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Author SHA1 Message Date
Richard Holland 4d00580a52 failing tests 2026-10-20 14:06:42 +11:00
Richard Holland 5db97be877 test clock fix 2026-10-16 16:59:35 +11:00
Richard Holland d70fd6fa72 fix stub 2026-10-16 12:04:02 +11:00
Richard Holland f9747d1633 credit note init 2026-10-15 12:44:19 +11:00
Richard Holland 0074cf9e95 Merge dev into jsontx; move sfJsonTxDelta to VL 95 (96 taken by sfAppLoader) 2026-10-15 10:38:24 +11:00
Richard Holland b9f2914c0e catalogue speed and memory fixes (#883) 2026-10-14 14:13:37 +10:00
tequ 023f55e283 fix: keep ledger_history in standalone mode for rwdb null node store (#893) 2026-10-14 12:30:51 +10:00
tequandRichard Holland d20e8ffb56 fix(hook): crash on the transaction after removing a HookName (#890)
* fix(hook): Read sfHookName via isFieldPresent instead of operator[]

SetHook removes a hook's name with makeFieldAbsent on an untemplated
sfHooks entry, which leaves an STI_NOTPRESENT placeholder for
sfHookName. STObject::at(~sfHookName) then fails the dynamic_cast,
dereferences the null template and asserts (null deref in release).

Every other optional field of an sfHooks entry is already read with
isFieldPresent/getField*, which treats the placeholder as absent.
Align the three sfHookName readers with that convention:

- Transactor::calculateHookChainFee
- Transactor::executeHookChain
- ClaimReward::preclaim (fix20260929 path)

hook::canHook now takes std::optional<Blob> so callers can pass the
copied value without a dangling Slice.

Add regression tests that remove a hook name with a HookName-only
SetHook update and then submit the next transaction (Invoke and
ClaimReward). Both crashed before this change.

* claude fixes

---------

Co-authored-by: Richard Holland <[email protected]>
2026-10-13 10:57:14 +10:00
Richard Holland c63ee8cc5f fix mkdir in release builder (#889) 2026-10-12 13:19:11 +10:00
Richard Holland 64a30b2a15 Various fixes (#888) 2026-10-12 12:48:34 +10:00
Richard Holland 0025355f43 UDP Superhighway (#877) 2026-10-12 10:54:31 +10:00
Richard Holland 7046616cdb FeatureRNG (#869) 2026-10-12 10:49:46 +10:00
Richard Holland a2e7f3c645 PWABootLoader (#793) 2026-10-12 08:22:29 +10:00
Richard Holland 004752d1c2 On Chain Manifests Directory, Partial Sync and Gossip Bloom Filter (#861) 2026-10-12 08:08:29 +10:00
tequ 22e6ad21b4 Add hook_validate RPC to run the hook guard checker (#882) 2026-10-11 23:08:29 +10:00
tequ 3423ee4665 fix: Stop embedded tests from hanging on ARM by using atomic_flag (#6248) (#887) 2026-10-11 22:39:17 +10:00
Richard Holland de7afa9895 Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-10-08 23:12:33 +10:00
Richard Holland 983c5dfe0c fix consensus ordering for sfTime 2026-10-09 00:12:04 +11:00
tequ 47b00e9a65 Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-10-07 15:48:17 +09:00
Richard Holland ee1d44f7d6 Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-10-04 10:52:56 +10:00
Richard Holland 5995cc2d00 Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-10-03 09:46:40 +10:00
Richard Holland e9cc9e6fcb edge cases for seq=0, update fix name 2026-10-01 08:28:38 +10:00
Richard Holland 350347c615 Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-10-01 05:43:23 +10:00
Richard Holland 7112b80d8f Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-09-30 14:20:36 +10:00
Richard Holland 3de9cc3ba7 Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-09-29 04:38:01 +10:00
Richard Holland e35ae4af20 seq=0 safety 2026-09-29 04:37:36 +10:00
Richard Holland d916f108da implied seq=0 when time present or ticketseq 2026-09-29 04:20:57 +10:00
Richard Holland a09c180a93 sfTime fixes, integer bounds, etc 2026-09-29 03:58:14 +10:00
Richard Holland 33939f0b02 improvements 2026-09-26 20:50:30 +10:00
Richard Holland 779a07804b Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-09-26 16:16:01 +10:00
Richard Holland 60caaea495 try again 2026-09-13 23:40:06 +10:00
RichardAHBot 4bbcc2d953 fix: regenerate hook/sfcodes.h on jsontx branch
Adds sfTime (UINT32/96), sfJsonTxDelta (VL/96), and sfAppLoader/sfAppLoaderID
which were added to sfields.macro but not propagated to the generated hook
header, causing verify-generated-headers CI failure.
2026-09-13 22:39:31 +10:00
RichardAHBot 72d793d912 style: clang-format-18 for jsontx files 2026-09-13 22:39:31 +10:00
RichardAHBot db25f9799c test: add 15 more error path tests for delta decoder and timestamp parser
Cover unsanitize_jsontx error paths: truncated delta, unmerged literal/run,
empty delta, undersize copy, unmerged copy run, bad literal length, overlong
varint, and delta value out of range. Also add timestamp edge cases: malformed
ISO format, out-of-range month/day, non-leap Feb 29, and before-epoch dates.
2026-09-13 22:39:31 +10:00
RichardAHBot e470d8a70b fix: tighten jsontx_exact integer boundary at 2^53
jsontx_exact: change the double boundary check from exclusive to inclusive
(d > max -> d >= max, d < -max -> d <= -max). Doubles cannot uniquely
represent odd integers at or above 2^53, so values like 2^53+1 silently
round to 2^53, corrupting the canonical form. The safe ceiling for
round-trip-exact integers is 2^53 - 1.

