       - name: Set artifact name
         if: matrix.job_type == 'build'
         id: set-artifact-name

Builds/levelization/results/loops.txt

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.nodestore
   xrpld.app > xrpld.nodestore
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.overlay
-  xrpld.overlay ~= xrpld.app
+  xrpld.overlay == xrpld.app
 
 Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.peerfinder
   xrpld.app > xrpld.peerfinder

Builds/levelization/results/ordering.txt

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ libxrpl.server > xrpl.basics
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.json
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.protocol
 libxrpl.server > xrpl.server
+test.app > test.shamap
 test.app > test.toplevel
 test.app > test.unit_test
 test.app > xrpl.basics
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ test.app > xrpld.ledger
 test.app > xrpld.nodestore
 test.app > xrpld.overlay
 test.app > xrpld.rpc
+test.app > xrpld.shamap
 test.app > xrpl.hook
 test.app > xrpl.json
 test.app > xrpl.protocol
@@ -101,6 +103,7 @@ test.overlay > xrpld.overlay
 test.overlay > xrpld.peerfinder
 test.overlay > xrpld.shamap
 test.overlay > xrpl.protocol
+test.overlay > xrpl.resource
 test.peerfinder > test.beast
 test.peerfinder > test.unit_test
 test.peerfinder > xrpl.basics

build-core.sh

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ else
   # GH Action, runner
     if [[ "$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)" == "release" ]]; then
         echo "building on the release branch... placing it in builds/candidate"
-        mkdir /data/builds/candidate
+        mkdir -p /data/builds/candidate
         cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
         cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
     else

cfg/xahaud-example.cfg

@@ -166,10 +166,13 @@
 #       ws          Websockets
 #       wss         Secure Websockets
 #       peer        Peer Protocol
+#       pwa         On-ledger AppLoader documents (featurePWALoader), for a
+#                   reverse proxy only. Read "pwa ports" below first.
 #
 #       Restrictions:
 #
 #       Only one port may be configured to support the peer protocol.
+#       The pwa protocol cannot be combined with any other protocol.
 #       A port cannot have websocket and non websocket protocols at the
 #       same time. It is possible have both Websockets and Secure Websockets
 #       together in one port.
@@ -264,6 +267,119 @@
 #       "secure_gateway" connections, then they will be treated as
 #       "admin" addresses.
 #
+#   pwa ports
+#
+#       A port whose protocol is "pwa" serves accounts' on-ledger AppLoader
+#       documents (featurePWALoader) as HTML. This makes the node a web host
+#       for third-party content: anyone can publish a loader to an account
+#       for about a drop per byte, and nothing in protocol takes one down.
+#       Hosting, and a hosting provider's obligations, are yours.
+#
+#       One host per account, on a zone used for nothing else:
+#
+#           https://pwa<account-index>.<domain>/<r-address>
+#           https://<domain>/<r-address>          301 to the above
+#           https://<custom host>/                see custom_domains
+#
+#       The first label of the Host header is "pwa" followed by the decimal
+#       AccountIndex of the account (an account created before AccountIndex
+#       existed has no host); the rest must be one of the port's "domain"
+#       values; the path must be that account's exact r-address. One
+#       trailing slash and a query string are ignored; anything else is
+#       404. The bare zone never serves a document (every page would share
+#       one origin): it redirects, keeping :port and query.
+#       Never set cookies at or above the zone and never serve your own
+#       site from it. Wildcard DNS and a wildcard certificate cover it.
+#
+#       Rules enforced at startup and on every request:
+#
+#       - "pwa" is the port's only protocol; no admin, user/password or
+#         ssl_* keys (terminate TLS at the proxy).
+#       - "domain" is required: the zone(s), comma-separated. The proxy must
+#         forward the Host header unchanged.
+#       - "secure_gateway" is required and may not cover every address.
+#         Every request must come from it carrying X-Forwarded-For, whose
+#         RIGHTMOST entry (the one the proxy wrote) is the client. The
+#         "Forwarded" header is ignored.
+#       - Clients are metered per IPv4 address, per IPv6 /64; a miss costs
+#         what a hit does; over-use is answered 503 until it decays.
+#       - GET and HEAD only; every response closes the connection; only
+#         validated state is served, with an ETag (304 on If-None-Match).
+#         X-NetworkID, X-LedgerSeq, X-LedgerHash and X-PWASeq name the
+#         validated ledger and AppLoaderSequence the document came from, so
+#         a client (a browser extension, say) can vet it against a second
+#         node with the pwa_validate RPC (account, hash of the bytes, host).
+#       - Lookups run on at most two job queue threads, below client RPC;
+#         beyond a bounded backlog they are refused with 503. Put a cache in
+#         front (the ETag makes revalidation cheap).
+#       - The admin RPC "pwa_info" reports requests by outcome and bytes
+#         served; "reset": true zeroes them, "flush_dns": true drops the
+#         custom domain cache (CLI: xahaud pwa_info [reset] [flush_dns]).
+#
+#       Example (also add port_pwa to the [server] list):
+#
+#           [port_pwa]
+#           port = 8088
+#           ip = 127.0.0.1
+#           protocol = pwa
+#           secure_gateway = 127.0.0.1
+#           domain = pwapp.example
+#
+#       with nginx in front, TLS terminated there, Host passed through:
+#
+#           server {
+#               listen 443 ssl;
+#               server_name pwapp.example ~^pwa[0-9]+\.pwapp\.example$;
+#               ssl_certificate     /etc/ssl/wildcard.pwapp.example.pem;
+#               ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/wildcard.pwapp.example.key;
+#               location / {
+#                   proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8088;
+#                   proxy_set_header Host $host;
+#                   proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
+#               }
+#           }
+#
+#   custom_domains = 0 | 1
+#
+#       Default 0. With 1, a request whose Host is outside every zone is
+#       served as the account named by DNS, so a domain owner can point
+#       their own name at your proxy:
+#
+#           app.example.org.             CNAME  pwa-proxy.your.example.
+#           _xahau-pwa.app.example.org.  TXT    "rAbC..."
+#
+#       The record lives on the _xahau-pwa label beneath the host because
+#       the host is usually a CNAME to your proxy. Exactly one address must
+#       be present there (other TXT strings are ignored; two addresses count
+#       as none). The named account must consent: its Domain field must
+#       equal the host or a parent of it (ignoring case), else 503. Lists
+#       apply as at the account's own host; only the root path is a
+#       document. No usable record is 404 (cached 15 minutes), a resolver
+#       failure 503 (cached 60 s), a record is cached for its TTL (clamped
+#       to 60..3600 s). Lookups run on their own job queue threads, at most
+#       four at a time and one per host; a request that misses the cache is
+#       answered 429 with Retry-After and a refreshing page rather than
+#       waiting, so a flood of Host headers cannot tie up the node. The
+#       admin RPC pwa_info with "flush_dns": true drops the cache. Your
+#       proxy must accept, and hold certificates for, the hosts you will
+#       serve (e.g. Caddy on-demand TLS); xahaud only sees the Host header.
+#
+#   resolver = <IPv4 address>[:port]
+#
+#       The recursive resolver for custom_domains; default is the system
+#       resolver. xahaud does not validate DNSSEC, so prefer a validating
+#       resolver on the same host.
+#
+#       Documents are served with "Content-Security-Policy: sandbox
+#       allow-scripts ...": an opaque origin that cannot read anything from
+#       the node but can still send requests anywhere, including the
+#       visitor's own machine, so keep admin ports behind credentials.
+#
+#       [pwa_allowlist] and [pwa_blocklist], one r-address per line, apply to
+#       every pwa port: if the allowlist is non-empty only those accounts are
+#       served; blocklisted accounts are never served (403), whatever the
+#       allowlist says. An account on both is a startup error.
+#
 #   ssl_key = <filename>
 #   ssl_cert = <filename>
 #   ssl_chain = <filename>
@@ -448,6 +564,30 @@
 #
 #
 #
+# [udp_highway]
+#
+#   0 or 1.
+#
+#   0: Disable the Xahau UDP Superhighway (XUSH). [default]
+#   1: Enable the Xahau UDP Superhighway (XUSH).
+#
+#   The UDP Superhighway is a best-effort transport that runs alongside the
+#   peer protocol. When it is enabled the server also listens for UDP
+#   datagrams on its peer port number, and every transaction it relays to its
+#   peers is also sent, over UDP, to a small random set of other servers that
+#   have the highway enabled. It never replaces the peer protocol: anything
+#   sent over the highway is also relayed normally.
+#
+#   To receive highway traffic, inbound UDP must be allowed to the peer port
+#   (in addition to inbound TCP).
+#
+#   A server that keeps its address private (peer_private = 1, or any server
+#   configured as a validator) only exchanges highway traffic with the peers
+#   listed in [ips_fixed], and never advertises highway endpoints. Fixed peers
+#   are never advertised to other servers.
+#
+#
+#
 # [peers_max]
 #
 #   The largest number of desired peer connections (incoming or outgoing).
@@ -674,6 +814,38 @@
 #
 #
 #
+# [early_manifest_sync]
+#
+#   Controls whether, while acquiring its first ledger, the server fetches and
+#   reads the on-ledger validator manifests ahead of the rest of that ledger's
+#   state. Doing so lets it resolve validators' current signing keys, including
+#   rotations and revocations published on-ledger, within seconds of starting
+#   a sync rather than once the whole state has arrived.
+#
+#   The manifests read are those of the master keys on the server's own
+#   validator lists, fetched by key, and as many more from the on-ledger
+#   manifest directory as the manifest cache keeps.
+#
+#   The cost is a dozen or so request/response rounds with peers. With more
+#   than one peer serving the ledger these overlap with fetching the rest of
+#   its state; with only one, they come first.
+#
+#   It also lets a server that starts with nothing but the master keys of its
+#   validators and a few peers find its way. Until it has validated a ledger,
+#   while it holds manifests for too few of its validators to make a quorum,
+#   it reads them from up to three of the ledgers its peers report, the most
+#   widely reported first, every 15 seconds. Every manifest read is checked
+#   against its master key's signature, so a ledger reported by a peer that
+#   is not on the network can leave something out but cannot add anything.
+#
+#   Legal values are:
+#     1 - Fetch the manifests first, and from peers' ledgers if needed
+#     0 - Fetch the ledger's state in the usual order, and read the manifests
+#         from it once it is complete
+#
+#   The default is 1. A ledger without on-ledger manifests costs only the few
+#   nodes on the paths to where their directory and objects would be.
+#
 #
 #
 # [ledger_history]
@@ -1416,6 +1588,19 @@
 #      contains breaking changes that require a new API version number.
 #      They are not ready for public consumption.
 #
+# [hook_validate_rpc]
+#
+#   0 or 1.
+#
+#   0: Disable the hook_validate RPC method
+#   1: Enable the hook_validate RPC method, which runs the Hook guard
+#      checker and WASM VM validation against caller-supplied code using
+#      the current open ledger's rules.
+#
+#   The default is 0 on networked nodes and 1 in standalone mode (-a).
+#   When enabled the method is available to non-admin (user role) clients,
+#   so consider the CPU cost before enabling it on a public-facing node.
+#
 #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 #
 # 10. Example Settings

cfg/xahaud-standalone.cfg

@@ -151,4 +151,3 @@ D686F2538F410C9D0D856788E98E3579595DAF7B38D38887F81ECAC934B06040 HooksUpdate1
 4B8466415FAB32FFA89D9DCBE166A42340115771DF611A7160F8D7439C87ECD8 fixNSDelete
 EDB4EE4C524E16BDD91D9A529332DED08DCAAA51CC6DC897ACFA1A0ED131C5B6 fix240819
 8063140E9260799D6716756B891CEC3E7006C4E4F277AB84670663A88F94B9C4 fixPageCap
-88693F108C3CD8A967F3F4253A32DEF5E35F9406ACD2A11B88B11D90865763A9 fix240911

cmake/RippledInterface.cmake

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ target_link_libraries (ripple_syslibs
       crypt32
     >
     $<$<NOT:$<BOOL:${MSVC}>>:dl>
+    $<$<NOT:$<BOOL:${MSVC}>>:resolv>
     $<$<NOT:$<OR:$<BOOL:${MSVC}>,$<BOOL:${APPLE}>>>:rt>)
 
 if (NOT MSVC)

hook/error.h

@@ -47,5 +47,6 @@
 #define MEM_OVERLAP -43
 #define TOO_MANY_STATE_MODIFICATIONS -44
 #define TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES -45
+#define TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY -46
 #define HOOK_ERROR_CODES
 #endif //HOOK_ERROR_CODES

hook/extern.h

@@ -339,6 +339,12 @@ prepare(
     uint32_t read_ptr,
     uint32_t read_len);
 
+extern int64_t
+dice(uint32_t sides);
+
+extern int64_t
+util_random(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

hook/hookapi.h

@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
 
 #include "error.h"
 #include "extern.h"
-#include "sfcodes.h"
 #include "macro.h"
+#include "sfcodes.h"
 #include "tts.h"
 
 #include "ls_flags.h"

hook/sfcodes.h

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
 #define sfHookApiVersion ((1U << 16U) + 20U)
 #define sfHookStateScale ((1U << 16U) + 21U)
 #define sfLedgerFixType ((1U << 16U) + 22U)
+#define sfEntropyCount ((1U << 16U) + 99U)
+#define sfEntropyDenominator ((1U << 16U) + 100U)
 #define sfNetworkID ((2U << 16U) + 1U)
 #define sfFlags ((2U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfSourceTag ((2U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -80,6 +82,7 @@
 #define sfRewardTime ((2U << 16U) + 98U)
 #define sfRewardLgrFirst ((2U << 16U) + 99U)
 #define sfRewardLgrLast ((2U << 16U) + 100U)
+#define sfAppLoaderSequence ((2U << 16U) + 101U)
 #define sfIndexNext ((3U << 16U) + 1U)
 #define sfIndexPrevious ((3U << 16U) + 2U)
 #define sfBookNode ((3U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -152,6 +155,8 @@
 #define sfEscrowID ((5U << 16U) + 35U)
 #define sfURITokenID ((5U << 16U) + 36U)
 #define sfDomainID ((5U << 16U) + 37U)
+#define sfNextRandomDigest ((5U << 16U) + 89U)
+#define sfRandomData ((5U << 16U) + 90U)
 #define sfManifestID ((5U << 16U) + 91U)
 #define sfHookOnOutgoing ((5U << 16U) + 93U)
 #define sfHookOnIncoming ((5U << 16U) + 94U)
@@ -222,6 +227,7 @@
 #define sfProvider ((7U << 16U) + 30U)
 #define sfMPTokenMetadata ((7U << 16U) + 31U)
 #define sfCredentialType ((7U << 16U) + 32U)
+#define sfAppLoader ((7U << 16U) + 96U)
 #define sfHookName ((7U << 16U) + 97U)
 #define sfRemarkValue ((7U << 16U) + 98U)
 #define sfRemarkName ((7U << 16U) + 99U)
@@ -289,6 +295,7 @@
 #define sfXChainCreateAccountAttestationCollectionElement ((14U << 16U) + 31U)
 #define sfPriceData ((14U << 16U) + 32U)
 #define sfCredential ((14U << 16U) + 33U)
+#define sfRandomDigestEntry ((14U << 16U) + 88U)
 #define sfManifest ((14U << 16U) + 90U)
 #define sfAmountEntry ((14U << 16U) + 91U)
 #define sfMintURIToken ((14U << 16U) + 92U)
@@ -321,6 +328,7 @@
 #define sfAuthorizeCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 26U)
 #define sfUnauthorizeCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 27U)
 #define sfAcceptedCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 28U)
+#define sfRandomDigests ((15U << 16U) + 91U)
 #define sfAmounts ((15U << 16U) + 92U)
 #define sfHookEmissions ((15U << 16U) + 93U)
 #define sfImportVLKeys ((15U << 16U) + 94U)

hook/tts.h

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #define ttNFTOKEN_MODIFY 70
 #define ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET 71
 #define ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE 72
+#define ttENTROPY 89
 #define ttMANIFEST_SET 91
 #define ttCRON 92
 #define ttCRON_SET 93

include/xrpl/hook/Enum.h

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #define uint256 std::string
 #define featureHooksUpdate1 "1"
 #define featureHooksUpdate2 "1"
+#define featureRNG "1"
 #define fix20250131 "1"
 #define fixGuardDepth32 "1"
 namespace hook_api {
@@ -385,7 +386,9 @@ enum class hook_return_code : int64_t {
     MEM_OVERLAP = -43,   // one or more specified buffers are the same memory
     TOO_MANY_STATE_MODIFICATIONS = -44,  // more than 256 modified state
                                          // entires in the combined hook chains
-    TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES = -45
+    TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES = -45,
+    TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY = -46  // featureRNG: no seed for this ledger, or too few
+                              // validators contributed to it
 };
 
 enum class ExitType : uint8_t {
@@ -398,6 +401,7 @@ enum class ExitType : uint8_t {
 const uint16_t max_state_modifications = 256;
 const uint8_t max_slots = 255;
 const uint8_t max_nonce = 255;
+const uint16_t max_rng_draws = 256;  // featureRNG, per Hook execution
 const uint8_t max_emit = 255;
 const uint8_t max_params = 16;
 const double fee_base_multiplier = 1.1f;

include/xrpl/hook/Guard.h

@@ -1096,7 +1096,11 @@ validateGuards(
             {
                 int name_len = parseLeb128(wasm, i, &i);
                 CHECK_SHORT_HOOK();
-                if (name_len == 4)
+                // Only compare the name if all four bytes are in bounds. A
+                // name running past the end is rejected as a short hook below
+                // either way, so this does not change which hooks are valid.
+                if (name_len == 4 &&
+                    static_cast<std::size_t>(i) + 4 <= wasm.size())
                 {
                     if (wasm[i] == 'h' && wasm[i + 1] == 'o' &&
                         wasm[i + 2] == 'o' && wasm[i + 3] == 'k')

include/xrpl/hook/hook_api.macro

@@ -298,4 +298,12 @@ HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
 HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
   int64_t, prepare, (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len),
   featureHooksUpdate2)
+
+HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
+  int64_t, dice, (uint32_t sides),
+  featureRNG)
+
+HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
+  int64_t, util_random, (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len),
+  featureRNG)
 // clang-format on

include/xrpl/protocol/AppLoader.h

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2025 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#ifndef RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_APPLOADER_H_INCLUDED
+#define RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_APPLOADER_H_INCLUDED
+
+#include <cstddef>
+#include <cstdint>
+
+namespace ripple {
+
+/** Validation of an AppLoader document (sfAppLoader), the bootstrap page of
+    a Progressive Web App served from an account.
+
+    Consensus cannot afford a real HTML parser, so this is a shallow sanity
+    gate and nothing more. A document must be non-empty and at most
+    maxAppLoaderLength bytes; well-formed UTF-8; free of C0 control
+    characters other than TAB, LF, FF and CR, and of DEL; begin, after an
+    optional BOM and whitespace, with an HTML doctype or an <html start tag;
+    and contain an <html start tag followed later by a </html> end tag with
+    nothing but whitespace after the last one. Nothing parses comments,
+    scripts or attributes, and content is not policed.
+
+    Consensus critical: a change to what it accepts needs an amendment.
+*/
+namespace appLoader {
+
+enum class Result : std::uint8_t {
+    ok = 0,
+    empty,
+    tooLarge,
+    badUTF8,
+    badControlChar,
+    noDoctype,        // does not open with a doctype or <html tag
+    noHtmlElement,    // no <html start tag
+    unclosed,         // no </html> end tag after it
+    trailingGarbage,  // non-whitespace after the last </html>
+};
+
+/** Total: every input yields a result. `data` may be null iff size is 0. */
+Result
+validate(std::uint8_t const* data, std::size_t size);
+
+char const*
+to_string(Result r);
+
+}  // namespace appLoader
+}  // namespace ripple
+
+#endif

include/xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h

@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ negativeUNL() noexcept;
 Keylet const&
 UNLReport() noexcept;
 
+/** The (fixed) index of the featureRNG random number generator object. */
+Keylet const&
+random() noexcept;
+
 /** The beginning of an order book */
 struct book_t
 {
@@ -328,6 +332,14 @@ xChainCreateAccountClaimID(STXChainBridge const& bridge, std::uint64_t seq);
 Keylet
 did(AccountID const& account) noexcept;
 
+/** An AppLoader belonging to an account.
+
+    There is at most one per account, so the key is derived from the owner's
+    AccountID alone.
+*/
+Keylet
+appLoader(AccountID const& account) noexcept;
+
 Keylet
 oracle(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t const& documentID) noexcept;
 
@@ -376,6 +388,16 @@ permissionedDomain(uint256 const& domainID) noexcept;
 Keylet
 manifest(PublicKey const& pk) noexcept;
 
+/** The directory listing every master key's ltMANIFEST object.
+
+    One entry per master key, made when its first manifest is published and
+    kept for good: a newer manifest, a revocation included, replaces the object
+    at the same key and keeps its place. The copy at the ephemeral key is not
+    listed; it is named by the master object.
+*/
+Keylet const&
+manifestDir() noexcept;
+
 }  // namespace keylet
 
 // Everything below is deprecated and should be removed in favor of keylets:
@@ -406,7 +428,7 @@ struct keyletDesc
 
 // This list should include all of the keylet functions that take a single
 // AccountID parameter.
-std::array<keyletDesc<AccountID const&>, 6> const directAccountKeylets{
+std::array<keyletDesc<AccountID const&>, 7> const directAccountKeylets{
     {{&keylet::account, jss::AccountRoot, false},
      {&keylet::ownerDir, jss::DirectoryNode, true},
      {&keylet::signers, jss::SignerList, true},
@@ -414,7 +436,8 @@ std::array<keyletDesc<AccountID const&>, 6> const directAccountKeylets{
      // test it anyway, since the invariant checks for it.
      {&keylet::nftpage_min, jss::NFTokenPage, true},
      {&keylet::nftpage_max, jss::NFTokenPage, true},
-     {&keylet::did, jss::DID, true}}};
+     {&keylet::did, jss::DID, true},
+     {&keylet::appLoader, jss::AppLoader, true}}};
 
 MPTID
 makeMptID(std::uint32_t sequence, AccountID const& account);

include/xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h

@@ -96,6 +96,25 @@ std::size_t constexpr maxDIDAttestationLength = 256;
 /** The maximum length of a domain */
 std::size_t constexpr maxDomainLength = 256;
 
+/** The maximum length of an AppLoader document.
+
+    The AppLoader holds the bootstrap document of a Progressive Web App
+    served from an account. It is deliberately capped: the blob lives in a
+    ledger object that carries no owner reserve at all, so the only things
+    standing between it and unbounded ledger growth are this limit and the
+    per-byte transaction fee below.
+*/
+std::size_t constexpr maxAppLoaderLength = 4096;
+
+/** Drops of transaction fee charged per byte of AppLoader document.
+
+    Storage is paid for through the fee rather than through an owner
+    reserve, so that a loader can be published by an account sitting at its
+    reserve floor. The fee is charged on every AccountSet that carries the
+    field, including overwrites.
+*/
+std::uint64_t constexpr appLoaderFeeDropsPerByte = 1;
+
 /** The maximum length of a URI inside a Credential */
 std::size_t constexpr maxCredentialURILength = 256;
 

include/xrpl/protocol/TER.h

@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ enum TEFcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
     tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE,
     tefPAST_MANIFEST_SEQ,
     tefREVOKED_MANIFEST,
+    tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE,
 };
 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------

include/xrpl/protocol/TxMeta.h

@@ -152,6 +152,26 @@ public:
         return static_cast<bool>(mHookEmissions);
     }
 
+    /** featureRNG: the RNG state this transaction's first Hook draw saw.
+        Every value the transaction's Hooks drew is derived from it. */
+    void
+    setRandomData(uint256 const& randomData)
+    {
+        mRandomData = randomData;
+    }
+
+    bool
+    hasRandomData() const
+    {
+        return static_cast<bool>(mRandomData);
+    }
+
+    uint256 const&
+    getRandomData() const
+    {
+        return *mRandomData;
+    }
+
     STAmount
     getDeliveredAmount() const
     {
@@ -176,6 +196,7 @@ private:
     std::optional<STAmount> mDelivered;
     std::optional<STArray> mHookExecutions;
     std::optional<STArray> mHookEmissions;
+    std::optional<uint256> mRandomData;
 
     STArray mNodes;
 };

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/features.macro

@@ -34,9 +34,11 @@
 // If you add an amendment here, then do not forget to increment `numFeatures`
 // in include/xrpl/protocol/Feature.h.
 
+XRPL_FEATURE(RNG,                        Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
+XRPL_FEATURE(PWALoader,                  Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FIX    (20261005,                   Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
 XRPL_FEATURE(EscrowDestinationCancel,    Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
-XRPL_FIX    (20260929,                   Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
+XRPL_FIX    (20260929,                   Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
 XRPL_FEATURE(HookOnV2_1,                 Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FEATURE(OnChainManifests,           Supported::yes,  VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FIX    (HookMap,                    Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
@@ -88,7 +90,6 @@ XRPL_FIX    (ReduceImport,               Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYe
 XRPL_FEATURE(Touch,                      Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FEATURE(Remarks,                    Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FIX    (FloatDivide,                Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
-XRPL_FIX    (240911,                     Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
 XRPL_FIX    (PageCap,                    Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
 XRPL_FIX    (240819,                     Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
 XRPL_FIX    (NSDelete,                   Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
@@ -164,6 +165,7 @@ XRPL_FEATURE(CryptoConditionsSuite, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::Obsolete)
 // pre-amendment code has been removed and the identifiers are deprecated.
 // All known amendments and amendments that may appear in a validated
 // ledger must be registered either here or above with the "active" amendments
+XRPL_RETIRE(fix240911)
 XRPL_RETIRE(fixXahauV2)
 XRPL_RETIRE(fixXahauV1)
 XRPL_RETIRE(MultiSign)

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/ledger_entries.macro

@@ -142,6 +142,22 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltIMPORT_VLSEQ, 0x0049, ImportVLSequence, import_vlseq, ({
     {sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq,    soeOPTIONAL},
 }))
 
+/** The bootstrap document of a Progressive Web App (featurePWALoader).
+
+    At most one per account, keyed on the owner alone (keylet::appLoader).
+    It is in no owner directory and takes no reserve: its storage is paid
+    for by a per-byte fee on the AccountSet that writes it, and
+    DeleteAccount erases it explicitly. AppLoaderSequence equals the owner's
+    AccountRoot AppLoaderSequence as of the AccountSet that wrote it.
+ */
+LEDGER_ENTRY(ltAPP_LOADER, 0x004c, AppLoader, app_loader, ({
+    {sfOwner,                soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfAppLoader,            soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfAppLoaderSequence,    soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfPreviousTxnID,        soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq,    soeREQUIRED},
+}))
+
 /** The ledger object which tracks the current negative UNL state.
 
     \note This is a singleton: only one such object exists in the ledger.
@@ -180,6 +196,26 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY_DUPLICATE(ltUNL_REPORT, 0x0052, UNLReport, unl_report, ({
     {sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq,    soeREQUIRED},
 }))
 
+/** featureRNG: the consensus random number generator.
+
+    A singleton. sfRandomData is seeded from validator reveals by the
+    ttENTROPY transactions applied at the start of each ledger, and then
+    iterated by every Hook API draw for the rest of that ledger.
+    sfRandomData and sfRandomDigests are never written to metadata, and
+    Hooks cannot load this object.
+
+    \sa keylet::random
+ */
+LEDGER_ENTRY(ltRANDOM, 0x526E, Random, random, ({
+    {sfLedgerSequence,       soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfRandomData,           soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfEntropyCount,         soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfEntropyDenominator,   soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfRandomDigests,        soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfPreviousTxnID,        soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq,    soeREQUIRED},
+}))
+
 /** A ledger object which contains a signer list for an account.
 
     \sa keylet::signers
@@ -262,6 +298,7 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltACCOUNT_ROOT, 0x0061, AccountRoot, account, ({
     {sfHookStateScale,       soeOPTIONAL},
     {sfCron,                 soeOPTIONAL},
     {sfAMMID,                soeOPTIONAL},
+    {sfAppLoaderSequence,    soeOPTIONAL},
     {sfManifestID,           soeOPTIONAL},
 }))
 
@@ -609,6 +646,7 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltMANIFEST, 0x004D, Manifest, manifest_entry, ({
     {sfMasterSignature,     soeREQUIRED},
     {sfSignature,           soeOPTIONAL}, /* absent if the master is revoked */
     {sfManifestID,          soeOPTIONAL}, /* pointer to the identical other copy on the other key */
+    {sfOwnerNode,           soeOPTIONAL}, /* master copy only: its page in keylet::manifestDir() */
     {sfPreviousTxnID,       soeREQUIRED},
     {sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq,   soeREQUIRED},
 }))

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/sfields.macro

@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookExecutionIndex,       UINT16,    19)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookApiVersion,           UINT16,    20)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookStateScale,           UINT16,    21)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfLedgerFixType,            UINT16,    22)
+TYPED_SFIELD(sfEntropyCount,             UINT16,    99)
+TYPED_SFIELD(sfEntropyDenominator,       UINT16,   100)
 
 // 32-bit integers (common)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfNetworkID,                UINT32,     1)
@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfImportSequence,           UINT32,    97)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfRewardTime,               UINT32,    98)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfRewardLgrFirst,           UINT32,    99)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfRewardLgrLast,            UINT32,   100)
+TYPED_SFIELD(sfAppLoaderSequence,        UINT32,   101)
 
 // 64-bit integers (common)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfIndexNext,                UINT64,     1)
@@ -210,6 +213,9 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfOfferID,                  UINT256,   34)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfEscrowID,                 UINT256,   35)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfURITokenID,               UINT256,   36)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfDomainID,                 UINT256,   37)
+TYPED_SFIELD(sfNextRandomDigest,         UINT256,   89)
+// RNG running state: never written to metadata (see featureRNG)
+TYPED_SFIELD(sfRandomData,               UINT256,   90, SField::sMD_Never)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfManifestID,               UINT256,   91)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookOnOutgoing,           UINT256,   93)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookOnIncoming,           UINT256,   94)
@@ -294,6 +300,7 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfAssetClass,               VL,        29)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfProvider,                 VL,        30)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfMPTokenMetadata,          VL,        31)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfCredentialType,           VL,        32)
+TYPED_SFIELD(sfAppLoader,                VL,        96)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookName,                 VL,        97)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemarkValue,              VL,        98)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemarkName,               VL,        99)
@@ -383,6 +390,7 @@ UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfXChainClaimAttestationCollectionElement, OBJECT, 30)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfXChainCreateAccountAttestationCollectionElement, OBJECT, 31)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfPriceData,              OBJECT,    32)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfCredential,             OBJECT,    33)
+UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfRandomDigestEntry,      OBJECT,    88)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfManifest,               OBJECT,    90)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAmountEntry,            OBJECT,    91)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfMintURIToken,           OBJECT,    92)
@@ -423,6 +431,8 @@ UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAuthAccounts,           ARRAY,     25)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAuthorizeCredentials,   ARRAY,     26)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfUnauthorizeCredentials, ARRAY,     27)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAcceptedCredentials,    ARRAY,     28)
+// RNG validator commitments: never written to metadata (see featureRNG)
+UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfRandomDigests,          ARRAY,     91, SField::sMD_Never)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAmounts,                ARRAY,     92)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfHookEmissions,          ARRAY,     93)
 UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfImportVLKeys,           ARRAY,     94)

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/transactions.macro

@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttACCOUNT_SET, 3, AccountSet, ({
     {sfTickSize, soeOPTIONAL},
     {sfNFTokenMinter, soeOPTIONAL},
     {sfHookStateScale, soeOPTIONAL},
+    {sfAppLoader, soeOPTIONAL},
 }))
 
 /** This transaction type cancels an existing escrow. */
@@ -500,6 +501,22 @@ TRANSACTION(ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE, 72, PermissionedDomainDelete, ({
     {sfDomainID, soeREQUIRED},
 }))
 
+/** featureRNG: a validator's entropy contribution for one ledger.
+
+    Each proposing UNLReport validator places exactly one of these in its own
+    initial position when it closes the ledger. It reveals the secret behind
+    the validator's commitment currently stored in the Random object (if any)
+    and commits to the secret it will reveal next time. It never enters the
+    open ledger, so a reveal only becomes public after the revealing
+    validator's transaction set is locked.
+ */
+TRANSACTION(ttENTROPY, 89, Entropy, ({
+    {sfLedgerSequence, soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfPublicKey, soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfNextRandomDigest, soeREQUIRED},
+    {sfRandomData, soeOPTIONAL},
+}))
+
 /* sfAccount is supplied by TxFormats::commonFields; listing it here as well
    makes the SOTemplate reject the format at construction. */
 TRANSACTION(ttMANIFEST_SET, 91, SetManifest, ({

include/xrpl/protocol/jss.h

@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ JSS(closed);                 // out: NetworkOPs, LedgerToJson,
                              //      handlers/Ledger
 JSS(closed_ledger);          // out: NetworkOPs
 JSS(cluster);                // out: PeerImp
-JSS(code);                   // out: errors
+JSS(code);                   // in: HookValidate; out: errors
 JSS(command);                // in: RPCHandler
 JSS(complete);               // out: NetworkOPs, InboundLedger
 JSS(complete_ledgers);       // out: NetworkOPs, PeerImp
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ JSS(index);    // in: LedgerEntry,
                //      LedgerEntry, TxHistory, LedgerData
 JSS(info);     // out: ServerInfo, ConsensusInfo, FetchInfo
 JSS(initial_sync_duration_us);
+JSS(instruction_count_cbak);  // out: HookValidate
+JSS(instruction_count_hook);  // out: HookValidate
 JSS(internal_command);     // in: Internal
 JSS(invalid_API_version);  // out: Many, when a request has an invalid
                            //      version
@@ -451,6 +453,7 @@ JSS(local);                   // out: resource/Logic.h
 JSS(local_txs);               // out: GetCounts
 JSS(local_static_keys);       // out: ValidatorList
 JSS(locked_balance);          // out: AccountLines
+JSS(log);                     // out: HookValidate
 JSS(low);                     // out: BookChanges
 JSS(lock_count);              // out: AccountLines
 JSS(lowest_sequence);         // out: AccountInfo
@@ -589,7 +592,6 @@ JSS(queue_data);        // out: AccountInfo
 JSS(queued);            // out: SubmitTransaction
 JSS(queued_duration_us);
 JSS(quote_asset);           // in: get_aggregate_price
-JSS(random);                // out: Random
 JSS(raw_meta);              // out: AcceptedLedgerTx
 JSS(receive_currencies);    // out: AccountCurrencies
 JSS(reference_level);       // out: TxQ
@@ -607,6 +609,7 @@ JSS(reserve_base_native);   // out: NetworkOPs
 JSS(reserve_inc);           // out: NetworkOPs
 JSS(reserve_inc_xrp);       // out: NetworkOPs
 JSS(reserve_inc_native);    // out: NetworkOPs
+JSS(reset);                 // in/out: PWAInfo
 JSS(response);              // websocket
 JSS(result);                // RPC
 JSS(ripple_lines);          // out: NetworkOPs
@@ -748,6 +751,7 @@ JSS(url_password);               // in: Subscribe
 JSS(url_username);               // in: Subscribe
 JSS(urlgravatar);                //
 JSS(username);                   // in: Subscribe
+JSS(valid);                      // out: HookValidate
 JSS(validated);                  // out: NetworkOPs, RPCHelpers, AccountTx*
                                  //      Tx
 JSS(validator_list_expires);     // out: NetworkOps, ValidatorList
@@ -769,6 +773,7 @@ JSS(validator_sites);  // out: ValidatorSites
 JSS(value);            // out: STAmount
 JSS(version);          // out: RPCVersion
 JSS(vetoed);           // out: AmendmentTableImpl
+JSS(vm_error);         // out: HookValidate
 JSS(volume_a);         // out: BookChanges
 JSS(volume_b);         // out: BookChanges
 JSS(vote);             // in: Feature

include/xrpl/server/Port.h

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 
 #include <xrpl/basics/BasicConfig.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/net/IPEndpoint.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
 #include <boost/asio/ip/address.hpp>
 #include <boost/asio/ip/network_v4.hpp>
 #include <boost/asio/ip/network_v6.hpp>
@@ -57,6 +58,12 @@ struct Port
     std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> admin_nets_v6;
     std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v4> secure_gateway_nets_v4;
     std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> secure_gateway_nets_v6;
+    // "pwa" ports only; see the "pwa ports" section of xahaud-example.cfg.
+    std::set<std::string> pwa_domains;  // zones, lower case, no trailing dot
+    std::set<AccountID> pwa_allowlist;  // if non-empty, only these are served
+    std::set<AccountID> pwa_blocklist;  // never served; wins over allowlist
+    bool pwa_custom_domains = false;    // serve hosts named by TXT records
+    std::optional<beast::IP::Endpoint> pwa_resolver;  // for those; else system
     std::string user;
     std::string password;
     std::string admin_user;
@@ -93,8 +100,18 @@ struct Port
         return protocol.count("udp") > 0;
     }
 
+    bool
+    has_peer() const
+    {
+        return protocol.count("peer") > 0;
+    }
+
     // Maximum UDP packet size (default 64KB)
     std::size_t udp_packet_size = 65536;
+
+    // If this is a peer port, also listen for UDP Superhighway (XUSH)
+    // datagrams on the same port number.
+    bool udp_highway = false;
 };
 
 std::ostream&
@@ -126,6 +143,9 @@ struct ParsedPort
     std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> admin_nets_v6;
     std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v4> secure_gateway_nets_v4;
     std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> secure_gateway_nets_v6;
+    std::set<std::string> pwa_domains;
+    bool pwa_custom_domains = false;
+    std::optional<beast::IP::Endpoint> pwa_resolver;
 };
 
 void

include/xrpl/server/detail/Door.h

@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ Door<Handler>::Door(
           port_.protocol.count("peer") > 0)
     , plain_(
           port_.protocol.count("http") > 0 || port_.protocol.count("ws") > 0 ||
-          port_.protocol.count("ws2"))
+          port_.protocol.count("ws2") || port_.protocol.count("pwa"))
 {
     reOpen();
 }

include/xrpl/server/detail/ServerImpl.h

@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ ServerImpl<Handler>::ports(std::vector<Port> const& ports)
 
                 sp->run();
             }
+
+            // UDP Superhighway (XUSH) datagrams arrive on the peer port
+            // number. TCP and UDP port numbers are independent, so this
+            // needs no socket sharing with the TCP door.
+            if (internalPort.has_peer() && internalPort.udp_highway)
+            {
+                if (auto sp = ios_.emplace<UDPDoor<Handler>>(
+                        handler_, io_context_, internalPort, j_))
+                    sp->run();
+            }
         }
     }
     return eps;

include/xrpl/server/detail/UDPDoor.h

@@ -78,10 +78,9 @@ public:
         error_code ec;
 
         // Create UDP endpoint from port configuration
-        auto const addr = port_.ip.to_v4();
-        boost::asio::ip::udp::endpoint udp_endpoint(addr, port_.port);
+        boost::asio::ip::udp::endpoint udp_endpoint(port_.ip, port_.port);
 
-        socket_.open(boost::asio::ip::udp::v4(), ec);
+        socket_.open(udp_endpoint.protocol(), ec);
         if (ec)
         {
             JLOG(j_.error()) << "UDP socket open failed: " << ec.message();
@@ -94,17 +93,22 @@ public:
         {
             JLOG(j_.error())
                 << "UDP set reuse_address failed: " << ec.message();
+            close();
             return;
         }
 
         socket_.bind(udp_endpoint, ec);
         if (ec)
         {
-            JLOG(j_.error()) << "UDP socket bind failed: " << ec.message();
+            // Close the socket so that run() does not start receiving on an
+            // unbound socket, which would silently bind an ephemeral port.
+            JLOG(j_.error()) << "UDP socket bind to " << udp_endpoint
+                             << " failed: " << ec.message();
+            close();
             return;
         }
 