tests: add coverage for the 2^53 boundary (positive and negative sides,
and the silent rounding case).
2026-09-13 22:39:31 +10:00
RichardAHBot 4fb88f5f80 fix: reject \u escapes in jsontx_strict; expand tests
jsontx_strict: the comment claimed \u sequences were rejected but the
code only tracked backslashes without checking if they introduced a
unicode escape. Now properly throws on \u inside strings, which also
covers NUL-byte injection (\u0000) and prevents canonical form
mismatches caused by jsoncpp silently decoding \uXXXX.

tests: add coverage for \u rejection, jsontx_u64 negative/non-integer/
infinity rejection, delta size scaling with transaction complexity,
and sanitize rejection of unicode escapes.

Fixes a subtle security concern: without this check, a signer could
send a preimage with \uXXXX that jsoncpp would decode into a
different character, causing the canonical form to diverge from what
the signer actually signed while still passing the delta round-trip.
2026-09-13 22:39:31 +10:00
RichardAHBot b2cdcf429e improve: add sig parameter check and expand json-tx test coverage
Submit.cpp: validate jss::sig presence before use so missing-signature
errors are reported clearly rather than as a misleading 'bad signature'.

JSONTxSignatures_test: 40 test sections covering:
- strict JSON parsing (comments, unicode, trailing commas, single quotes)
- ISO-8601 timestamp round-trips and overflow
- sanitize/unsanitize delta encoding round-trips
- unknown field and duplicate field rejection
- NUL byte rejection in string values
- document size limit enforcement
- nested objects and canonical field reordering
- delta decoding edge cases (varint bounds, too many ops, copy past end,
  unknown ops, non-minimal varints)
- multiple round-trip stability
- u64 formatting edge cases
2026-09-13 22:39:31 +10:00
RichardAHBot 3fd6ee472a add: unit tests for JSONTxSignatures
Comprehensive test coverage for jsontx_strict, jsontx_iso round-tripping,
sanitize/unsanitize delta encoding, jsontx_num edge cases, jsontx_field
lookup, and full pipeline integration tests.