-        JLOG(j_.info()) << "UDP-RPC listening on " << udp_endpoint;
+        JLOG(j_.info()) << "UDP listening on " << udp_endpoint;
     }
 
     endpoint_type
@@ -169,6 +173,7 @@ private:
         handler_.onUDPMessage(
             std::string(recv_buffer_.data(), bytes_transferred),
             tcp_endpoint,
+            port_,
             [this, tcp_endpoint](std::string const& response) {
                 do_send(response, tcp_endpoint);
             });

src/libxrpl/protocol/AppLoader.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2025 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <xrpl/basics/Slice.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/UTF8.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/AppLoader.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
+
+#include <string_view>
+
+namespace ripple {
+namespace appLoader {
+
+namespace {
+
+// HTML "ASCII whitespace": TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE.
+inline bool
+isSpace(std::uint8_t c) noexcept
+{
+    return c == 0x09 || c == 0x0A || c == 0x0C || c == 0x0D || c == 0x20;
+}
+
+inline std::uint8_t
+lower(std::uint8_t c) noexcept
+{
+    return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ? static_cast<std::uint8_t>(c + 32) : c;
+}
+
+// Case-insensitive match of lower-case `lit` at `pos`; never reads past
+// the end.
+bool
+matchAt(
+    std::uint8_t const* data,
+    std::size_t size,
+    std::size_t pos,
+    std::string_view lit) noexcept
+{
+    if (pos > size || size - pos < lit.size())
+        return false;
+    for (std::size_t i = 0; i < lit.size(); ++i)
+        if (lower(data[pos + i]) != static_cast<std::uint8_t>(lit[i]))
+            return false;
+    return true;
+}
+
+std::size_t
+findFrom(
+    std::uint8_t const* data,
+    std::size_t size,
+    std::size_t from,
+    std::string_view lit) noexcept
+{
+    for (std::size_t i = from; i + lit.size() <= size; ++i)
+        if (matchAt(data, size, i, lit))
+            return i;
+    return size;
+}
+
+// So that "<htmlish>" is not mistaken for "<html>".
+inline bool
+isTagNameEnd(std::uint8_t c) noexcept
+{
+    return isSpace(c) || c == '>' || c == '/';
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+Result
+validate(std::uint8_t const* data, std::size_t size)
+{
+    if (size == 0 || data == nullptr)
+        return Result::empty;
+    if (size > maxAppLoaderLength)
+        return Result::tooLarge;
+    if (!isValidUTF8(Slice(data, size)))
+        return Result::badUTF8;
+    for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
+        if (!isSpace(data[i]) && (data[i] < 0x20 || data[i] == 0x7F))
+            return Result::badControlChar;
+
+    std::size_t begin = 0;
+    if (size >= 3 && data[0] == 0xEF && data[1] == 0xBB && data[2] == 0xBF)
+        begin = 3;
+    while (begin < size && isSpace(data[begin]))
+        ++begin;
+    if (begin == size)
+        return Result::empty;
+
+    // "<!doctype" followed by whitespace is the only doctype form any
+    // browser treats as standards-mode HTML.
+    bool const doctype = matchAt(data, size, begin, "<!doctype") &&
+        begin + 9 < size && isSpace(data[begin + 9]);
+    bool const html = matchAt(data, size, begin, "<html") && begin + 5 < size &&
+        isTagNameEnd(data[begin + 5]);
+    if (!doctype && !html)
+        return Result::noDoctype;
+
+    std::size_t open = begin;
+    for (;;)
+    {
+        open = findFrom(data, size, open, "<html");
+        if (open == size)
+            return Result::noHtmlElement;
+        if (open + 5 < size && isTagNameEnd(data[open + 5]))
+            break;
+        ++open;
+    }
+
+    // The LAST well-formed </html>, so that one quoted inside a script
+    // does not shadow the real one. Linear: each probe resumes one past
+    // the previous match.
+    // closeEnd == 0 means none found: a well-formed </html> always ends
+    // past position 0.
+    std::size_t closeEnd = 0;
+    for (std::size_t probe = open;;)
+    {
+        std::size_t const found = findFrom(data, size, probe, "</html");
+        if (found == size)
+            break;
+        std::size_t j = found + 6;
+        while (j < size && isSpace(data[j]))
+            ++j;
+        if (j < size && data[j] == '>')
+            closeEnd = j + 1;
+        probe = found + 1;
+    }
+    if (closeEnd == 0)
+        return Result::unclosed;
+
+    for (std::size_t i = closeEnd; i < size; ++i)
+        if (!isSpace(data[i]))
+            return Result::trailingGarbage;
+    return Result::ok;
+}
+
+char const*
+to_string(Result r)
+{
+    switch (r)
+    {
+        case Result::ok:
+            return "ok";
+        case Result::empty:
+            return "empty document";
+        case Result::tooLarge:
+            return "document exceeds maxAppLoaderLength";
+        case Result::badUTF8:
+            return "malformed UTF-8";
+        case Result::badControlChar:
+            return "forbidden control character";
+        case Result::noDoctype:
+            return "does not open with a doctype or <html> tag";
+        case Result::noHtmlElement:
+            return "missing <html> start tag";
+        case Result::unclosed:
+            return "missing or misplaced </html> end tag";
+        case Result::trailingGarbage:
+            return "content after </html>";
+    }
+    return "unknown";
+}
+
+}  // namespace appLoader
+}  // namespace ripple

src/libxrpl/protocol/Indexes.cpp

@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ enum class LedgerNameSpace : std::uint16_t {
     IMPORT_VLSEQ = 'I',
     UNL_REPORT = 'R',
     CRON = 'L',
+    APP_LOADER = 'W',
     AMM = 'A',
     BRIDGE = LEDGER_NAMESPACE2(0x01, 'H'),
     XCHAIN_CLAIM_ID = 'Q',
@@ -90,8 +91,10 @@ enum class LedgerNameSpace : std::uint16_t {
     MPTOKEN_ISSUANCE = '~',
     MPTOKEN = 't',
     MANIFEST = 'M',
+    MANIFEST_DIR = LEDGER_NAMESPACE2(0x01, 'M'),
     CREDENTIAL = LEDGER_NAMESPACE2(0x01, 'D'),
     PERMISSIONED_DOMAIN = 'm',
+    RANDOM = 0x526E,  // Rn
 
     // No longer used or supported. Left here to reserve the space
     // to avoid accidental reuse.
@@ -276,6 +279,13 @@ UNLReport() noexcept
     return ret;
 }
 
+Keylet const&
+random() noexcept
+{
+    static Keylet const ret{ltRANDOM, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::RANDOM)};
+    return ret;
+}
+
 Keylet
 book_t::operator()(Book const& b) const
 {
@@ -613,6 +623,12 @@ did(AccountID const& account) noexcept
     return {ltDID, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::DID, account)};
 }
 
+Keylet
+appLoader(AccountID const& account) noexcept
+{
+    return {ltAPP_LOADER, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::APP_LOADER, account)};
+}
+
 Keylet
 oracle(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t const& documentID) noexcept
 {
@@ -677,6 +693,14 @@ manifest(PublicKey const& pk) noexcept
     return {ltMANIFEST, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::MANIFEST, pk.slice())};
 }
 
+Keylet const&
+manifestDir() noexcept
+{
+    static Keylet const ret{
+        ltDIR_NODE, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::MANIFEST_DIR)};
+    return ret;
+}
+
 }  // namespace keylet
 
 }  // namespace ripple

src/libxrpl/protocol/InnerObjectFormats.cpp

@@ -143,6 +143,14 @@ InnerObjectFormats::InnerObjectFormats()
             {sfAccount, soeOPTIONAL},
         });
 
+    add(sfRandomDigestEntry.jsonName,
+        sfRandomDigestEntry.getCode(),
+        {
+            {sfPublicKey, soeREQUIRED},
+            {sfNextRandomDigest, soeREQUIRED},
+            {sfLedgerSequence, soeREQUIRED},
+        });
+
     add(sfAmountEntry.jsonName,
         sfAmountEntry.getCode(),
         {

src/libxrpl/protocol/STTx.cpp

@@ -684,7 +684,8 @@ isPseudoTx(STObject const& tx)
 
     auto tt = safe_cast<TxType>(*t);
     return tt == ttAMENDMENT || tt == ttFEE || tt == ttUNL_MODIFY ||
-        tt == ttEMIT_FAILURE || tt == ttUNL_REPORT || tt == ttCRON;
+        tt == ttEMIT_FAILURE || tt == ttUNL_REPORT || tt == ttCRON ||
+        tt == ttENTROPY;
 }
 
 }  // namespace ripple

src/libxrpl/protocol/TER.cpp

@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ transResults()
         MAKE_ERROR(tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE,     "The LedgerFixType field has an invalid value."),
         MAKE_ERROR(tefPAST_MANIFEST_SEQ,           "The submitted manifest's sequence is not newer than the current."),
         MAKE_ERROR(tefREVOKED_MANIFEST,            "The submitted manifest is for a revoked master key."),
+        MAKE_ERROR(tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE,         "A key the submitted manifest names is already in use by another manifest."),
 
         MAKE_ERROR(telLOCAL_ERROR,            "Local failure."),
         MAKE_ERROR(telBAD_DOMAIN,             "Domain too long."),

src/libxrpl/protocol/TxMeta.cpp

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ TxMeta::TxMeta(
 
     if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfHookEmissions))
         setHookEmissions(obj.getFieldArray(sfHookEmissions));
+
+    if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfRandomData))
+        setRandomData(obj.getFieldH256(sfRandomData));
 }
 
 TxMeta::TxMeta(uint256 const& txid, std::uint32_t ledger, STObject const& obj)
@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ TxMeta::TxMeta(uint256 const& txid, std::uint32_t ledger, STObject const& obj)
 
     if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfHookEmissions))
         setHookEmissions(obj.getFieldArray(sfHookEmissions));
+
+    if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfRandomData))
+        setRandomData(obj.getFieldH256(sfRandomData));
 }
 
 TxMeta::TxMeta(uint256 const& txid, std::uint32_t ledger, Blob const& vec)
@@ -245,6 +251,9 @@ TxMeta::getAsObject() const
     if (hasHookEmissions())
         metaData.setFieldArray(sfHookEmissions, getHookEmissions());
 
+    if (hasRandomData())
+        metaData.setFieldH256(sfRandomData, getRandomData());
+
     return metaData;
 }
 

src/libxrpl/server/Port.cpp

@@ -21,7 +21,10 @@
 #include <xrpl/beast/core/LexicalCast.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/rfc2616.h>
 #include <xrpl/server/Port.h>
+#include <boost/algorithm/string/case_conv.hpp>
+#include <boost/algorithm/string/classification.hpp>
 #include <boost/algorithm/string/predicate.hpp>
+#include <boost/algorithm/string/split.hpp>
 #include <boost/algorithm/string/trim.hpp>
 #include <sstream>
 #include <stdexcept>
@@ -66,6 +69,14 @@ operator<<(std::ostream& os, Port const& p)
         }
     }
 
+    if (!p.pwa_domains.empty())
+    {
+        os << "domains:";
+        for (auto const& d : p.pwa_domains)
+            os << " " << d;
+        os << ", ";
+    }
+
     if (p.secure_gateway_nets_v4.size() || p.secure_gateway_nets_v6.size())
     {
         os << "secure_gateway nets:";
@@ -311,6 +322,64 @@ parse_Port(ParsedPort& port, Section const& section, std::ostream& log)
         port.secure_gateway_nets_v4,
         port.secure_gateway_nets_v6);
 
+    // pwa ports: the zone(s) documents are served under, normalised like a
+    // Host header: lower case, no trailing dot, LDH labels of 1..63, with
+    // room left for the longest "pwa<AccountIndex>" label in front.
+    if (auto const optResult = section.get("domain"))
+    {
+        std::vector<std::string> domains;
+        boost::algorithm::split(
+            domains, *optResult, boost::algorithm::is_any_of(","));
+        for (auto& domain : domains)
+        {
+            boost::algorithm::trim(domain);
+            boost::algorithm::to_lower(domain);
+            if (!domain.empty() && domain.back() == '.')
+                domain.pop_back();
+            if (domain.empty())
+                continue;
+            bool valid = domain.size() + 24 <= 253;
+            std::vector<std::string> labels;
+            boost::algorithm::split(
+                labels, domain, boost::algorithm::is_any_of("."));
+            for (auto const& l : labels)
+                valid = valid && !l.empty() && l.size() <= 63 &&
+                    l.front() != '-' && l.back() != '-' &&
+                    l.find_first_not_of(
+                        "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-") ==
+                        std::string::npos;
+            if (!valid)
+            {
+                log << "Invalid value '" << domain << "' for key 'domain' in ["
+                    << section.name()
+                    << "]: expected a DNS zone such as pwapp.example";
+                Throw<std::exception>();
+            }
+            port.pwa_domains.insert(domain);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Custom domains on pwa ports, and the IPv4 recursive resolver to use for
+    // their TXT records (default: the system resolver).
+    if (auto const v = section.get("custom_domains"))
+        if (!beast::lexicalCastChecked(port.pwa_custom_domains, *v))
+        {
+            log << "Invalid value '" << *v << "' for key 'custom_domains' in ["
+                << section.name() << "]: expected 0 or 1";
+            Throw<std::exception>();
+        }
+    if (auto const v = section.get("resolver"))
+    {
+        auto const ep = beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string_checked(*v);
+        if (!ep || !ep->is_v4() || ep->address().is_unspecified())
+        {
+            log << "Invalid value '" << *v << "' for key 'resolver' in ["
+                << section.name() << "]: expected an IPv4 address[:port]";
+            Throw<std::exception>();
+        }
+        port.pwa_resolver = ep->port() ? *ep : ep->at_port(53);
+    }
+
     set(port.user, "user", section);
     set(port.password, "password", section);
     set(port.admin_user, "admin_user", section);

src/test/app/ClaimReward_test.cpp

@@ -578,6 +578,25 @@ public:
                     ter(tecNO_TARGET));
                 env.close();
             }
+            // HookName removed with a HookName-only update
+            // The sfHooks entry keeps an STI_NOTPRESENT placeholder for
+            // sfHookName, which preclaim must treat as "no name".
+            {
+                Json::Value jv;
+                jv[jss::Account] = issuer.human();
+                jv[jss::TransactionType] = jss::SetHook;
+                jv[jss::Flags] = 0;
+                jv[jss::Hooks] = Json::Value{Json::arrayValue};
+                jv[jss::Hooks][0U][jss::Hook][jss::HookName] = "";
+                env(jv, fee(XRP(1)));
+                env.close();
+
+                env(reward::claim(alice),
+                    reward::issuer(issuer),
+                    fee(XRP(1)),
+                    ter(tesSUCCESS));
+                env.close();
+            }
             // Vaild HookOn
             {
                 auto hookObj = hso(jtx::genesis::AcceptHook, overrideFlag);

src/test/app/HookAPI_test.cpp

@@ -3043,6 +3043,91 @@ public:
         BEAST_EXPECT(acct->value() == alice.id());
     }
 
+    void
+    test_otxn_field_emit_failure(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        testcase("Test otxn_field on emit failure callback");
+
+        using namespace jtx;
+        using namespace hook_api;
+
+        auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
+        auto const bob = Account{"bob"};
+
+        // the cleanup pseudo carries sfLedgerSequence / sfTransactionHash,
+        // the original emitted txn carries sfDestination
+        STTx const pseudo = STTx(ttEMIT_FAILURE, [&](STObject& obj) {
+            obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, 1);
+            obj.setFieldH256(sfTransactionHash, uint256{5});
+        });
+        STTx const emitted = STTx(ttPAYMENT, [&](STObject& obj) {
+            obj[sfAccount] = alice.id();
+            obj[sfDestination] = bob.id();
+        });
+
+        for (bool const withFix : {false, true})
+        {
+            Env env{
+                *this,
+                withFix ? features | fix20261005 : features - fix20261005};
+            OpenView ov{*env.current()};
+            ApplyContext applyCtx = createApplyContext(env, ov, pseudo);
+            StubHookContext stubCtx{.emitFailure = emitted};
+            auto hookCtx =
+                makeStubHookContext(applyCtx, alice.id(), alice.id(), stubCtx);
+            auto& api = hookCtx.api();
+
+            // present on both: read from the emitted txn either way
+            {
+                auto const result = api.otxn_field(sfAccount.getCode());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(result.has_value());
+                auto const* acct =
+                    dynamic_cast<STAccount const*>(result.value());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(acct && acct->value() == alice.id());
+            }
+
+            // only on the emitted txn: before the fix presence was checked
+            // on the pseudo, so the field was reported missing
+            {
+                auto const result = api.otxn_field(sfDestination.getCode());
+                if (withFix)
+                {
+                    BEAST_EXPECT(result.has_value());
+                    auto const* dest =
+                        dynamic_cast<STAccount const*>(result.value());
+                    BEAST_EXPECT(dest && dest->value() == bob.id());
+                }
+                else
+                {
+                    BEAST_EXPECT(
+                        !result.has_value() && result.error() == DOESNT_EXIST);
+                }
+            }
+
+            // only on the pseudo: before the fix this throws out of
+            // getField on the emitted txn
+            if (withFix)
+            {
+                auto const result = api.otxn_field(sfLedgerSequence.getCode());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(
+                    !result.has_value() && result.error() == DOESNT_EXIST);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                bool threw = false;
+                try
+                {
+                    (void)api.otxn_field(sfLedgerSequence.getCode());
+                }
+                catch (std::exception const&)
+                {
+                    threw = true;
+                }
+                BEAST_EXPECT(threw);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     void
     test_otxn_id(FeatureBitset features)
     {
@@ -3741,6 +3826,174 @@ public:
         }
     }
 
+    void
+    test_state_foreign_read_accounting(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        testcase("Test state_foreign read does not consume write resources");
+
+        using namespace jtx;
+        using namespace hook_api;
+        using namespace hook;
+
+        bool const hasFix = features[fix20261005];
+        bool const hasExtended = features[featureExtendedHookState];
+
+        Env env{*this, features};
+
+        auto const fees = env.current()->fees();
+        auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
+        auto const bob = Account{"bob"};
+        auto const carol = Account{"carol"};
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
+        // exactly one state reserve slot available
+        env.fund(fees.accountReserve(0) + fees.increment, bob);
+        // no state reserve slot available
+        env.fund(fees.accountReserve(0), carol);
+        env.close();
+
+        uint256 const readKey{1};
+        uint256 const writeKey{2};
+        uint256 const ns{3};
+        Bytes const existingData{0xAA, 0xBB};
+        Bytes writeData{0x01};
+
+        OpenView ov{*env.current()};
+
+        // Place an existing state entry (and its namespace directory) on
+        // ledger for each account, so state_foreign's cache-miss path reads it.
+        auto insertState = [&](AccountID const& acc) {
+            auto const dirKeylet = keylet::hookStateDir(acc, ns);
+            auto dir = std::make_shared<SLE>(dirKeylet);
+            dir->setFieldH256(sfRootIndex, dirKeylet.key);
+            dir->setFieldV256(
+                sfIndexes,
+                STVector256{std::vector<uint256>{
+                    keylet::hookState(acc, readKey, ns).key}});
+            ov.rawInsert(dir);
+
+            auto hs =
+                std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::hookState(acc, readKey, ns));
+            hs->setFieldVL(sfHookStateData, existingData);
+            hs->setFieldH256(sfHookStateKey, readKey);
+            hs->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, 0);
+            ov.rawInsert(hs);
+        };
+        insertState(alice.id());
+        insertState(bob.id());
+        insertState(carol.id());
+
+        STTx invokeTx = STTx(ttINVOKE, [&](STObject& obj) {});
+        ApplyContext applyCtx = createApplyContext(env, ov, invokeTx);
+
+        auto availableSlots = [&](AccountID const& acc) -> int64_t {
+            auto const sle = ov.read(keylet::account(acc));
+            int64_t avail = sle->getFieldAmount(sfBalance).xrp().drops() -
+                fees.accountReserve(sle->getFieldU32(sfOwnerCount)).drops();
+            return avail / fees.increment.drops();
+        };
+
+        {
+            // A read must not consume the shared modification limit.
+            HookStateMap stateMap;
+            auto hookCtx = makeStubHookContext(
+                applyCtx, alice.id(), alice.id(), {}, stateMap);
+            auto& api = hookCtx.api();
+
+            stateMap.modified_entry_count = max_state_modifications - 1;
+
+            auto const read = api.state_foreign(readKey, ns, alice.id());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(read.has_value() && read.value() == existingData);
+
+            int64_t const slots = availableSlots(alice.id());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(slots > 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                stateMap.modified_entry_count ==
+                max_state_modifications - (hasFix ? 1 : 0));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                std::get<0>(stateMap[alice.id()]) == slots - (hasFix ? 0 : 1));
+
+            auto const write =
+                api.state_foreign_set(writeKey, ns, alice.id(), writeData);
+            if (hasFix)
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(write.has_value());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(
+                    stateMap.modified_entry_count == max_state_modifications);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(!write.has_value());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(write.error() == TOO_MANY_STATE_MODIFICATIONS);
+            }
+        }
+
+        {
+            // A read must not consume the reserve budget.
+            HookStateMap stateMap;
+            auto hookCtx =
+                makeStubHookContext(applyCtx, bob.id(), bob.id(), {}, stateMap);
+            auto& api = hookCtx.api();
+
+            BEAST_EXPECT(availableSlots(bob.id()) == 1);
+
+            auto const read = api.state_foreign(readKey, ns, bob.id());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(read.has_value() && read.value() == existingData);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(std::get<0>(stateMap[bob.id()]) == (hasFix ? 1 : 0));
+
+            auto const write =
+                api.state_foreign_set(writeKey, ns, bob.id(), writeData);
+            if (hasFix)
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(write.has_value());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(std::get<0>(stateMap[bob.id()]) == 0);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(!write.has_value());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(write.error() == RESERVE_INSUFFICIENT);
+            }
+
+            // Modifying the entry that was read needs no new reserve and
+            // is still charged as a modification.
+            auto const before = stateMap.modified_entry_count;
+            Bytes overwrite{0x02};
+            auto const update =
+                api.state_foreign_set(readKey, ns, bob.id(), overwrite);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(update.has_value());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(stateMap.modified_entry_count == before + 1);
+        }
+
+        {
+            // A read on an account with no spare reserve must succeed;
+            // previously ExtendedHookState's sanity check rejected it.
+            HookStateMap stateMap;
+            auto hookCtx = makeStubHookContext(
+                applyCtx, carol.id(), carol.id(), {}, stateMap);
+            auto& api = hookCtx.api();
+
+            BEAST_EXPECT(availableSlots(carol.id()) == 0);
+
+            auto const read = api.state_foreign(readKey, ns, carol.id());
+            if (hasExtended && !hasFix)
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(!read.has_value());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(read.error() == INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(read.has_value() && read.value() == existingData);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(stateMap.modified_entry_count == (hasFix ? 0 : 1));
+            }
+
+            // Writing a new key still fails on reserve either way.
+            auto const write =
+                api.state_foreign_set(writeKey, ns, carol.id(), writeData);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!write.has_value());
+            if (!write.has_value())
+                BEAST_EXPECT(write.error() == RESERVE_INSUFFICIENT);
+        }
+    }
+
     void
     test_state_foreign_set_max(FeatureBitset features)
     {
@@ -4958,6 +5211,7 @@ public:
         test_fee_base(features);
 
         test_otxn_field(features);
+        test_otxn_field_emit_failure(features);
 
         test_ledger_keylet(features);
 
@@ -5012,6 +5266,10 @@ public:
 
         test_state(features);
         test_state_foreign(features);
+        test_state_foreign_read_accounting(features);
+        test_state_foreign_read_accounting(features - fix20261005);
+        test_state_foreign_read_accounting(
+            features - fix20261005 - featureExtendedHookState);
         test_state_foreign_set(features - fixHookMap);
         test_state_foreign_set(features);
         test_state_foreign_set_max(features);

src/test/app/Manifest_test.cpp

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/rdb/Wallet.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/StringUtilities.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/base64.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/contract.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STExchange.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
@@ -975,9 +976,482 @@ public:
             ".example.com"));
     }
 
+    struct Validator
+    {
+        SecretKey masterSecret;
+        PublicKey master;
+        SecretKey signingSecret;
+        PublicKey signing;
+    };
+
+    static Validator
+    makeValidator()
+    {
+        auto const ms = randomSecretKey();
+        auto const ss = randomSecretKey();
+        return {
+            ms,
+            derivePublicKey(KeyType::ed25519, ms),
+            ss,
+            derivePublicKey(KeyType::secp256k1, ss)};
+    }
+
+    /** The same master key with a fresh ephemeral key. */
+    static Validator
+    rotate(Validator const& v)
+    {
+        auto const ss = randomSecretKey();
+        return {
+            v.masterSecret,
+            v.master,
+            ss,
+            derivePublicKey(KeyType::secp256k1, ss)};
+    }
+
+    /** Another master key claiming the same ephemeral key. */
+    static Validator
+    impostor(Validator const& v)
+    {
+        auto const ms = randomSecretKey();
+        return {
+            ms,
+            derivePublicKey(KeyType::ed25519, ms),
+            v.signingSecret,
+            v.signing};
+    }
+
+    Manifest
+    manifestFor(Validator const& v, int seq, bool invalidSig = false)
+    {
+        return makeManifest(
+            v.masterSecret,
+            KeyType::ed25519,
+            v.signingSecret,
+            KeyType::secp256k1,
+            seq,
+            invalidSig);
+    }
+
+    static std::size_t
+    offered(ManifestCache const& cache)
+    {
+        std::size_t n = 0;
+        cache.for_each_gossip_manifest(
+            [](std::size_t) {}, [&n](Manifest const&) { ++n; });
+        return n;
+    }
+
+    void
+    testGossipAdmission()
+    {
+        testcase("gossip admission");
+
+        using D = ManifestDisposition;
+        auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
+
+        TestStopwatch clock;
+        ManifestCache cache{
+            beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+
+        // Gossip for a master key not held, before its ephemeral key has
+        // signed anything: held back, not admitted.
+        auto const a = makeValidator();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(a, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == a.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(a.master));
+
+        // Its first validation releases it, once.
+        auto const seq = cache.sequence();
+        auto const released = cache.noteValidation(a.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->masterKey == a.master);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == a.master);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(a.master) == gossip);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(a.signing));
+
+        // Seen first, then gossiped: admitted at once.
+        auto const b = makeValidator();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(b.signing));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(b, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
+
+        // A master key held from gossip rotates without its new key having
+        // been seen...
+        auto const b2 = rotate(b);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(b2, 2), gossip) == D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(b2.signing) == b.master);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(b.signing) == b.signing);
+
+        // ...and is revoked from gossip too, since that only takes trust away.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(
+                makeRevocation(b.masterSecret, KeyType::ed25519), gossip) ==
+            D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(b.master));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(b2.signing) == b2.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(b.master) == gossip);
+
+        // A revocation for a master key not held names no ephemeral key that
+        // could have been seen, so gossip cannot introduce one...
+        auto const c = makeValidator();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(
+                makeRevocation(c.masterSecret, KeyType::ed25519), gossip) ==
+            D::unseen);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(c.master));
+
+        // ...but a list can.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(makeRevocation(
+                c.masterSecret, KeyType::ed25519)) == D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(c.master) == ManifestSource::list);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(c.master));
+
+        // A forgery waits unverified, and is dropped when released.
+        auto const d = makeValidator();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(d, 1, true), gossip) == D::unseen);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(d.signing));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(d.master));
+
+        // A key is remembered for three to four epochs of the filter.
+        auto const e = makeValidator();
+        cache.noteValidation(e.signing);
+        clock.advance(ManifestCache::seenInterval * 3);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(e, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
+
+        auto const f = makeValidator();
+        cache.noteValidation(f.signing);
+        clock.advance(ManifestCache::seenInterval * 4);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(f, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPendingSubstitution()
+    {
+        testcase("pending ring: forged replacement");
+
+        using D = ManifestDisposition;
+        auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
+
+        // Same master and signing key, higher sequence, bad master signature.
+        {
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{
+                beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+            auto const v = makeValidator();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2, true), gossip) ==
+                D::unseen);
+            auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
+        }
+
+        // Different master claiming the same signing key, bad master signature.
+        {
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{
+                beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+            auto const v = makeValidator();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(
+                    manifestFor(impostor(v), 2, true), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->masterKey == v.master);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
+        }
+
+        // A forgery that arrives first, for the same master key with a
+        // higher sequence, does not keep out the genuine manifest.
+        {
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{
+                beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+            auto const v = makeValidator();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2, true), gossip) ==
+                D::unseen);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
+        }
+
+        // Nor does one that arrives first for another master key.
+        {
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{
+                beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+            auto const v = makeValidator();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(
+                    manifestFor(impostor(v), 2, true), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->masterKey == v.master);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
+        }
+
+        // A genuine manifest waiting is not displaced by an older genuine one.
+        {
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{
+                beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+            auto const v = makeValidator();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 2);
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testGossipCapacity()
+    {
+        testcase("gossip capacity and decay");
+
+        using D = ManifestDisposition;
+        auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
+
+        TestStopwatch clock;
+        ManifestCache cache{
+            beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+
+        std::vector<Validator> held;
+        for (std::size_t i = 0; i < ManifestCache::gossipCapacity; ++i)
+        {
+            held.push_back(makeValidator());
+            cache.noteValidation(held.back().signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(held.back(), 1), gossip) ==
+                D::accepted);
+        }
+        BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity);
+
+        // Every entry is exactly as active as a newcomer: none gives way.
+        auto const newcomer = makeValidator();
+        cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(newcomer, 1), gossip) == D::full);
+
+        // Four half-lives on, all but the first have gone on validating. The
+        // first has decayed to a sixteenth of a sighting, the rest stand at
+        // seventeen sixteenths, and a newcomer is worth a whole one: it
+        // displaces the first and nothing else.
+        clock.advance(ManifestCache::halfLife * 4);
+        for (std::size_t i = 1; i < held.size(); ++i)
+            cache.noteValidation(held[i].signing);
+
+        auto const seq = cache.sequence();
+        cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(newcomer, 1), gossip) ==
+            D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(held[0].master));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(held[0].signing) == held[0].signing);
+        for (std::size_t i = 1; i < held.size(); ++i)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[i].master) == gossip);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity);
+
+        // The newcomer is now the least active, but no less active than
+        // another newcomer, which therefore finds no room.
+        auto const late = makeValidator();
+        cache.noteValidation(late.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(late, 1), gossip) == D::full);
+
+        // Far enough on that the weights are rebased. Their order survives:
+        // the one entry that stopped validating is the one displaced.
+        clock.advance(ManifestCache::halfLife * 300);
+        for (std::size_t i = 2; i < held.size(); ++i)
+            cache.noteValidation(held[i].signing);
+        cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
+        cache.noteValidation(late.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(late, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(held[1].master));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(newcomer.master) == gossip);
+        for (std::size_t i = 2; i < held.size(); ++i)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[i].master) == gossip);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPinning()
+    {
+        testcase("pinning");
+
+        using D = ManifestDisposition;
+        auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
+
+        TestStopwatch clock;
+        ManifestCache cache{
+            beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+
+        std::vector<Validator> held;
+        for (std::size_t i = 0; i < ManifestCache::gossipCapacity; ++i)
+        {
+            held.push_back(makeValidator());
+            cache.noteValidation(held.back().signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(held.back(), 1), gossip) ==
+                D::accepted);
+        }
+
+        // Pinned, a gossip entry is retained as list and frees its slot.
+        auto const seq = cache.sequence();
+        cache.pin({held[0].master});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[0].master) == ManifestSource::list);
+
+        auto const newcomer = makeValidator();
+        cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(newcomer, 1), gossip) ==
+            D::accepted);
+        for (auto const& v : held)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(v.master));
+
+        // Unpinned, it falls back into a full tier, which sheds its least
+        // active entry: one of those that stopped validating.
+        clock.advance(ManifestCache::halfLife);
+        cache.noteValidation(held[0].signing);
+        cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
+        cache.pin({});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[0].master) == gossip);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(newcomer.master) == gossip);
+        std::size_t remaining = 0;
+        for (std::size_t i = 1; i < held.size(); ++i)
+            remaining += cache.getTier(held[i].master) ? 1 : 0;
+        BEAST_EXPECT(remaining == held.size() - 2);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity);
+
+        // A master key a list vouched for stays in the list tier however it
+        // is updated later, and is offered alongside gossip.
+        auto const listed = makeValidator();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(listed, 1)) == D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(rotate(listed), 2), gossip) ==
+            D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(listed.master) == ManifestSource::list);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity + 1);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPrecedence()
+    {
+        testcase("tier precedence on key conflicts");
+
+        using D = ManifestDisposition;
+        auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
+
+        TestStopwatch clock;
+        ManifestCache cache{
+            beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+
+        // Gossip binds an ephemeral key to a master key...
+        auto const a = makeValidator();
+        cache.noteValidation(a.signing);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(a, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
+
+        // ...and a list binding the same key to another master key wins,
+        // evicting it, where before it would have been refused.
+        auto const b = impostor(a);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(b, 1)) == D::accepted);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == b.master);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(a.master));
+
+        // Gossip cannot do the same to the list...
+        auto const c = impostor(a);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(c, 1), gossip) ==
+            D::badEphemeralKey);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == b.master);
+
+        // ...and between equals the first holds, as it always has.
+        auto const d = impostor(a);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(d, 1)) == D::badEphemeralKey);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == b.master);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPending()
+    {
+        testcase("pending");
+
+        using D = ManifestDisposition;
+        auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
+
+        {
+            // A newer manifest for a key already waiting replaces it.
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{
+                beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+
+            auto const v = makeValidator();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 3), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 3);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getSequence(v.master) == 3);
+        }
+
+        {
+            // The ring holds pendingCapacity; the first to arrive makes way
+            // for the one after.
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{
+                beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
+
+            std::vector<Validator> waiting;
+            for (std::size_t i = 0; i <= ManifestCache::pendingCapacity; ++i)
+            {
+                waiting.push_back(makeValidator());
+                BEAST_EXPECT(
+                    cache.applyManifest(
+                        manifestFor(waiting.back(), 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
+            }
+
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(waiting.front().signing));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(waiting.front().master));
+
+            std::size_t released = 0;
+            for (std::size_t i = 1; i < waiting.size(); ++i)
+                released += cache.noteValidation(waiting[i].signing) ? 1 : 0;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(released == ManifestCache::pendingCapacity);
+        }
+    }
+
     void
     run() override
     {
+        testGossipAdmission();
+        testGossipCapacity();
+        testPendingSubstitution();
+        testPinning();
+        testPrecedence();
+        testPending();
+
         ManifestCache cache;
         {
             testcase("apply");

src/test/app/PWALoader_test.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2025 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <test/jtx.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/StringUtilities.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/AppLoader.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/digest.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
+
+#include <string>
+
+namespace ripple {
+namespace test {
+
+class PWALoader_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
+{
+    static appLoader::Result
+    check(std::string const& s)
+    {
+        return appLoader::validate(
+            reinterpret_cast<std::uint8_t const*>(s.data()), s.size());
+    }
+
+    static std::string
+    docOfSize(std::size_t len)
+    {
+        std::string const head = "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>";
+        std::string const tail = "</body></html>";
+        if (len < head.size() + tail.size())
+            return head + tail;
+        return head + std::string(len - head.size() - tail.size(), 'x') + tail;
+    }
+
+    static std::string
+    doc()
+    {
+        return "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>hi</body></html>";
+    }
+
+    // AccountSet carrying sfAppLoader.
+    static Json::Value
+    set(jtx::Account const& a, std::string const& d)
+    {
+        auto jt = jtx::noop(a);
+        jt[sfAppLoader.fieldName] = strHex(d);
+        return jt;
+    }
+
+    // validate() is consensus critical: these pin its edges, so a refactor
+    // that moves any of them fails here rather than forking the network.
+    void
+    testValidator()
+    {
+        testcase("validator");
+        using R = appLoader::Result;
+        using namespace std::string_literals;
+
+        for (auto const& s :
+             {"<!DOCTYPE html><html></html>"s,
+              "<!doctype html><html></html>"s,
+              "<html></html>"s,
+              "<HTML></HTML>"s,
+              "<html lang=\"en\" class=\"root\"></html>"s,
+              "  \n\t<html></html>\n\n  "s,
+              "<html></html >"s,
+              "<html></html\n>"s,
+              "\xEF\xBB\xBF<html></html>"s,
+              "\xEF\xBB\xBF<!DOCTYPE html><html></html>"s,
+              "<html><body>\xE6\xBC\xA2\xE5\xAD\x97</body></html>"s,
+              "<html><script>var s=\"</html>\";</script></html>"s,
+              "<html>\t\n\r\f</html>"s,
+              "<html></html>  \n"s,
+              "<!DOCTYPE html>\n<!-- c --><html></html>"s,
+              "<html>\xC2\x85</html>"s,  // C1 controls are not rejected
+              docOfSize(maxAppLoaderLength)})
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(check(s) == R::ok, s);
+
+        std::vector<std::pair<std::string, R>> const bad{
+            {""s, R::empty},
+            {"   \n"s, R::empty},
+            {"\xEF\xBB\xBF"s, R::empty},
+            {docOfSize(maxAppLoaderLength + 1), R::tooLarge},
+            {"<html>\xC0\xAF</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
+            {"<html>\xED\xA0\x80</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
+            {"<html>\xEF\xBF\xBE</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
+            {"<html>\xE6\xBC</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
+            {"<html></html>\xE6"s, R::badUTF8},
+            {"<html>\0</html>"s, R::badControlChar},
+            {"<html>\x1B</html>"s, R::badControlChar},
+            {"<html>\x7F</html>"s, R::badControlChar},
+            {"hello"s, R::noDoctype},
+            {"<div>frag</div>"s, R::noDoctype},
+            {"<htmlish></html>"s, R::noDoctype},
+            {"<!DOCTYPEhtml><html></html>"s, R::noDoctype},
+            {"<!DOCTYPE"s, R::noDoctype},
+            {"<!DOCTYPE html>"s, R::noHtmlElement},
+            {"<!DOCTYPE html><htmlish></html>"s, R::noHtmlElement},
+            {"<html>"s, R::unclosed},
+            {"<html></html"s, R::unclosed},
+            {"<html></htmlx>"s, R::unclosed},
+            {"<html></html>trailing"s, R::trailingGarbage},
+            {"<html></html><p>"s, R::trailingGarbage},
+            {"<html></html>\xC2\xA0"s, R::trailingGarbage},  // NBSP
+        };
+        for (auto const& [s, r] : bad)
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(
+                check(s) == r, s + ": " + appLoader::to_string(check(s)));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testEnabled()
+    {
+        testcase("amendment gate");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Env env{*this, supported_amendments() - featurePWALoader};
+        Account const alice{"alice"};
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
+        env.close();
+        env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)), ter(temDISABLED));
+        env(set(alice, ""), fee(XRP(1)), ter(temDISABLED));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::appLoader(alice.id())));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoaderSequence));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testSetAndRemove()
+    {
+        testcase("set, overwrite, remove, sequence");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Env env{*this};
+        Account const alice{"alice"};
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
+        env.close();
+        auto const kl = keylet::appLoader(alice.id());
+        auto seq = [&] {
+            return (*env.le(alice))[~sfAppLoaderSequence].value_or(0);
+        };
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoaderSequence));
+
+        // Create: the object, with the owner's new sequence; nothing inline
+        // on the AccountRoot, no reserve, not in the owner directory.
+        env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
+        env.close();
+        auto sle = env.le(kl);
+        if (BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
+        {
+            BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfAppLoader] == makeSlice(doc()));
+            BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfOwner] == alice.id());
+            BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 1);
+        }
+        BEAST_EXPECT(seq() == 1);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoader));
+        BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(alice))[sfOwnerCount] == 0);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            env.rpc(
+                   "json",
+                   "account_objects",
+                   R"({"account":")" + alice.human() +
+                       R"("})")[jss::result][jss::account_objects]
+                .size() == 0);
+        auto const txid = (*sle)[sfPreviousTxnID];
+
+        // Overwrite: new content, next sequence, rethreaded.
+        env(set(alice, "<html><body>v2</body></html>"), fee(XRP(1)));
+        env.close();
+        sle = env.le(kl);
+        if (BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
+        {
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                (*sle)[sfAppLoader] ==
+                makeSlice(std::string("<html><body>v2</body></html>")));
+            BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 2);
+            BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfPreviousTxnID] != txid);
+        }
+        BEAST_EXPECT(seq() == 2);
+
+        // An AccountSet without the field leaves everything alone.
+        env(noop(alice));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(kl))[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 2 && seq() == 2);
+
+        // Remove with an empty blob: the object goes, the sequence still
+        // advances (so a copy of sequence 2 is known to be stale), and
+        // removing again is a no-op that advances it again.
+        env(set(alice, ""), fee(XRP(1)));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl) && seq() == 3);
+        env(set(alice, ""), fee(XRP(1)));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl) && seq() == 4);
+
+        // Republish: the sequence carries on.
+        env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(kl))[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 5 && seq() == 5);
+
+        // ledger_entry reaches it by account or by index.
+        for (auto const& req :
+             {R"({"app_loader":")" + alice.human() + R"("})",
+              R"({"index":")" + to_string(kl.key) + R"("})"})
+        {
+            auto const r = env.rpc("json", "ledger_entry", req)[jss::result];
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(
+                r[jss::node][sfLedgerEntryType.fieldName] == jss::AppLoader &&
+                    r[jss::node][sfAppLoaderSequence.fieldName] == 5,
+                req);
+        }
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            env.rpc(
+                "json",
+                "ledger_entry",
+                R"({"app_loader":"nope"})")[jss::result][jss::error] ==
+            "malformedAddress");
+    }
+
+    void
+    testFee()
+    {
+        testcase("fee: base plus one drop per byte");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Env env{*this};
+        Account const alice{"alice"};
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
+        env.close();
+        auto const base = env.current()->fees().base;
+        auto const kl = keylet::appLoader(alice.id());
+
+        auto const expected = base + XRPAmount{1024};
+        env(set(alice, docOfSize(1024)),
+            fee(expected - XRPAmount{1}),
+            ter(telINSUF_FEE_P));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl));
+        auto const before = env.balance(alice);
+        env(set(alice, docOfSize(1024)), fee(expected));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            env.le(kl) && before - env.balance(alice) == drops(expected));
+
+        // Overwrites pay again; removal is base fee only.
+        env(set(alice, docOfSize(100)),
+            fee(base + XRPAmount{99}),
+            ter(telINSUF_FEE_P));
+        env(set(alice, docOfSize(100)), fee(base + XRPAmount{100}));
+        env(set(alice, ""), fee(base));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl));
+
+        // Publishing takes no reserve: an account at its reserve floor can.
+        Account const poor{"poor"};
+        auto const reserve = env.current()->fees().accountReserve(0);
+        env.fund(drops(reserve + base + XRPAmount{100}), noripple(poor));
+        env.close();
+        env(set(poor, docOfSize(100)), fee(base + XRPAmount{100}));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::appLoader(poor.id())));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(poor) == drops(reserve));
+        env.require(owners(poor, 0));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testMalformed()
+    {
+        testcase("malformed documents are temMALFORMED");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Env env{*this};
+        Account const alice{"alice"};
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
+        env.close();
+        for (auto const& d :
+             {std::string("hello"),
+              std::string("<html>"),
+              std::string("<html></html>x"),
+              std::string("<html>\0</html>", 14),
+              std::string("<html>\xC0\xAF</html>"),
+              docOfSize(maxAppLoaderLength + 1)})
+        {
+            env(set(alice, d), fee(XRP(1)), ter(temMALFORMED));
+            env.close();
+        }
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::appLoader(alice.id())));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoaderSequence));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testAccountDelete()
+    {
+        testcase("account delete erases the loader");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Env env{*this};
+        Account const alice{"alice"}, bob{"bob"};
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), alice, bob);
+        env.close();
+        env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
+        env.close();
+        for (int i = 0; i < 256; ++i)
+            env.close();
+        // Not in the owner directory, so it cannot block deletion; erased
+        // explicitly, or AccountRootsDeletedClean would fire on the orphan.
+        env(acctdelete(alice, bob),
+            fee(drops(env.current()->fees().increment)));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::appLoader(alice.id())));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testValidateRPC()
+    {
+        testcase("pwa_validate");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Env env{*this};
+        Account const alice{"alice"};
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
+        env.close();
+        auto validate = [&](std::string const& d, std::string const& domain) {
+            Json::Value p(Json::objectValue);
+            p[jss::account] = alice.human();
+            p[jss::hash] = to_string(sha512Half(makeSlice(d)));
+            if (!domain.empty())
+                p[jss::domain] = domain;
+            return env.rpc("json", "pwa_validate", to_string(p))[jss::result];
+        };
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(validate(doc(), "")["reason"] == "no loader");
+        env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
+        env.close();
+        auto r = validate(doc(), "");
+        BEAST_EXPECT(r["valid"] == true && r["app_loader_sequence"] == 1);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::ledger_index] == env.closed()->seq());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            validate("<html></html>", "")["reason"] == "hash mismatch");
+
+        // domain: the account's Domain, or a host beneath it, ignoring case.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            validate(doc(), "pwa.test")["reason"] ==
+            "domain not endorsed by account");
+        auto jt = noop(alice);
+        jt[sfDomain.fieldName] = strHex(std::string("Pwa.Test"));
+        env(jt);
+        env.close();
+        for (auto const d :
+             {"pwa.test", "PWA.TEST.", "pwaabcd.pwa.test", "a.b.pwa.test"})
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(validate(doc(), d)["valid"] == true, d);
+        for (auto const d : {"other.test", "xpwa.test", "pwa.test.evil"})
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(validate(doc(), d)["valid"] == false, d);
+
+        // Malformed input.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            env.rpc(
+                "json",
+                "pwa_validate",
+                R"({"account":"x","hash":"00"})")[jss::result][jss::error] ==
+            "actMalformed");
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            env.rpc(
+                "pwa_validate", alice.human(), "zz")[jss::result][jss::error] ==
+            "invalidParams");
+    }
+
+public:
+    void
+    run() override
+    {
+        testValidator();
+        testEnabled();
+        testSetAndRemove();
+        testFee();
+        testMalformed();
+        testAccountDelete();
+        testValidateRPC();
+    }
+};
+
+BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(PWALoader, app, ripple);
+
+}  // namespace test
+}  // namespace ripple