Tests cover:
- Valid and invalid strict JSON parsing (comments, unicode, syntax)
- ISO-8601 timestamp round-trips and overflow rejection
- Delta encoding round-trips for various transaction shapes
- Bounds checking on malformed deltas
- Multiple round-trip stability
- Whitespace normalization producing identical canonical forms
- Delta size bounded by jsontx_max_diff
2026-09-13 22:39:31 +10:00
Richard Holland b2aeb1cd92 more 2026-09-11 19:06:34 +10:00
Richard Holland 0f56d2d807 Merge branch 'dev' into jsontx 2026-09-11 16:18:41 +10:00
Richard Holland e904290e4e jsontx stuff 2026-08-05 12:43:25 +10:00
Richard Holland 723103150c init jsontxsig amendment 2026-07-31 12:36:39 +10:00
175 changed files with 23567 additions and 889 deletions

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+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.nodestore
xrpld.app > xrpld.nodestore
Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.overlay
xrpld.overlay ~= xrpld.app
xrpld.overlay == xrpld.app
Loop: xrpld.app xrpld.peerfinder
xrpld.app > xrpld.peerfinder
+4
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ libxrpl.server > xrpl.basics
libxrpl.server > xrpl.json
libxrpl.server > xrpl.protocol
libxrpl.server > xrpl.server
test.app > test.shamap
test.app > test.toplevel
test.app > test.unit_test
test.app > xrpl.basics
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ test.app > xrpld.ledger
test.app > xrpld.nodestore
test.app > xrpld.overlay
test.app > xrpld.rpc
test.app > xrpld.shamap
test.app > xrpl.hook
test.app > xrpl.json
test.app > xrpl.protocol
@@ -101,6 +103,7 @@ test.overlay > xrpld.overlay
test.overlay > xrpld.peerfinder
test.overlay > xrpld.shamap
test.overlay > xrpl.protocol
test.overlay > xrpl.resource
test.peerfinder > test.beast
test.peerfinder > test.unit_test
test.peerfinder > xrpl.basics
@@ -124,6 +127,7 @@ test.rpc > xrpl.basics
test.rpc > xrpld.app
test.rpc > xrpld.core
test.rpc > xrpld.net
test.rpc > xrpld.nodestore
test.rpc > xrpld.overlay
test.rpc > xrpld.rpc
test.rpc > xrpld.shamap
+1 -1
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ else
# GH Action, runner
if [[ "$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)" == "release" ]]; then
echo "building on the release branch... placing it in builds/candidate"
mkdir /data/builds/candidate
mkdir -p /data/builds/candidate
cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
else
+185
View File
@@ -166,10 +166,13 @@
# ws Websockets
# wss Secure Websockets
# peer Peer Protocol
# pwa On-ledger AppLoader documents (featurePWALoader), for a
# reverse proxy only. Read "pwa ports" below first.
#
# Restrictions:
#
# Only one port may be configured to support the peer protocol.
# The pwa protocol cannot be combined with any other protocol.
# A port cannot have websocket and non websocket protocols at the
# same time. It is possible have both Websockets and Secure Websockets
# together in one port.
@@ -264,6 +267,119 @@
# "secure_gateway" connections, then they will be treated as
# "admin" addresses.
#
# pwa ports
#
# A port whose protocol is "pwa" serves accounts' on-ledger AppLoader
# documents (featurePWALoader) as HTML. This makes the node a web host
# for third-party content: anyone can publish a loader to an account
# for about a drop per byte, and nothing in protocol takes one down.
# Hosting, and a hosting provider's obligations, are yours.
#
# One host per account, on a zone used for nothing else:
#
# https://pwa<account-index>.<domain>/<r-address>
# https://<domain>/<r-address> 301 to the above
# https://<custom host>/ see custom_domains
#
# The first label of the Host header is "pwa" followed by the decimal
# AccountIndex of the account (an account created before AccountIndex
# existed has no host); the rest must be one of the port's "domain"
# values; the path must be that account's exact r-address. One
# trailing slash and a query string are ignored; anything else is
# 404. The bare zone never serves a document (every page would share
# one origin): it redirects, keeping :port and query.
# Never set cookies at or above the zone and never serve your own
# site from it. Wildcard DNS and a wildcard certificate cover it.