src/test/app/RotatingBloomFilter_test.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/RotatingBloomFilter.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
+
+#include <chrono>
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <string>
+
+namespace ripple {
+namespace test {
+
+class RotatingBloomFilter_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
+{
+    using time_point = std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point;
+
+    void
+    testWindow()
+    {
+        testcase("window");
+        using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+
+        RotatingBloomFilter<1024, 4, 4> filter{10s};
+        time_point const t{};
+        std::string const a{"a"};
+        std::string const b{"b"};
+
+        filter.insert(a, t);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(b, t));
+
+        // Remembered to the end of the third epoch after its own, and
+        // forgotten at the start of the fourth.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t + 39s));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(a, t + 40s));
+
+        // Inserting again extends it.
+        filter.insert(a, t + 35s);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t + 69s));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(a, t + 70s));
+
+        // A clock that jumps finds everything expired.
+        filter.insert(b, t + 70s);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(b, t + 1h));
+
+        // An insertion that read the clock before another thread rotated its
+        // slot lands in the newer epoch rather than being lost.
+        filter.insert(b, t + 1h + 40s);
+        filter.insert(a, t + 1h);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t + 1h + 40s));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testFalsePositives()
+    {
+        testcase("false positives");
+        using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+
+        using Filter = RotatingBloomFilter<std::size_t{1} << 14, 4, 4>;
+        static_assert(Filter::bytes == 8192);
+
+        Filter filter{120s};
+        time_point const t{};
+
+        std::uint64_t const inserted = 1000;
+        for (std::uint64_t i = 0; i < inserted; ++i)
+            filter.insert(i, t);
+
+        bool all = true;
+        for (std::uint64_t i = 0; i < inserted; ++i)
+            all = all && filter.contains(i, t);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(all);
+
+        // About 0.24% in theory for a thousand elements in one generation.
+        std::uint64_t const probes = 100000;
+        std::uint64_t hits = 0;
+        for (std::uint64_t i = inserted; i < inserted + probes; ++i)
+            hits += filter.contains(i, t) ? 1 : 0;
+        BEAST_EXPECT(hits < probes / 100);
+    }
+
+public:
+    void
+    run() override
+    {
+        testWindow();
+        testFalsePositives();
+    }
+};
+
+BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(RotatingBloomFilter, app, ripple);
+
+}  // namespace test
+}  // namespace ripple

src/test/app/SetHookTSH_test.cpp

@@ -6146,6 +6146,15 @@ private:
         pass();
     }
 
+    void
+    testEntropyTSH(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        testcase("entropy tsh");
+
+        // pseudo transaction
+        pass();
+    }
+
     // | otxn | tfBurnable | tsh |   mint |  burn  |  buy  |  sell  | cancel
     // |   O  |    false   |  O  |   N/A  |   S    |  N/A  |   S    |   S
     // |   O  |    false   |  I  |   N/A  |   N    |  N/A  |   W    |   N/A

src/test/app/SetHook_test.cpp

@@ -2134,6 +2134,118 @@ public:
             }
         }
 
+        {
+            /// Rename and remove the HookName with HookName-only updates
+            Env env{*this, features};
+
+            env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
+            env.close();
+
+            // Create with hook name
+            auto jvh = hso(accept_wasm);
+            jvh[jss::HookName] = "41424344";
+            env(ripple::test::jtx::hook(alice, {{jvh}}, 0),
+                M("Create named hook"),
+                HSFEE);
+            env.close();
+
+            auto const hookNameOnlyUpdate = [&](std::string const& name) {
+                Json::Value jv;
+                jv[jss::Account] = alice.human();
+                jv[jss::TransactionType] = jss::SetHook;
+                jv[jss::Flags] = 0;
+                jv[jss::Hooks] = Json::Value{Json::arrayValue};
+                Json::Value iv;
+                iv[jss::HookName] = name;
+                jv[jss::Hooks][0U][jss::Hook] = iv;
+                return jv;
+            };
+
+            // Rename: update carrying only a non-empty sfHookName
+            env(hookNameOnlyUpdate("4142434445"),
+                M("Rename hook with a HookName-only update"),
+                HSFEE);
+            env.close();
+            {
+                auto const hooks = env.le(keylet::hook(alice));
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hooks && hooks->isFieldPresent(sfHooks));
+                auto const& hooksArray = hooks->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray.size() == 1);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray[0].isFieldPresent(sfHookName));
+                BEAST_EXPECT(
+                    strHex(hooksArray[0].getFieldVL(sfHookName)) ==
+                    "4142434445");
+            }
+
+            // Remove: update carrying only an empty sfHookName
+            env(hookNameOnlyUpdate(""),
+                M("Remove hook name with a HookName-only update"),
+                HSFEE);
+
+            // In the same open ledger as the removal: the open view hands
+            // the next transaction the very sfHooks entry the SetHook just
+            // modified, so the fee calculation and the hook chain must
+            // tolerate the removed name. This is the path that crashed the
+            // node at submit, and crashed every validator replaying the
+            // pair while building the ledger.
+            {
+                auto jv = invoke::invoke(alice);
+                auto const expectedFee =
+                    calculateBaseFee(*env.current(), *env.jt(jv).stx);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(expectedFee == drops(19));
+                env(jv,
+                    M("Invoke in the same open ledger as the removal"),
+                    HSFEE);
+            }
+            env.close();
+            {
+                auto const hookExecutions =
+                    env.meta()->getFieldArray(sfHookExecutions);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions.size() == 1);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(
+                    hookExecutions[0].getFieldH256(sfHookHash) == accept_hash);
+            }
+            {
+                auto const hooks = env.le(keylet::hook(alice));
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hooks && hooks->isFieldPresent(sfHooks));
+                auto const& hooksArray = hooks->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray.size() == 1);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(!hooksArray[0].isFieldPresent(sfHookName));
+            }
+
+            // The now non-named hook must still be charged for and
+            // executed by transactions in later ledgers, where the entry
+            // is re-read from its serialized form.
+            {
+                auto jv = invoke::invoke(alice);
+                auto const expectedFee =
+                    calculateBaseFee(*env.current(), *env.jt(jv).stx);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(expectedFee == drops(19));
+                env(jv, M("Invoke after removing the hook name"), HSFEE);
+                env.close();
+                auto const hookExecutions =
+                    env.meta()->getFieldArray(sfHookExecutions);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions.size() == 1);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(
+                    hookExecutions[0].getFieldH256(sfHookHash) == accept_hash);
+            }
+
+            // Removing the name of a hook that has none must be a no-op,
+            // not a thrown FieldErr (-> tefEXCEPTION): makeFieldAbsent on
+            // the untemplated entry throws when the field is missing.
+            env(hookNameOnlyUpdate(""),
+                M("Remove hook name again (no-op)"),
+                HSFEE);
+            env.close();
+            {
+                auto const hooks = env.le(keylet::hook(alice));
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hooks && hooks->isFieldPresent(sfHooks));
+                auto const& hooksArray = hooks->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray.size() == 1);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(!hooksArray[0].isFieldPresent(sfHookName));
+            }
+        }
+
         // Install named hook
         auto jvh = hso(accept_wasm);
         jvh[jss::HookName] = "41424344";
@@ -4675,6 +4787,218 @@ public:
         }
     }
 
+    void
+    test_emit_failure_callback(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        testcase("Test emit failure callback");
+        using namespace jtx;
+
+        // An emitted txn that is never applied expires into a ttEMIT_FAILURE
+        // cleanup pseudo, which removes its ltEMITTED_TXN entry and then
+        // runs the emitting Hook's cbak. Before fix20261005 the callback
+        // re-read that (already erased) entry and dereferenced null, taking
+        // the process down, so only the fixed behaviour can be run here.
+        Env env{*this, features | fix20261005};
+
+        auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
+        env.close();
+
+        TestHook hook_wasm = wasm[R"[test.hook](
+            #include <stdint.h>
+            extern int32_t _g       (uint32_t id, uint32_t maxiter);
+            extern int64_t accept   (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+            extern int64_t rollback (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+            extern int64_t emit     (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
+            extern int64_t hook_account (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
+            extern int64_t etxn_reserve (uint32_t);
+            extern int64_t etxn_fee_base (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
+            extern int64_t etxn_details (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
+            extern int64_t ledger_seq (void);
+            extern int64_t otxn_id (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
+            extern int64_t otxn_type (void);
+            extern int64_t otxn_field (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t field_id);
+            extern int64_t state_set (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
+            #define SBUF(x) (uint32_t)(x), sizeof(x)
+            #define ASSERT(x)\
+                if (!(x))\
+                    rollback((uint32_t)#x, sizeof(#x), __LINE__);
+            #define DOESNT_EXIST (-5)
+            #define ttINVOKE 99
+            #define sfAccount ((8U << 16U) + 1U)
+            #define sfLedgerSequence ((2U << 16U) + 6U)
+
+            uint8_t key[32] = { [31] = 1U };
+
+            // an Invoke from the hook account, emitted with a callback
+            uint8_t txn[229] =
+            {
+                /* size, upto, field name               */
+                /*    3,    0, tt = Invoke              */   0x12U, 0x00U, 0x63U,
+                /*    5,    3, flags                    */   0x22U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    5,    8, sequence                 */   0x24U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    6,   13, firstledgersequence      */   0x20U, 0x1AU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    6,   19, lastledgersequence       */   0x20U, 0x1BU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    9,   25, fee                      */   0x68U, 0x40U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*   35,   34, signingpubkey            */   0x73U, 0x21U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+                /*   22,   69, account                  */   0x81U, 0x14U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+                /*  138,   91, emit details             */
+                /*    0,  229,                          */
+            };
+            #define FLS_OUT (txn + 15U)
+            #define LLS_OUT (txn + 21U)
+            #define FEE_OUT (txn + 26U)
+            #define ACCOUNT_OUT (txn + 71U)
+            #define EMIT_OUT (txn + 91U)
+            #define SET_UINT32(ptr, value)\
+                {\
+                    uint32_t v = (value);\
+                    (ptr)[0] = v >> 24U; (ptr)[1] = v >> 16U; (ptr)[2] = v >> 8U; (ptr)[3] = v;\
+                }
+            #define SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(ptr, amount)\
+                {\
+                    uint64_t a = (amount);\
+                    (ptr)[0] = 0x40U + ((a >> 56U) & 0x3FU);\
+                    (ptr)[1] = a >> 48U; (ptr)[2] = a >> 40U; (ptr)[3] = a >> 32U;\
+                    (ptr)[4] = a >> 24U; (ptr)[5] = a >> 16U; (ptr)[6] = a >> 8U; (ptr)[7] = a;\
+                }
+            #define ACC_EQ(a, b)\
+                (*(uint64_t*)(a) == *(uint64_t*)(b) &&\
+                 *(uint64_t*)((a) + 8U) == *(uint64_t*)((b) + 8U) &&\
+                 *(uint32_t*)((a) + 16U) == *(uint32_t*)((b) + 16U))
+
+            int64_t cbak(uint32_t r)
+            {
+                _g(1,1);
+
+                // 1 = the emitted txn failed (ttEMIT_FAILURE)
+                ASSERT(r == 1);
+
+                // the otxn is the original emitted txn, not the pseudo
+                ASSERT(otxn_type() == ttINVOKE);
+
+                uint8_t me[20];
+                ASSERT(hook_account(SBUF(me)) == 20);
+                uint8_t acc[20];
+                ASSERT(otxn_field(SBUF(acc), sfAccount) == 20);
+                ASSERT(ACC_EQ(acc, me));
+
+                // carried by the pseudo but not by the emitted txn
+                ASSERT(otxn_field(0, 0, sfLedgerSequence) == DOESNT_EXIST);
+
+                // record the id of the emitted txn that failed
+                uint8_t id[32];
+                ASSERT(otxn_id(SBUF(id), 0) == 32);
+                ASSERT(state_set(SBUF(id), SBUF(key)) == 32);
+
+                return accept(0,0,0);
+            }
+
+            int64_t hook(uint32_t r)
+            {
+                _g(1,1);
+
+                ASSERT(etxn_reserve(1) == 1);
+
+                // FirstLedgerSequence is the current ledger, so by the time
+                // the emission directory is processed for the next ledger it
+                // has already passed: the txn is never applied and expires
+                // once LastLedgerSequence is behind the ledger
+                uint32_t seq = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();
+                SET_UINT32(FLS_OUT, seq);
+                SET_UINT32(LLS_OUT, seq + 1);
+                ASSERT(hook_account(ACCOUNT_OUT, 20) == 20);
+                ASSERT(etxn_details(EMIT_OUT, 138U) == 138);
+                int64_t fee = etxn_fee_base(SBUF(txn));
+                ASSERT(fee > 0);
+                SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(FEE_OUT, fee);
+
+                uint8_t emithash[32];
+                ASSERT(emit(SBUF(emithash), SBUF(txn)) == 32);
+
+                return accept(0,0,0);
+            }
+        )[test.hook]"];
+
+        HASH_WASM(hook);
+
+        env(ripple::test::jtx::hook(alice, {{hso(hook_wasm, overrideFlag)}}, 0),
+            M("set emit failure callback"),
+            HSFEE);
+        env.close();
+
+        env(invoke::invoke(alice),
+            M("emit failure callback: emit"),
+            fee(XRP(1)),
+            ter(tesSUCCESS));
+
+        // the emitted txn, from the ltEMITTED_TXN this created
+        std::optional<uint256> emittedID;
+        {
+            auto const meta = env.meta();  // closes the ledger
+            BEAST_REQUIRE(meta);
+            for (auto const& node : meta->getFieldArray(sfAffectedNodes))
+            {
+                if (node.getFName() != sfCreatedNode ||
+                    node.getFieldU16(sfLedgerEntryType) != ltEMITTED_TXN)
+                    continue;
+                auto const& nf = const_cast<ripple::STObject&>(node)
+                                     .getField(sfNewFields)
+                                     .downcast<STObject>();
+                auto const& et = const_cast<ripple::STObject&>(nf)
+                                     .getField(sfEmittedTxn)
+                                     .downcast<STObject>();
+                Serializer s;
+                et.add(s);
+                SerialIter sit(s.slice());
+                emittedID = STTx(sit).getTransactionID();
+            }
+        }
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(emittedID);
+        auto const emittedKeylet = keylet::emittedTxn(*emittedID);
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(env.le(emittedKeylet));
+
+        // close until the cleanup pseudo has been applied
+        std::shared_ptr<STObject const> failureMeta;
+        for (int i = 0; i < 5 && !failureMeta; ++i)
+        {
+            env.close();
+            for (auto const& [tx, meta] : env.closed()->txs)
+            {
+                // the emitted txn itself never makes it into a ledger
+                BEAST_EXPECT(tx->getTransactionID() != *emittedID);
+                if (tx->getTxnType() == ttEMIT_FAILURE &&
+                    tx->getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash) == *emittedID)
+                    failureMeta = meta;
+            }
+        }
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(failureMeta);
+
+        // the cleanup removed the entry and its directory slot
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(emittedKeylet));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::emittedDir()));
+
+        // the callback ran to accept() with the original emitted txn
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(failureMeta->isFieldPresent(sfHookExecutions));
+        auto const hookExecutions =
+            failureMeta->getFieldArray(sfHookExecutions);
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(hookExecutions.size() == 1);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions[0].getFieldH256(sfHookHash) == hook_hash);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            hookExecutions[0].getAccountID(sfHookAccount) == alice.id());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions[0].getFieldU64(sfHookReturnCode) == 0);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions[0].getFieldU8(sfHookResult) == 3);
+
+        uint256 key;
+        key.data()[31] = 1;
+        auto const state =
+            env.le(keylet::hookState(alice.id(), key, uint256{beast::zero}));
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(state);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            state->getFieldVL(sfHookStateData) ==
+            Blob(emittedID->begin(), emittedID->end()));
+    }
+
     void
     test_etxn_details(FeatureBitset features)
     {
@@ -16192,6 +16516,7 @@ public:
         testGuards(features);
 
         test_emit(features);  //
+        test_emit_failure_callback(features);
         test_prepare(features);
         // test_etxn_burden(features);       // tested above
         // test_etxn_generation(features);   // tested above

src/test/app/SetHook_wasm.h

@@ -35007,6 +35007,310 @@ std::map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>> wasm = {
          0x65U, 0x64U, 0x2EU, 0x00U,
      }},
 
+    {R"[test.hook](
+            #include <stdint.h>
+            extern int32_t _g       (uint32_t id, uint32_t maxiter);
+            extern int64_t accept   (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+            extern int64_t rollback (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
+            extern int64_t emit     (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
+            extern int64_t hook_account (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
+            extern int64_t etxn_reserve (uint32_t);
+            extern int64_t etxn_fee_base (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
+            extern int64_t etxn_details (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
+            extern int64_t ledger_seq (void);
+            extern int64_t otxn_id (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
+            extern int64_t otxn_type (void);
+            extern int64_t otxn_field (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t field_id);
+            extern int64_t state_set (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
+            #define SBUF(x) (uint32_t)(x), sizeof(x)
+            #define ASSERT(x)\
+                if (!(x))\
+                    rollback((uint32_t)#x, sizeof(#x), __LINE__);
+            #define DOESNT_EXIST (-5)
+            #define ttINVOKE 99
+            #define sfAccount ((8U << 16U) + 1U)
+            #define sfLedgerSequence ((2U << 16U) + 6U)
+
+            uint8_t key[32] = { [31] = 1U };
+
+            // an Invoke from the hook account, emitted with a callback
+            uint8_t txn[229] =
+            {
+                /* size, upto, field name               */
+                /*    3,    0, tt = Invoke              */   0x12U, 0x00U, 0x63U,
+                /*    5,    3, flags                    */   0x22U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    5,    8, sequence                 */   0x24U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    6,   13, firstledgersequence      */   0x20U, 0x1AU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    6,   19, lastledgersequence       */   0x20U, 0x1BU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*    9,   25, fee                      */   0x68U, 0x40U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+                /*   35,   34, signingpubkey            */   0x73U, 0x21U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+                /*   22,   69, account                  */   0x81U, 0x14U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+                /*  138,   91, emit details             */
+                /*    0,  229,                          */
+            };
+            #define FLS_OUT (txn + 15U)
+            #define LLS_OUT (txn + 21U)
+            #define FEE_OUT (txn + 26U)
+            #define ACCOUNT_OUT (txn + 71U)
+            #define EMIT_OUT (txn + 91U)
+            #define SET_UINT32(ptr, value)\
+                {\
+                    uint32_t v = (value);\
+                    (ptr)[0] = v >> 24U; (ptr)[1] = v >> 16U; (ptr)[2] = v >> 8U; (ptr)[3] = v;\
+                }
+            #define SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(ptr, amount)\
+                {\
+                    uint64_t a = (amount);\
+                    (ptr)[0] = 0x40U + ((a >> 56U) & 0x3FU);\
+                    (ptr)[1] = a >> 48U; (ptr)[2] = a >> 40U; (ptr)[3] = a >> 32U;\
+                    (ptr)[4] = a >> 24U; (ptr)[5] = a >> 16U; (ptr)[6] = a >> 8U; (ptr)[7] = a;\
+                }
+            #define ACC_EQ(a, b)\
+                (*(uint64_t*)(a) == *(uint64_t*)(b) &&\
+                 *(uint64_t*)((a) + 8U) == *(uint64_t*)((b) + 8U) &&\
+                 *(uint32_t*)((a) + 16U) == *(uint32_t*)((b) + 16U))
+
+            int64_t cbak(uint32_t r)
+            {
+                _g(1,1);
+
+                // 1 = the emitted txn failed (ttEMIT_FAILURE)
+                ASSERT(r == 1);
+
+                // the otxn is the original emitted txn, not the pseudo
+                ASSERT(otxn_type() == ttINVOKE);
+
+                uint8_t me[20];
+                ASSERT(hook_account(SBUF(me)) == 20);
+                uint8_t acc[20];
+                ASSERT(otxn_field(SBUF(acc), sfAccount) == 20);
+                ASSERT(ACC_EQ(acc, me));
+
+                // carried by the pseudo but not by the emitted txn
+                ASSERT(otxn_field(0, 0, sfLedgerSequence) == DOESNT_EXIST);
+
+                // record the id of the emitted txn that failed
+                uint8_t id[32];
+                ASSERT(otxn_id(SBUF(id), 0) == 32);
+                ASSERT(state_set(SBUF(id), SBUF(key)) == 32);
+
+                return accept(0,0,0);
+            }
+
+            int64_t hook(uint32_t r)
+            {
+                _g(1,1);
+
+                ASSERT(etxn_reserve(1) == 1);
+
+                // FirstLedgerSequence is the current ledger, so by the time
+                // the emission directory is processed for the next ledger it
+                // has already passed: the txn is never applied and expires
+                // once LastLedgerSequence is behind the ledger
+                uint32_t seq = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();
+                SET_UINT32(FLS_OUT, seq);
+                SET_UINT32(LLS_OUT, seq + 1);
+                ASSERT(hook_account(ACCOUNT_OUT, 20) == 20);
+                ASSERT(etxn_details(EMIT_OUT, 138U) == 138);
+                int64_t fee = etxn_fee_base(SBUF(txn));
+                ASSERT(fee > 0);
+                SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(FEE_OUT, fee);
+
+                uint8_t emithash[32];
+                ASSERT(emit(SBUF(emithash), SBUF(txn)) == 32);
+
+                return accept(0,0,0);
+            }
+        )[test.hook]",
+     {
+         0x00U, 0x61U, 0x73U, 0x6DU, 0x01U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x01U, 0x2CU,
+         0x07U, 0x60U, 0x02U, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x60U, 0x03U, 0x7FU,
+         0x7FU, 0x7EU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x00U, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x02U,
+         0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x03U, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U,
+         0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x04U, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U,
+         0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x02U, 0xCEU, 0x01U, 0x0DU, 0x03U, 0x65U,
+         0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x02U, 0x5FU, 0x67U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU,
+         0x76U, 0x08U, 0x72U, 0x6FU, 0x6CU, 0x6CU, 0x62U, 0x61U, 0x63U, 0x6BU,
+         0x00U, 0x01U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x09U, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U,
+         0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x74U, 0x79U, 0x70U, 0x65U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x03U, 0x65U,
+         0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x0CU, 0x68U, 0x6FU, 0x6FU, 0x6BU, 0x5FU, 0x61U, 0x63U,
+         0x63U, 0x6FU, 0x75U, 0x6EU, 0x74U, 0x00U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU,
+         0x76U, 0x0AU, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x66U, 0x69U, 0x65U,
+         0x6CU, 0x64U, 0x00U, 0x04U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x07U, 0x6FU,
+         0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x69U, 0x64U, 0x00U, 0x04U, 0x03U, 0x65U,
+         0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x09U, 0x73U, 0x74U, 0x61U, 0x74U, 0x65U, 0x5FU, 0x73U,
+         0x65U, 0x74U, 0x00U, 0x05U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x06U, 0x61U,
+         0x63U, 0x63U, 0x65U, 0x70U, 0x74U, 0x00U, 0x01U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU,
+         0x76U, 0x0CU, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x72U, 0x65U, 0x73U,
+         0x65U, 0x72U, 0x76U, 0x65U, 0x00U, 0x06U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U,
+         0x0AU, 0x6CU, 0x65U, 0x64U, 0x67U, 0x65U, 0x72U, 0x5FU, 0x73U, 0x65U,
+         0x71U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x0CU, 0x65U, 0x74U,
+         0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x64U, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x61U, 0x69U, 0x6CU, 0x73U,
+         0x00U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x0DU, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x78U,
+         0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x66U, 0x65U, 0x65U, 0x5FU, 0x62U, 0x61U, 0x73U, 0x65U,
+         0x00U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x04U, 0x65U, 0x6DU, 0x69U,
+         0x74U, 0x00U, 0x05U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x02U, 0x06U, 0x06U, 0x05U, 0x03U,
+         0x01U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x06U, 0x08U, 0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x90U,
+         0x8DU, 0x04U, 0x0BU, 0x07U, 0x0FU, 0x02U, 0x04U, 0x63U, 0x62U, 0x61U,
+         0x6BU, 0x00U, 0x0DU, 0x04U, 0x68U, 0x6FU, 0x6FU, 0x6BU, 0x00U, 0x0EU,
+         0x0AU, 0x85U, 0x87U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x88U, 0x83U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x01U,
+         0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x23U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
+         0xE0U, 0x00U, 0x6BU, 0x22U, 0x01U, 0x24U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
+         0x00U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x10U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
+         0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x46U, 0x0DU,
+         0x00U, 0x41U, 0xD5U, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x07U, 0x42U,
+         0xC5U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU,
+         0x02U, 0x40U, 0x10U, 0x82U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0xE3U,
+         0x00U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xB3U, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x41U, 0x18U, 0x42U, 0xC8U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
+         0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0xC0U, 0x00U,
+         0x6AU, 0x41U, 0x14U, 0x10U, 0x83U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U,
+         0x14U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xBCU, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x41U, 0x1DU, 0x42U, 0xCBU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
+         0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x6AU,
+         0x41U, 0x14U, 0x41U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x20U, 0x10U, 0x84U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x14U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xF1U, 0x89U,
+         0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x27U, 0x42U, 0xCDU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U,
+         0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x02U, 0x40U,
+         0x20U, 0x01U, 0x29U, 0x03U, 0x20U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x29U, 0x03U, 0x40U,
+         0x52U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x29U, 0x03U, 0x28U, 0x20U, 0x01U,
+         0x29U, 0x03U, 0x48U, 0x52U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x28U, 0x02U,
+         0x30U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x28U, 0x02U, 0x50U, 0x46U, 0x0DU, 0x01U, 0x0BU,
+         0x41U, 0xE1U, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x10U, 0x42U, 0xCEU,
+         0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U,
+         0x40U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x86U, 0x80U, 0x08U, 0x10U,
+         0x84U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x7BU, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U,
+         0x41U, 0x80U, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x33U, 0x42U, 0xD1U,
+         0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U,
+         0x40U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x85U, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x20U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xEFU,
+         0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x1BU, 0x42U, 0xD5U, 0x00U, 0x10U,
+         0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U,
+         0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x41U, 0x80U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
+         0x20U, 0x10U, 0x86U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x20U, 0x51U,
+         0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x8AU, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x25U,
+         0x42U, 0xD6U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU,
+         0x0BU, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x87U, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x21U, 0x02U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0xE0U, 0x00U,
+         0x6AU, 0x24U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x0BU,
+         0xF6U, 0x83U, 0x00U, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x01U, 0x7FU,
+         0x23U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x6BU, 0x22U,
+         0x01U, 0x24U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x41U,
+         0x01U, 0x10U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x02U, 0x40U,
+         0x41U, 0x01U, 0x10U, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x01U,
+         0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xDCU, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
+         0x15U, 0x42U, 0xDFU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x22U, 0x02U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xB2U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
+         0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x08U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xB1U, 0x8BU,
+         0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x10U, 0x88U,
+         0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xB0U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U,
+         0x02U, 0x42U, 0x18U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xAFU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U,
+         0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0xA7U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x6AU, 0x22U,
+         0x03U, 0x3AU, 0x00U, 0xB8U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U,
+         0x20U, 0x03U, 0x41U, 0x08U, 0x76U, 0x3AU, 0x00U, 0xB7U, 0x8BU, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x03U, 0x41U, 0x10U, 0x76U, 0x3AU,
+         0x00U, 0xB6U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x03U,
+         0x41U, 0x18U, 0x76U, 0x3AU, 0x00U, 0xB5U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x02U, 0x40U, 0x41U, 0xE7U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x14U,
+         0x10U, 0x83U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x14U, 0x51U, 0x0DU,
+         0x00U, 0x41U, 0x98U, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x24U, 0x42U,
+         0xE8U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU,
+         0x02U, 0x40U, 0x41U, 0xFBU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x8AU,
+         0x01U, 0x10U, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x8AU, 0x01U,
+         0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xCBU, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
+         0x24U, 0x42U, 0xE9U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x41U, 0xA0U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x41U, 0xE5U, 0x01U, 0x10U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x22U,
+         0x02U, 0x42U, 0x00U, 0x55U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xD9U, 0x8AU, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x08U, 0x42U, 0xEBU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x3CU,
+         0x00U, 0xC1U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U,
+         0x42U, 0x08U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xC0U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x10U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xBFU,
+         0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x18U,
+         0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xBEU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U,
+         0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x20U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xBDU, 0x8BU, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x28U, 0x88U, 0x3CU,
+         0x00U, 0xBCU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U,
+         0x42U, 0x30U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xBBU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
+         0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x38U, 0x88U, 0xA7U, 0x41U, 0x3FU,
+         0x71U, 0x41U, 0xC0U, 0x00U, 0x72U, 0x3AU, 0x00U, 0xBAU, 0x8BU, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x41U, 0xA0U,
+         0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xE5U, 0x01U, 0x10U, 0x8CU, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x20U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xAFU,
+         0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x26U, 0x42U, 0xEFU, 0x00U, 0x10U,
+         0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
+         0x00U, 0x42U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x87U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x21U,
+         0x02U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x6AU, 0x24U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
+         0x80U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x0BU, 0x0BU, 0x85U, 0x05U, 0x02U, 0x00U,
+         0x41U, 0x80U, 0x08U, 0x0BU, 0xF1U, 0x02U, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU,
+         0x5FU, 0x66U, 0x69U, 0x65U, 0x6CU, 0x64U, 0x28U, 0x30U, 0x2CU, 0x20U,
+         0x30U, 0x2CU, 0x20U, 0x73U, 0x66U, 0x4CU, 0x65U, 0x64U, 0x67U, 0x65U,
+         0x72U, 0x53U, 0x65U, 0x71U, 0x75U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x63U, 0x65U, 0x29U,
+         0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x44U, 0x4FU, 0x45U, 0x53U, 0x4EU, 0x54U,
+         0x5FU, 0x45U, 0x58U, 0x49U, 0x53U, 0x54U, 0x00U, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U,
+         0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x74U, 0x79U, 0x70U, 0x65U, 0x28U, 0x29U, 0x20U, 0x3DU,
+         0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x74U, 0x74U, 0x49U, 0x4EU, 0x56U, 0x4FU, 0x4BU, 0x45U,
+         0x00U, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x64U, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x61U,
+         0x69U, 0x6CU, 0x73U, 0x28U, 0x45U, 0x4DU, 0x49U, 0x54U, 0x5FU, 0x4FU,
+         0x55U, 0x54U, 0x2CU, 0x20U, 0x31U, 0x33U, 0x38U, 0x55U, 0x29U, 0x20U,
+         0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x31U, 0x33U, 0x38U, 0x00U, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U,
+         0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x69U, 0x64U, 0x28U, 0x53U, 0x42U, 0x55U, 0x46U, 0x28U,
+         0x69U, 0x64U, 0x29U, 0x2CU, 0x20U, 0x30U, 0x29U, 0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU,
+         0x20U, 0x33U, 0x32U, 0x00U, 0x73U, 0x74U, 0x61U, 0x74U, 0x65U, 0x5FU,
+         0x73U, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x28U, 0x53U, 0x42U, 0x55U, 0x46U, 0x28U, 0x69U,
+         0x64U, 0x29U, 0x2CU, 0x20U, 0x53U, 0x42U, 0x55U, 0x46U, 0x28U, 0x6BU,
+         0x65U, 0x79U, 0x29U, 0x29U, 0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x33U, 0x32U,
+         0x00U, 0x65U, 0x6DU, 0x69U, 0x74U, 0x28U, 0x53U, 0x42U, 0x55U, 0x46U,
+         0x28U, 0x65U, 0x6DU, 0x69U, 0x74U, 0x68U, 0x61U, 0x73U, 0x68U, 0x29U,
+         0x2CU, 0x20U, 0x53U, 0x42U, 0x55U, 0x46U, 0x28U, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU,
+         0x29U, 0x29U, 0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x33U, 0x32U, 0x00U, 0x72U,
+         0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x31U, 0x00U, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU,
+         0x5FU, 0x72U, 0x65U, 0x73U, 0x65U, 0x72U, 0x76U, 0x65U, 0x28U, 0x31U,
+         0x29U, 0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x31U, 0x00U, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U,
+         0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x66U, 0x69U, 0x65U, 0x6CU, 0x64U, 0x28U, 0x53U, 0x42U,
+         0x55U, 0x46U, 0x28U, 0x61U, 0x63U, 0x63U, 0x29U, 0x2CU, 0x20U, 0x73U,
+         0x66U, 0x41U, 0x63U, 0x63U, 0x6FU, 0x75U, 0x6EU, 0x74U, 0x29U, 0x20U,
+         0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x32U, 0x30U, 0x00U, 0x68U, 0x6FU, 0x6FU, 0x6BU,
+         0x5FU, 0x61U, 0x63U, 0x63U, 0x6FU, 0x75U, 0x6EU, 0x74U, 0x28U, 0x41U,
+         0x43U, 0x43U, 0x4FU, 0x55U, 0x4EU, 0x54U, 0x5FU, 0x4FU, 0x55U, 0x54U,
+         0x2CU, 0x20U, 0x32U, 0x30U, 0x29U, 0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x32U,
+         0x30U, 0x00U, 0x68U, 0x6FU, 0x6FU, 0x6BU, 0x5FU, 0x61U, 0x63U, 0x63U,
+         0x6FU, 0x75U, 0x6EU, 0x74U, 0x28U, 0x53U, 0x42U, 0x55U, 0x46U, 0x28U,
+         0x6DU, 0x65U, 0x29U, 0x29U, 0x20U, 0x3DU, 0x3DU, 0x20U, 0x32U, 0x30U,
+         0x00U, 0x66U, 0x65U, 0x65U, 0x20U, 0x3EU, 0x20U, 0x30U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
+         0x43U, 0x43U, 0x5FU, 0x45U, 0x51U, 0x28U, 0x61U, 0x63U, 0x63U, 0x2CU,
+         0x20U, 0x6DU, 0x65U, 0x29U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x80U, 0x0BU, 0x0BU,
+         0x85U, 0x02U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x01U, 0x12U, 0x00U, 0x63U, 0x22U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x24U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x1AU, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x1BU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x68U,
+         0x40U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x73U, 0x21U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x81U, 0x14U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+         0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
+     }},
+
 };
 }
 }  // namespace ripple

src/test/app/SetManifest_test.cpp

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/HashRouter.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/ManifestLedger.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/tx/apply.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetManifest.h>
@@ -553,9 +554,99 @@ struct SetManifest_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
         submit(env, makeManifest(master, ephemeral, 1));
         env.close();
 
+        // Every refusal over a key in use is tef. The transaction is unsigned
+        // and consumes no sequence, so anyone holding it could resubmit it in
+        // every ledger; a tec would charge the master account each time.
+        auto const masterBalance = env.balance(master);
+        auto const otherBalance = env.balance(other);
+
         BEAST_EXPECT(
             engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(other, ephemeral, 1))) ==
-            "tecDUPLICATE");
+            "tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE");
+
+        // A newer manifest that keeps the current ephemeral key. Every
+        // manifest cache refuses it, so the ledger must too, or it would stay
+        // ahead of what any node believes.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(master, ephemeral, 2))) ==
+            "tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE");
+
+        // A master key that is already another account's ephemeral key: the
+        // two kinds of manifest keylet share one namespace.
+        auto const third = Account("third", KeyType::ed25519);
+        auto const thirdEph = Account("thirdEph", KeyType::ed25519);
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), third);
+        env.close();
+
+        auto const thirdBalance = env.balance(third);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(other, third, 1))) ==
+            "tesSUCCESS");
+        env.close();
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(third, thirdEph, 1))) ==
+            "tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE");
+        env.close();
+
+        // Nothing was charged and nothing was written.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(master) == masterBalance);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(third) == thirdBalance);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(other) < otherBalance);
+        if (auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(master.pk()));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
+            BEAST_EXPECT(sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence) == 1);
+        if (auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(third.pk()));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
+            BEAST_EXPECT(sle->getAccountID(sfAccount) == other.id());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::manifest(thirdEph.pk())));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            !env.le(keylet::account(third.id()))->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testAccountDelete(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        testcase("account delete");
+        using namespace jtx;
+
+        Env env{*this, makeConfig(), features};
+
+        auto const master = Account("master", KeyType::ed25519);
+        auto const ephemeral = Account("ephemeral", KeyType::ed25519);
+        auto const plain = Account("plain", KeyType::ed25519);
+        auto const dest = Account("dest");
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), master, plain, dest);
+        env.close();
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(master, ephemeral, 1))) ==
+            "tesSUCCESS");
+        env.close();
+
+        // Old enough to delete, so the manifest is the only obstacle.
+        incLgrSeqForAccDel(env, master);
+        incLgrSeqForAccDel(env, plain);
+
+        // An on-ledger manifest outlives its account: neither copy is in the
+        // owner directory, and the master copy stays listed in the manifest
+        // directory for good.
+        env(acctdelete(master, dest),
+            fee(drops(env.current()->fees().increment)),
+            ter(tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS));
+        env.close();
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::account(master.id())));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::manifest(master.pk())));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::manifest(ephemeral.pk())));
+
+        // An account of the same age without one goes as usual.
+        env(acctdelete(plain, dest),
+            fee(drops(env.current()->fees().increment)),
+            ter(tesSUCCESS));
+        env.close();
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::account(plain.id())));
     }
 
     void
@@ -880,6 +971,11 @@ struct SetManifest_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
 
         BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedger(*env.closed(), all) == 4);
 
+        // Read from the ledger and pinned by nothing, all four are held as
+        // ledger lookup cache entries.
+        for (auto const& m : masters)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(m.pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
+
         // The raw form is what a republishing node needs: the exact bytes the
         // master key signed, plus the sequence to compare against the ledger.
         auto const raw = cache.getRawManifest(masters[0].pk());
@@ -895,33 +991,237 @@ struct SetManifest_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
         auto const seq = cache.sequence();
         cache.pin({masters[0].pk(), masters[1].pk()});
         BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(masters[0].pk()) == ManifestSource::list);
 
         auto const seq2 = cache.sequence();
         cache.pin({masters[0].pk(), masters[1].pk()});
         BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() == seq2);
 
-        // Everything is offered: two pinned plus two under the gossip limit.
+        // Only the pinned two are offered. The other two are on the ledger,
+        // where any peer that is not amendment blocked can read them.
         std::size_t reserved = 0;
         std::vector<PublicKey> offered;
         cache.for_each_gossip_manifest(
             [&](std::size_t n) { reserved = n; },
             [&](Manifest const& m) { offered.push_back(m.masterKey); });
 
-        BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 4);
-        BEAST_EXPECT(offered.size() == 4);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 2);
         BEAST_EXPECT(
-            hash_set<PublicKey>(offered.begin(), offered.end()) == all);
+            hash_set<PublicKey>(offered.begin(), offered.end()) ==
+            hash_set<PublicKey>({masters[0].pk(), masters[1].pk()}));
 
-        // A pinned key with no manifest is counted in the reservation but not
-        // offered, since the reservation is only an upper bound.
+        // Unpinned, a master key falls back to the lookup cache. A pinned key
+        // with no manifest is neither offered nor counted.
         cache.pin({masters[0].pk(), ephemeral.pk()});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(masters[1].pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
         offered.clear();
         cache.for_each_gossip_manifest(
             [&](std::size_t n) { reserved = n; },
             [&](Manifest const& m) { offered.push_back(m.masterKey); });
 
-        BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 5);
-        BEAST_EXPECT(offered.size() == 4);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 1);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(offered.size() == 1);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testLedgerOutranksGossip(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        testcase("ledger outranks gossip");
+        using namespace jtx;
+
+        Env env{*this, makeConfig(), features};
+
+        auto const master = Account("master", KeyType::ed25519);
+        auto const eph1 = Account("eph1", KeyType::ed25519);
+        auto const eph2 = Account("eph2", KeyType::ed25519);
+        env.fund(XRP(1000), master);
+        env.close();
+
+        submit(env, makeManifest(master, eph1, 1));
+        env.close();
+
+        auto const fromPeer = [](std::string const& s) {
+            auto mo = deserializeManifest(s);
+            return std::move(*mo);
+        };
+        auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
+
+        {
+            // Gossip repeating what the ledger holds is stale, and it is the
+            // ledger's copy that is kept, as a lookup cache entry.
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
+            cache.noteValidation(eph1.pk());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(
+                    fromPeer(makeManifest(master, eph1, 1)),
+                    gossip,
+                    env.closed().get()) == ManifestDisposition::stale);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(master.pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph1.pk()) == master.pk());
+        }
+
+        submit(
+            env,
+            makeManifest(
+                master, eph1, std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max()));
+        env.close();
+
+        {
+            // Revoked on-ledger, a master key cannot come back by gossip with
+            // a fresh ephemeral key, even one seen validating, and even in a
+            // cache that never held it.
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
+            cache.noteValidation(eph2.pk());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(
+                    fromPeer(makeManifest(master, eph2, 5)),
+                    gossip,
+                    env.closed().get()) == ManifestDisposition::stale);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(master.pk()));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(master.pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph2.pk()) == eph2.pk());
+        }
+
+        {
+            // A cache that took the gossip without a ledger to check it
+            // against learns of the revocation at its next refresh, though it
+            // never misses on the ephemeral key.
+            TestStopwatch clock;
+            ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
+            cache.noteValidation(eph2.pk());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                cache.applyManifest(
+                    fromPeer(makeManifest(master, eph2, 5)), gossip) ==
+                ManifestDisposition::accepted);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph2.pk()) == master.pk());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedger(*env.closed()) == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(master.pk()));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph2.pk()) == eph2.pk());
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testDirectory(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        testcase("manifest directory");
+        using namespace jtx;
+
+        Env env{*this, makeConfig(), features};
+        auto const revoke = std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max();
+
+        std::vector<Account> masters;
+        std::vector<Account> ephs;
+        for (int i = 0; i < 40; ++i)
+        {
+            masters.emplace_back("dm" + std::to_string(i), KeyType::ed25519);
+            ephs.emplace_back("de" + std::to_string(i), KeyType::ed25519);
+            env.fund(XRP(1000), masters.back());
+        }
+        env.close();
+
+        for (int i = 0; i < 40; ++i)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                engineResult(
+                    submit(env, makeManifest(masters[i], ephs[i], 1))) ==
+                "tesSUCCESS");
+        env.close();
+
+        auto const listed = [&]() {
+            std::map<PublicKey, std::uint32_t> out;
+            forEachLedgerManifest(
+                *env.closed(), [&](std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& sle) {
+                    out.emplace(
+                        PublicKey{makeSlice(sle->getFieldVL(sfPublicKey))},
+                        sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence));
+                });
+            return out;
+        };
+
+        auto const pageOf = [&](Account const& a) {
+            auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(a.pk()));
+            return sle && sle->isFieldPresent(sfOwnerNode)
+                ? std::optional<std::uint64_t>{sle->getFieldU64(sfOwnerNode)}
+                : std::nullopt;
+        };
+
+        // Each master object listed once, on the page it records; the
+        // ephemeral copies are not listed.
+        {
+            auto const all = listed();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(all.size() == 40);
+            for (auto const& m : masters)
+                BEAST_EXPECT(all.count(m.pk()) && all.at(m.pk()) == 1);
+            for (auto const& e : ephs)
+            {
+                auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(e.pk()));
+                BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFieldPresent(sfOwnerNode));
+            }
+        }
+
+        std::vector<std::optional<std::uint64_t>> pages;
+        for (auto const& m : masters)
+        {
+            pages.push_back(pageOf(m));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(pages.back());
+        }
+
+        // Rotated to a new ephemeral key...
+        std::vector<Account> rotated;
+        for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i)
+        {
+            rotated.emplace_back("dr" + std::to_string(i), KeyType::ed25519);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                engineResult(
+                    submit(env, makeManifest(masters[i], rotated.back(), 2))) ==
+                "tesSUCCESS");
+        }
+        env.close();
+
+        // ...revoked...
+        for (int i = 10; i < 15; ++i)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                engineResult(
+                    submit(env, makeManifest(masters[i], ephs[i], revoke))) ==
+                "tesSUCCESS");
+        env.close();
+
+        // ...or replaced unsuccessfully, which changes nothing.
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            engineResult(
+                submit(env, makeManifest(masters[0], rotated[0], 2))) ==
+            "tefPAST_MANIFEST_SEQ");
+        env.close();
+
+        // Still each master key once, at its latest, on the same page.
+        auto const all = listed();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(all.size() == 40);
+        for (int i = 0; i < 40; ++i)
+        {
+            auto const expected = i < 10 ? 2u : i < 15 ? revoke : 1u;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                all.count(masters[i].pk()) &&
+                all.at(masters[i].pk()) == expected);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(pageOf(masters[i]) == pages[i]);
+        }
+        for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i)
+        {
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::manifest(ephs[i].pk())));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::manifest(rotated[i].pk())));
+        }
+        for (int i = 10; i < 15; ++i)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::manifest(ephs[i].pk())));
+
+        // Read from the directory alone, with no key to start from.
+        TestStopwatch clock;
+        ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedgerDirectory(*env.closed()) == 40);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(rotated[0].pk()) == masters[0].pk());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(ephs[0].pk()) == ephs[0].pk());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(ephs[20].pk()) == masters[20].pk());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(masters[10].pk()));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedgerDirectory(*env.closed()) == 0);
     }
 
     void
@@ -961,10 +1261,13 @@ public:
         testRetrieval(sa);
         testSigningKeyRetrieval(sa);
         testMalformed(sa);
+        testAccountDelete(sa);
         testEnvelopeRejections(sa);
         testCanonicalFee(sa);
         testCorruptLedger(sa);
         testGossipSelection(sa);
+        testLedgerOutranksGossip(sa);
+        testDirectory(sa);
         testDisabled(sa);
     }
 };

src/test/app/TxQ_test.cpp

@@ -5055,7 +5055,15 @@ public:
     run() override
     {
         using namespace test::jtx;
-        FeatureBitset const all{supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis};
+        // featureRNG is excluded: makeConfig() runs as a validator whenever
+        // voting settings are given, and a validator puts a ttENTROPY with a
+        // fresh random commitment into every ledger. That makes the
+        // transaction set hash, and so the canonical order in which
+        // different accounts' transactions apply when the ledger closes,
+        // differ from run to run, which breaks tests that assert balances
+        // depending on that order (e.g. unexpected balance change).
+        FeatureBitset const all{
+            supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis - featureRNG};
         testQueueSeq(all);
         testQueueTicket(all);
         testTecResult(all);
@@ -5082,7 +5090,15 @@ public:
     runMetaInfo()
     {
         using namespace test::jtx;
-        FeatureBitset const all{supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis};
+        // featureRNG is excluded: makeConfig() runs as a validator whenever
+        // voting settings are given, and a validator puts a ttENTROPY with a
+        // fresh random commitment into every ledger. That makes the
+        // transaction set hash, and so the canonical order in which
+        // different accounts' transactions apply when the ledger closes,
+        // differ from run to run, which breaks tests that assert balances
+        // depending on that order (e.g. unexpected balance change).
+        FeatureBitset const all{
+            supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis - featureRNG};
         testAcctInQueueButEmpty(all);
         testRPC(all);
         testExpirationReplacement(all);

src/test/app/XahauGenesis_test.cpp

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STAccount.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/digest.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
+#include <limits>
 #include <string>
 #include <vector>
 
@@ -4676,11 +4677,12 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
         // validate account fields
         STAmount const postUser = preUser + netReward;
         bool const has240819 = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819);
+        bool const has20261005 = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix20261005);
         BEAST_EXPECT(expectAccountFields(
             env,
             user,
             preLedger,
-            has240819 ? preLedger : preLedger + 1,
+            (has240819 && !has20261005) ? preLedger : preLedger + 1,
             has240819 ? (preUser - feesXRP) : postUser,
             preTime));
     }
@@ -5567,8 +5569,7 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
         env.close();
 
         // calculate rewards
-        bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819) &&
-            env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240911);
+        bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819);
         STAmount const netReward =
             rewardUserAmount(*acctSle, preLedger, rateDrops);
         BEAST_EXPECT(netReward == (hasFix ? XRP(3.329999) : XRP(3.329999)));
@@ -5659,8 +5660,7 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
         env.close();
 
         // calculate rewards
-        bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819) &&
-            env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240911);
+        bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819);
         STAmount const netReward =
             rewardUserAmount(*acctSle, preLedger, rateDrops);
         BEAST_EXPECT(netReward == (hasFix ? XRP(3.479999) : XRP(6.663333)));
@@ -5678,9 +5678,196 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
             postUser == (hasFix ? XRP(2002.479999) : XRP(2005.663333)));
     }
 
+    void
+    test20261005(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        using namespace jtx;
+        using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+        testcase("test fix20261005");
+
+        bool const has240819 = features[fix240819];
+        bool const has20261005 = features[fix20261005];
+        bool const nofix = !(has240819 && has20261005);
+
+        Env env{
+            *this, makeNetworkConfig(21337), features - featureXahauGenesis};
+
+        STAmount const feesXRP = XRP(1);
+
+        Account const user = Account("user");
+        env.fund(XRP(200), user);
+        env.close();
+
+        // setup governance
+        Account const alice = Account("alice");
+        Account const bob = Account("bob");
+        Account const carol = Account("carol");
+        Account const david = Account("david");
+        Account const edward = Account("edward");
+
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob, carol, david, edward);
+        env.close();
+
+        std::vector<AccountID> initial_members_ids{
+            alice.id(), bob.id(), carol.id(), david.id(), edward.id()};
+
+        setupGov(env, initial_members_ids);
+
+        {
+            std::vector<uint8_t> vote_data{
+                0x00U, 0x80U, 0xC6U, 0xA4U, 0x7EU, 0x8DU, 0x03U, 0x55U};
+
+            updateTopic(
+                env, alice, bob, carol, david, edward, 'R', 'D', vote_data);
+        }
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(hasUNLReport(env) == false);
+
+        env(claimReward(user, env.master), fee(feesXRP), ter(tesSUCCESS));
+        env.close();
+
+        env(noop(user),
+            fee(env.balance(user) - drops(500'000)),
+            ter(tesSUCCESS));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(user) == drops(500'000));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(user) < XRP(1));
+
+        std::uint32_t const drainMarker =
+            env.le(keylet::account(user))->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast);
+
+        for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i)
+            env.close(10s);
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(user) < XRP(1));
+
+        env(pay(alice, user, XRP(1000)));
+        env.close();
+
+        std::uint32_t const fundMarker =
+            env.le(keylet::account(user))->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast);
+
+        bool const markerFrozen = has240819 && !has20261005;
+        if (markerFrozen)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(fundMarker == drainMarker);
+        else
+            BEAST_EXPECT(fundMarker > drainMarker);
+
+        STAmount const preUser = env.balance(user);
+
+        env(claimReward(user, env.master), fee(feesXRP), ter(tesSUCCESS));
+        env.close();
+
+        env.close();
+
+        STAmount const postUser = env.balance(user);
+
+        if (nofix)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(postUser > preUser + XRP(1));
+        else
+            BEAST_EXPECT(postUser < preUser + XRP(1));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testRewardAccumulatorOverflow(FeatureBitset features)
+    {
+        using namespace jtx;
+        testcase("reward accumulator overflow");
+
+        bool const has20261005 = features[fix20261005];
+
+        Env env{
+            *this, makeNetworkConfig(21337), features - featureXahauGenesis};
+
+        STAmount const feesXRP = XRP(1);
+
+        Account const user = Account("user");
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), user);
+        env.close();
+
+        // setup governance
+        Account const alice = Account("alice");
+        Account const bob = Account("bob");
+        Account const carol = Account("carol");
+        Account const david = Account("david");
+        Account const edward = Account("edward");
+
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob, carol, david, edward);
+        env.close();
+
+        std::vector<AccountID> initial_members_ids{
+            alice.id(), bob.id(), carol.id(), david.id(), edward.id()};
+
+        setupGov(env, initial_members_ids);
+
+        {
+            std::vector<uint8_t> vote_data{
+                0x00U, 0x80U, 0xC6U, 0xA4U, 0x7EU, 0x8DU, 0x03U, 0x55U};
+
+            updateTopic(
+                env, alice, bob, carol, david, edward, 'R', 'D', vote_data);
+        }
+
+        // opt in so the account carries the reward fields
+        env(claimReward(user, env.master), fee(feesXRP), ter(tesSUCCESS));
+        env.close();
+        env.close();
+
+        auto const preSle = env.le(keylet::account(user));
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(preSle);
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(preSle->isFieldPresent(sfRewardLgrLast));
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(preSle->isFieldPresent(sfRewardAccumulator));
+
+        std::uint32_t const preMarker = preSle->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(preMarker < env.current()->seq());
+
+        constexpr std::uint64_t maxAccum =
+            std::numeric_limits<std::uint64_t>::max();
+
+        // Push the accumulator to the brink in the open ledger so that any
+        // non-zero bal * lgrElapsed wraps around in finishApply.
+        env.app().openLedger().modify(
+            [&](OpenView& view, beast::Journal) -> bool {
+                auto const sle = view.read(keylet::account(user));
+                if (!sle)
+                    return false;
+                auto replacement = std::make_shared<SLE>(*sle);
+                replacement->setFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator, maxAccum);
+                view.rawReplace(replacement);
+                return true;
+            });
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            env.le(keylet::account(user))->getFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator) ==
+            maxAccum);
+
+        // Any balance change on user runs the reward block in finishApply.
+        env(pay(alice, user, XRP(1)), ter(tesSUCCESS));
+
+        // Check the open ledger before close() rebuilds it without the
+        // injected accumulator.
+        auto const postSle = env.le(keylet::account(user));
+        BEAST_REQUIRE(postSle);
+
+        // the overflowing contribution is never added
+        BEAST_EXPECT(postSle->getFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator) == maxAccum);
+
+        // with the fix the marker advances so the span can't be reused;
+        // without it the marker is left behind
+        if (has20261005)
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                postSle->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast) == env.current()->seq());
+        else
+            BEAST_EXPECT(postSle->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast) == preMarker);
+
+        env.close();
+    }
+
     void
     testRewardHookWithFeats(FeatureBitset features)
     {
+        test20261005(features);
+        testRewardAccumulatorOverflow(features);
         testLastCloseTime(features);
         testInvalidRate0(features);
         testInvalidRateGreater1(features);
@@ -5723,7 +5910,7 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
         testGovernHookWithFeats(sa);
         testRewardHookWithFeats(sa);
         testRewardHookWithFeats(sa - fix240819);
-        testRewardHookWithFeats(sa - fix240819 - fix240911);
+        testRewardHookWithFeats(sa - fix20261005);
     }
 };
 

src/test/consensus/Consensus_test.cpp

@@ -1052,6 +1052,67 @@ public:
         BEAST_EXPECT(sim.synchronized());
     }
 
+    void
+    testForcedInclusion()
+    {
+        using namespace csf;
+        using namespace std::chrono;
+        testcase("forced inclusion");
+
+        // Transaction n * 1000 + k belongs to peer n - 1. Each one is placed
+        // only in a single peer's open set and never relayed, so without
+        // forced inclusion it has one vote in five and stays out.
+        auto const owner = [](Tx const& tx) -> std::optional<PeerID> {
+            if (tx.id() < 1000)
+                return std::nullopt;
+            return PeerID{tx.id() / 1000 - 1};
+        };
+
+        auto const run = [&](bool withHook) {
+            ConsensusParms const parms{};
+            Sim sim;
+            PeerGroup peers = sim.createGroup(5);
+            peers.trustAndConnect(
+                peers, round<milliseconds>(0.2 * parms.ledgerGRANULARITY));
+
+            for (Peer* p : peers)
+            {
+                if (withHook)
+                    p->txOwner = owner;
+
+                std::uint32_t const base =
+                    (static_cast<std::uint32_t>(p->id) + 1) * 1000;
+                p->openTxs.insert(Tx{base + 1});
+                if (p->id == PeerID{4})
+                {
+                    // more of its own than it may force
+                    p->openTxs.insert(Tx{base + 2});
+                    p->openTxs.insert(Tx{base + 3});
+                    // one that names another owner, who does not hold it
+                    p->openTxs.insert(Tx{1999});
+                }
+            }
+
+            sim.run(1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(sim.synchronized());
+            return peers[0]->lastClosedLedger.txs();
+        };
+
+        {
+            auto const txs = run(false);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(txs.empty());
+        }
+
+        {
+            auto const txs = run(true);
+            // every owner's own transaction, and only the lowest of the
+            // several peer 4 put in its position
+            TxSetType const expected{
+                Tx{1001}, Tx{2001}, Tx{3001}, Tx{4001}, Tx{5001}};
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(txs == expected, to_string(txs));
+        }
+    }
+
     void
     run() override
     {
@@ -1068,6 +1129,7 @@ public:
         testHubNetwork();
         testPreferredByBranch();
         testPauseForLaggards();
+        testForcedInclusion();
     }
 };
 

src/test/core/Config_test.cpp

@@ -421,6 +421,72 @@ port_wss_admin
         }
     }
 
+    void
+    testEarlyManifestSync()
+    {
+        testcase("early_manifest_sync");
+
+        // On unless turned off.
+        {
+            Config c;
+            c.loadFromString("");
+            BEAST_EXPECT(c.EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC);
+        }
+
+        std::vector<std::pair<std::string, bool>> const values{
+            {"0", false}, {"false", false}, {"1", true}, {"TRUE", true}};
+        for (auto const& [value, expected] : values)
+        {
+            Config c;
+            c.loadFromString("[early_manifest_sync]\n" + value + "\n");
+            BEAST_EXPECT(c.EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC == expected);
+        }
+
+        try
+        {
+            Config c;
+            c.loadFromString("[early_manifest_sync]\nsometimes\n");
+            fail();
+        }
+        catch (std::exception const&)
+        {
+            pass();
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testUdpHighway()
+    {
+        testcase("udp_highway");
+
+        // The UDP Superhighway is opt-in: off unless turned on.
+        {
+            Config c;
+            c.loadFromString("");
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!c.UDP_HIGHWAY);
+        }
+
+        std::vector<std::pair<std::string, bool>> const values{
+            {"0", false}, {"false", false}, {"1", true}, {"TRUE", true}};
+        for (auto const& [value, expected] : values)
+        {
+            Config c;
+            c.loadFromString("[udp_highway]\n" + value + "\n");
+            BEAST_EXPECT(c.UDP_HIGHWAY == expected);
+        }
+
+        try
+        {
+            Config c;
+            c.loadFromString("[udp_highway]\nsometimes\n");
+            fail();
+        }
+        catch (std::exception const&)
+        {
+            pass();
+        }
+    }
+
     void
     testNetworkID()
     {
@@ -1758,6 +1824,8 @@ r.ripple.com:51235
         testDatabasePinnedValidation();
         testOverlay();
         testNetworkID();
+        testEarlyManifestSync();
+        testUdpHighway();
     }
 };
 

src/test/csf/Peer.h

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
 #include <boost/container/flat_map.hpp>
 #include <boost/container/flat_set.hpp>
 #include <algorithm>
+#include <functional>
+#include <optional>
 
 namespace ripple {
 namespace test {
@@ -257,6 +259,11 @@ struct Peer
     // Simulation parameters
     ConsensusParms consensusParms;
 
+    //! Names the peer a transaction belongs to, for Consensus forced
+    //! inclusion (as featureRNG uses for entropy contributions). Unset, it
+    //! behaves exactly like an adaptor without the forcedTxOwner hook.
+    std::function<std::optional<PeerID>(Tx const&)> txOwner;
+
     //! The collectors to report events to
     CollectorRefs& collectors;
 
@@ -655,6 +662,14 @@ struct Peer
         return consensusParms;
     }
 
+    std::optional<PeerID>
+    forcedTxOwner(Tx const& tx, Ledger const&) const
+    {
+        if (!txOwner)
+            return std::nullopt;
+        return txOwner(tx);
+    }
+
     // Not interested in tracking consensus mode changes for now
     void
     onModeChange(ConsensusMode, ConsensusMode)

src/test/ledger/Invariants_test.cpp

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/InnerObjectFormats.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
 
 #include <boost/algorithm/string/predicate.hpp>
@@ -1234,6 +1235,90 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
             {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
     }
 
+    void
+    testAppLoader()
+    {
+        using namespace test::jtx;
+        static std::string const good = "<html></html>";
+
+        auto insert = [](ApplyContext& ac,
+                         AccountID const& owner,
+                         uint256 const& key,
+                         std::string const& blob,
+                         std::uint32_t seq) {
+            auto sle = std::make_shared<SLE>(Keylet{ltAPP_LOADER, key});
+            sle->setAccountID(sfOwner, owner);
+            sle->setFieldVL(sfAppLoader, Slice(blob.data(), blob.size()));
+            sle->setFieldU32(sfAppLoaderSequence, seq);
+            ac.view().insert(sle);
+            auto root = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(owner));
+            root->setFieldU32(sfAppLoaderSequence, seq);
+            ac.view().update(root);
+            return true;
+        };
+        Preclose publish = [](Account const& A1, Account const&, Env& env) {
+            auto jt = noop(A1);
+            jt[sfAppLoader.fieldName] = strHex(good);
+            env(jt, fee(XRP(1)));
+            return bool(env.le(keylet::appLoader(A1.id())));
+        };
+        auto bad = [&](char const* log,
+                       Precheck const& pre,
+                       std::uint16_t txType = ttACCOUNT_SET,
+                       Preclose const& preclose = {}) {
+            doInvariantCheck(
+                {{log}},
+                pre,
+                XRPAmount{},
+                STTx{TxType(txType), [](STObject&) {}},
+                {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
+                preclose);
+        };
+
+        testcase << "AppLoader at the wrong key";
+        bad("AppLoader is not keyed at its owner's keylet",
+            [&](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
+                return insert(ac, A1, keylet::appLoader(A2).key, good, 1);
+            });
+        testcase << "AppLoader with invalid blob";
+        bad("AppLoader blob does not validate",
+            [&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
+                return insert(ac, A1, keylet::appLoader(A1).key, "nope", 1);
+            });
+        testcase << "AppLoader blob over the size limit";
+        bad("AppLoader blob does not validate",
+            [&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
+                return insert(
+                    ac,
+                    A1,
+                    keylet::appLoader(A1).key,
+                    "<html>" + std::string(maxAppLoaderLength, 'x') + "</html>",
+                    1);
+            });
+        testcase << "AppLoader sequence differs from its owner's";
+        bad(
+            "AppLoader sequence does not match its owner's",
+            [&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
+                auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::appLoader(A1));
+                sle->setFieldU32(sfAppLoaderSequence, 7);
+                ac.view().update(sle);
+                return true;
+            },
+            ttACCOUNT_SET,
+            publish);
+        testcase << "AppLoader changed by the wrong transaction type";
+        bad(
+            "AppLoader changed by a transaction other than AccountSet or "
+            "AccountDelete",
+            [&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
+                auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::appLoader(A1));
+                ac.view().erase(sle);
+                return true;
+            },
+            ttPAYMENT,
+            publish);
+    }
+
     void
     testLockedBalance()
     {
@@ -1289,6 +1374,7 @@ public:
         testNFTokenPageInvariants();
         testPermissionedDomainInvariants();
         testLockedBalance();
+        testAppLoader();
     }
 };
 

src/test/overlay/OverlayXUSH_test.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,542 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <test/jtx.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/HashRouter.h>
+#include <xrpld/core/JobQueue.h>
+#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/OverlayImpl.h>
+#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/XUSH.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/net/IPAddressConversion.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
+#include <xrpl/resource/ResourceManager.h>
+#include <xrpl/resource/detail/Tuning.h>
+
+#include <boost/asio/ip/udp.hpp>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <array>
+#include <chrono>
+#include <cstring>
+#include <optional>
+#include <set>
+#include <string>
+#include <thread>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace ripple {
+namespace test {
+
+// Tests the UDP Superhighway (XUSH) handling in OverlayImpl: inbound datagram
+// processing, outbound publishing and the XUSHPEER advertisement timer.
+class OverlayXUSH_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
+{
+    using udp = boost::asio::ip::udp;
+
+    static std::unique_ptr<Config>
+    highway(std::unique_ptr<Config> cfg)
+    {
+        cfg->UDP_HIGHWAY = true;
+        return cfg;
+    }
+
+    static beast::IP::Endpoint
+    ep(std::string const& s)
+    {
+        return beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string(s);
+    }
+
+    static std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>
+    asSet(std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> const& v)
+    {
+        return {v.begin(), v.end()};
+    }
+
+    static Slice
+    slice(Buffer const& b)
+    {
+        return Slice(b.data(), b.size());
+    }
+
+    static std::string
+    str(Buffer const& b)
+    {
+        return std::string(reinterpret_cast<char const*>(b.data()), b.size());
+    }
+
+    static Buffer
+    serialize(STTx const& stx)
+    {
+        Serializer s;
+        stx.add(s);
+        return Buffer(s.data(), s.size());
+    }
+
+    // A pseudo-transaction, which servers never submit
+    static STTx
+    pseudoTx()
+    {
+        return STTx(ttAMENDMENT, [](auto& obj) {
+            obj.setAccountID(sfAccount, AccountID());
+            obj.setFieldH256(sfAmendment, uint256(2));
+            obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, 5);
+        });
+    }
+
+    // A local UDP socket that highway datagrams can be sent to
+    struct Sink
+    {
+        boost::asio::io_context io;
+        udp::socket socket;
+
+        explicit Sink(boost::asio::ip::address const& addr)
+            : socket(io, udp::endpoint(addr, 0))
+        {
+            socket.non_blocking(true);
+        }
+
+        beast::IP::Endpoint
+        endpoint() const
+        {
+            auto const local = socket.local_endpoint();
+            return beast::IP::Endpoint(local.address(), local.port());
+        }
+
+        void
+        sendTo(Buffer const& datagram, std::uint16_t port)
+        {
+            socket.send_to(
+                boost::asio::buffer(datagram.data(), datagram.size()),
+                udp::endpoint(socket.local_endpoint().address(), port));
+        }
+
+        std::optional<std::string>
+        receive(std::chrono::milliseconds timeout = std::chrono::seconds(5))
+        {
+            auto const deadline = std::chrono::steady_clock::now() + timeout;
+            std::array<char, 4096> buf;
+            while (std::chrono::steady_clock::now() < deadline)
+            {
+                udp::endpoint from;
+                boost::system::error_code ec;
+                auto const n =
+                    socket.receive_from(boost::asio::buffer(buf), from, 0, ec);
+                if (!ec)
+                    return std::string(buf.data(), n);
+                if (ec != boost::asio::error::would_block &&
+                    ec != boost::asio::error::try_again)
+                    return std::nullopt;
+                std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(5));
+            }
+            return std::nullopt;
+        }
+
+        // Receives datagrams until one of the given type arrives
+        std::optional<std::string>
+        receive(xush::MessageType type)
+        {
+            while (auto d = receive())
+            {
+                if (xush::classify(makeSlice(*d)) == type)
+                    return d;
+            }
+            return std::nullopt;
+        }
+    };
+
+    struct Fixture
+    {
+        jtx::Env env;
+        OverlayImpl& overlay;
+        PeerFinder::Manager& peerFinder;
+        Resource::Manager& resources;
+
+        Fixture(beast::unit_test::suite& suite, bool enabled)
+            : env(suite, enabled ? jtx::envconfig(highway) : jtx::envconfig())
+            , overlay(dynamic_cast<OverlayImpl&>(env.app().overlay()))
+            , peerFinder(overlay.peerFinder())
+            , resources(env.app().getResourceManager())
+        {
+        }
+
+        // Delivers a datagram as if it had been received from `remote`
+        void
+        deliver(Buffer const& datagram, beast::IP::Endpoint const& remote)
+        {
+            overlay.processXUSH(
+                str(datagram), beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(remote));
+        }
+
+        void
+        deliver(
+            std::vector<Buffer> const& datagrams,
+            beast::IP::Endpoint const& remote)
+        {
+            for (auto const& d : datagrams)
+                deliver(d, remote);
+        }
+
+        // Tracks the resource balance charged to `remote`
+        Resource::Consumer
+        probe(beast::IP::Endpoint const& remote)
+        {
+            return resources.newInboundEndpoint(remote);
+        }
+
+        std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>
+        targets()
+        {
+            return asSet(peerFinder.highway_targets(1000));
+        }
+
+        // Whether `probe` was charged at least `fee` since `before`. Balances
+        // are normalized by the decay window, so a charge of `fee` raises the
+        // balance by at least fee / decayWindowSeconds.
+        static bool
+        charged(Resource::Consumer& probe, int before, int fee)
+        {
+            return probe.balance() - before >=
+                fee / Resource::decayWindowSeconds;
+        }
+
+        bool
+        isBad(uint256 const& txid)
+        {
+            env.app().getJobQueue().rendezvous();
+            return env.app().getHashRouter().getFlags(txid) & SF_BAD;
+        }
+    };
+
+    void
+    testDisabled()
+    {
+        testcase("disabled");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Fixture f(*this, false);
+        auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.1:51235");
+
+        // Nothing is learned or sent while the highway is disabled
+        f.deliver(xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
+
+        Sink sink(boost::asio::ip::make_address("127.0.0.1"));
+        f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink", {sink.endpoint()});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
+
+        Account const alice("alice");
+        f.env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
+        f.env.close();
+
+        Buffer const blob(64);
+        f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(blob), uint256(1));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!sink.receive(std::chrono::milliseconds(200)));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPeers()
+    {
+        testcase("XUSHPEER");
+        Fixture f(*this, true);
+        auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.2:51235");
+        auto probe = f.probe(remote);
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
+
+        f.deliver(
+            xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235"), ep("1.1.1.1:51235")}),
+            remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            f.targets() == asSet({ep("8.8.8.8:51235"), ep("1.1.1.1:51235")}));
+        auto const balance = probe.balance();
+
+        // Unknown datagram types are ignored and cost almost nothing
+        f.deliver(Buffer("XUSHPING", 8), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 100));
+
+        // A malformed advertisement is charged for
+        Buffer malformed(xush::tagSize + 2);
+        std::memcpy(malformed.data(), "XUSHPEER\x05\x00", malformed.size());
+        f.deliver(malformed, remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 200));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().size() == 2);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testTransaction()
+    {
+        testcase("XUSHTXNF transaction");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Fixture f(*this, true);
+        auto& env = f.env;
+        auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.3:51235");
+
+        Account const alice("alice");
+        Account const bob("bob");
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
+        env.close();
+
+        auto const jt = env.jt(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)));
+        auto const txid = jt.stx->getTransactionID();
+
+        // Fragments arrive out of order and are reassembled
+        auto datagrams = xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(*jt.stx)), txid, 40);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() > 2);
+        std::reverse(datagrams.begin(), datagrams.end());
+        f.deliver(datagrams, remote);
+        env.app().getJobQueue().rendezvous();
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!f.isBad(txid));
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob) == XRP(10100));
+
+        // Delivering it again is harmless
+        f.deliver(datagrams, remote);
+        env.app().getJobQueue().rendezvous();
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob) == XRP(10100));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testBadTransactions()
+    {
+        testcase("XUSHTXNF bad transactions");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Fixture f(*this, true);
+        auto& env = f.env;
+        auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.4:51235");
+        auto probe = f.probe(remote);
+
+        Account const alice("alice");
+        Account const bob("bob");
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
+        env.close();
+
+        auto const good = env.jt(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)));
+        auto const blob = serialize(*good.stx);
+        auto const txid = good.stx->getTransactionID();
+
+        // The ID in the header must match the transaction
+        auto balance = probe.balance();
+        f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(1)), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 400));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!f.isBad(txid));
+
+        // Garbage that doesn't parse as a transaction
+        balance = probe.balance();
+        f.deliver(
+            xush::encodeTxn(makeSlice(std::string("garbage")), uint256(2)),
+            remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 400));
+
+        // Fragments of one transaction that disagree with each other
+        balance = probe.balance();
+        f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(3), 40).front(), remote);
+        f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(3), 60).front(), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 400));
+
+        // A malformed fragment
+        balance = probe.balance();
+        f.deliver(Buffer("XUSHTXNF", 8), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 200));
+
+        // Pseudo-transactions are never accepted
+        balance = probe.balance();
+        auto const pseudo = pseudoTx();
+        f.deliver(
+            xush::encodeTxn(
+                slice(serialize(pseudo)), pseudo.getTransactionID()),
+            remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 2000));
+
+        // An expired transaction is remembered as bad
+        auto const expired =
+            env.jt(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)), last_ledger_seq(1));
+        auto const expiredId = expired.stx->getTransactionID();
+        balance = probe.balance();
+        f.deliver(
+            xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(*expired.stx)), expiredId), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.isBad(expiredId));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 150));
+
+        // A badly signed transaction is remembered as bad
+        auto corrupted = good.stx->getJson(JsonOptions::none);
+        corrupted[jss::TxnSignature] = std::string(128, '0');
+        STTx const badSig(parse(corrupted));
+        auto const badSigId = badSig.getTransactionID();
+        balance = probe.balance();
+        f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(badSig)), badSigId), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.isBad(badSigId));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 2000));
+
+        // A known bad transaction is charged for again
+        balance = probe.balance();
+        f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(badSig)), badSigId), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 150));
+
+        env.close();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob) == XRP(10000));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testDisconnect()
+    {
+        testcase("resource limit");
+        Fixture f(*this, true);
+        auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.5:51235");
+        auto probe = f.probe(remote);
+
+        // A sender that keeps misbehaving is ignored
+        Buffer const blob(64);
+        for (int i = 0; i < 10000 && probe.balance() < Resource::dropThreshold;
+             ++i)
+            f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(1)), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(probe.balance() >= Resource::dropThreshold);
+
+        f.deliver(xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}), remote);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
+
+        // Other senders are not affected
+        f.deliver(
+            xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}), ep("203.0.113.6:51235"));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets() == asSet({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPublish()
+    {
+        testcase("publish");
+        using namespace jtx;
+        Fixture f(*this, true);
+        auto& env = f.env;
+
+        Account const alice("alice");
+        Account const bob("bob");
+        env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
+        env.close();
+
+        Sink sink4(boost::asio::ip::make_address("127.0.0.1"));
+        f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink4", {sink4.endpoint()});
+
+        std::optional<Sink> sink6;
+        try
+        {
+            sink6.emplace(boost::asio::ip::make_address("::1"));
+            f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink6", {sink6->endpoint()});
+        }
+        catch (std::exception const&)
+        {
+            log << "IPv6 loopback unavailable, skipping" << std::endl;
+        }
+
+        // A transaction relayed by NetworkOPs is published on the highway
+        env(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)));
+        auto const stx = env.tx();
+        auto const blob = serialize(*stx);
+
+        auto check = [&](Sink& sink) {
+            auto const d = sink.receive(xush::MessageType::txn);
+            if (!BEAST_EXPECT(d))
+                return;
+            auto const fragment = xush::decodeTxnFragment(makeSlice(*d));
+            if (!BEAST_EXPECT(fragment))
+                return;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->txid == stx->getTransactionID());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->count == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->payload == slice(blob));
+        };
+        check(sink4);
+        if (sink6)
+            check(*sink6);
+
+        // Large transactions are fragmented
+        Buffer big(5000);
+        for (std::size_t i = 0; i < big.size(); ++i)
+            big.data()[i] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(i);
+        f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(big), uint256(7));
+
+        xush::Reassembler reassembler;
+        std::optional<Buffer> rebuilt;
+        while (!rebuilt)
+        {
+            auto const d = sink4.receive(xush::MessageType::txn);
+            if (!BEAST_EXPECT(d))
+                break;
+            auto const fragment = xush::decodeTxnFragment(makeSlice(*d));
+            if (!BEAST_EXPECT(fragment && fragment->txid == uint256(7)))
+                break;
+            auto result = reassembler.add(
+                sink4.endpoint(),
+                *fragment,
+                xush::Reassembler::clock_type::now());
+            if (result.status == xush::Reassembler::Status::complete)
+                rebuilt = std::move(result.txn);
+        }
+        BEAST_EXPECT(rebuilt && *rebuilt == big);
+
+        // Transactions too large for the highway are not sent
+        Buffer const huge(xush::maxTxnSize + 1);
+        f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(huge), uint256(8));
+        f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(big), uint256(9));
+        auto const d = sink4.receive(xush::MessageType::txn);
+        if (BEAST_EXPECT(d))
+        {
+            auto const fragment = xush::decodeTxnFragment(makeSlice(*d));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(fragment && fragment->txid == uint256(9));
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testSendPeers()
+    {
+        testcase("advertise");
+        Fixture f(*this, true);
+
+        Sink sink(boost::asio::ip::make_address("127.0.0.1"));
+        f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink", {sink.endpoint()});
+
+        // Learned endpoints are advertised to targets once per second, but
+        // fixed peers are never advertised.
+        f.peerFinder.add_highway_peers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
+
+        auto const d = sink.receive(xush::MessageType::peers);
+        if (!BEAST_EXPECT(d))
+            return;
+        auto const endpoints = xush::decodePeers(makeSlice(*d));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            endpoints && asSet(*endpoints) == asSet({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}));
+    }
+
+public:
+    void
+    run() override
+    {
+        testDisabled();
+        testPeers();
+        testTransaction();
+        testBadTransactions();
+        testDisconnect();
+        testPublish();
+        testSendPeers();
+    }
+};
+
+BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(OverlayXUSH, overlay, ripple);
+
+}  // namespace test
+}  // namespace ripple

src/test/overlay/ProtocolMessage_test.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <xrpld/overlay/Message.h>
+#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/ProtocolMessage.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/messages.h>
+
+#include <boost/asio/buffer.hpp>
+#include <boost/beast/core/multi_buffer.hpp>
+#include <boost/system/error_code.hpp>
+
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <memory>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace ripple {
+namespace test {
+
+/** Receive-side framing tests for invokeProtocolMessage.
+
+    PeerImp::onReadMessage hands its entire read buffer to
+    invokeProtocolMessage, which must decode exactly one frame and report
+    exactly that frame's size as consumed. A single read routinely contains
+    several frames, so the payload parser must never look past the payload
+    size declared in the frame header.
+*/
+class ProtocolMessage_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
+{
+    using Compressed = compression::Compressed;
+
+    /** Minimal stand-in for the PeerImp handler interface. */
+    struct Handler
+    {
+        bool compression = false;
+        std::vector<std::shared_ptr<::google::protobuf::Message>> received;
+        std::vector<std::uint16_t> types;
+
+        bool
+        compressionEnabled() const
+        {
+            return compression;
+        }
+
+        void
+        onMessageBegin(
+            std::uint16_t,
+            std::shared_ptr<::google::protobuf::Message> const&,
+            std::size_t,
+            std::size_t,
+            bool)
+        {
+        }
+
+        template <class T>
+        void
+        onMessage(std::shared_ptr<T> const& m)
+        {
+            received.push_back(m);
+        }
+
+        void
+        onMessageEnd(
+            std::uint16_t type,
+            std::shared_ptr<::google::protobuf::Message> const&)
+        {
+            types.push_back(type);
+        }
+
+        void
+        onMessageUnknown(std::uint16_t type)
+        {
+            types.push_back(type);
+        }
+    };
+
+    /** Loads wire bytes into a multi_buffer as one or two committed
+        segments, split at `split` (no split if split is 0 or past the end).
+    */
+    static void
+    load(
+        boost::beast::multi_buffer& rb,
+        std::vector<std::uint8_t> const& wire,
+        std::size_t split = 0)
+    {
+        auto commit = [&rb](std::uint8_t const* p, std::size_t n) {
+            if (n != 0)
+                rb.commit(boost::asio::buffer_copy(
+                    rb.prepare(n), boost::asio::buffer(p, n)));
+        };
+
+        if (split == 0 || split >= wire.size())
+        {
+            commit(wire.data(), wire.size());
+            return;
+        }
+        commit(wire.data(), split);
+        commit(wire.data() + split, wire.size() - split);
+    }
+
+    /** Mirrors the consume loop in PeerImp::onReadMessage. */
+    static boost::system::error_code
+    drain(boost::beast::multi_buffer& rb, Handler& handler)
+    {
+        std::size_t hint = 0;
+        while (rb.size() > 0)
+        {
+            auto const [consumed, ec] =
+                invokeProtocolMessage(rb.data(), handler, hint);
+            if (ec)
+                return ec;
+            if (consumed == 0)
+                break;
+            rb.consume(consumed);
+        }
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    static std::vector<std::uint8_t>
+    frame(
+        ::google::protobuf::Message const& m,
+        protocol::MessageType type,
+        Compressed compressed = Compressed::Off)
+    {
+        Message msg(m, type);
+        return msg.getBuffer(compressed);
+    }
+
+    static protocol::TMPing
+    makePing(protocol::TMPing::pingType type, std::uint32_t seq)
+    {
+        protocol::TMPing ping;
+        ping.set_type(type);
+        ping.set_seq(seq);
+        return ping;
+    }
+
+    template <class T>
+    std::shared_ptr<T>
+    receivedAs(Handler const& h, std::size_t i)
+    {
+        if (!BEAST_EXPECT(i < h.received.size()))
+            return {};
+        auto p = std::dynamic_pointer_cast<T>(h.received[i]);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(p);
+        return p;
+    }
+
+    void
+    testCoalescedUncompressed()
+    {
+        testcase("Coalesced uncompressed frames");
+
+        auto const first = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPING, 7);
+        auto second = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPONG, 99);
+        second.set_nettime(5);
+
+        auto wire = frame(first, protocol::mtPING);
+        auto const firstSize = wire.size();
+        auto const tail = frame(second, protocol::mtPING);
+        wire.insert(wire.end(), tail.begin(), tail.end());
+
+        // Both frames delivered by a single read, with every possible
+        // segmentation of the read buffer (0 means one contiguous segment).
+        for (std::size_t split = 0; split < wire.size(); ++split)
+        {
+            boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
+            load(rb, wire, split);
+
+            Handler h;
+            auto const ec = drain(rb, h);
+
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(
+                !ec, "split " + std::to_string(split) + ": " + ec.message());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(rb.size() == 0);
+            if (!BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.size() == 2))
+                continue;
+
+            auto const a = receivedAs<protocol::TMPing>(h, 0);
+            auto const b = receivedAs<protocol::TMPing>(h, 1);
+            if (!a || !b)
+                continue;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(a->type() == protocol::TMPing::ptPING);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(a->seq() == 7);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!a->has_nettime());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(b->type() == protocol::TMPing::ptPONG);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(b->seq() == 99);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(b->nettime() == 5);
+        }
+
+        // The first frame on its own, followed by a partial second frame,
+        // is delivered alone and the remainder is left for the next read.
+        {
+            boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
+            std::vector<std::uint8_t> partial(
+                wire.begin(), wire.begin() + firstSize + 3);
+            load(rb, partial);
+
+            Handler h;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!drain(rb, h));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.size() == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(rb.size() == 3);
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testUncompressedThenCompressed()
+    {
+        testcase("Uncompressed frame followed by compressed frame");
+
+        auto const ping = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPING, 1234);
+
+        protocol::TMTransaction tx;
+        tx.set_rawtransaction(std::string(4096, 'x'));
+        tx.set_status(protocol::tsNEW);
+
+        auto wire = frame(ping, protocol::mtPING);
+        auto const txFrame = frame(tx, protocol::mtTRANSACTION, Compressed::On);
+        // The second frame must really be compressed for this test to mean
+        // anything: its header is what the first parse used to run into.
+        if (!BEAST_EXPECT(!txFrame.empty() && (txFrame[0] & 0x80)))
+            return;
+        wire.insert(wire.end(), txFrame.begin(), txFrame.end());
+
+        for (std::size_t split = 0; split < wire.size(); split += 7)
+        {
+            boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
+            load(rb, wire, split);
+
+            Handler h;
+            h.compression = true;
+            auto const ec = drain(rb, h);
+
+            BEAST_EXPECTS(
+                !ec, "split " + std::to_string(split) + ": " + ec.message());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(rb.size() == 0);
+            if (!BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.size() == 2))
+                continue;
+
+            auto const p = receivedAs<protocol::TMPing>(h, 0);
+            auto const t = receivedAs<protocol::TMTransaction>(h, 1);
+            if (!p || !t)
+                continue;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(p->type() == protocol::TMPing::ptPING);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(p->seq() == 1234);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(t->rawtransaction() == tx.rawtransaction());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(t->status() == protocol::tsNEW);
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testDeclaredSizeIsAuthoritative()
+    {
+        testcase("Declared payload size bounds the parse");
+
+        auto const ping = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPING, 7);
+        auto wire = frame(ping, protocol::mtPING);
+
+        // Shrink the declared payload size by one byte without removing the
+        // byte from the stream. The declared payload alone is a truncated
+        // TMPing, so the frame must be rejected rather than completed from
+        // bytes that lie beyond it.
+        std::uint32_t declared = (std::uint32_t(wire[0]) << 24) |
+            (std::uint32_t(wire[1]) << 16) | (std::uint32_t(wire[2]) << 8) |
+            std::uint32_t(wire[3]);
+        if (!BEAST_EXPECT(declared > 0))
+            return;
+        --declared;
+        wire[0] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared >> 24);
+        wire[1] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared >> 16);
+        wire[2] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared >> 8);
+        wire[3] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared);
+
+        boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
+        load(rb, wire);
+
+        Handler h;
+        auto const ec = drain(rb, h);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(ec == boost::system::errc::bad_message);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.empty());
+    }
+
+public:
+    void
+    run() override
+    {
+        testCoalescedUncompressed();
+        testUncompressedThenCompressed();
+        testDeclaredSizeIsAuthoritative();
+    }
+};
+
+BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(ProtocolMessage, overlay, ripple);
+
+}  // namespace test
+}  // namespace ripple

src/test/overlay/XUSH_test.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/XUSH.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <chrono>
+#include <cstring>
+#include <set>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace ripple {
+namespace test {
+
+class XUSH_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
+{
+    using Status = xush::Reassembler::Status;
+
+    static beast::IP::Endpoint
+    ep(std::string const& s)
+    {
+        return beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string(s);
+    }
+
+    static Slice
+    slice(Buffer const& b)
+    {
+        return Slice(b.data(), b.size());
+    }
+
+    static Buffer
+    makeTxn(std::size_t size)
+    {
+        Buffer b(size);
+        for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
+            b.data()[i] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(i * 31 + 7);
+        return b;
+    }
+
+    static void
+    putU32(std::uint8_t* p, std::uint32_t v)
+    {
+        p[0] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v >> 24);
+        p[1] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v >> 16);
+        p[2] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v >> 8);
+        p[3] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v);
+    }
+
+    // A XUSHTXNF datagram with an arbitrary (possibly invalid) header
+    static Buffer
+    rawFragment(
+        uint256 const& txid,
+        std::uint32_t totalSize,
+        std::uint32_t count,
+        std::uint32_t index,
+        std::size_t payloadSize)
+    {
+        Buffer b(xush::txnHeaderSize + payloadSize);
+        std::memset(b.data(), 0xAB, b.size());
+        std::memcpy(b.data(), "XUSHTXNF", xush::tagSize);
+        std::memcpy(b.data() + xush::tagSize, txid.data(), txid.size());
+        putU32(b.data() + 40, totalSize);
+        putU32(b.data() + 44, count);
+        putU32(b.data() + 48, index);
+        return b;
+    }
+
+    // A XUSHPEER datagram with arbitrary (possibly invalid) counts
+    static Buffer
+    rawPeers(std::uint8_t n4, std::uint8_t n6, std::size_t bodySize)
+    {
+        Buffer b(xush::tagSize + 2 + bodySize);
+        std::memset(b.data(), 0, b.size());
+        std::memcpy(b.data(), "XUSHPEER", xush::tagSize);
+        b.data()[8] = n4;
+        b.data()[9] = n6;
+        return b;
+    }
+
+    void
+    testClassify()
+    {
+        testcase("classify");
+        using namespace xush;
+
+        auto type = [](std::string const& s) { return classify(makeSlice(s)); };
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPEER") == MessageType::peers);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPEER and more") == MessageType::peers);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHTXNF") == MessageType::txn);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPING") == MessageType::unknown);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPEE") == MessageType::unknown);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(type("") == MessageType::unknown);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(type("{\"command\":\"ping\"}") == MessageType::unknown);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPeers()
+    {
+        testcase("XUSHPEER");
+        using namespace xush;
+
+        std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> const endpoints{
+            ep("1.2.3.4:51235"), ep("[2001:db8::1]:21337"), ep("5.6.7.8:1")};
+
+        auto const datagram = encodePeers(endpoints);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(datagram.size() == tagSize + 2 + 2 * 8 + 20);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(classify(slice(datagram)) == MessageType::peers);
+
+        if (auto const decoded = decodePeers(slice(datagram));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(decoded))
+        {
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>(
+                    decoded->begin(), decoded->end()) ==
+                std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>(
+                    endpoints.begin(), endpoints.end()));
+        }
+
+        // An empty advertisement is valid
+        if (auto const decoded = decodePeers(slice(encodePeers({})));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(decoded))
+            BEAST_EXPECT(decoded->empty());
+
+        // At most maxAdvertisedPeers are advertised, and the result fits in
+        // a single datagram even if they are all IPv6
+        {
+            std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> many;
+            for (std::uint16_t i = 1; i <= maxAdvertisedPeers + 10; ++i)
+                many.emplace_back(
+                    boost::asio::ip::make_address("2001:db8::1"), i);
+
+            auto const big = encodePeers(many);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(big.size() <= maxDatagramSize);
+
+            auto const decoded = decodePeers(slice(big));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(decoded && decoded->size() == maxAdvertisedPeers);
+        }
+
+        // Truncated or padded
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(Slice(datagram.data(), datagram.size() - 1)));
+        {
+            Buffer padded(datagram.size() + 1);
+            std::memcpy(padded.data(), datagram.data(), datagram.size());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(padded)));
+        }
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(Slice(datagram.data(), tagSize + 1)));
+
+        // Too many endpoints, even with a consistent size
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(rawPeers(
+            maxAdvertisedPeers + 1, 0, (maxAdvertisedPeers + 1) * 8))));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(decodePeers(
+            slice(rawPeers(maxAdvertisedPeers, 0, maxAdvertisedPeers * 8))));
+
+        // A port that doesn't fit in 16 bits
+        {
+            auto bad = rawPeers(1, 0, 8);
+            putU32(bad.data() + tagSize + 2 + 4, 0x10000);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(bad)));
+            putU32(bad.data() + tagSize + 2 + 4, 0xFFFF);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(decodePeers(slice(bad)));
+        }
+
+        // Wrong tag
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(rawFragment(uint256{1}, 1, 1, 0, 1))));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testTxnEncoding()
+    {
+        testcase("XUSHTXNF encoding");
+        using namespace xush;
+
+        uint256 const txid{42};
+
+        // A typical transaction fits in a single datagram
+        {
+            auto const txn = makeTxn(200);
+            auto const datagrams = encodeTxn(slice(txn), txid);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams[0].size() == txnHeaderSize + 200);
+
+            auto const fragment = decodeTxnFragment(slice(datagrams[0]));
+            if (BEAST_EXPECT(fragment))
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->txid == txid);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->totalSize == 200);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->count == 1);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->index == 0);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->payload == slice(txn));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Larger transactions are split, and no datagram is too large
+        for (auto const size :
+             {maxFragmentPayload,
+              maxFragmentPayload + 1,
+              3 * maxFragmentPayload,
+              3 * maxFragmentPayload + 17})
+        {
+            auto const txn = makeTxn(size);
+            auto const datagrams = encodeTxn(slice(txn), txid);
+            auto const count =
+                (size + maxFragmentPayload - 1) / maxFragmentPayload;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() == count);
+
+            std::size_t total = 0;
+            for (std::size_t i = 0; i < datagrams.size(); ++i)
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams[i].size() <= maxDatagramSize);
+                auto const fragment = decodeTxnFragment(slice(datagrams[i]));
+                if (!BEAST_EXPECT(fragment))
+                    continue;
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->index == i);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->count == count);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->totalSize == size);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(
+                    fragment->payload ==
+                    Slice(
+                        txn.data() + i * maxFragmentPayload,
+                        fragment->payload.size()));
+                total += fragment->payload.size();
+            }
+            BEAST_EXPECT(total == size);
+        }
+
+        // Limits
+        BEAST_EXPECT(encodeTxn(Slice{}, txid).empty());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(encodeTxn(slice(Buffer(maxTxnSize + 1)), txid).empty());
+        {
+            auto const datagrams = encodeTxn(slice(Buffer(maxTxnSize)), txid);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!datagrams.empty());
+            BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() <= maxFragments);
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testTxnDecoding()
+    {
+        testcase("XUSHTXNF decoding");
+        using namespace xush;
+
+        uint256 const id{7};
+        auto decode = [](Buffer const& b) {
+            return decodeTxnFragment(slice(b)).has_value();
+        };
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 2, 1, 5)));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 1, 0, 10)));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(decode(rawFragment(id, maxTxnSize, maxFragments, 0, 1)));
+
+        // No payload
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 1, 0, 0)));
+        // Bad total size
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 0, 1, 0, 1)));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, maxTxnSize + 1, 2, 0, 1)));
+        // Bad fragment count
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 0, 0, 1)));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 11, 0, 1)));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            !decode(rawFragment(id, maxTxnSize, maxFragments + 1, 0, 1)));
+        // Bad index
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 2, 2, 1)));
+        // Payload larger than the transaction
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 2, 0, 11)));
+        // Wrong tag
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!decodeTxnFragment(slice(encodePeers({}))));
+    }
+
+    void
+    testReassembly()
+    {
+        testcase("reassembly");
+        using namespace xush;
+        using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+
+        auto const now = Reassembler::clock_type::now();
+        auto const alice = ep("1.2.3.4:5000");
+        auto const bob = ep("5.6.7.8:5000");
+        auto const carol = ep("9.9.9.9:5000");
+
+        uint256 const id1{1};
+        uint256 const id2{2};
+
+        auto const txn1 = makeTxn(2 * maxFragmentPayload + 100);
+        auto const txn2 = makeTxn(2 * maxFragmentPayload + 200);
+        auto const d1 = encodeTxn(slice(txn1), id1);
+        auto const d2 = encodeTxn(slice(txn2), id2);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(d1.size() == 3 && d2.size() == 3);
+
+        auto f1 = [&](std::size_t i) {
+            return *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d1[i]));
+        };
+        auto f2 = [&](std::size_t i) {
+            return *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d2[i]));
+        };
+
+        // Out of order, with a repeated fragment
+        {
+            Reassembler r;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(2), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
+
+            auto const result = r.add(alice, f1(1), now);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(result.status == Status::complete);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(result.txn == txn1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.bytes() == 0);
+        }
+
+        // A transaction in a single datagram needs no state
+        {
+            Reassembler r;
+            auto const small = makeTxn(100);
+            auto const d = encodeTxn(slice(small), id2);
+            auto const result =
+                r.add(alice, *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d[0])), now);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(result.status == Status::complete);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(result.txn == small);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
+
+            // ... but must be consistent
+            auto bad = *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d[0]));
+            bad.totalSize += 1;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, bad, now).status == Status::invalid);
+        }
+
+        // Senders are kept apart
+        {
+            Reassembler r;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(bob, f1(2), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(2), now).status == Status::complete);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
+        }
+
+        // A header that disagrees with earlier fragments
+        {
+            Reassembler r;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            auto bad = f1(1);
+            bad.count += 1;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, bad, now).status == Status::invalid);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.bytes() == 0);
+        }
+
+        // More bytes than the advertised total size
+        {
+            Reassembler r;
+            auto first = f1(0);
+            first.count = 2;
+            first.totalSize = maxFragmentPayload + 10;
+            auto second = f1(1);
+            second.count = 2;
+            second.totalSize = first.totalSize;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, first, now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, second, now).status == Status::invalid);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
+        }
+
+        // Every fragment present but fewer bytes than the total size
+        {
+            Reassembler r;
+            auto first = f1(0);
+            first.count = 2;
+            first.totalSize = 2 * maxFragmentPayload + 5;
+            auto second = f1(1);
+            second.count = 2;
+            second.totalSize = first.totalSize;
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, first, now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, second, now).status == Status::invalid);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
+        }
+
+        // Partial transactions time out
+        {
+            Reassembler r(
+                Reassembler::defaultMaxPending,
+                Reassembler::defaultMaxBytes,
+                30s);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::pending);
+
+            // Not yet
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                r.add(bob, f2(0), now + 30s).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
+
+            // Now: the first transaction has to start over
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                r.add(bob, f2(1), now + 31s).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                r.add(alice, f1(2), now + 31s).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
+        }
+
+        // The number of partial transactions is limited
+        {
+            Reassembler r(2, Reassembler::defaultMaxBytes, 30s);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(bob, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(carol, f1(0), now).status == Status::overloaded);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
+
+            // Fragments of transactions already being rebuilt are accepted
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(2), now).status == Status::complete);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(carol, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+        }
+
+        // The number of bytes buffered is limited
+        {
+            Reassembler r(
+                Reassembler::defaultMaxPending,
+                maxFragmentPayload + Reassembler::fragmentOverhead,
+                30s);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::overloaded);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(bob, f1(0), now).status == Status::overloaded);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(
+                r.bytes() ==
+                maxFragmentPayload + Reassembler::fragmentOverhead);
+        }
+    }
+
+public:
+    void
+    run() override
+    {
+        testClassify();
+        testPeers();
+        testTxnEncoding();
+        testTxnDecoding();
+        testReassembly();
+    }
+};
+
+BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(XUSH, overlay, ripple);
+
+}  // namespace test
+}  // namespace ripple

src/test/peerfinder/HighwayPeers_test.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <test/unit_test/SuiteJournal.h>
+#include <xrpld/peerfinder/PeerfinderManager.h>
+#include <xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Tuning.h>
+#include <xrpld/peerfinder/make_Manager.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/BasicConfig.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/insight/NullCollector.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/net/IPAddressConversion.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
+
+#include <boost/asio/io_context.hpp>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <set>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace ripple {
+namespace PeerFinder {
+
+// Tests the UDP Superhighway (XUSH) endpoint set kept by PeerFinder::Manager
+class HighwayPeers_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
+{
+    test::SuiteJournal journal_{"HighwayPeers_test", *this};
+
+    struct Fixture
+    {
+        boost::asio::io_context io;
+        TestStopwatch clock;
+        BasicConfig basicConfig;
+        std::unique_ptr<Manager> manager;
+
+        Fixture(beast::Journal journal, bool enabled, bool peerPrivate)
+            : manager(make_Manager(
+                  io,
+                  clock,
+                  journal,
+                  basicConfig,
+                  beast::insight::NullCollector::New(),
+                  false))
+        {
+            Config config;
+            config.udpHighway = enabled;
+            config.peerPrivate = peerPrivate;
+            manager->setConfig(config);
+        }
+
+        ~Fixture()
+        {
+            manager->stop();
+        }
+    };
+
+    static beast::IP::Endpoint
+    ep(std::string const& s)
+    {
+        return beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string(s);
+    }
+
+    // A distinct public IPv4 endpoint
+    static beast::IP::Endpoint
+    publicEp(std::uint32_t i)
+    {
+        return beast::IP::Endpoint(
+            boost::asio::ip::address_v4(0x2C000000 + i), 51235);
+    }
+
+    static std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>
+    asSet(std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> const& v)
+    {
+        return {v.begin(), v.end()};
+    }
+
+    void
+    testDisabled()
+    {
+        testcase("disabled");
+        Fixture f(journal_, false, false);
+
+        f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.1:51235")});
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
+        f.manager->onRedirects(
+            beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("8.8.4.4:51235")),
+            {beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("1.1.1.1:51235"))});
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).empty());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_adverts(100).empty());
+    }
+
+    void
+    testLearning()
+    {
+        testcase("learning");
+        Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
+
+        // Only valid public endpoints are learned from other servers
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers(
+            {ep("8.8.8.8:51235"),
+             ep("10.0.0.1:51235"),
+             ep("127.0.0.1:51235"),
+             ep("9.9.9.9:0"),
+             ep("0.0.0.0:51235")});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
+            std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
+
+        // Fixed peers are trusted, even with a private address, but they
+        // are never advertised
+        f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
+            (std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{
+                ep("8.8.8.8:51235"), ep("10.0.0.2:51235")}));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            asSet(f.manager->highway_adverts(100)) ==
+            std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
+
+        // A learned endpoint that is later configured as fixed stops being
+        // advertised
+        f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed2", {ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_adverts(100).empty());
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 2);
+
+        // Redirects are learned too
+        f.manager->onRedirects(
+            beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("8.8.4.4:51235")),
+            {beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("1.1.1.1:51235"))});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 3);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testSampling()
+    {
+        testcase("sampling");
+        Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
+
+        std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> endpoints;
+        for (std::uint32_t i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
+            endpoints.push_back(publicEp(i));
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers(endpoints);
+
+        for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i)
+        {
+            auto const targets = f.manager->highway_targets(16);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(targets.size() == 16);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(asSet(targets).size() == 16);
+        }
+
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(1000)) == asSet(endpoints));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(0).empty());
+    }
+
+    void
+    testPrivate()
+    {
+        testcase("private");
+        Fixture f(journal_, true, true);
+
+        f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
+
+        // A private server only talks to its fixed peers, and advertises
+        // nothing
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
+            std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_adverts(100).empty());
+    }
+
+    void
+    testExpiry()
+    {
+        testcase("expiry");
+        using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+        Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
+
+        auto const ttl = Tuning::highwayPeerSecondsToLive;
+        auto const advertised = ep("8.8.8.8:51235");
+        auto const redirected = ep("1.1.1.1:51235");
+        auto const fixed = ep("10.0.0.2:51235");
+
+        f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {fixed});
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers({advertised});
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers({redirected});
+
+        // Advertisements don't extend the life of an entry, but
+        // authenticated sources (here, a redirect) do
+        f.clock.advance(ttl / 2);
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers({advertised, redirected});
+        f.manager->onRedirects(
+            beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("8.8.4.4:51235")),
+            {beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(redirected)});
+
+        f.clock.advance(ttl / 2);
+        f.manager->once_per_second();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 3);
+
+        f.clock.advance(1s);
+        f.manager->once_per_second();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
+            (std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{redirected, fixed}));
+
+        f.clock.advance(ttl / 2);
+        f.manager->once_per_second();
+        BEAST_EXPECT(
+            asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
+            std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{fixed});
+
+        // An expired entry can be learned again
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers({advertised});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 2);
+    }
+
+    void
+    testLimit()
+    {
+        testcase("limit");
+        Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
+
+        auto const max = Tuning::highwayPeersMax;
+
+        std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> endpoints;
+        for (std::uint32_t i = 0; i < max + 100; ++i)
+            endpoints.push_back(publicEp(i));
+        f.manager->add_highway_peers(endpoints);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(max + 100).size() == max);
+
+        // Fixed peers don't count towards the limit
+        f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(max + 100).size() == max + 1);
+
+        // Disabling the highway forgets everything
+        Config config;
+        config.udpHighway = false;
+        f.manager->setConfig(config);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(max + 100).empty());
+    }
+
+public:
+    void
+    run() override
+    {
+        testDisabled();
+        testLearning();
+        testSampling();
+        testPrivate();
+        testExpiry();
+        testLimit();
+    }
+};
+
+BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(HighwayPeers, peerfinder, ripple);
+
+}  // namespace PeerFinder
+}  // namespace ripple

src/test/rpc/HookValidate_test.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <test/jtx.h>
+#include <xrpld/core/Config.h>
+#include <xrpl/hook/Enum.h>
+#include <xrpl/json/to_string.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
+#include <cctype>
+#include <string>
+
+namespace ripple {
+
+// A valid hook exporting both hook() and cbak() (emit test hook).
+static char const validHex[] =
+    "0061736D0100000001250660027F7F017F60037F7F7E017E60017F017E600001"
+    "7E60027F7F017E60047F7F7F7F017E028F010903656E76025F67000003656E76"
+    "06616363657074000103656E760C6574786E5F72657365727665000203656E76"
+    "0A6C65646765725F736571000303656E760C686F6F6B5F6163636F756E740004"
+    "03656E760C6574786E5F64657461696C73000403656E760D6574786E5F666565"
+    "5F62617365000403656E7604656D6974000503656E7608726F6C6C6261636B00"
+    "01030302020205030100020627067F0141908A040B7F0041820A0B7F00418008"
+    "0B7F0041908A040B7F004180080B7F004180080B070F02046362616B00090468"
+    "6F6F6B000A0AA883000299800000410141011080808080001A41004100420010"
+    "81808080000B88830002037F017E23808080800041206B220124808080800041"
+    "0141011080808080001A41011082808080001A4100108380808000A722024105"
+    "6A22034118742003410874418080FC07717220034108764180FE037120034118"
+    "767272360295888080004100200241016A22034118742003410874418080FC07"
+    "717220034108764180FE03712003411876727236028F8880800041C788808000"
+    "41141084808080001A41DB88808000418A011085808080001A41004180888080"
+    "0041E50110868080800022043C00A188808000410020044208883C00A0888080"
+    "00410020044210883C009F88808000410020044218883C009E88808000410020"
+    "044220883C009D88808000410020044228883C009C8880800041002004423088"
+    "3C009B8880800041002004423888A7413F7141C000723A009A88808000024002"
+    "402001412041808880800041E501108780808000427F550D0041E58980800041"
+    "0D42D30010888080800021040C010B41F289808000411042D400108180808000"
+    "21040B200141206A24808080800020040B0B900202004180080BE50112006322"
+    "000000002400000000201A00000000201B000000006840000000000000007321"
+    "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+    "0081140000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+    "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+    "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+    "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+    "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+    "000041E5090B1D456D6974206661696C65642E00456D69742073756363656564"
+    "65642E00";
+
+class HookValidate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
+{
+    static Json::Value
+    call(test::jtx::Env& env, std::string const& code)
+    {
+        Json::Value params(Json::objectValue);
+        params[jss::code] = code;
+        return env.rpc("json", "hook_validate", to_string(params))[jss::result];
+    }
+
+    static std::unique_ptr<Config>
+    withRpc(std::unique_ptr<Config> cfg, bool enabled)
+    {
+        cfg->HOOK_VALIDATE_RPC = enabled;
+        return cfg;
+    }
+
+    void
+    testDisabled()
+    {
+        testcase("Disabled");
+        using namespace test::jtx;
+        Env env{*this, envconfig(withRpc, false)};
+        auto const r = call(env, validHex);
+        BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "notSupported");
+    }
+
+    void
+    testParams()
+    {
+        testcase("Parameter validation");
+        using namespace test::jtx;
+        Env env{*this, envconfig(withRpc, true)};
+
+        {
+            // missing code
+            auto const r = env.rpc("json", "hook_validate", "{}")[jss::result];
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
+        }
+        {
+            // code not a string
+            auto const r =
+                env.rpc("json", "hook_validate", "{\"code\": 1}")[jss::result];
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
+        }
+        {
+            // empty, odd-length and non-hex input
+            for (auto const& bad : {"", "0", "0061736Z"})
+            {
+                auto const r = call(env, bad);
+                BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
+            }
+        }
+        {
+            // one byte over the maximum hook size
+            auto const r =
+                call(env, std::string(2 * (hook::maxHookWasmSize() + 1), '0'));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testValidate()
+    {
+        testcase("Validate");
+        using namespace test::jtx;
+        Env env{*this, envconfig(withRpc, true)};
+
+        {
+            auto const r = call(env, validHex);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == true);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.isMember(jss::instruction_count_hook));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r.isMember(jss::instruction_count_cbak));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!r.isMember(jss::vm_error));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::log].isArray());
+        }
+        {
+            // the lowercase hex the toolchains emit is accepted too
+            std::string lower = validHex;
+            for (auto& c : lower)
+                c = std::tolower(static_cast<unsigned char>(c));
+            auto const r = call(env, lower);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == true);
+        }
+        {
+            // not webassembly
+            auto const r = call(env, std::string(140, '0'));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == false);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(!r.isMember(jss::instruction_count_hook));
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::log].isArray() && r[jss::log].size() > 0);
+        }
+        {
+            std::string bad = validHex;
+            bad[2] = 'F';  // corrupt magic header
+            auto const r = call(env, bad);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == false);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::log].isArray() && r[jss::log].size() > 0);
+        }
+        {
+            // truncated module
+            std::string const truncated = std::string(validHex).substr(0, 200);
+            auto const r = call(env, truncated);
+            BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == false);
+        }
+    }
+
+    void
+    testConfigDefault()
+    {
+        testcase("Config default");
+        auto load = [](bool standalone, char const* content) {
+            Config cfg;
+            cfg.setupControl(true, true, standalone);
+            cfg.loadFromString(content);
+            return cfg.HOOK_VALIDATE_RPC;
+        };
+        BEAST_EXPECT(load(true, ""));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!load(true, "[hook_validate_rpc]\n0\n"));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(!load(false, ""));
+        BEAST_EXPECT(load(false, "[hook_validate_rpc]\n1\n"));
+    }
+
+    void
+    run() override
+    {
+        testConfigDefault();
+        testDisabled();
+        testParams();
+        testValidate();
+    }
+};
+
+BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(HookValidate, rpc, ripple);
+
+}  // namespace ripple

src/test/rpc/RPCCall_test.cpp

@@ -2998,6 +2998,50 @@ static RPCCallTestData const rpcCallTestArray[] = {
      RPCCallTestData::bad_cast,
      R"()"},
 
+    // hook_validate
+    // ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    {"hook_validate: minimal.",
+     __LINE__,
+     {"hook_validate", "0061736D01000000"},
+     RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
+     R"({
+    "method" : "hook_validate",
+    "params" : [
+      {
+         "api_version" : %API_VER%,
+         "code" : "0061736D01000000"
+      }
+    ]
+    })"},
+    {"hook_validate: too few arguments.",
+     __LINE__,
+     {"hook_validate"},
+     RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
+     R"({
+    "method" : "hook_validate",
+    "params" : [
+      {
+         "error" : "badSyntax",
+         "error_code" : 1,
+         "error_message" : "Syntax error."
+      }
+    ]
+    })"},
+    {"hook_validate: too many arguments.",
+     __LINE__,
+     {"hook_validate", "00", "00"},
+     RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
+     R"({
+    "method" : "hook_validate",
+    "params" : [
+      {
+         "error" : "badSyntax",
+         "error_code" : 1,
+         "error_message" : "Syntax error."
+      }
+    ]
+    })"},
+
     // json
     // ------------------------------------------------------------------------
     {"json: minimal.",

src/test/server/Server_test.cpp

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
 #include <boost/utility/in_place_factory.hpp>
 
 #include <chrono>
+#include <condition_variable>
+#include <mutex>
 #include <optional>
 #include <stdexcept>
 #include <thread>
@@ -158,6 +160,7 @@ public:
         onUDPMessage(
             std::string const& message,
             boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint const& remoteEndpoint,
+            Port const& port,
             std::function<void(std::string const&)> sendResponse)
         {
         }
@@ -371,6 +374,7 @@ public:
             onUDPMessage(
                 std::string const& message,
                 boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint const& remoteEndpoint,
+                Port const& port,
                 std::function<void(std::string const&)> sendResponse)
             {
             }
@@ -404,6 +408,96 @@ public:
         pass();
     }
 
+    // Records the datagrams delivered to onUDPMessage
+    struct UDPHandler : TestHandler
+    {
+        std::mutex mutex;
+        std::condition_variable cv;
+        std::vector<std::pair<std::string, bool>> received;
+
+        void
+        onUDPMessage(
+            std::string const& message,
+            boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint const& remoteEndpoint,
+            Port const& port,
+            std::function<void(std::string const&)> sendResponse)
+        {
+            std::lock_guard lock(mutex);
+            received.emplace_back(message, port.has_peer());
+            cv.notify_all();
+        }
+
+        bool
+        wait(std::size_t count, std::chrono::milliseconds timeout)
+        {
+            std::unique_lock lock(mutex);
+            return cv.wait_for(
+                lock, timeout, [&] { return received.size() >= count; });
+        }
+    };
+
+    // A peer port with udp_highway set also accepts UDP datagrams on the
+    // same port number; one without it does not.
+    void
+    udpHighwayTests()
+    {
+        testcase("UDP Superhighway door");
+        using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+        using udp = boost::asio::ip::udp;
+
+        TestSink sink{*this};
+        TestThread thread;
+        sink.threshold(beast::severities::Severity::kAll);
+        beast::Journal journal{sink};
+
+        auto const addr = boost::asio::ip::make_address(getEnvLocalhostAddr());
+
+        auto run = [&](bool highway) {
+            UDPHandler handler;
+            auto s = make_Server(handler, thread.get_io_context(), journal);
+
+            std::vector<Port> ports(1);
+            ports.back().name = "peer";
+            ports.back().ip = addr;
+            ports.back().port = 0;
+            ports.back().protocol.insert("peer");
+            ports.back().udp_highway = highway;
+
+            auto const eps = s->ports(ports);
+            if (!BEAST_EXPECT(eps.size() == 1))
+                return;
+
+            // The TCP door picked the port number; the UDP door shares it.
+            auto const port = eps.begin()->second.port();
+            BEAST_EXPECT(port != 0);
+
+            boost::asio::io_context io;
+            udp::socket client(io, udp::endpoint(addr, 0));
+            std::string const message = "XUSHTEST";
+            client.send_to(
+                boost::asio::buffer(message), udp::endpoint(addr, port));
+
+            if (highway)
+            {
+                if (BEAST_EXPECT(handler.wait(1, 5s)))
+                {
+                    std::lock_guard lock(handler.mutex);
+                    BEAST_EXPECT(handler.received.front().first == message);
+                    BEAST_EXPECT(handler.received.front().second);
+                }
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                BEAST_EXPECT(!handler.wait(1, 200ms));
+            }
+
+            s = nullptr;
+        };
+
+        run(true);
+        run(false);
+    }
+
     void
     testBadConfig()
     {
@@ -547,6 +641,7 @@ public:
     {
         basicTests();
         stressTest();
+        udpHighwayTests();
         testBadConfig();
     }
 };

src/xrpld/app/consensus/RCLConsensus.cpp

@@ -41,8 +41,11 @@
 #include <xrpl/basics/random.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/core/LexicalCast.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/utility/rngfill.h>
+#include <xrpl/crypto/csprng.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/digest.h>
 
 #include <algorithm>
@@ -348,6 +351,10 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
             make_shamapitem(tx.first->getTransactionID(), s.slice()));
     }
 
+    // featureRNG: our entropy contribution, if we add one. It is not tracked
+    // by the censorship detector: it is only valid for this ledger.
+    std::optional<uint256> entropyTxID;
+
     // Keep enough validation history for the next flag ledger's score table
     // even when we don't vote this round (not proposing / wrong LCL).
     // Otherwise toKeep_ goes stale, validations older than
@@ -389,6 +396,26 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
                 app_.getValidations(),
                 initialSet);
         }
+
+        // featureRNG: our entropy contribution goes into our own initial
+        // position, never the open ledger, so it only becomes public once our
+        // transaction set for this ledger is fixed.
+        if (prevLedger->rules().enabled(featureRNG))
+        {
+            if (auto const entropyTx = makeEntropyTx(prevLedger))
+            {
+                Serializer s;
+                entropyTx->add(s);
+                entropyTxID = entropyTx->getTransactionID();
+                if (!initialSet->addItem(
+                        SHAMapNodeType::tnTRANSACTION_NM,
+                        make_shamapitem(*entropyTxID, s.slice())))
+                {
+                    entropyTxID.reset();
+                    JLOG(j_.warn()) << "RNG: failed to add entropy txn";
+                }
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     // Now we need an immutable snapshot
@@ -400,9 +427,10 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
         RCLCensorshipDetector<TxID, LedgerIndex>::TxIDSeqVec proposed;
 
         initialSet->visitLeaves(
-            [&proposed,
-             seq](boost::intrusive_ptr<SHAMapItem const> const& item) {
-                proposed.emplace_back(item->key(), seq);
+            [&proposed, &entropyTxID, seq](
+                boost::intrusive_ptr<SHAMapItem const> const& item) {
+                if (item->key() != entropyTxID)
+                    proposed.emplace_back(item->key(), seq);
             });
 
         censorshipDetector_.propose(std::move(proposed));
@@ -422,6 +450,99 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
             validatorKeys_.nodeID}};
 }
 
+std::optional<STTx>
+RCLConsensus::Adaptor::makeEntropyTx(
+    std::shared_ptr<Ledger const> const& prevLedger)
+{
+    if (!validatorKeys_.keys)
+        return std::nullopt;
+
+    auto const& masterKey = validatorKeys_.keys->masterPublicKey;
+
+    // The commitment the ledger currently holds for us, if any.
+    std::optional<uint256> commitment;
+    if (auto const sle = prevLedger->read(keylet::random()))
+    {
+        for (auto const& entry : sle->getFieldArray(sfRandomDigests))
+        {
+            if (makeSlice(entry.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey)) == masterKey.slice())
+            {
+                commitment = entry.getFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // We only ever hold the secret from our last contribution, which has
+    // never been published. Reveal it iff the ledger holds its commitment.
+    // Otherwise (first contribution, restart, or our last contribution was
+    // not included) we only commit this time, and our previous secret,
+    // whatever became of it, is never used again.
+    std::optional<uint256> reveal;
+    if (commitment && rngSecret_ && rngSecret_->first == *commitment)
+        reveal = rngSecret_->second;
+
+    uint256 secret;
+    beast::rngfill(secret.begin(), secret.size(), crypto_prng());
+    uint256 const nextCommitment = sha512Half(secret);
+    rngSecret_.emplace(nextCommitment, secret);
+
+    auto const seq = prevLedger->info().seq + 1;
+
+    JLOG(j_.debug()) << "RNG: entropy txn for ledger " << seq
+                     << (reveal ? " (reveal and commit)" : " (commit only)");
+
+    return STTx(ttENTROPY, [&](auto& obj) {
+        obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, seq);
+        obj.setFieldVL(sfPublicKey, masterKey.slice());
+        obj.setFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest, nextCommitment);
+        if (reveal)
+            obj.setFieldH256(sfRandomData, *reveal);
+    });
+}
+
+std::optional<NodeID>
+RCLConsensus::Adaptor::forcedTxOwner(
+    RCLCxTx const& tx,
+    RCLCxLedger const& prevLedger) const
+{
+    if (!prevLedger.ledger_ || !prevLedger.ledger_->rules().enabled(featureRNG))
+        return std::nullopt;
+
+    try
+    {
+        SerialIter sit(tx.tx_->slice());
+        STTx const stx(sit);
+
+        if (stx.getTxnType() != ttENTROPY ||
+            stx.getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence) != prevLedger.seq() + 1)
+            return std::nullopt;
+
+        auto const pk = stx.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey);
+        if (!publicKeyType(makeSlice(pk)))
+            return std::nullopt;
+
+        // Only the exact bytes makeEntropyTx would build, so an owner cannot
+        // force extra fields (memos and the like) in with its contribution.
+        STTx const canonical(ttENTROPY, [&](auto& obj) {
+            obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, prevLedger.seq() + 1);
+            obj.setFieldVL(sfPublicKey, pk);
+            obj.setFieldH256(
+                sfNextRandomDigest, stx.getFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest));
+            if (stx.isFieldPresent(sfRandomData))
+                obj.setFieldH256(sfRandomData, stx.getFieldH256(sfRandomData));
+        });
+        if (canonical.getTransactionID() != tx.id())
+            return std::nullopt;
+
+        return calcNodeID(PublicKey(makeSlice(pk)));
+    }
+    catch (std::exception const&)
+    {
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+}
+
 void
 RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onForceAccept(
     Result const& result,

src/xrpld/app/consensus/RCLConsensus.h

@@ -34,10 +34,12 @@
 #include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/RippleLedgerHash.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STValidation.h>
 #include <atomic>
 #include <memory>
 #include <mutex>
+#include <optional>
 #include <set>
 #include <sstream>
 #include <string>
@@ -91,6 +93,11 @@ class RCLConsensus
         RCLCensorshipDetector<TxID, LedgerIndex> censorshipDetector_;
         NegativeUNLVote nUnlVote_;
 
+        // featureRNG: the secret behind the commitment in our most recent
+        // entropy contribution, as {commitment, secret}. Only touched by
+        // onClose, which runs under the consensus lock.
+        std::optional<std::pair<uint256, uint256>> rngSecret_;
+
     public:
         using Ledger_t = RCLCxLedger;
         using NodeID_t = NodeID;
@@ -182,7 +189,23 @@ class RCLConsensus
             return parms_;
         }
 
+        /** featureRNG: if tx is a validator's entropy contribution for the
+            ledger after prevLedger, the NodeID of that validator.
+
+            Consensus votes for such a transaction while it is in its owner's
+            own position during the opening window of the establish phase.
+        */
+        std::optional<NodeID>
+        forcedTxOwner(RCLCxTx const& tx, RCLCxLedger const& prevLedger) const;
+
     private:
+        /** featureRNG: build our entropy contribution for the ledger after
+            prevLedger, revealing our previous secret if the ledger holds its
+            commitment, and committing to a fresh one.
+        */
+        std::optional<STTx>
+        makeEntropyTx(std::shared_ptr<Ledger const> const& prevLedger);
+
         //---------------------------------------------------------------------
         // The following members implement the generic Consensus requirements
         // and are marked private to indicate ONLY Consensus<Adaptor> will call

src/xrpld/app/consensus/RCLValidations.cpp

@@ -23,17 +23,22 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerMaster.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/main/Application.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/HashRouter.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/ValidatorList.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/rdb/Wallet.h>
 #include <xrpld/consensus/LedgerTiming.h>
 #include <xrpld/core/JobQueue.h>
 #include <xrpld/core/TimeKeeper.h>
+#include <xrpld/overlay/Overlay.h>
+#include <xrpld/overlay/predicates.h>
 #include <xrpld/perflog/PerfLog.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/StringUtilities.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/messages.h>
 #include <memory>
 #include <mutex>
 #include <thread>
@@ -167,6 +172,40 @@ RCLValidationsAdaptor::acquire(LedgerHash const& hash)
     return RCLValidatedLedger(std::move(ledger), j_);
 }
 
+namespace {
+
+/** Announce a manifest the cache accepted other than from peer gossip.
+
+    Not to the peers it was held back from: OverlayImpl::onManifests records
+    each of them against the manifest's hash.
+*/
+void
+relayManifest(Application& app, Manifest const& manifest)
+{
+    app.getOPs().pubManifest(manifest);
+
+    // As OverlayImpl::onManifests does for gossip it accepts directly.
+    if (app.validators().listed(manifest.masterKey))
+    {
+        auto db = app.getWalletDB().checkoutDb();
+        addValidatorManifest(*db, manifest.serialized);
+    }
+
+    auto const toSkip = app.getHashRouter().shouldRelay(manifest.hash());
+    if (!toSkip)
+        return;
+
+    protocol::TMManifests tm;
+    tm.add_list()->set_stobject(
+        manifest.serialized.data(), manifest.serialized.size());
+
+    app.overlay().foreach(send_if_not(
+        std::make_shared<Message>(tm, protocol::mtMANIFESTS),
+        peer_in_set(*toSkip)));
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
 void
 handleNewValidation(
     Application& app,
@@ -191,13 +230,29 @@ handleNewValidation(
     // Resolving now also means this validation is classified in the round it
     // arrived in rather than written off along with every other one until the
     // trusted set is next recomputed.
-    if (app.validatorManifests().getMasterKey(signingKey) == signingKey)
+    auto& manifests = app.validatorManifests();
+
+    std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> view;
+    if (manifests.getMasterKey(signingKey) == signingKey)
     {
-        if (auto const view = app.openLedger().current();
-            view && view->rules().enabled(featureOnChainManifests))
-            app.validatorManifests().applyLedgerSigningKey(*view, signingKey);
+        view = app.openLedger().current();
+        if (view && !view->rules().enabled(featureOnChainManifests))
+            view.reset();
     }
 
+    // Every caller has verified this validation's signature and found it
+    // current, so its ephemeral key is live. That is what admits a manifest
+    // gossiped for the key, and what keeps the manifest it belongs to from
+    // being evicted. A manifest that arrived before the key was ever seen is
+    // released here, and relayed: the peers that held it back are waiting on
+    // the same validation.
+    if (auto const released = manifests.noteValidation(signingKey, view.get()))
+        relayManifest(app, *released);
+
+    // The ledger tier's miss path.
+    if (view && manifests.getMasterKey(signingKey) == signingKey)
+        manifests.applyLedgerSigningKey(*view, signingKey);
+
     // Ensure validation is marked as trusted if signer currently trusted
     auto masterKey = app.validators().getTrustedKey(signingKey);
 

src/xrpld/app/hook/HookAPI.h

@@ -491,6 +491,16 @@ public:
     Expected<uint256, HookReturnCode>
     ledger_nonce() const;
 
+    /// RNG APIs (featureRNG)
+
+    // A uniform integer in [0, sides).
+    Expected<uint64_t, HookReturnCode>
+    dice(uint32_t sides) const;
+
+    // len (1 to 512) random bytes.
+    Expected<Bytes, HookReturnCode>
+    util_random(uint32_t len) const;
+
     Expected<Keylet, HookReturnCode>
     ledger_keylet(Keylet const& klLo, Keylet const& klHi) const;
 
@@ -630,6 +640,10 @@ private:
         Rules const& rules,
         int recursion_depth = 0)  // used internally
         const;
+
+    // featureRNG: advance the ledger's RNG state and return one output block.
+    Expected<uint256, HookReturnCode>
+    rng_next() const;
 };
 
 }  // namespace hook

src/xrpld/app/hook/applyHook.h

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ bool
 canHook(
     STTx const& tx,
     ripple::uint256 hookOn,
-    std::optional<ripple::Slice> hookName);
+    std::optional<ripple::Blob> hookName);
 
 bool
 canEmit(ripple::TxType txType, ripple::uint256 hookCanEmit);
@@ -129,7 +129,11 @@ apply(
     uint32_t wasmParam,
     uint8_t hookChainPosition,
     // result of apply() if this is weak exec
-    std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta);
+    std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta,
+    // fix20261005: the original emitted transaction for a ttEMIT_FAILURE
+    // callback, captured before the cleanup pseudo removed its
+    // ltEMITTED_TXN entry. Ignored before the fix.
+    std::optional<ripple::STObject> const& emitFailureTxn = std::nullopt);
 
 struct HookContext;
 
@@ -207,6 +211,7 @@ struct HookContext
     uint16_t emit_nonce_counter{
         0};  // incremented whenever nonce is called to ensure unique nonces
     uint16_t ledger_nonce_counter{0};
+    uint16_t rng_draws{0};  // featureRNG: dice/random calls this execution
     int64_t expected_etxn_count{-1};  // make this a 64bit int so the uint32
                                       // from the hookapi cant overflow it
     std::map<ripple::uint256, bool> nonce_used{};

src/xrpld/app/hook/detail/HookAPI.cpp

@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/TransactionMaster.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Import.h>
+#include <xrpld/ledger/ApplyViewImpl.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STParsedJSON.h>
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <limits>
 
 namespace hook {
 
@@ -1581,6 +1584,18 @@ HookAPI::otxn_field(uint32_t field_id) const
     if (fieldType == sfInvalid)
         return Unexpected(INVALID_FIELD);
 
+    // fix20261005: on an emit failure callback the field is read from the
+    // original emitted transaction, so check presence there rather than on
+    // the ttEMIT_FAILURE pseudo (which carries sfLedgerSequence and
+    // sfTransactionHash the emitted txn lacks, and lacks most of its fields).
+    if (hookCtx.emitFailure &&
+        hookCtx.applyCtx.view().rules().enabled(fix20261005))
+    {
+        if (!hookCtx.emitFailure->isFieldPresent(fieldType))
+            return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
+        return &hookCtx.emitFailure->getField(fieldType);
+    }
+
     if (!hookCtx.applyCtx.tx.isFieldPresent(fieldType))
         return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
 
@@ -1895,6 +1910,147 @@ HookAPI::ledger_nonce() const
     return hash;
 }
 
+// featureRNG
+//
+// The ledger's RNG state lives in the Random object. The ttENTROPY
+// transactions applied at the start of the ledger seed it from validator
+// reveals; after that every draw from any Hook replaces it with
+// H(step, state). So the state iterates between API calls, between Hook
+// executions and between transactions, including transactions that end in a
+// tec: ApplyContext::discard keeps the advance, so a rollback cannot preserve
+// an RNG state for whatever executes next.
+//
+// No Hook can read the state, so none can work out what a later draw will
+// return, even one that ran earlier in the same transaction: slot_set and
+// ledger_keylet refuse the Random object, slot_set refuses ttENTROPY
+// transactions, the object is left out of provisional metadata (meta_slot),
+// and its state and commitment fields are never written to any metadata.
+//
+// Each draw returns H(output, state, txid, hook account, hook hash, chain
+// position, strong, callback, wasm param). Those extra inputs keep outputs
+// distinct for different executions even if they somehow saw the same state.
+//
+// The state the transaction's first draw saw is written to the transaction's
+// final metadata (sfRandomData), never its provisional metadata.
+Expected<uint256, HookReturnCode>
+HookAPI::rng_next() const
+{
+    static constexpr std::uint32_t rngOutputTag = 0x524E474F;  // 'RNGO'
+    static constexpr std::uint32_t rngStepTag = 0x524E4749;    // 'RNGI'
+
+    auto& applyCtx = hookCtx.applyCtx;
+    auto& view = applyCtx.view();
+
+    if (!view.rules().enabled(featureRNG))
+        return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
+
+    if (hookCtx.rng_draws >= hook_api::max_rng_draws)
+        return Unexpected(TOO_MANY_NONCES);
+
+    auto sle = view.peek(keylet::random());
+    if (!sle)
+        return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
+
+    // A closed ledger may only draw on its own seed. Open ledger application
+    // is a preview, so it may run on the last closed ledger's state; the
+    // final result is decided when the ledger closes.
+    auto const seq = view.seq();
+    auto const seededFor = sle->getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence);
+    if (seededFor != seq && !(view.open() && seededFor + 1 == seq))
+        return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
+
+    // At least 80% of the UNLReport must have contributed (at least one
+    // validator if there is no UNLReport). Both fields are 16 bits on the
+    // ledger; they are widened here so the scaled comparison cannot overflow.
+    std::uint32_t const count = sle->getFieldU16(sfEntropyCount);
+    std::uint32_t const denominator = sle->getFieldU16(sfEntropyDenominator);
+    if (count == 0 || count * 5 < denominator * 4)
+        return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
+
+    uint256 const state = sle->getFieldH256(sfRandomData);
+
+    if (auto* avi = dynamic_cast<ApplyViewImpl*>(&view))
+        avi->setRandomData(state);
+
+    auto const& hr = hookCtx.result;
+    uint256 const out = ripple::sha512Half(
+        rngOutputTag,
+        state,
+        applyCtx.tx.getTransactionID(),
+        hr.account,
+        hr.hookHash,
+        static_cast<std::uint8_t>(hr.hookChainPosition),
+        static_cast<std::uint8_t>(hr.isStrong ? 1 : 0),
+        static_cast<std::uint8_t>(hr.isCallback ? 1 : 0),
+        hr.wasmParam);
+
+    sle->setFieldH256(sfRandomData, ripple::sha512Half(rngStepTag, state));
+    view.update(sle);
+
+    ++hookCtx.rng_draws;
+    return out;
+}
+
+Expected<uint64_t, HookReturnCode>
+HookAPI::dice(uint32_t sides) const
+{
+    if (sides == 0)
+        return Unexpected(INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+
+    auto block = rng_next();
+    if (!block)
+        return Unexpected(block.error());
+
+    // Rejection sampling over big-endian 64-bit words, so every side is
+    // exactly equally likely. A word is rejected with probability below
+    // 2^-32, so the bound on blocks is never reached in practice; it only
+    // keeps the loop finite.
+    std::uint64_t const max = std::numeric_limits<std::uint64_t>::max();
+    std::uint64_t const excess = (max % sides + 1) % sides;  // 2^64 mod sides
+    std::uint64_t word = 0;
+    uint256 b = *block;
+    for (int i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+    {
+        for (std::size_t w = 0; w < 4; ++w)
+        {
+            word = 0;
+            for (std::size_t k = 0; k < 8; ++k)
+                word = (word << 8) | b.data()[w * 8 + k];
+            if (word <= max - excess)
+                return word % sides;
+        }
+        b = ripple::sha512Half(b);
+    }
+    return word % sides;
+}
+
+Expected<Bytes, HookReturnCode>
+HookAPI::util_random(uint32_t len) const
+{
+    if (len == 0)
+        return Unexpected(TOO_SMALL);
+
+    if (len > 512)
+        return Unexpected(TOO_BIG);
+
+    auto block = rng_next();
+    if (!block)
+        return Unexpected(block.error());
+
+    Bytes out;
+    out.reserve(len);
+    uint256 b = *block;
+    while (true)
+    {
+        auto const n = std::min<std::size_t>(32, len - out.size());
+        out.insert(out.end(), b.data(), b.data() + n);
+        if (out.size() >= len)
+            break;
+        b = ripple::sha512Half(b);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
 Expected<Keylet, HookReturnCode>
 HookAPI::ledger_keylet(Keylet const& klLo, Keylet const& klHi) const
 {
@@ -1905,6 +2061,10 @@ HookAPI::ledger_keylet(Keylet const& klLo, Keylet const& klHi) const
     std::optional<ripple::uint256> found =
         hookCtx.applyCtx.view().succ(klLo.key, klHi.key.next());
 
+    // featureRNG: the RNG object is invisible to Hooks, even by key.
+    if (found && *found == keylet::random().key)
+        found = hookCtx.applyCtx.view().succ(*found, klHi.key.next());
+
     if (!found)
         return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
 
@@ -2149,6 +2309,12 @@ HookAPI::slot_set(Bytes const& data, uint32_t slot_no) const
         if (kl->key == beast::zero)
             return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
 
+        // featureRNG: the RNG state must never be readable by a Hook, or an
+        // earlier Hook could compute what later draws will return. Matched on
+        // the key because a Hook-supplied keylet type can be ltANY.
+        if (kl->key == keylet::random().key)
+            return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
+
         auto const sle = hookCtx.applyCtx.view().read(*kl);
         if (!sle)
             return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
@@ -2172,6 +2338,11 @@ HookAPI::slot_set(Bytes const& data, uint32_t slot_no) const
             slot_value = p->first->getSTransaction();
         else
             return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
+
+        // featureRNG: validator reveals are never readable by Hooks.
+        if (*slot_value &&
+            (*slot_value)->getFieldU16(sfTransactionType) == ttENTROPY)
+            return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
     }
     else
         return Unexpected(INVALID_ARGUMENT);
@@ -2828,11 +2999,19 @@ HookAPI::set_state_cache(
         if (availableForReserves < hookStateScale && modified)
             return Unexpected(RESERVE_INSUFFICIENT);
 
+        // Prior to fix20261005 the first-account branch charged write
+        // resources (a state modification, a reserve slot and, if needed, a
+        // namespace slot) even when the entry was only being read into the
+        // cache (modified == false). Every other branch only charges for
+        // writes. With the fix, reads into the cache are free; a later write
+        // of the same key is charged by the existing-key branch below.
+        bool const chargeWrite = modified || !view.rules().enabled(fix20261005);
+
         int64_t namespaceCount = accSLE->isFieldPresent(sfHookNamespaces)
             ? accSLE->getFieldV256(sfHookNamespaces).size()
             : 0;
 
-        if (createNamespace)
+        if (createNamespace && chargeWrite)
         {
             // overflow should never ever happen but check anyway
             if (namespaceCount + 1 < namespaceCount)
@@ -2842,15 +3021,20 @@ HookAPI::set_state_cache(
                 return Unexpected(TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES);
         }
 
-        stateMap.modified_entry_count++;
+        if (chargeWrite)
+        {
+            stateMap.modified_entry_count++;
 
-        // sanity check
-        if (view.rules().enabled(featureExtendedHookState) &&
-            availableForReserves < hookStateScale)
-            return Unexpected(INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            // sanity check
+            if (view.rules().enabled(featureExtendedHookState) &&
+                availableForReserves < hookStateScale)
+                return Unexpected(INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+            availableForReserves -= hookStateScale;
+        }
 
         stateMap[acc] = {
-            availableForReserves - hookStateScale,
+            availableForReserves,
             namespaceCount,
             hookStateScale,
             {{ns, {{key, {modified, data}}}}}};

src/xrpld/app/hook/detail/applyHook.cpp

@@ -558,7 +558,8 @@ getTransactionalStakeHolders(STTx const& tx, ReadView const& rv)
         case ttFEE:
         case ttUNL_MODIFY:
         case ttEMIT_FAILURE:
-        case ttUNL_REPORT: {
+        case ttUNL_REPORT:
+        case ttENTROPY: {
             break;
         }
         default: {
@@ -813,7 +814,7 @@ bool
 hook::canHook(
     STTx const& tx,
     ripple::uint256 hookOn,
-    std::optional<ripple::Slice> hookName)
+    std::optional<ripple::Blob> hookName)
 {
     if (!canHookTT(tx.getTxnType(), hookOn))
         return false;
@@ -827,7 +828,7 @@ hook::canHook(
         // transaction, so we can't hook without the hook name
         return false;
 
-    return tx[sfHookName] == *hookName;
+    return tx.getFieldVL(sfHookName) == *hookName;
 }
 
 ripple::uint256
@@ -1041,8 +1042,29 @@ hook::apply(
     bool isStrong,
     uint32_t wasmParam,
     uint8_t hookChainPosition,
-    std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta)
+    std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta,
+    std::optional<ripple::STObject> const& emitFailureTxn)
 {
+    std::optional<ripple::STObject> emitFailure;
+    if (isCallback && (wasmParam & 1))
+    {
+        if (applyCtx.view().rules().enabled(fix20261005))
+        {
+            // fix20261005: by the time the callback runs the ttEMIT_FAILURE
+            // pseudo has already erased the ltEMITTED_TXN entry from this
+            // view, so it can't be read back here. The caller captures the
+            // original emitted transaction before base application.
+            emitFailure = emitFailureTxn;
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            // pre-fix: reads the entry the pseudo has already erased
+            emitFailure = (*(applyCtx.view().peek(keylet::emittedTxn(
+                               applyCtx.tx.getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash)))))
+                              .downcast<STObject>();
+        }
+    }
+
     HookContext hookCtx = {
         .applyCtx = applyCtx,
         // we will return this context object (RVO / move constructed)
@@ -1074,12 +1096,7 @@ hook::apply(
              .foreignStateSetDisabled = false,
              .provisionalMeta = provisionalMeta,
              .foreignStateGrantCache = {}},
-        .emitFailure = isCallback && wasmParam & 1
-            ? std::optional<ripple::STObject>(
-                  (*(applyCtx.view().peek(keylet::emittedTxn(
-                       applyCtx.tx.getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash)))))
-                      .downcast<STObject>())
-            : std::optional<ripple::STObject>(),
+        .emitFailure = std::move(emitFailure),
         .module = nullptr,
         .api_ = nullptr};
 
@@ -2866,6 +2883,49 @@ DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(
     HOOK_TEARDOWN();
 }
 
+// featureRNG: a uniform integer in [0, sides)
+DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(int64_t, dice, uint32_t sides)
+{
+    HOOK_SETUP();
+
+    auto const result = api.dice(sides);
+    if (!result)
+        return result.error();
+
+    return result.value();
+
+    HOOK_TEARDOWN();
+}
+
+// featureRNG: write_len (1 to 512) random bytes
+DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(
+    int64_t,
+    util_random,
+    uint32_t write_ptr,
+    uint32_t write_len)
+{
+    HOOK_SETUP();
+
+    if (NOT_IN_BOUNDS(write_ptr, write_len, memory_length))
+        return OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
+
+    auto const result = api.util_random(write_len);
+    if (!result)
+        return result.error();
+
+    auto const& bytes = result.value();
+
+    WRITE_WASM_MEMORY_AND_RETURN(
+        write_ptr,
+        write_len,
+        bytes.data(),
+        bytes.size(),
+        memory,
+        memory_length);
+
+    HOOK_TEARDOWN();
+}
+
 DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(
     int64_t,
     ledger_keylet,

src/xrpld/app/ledger/InboundLedger.h

@@ -25,7 +25,11 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/main/Application.h>
 #include <xrpld/overlay/PeerSet.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/CountedObject.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
+#include <atomic>
 #include <mutex>
+#include <optional>
 #include <set>
 #include <utility>
 
@@ -175,6 +179,36 @@ private:
     clock_type::time_point mLastAction;
 
     std::shared_ptr<Ledger> mLedger;
+
+    /** Whether this ledger is to be read for manifests as soon as it can be:
+        early, before the rest of the state map, if [early_manifest_sync]
+        allows, and otherwise once it is complete. */
+    bool
+    wantManifests();
+
+    /** Read the manifests from the ledger, now that they can be.
+
+        Dispatches the read at most once per ledger, however many paths reach
+        here.
+
+        @param listed Master keys to read by key, whether or not the part of
+            the directory read lists them. If unseated, the master keys on the
+            validator lists are collected in the job, so that a caller holding
+            mtx_ need not take the validator list's lock.
+        @param maxPages Most manifest directory pages to read
+    */
+    void
+    syncManifests(
+        std::optional<hash_set<PublicKey>> listed,
+        std::uint64_t maxPages);
+
+    /** The manifests have been read, or are being, from this ledger.
+
+        Atomic because done() can be reached from trigger() after it has
+        released mtx_.
+    */
+    std::atomic<bool> mManifestsSynced{false};
+
     bool mHaveHeader;
     bool mHaveState;
     bool mHaveTransactions;

src/xrpld/app/ledger/ManifestSync.h

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#ifndef RIPPLE_APP_LEDGER_MANIFESTSYNC_H_INCLUDED
+#define RIPPLE_APP_LEDGER_MANIFESTSYNC_H_INCLUDED
+
+#include <xrpld/shamap/SHAMap.h>
+#include <xrpld/shamap/SHAMapNodeID.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
+
+#include <cstddef>
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace ripple {
+
+/** Manifest directory pages read while a ledger is still being acquired.
+
+    Enough entries to fill the manifest cache's ledger tier, which is all a
+    bulk read of the directory can admit. The master keys a node actually
+    depends on are fetched by key instead, wherever they are listed, so a
+    directory grown long by anyone able to fund an account cannot make the
+    early phase of a sync arbitrarily long.
+*/
+std::uint64_t constexpr manifestSyncPages = 16;
+
+/** The nodes a partly synced state map still needs to read its manifests.
+
+    Walks the manifest directory as far as the nodes held allow: the root page;
+    every other page, all at once, since the root names the last of them and
+    pages are only ever added after it; each master object listed; and the
+    ephemeral object each unrevoked one names, which is what a validation is
+    resolved through. Where a key cannot be read, the first node on its path
+    that is not held is reported, once however many keys it blocks.
+
+    Asking peers for the nodes reported and calling again converges in a
+    handful of rounds -- roughly the depth of the map plus one round each for
+    the pages and for the objects they list -- on a set of nodes far smaller
+    than the map. After that every read forEachLedgerManifest() and
+    ManifestCache::applyLedgerDirectory() make succeeds on the partial map.
+
+    A map with no manifest directory converges on the path to where its root
+    would be, and nothing else.
+
+    @param stateMap State map, with at least its root node
+    @param max Most nodes to report
+    @param keys Further keys to read, with the ephemeral object any manifest
+        among them names: in practice keylet::manifest() of each master key on
+        the node's validator lists, which needs no directory to find
+    @param maxPages Most directory pages to read, the root page included
+
+    @return nodes needed, as getMissingNodes() reports them; empty once every
+        manifest can be read
+*/
+std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>>
+missingManifestNodes(
+    SHAMap const& stateMap,
+    std::size_t max,
+    std::vector<uint256> const& keys = {},
+    std::uint64_t maxPages = dirNodeMaxPages);
+
+/** Ledgers to read manifests from, chosen by how many peers report them.
+
+    A node that has never validated a ledger, and holds no manifest for enough
+    of the validators it trusts, cannot tell which validations to believe. The
+    closed ledgers its peers report are then its only evidence of where the
+    network is, and any recent ledger of the network holds the manifests
+    published on it.
+
+    Choosing wrongly costs little. Every manifest read from a ledger is
+    verified as from any other source and the cache only moves forward, so a
+    ledger a peer made up can at worst leave something out. Reading several
+    candidates, rather than trusting the single most reported, is what keeps
+    one misreporting peer among a few from deciding what is read.
+
+    @param reported The closed ledger each peer last reported, one entry per
+        peer. Zero entries are ignored.
+    @param skip Ledgers already read, or being read
+    @param max Most ledgers to return
+
+    @return distinct ledgers, the most widely reported first. Ties go to the
+        larger hash, as when NetworkOPs picks a ledger by peer count, so the
+        first is usually a ledger being acquired anyway.
+*/
+std::vector<uint256>
+pickManifestCandidates(
+    std::vector<uint256> const& reported,
+    hash_set<uint256> const& skip,
+    std::size_t max);
+
+/** How many validators need a manifest before a node can trust a ledger.
+
+    @param validators The validators that count: the trusted set once
+        ValidatorList has worked it out, and every listed one before that
+    @param trusted Whether `validators` is the trusted set, and so whether
+        `quorum` has been worked out from it
+    @param quorum ValidatorList::quorum(). Before the trusted set exists this
+        is a placeholder, so the usual 80% of `validators` is assumed instead.
+
+    @return the number needed; never more than `validators`
+*/
+std::size_t
+manifestQuorum(std::size_t validators, bool trusted, std::size_t quorum);
+
+}  // namespace ripple
+
+#endif

src/xrpld/app/ledger/detail/BuildLedger.cpp

@@ -106,6 +106,41 @@ applyTransactions(
     bool certainRetry = true;
     std::size_t count = 0;
 
+    // featureRNG: validator entropy contributions are applied before anything
+    // else, so this ledger's seed is final before any Hook can draw from it.
+    // Pseudo-transactions otherwise sort to an arbitrary position. Each is
+    // attempted exactly once; one that fails is never retried later, where it
+    // could change the seed after Hooks had drawn from it.
+    if (view.rules().enabled(featureRNG))
+    {
+        for (auto it = txns.begin(); it != txns.end();)
+        {
+            if (it->second->getTxnType() != ttENTROPY)
+            {
+                ++it;
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            auto const txid = it->first.getTXID();
+            try
+            {
+                if (applyTransaction(
+                        app, view, *it->second, false, tapNONE, j) ==
+                    ApplyTransactionResult::Success)
+                    ++count;
+                else
+                    failed.insert(txid);
+            }
+            catch (std::exception const& ex)
+            {
+                JLOG(j.warn())
+                    << "Transaction " << txid << " throws: " << ex.what();
+                failed.insert(txid);
+            }
+            it = txns.erase(it);
+        }
+    }
+
     // Attempt to apply all of the retriable transactions
     for (int pass = 0; pass < LEDGER_TOTAL_PASSES; ++pass)
     {

src/xrpld/app/ledger/detail/InboundLedger.cpp

@@ -21,14 +21,18 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/InboundLedger.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/InboundLedgers.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerMaster.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/ledger/ManifestSync.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/TransactionStateSF.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/main/Application.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/ValidatorList.h>
 #include <xrpld/core/JobQueue.h>
 #include <xrpld/overlay/Overlay.h>
 #include <xrpld/shamap/SHAMapNodeID.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
 #include <xrpl/resource/Fees.h>
 
@@ -39,6 +43,16 @@
 
 namespace ripple {
 
+/** Master keys on any of this node's validator lists, trusted or not. */
+static hash_set<PublicKey>
+listedMasterKeys(Application& app)
+{
+    hash_set<PublicKey> keys;
+    app.validators().for_each_listed(
+        [&keys](PublicKey const& pk, bool) { keys.insert(pk); });
+    return keys;
+}
+
 using namespace std::chrono_literals;
 
 enum {
@@ -457,6 +471,19 @@ InboundLedger::done()
             mLedger->read(keylet::fees()),
             "ripple::InboundLedger::done : valid ledger fees");
         mLedger->setImmutable();
+
+        // The state map arrived whole before the early walk in trigger()
+        // finished, as it does when most of it is held locally already, or
+        // when [early_manifest_sync] turns the early walk off. Read the
+        // manifests from the whole map instead, now that it is immutable.
+        // Only as many directory pages as the early walk reads: past those
+        // the ledger tier is full, and the listed master keys are read by
+        // key whatever the directory holds. The keys are collected in the
+        // job: this runs under mtx_, and the validator list has a lock of
+        // its own.
+        if (!mManifestsSynced && wantManifests())
+            syncManifests(std::nullopt, manifestSyncPages);
+
         switch (mReason)
         {
             case Reason::HISTORY:
@@ -636,6 +663,63 @@ InboundLedger::trigger(std::shared_ptr<Peer> const& peer, TriggerReason reason)
         }
         else
         {
+            // Partial sync. A node that has not yet validated a ledger cannot
+            // tell which validations to trust until it knows each trusted
+            // validator's current ephemeral key, and on-ledger is where a
+            // rotation or a revocation is published. So the manifests come
+            // first: just the nodes on the paths to the manifest directory and
+            // the objects it lists, which can be read and ingested long before
+            // the rest of the state map arrives.
+            //
+            // The master keys on this node's validator lists are fetched by
+            // key as well as through the directory. They are what a node with
+            // no manifests at all needs, and reading them by key does not
+            // depend on how long the directory has grown.
+            if (!mManifestsSynced && app_.config().EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC &&
+                wantManifests())
+            {
+                sl.unlock();
+                auto listed = listedMasterKeys(app_);
+                std::vector<uint256> targets;
+                targets.reserve(listed.size());
+                for (auto const& pk : listed)
+                    targets.push_back(keylet::manifest(pk).key);
+                auto nodes = missingManifestNodes(
+                    mLedger->stateMap(),
+                    missingNodesFind,
+                    targets,
+                    manifestSyncPages);
+                sl.lock();
+
+                if (!failed_ && !complete_ && !mHaveState && !mManifestsSynced)
+                {
+                    if (nodes.empty())
+                    {
+                        syncManifests(std::move(listed), manifestSyncPages);
+                    }
+                    else
+                    {
+                        filterNodes(nodes, reason);
+
+                        // All recently asked for: fall through to the rest of
+                        // the map rather than wait on them.
+                        if (!nodes.empty())
+                        {
+                            tmGL.set_itype(protocol::liAS_NODE);
+                            for (auto const& id : nodes)
+                                *(tmGL.add_nodeids()) = id.first.getRawString();
+
+                            JLOG(journal_.trace())
+                                << "Sending manifest node request ("
+                                << nodes.size() << ") to "
+                                << (peer ? "selected peer" : "all peers");
+                            mPeerSet->sendRequest(tmGL, peer);
+                            return;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
             AccountStateSF filter(
                 mLedger->stateMap().family().db(), app_.getLedgerMaster());
 
@@ -764,6 +848,73 @@ InboundLedger::trigger(std::shared_ptr<Peer> const& peer, TriggerReason reason)
     }
 }
 
+bool
+InboundLedger::wantManifests()
+{
+    // Not for history, and not once a ledger has been validated: from then on
+    // the manifests are kept current from each new ledger as it closes.
+    return mReason != Reason::HISTORY &&
+        !app_.getLedgerMaster().haveValidated();
+}
+
+void
+InboundLedger::syncManifests(
+    std::optional<hash_set<PublicKey>> listed,
+    std::uint64_t maxPages)
+{
+    if (mManifestsSynced.exchange(true))
+        return;
+
+    // Reading verifies a signature per manifest, so it runs as its own job.
+    // The ledger is held by shared_ptr, and reading a map while nodes are
+    // still being added to it is what getMissingNodes() already does.
+    app_.getJobQueue().addJob(
+        jtMANIFEST,
+        "InboundLedger::syncManifests",
+        [ledger = mLedger,
+         listed = std::move(listed),
+         maxPages,
+         &app = app_,
+         j = journal_]() mutable {
+            auto const keys =
+                listed ? std::move(*listed) : listedMasterKeys(app);
+            auto& cache = app.validatorManifests();
+            std::size_t accepted = 0;
+            std::size_t unreadable = 0;
+
+            // By key first, one at a time: on a partial map a key whose path
+            // is not held throws, and must not cost the keys after it. One
+            // can be missing if the lists changed after the nodes were found.
+            for (auto const& pk : keys)
+            {
+                try
+                {
+                    accepted += cache.applyLedger(*ledger, {pk});
+                }
+                catch (std::exception const&)
+                {
+                    ++unreadable;
+                }
+            }
+
+            try
+            {
+                accepted += cache.applyLedgerDirectory(*ledger, maxPages);
+            }
+            catch (std::exception const& e)
+            {
+                JLOG(j.warn())
+                    << "Could not read the manifest directory of ledger "
+                    << ledger->info().seq << " during sync: " << e.what();
+            }
+
+            JLOG(j.info()) << "Read manifests from ledger "
+                           << ledger->info().seq << " during sync: " << accepted
+                           << " accepted, " << keys.size() << " listed, "
+                           << unreadable << " not yet readable";
+        });
+}
+
 void
 InboundLedger::filterNodes(
     std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>>& nodes,

src/xrpld/app/ledger/detail/ManifestSync.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <xrpld/app/ledger/ManifestSync.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <limits>
+#include <optional>
+
+namespace ripple {
+
+static_assert(
+    manifestSyncPages * dirNodeMaxEntries >= ManifestCache::ledgerCapacity,
+    "the early read must be able to fill the ledger tier");
+
+std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>>
+missingManifestNodes(
+    SHAMap const& stateMap,
+    std::size_t max,
+    std::vector<uint256> const& keys,
+    std::uint64_t maxPages)
+{
+    std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>> missing;
+
+    // By hash: several keys blocked by the same node report it once.
+    hash_set<uint256> reported;
+    hash_set<uint256> visited;
+
+    auto const& root = keylet::manifestDir();
+
+    // The manifest directory's own pages: the only directory nodes whose
+    // entries are followed. The ledger walked is not validated, and one a
+    // peer made up could otherwise lead the walk from directory to directory
+    // through as much of the map as it cared to serve.
+    hash_set<uint256> pages{root.key};
+
+    // A stack, so the keys asked for by name go last and are read first: they
+    // are the ones that decide whether this node can trust a validation.
+    std::vector<uint256> pending{root.key};
+    pending.insert(pending.end(), keys.rbegin(), keys.rend());
+
+    maxPages = std::clamp<std::uint64_t>(maxPages, 1, dirNodeMaxPages);
+
+    while (!pending.empty() && missing.size() < max)
+    {
+        auto const key = pending.back();
+        pending.pop_back();
+
+        if (!visited.insert(key).second)
+            continue;
+
+        std::optional<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>> gap;
+        auto const item = stateMap.peekItemPartial(key, gap);
+
+        if (gap)
+        {
+            if (reported.insert(gap->second).second)
+                missing.push_back(*gap);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (!item)
+            continue;
+
+        std::optional<SLE const> sle;
+        try
+        {
+            sle.emplace(SerialIter{item->slice()}, item->key());
+        }
+        catch (std::exception const&)
+        {
+            // Not this walk's to judge: the node verified against its hash,
+            // so a full read of the ledger would meet the same object.
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (sle->getType() == ltDIR_NODE)
+        {
+            if (!pages.contains(key))
+                continue;
+
+            for (auto const& k : sle->getFieldV256(sfIndexes))
+                pending.push_back(k);
+
+            // The root names the last page, every page in use has an index no
+            // greater, and the directory only ever grows at its end. Asking
+            // for them all now saves a round trip per page; an index not in
+            // use costs at most the node that shows it absent.
+            if (key == root.key)
+            {
+                auto const last = std::min<std::uint64_t>(
+                    sle->getFieldU64(sfIndexPrevious), maxPages - 1);
+                for (std::uint64_t i = 1; i <= last; ++i)
+                {
+                    auto const pageKey = keylet::page(root, i).key;
+                    pages.insert(pageKey);
+                    pending.push_back(pageKey);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        else if (
+            sle->getType() == ltMANIFEST &&
+            sle->isFieldPresent(sfSigningPubKey) &&
+            sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence) !=
+                std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max())
+        {
+            auto const signing = sle->getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey);
+            if (publicKeyType(makeSlice(signing)))
+                pending.push_back(
+                    keylet::manifest(PublicKey{makeSlice(signing)}).key);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return missing;
+}
+
+std::vector<uint256>
+pickManifestCandidates(
+    std::vector<uint256> const& reported,
+    hash_set<uint256> const& skip,
+    std::size_t max)
+{
+    hash_map<uint256, std::size_t> counts;
+    for (auto const& hash : reported)
+        if (hash.isNonZero() && !skip.contains(hash))
+            ++counts[hash];
+
+    std::vector<std::pair<std::size_t, uint256>> ranked;
+    ranked.reserve(counts.size());
+    for (auto const& [hash, count] : counts)
+        ranked.emplace_back(count, hash);
+
+    auto const keep = std::min(max, ranked.size());
+    std::partial_sort(
+        ranked.begin(),
+        ranked.begin() + keep,
+        ranked.end(),
+        [](auto const& a, auto const& b) { return a > b; });
+
+    std::vector<uint256> picked;
+    picked.reserve(keep);
+    for (std::size_t i = 0; i < keep; ++i)
+        picked.push_back(ranked[i].second);
+    return picked;
+}
+
+std::size_t
+manifestQuorum(std::size_t validators, bool trusted, std::size_t quorum)
+{
+    if (trusted)
+        return std::min(quorum, validators);
+
+    // ceil(0.8 * validators), in integers.
+    return (validators * 4 + 4) / 5;
+}
+
+}  // namespace ripple

src/xrpld/app/main/Application.cpp

@@ -228,11 +228,7 @@ public:
 
     boost::asio::signal_set m_signals;
 
-    // Once we get C++20, we could use `std::atomic_flag` for `isTimeToStop`
-    // and eliminate the need for the condition variable and the mutex.
-    std::condition_variable stoppingCondition_;
-    mutable std::mutex stoppingMutex_;
-    std::atomic<bool> isTimeToStop = false;
+    std::atomic_flag isTimeToStop;
 
     std::atomic<bool> checkSigs_;
 
@@ -1585,10 +1581,7 @@ ApplicationImp::run()
         getLoadManager().activateDeadlockDetector();
     }
 
-    {
-        std::unique_lock<std::mutex> lk{stoppingMutex_};
-        stoppingCondition_.wait(lk, [this] { return isTimeToStop.load(); });
-    }
+    isTimeToStop.wait(false, std::memory_order_relaxed);
 
     JLOG(m_journal.debug()) << "Application stopping";
 
@@ -1675,19 +1668,14 @@ ApplicationImp::run()
 void
 ApplicationImp::signalStop(std::string msg)
 {
-    if (!isTimeToStop.exchange(true))
+    if (!isTimeToStop.test_and_set(std::memory_order_acquire))
     {
         if (msg.empty())
             JLOG(m_journal.warn()) << "Server stopping";
         else
             JLOG(m_journal.warn()) << "Server stopping: " << msg;
 
-        // run() checks isTimeToStop and blocks on stoppingCondition_ while
-        // holding stoppingMutex_. Notifying without the lock can land in the
-        // gap between that check and the wait and be lost, leaving run()
-        // blocked forever (seen as a hung Env::~AppBundle thread.join()).
-        std::lock_guard lk{stoppingMutex_};
-        stoppingCondition_.notify_all();
+        isTimeToStop.notify_all();
     }
 }
 
@@ -1706,7 +1694,7 @@ ApplicationImp::checkSigs(bool check)
 bool
 ApplicationImp::isStopping() const
 {
-    return isTimeToStop.load();
+    return isTimeToStop.test(std::memory_order_relaxed);
 }
 
 int

src/xrpld/app/main/Main.cpp

@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ printHelp(const po::options_description& desc)
            "     gateway_balances [<ledger>] <issuer_account> [ <hotwallet> [ "
            "<hotwallet> ]]\n"
            "     get_counts\n"
+           "     hook_validate <hex>\n"
            "     json <method> <json>\n"
            "     ledger [<id>|current|closed|validated] [full]\n"
            "     ledger_accept\n"

src/xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h

@@ -20,13 +20,20 @@
 #ifndef RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFEST_H_INCLUDED
 #define RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFEST_H_INCLUDED
 
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/RotatingBloomFilter.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
 
-#include <algorithm>
+#include <array>
 #include <atomic>
+#include <chrono>
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <functional>
+#include <limits>
+#include <memory>
 #include <mutex>
 #include <optional>
 #include <shared_mutex>
@@ -36,6 +43,8 @@
 namespace ripple {
 
 class ReadView;
+class STLedgerEntry;
+using SLE = STLedgerEntry;
 
 /*
     Validator key manifests
@@ -64,8 +73,9 @@ class ReadView;
     master public key, and (b) the most senior of all valid manifests it has
     seen for that validator, if any.  On startup, the [validator_token] config
     entry (which contains the manifest for this validator) is decoded and
-    added to the manifest cache.  Other manifests are added as "gossip"
-    received from rippled peers.
+    added to the manifest cache.  Other manifests arrive in published validator
+    lists, from ltMANIFEST ledger objects, and as "gossip" received from
+    rippled peers; see ManifestCache for how each is retained.
 
     When an ephemeral key is compromised, a new signing key pair is created,
     along with a new manifest vouching for it (with a higher sequence number),
@@ -242,7 +252,17 @@ enum class ManifestDisposition {
     badEphemeralKey,
 
     /// Timely, but invalid signature
-    invalid
+    invalid,
+
+    /// Gossip introducing a master key not held, whose ephemeral key has not
+    /// recently signed a validation this node verified, or which names no
+    /// ephemeral key at all. Not admitted and not relayed; if it names an
+    /// ephemeral key it is held pending, unverified, until that key is seen.
+    unseen,
+
+    /// Gossip with nowhere to go: every manifest held from gossip has been
+    /// more active than this one could claim to be.
+    full
 };
 
 inline std::string
@@ -260,6 +280,58 @@ to_string(ManifestDisposition m)
             return "badEphemeralKey";
         case ManifestDisposition::invalid:
             return "invalid";
+        case ManifestDisposition::unseen:
+            return "unseen";
+        case ManifestDisposition::full:
+            return "full";
+        default:
+            return "unknown";
+    }
+}
+
+/** Where a held manifest came from, in increasing order of precedence.
+
+    The source never makes a manifest valid. Whatever its source, a manifest
+    is accepted only if its signatures verify and its sequence is newer than
+    the one held. The source decides how long the cache keeps it, and which
+    side loses when two held manifests claim the same key.
+*/
+enum class ManifestSource : std::uint8_t {
+    /** Relayed by a peer: the legacy transport, open to anyone.
+
+        A master key not already held from gossip is admitted only if its
+        ephemeral key has recently signed a validation this node verified, and
+        only into one of ManifestCache::gossipCapacity slots, which go to the
+        most active.
+    */
+    gossip = 0,
+
+    /** Read from an ltMANIFEST ledger object.
+
+        The ledger is the store and this is a lookup cache over it, of
+        ManifestCache::ledgerCapacity entries: dropping one costs a SHAMap
+        read the next time it is wanted, and loses nothing. Revocations are
+        expected to live here, since a validator revokes on-ledger.
+    */
+    ledger = 1,
+
+    /** Carried in a validator list, the config, or the wallet those were
+        saved to. Never evicted.
+    */
+    list = 2,
+};
+
+inline std::string
+to_string(ManifestSource s)
+{
+    switch (s)
+    {
+        case ManifestSource::gossip:
+            return "gossip";
+        case ManifestSource::ledger:
+            return "ledger";
+        case ManifestSource::list:
+            return "list";
         default:
             return "unknown";
     }
@@ -267,65 +339,51 @@ to_string(ManifestDisposition m)
 
 class DatabaseCon;
 
-/** Remembers manifests with the highest sequence number. */
+/** Remembers manifests with the highest sequence number.
+
+    Every master key held is retained in one of three tiers:
+
+    - list: the master key is pinned (trusted), configured, or a validator
+      list or the wallet carried a manifest for it. Never evicted, whatever
+      transport later delivered a newer manifest for it.
+
+    - ledger: otherwise, if the manifest held was read from the ledger. A
+      lookup cache over the ledger, capped at ledgerCapacity; when full the
+      least active entry is dropped, to be read again on demand.
+
+    - gossip: otherwise. Capped at gossipCapacity. A master key enters only
+      if its ephemeral key is in seen_, a rotating bloom filter of ephemeral
+      keys that recently signed a validation this node verified, and only by
+      displacing an entry less active than a single fresh sighting.
+
+    Activity is the number of validations seen from the held ephemeral key,
+    decayed exponentially with a half-life of halfLife. It is what decides
+    eviction in both capped tiers.
+
+    Gossip that fails the bloom filter is held, unverified, in a fixed ring of
+    pendingCapacity entries keyed by ephemeral key. The first validation
+    signed by that key releases it into the cache. Without this a validator's
+    manifest, which normally arrives before its first validation, would be
+    refused everywhere and never offered again.
+
+    A held manifest that conflicts with a new one over a key, and is held in a
+    lower tier than the new one would be, is evicted rather than the new one
+    refused. A manifest is never evicted by one ranked at or below it.
+
+    Ledger access goes through readLedger() alone, so a source other than a
+    full SHAMap can be substituted there.
+*/
 class ManifestCache
 {
-private:
-    beast::Journal j_;
-    std::shared_mutex mutable mutex_;
-
-    /** Active manifests stored by master public key. */
-    hash_map<PublicKey, Manifest> map_;
-
-    /** Master public keys stored by current ephemeral public key. */
-    hash_map<PublicKey, PublicKey> signingToMasterKeys_;
-
-    /** Master keys always offered to a peer, whatever their recency.
-
-        Set by pin(); in practice the master keys on the configured validator
-        lists, which are the manifests consensus actually depends on.
-    */
-    hash_set<PublicKey> pinned_;
-
-    /** Recency of use, keyed by master public key.
-
-        The structure of this map is guarded by mutex_ exactly as map_ is:
-        entries are created next to it in applyManifest() and are never
-        removed. The counters themselves are atomic, so recording a hit is a
-        write to an atomic rather than a structural modification and is legal
-        while only a shared lock is held.
-
-        This is deliberately not a second mutex. A second mutex would have to
-        be ordered against mutex_, and that ordering would be an unenforced
-        invariant that any future caller could invert.
-    */
-    hash_map<PublicKey, std::atomic<std::uint64_t>> mutable lastUsed_;
-    std::atomic<std::uint64_t> mutable tick_{0};
-
-    /** Ephemeral keys already probed against the ledger, and where.
-
-        Bounds the reads driven by incoming validations to one per key per
-        ledger. A key that resolves does not come back here: the mapping then
-        lives in signingToMasterKeys_ and applyLedgerSigningKey() answers from
-        it before reaching this map.
-
-        Unlike lastUsed_ this is written structurally, so it is guarded by
-        mutex_ in exclusive mode.
-    */
-    hash_map<PublicKey, std::uint32_t> probed_;
-
-    /** Record that a manifest was looked up.
-
-        @pre The caller holds mutex_, shared or exclusive.
-    */
-    void
-    touch(PublicKey const& masterKey) const;
-
-    std::atomic<std::uint32_t> seq_{0};
-
 public:
-    /** Ceiling on the unpinned manifests offered to a newly connected peer. */
-    static constexpr std::size_t gossipLimit = 64;
+    /** Manifests held for gossip-tier master keys. */
+    static constexpr std::size_t gossipCapacity = 64;
+
+    /** Manifests held for ledger-tier master keys: a lookup cache. */
+    static constexpr std::size_t ledgerCapacity = 512;
+
+    /** Gossip manifests waiting, unverified, for their ephemeral key. */
+    static constexpr std::size_t pendingCapacity = 64;
 
     /** Ceiling on remembered ephemeral key probes before they are dropped.
 
@@ -334,11 +392,202 @@ public:
     */
     static constexpr std::size_t probeLimit = 4096;
 
-    explicit ManifestCache(
-        beast::Journal j = beast::Journal(beast::Journal::getNullSink()))
-        : j_(j)
+    /** Time over which a master key's validation activity halves. */
+    static constexpr std::chrono::seconds halfLife{300};
+
+    /** Epoch of seen_. A key is remembered for three to four of them. */
+    static constexpr std::chrono::seconds seenInterval{120};
+
+    /** Ephemeral keys recently seen signing a verified validation.
+
+        2 KiB (16 Kibit) per generation, 4 generations: 8 KiB in all. Around
+        0.2% false positives per live generation with a thousand distinct keys
+        in it.
+    */
+    using SeenFilter = RotatingBloomFilter<std::size_t{1} << 14, 4, 4>;
+
+private:
+    struct Slot
     {
-    }
+        Slot(
+            ManifestSource source_,
+            ManifestSource tier_,
+            bool vouched_,
+            double weight_)
+            : source(source_), tier(tier_), vouched(vouched_), weight(weight_)
+        {
+        }
+
+        /// Where the manifest held for this master key came from.
+        ManifestSource source;
+
+        /// What it is retained as; see tierOf().
+        ManifestSource tier;
+
+        /// A validator list, the config or the wallet once carried a manifest
+        /// for this master key. Survives later updates from other sources.
+        bool vouched;
+
+        /** Validations seen from the held ephemeral key, decayed.
+
+            Stored as the sum, over the times t it was seen, of
+            2^((t - weightBase_) / halfLife). Every slot shares weightBase_, so
+            comparing two stored weights compares their decayed values at any
+            common instant, without computing a decay.
+
+            Atomic so that a sighting is recorded under a shared lock.
+            Everything else in a slot changes only under an exclusive one.
+        */
+        std::atomic<double> weight;
+    };
+
+    struct Pending
+    {
+        /// Arrival order; the lowest is replaced first.
+        std::uint64_t order = 0;
+        std::optional<Manifest> manifest;
+        /// manifest has been checked with Manifest::verify(), and passed.
+        bool verified = false;
+    };
+
+    beast::Journal j_;
+    Stopwatch& clock_;
+    std::shared_mutex mutable mutex_;
+
+    /** Active manifests stored by master public key. */
+    hash_map<PublicKey, Manifest> map_;
+
+    /** Master public keys stored by current ephemeral public key. */
+    hash_map<PublicKey, PublicKey> signingToMasterKeys_;
+
+    /** Retention state, by master public key. In step with map_. */
+    hash_map<PublicKey, Slot> slots_;
+
+    /** Number of slots_ in each tier, indexed by ManifestSource. */
+    std::array<std::size_t, 3> tierSize_{};
+
+    /** Master keys retained as list regardless of source; set by pin(). */
+    hash_set<PublicKey> pinned_;
+
+    /** Master keys of the configured validator token and revocation. */
+    hash_set<PublicKey> configured_;
+
+    std::array<Pending, pendingCapacity> pending_;
+    std::uint64_t pendingOrder_ = 0;
+    std::size_t pendingSize_ = 0;
+
+    /** Ephemeral keys already probed against the ledger, and where.
+
+        Bounds the reads driven by incoming validations to one per key per
+        ledger. Guarded by mutex_ in exclusive mode.
+    */
+    hash_map<PublicKey, std::uint32_t> probed_;
+
+    /** Reference instant for Slot::weight. Moved forward by rebase(). */
+    Stopwatch::time_point weightBase_;
+
+    SeenFilter seen_{seenInterval};
+
+    std::atomic<std::uint32_t> seq_{0};
+
+    /** Tier a master key is retained in, given where its manifest came from.
+
+        @pre The caller holds mutex_, shared or exclusive.
+    */
+    ManifestSource
+    tierOf(PublicKey const& master, ManifestSource source, bool vouched) const;
+
+    /** Weight of a single sighting at now. @pre mutex_ held. */
+    double
+    unit(Stopwatch::time_point now) const;
+
+    /** Whether weightBase_ is far enough behind to need moving now.
+
+        @pre mutex_ held.
+    */
+    bool
+    overdue(Stopwatch::time_point now) const;
+
+    /** Move weightBase_ toward now, rescaling every weight to match.
+
+        @pre mutex_ held exclusively.
+    */
+    void
+    rebase(Stopwatch::time_point now);
+
+    /** The least active entry in a tier, other than exclude.
+
+        @pre mutex_ held.
+    */
+    std::optional<std::pair<PublicKey, double>>
+    coldest(ManifestSource tier, PublicKey const* exclude) const;
+
+    /** Whether master could enter tier, competing with weight.
+
+        A capped tier that is full admits by evicting its least active entry.
+        The lookup cache always does; the gossip tier only if that entry is
+        less active than weight.
+
+        @pre mutex_ held.
+    */
+    bool
+    admissible(ManifestSource tier, PublicKey const& master, double weight)
+        const;
+
+    /** Evict what admissible() said could be evicted.
+
+        @pre mutex_ held exclusively.
+    */
+    bool
+    makeRoom(ManifestSource tier, PublicKey const& master, double weight);
+
+    /** Forget a master key entirely. @pre mutex_ held exclusively. */
+    void
+    erase(PublicKey const& master);
+
+    /** Move a slot to another tier. @pre mutex_ held exclusively. */
+    void
+    retier(Slot& slot, ManifestSource tier);
+
+    /** Hold gossip until its ephemeral key is seen.
+
+        @param verified m has already been checked with Manifest::verify().
+            Only a verified manifest may displace one already waiting for
+            the same ephemeral key.
+
+        @pre mutex_ held exclusively; m names an ephemeral key.
+    */
+    void
+    addPending(Manifest m, bool verified);
+
+    /** @pre mutex_ held. */
+    bool
+    hasPending(PublicKey const& signingKey) const;
+
+    /** @pre mutex_ held exclusively. */
+    std::optional<Manifest>
+    takePending(PublicKey const& signingKey);
+
+    /** Adopt a gossip entry the ledger turns out to hold verbatim.
+
+        It is then a ledger lookup cache entry, and frees its gossip slot.
+
+        @pre mutex_ held exclusively.
+    */
+    void
+    adopt(Manifest const& m);
+
+    /** The ledger object for a manifest, keyed by its master or ephemeral key.
+
+        The one place the cache reads the ledger.
+    */
+    std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
+    readLedger(ReadView const& view, PublicKey const& key) const;
+
+public:
+    explicit ManifestCache(
+        beast::Journal j = beast::Journal(beast::Journal::getNullSink()),
+        Stopwatch& clock = stopwatch());
 
     /** A monotonically increasing number used to detect new manifests. */
     std::uint32_t
@@ -408,24 +657,65 @@ public:
     bool
     revoked(PublicKey const& pk) const;
 
+    /** Returns the tier a master key is held in, if it is held.
+
+        @par Thread Safety
+
+        May be called concurrently
+    */
+    std::optional<ManifestSource>
+    getTier(PublicKey const& pk) const;
+
     /** Add manifest to cache.
 
         @param m Manifest to add
 
+        @param source Where it came from. The default is the trusted path
+            taken by validator lists, the config and the wallet.
+
+        @param view For gossip, a ledger to consult first. A master key whose
+            ledger object is at the same or a later sequence -- above all, a
+            revocation -- has that object ingested instead, and the gossip is
+            stale. Ignored for other sources.
+
         @return `ManifestDisposition::accepted` if successful, or
-                `stale` or `invalid` otherwise
+                the disposition explaining why admission was refused
 
         @par Thread Safety
 
         May be called concurrently
     */
     ManifestDisposition
-    applyManifest(Manifest m);
+    applyManifest(
+        Manifest m,
+        ManifestSource source = ManifestSource::list,
+        ReadView const* view = nullptr);
 
-    /** Set the master keys that are always offered to peers.
+    /** Record a verified, current validation signed by an ephemeral key.
 
-        Replaces any previous set. Bumps sequence() when the set actually
-        changes, so a cached gossip message built from it is rebuilt.
+        Marks the key as seen for gossip admission, adds to the activity of the
+        master key it belongs to, and releases a pending manifest for it.
+
+        @param signingKey Ephemeral key that signed the validation
+
+        @param view Passed on to applyManifest() for a released manifest
+
+        @return the manifest released and accepted, if any, for the caller to
+            relay
+
+        @par Thread Safety
+
+        May be called concurrently
+    */
+    std::optional<Manifest>
+    noteValidation(PublicKey const& signingKey, ReadView const* view = nullptr);
+
+    /** Set the master keys retained as list, whatever their source.
+
+        Replaces any previous set. A key that leaves falls back to the tier of
+        its source, which sheds its least active entries if that puts it over
+        capacity. Bumps sequence() when the set actually changes, so a cached
+        gossip message built from it is rebuilt.
 
         @param keys Master public keys to pin
 
@@ -458,8 +748,7 @@ public:
         manifest found and feeds it through applyManifest(), so an on-chain
         manifest is subject to exactly the same staleness, revocation and
         key-reuse rules -- and the same signature check -- as one arriving by
-        peer gossip or in a published list. It is a third source of manifests,
-        not a more trusted one.
+        peer gossip or in a published list.
 
         Probes a known key set rather than scanning the ledger's transactions:
         this costs one SHAMap read per key, and picks up manifests published in
@@ -477,22 +766,39 @@ public:
     std::size_t
     applyLedger(ReadView const& view, hash_set<PublicKey> const& masterKeys);
 
+    /** Refresh from the ledger everything held or pinned.
+
+        Probes every pinned and configured master key, and every master key
+        held in any tier. This is what brings in a revocation, which is
+        published on-ledger by master key and nowhere else, for a master key
+        whose ephemeral key the cache already resolves and so never misses on.
+
+        @return the number of manifests newly accepted
+
+        @par Thread Safety
+
+        May be called concurrently
+    */
+    std::size_t
+    applyLedger(ReadView const& view);
+
     /** Resolve an ephemeral signing key against a manifest published on-ledger.
 
-        applyLedger() probes a known master key set, which cannot help a key
-        this node has no manifest for: the master key is exactly what is
-        missing. SetManifest writes a second copy of every manifest keyed by
-        its ephemeral key, so that case is one read rather than a search.
+        The miss path of the ledger tier. applyLedger() probes a known master
+        key set, which cannot help a key this node has no manifest for: the
+        master key is exactly what is missing. SetManifest writes a second copy
+        of every manifest keyed by its ephemeral key, so that case is one read
+        rather than a search.
 
         Anything found is fed through applyManifest(), so an on-chain manifest
         faces the same signature check and the same staleness, revocation and
-        key-reuse rules as one arriving by gossip. The ledger is a transport
-        here, not an authority: the answer is read back out of the cache rather
-        than taken from the ledger object, because applyManifest() may decline
-        it.
+        key-reuse rules as one arriving by gossip. The answer is read back out
+        of the cache rather than taken from the ledger object, because
+        applyManifest() may decline it.
 
         A key is probed at most once per ledger, and a key that resolves is
-        answered from the cache thereafter without any ledger read.
+        answered from the cache thereafter without any ledger read, until it
+        is evicted.
 
         @param view Ledger to read from
         @param signingKey Ephemeral public key to resolve
@@ -506,6 +812,37 @@ public:
     std::optional<PublicKey>
     applyLedgerSigningKey(ReadView const& view, PublicKey const& signingKey);
 
+    /** Ingest the manifests listed in the ledger's manifest directory.
+
+        Every master key with a manifest on-ledger is listed in
+        keylet::manifestDir(), so unlike applyLedger() this needs no key to
+        start from. Pinned, configured and held master keys are refreshed as
+        applyLedger() would; any other is admitted to the ledger tier only
+        while it has room, so a bulk read fills the lookup cache without
+        churning it.
+
+        The view need not be complete: one in which the directory and the
+        objects it lists can be read will do. That is what lets a node read
+        them during sync, before it holds the rest of the state map. The
+        ledger need not be validated either: every manifest read is verified
+        as from any other source, and the cache only ever moves forward, so
+        the worst an unvalidated ledger can do is leave something out.
+
+        @param view Ledger to read from
+        @param maxPages Most directory pages to read; see
+            forEachLedgerManifest()
+
+        @return the number of manifests newly accepted
+
+        @par Thread Safety
+
+        May be called concurrently
+    */
+    std::size_t
+    applyLedgerDirectory(
+        ReadView const& view,
+        std::uint64_t maxPages = std::numeric_limits<std::uint64_t>::max());
+
     /** Populate manifest cache with manifests in database and config.
 
         @param dbCon Database connection with dbTable
@@ -542,11 +879,15 @@ public:
     void
     load(DatabaseCon& dbCon, std::string const& dbTable);
 
-    /** Save cached manifests to database.
+    /** Save list-tier manifests to database.
+
+        Ledger-tier manifests are on the ledger already, revocations included,
+        and gossip-tier ones are not worth carrying across a restart.
 
         @param dbCon Database connection with `ValidatorManifests` table
 
-        @param isTrusted Function that returns true if manifest is trusted
+        @param isTrusted Function that returns true if manifest is trusted.
+            Called without the cache locked, so it may call back into it.
 
         @par Thread Safety
 
@@ -614,19 +955,16 @@ public:
 
     /** Invokes the callback for the manifests worth offering a new peer.
 
-        Offering the whole cache means offering everything the node has ever
-        seen, which grows without bound and is mostly of no use to the peer.
-        This offers the pinned set plus up to gossipLimit further manifests,
-        most recently used first. A manifest left out still reaches the peer by
-        ordinary relay if it turns out to be needed.
+        The list and gossip tiers: at most the listed validators plus
+        gossipCapacity. The ledger tier is left out, since any peer that is
+        not amendment blocked can read it from the ledger.
 
         @note Do not call ManifestCache member functions from within the
         callback. This can re-lock the mutex from the same thread, which is UB.
         @note Do not write ManifestCache member variables from
         within the callback. This can lead to data races.
 
-        @param pf Pre-function called with the maximum number of times f will be
-            called (useful for memory allocations)
+        @param pf Pre-function called with the number of times f will be called
 
         @param f Function called for each manifest
 
@@ -640,40 +978,12 @@ public:
     {
         std::shared_lock lock{mutex_};
 
-        // Rank the unpinned entries by recency and keep the head. Pointers
-        // into map_ stay valid: it is node based and the shared lock is held
-        // throughout.
-        std::vector<std::pair<std::uint64_t, PublicKey const*>> ranked;
-        ranked.reserve(map_.size());
-        for (auto const& [key, manifest] : map_)
-        {
-            (void)manifest;
-            if (pinned_.count(key))
-                continue;
-            auto const used = lastUsed_.find(key);
-            ranked.emplace_back(
-                used == lastUsed_.end()
-                    ? 0
-                    : used->second.load(std::memory_order_relaxed),
-                &key);
-        }
+        pf(tierSize_[static_cast<std::size_t>(ManifestSource::list)] +
+           tierSize_[static_cast<std::size_t>(ManifestSource::gossip)]);
 
-        auto const keep = std::min(gossipLimit, ranked.size());
-        std::partial_sort(
-            ranked.begin(),
-            ranked.begin() + keep,
-            ranked.end(),
-            [](auto const& a, auto const& b) { return a.first > b.first; });
-
-        // An upper bound: a pinned key need not have a manifest yet.
-        pf(pinned_.size() + keep);
-
-        for (auto const& key : pinned_)
-            if (auto const iter = map_.find(key); iter != map_.end())
-                f(iter->second);
-
-        for (std::size_t i = 0; i < keep; ++i)
-            f(map_.find(*ranked[i].second)->second);
+        for (auto const& [key, slot] : slots_)
+            if (slot.tier != ManifestSource::ledger)
+                f(map_.find(key)->second);
     }
 };
 

src/xrpld/app/misc/ManifestLedger.h

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#ifndef RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFESTLEDGER_H_INCLUDED
+#define RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFESTLEDGER_H_INCLUDED
+
+#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
+
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <functional>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace ripple {
+
+class ApplyView;
+class ReadView;
+struct Manifest;
+
+/** Write a manifest to the ledger, replacing any earlier one for its master.
+
+    A manifest is stored twice so that it can be found from either key:
+
+        keylet::manifest(masterKey)  -> obj1, sfManifestID -> obj2
+        keylet::manifest(signingKey) -> obj2, sfManifestID -> obj1
+
+    A revocation has no signing key, so it is stored only as obj1, with no
+    sfManifestID. The master key's account points at obj1 with its own
+    sfManifestID.
+
+    obj1 is listed in keylet::manifestDir() and records its page there in
+    sfOwnerNode. The entry is made with the master key's first manifest and is
+    never removed: every later manifest for the master key, a revocation
+    included, is written at the same key, so the entry stays and the page is
+    carried from the old obj1 to the new. Removing and re-adding it instead
+    would move it between pages on every key rotation for no gain. obj2 is not
+    listed; it moves with the ephemeral key, and a reader finds it from obj1.
+
+    Both of the old objects are erased and both new ones written afresh, so the
+    two copies can never drift apart.
+
+    @param view View to write to
+    @param account The master key's account root, which is updated
+    @param manifest The manifest as signed, in its serialized STObject form
+    @param parsed The same manifest, deserialized and checked by the caller
+    @param j Journal for reporting a corrupt ledger
+
+    @return tesSUCCESS; tecDIR_FULL if the directory cannot take another
+        master key; tefBAD_LEDGER if the existing objects are inconsistent
+*/
+TER
+writeManifestObjects(
+    ApplyView& view,
+    std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& account,
+    STObject const& manifest,
+    Manifest const& parsed,
+    beast::Journal j);
+
+/** Visit every master key's manifest object listed in keylet::manifestDir().
+
+    Each master key is visited once, with its current object: a revocation if
+    it has been revoked. Entries that do not name an ltMANIFEST object are
+    skipped.
+
+    The view need not be complete. It must be able to read the directory and
+    the objects listed in it, which is all this reads; a view over a partially
+    synced state map that holds them will do.
+
+    @param view View to read from
+    @param f Called with each master manifest object
+    @param maxPages Most directory pages to read, the root page included.
+        Pages are only ever appended, so this reads the oldest entries. A
+        partial view need hold no more pages than this.
+*/
+void
+forEachLedgerManifest(
+    ReadView const& view,
+    std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&)> const& f,
+    std::uint64_t maxPages = dirNodeMaxPages);
+
+}  // namespace ripple
+
+#endif

src/xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.cpp

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerMaster.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerToJson.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/LocalTxs.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/ledger/ManifestSync.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/OrderBookDB.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/ledger/TransactionMaster.h>
@@ -319,6 +320,13 @@ private:
     void
     publishNewerManifests(ReadView const& ledger);
 
+    /** Read manifests from ledgers peers report, while too few of this node's
+        validators can be resolved to trust any ledger. See
+        [early_manifest_sync].
+    */
+    void
+    bootstrapManifests();
+
 public:
     bool
     beginConsensus(
@@ -667,6 +675,12 @@ private:
     std::atomic<OperatingMode> mMode;
 
     std::atomic<bool> needNetworkLedger_{false};
+
+    /** State of bootstrapManifests(), which only the heartbeat calls. */
+    std::mutex manifestBootstrapMutex_;
+    hash_set<uint256> manifestBootstrapTried_;
+    std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point manifestBootstrapNext_{};
+
     std::atomic<bool> amendmentBlocked_{false};
     std::atomic<bool> amendmentWarned_{false};
     std::atomic<bool> unlBlocked_{false};
@@ -1027,6 +1041,8 @@ NetworkOPsImp::processHeartbeatTimer()
     }
     CLOG(clog.ss()) << ". ";
 
+    bootstrapManifests();
+
     setHeartbeatTimer();
 }
 
@@ -1246,6 +1262,105 @@ NetworkOPsImp::publishNewerManifests(ReadView const& ledger)
     }
 }
 
+namespace {
+
+/** How often a node that cannot resolve enough of its validators looks for
+    ledgers to read their manifests from. */
+constexpr std::chrono::seconds manifestBootstrapInterval{15};
+
+/** Most ledgers it starts reading at each look. */
+constexpr std::size_t manifestBootstrapWidth = 3;
+
+/** Ledgers remembered as read, past which the record starts over. */
+constexpr std::size_t manifestBootstrapMemory = 256;
+
+}  // namespace
+
+void
+NetworkOPsImp::bootstrapManifests()
+{
+    // Only until a ledger has been validated: from then on the manifests are
+    // kept current from each ledger as it closes, in beginConsensus().
+    if (!app_.config().EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC || m_ledgerMaster.haveValidated())
+        return;
+
+    std::vector<uint256> picked;
+    {
+        auto const now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
+        std::lock_guard lock(manifestBootstrapMutex_);
+        if (now < manifestBootstrapNext_)
+            return;
+        manifestBootstrapNext_ = now + manifestBootstrapInterval;
+
+        // The validators whose manifests matter: the trusted ones once the
+        // trusted set has been worked out, every listed one before that.
+        auto keys = app_.validators().getTrustedMasterKeys();
+        bool const trusted = !keys.empty();
+        if (!trusted)
+            app_.validators().for_each_listed(
+                [&keys](PublicKey const& pk, bool) { keys.insert(pk); });
+        if (keys.empty())
+            return;
+
+        // Enough of them to make a quorum.
+        std::size_t const needed =
+            manifestQuorum(keys.size(), trusted, app_.validators().quorum());
+
+        auto const& manifests = app_.validatorManifests();
+        std::size_t resolved = 0;
+        for (auto const& pk : keys)
+            if (manifests.getManifest(pk))
+                ++resolved;
+
+        if (resolved >= needed)
+            return;
+
+        std::vector<uint256> reported;
+        for (auto const& peer : app_.overlay().getActivePeers())
+            reported.push_back(peer->getClosedLedgerHash());
+
+        if (manifestBootstrapTried_.size() > manifestBootstrapMemory)
+            manifestBootstrapTried_.clear();
+
+        picked = pickManifestCandidates(
+            reported, manifestBootstrapTried_, manifestBootstrapWidth);
+        if (picked.empty())
+            return;
+
+        manifestBootstrapTried_.insert(picked.begin(), picked.end());
+
+        JLOG(m_journal.info())
+            << "Manifests held for " << resolved << " of " << keys.size()
+            << " validators, " << needed << " needed: reading manifests from "
+            << picked.size() << " ledger(s) reported by " << reported.size()
+            << " peer(s)";
+    }
+
+    // Each is acquired as consensus would acquire it. Before a ledger has
+    // been validated, InboundLedger reads the manifests first, by key and from
+    // the directory, and only then fetches the rest. The first pick is
+    // usually the ledger checkLastClosedLedger() is already acquiring. Ledgers
+    // of the same network share nearly all their nodes, so each further one
+    // costs little more than what changed; one that only a peer has fails and
+    // costs nothing more.
+    //
+    // Runs on the heartbeat, ahead of re-arming it, so nothing here may throw.
+    for (auto const& hash : picked)
+    {
+        JLOG(m_journal.debug()) << "Reading manifests from ledger " << hash;
+        try
+        {
+            app_.getInboundLedgers().acquire(
+                hash, 0, InboundLedger::Reason::CONSENSUS);
+        }
+        catch (std::exception const& e)
+        {
+            JLOG(m_journal.warn()) << "Could not start reading manifests from "
+                                   << "ledger " << hash << ": " << e.what();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 void
 NetworkOPsImp::processTransaction(
     std::shared_ptr<Transaction>& transaction,
@@ -1610,6 +1725,12 @@ NetworkOPsImp::apply(std::unique_lock<std::mutex>& batchLock)
                     tx.set_deferred(e.result == terQUEUED);
                     // FIXME: This should be when we received it
                     app_.overlay().relay(e.transaction->getID(), tx, *toSkip);
+
+                    // Also fan it out over the UDP Superhighway, if enabled.
+                    // shouldRelay() above ensures we do this at most once.
+                    app_.overlay().publishTxXUSH(
+                        s.slice(), e.transaction->getID());
+
                     e.transaction->setBroadcast();
                 }
             }
@@ -2081,13 +2202,13 @@ NetworkOPsImp::beginConsensus(
         app_.validators().setNegativeUNL(prevLedger->negativeUNL());
     // Pull in any manifests published on-ledger before the trusted set is
     // recomputed, so a validator that rotated its ephemeral key on-chain is
-    // resolved to the new signing key in this same round. The master keys come
-    // from the published lists, so this needs no bootstrap: only the ephemeral
-    // half of the mapping ever comes from a manifest.
+    // resolved to the new signing key in this same round. Every master key the
+    // cache holds or pins is probed, not only the trusted ones: a revocation is
+    // published on-ledger by master key alone, and a master key whose ephemeral
+    // key the cache already resolves would otherwise never be looked up again.
     if (prevLedger->rules().enabled(featureOnChainManifests))
     {
-        app_.validatorManifests().applyLedger(
-            *prevLedger, app_.validators().getTrustedMasterKeys());
+        app_.validatorManifests().applyLedger(*prevLedger);
 
         // The reverse of applyLedger above. Manifests reach us by peer gossip
         // and in published validator lists, both of which can arrive before
@@ -2103,8 +2224,8 @@ NetworkOPsImp::beginConsensus(
         app_.overlay(),
         app_.getHashRouter());
 
-    // Pin the trusted master keys so they are always offered to a new peer and
-    // cannot be crowded out of the gossip set by more recently used manifests.
+    // Pin the trusted master keys: their manifests are retained in the list
+    // tier and offered to every new peer, whichever source delivered them.
     app_.validatorManifests().pin(app_.validators().getTrustedMasterKeys());
 
     if (!changes.added.empty() || !changes.removed.empty())

src/xrpld/app/misc/RotatingBloomFilter.h

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#ifndef RIPPLE_APP_MISC_ROTATINGBLOOMFILTER_H_INCLUDED
+#define RIPPLE_APP_MISC_ROTATINGBLOOMFILTER_H_INCLUDED
+
+#include <xrpl/basics/hardened_hash.h>
+
+#include <array>
+#include <chrono>
+#include <cstddef>
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <limits>
+#include <mutex>
+
+namespace ripple {
+
+/** Approximate membership of everything inserted recently, in fixed space.
+
+    Time is cut into epochs of a fixed interval. Each of the Generations
+    filters holds the insertions of one epoch: an insertion goes to the filter
+    for the current epoch, and a query consults every filter whose epoch is
+    one of the last Generations. An element is therefore reported for at least
+    (Generations - 1) and at most Generations intervals after it was last
+    inserted, and then forgotten.
+
+    A filter is cleared lazily, when its slot is first wanted for a newer
+    epoch. Nothing has to tick: an idle filter costs nothing, and a clock that
+    jumps forward simply finds every slot expired.
+
+    Within the window there are no false negatives. False positives occur at
+    the usual bloom rate for one epoch's insertions, once per live generation.
+    The footprint is Generations * Bits / 8 bytes however much is inserted:
+    saturating the filter raises the false positive rate and never grows it.
+
+    Bit positions come from a hash seeded randomly per instance, so nobody
+    without the seed can choose elements that set a particular set of bits.
+
+    @par Thread Safety
+    Safe to call concurrently. The internal mutex is never held while calling
+    out, so this is a leaf in any lock order.
+*/
+template <std::size_t Bits, std::size_t Hashes, std::size_t Generations>
+class RotatingBloomFilter
+{
+    static_assert(
+        Bits >= 64 && (Bits & (Bits - 1)) == 0,
+        "Bits must be a power of two, at least 64");
+    static_assert(
+        Bits <= (std::size_t{1} << 32),
+        "bit positions are computed in 32 bits");
+    static_assert(Hashes >= 1 && Hashes <= 16);
+    static_assert(
+        Generations >= 2,
+        "a single generation would forget everything at each rotation");
+
+public:
+    using clock_type = std::chrono::steady_clock;
+    using time_point = clock_type::time_point;
+    using duration = clock_type::duration;
+
+    /** Size of the filter state, in bytes. */
+    static constexpr std::size_t bytes = Generations * Bits / 8;
+
+    explicit RotatingBloomFilter(duration interval)
+        : interval_(interval > duration::zero() ? interval : duration{1})
+    {
+        epochs_.fill(none);
+    }
+
+    RotatingBloomFilter(RotatingBloomFilter const&) = delete;
+    RotatingBloomFilter&
+    operator=(RotatingBloomFilter const&) = delete;
+
+    /** Length of one epoch. */
+    duration
+    interval() const
+    {
+        return interval_;
+    }
+
+    template <class T>
+    void
+    insert(T const& item, time_point now)
+    {
+        auto const positions = probe(item);
+        auto const epoch = epochOf(now);
+        auto const slot = slotOf(epoch);
+
+        std::lock_guard lock{mutex_};
+
+        // The slot last held an earlier epoch, now out of the window or about
+        // to be: it is reused for this one. A slot already ahead of us (the
+        // caller read the clock before another thread rotated) keeps its bits,
+        // and ours are added to them: that can only remember the element a
+        // little longer than asked, never forget it early.
+        if (epochs_[slot] < epoch)
+        {
+            bits_[slot].fill(0);
+            epochs_[slot] = epoch;
+        }
+
+        for (auto const p : positions)
+            bits_[slot][p / 64] |= std::uint64_t{1} << (p % 64);
+    }
+
+    template <class T>
+    bool
+    contains(T const& item, time_point now) const
+    {
+        auto const positions = probe(item);
+        auto const oldest =
+            epochOf(now) - static_cast<std::int64_t>(Generations);
+
+        std::lock_guard lock{mutex_};
+
+        for (std::size_t g = 0; g < Generations; ++g)
+        {
+            if (epochs_[g] == none || epochs_[g] <= oldest)
+                continue;
+
+            bool all = true;
+            for (auto const p : positions)
+            {
+                if ((bits_[g][p / 64] & (std::uint64_t{1} << (p % 64))) == 0)
+                {
+                    all = false;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (all)
+                return true;
+        }
+
+        return false;
+    }
+
+private:
+    static constexpr std::size_t words = Bits / 64;
+    static constexpr std::int64_t none =
+        std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::min();
+
+    std::int64_t
+    epochOf(time_point now) const
+    {
+        // Floor division, so a clock reading before its own epoch still maps
+        // to consecutive epochs.
+        auto const t = now.time_since_epoch().count();
+        auto const i = interval_.count();
+        return t >= 0 ? t / i : -((-t + i - 1) / i);
+    }
+
+    static std::size_t
+    slotOf(std::int64_t epoch)
+    {
+        auto const g = static_cast<std::int64_t>(Generations);
+        return static_cast<std::size_t>(((epoch % g) + g) % g);
+    }
+
+    /** Bit positions for an element: Kirsch-Mitzenmacher double hashing.
+
+        Hashes positions from a single 64 bit hash, as h1 + i * h2. Forcing h2
+        odd makes it invertible modulo the power of two table size, so the
+        positions for one element are all distinct.
+    */
+    template <class T>
+    std::array<std::uint32_t, Hashes>
+    probe(T const& item) const
+    {
+        std::uint64_t const h = hash_(item);
+        auto const h1 = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(h);
+        auto const h2 = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(h >> 32) | 1u;
+        constexpr auto mask = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(Bits - 1);
+
+        std::array<std::uint32_t, Hashes> positions;
+        for (std::size_t i = 0; i < Hashes; ++i)
+            positions[i] = (h1 + static_cast<std::uint32_t>(i) * h2) & mask;
+        return positions;
+    }
+
+    hardened_hash<> const hash_;
+    duration const interval_;
+    std::mutex mutable mutex_;
+    std::array<std::int64_t, Generations> epochs_;
+    std::array<std::array<std::uint64_t, words>, Generations> bits_{};
+};
+
+}  // namespace ripple
+
+#endif

src/xrpld/app/misc/detail/ManifestLedger.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/*
+    This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
+    Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+    purpose  with  or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE  SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH  REGARD  TO  THIS  SOFTWARE  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY  AND  FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY  SPECIAL ,  DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER  RESULTING  FROM  LOSS  OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION  OF  CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+*/
+//==============================================================================
+
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/ManifestLedger.h>
+#include <xrpld/ledger/ApplyView.h>
+#include <xrpld/ledger/ReadView.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <optional>
+
+namespace ripple {
+
+TER
+writeManifestObjects(
+    ApplyView& view,
+    std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& account,
+    STObject const& manifest,
+    Manifest const& parsed,
+    beast::Journal j)
+{
+    AccountID const id = account->getAccountID(sfAccount);
+    Keylet const klMan1 = keylet::manifest(parsed.masterKey);
+
+    // The page obj1 is listed on, carried across a replacement.
+    std::optional<std::uint64_t> page;
+
+    if (account->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID))
+    {
+        uint256 const firstID = account->getFieldH256(sfManifestID);
+
+        // The account is derived from the master key, so it can only ever
+        // have pointed at that key's obj1. Anything else is corruption, and
+        // carrying its page across would corrupt the directory as well.
+        auto const sleMan1 = view.peek(Keylet{ltMANIFEST, firstID});
+        if (firstID != klMan1.key || !sleMan1 ||
+            sleMan1->getAccountID(sfAccount) != id)
+        {
+            JLOG(j.error()) << "SetManifest: Old manifest object missing or "
+                               "misowned (ID1) !! "
+                            << strHex(firstID);
+            return tefBAD_LEDGER;
+        }
+
+        // Absent when the previous manifest was a revocation.
+        if (sleMan1->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID))
+        {
+            uint256 const secondID = sleMan1->getFieldH256(sfManifestID);
+            auto const sleMan2 = view.peek(Keylet{ltMANIFEST, secondID});
+            if (secondID == firstID || !sleMan2 ||
+                sleMan2->getAccountID(sfAccount) != id)
+            {
+                JLOG(j.error())
+                    << "SetManifest: Old manifest object missing, misowned or "
+                       "self-referential (ID2) !! "
+                    << strHex(secondID);
+                return tefBAD_LEDGER;
+            }
+            view.erase(sleMan2);
+        }
+
+        if (sleMan1->isFieldPresent(sfOwnerNode))
+            page = sleMan1->getFieldU64(sfOwnerNode);
+
+        view.erase(sleMan1);
+    }
+
+    std::optional<Keylet> klMan2;
+    if (!parsed.revoked() && parsed.signingKey)
+        klMan2 = keylet::manifest(*parsed.signingKey);
+
+    // Neither key may still be occupied: preclaim rejects an ephemeral key held
+    // by another account, and the block above cleared this account's own
+    // copies.
+    if (view.exists(klMan1) || (klMan2 && view.exists(*klMan2)))
+    {
+        JLOG(j.error()) << "SetManifest: Manifest keylet already occupied !! "
+                        << strHex(klMan1.key);
+        return tefBAD_LEDGER;
+    }
+
+    // A master key's first manifest. Also an obj1 written before it carried a
+    // page, which has no entry to keep.
+    if (!page)
+    {
+        page = view.dirInsert(
+            keylet::manifestDir(), klMan1.key, [](std::shared_ptr<SLE> const&) {
+            });
+        if (!page)
+            return tecDIR_FULL;
+    }
+
+    // Mirror the manifest losslessly, signatures included, so any node can
+    // reconstruct and independently verify it (ManifestCache::applyLedger).
+    // Field *presence* is copied faithfully: sfVersion is soeDEFAULT in the
+    // manifest format, so materialising an absent one would alter the signed
+    // payload and break verification.
+    auto const write = [&](Keylet const& kl,
+                           std::optional<uint256> const& other,
+                           std::optional<std::uint64_t> const& dirPage) {
+        auto sleMan = std::make_shared<SLE>(kl);
+        sleMan->setAccountID(sfAccount, id);
+        sleMan->setFieldU32(sfSequence, manifest.getFieldU32(sfSequence));
+        sleMan->setFieldVL(sfPublicKey, manifest.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey));
+        sleMan->setFieldVL(
+            sfMasterSignature, manifest.getFieldVL(sfMasterSignature));
+        if (manifest.isFieldPresent(sfVersion))
+            sleMan->setFieldU16(sfVersion, manifest.getFieldU16(sfVersion));
+        if (manifest.isFieldPresent(sfSigningPubKey))
+            sleMan->setFieldVL(
+                sfSigningPubKey, manifest.getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey));
+        if (manifest.isFieldPresent(sfSignature))
+            sleMan->setFieldVL(sfSignature, manifest.getFieldVL(sfSignature));
+        if (manifest.isFieldPresent(sfDomain))
+            sleMan->setFieldVL(sfDomain, manifest.getFieldVL(sfDomain));
+        if (other)
+            sleMan->setFieldH256(sfManifestID, *other);
+        if (dirPage)
+            sleMan->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *dirPage);
+        view.insert(sleMan);
+    };
+
+    write(
+        klMan1,
+        klMan2 ? std::optional<uint256>{klMan2->key} : std::nullopt,
+        page);
+    if (klMan2)
+        write(*klMan2, klMan1.key, std::nullopt);
+
+    account->setFieldH256(sfManifestID, klMan1.key);
+    view.update(account);
+
+    return tesSUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+forEachLedgerManifest(
+    ReadView const& view,
+    std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&)> const& f,
+    std::uint64_t maxPages)
+{
+    auto const& root = keylet::manifestDir();
+    auto page = view.read(root);
+
+    // Also bounds the walk should a corrupt ledger link the pages in a cycle.
+    maxPages = std::min(maxPages, dirNodeMaxPages);
+    for (std::uint64_t pages = 0; page && pages < maxPages; ++pages)
+    {
+        for (auto const& key : page->getFieldV256(sfIndexes))
+            if (auto const sle = view.read(Keylet{ltMANIFEST, key}))
+                f(sle);
+
+        auto const next = page->getFieldU64(sfIndexNext);
+        if (next == 0 || pages + 1 >= maxPages)
+            break;
+
+        page = view.read(keylet::page(root, next));
+    }
+}
+
+}  // namespace ripple

src/xrpld/app/misc/detail/TxQ.cpp

@@ -106,17 +106,18 @@ TxQ::FeeMetrics::update(
     TxQ::Setup const& setup)
 {
     std::vector<FeeLevel64> feeLevels;
-    auto const txBegin = view.txs.begin();
-    auto const txEnd = view.txs.end();
-    auto const size = std::distance(txBegin, txEnd);
-    feeLevels.reserve(size);
-    std::for_each(txBegin, txEnd, [&](auto const& tx) {
+    for (auto const& tx : view.txs)
+    {
+        // featureRNG: every proposing validator puts a zero-fee ttENTROPY
+        // into every ledger. These are consensus plumbing, not demand for
+        // ledger space, so they must not raise the expected transaction count
+        // or drag down the median fee level used for escalation.
+        if (tx.first->getTxnType() == ttENTROPY)
+            continue;
         feeLevels.push_back(getFeeLevelPaid(view, *tx.first));
-    });
+    }
     std::sort(feeLevels.begin(), feeLevels.end());
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        size == feeLevels.size(),
-        "ripple::TxQ::FeeMetrics::update : fee levels size");
+    std::size_t const size = feeLevels.size();
 
     JLOG((timeLeap ? j_.warn() : j_.debug()))
         << "Ledger " << view.info().seq << " has " << size << " transactions. "

src/xrpld/app/rdb/Wallet.h

@@ -68,11 +68,13 @@ getManifests(
     beast::Journal j);
 
 /**
- * @brief saveManifests Saves all given manifests to the database.
+ * @brief saveManifests Replaces the table's contents with the given
+ *        manifests: every revocation, and every other manifest whose master
+ *        key is trusted.
  * @param session Session with the database.
  * @param dbTable Name of the database table that will store the manifest.
  * @param isTrusted Callback that returns true if the key is trusted.
- * @param map Maps public keys to manifests.
+ * @param manifests Manifests to consider.
  * @param j Journal.
  */
 void
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ saveManifests(
     soci::session& session,
     std::string const& dbTable,
     std::function<bool(PublicKey const&)> const& isTrusted,
-    hash_map<PublicKey, Manifest> const& map,
+    std::vector<Manifest> const& manifests,
     beast::Journal j);
 
 /**

src/xrpld/app/rdb/detail/Wallet.cpp

@@ -94,22 +94,22 @@ saveManifests(
     soci::session& session,
     std::string const& dbTable,
     std::function<bool(PublicKey const&)> const& isTrusted,
-    hash_map<PublicKey, Manifest> const& map,
+    std::vector<Manifest> const& manifests,
     beast::Journal j)
 {
     soci::transaction tr(session);
     session << "DELETE FROM " << dbTable;
-    for (auto const& v : map)
+    for (auto const& m : manifests)
     {
         // Save all revocation manifests,
         // but only save trusted non-revocation manifests.
-        if (!v.second.revoked() && !isTrusted(v.second.masterKey))
+        if (!m.revoked() && !isTrusted(m.masterKey))
         {
             JLOG(j.info()) << "Untrusted manifest in cache not saved to db";
             continue;
         }
 
-        saveManifest(session, dbTable, v.second.serialized);
+        saveManifest(session, dbTable, m.serialized);
     }
     tr.commit();
 }

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ApplyContext.cpp

@@ -50,7 +50,31 @@ ApplyContext::ApplyContext(
 void
 ApplyContext::discard()
 {
+    // featureRNG: Hook draws are never undone. If this transaction drew from
+    // the RNG, its advanced state survives the discard (as does the record of
+    // what its Hooks were given), so a rollback cannot preserve an RNG state
+    // for whatever executes next.
+    std::optional<uint256> const randomData = view_->getRandomData();
+    std::optional<uint256> rngState;
+    if (randomData)
+    {
+        if (auto const sle = view_->read(keylet::random()))
+            rngState = sle->getFieldH256(sfRandomData);
+    }
+
     view_.emplace(&base_, flags_);
+
+    if (randomData)
+        view_->setRandomData(*randomData);
+
+    if (rngState)
+    {
+        if (auto sle = view_->peek(keylet::random()))
+        {
+            sle->setFieldH256(sfRandomData, *rngState);
+            view_->update(sle);
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 std::optional<TxMeta>

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/Change.cpp

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/digest.h>
+#include <algorithm>
 #include <string_view>
 
 namespace ripple {
@@ -98,6 +100,21 @@ Change::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
         }
     }
 
+    if (ctx.tx.getTxnType() == ttENTROPY)
+    {
+        if (!ctx.rules.enabled(featureRNG))
+        {
+            JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Change: RNG is not enabled.";
+            return temDISABLED;
+        }
+
+        if (!publicKeyType(makeSlice(ctx.tx.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey))))
+        {
+            JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Change: Entropy has an invalid PublicKey.";
+            return temMALFORMED;
+        }
+    }
+
     return tesSUCCESS;
 }
 
@@ -157,6 +174,29 @@ Change::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
         case ttUNL_MODIFY:
         case ttEMIT_FAILURE:
             return tesSUCCESS;
+        case ttENTROPY: {
+            if (ctx.tx.getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence) != ctx.view.seq())
+            {
+                JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Change: Entropy for wrong ledger.";
+                return tefFAILURE;
+            }
+
+            // Only validators on the UNLReport may contribute, when there is
+            // one. Without a UNLReport (new networks, standalone, unit tests)
+            // inclusion by consensus is the only gate.
+            auto const unlRep = ctx.view.read(keylet::UNLReport());
+            if (!unlRep || !unlRep->isFieldPresent(sfActiveValidators))
+                return tesSUCCESS;
+
+            auto const pk = ctx.tx.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey);
+            for (auto const& av : unlRep->getFieldArray(sfActiveValidators))
+                if (av.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey) == pk)
+                    return tesSUCCESS;
+
+            JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Change: Entropy from a validator that is "
+                                  "not on the UNLReport.";
+            return tefFAILURE;
+        }
         case ttUNL_REPORT: {
             if (!ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfImportVLKey) ||
                 ctx.app.config().IMPORT_VL_KEYS.empty())
@@ -211,12 +251,142 @@ Change::doApply()
             return applyEmitFailure();
         case ttUNL_REPORT:
             return applyUNLReport();
+        case ttENTROPY:
+            return applyEntropy();
         default:
             UNREACHABLE("ripple::Change::doApply : invalid transaction type");
             return tefFAILURE;
     }
 }
 
+// featureRNG
+//
+// The Random object holds one commitment per validator: the hash of the
+// secret that validator will reveal next. A ttENTROPY reveals the secret for
+// the stored commitment (if it has one) and replaces the commitment with a new
+// one. A reveal that matches is mixed into sfRandomData and counted. Anything
+// else (no commitment yet, a lost secret, a mismatch) just re-registers, which
+// is no different from the validator having withheld.
+//
+// The first ttENTROPY of each ledger restarts sfRandomData. All of them are
+// applied before any other transaction (see BuildLedger), so by the time Hooks
+// run, sfRandomData is the seed for this ledger. The Hook API then iterates it
+// on every draw.
+TER
+Change::applyEntropy()
+{
+    // Commitments not refreshed within this many ledgers are forgotten.
+    static constexpr std::uint32_t maxCommitmentAge = 8;
+
+    // domain separators for the two hashes computed here
+    static constexpr std::uint32_t rngSeedTag = 0x524E4753;        // 'RNGS'
+    static constexpr std::uint32_t rngAccumulateTag = 0x524E4741;  // 'RNGA'
+
+    auto const seq = view().seq();
+    auto const& tx = ctx_.tx;
+    auto const pk = tx.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey);
+
+    auto sle = view().peek(keylet::random());
+    bool const created = !sle;
+
+    // find this validator's commitment, if it has one
+    std::optional<STObject> commitment;
+    if (!created)
+    {
+        for (auto const& entry : sle->getFieldArray(sfRandomDigests))
+        {
+            if (entry.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey) == pk)
+            {
+                commitment = entry;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // one contribution per validator per ledger
+    if (commitment && commitment->getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence) == seq)
+    {
+        JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Change: second Entropy from one validator in "
+                        << "ledger " << seq;
+        return tefFAILURE;
+    }
+
+    if (created)
+        sle = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::random());
+
+    // the first ttENTROPY applied in this ledger restarts the accumulator
+    if (created || sle->getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence) != seq)
+    {
+        std::size_t denominator = 0;
+        if (auto const unlRep = view().read(keylet::UNLReport());
+            unlRep && unlRep->isFieldPresent(sfActiveValidators))
+            denominator = unlRep->getFieldArray(sfActiveValidators).size();
+
+        sle->setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, seq);
+        sle->setFieldU16(sfEntropyCount, 0);
+        sle->setFieldU16(
+            sfEntropyDenominator,
+            static_cast<std::uint16_t>(
+                std::min<std::size_t>(denominator, 0xFFFFU)));
+        sle->setFieldH256(
+            sfRandomData,
+            sha512Half(rngSeedTag, seq, view().info().parentHash));
+    }
+
+    // mix in the reveal if it matches the validator's commitment
+    if (commitment && tx.isFieldPresent(sfRandomData))
+    {
+        auto const reveal = tx.getFieldH256(sfRandomData);
+        if (sha512Half(reveal) == commitment->getFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest))
+        {
+            sle->setFieldH256(
+                sfRandomData,
+                sha512Half(
+                    rngAccumulateTag,
+                    sle->getFieldH256(sfRandomData),
+                    makeSlice(pk),
+                    reveal));
+            sle->setFieldU16(
+                sfEntropyCount, sle->getFieldU16(sfEntropyCount) + 1);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Change: Entropy reveal does not match the "
+                            << "validator's commitment, ignoring it.";
+        }
+    }
+
+    // store the new commitment, dropping stale ones
+    STArray digests(sfRandomDigests);
+    for (auto const& entry : sle->getFieldArray(sfRandomDigests))
+    {
+        if (entry.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey) == pk)
+            continue;
+        if (entry.getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence) + maxCommitmentAge < seq)
+            continue;
+        digests.push_back(entry);
+    }
+
+    STObject entry(sfRandomDigestEntry);
+    entry.setFieldVL(sfPublicKey, pk);
+    entry.setFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest, tx.getFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest));
+    entry.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, seq);
+    digests.push_back(std::move(entry));
+
+    digests.sort([](STObject const& a, STObject const& b) {
+        return a.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey) < b.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey);
+    });
+
+    sle->setFieldArray(sfRandomDigests, digests);
+
+    if (created)
+        view().insert(sle);
+    else
+        view().update(sle);
+
+    return tesSUCCESS;
+}
+
 TER
 Change::applyUNLReport()
 {

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/Change.h

@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ private:
 
     TER
     applyUNLReport();
+
+    TER
+    applyEntropy();
 };
 
 using EnableAmendment = Change;
@@ -83,6 +86,7 @@ using SetFee = Change;
 using UNLModify = Change;
 using EmitFailure = Change;
 using UNLReport = Change;
+using Entropy = Change;
 
 }  // namespace ripple
 

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ClaimReward.cpp

@@ -158,8 +158,9 @@ ClaimReward::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
 
                 auto const& hookOn =
                     hook::getHookOn(hook, sleDef, sfHookOnIncoming);
-                auto const hookName = ctx.view.rules().enabled(fix20260929)
-                    ? hook[~sfHookName]
+                auto const hookName = ctx.view.rules().enabled(fix20260929) &&
+                        hook.isFieldPresent(sfHookName)
+                    ? std::optional<Blob>(hook.getFieldVL(sfHookName))
                     : std::nullopt;
                 if (hook::canHook(ctx.tx, hookOn, hookName))
                 {

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/DeleteAccount.cpp

@@ -292,6 +292,15 @@ DeleteAccount::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
     if (sleAccount->getFlags() & lsfURITokenIssuer)
         return tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS;
 
+    // An on-ledger manifest outlives its account. Neither copy is in the owner
+    // directory, and the master copy stays listed in keylet::manifestDir() for
+    // good, so deleting the account would orphan both. A re-funded account
+    // could then never publish again: its first SetManifest would find the old
+    // master copy in the way, with no sfManifestID to say it is its own.
+    if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureOnChainManifests) &&
+        sleAccount->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID))
+        return tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS;
+
     if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureNonFungibleTokensV1))
     {
         // If an issuer has any issued NFTs resident in the ledger then it
@@ -428,6 +437,13 @@ DeleteAccount::doApply()
     if (src->isFieldPresent(sfHookNamespaces) || src->isFieldPresent(sfHooks))
         return tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS;
 
+    // The AppLoader is in no owner directory, so the cleanup walk below never
+    // visits it; erase it here or AccountRootsDeletedClean fires on the
+    // orphan. Not gated on featurePWALoader: without it no such object can
+    // exist, and gating could only ever leave one behind.
+    if (auto sleLoader = view().peek(keylet::appLoader(account_)))
+        view().erase(sleLoader);
+
     // Delete all of the entries in the account directory.
     Keylet const ownerDirKeylet{keylet::ownerDir(account_)};
     auto const ter = cleanupOnAccountDelete(

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/InvariantCheck.cpp

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <xrpld/ledger/ReadView.h>
 #include <xrpld/ledger/View.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/AppLoader.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/FeeUnits.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STArray.h>
@@ -603,6 +604,7 @@ LedgerEntryTypesMatch::visitEntry(
             case ltCRON:
             case ltIMPORT_VLSEQ:
             case ltUNL_REPORT:
+            case ltRANDOM:
             case ltAMM:
             case ltBRIDGE:
             case ltXCHAIN_OWNED_CLAIM_ID:
@@ -613,6 +615,7 @@ LedgerEntryTypesMatch::visitEntry(
             case ltMPTOKEN:
             case ltCREDENTIAL:
             case ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN:
+            case ltAPP_LOADER:
             case ltMANIFEST:
                 break;
             default:
@@ -2020,4 +2023,61 @@ ValidLockedBalance::finalize(
 
     return true;
 }
+
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+void
+ValidAppLoader::visitEntry(
+    bool isDelete,
+    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
+    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
+{
+    auto const& sle = after ? after : before;
+    if (!sle || sle->getType() != ltAPP_LOADER)
+        return;
+    touched_ = true;
+    if (!isDelete)
+        live_.push_back(after);
+}
+
+bool
+ValidAppLoader::finalize(
+    STTx const& tx,
+    TER const,
+    XRPAmount const,
+    ReadView const& view,
+    beast::Journal const& j)
+{
+    if (!touched_)
+        return true;
+
+    auto fail = [&](char const* why) {
+        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: AppLoader " << why;
+        return false;
+    };
+
+    if (!view.rules().enabled(featurePWALoader))
+        return fail("changed before featurePWALoader was enabled");
+    if (tx.getTxnType() != ttACCOUNT_SET && tx.getTxnType() != ttACCOUNT_DELETE)
+        return fail(
+            "changed by a transaction other than AccountSet or "
+            "AccountDelete");
+
+    for (auto const& sle : live_)
+    {
+        auto const owner = sle->getAccountID(sfOwner);
+        if (sle->key() != keylet::appLoader(owner).key)
+            return fail("is not keyed at its owner's keylet");
+        auto const blob = sle->getFieldVL(sfAppLoader);
+        if (appLoader::validate(blob.data(), blob.size()) !=
+            appLoader::Result::ok)
+            return fail("blob does not validate");
+        auto const root = view.read(keylet::account(owner));
+        if (!root ||
+            (*root)[~sfAppLoaderSequence] != (*sle)[sfAppLoaderSequence])
+            return fail("sequence does not match its owner's");
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
 }  // namespace ripple

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/InvariantCheck.h

@@ -708,8 +708,37 @@ public:
         beast::Journal const&);
 };
 
-// additional invariant checks can be declared above and then added to this
-// tuple
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: AppLoader objects stay consistent with their owners.
+ *
+ * An ltAPP_LOADER is in no owner directory, so nothing else would notice it
+ * drifting. For every transaction that creates, changes or deletes one:
+ * featurePWALoader is enabled and the transaction is an AccountSet or
+ * AccountDelete; a live loader is keyed at keylet::appLoader(sfOwner), its
+ * blob passes appLoader::validate, and its AppLoaderSequence equals its
+ * owner's.
+ */
+class ValidAppLoader
+{
+    bool touched_ = false;
+    std::vector<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>> live_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(
+        bool,
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&,
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(
+        STTx const&,
+        TER const,
+        XRPAmount const,
+        ReadView const&,
+        beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
 using InvariantChecks = std::tuple<
     TransactionFeeCheck,
     AccountRootsNotDeleted,
@@ -729,7 +758,8 @@ using InvariantChecks = std::tuple<
     ValidMPTIssuance,
     ValidPermissionedDomain,
     ValidAMM,
-    ValidLockedBalance>;
+    ValidLockedBalance,
+    ValidAppLoader>;
 
 /**
  * @brief get a tuple of all invariant checks

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetAccount.cpp

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <xrpld/core/Config.h>
 #include <xrpld/ledger/View.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/AppLoader.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
@@ -55,6 +56,25 @@ SetAccount::makeTxConsequences(PreflightContext const& ctx)
     return TxConsequences{ctx.tx, getTxConsequencesCategory(ctx.tx)};
 }
 
+XRPAmount
+SetAccount::calculateBaseFee(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
+{
+    XRPAmount extraFee{0};
+
+    if (view.rules().enabled(featurePWALoader))
+    {
+        if (auto const loader = tx[~sfAppLoader])
+        {
+            // One drop per byte, on every AccountSet carrying the field;
+            // removal carries an empty blob and so costs nothing extra.
+            extraFee += XRPAmount{static_cast<std::int64_t>(
+                loader->size() * appLoaderFeeDropsPerByte)};
+        }
+    }
+
+    return Transactor::calculateBaseFee(view, tx) + extraFee;
+}
+
 NotTEC
 SetAccount::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
 {
@@ -184,6 +204,28 @@ SetAccount::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
             return temMALFORMED;
     }
 
+    // AppLoader
+    if (auto const loader = tx[~sfAppLoader])
+    {
+        if (!ctx.rules.enabled(featurePWALoader))
+            return temDISABLED;
+
+        // An empty blob is the removal sentinel, matching Domain and
+        // MessageKey. It is not validated as a document.
+        if (!loader->empty())
+        {
+            auto const result =
+                appLoader::validate(loader->data(), loader->size());
+
+            if (result != appLoader::Result::ok)
+            {
+                JLOG(j.trace()) << "Malformed transaction: AppLoader: "
+                                << appLoader::to_string(result);
+                return temMALFORMED;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     // HookStateScale
     if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfHookStateScale))
     {
@@ -565,6 +607,42 @@ SetAccount::doApply()
         }
     }
 
+    // AppLoader: its own ltAPP_LOADER object (no directory entry, no
+    // reserve; the per-byte fee from calculateBaseFee pays for it). Every
+    // AccountSet carrying the field, removal included, advances the owner's
+    // AppLoaderSequence, and a written object records the sequence it was
+    // written at, so a reader can tell whether a copy is current.
+    if (view().rules().enabled(featurePWALoader) &&
+        tx.isFieldPresent(sfAppLoader))
+    {
+        Blob const loader = tx.getFieldVL(sfAppLoader);
+        Keylet const klLoader = keylet::appLoader(account_);
+        auto sleLoader = view().peek(klLoader);
+        std::uint32_t const seq = (*sle)[~sfAppLoaderSequence].value_or(0) + 1;
+        (*sle)[sfAppLoaderSequence] = seq;
+
+        if (loader.empty())
+        {
+            if (sleLoader)
+                view().erase(sleLoader);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            bool const create = !sleLoader;
+            if (create)
+            {
+                sleLoader = std::make_shared<SLE>(klLoader);
+                (*sleLoader)[sfOwner] = account_;
+            }
+            sleLoader->setFieldVL(sfAppLoader, loader);
+            (*sleLoader)[sfAppLoaderSequence] = seq;
+            if (create)
+                view().insert(sleLoader);
+            else
+                view().update(sleLoader);
+        }
+    }
+
     //
     // TransferRate
     //

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetAccount.h

@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@ public:
     static TxConsequences
     makeTxConsequences(PreflightContext const& ctx);
 
+    /** Adds appLoaderFeeDropsPerByte per byte of AppLoader document.
+
+        The AppLoader ledger object carries no owner reserve, so the cost of
+        the storage is recovered here instead.
+    */
+    static XRPAmount
+    calculateBaseFee(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx);
+
     static NotTEC
     preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx);
 

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetHook.cpp

@@ -1740,7 +1740,15 @@ SetHook::setHook()
                 {
                     if (newHookName->size() == 0)
                     {
-                        newHook.makeFieldAbsent(sfHookName);
+                        // Erase the field outright rather than
+                        // makeFieldAbsent: newHook carries no template, so
+                        // makeFieldAbsent leaves an STI_NOTPRESENT
+                        // placeholder in the in-memory entry that every
+                        // reader must then special-case, and it throws
+                        // (-> tefEXCEPTION) when the hook has no name to
+                        // remove. delField matches the serialized form of
+                        // the entry and is a no-op on a nameless hook.
+                        newHook.delField(sfHookName);
                     }
                     else
                     {

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetManifest.cpp

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 //==============================================================================
 
 #include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
+#include <xrpld/app/misc/ManifestLedger.h>
 #include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetManifest.h>
 #include <xrpld/core/Config.h>
 #include <xrpld/ledger/View.h>
@@ -250,6 +251,12 @@ SetManifest::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
     // txid after a fee change. The strictly-increasing sequence test below
     // covers that, both within this ledger and in every later one. Either
     // result is tef, so a replay is never included and never claims a fee.
+    //
+    // The same goes for every other refusal here that turns on ledger state.
+    // The envelope is unsigned and consumes no account sequence, so once
+    // relayed anyone can resubmit it, in every ledger, for as long as the
+    // state it was refused on stays as it is. A tec would charge the master
+    // account its fee each time.
     if (sle->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID))
     {
         // A dangling sfManifestID is a corrupt ledger; doApply reports it.
@@ -279,6 +286,22 @@ SetManifest::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
     // account, but keylet::manifest(signingKey) is not: without this, a
     // manifest naming another validator's key as its ephemeral key would
     // collide with -- and clobber -- that validator's object.
+    //
+    // The two kinds of keylet share one namespace, so the master key's own
+    // keylet can be held as well: by another account's ephemeral copy, when
+    // this master key is that account's ephemeral key. Left to doApply, that
+    // would be reported as a corrupt ledger.
+    if (auto const sleMaster =
+            ctx.view.read(keylet::manifest(newManifest->masterKey));
+        sleMaster && sleMaster->getAccountID(sfAccount) != id)
+    {
+        JLOG(ctx.j.warn())
+            << "SetManifest: Master key already claimed as an ephemeral key "
+               "by another account. "
+            << id;
+        return tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE;
+    }
+
     if (newManifest->signingKey)
     {
         auto const sleEph =
@@ -289,7 +312,22 @@ SetManifest::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
                 << "SetManifest: Ephemeral key already claimed by another "
                    "account. "
                 << id;
-            return tecDUPLICATE;
+            return tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE;
+        }
+
+        // Held by this account, the object can only be the ephemeral copy of
+        // its current manifest: the master copy is at another key, since a
+        // manifest's two keys must differ. Every manifest cache refuses a
+        // newer manifest that keeps the ephemeral key (badEphemeralKey), so
+        // accepting one here would leave the ledger permanently ahead of what
+        // any node believes. A rotation names a new key; a revocation none.
+        if (sleEph)
+        {
+            JLOG(ctx.j.warn())
+                << "SetManifest: Ephemeral key already used by this master "
+                   "key's current manifest. "
+                << id;
+            return tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE;
         }
     }
 
@@ -313,94 +351,9 @@ SetManifest::doApply()
     if (!manifest || calcAccountID(manifest->masterKey) != account_)
         return tefINTERNAL;
 
-    // A manifest is stored twice so it can be found from either key:
-    //   keylet::manifest(masterKey)  -> obj1, sfManifestID -> obj2
-    //   keylet::manifest(signingKey) -> obj2, sfManifestID -> obj1
-    // A revoked manifest has no signing key, so it exists only as obj1 with no
-    // sfManifestID. Both copies are erased and rewritten on every update so
-    // they can never drift apart.
-    if (sle->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID))
-    {
-        uint256 const firstID = sle->getFieldH256(sfManifestID);
-        auto const sleMan1 = view().peek(Keylet{ltMANIFEST, firstID});
-        if (!sleMan1 || sleMan1->getAccountID(sfAccount) != account_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j_.error()) << "SetManifest: Old manifest object missing or "
-                                "misowned (ID1) !! "
-                             << strHex(firstID);
-            return tefBAD_LEDGER;
-        }
-
-        // Absent when the previous manifest was a revocation.
-        if (sleMan1->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID))
-        {
-            uint256 const secondID = sleMan1->getFieldH256(sfManifestID);
-            auto const sleMan2 = view().peek(Keylet{ltMANIFEST, secondID});
-            if (secondID == firstID || !sleMan2 ||
-                sleMan2->getAccountID(sfAccount) != account_)
-            {
-                JLOG(j_.error())
-                    << "SetManifest: Old manifest object missing, misowned or "
-                       "self-referential (ID2) !! "
-                    << strHex(secondID);
-                return tefBAD_LEDGER;
-            }
-            view().erase(sleMan2);
-        }
-
-        view().erase(sleMan1);
-    }
-
-    Keylet const klMan1 = keylet::manifest(manifest->masterKey);
-    std::optional<Keylet> klMan2;
-    if (!manifest->revoked() && manifest->signingKey)
-        klMan2 = keylet::manifest(*manifest->signingKey);
-
-    // Neither key may still be occupied: preclaim rejects an ephemeral key held
-    // by another account, and the block above cleared this account's own
-    // copies.
-    if (view().exists(klMan1) || (klMan2 && view().exists(*klMan2)))
-    {
-        JLOG(j_.error()) << "SetManifest: Manifest keylet already occupied !! "
-                         << strHex(klMan1.key);
-        return tefBAD_LEDGER;
-    }
-
-    // Mirror the manifest losslessly, signatures included, so any node can
-    // reconstruct and independently verify it (ManifestCache::applyLedger).
-    // Field *presence* is copied faithfully: sfVersion is soeDEFAULT in the
-    // manifest format, so materialising an absent one would alter the signed
-    // payload and break verification.
-    auto const write = [&](Keylet const& kl,
-                           std::optional<uint256> const& other) {
-        auto sleMan = std::make_shared<SLE>(kl);
-        sleMan->setAccountID(sfAccount, account_);
-        sleMan->setFieldU32(sfSequence, obj.getFieldU32(sfSequence));
-        sleMan->setFieldVL(sfPublicKey, obj.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey));
-        sleMan->setFieldVL(
-            sfMasterSignature, obj.getFieldVL(sfMasterSignature));
-        if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfVersion))
-            sleMan->setFieldU16(sfVersion, obj.getFieldU16(sfVersion));
-        if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfSigningPubKey))
-            sleMan->setFieldVL(
-                sfSigningPubKey, obj.getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey));
-        if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfSignature))
-            sleMan->setFieldVL(sfSignature, obj.getFieldVL(sfSignature));
-        if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfDomain))
-            sleMan->setFieldVL(sfDomain, obj.getFieldVL(sfDomain));
-        if (other)
-            sleMan->setFieldH256(sfManifestID, *other);
-        view().insert(sleMan);
-    };
-
-    write(klMan1, klMan2 ? std::optional<uint256>{klMan2->key} : std::nullopt);
-    if (klMan2)
-        write(*klMan2, klMan1.key);
-
-    sle->setFieldH256(sfManifestID, klMan1.key);
-    view().update(sle);
-
-    return tesSUCCESS;
+    // The objects, and the manifest directory entry, are maintained in one
+    // place; see writeManifestObjects.
+    return writeManifestObjects(view(), sle, obj, *manifest, j_);
 }
 
 XRPAmount

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.cpp

@@ -287,7 +287,9 @@ Transactor::calculateHookChainFee(
             // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
         }
 
-        auto const hookName = hookObj[~sfHookName];
+        std::optional<Blob> const hookName = hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookName)
+            ? std::optional<Blob>(hookObj.getFieldVL(sfHookName))
+            : std::nullopt;
 
         uint32_t flags = 0;
         if (hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfFlags))
@@ -1409,7 +1411,9 @@ Transactor::executeHookChain(
             // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
         }
 
-        auto const hookName = hookObj[~sfHookName];
+        std::optional<Blob> const hookName = hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookName)
+            ? std::optional<Blob>(hookObj.getFieldVL(sfHookName))
+            : std::nullopt;
 
         // check if the hook can fire
         uint256 hookOn = hook::getHookOn(
@@ -1541,6 +1545,21 @@ Transactor::doHookCallback(
     if (!emitDetails.isFieldPresent(sfEmitCallback))
         return;
 
+    bool const isEmitFailure = ctx_.tx.getTxnType() == ttEMIT_FAILURE;
+
+    // fix20261005: an emit failure callback is only meaningful with the
+    // original emitted transaction. If it wasn't in the ledger when this
+    // pseudo was applied there is nothing to report on, so skip rather than
+    // read the (already removed) entry.
+    if (isEmitFailure && view().rules().enabled(fix20261005) &&
+        !emitFailureTxn_)
+    {
+        JLOG(j_.warn()) << "HookError["
+                        << ctx_.tx.getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash)
+                        << "]: emitted txn missing on emit failure callback";
+        return;
+    }
+
     AccountID const& callbackAccountID =
         emitDetails.getAccountID(sfEmitCallback);
     uint256 const& callbackHookHash = emitDetails.getFieldH256(sfEmitHookHash);
@@ -1624,9 +1643,10 @@ Transactor::doHookCallback(
                 true,
                 true,
                 false,
-                ctx_.tx.getTxnType() == ttEMIT_FAILURE ? 1UL : 0UL,
+                isEmitFailure ? 1UL : 0UL,
                 hook_no - 1,
-                provisionalMeta);
+                provisionalMeta,
+                emitFailureTxn_);
 
             executedHookCount_++;
 
@@ -2089,6 +2109,24 @@ Transactor::operator()()
         }
     }
 
+    // fix20261005: a ttEMIT_FAILURE erases the expired ltEMITTED_TXN entry in
+    // doApply, but the Hook callback that runs afterwards (finishApply ->
+    // doHookCallback) needs the original emitted transaction. Capture it
+    // before base application mutates the view.
+    if (hooksEnabled && isTesSuccess(result) &&
+        ctx_.tx.getTxnType() == ttEMIT_FAILURE &&
+        view().rules().enabled(fix20261005))
+    {
+        if (auto const sle = view().read(
+                keylet::emittedTxn(ctx_.tx.getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash)));
+            sle && sle->isFieldPresent(sfEmittedTxn))
+        {
+            if (auto const inner = dynamic_cast<STObject const*>(
+                    sle->peekAtPField(sfEmittedTxn)))
+                emitFailureTxn_.emplace(*inner);
+        }
+    }
+
     // fall through allows normal apply
     if (isTesSuccess(result))
         result = apply();
@@ -2119,6 +2157,17 @@ Transactor::finishApply(
     if (ctx_.size() > oversizeMetaDataCap)
         result = tecOVERSIZE;
 
+    // featureRNG: a transaction whose Hooks drew from the RNG is never
+    // retried on a tec. Under tapRETRY (the first closed-ledger pass, and
+    // open-ledger retries) a tec would otherwise drop the view without going
+    // through reset(), so the RNG state would not be rolled forward: a Hook
+    // that rolled back (tecHOOK_REJECTED) would leave the state it drew from
+    // in place for the next transaction in the pass, and would draw again on
+    // the final pass against a different state. Draws only exist when the
+    // amendment is enabled, so this needs no separate gate.
+    bool const rngDrawn =
+        dynamic_cast<ApplyViewImpl&>(ctx_.view()).getRandomData().has_value();
+
     if (isTecClaim(result) && (view().flags() & tapFAIL_HARD))
     {
         // If the tapFAIL_HARD flag is set, a tec result
@@ -2129,7 +2178,8 @@ Transactor::finishApply(
     else if (
         (result == tecOVERSIZE) || (result == tecKILLED) ||
         (result == tecINCOMPLETE) || (result == tecEXPIRED) ||
-        (isTecClaimHardFail(result, view().flags())))
+        (isTecClaimHardFail(result, view().flags())) ||
+        (rngDrawn && isTecClaim(result)))
     {
         JLOG(j_.trace()) << "reapplying because of " << transToken(result);
 
@@ -2260,7 +2310,6 @@ Transactor::finishApply(
         uint32_t lgrCur = view().seq();
 
         bool const has240819 = view().rules().enabled(fix240819);
-        bool const has240911 = view().rules().enabled(fix240911);
         bool const hasIOURewardClaim =
             view().rules().enabled(featureIOURewardClaim);
         auto const& sfRewardFields =
@@ -2380,10 +2429,12 @@ Transactor::finishApply(
             if (!finalFields.isFieldPresent(sfBalance))
                 continue;
 
+            bool const has20261005 = view().rules().enabled(fix20261005);
+
             uint64_t bal =
                 finalFields.getFieldAmount(sfBalance).xrp().drops() / 1'000'000;
 
-            if (bal == 0)
+            if (!has20261005 && bal == 0)
                 continue;
 
             uint32_t lgrLast = sle->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast);
@@ -2391,19 +2442,33 @@ Transactor::finishApply(
             uint32_t lgrElapsed = lgrCur - lgrLast;
 
             // overflow safety
-            if (!has240911 &&
-                (lgrElapsed > lgrCur || lgrElapsed > lgrLast ||
-                 lgrElapsed == 0))
-                continue;
-            if (has240911 && (lgrElapsed > lgrCur || lgrElapsed == 0))
+            if (lgrElapsed > lgrCur || lgrElapsed == 0)
+            {
+                if (has20261005)
+                {
+                    sle->setFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast, lgrCur);
+                    view().update(sle);
+                }
                 continue;
+            }
 
             uint64_t accum = sle->getFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator);
+
+            // When bal == 0 there is no accumulator contribution to add, but
+            // the marker must still advance (handled below) so the stale span
+            // cannot be reused. accumNew == accum in that case.
             uint64_t accumNew = accum + bal * ((uint64_t)lgrElapsed);
 
             // check for overflow
             if (accumNew < accum)
+            {
+                if (has20261005)
+                {
+                    sle->setFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast, lgrCur);
+                    view().update(sle);
+                }
                 continue;
+            }
 
             sle->setFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator, accumNew);
             sle->setFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast, lgrCur);

src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h

@@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ protected:
         touched_;  // fix20261005: accounts touched (featureTouch) in the
                    // current view. Never populated before the fix, emptied
                    // whenever the view is discarded.
+    std::optional<STObject>
+        emitFailureTxn_;  // fix20261005: for ttEMIT_FAILURE, the original
+                          // emitted transaction, captured before doApply
+                          // erases its ltEMITTED_TXN entry. Consumed by the
+                          // callback in doHookCallback.
 
     // The post-apply pipeline of operator(): tec handling (reset),
     // invariants, balance rewards, weak hooks and commit.

src/xrpld/consensus/Consensus.h

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
 #include <boost/logic/tribool.hpp>
 
 #include <chrono>
+#include <concepts>
 #include <deque>
+#include <map>
 #include <optional>
 #include <sstream>
 
@@ -532,6 +534,50 @@ private:
     void
     updateOurPositions(std::unique_ptr<std::stringstream> const& clog);
 
+    /** Whether a disputed transaction must be in our position regardless of
+        its vote count.
+
+        Optional adaptor hook: an adaptor that provides
+        `std::optional<NodeID_t> forcedTxOwner(Tx_t const&, Ledger_t const&)`
+        can name a node that a transaction belongs to (featureRNG uses this
+        for each validator's entropy contribution). During the opening
+        window of the establish phase such a transaction is voted yes iff its
+        owner's own position contains it, but at most one per owner per round
+        (see forcedTxs_). Afterwards it is voted on like any other disputed
+        transaction, so an owner publishing late cannot force churn. Adaptors
+        without the hook are unaffected.
+    */
+    bool
+    forcedInclusion(typename Result::Dispute_t const& dispute) const;
+
+    /** The owner the adaptor names for a disputed transaction while the
+        forced-inclusion window is open. Always unseated for an adaptor
+        without the forcedTxOwner hook.
+    */
+    std::optional<NodeID_t>
+    forcedOwner(typename Result::Dispute_t const& dispute) const;
+
+    /** Add any forced-inclusion transactions to our position. */
+    void
+    mergeForcedTxs(std::unique_ptr<std::stringstream> const& clog);
+
+    /** The one transaction each owner may force into our position this
+        round, chosen by mergeForcedTxs the first time the owner's position
+        offers one. An owner whose position carries several cannot make us
+        carry them all. Cleared when we close.
+    */
+    std::map<NodeID_t, typename Tx_t::ID> forcedTxs_;
+
+    /** forcedTxOwner results for this round, keyed by transaction ID.
+
+        The adaptor's answer depends only on the transaction and the previous
+        ledger, both fixed for the round, so it is computed once per disputed
+        transaction rather than on every tick (forcedOwner is reached several
+        times per dispute per tick, and the RCL adaptor deserialises the
+        transaction to answer). Cleared when we close.
+    */
+    mutable std::map<typename Tx_t::ID, std::optional<NodeID_t>> forcedOwners_;
+
     bool
     haveConsensus(std::unique_ptr<std::stringstream> const& clog);
 
@@ -1368,6 +1414,8 @@ Consensus<Adaptor>::phaseEstablish(
                << "avMIN_CONSENSUS_TIME: " << parms.avMIN_CONSENSUS_TIME.count()
                << "ms. ";
 
+    mergeForcedTxs(clog);
+
     // Give everyone a chance to take an initial position
     if (result_->roundTime.read() < parms.ledgerMIN_CONSENSUS)
     {
@@ -1418,6 +1466,8 @@ Consensus<Adaptor>::closeLedger(std::unique_ptr<std::stringstream> const& clog)
     phase_ = ConsensusPhase::establish;
     JLOG(j_.debug()) << "transitioned to ConsensusPhase::establish";
     rawCloseTimes_.self = now_;
+    forcedTxs_.clear();
+    forcedOwners_.clear();
 
     result_.emplace(adaptor_.onClose(previousLedger_, now_, mode_.get()));
     result_->roundTime.reset(clock_.now());
@@ -1513,6 +1563,10 @@ Consensus<Adaptor>::updateOurPositions(
         std::optional<typename TxSet_t::MutableTxSet> mutableSet;
         for (auto& [txId, dispute] : result_->disputes)
         {
+            // Already merged into our position by mergeForcedTxs.
+            if (forcedInclusion(dispute))
+                continue;
+
             // Because the threshold for inclusion increases,
             //  time can change our position on a dispute
             if (dispute.updateVote(
@@ -1659,6 +1713,128 @@ Consensus<Adaptor>::updateOurPositions(
     }
 }
 
+template <class Adaptor>
+std::optional<typename Consensus<Adaptor>::NodeID_t>
+Consensus<Adaptor>::forcedOwner(typename Result::Dispute_t const& dispute) const
+{
+    if constexpr (requires(Adaptor& a, Tx_t const& tx, Ledger_t const& l) {
+                      {
+                          a.forcedTxOwner(tx, l)
+                      } -> std::convertible_to<std::optional<NodeID_t>>;
+                  })
+    {
+        if (!result_)
+            return std::nullopt;
+
+        ConsensusParms const& parms = adaptor_.parms();
+        if (result_->roundTime.read() >=
+            parms.ledgerMIN_CONSENSUS + parms.ledgerGRANULARITY)
+            return std::nullopt;
+
+        auto const& id = dispute.tx().id();
+        auto it = forcedOwners_.find(id);
+        if (it == forcedOwners_.end())
+            it = forcedOwners_
+                     .emplace(
+                         id,
+                         adaptor_.forcedTxOwner(dispute.tx(), previousLedger_))
+                     .first;
+        return it->second;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+}
+
+template <class Adaptor>
+bool
+Consensus<Adaptor>::forcedInclusion(
+    typename Result::Dispute_t const& dispute) const
+{
+    std::optional<NodeID_t> const owner = forcedOwner(dispute);
+    if (!owner)
+        return false;
+
+    // our own contribution: keep it while the window is open
+    if (*owner == result_->position.nodeID())
+        return result_->txns.exists(dispute.tx().id());
+
+    // otherwise only the one transaction chosen for this owner this round
+    auto const it = forcedTxs_.find(*owner);
+    if (it == forcedTxs_.end() || it->second != dispute.tx().id())
+        return false;
+
+    return dispute.getVote(*owner).value_or(false);
+}
+
+template <class Adaptor>
+void
+Consensus<Adaptor>::mergeForcedTxs(
+    std::unique_ptr<std::stringstream> const& clog)
+{
+    XRPL_ASSERT(result_, "ripple::Consensus::mergeForcedTxs : result is set");
+
+    // Choose the one transaction each owner may force this round: the lowest
+    // ID its position offers the first time it offers any. Nodes that see the
+    // same position make the same choice.
+    NodeID_t const& self = result_->position.nodeID();
+    std::map<NodeID_t, typename Tx_t::ID> chosen;
+    for (auto const& [txId, dispute] : result_->disputes)
+    {
+        std::optional<NodeID_t> const owner = forcedOwner(dispute);
+        if (!owner || *owner == self || forcedTxs_.count(*owner) != 0 ||
+            !dispute.getVote(*owner).value_or(false))
+            continue;
+
+        auto const [it, inserted] = chosen.emplace(*owner, txId);
+        if (!inserted && txId < it->second)
+            it->second = txId;
+    }
+    forcedTxs_.merge(chosen);
+
+    std::optional<typename TxSet_t::MutableTxSet> mutableSet;
+    for (auto& [txId, dispute] : result_->disputes)
+    {
+        if (dispute.getOurVote() || !forcedInclusion(dispute))
+            continue;
+
+        dispute.setOurVote(true);
+        if (!mutableSet)
+            mutableSet.emplace(result_->txns);
+        mutableSet->insert(dispute.tx());
+    }
+
+    if (!mutableSet)
+        return;
+
+    TxSet_t newSet{std::move(*mutableSet)};
+    auto const newID = newSet.id();
+    result_->txns = std::move(newSet);
+
+    JLOG(j_.info()) << "Position change: forced inclusion, tx " << newID;
+    CLOG(clog) << "Position change: forced inclusion, tx " << newID << ". ";
+
+    result_->position.changePosition(
+        newID, result_->position.closeTime(), now_);
+
+    if (acquired_.emplace(newID, result_->txns).second)
+    {
+        if (!result_->position.isBowOut())
+            adaptor_.share(result_->txns);
+
+        for (auto const& [nodeId, peerPos] : currPeerPositions_)
+        {
+            if (peerPos.proposal().position() == newID)
+                updateDisputes(nodeId, result_->txns);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!result_->position.isBowOut() &&
+        (mode_.get() == ConsensusMode::proposing))
+        adaptor_.propose(result_->position);
+}
+
 template <class Adaptor>
 bool
 Consensus<Adaptor>::haveConsensus(

src/xrpld/consensus/DisputedTx.h

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/UintTypes.h>
 #include <boost/container/flat_map.hpp>
 #include <memory>
+#include <optional>
 
 namespace ripple {
 
@@ -113,6 +114,19 @@ public:
     void
     unVote(NodeID_t const& peer);
 
+    /** A peer's vote, if we have one.
+
+        @param peer Identifier of peer.
+    */
+    std::optional<bool>
+    getVote(NodeID_t const& peer) const
+    {
+        auto const it = votes_.find(peer);
+        if (it == votes_.end())
+            return std::nullopt;
+        return it->second;
+    }
+
     /** Update our vote given progression of consensus.
 
         Updates our vote on this disputed transaction based on our peers' votes

src/xrpld/core/Config.h

@@ -191,8 +191,17 @@ public:
     int RELAY_UNTRUSTED_VALIDATIONS = 1;
     int RELAY_UNTRUSTED_PROPOSALS = 0;
 
+    // While acquiring the first ledger, fetch and read the on-ledger manifests
+    // ahead of the rest of its state. See [early_manifest_sync].
+    bool EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC = true;
+
     // True to ask peers not to relay current IP.
     bool PEER_PRIVATE = false;
+
+    // True to enable the Xahau UDP Superhighway (XUSH): a best-effort UDP
+    // transport on the peer port used to fan transactions out to other
+    // highway-enabled servers in addition to the normal peer relay.
+    bool UDP_HIGHWAY = false;
     // peers_max is a legacy configuration, which is going to be replaced
     // with individual inbound peers peers_in_max and outbound peers
     // peers_out_max configuration. for now we support both the legacy and
@@ -309,6 +318,9 @@ public:
     // Enable the beta API version
     bool BETA_RPC_API = false;
 
+    // Enable the hook_validate RPC (defaults to true in standalone mode).
+    bool HOOK_VALIDATE_RPC = false;
+
     // First, attempt to load the latest ledger directly from disk.
     bool FAST_LOAD = false;
     // When starting rippled with existing database it do not know it has those