#
# Rules enforced at startup and on every request:
#
# - "pwa" is the port's only protocol; no admin, user/password or
# ssl_* keys (terminate TLS at the proxy).
# - "domain" is required: the zone(s), comma-separated. The proxy must
# forward the Host header unchanged.
# - "secure_gateway" is required and may not cover every address.
# Every request must come from it carrying X-Forwarded-For, whose
# RIGHTMOST entry (the one the proxy wrote) is the client. The
# "Forwarded" header is ignored.
# - Clients are metered per IPv4 address, per IPv6 /64; a miss costs
# what a hit does; over-use is answered 503 until it decays.
# - GET and HEAD only; every response closes the connection; only
# validated state is served, with an ETag (304 on If-None-Match).
# X-NetworkID, X-LedgerSeq, X-LedgerHash and X-PWASeq name the
# validated ledger and AppLoaderSequence the document came from, so
# a client (a browser extension, say) can vet it against a second
# node with the pwa_validate RPC (account, hash of the bytes, host).
# - Lookups run on at most two job queue threads, below client RPC;
# beyond a bounded backlog they are refused with 503. Put a cache in
# front (the ETag makes revalidation cheap).
# - The admin RPC "pwa_info" reports requests by outcome and bytes
# served; "reset": true zeroes them, "flush_dns": true drops the
# custom domain cache (CLI: xahaud pwa_info [reset] [flush_dns]).
#
# Example (also add port_pwa to the [server] list):
#
# [port_pwa]
# port = 8088
# ip = 127.0.0.1
# protocol = pwa
# secure_gateway = 127.0.0.1
# domain = pwapp.example
#
# with nginx in front, TLS terminated there, Host passed through:
#
# server {
# listen 443 ssl;
# server_name pwapp.example ~^pwa[0-9]+\.pwapp\.example$;
# ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/wildcard.pwapp.example.pem;
# ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/wildcard.pwapp.example.key;
# location / {
# proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8088;
# proxy_set_header Host $host;
# proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
# }
# }
#
# custom_domains = 0 | 1
#
# Default 0. With 1, a request whose Host is outside every zone is
# served as the account named by DNS, so a domain owner can point
# their own name at your proxy:
#
# app.example.org. CNAME pwa-proxy.your.example.
# _xahau-pwa.app.example.org. TXT "rAbC..."
#
# The record lives on the _xahau-pwa label beneath the host because
# the host is usually a CNAME to your proxy. Exactly one address must
# be present there (other TXT strings are ignored; two addresses count
# as none). The named account must consent: its Domain field must
# equal the host or a parent of it (ignoring case), else 503. Lists
# apply as at the account's own host; only the root path is a
# document. No usable record is 404 (cached 15 minutes), a resolver
# failure 503 (cached 60 s), a record is cached for its TTL (clamped
# to 60..3600 s). Lookups run on their own job queue threads, at most
# four at a time and one per host; a request that misses the cache is
# answered 429 with Retry-After and a refreshing page rather than
# waiting, so a flood of Host headers cannot tie up the node. The
# admin RPC pwa_info with "flush_dns": true drops the cache. Your
# proxy must accept, and hold certificates for, the hosts you will
# serve (e.g. Caddy on-demand TLS); xahaud only sees the Host header.
#
# resolver = <IPv4 address>[:port]
#
# The recursive resolver for custom_domains; default is the system
# resolver. xahaud does not validate DNSSEC, so prefer a validating
# resolver on the same host.
#
# Documents are served with "Content-Security-Policy: sandbox
# allow-scripts ...": an opaque origin that cannot read anything from
# the node but can still send requests anywhere, including the
# visitor's own machine, so keep admin ports behind credentials.
#
# [pwa_allowlist] and [pwa_blocklist], one r-address per line, apply to
# every pwa port: if the allowlist is non-empty only those accounts are
# served; blocklisted accounts are never served (403), whatever the
# allowlist says. An account on both is a startup error.
#
# ssl_key = <filename>
# ssl_cert = <filename>
# ssl_chain = <filename>
@@ -448,6 +564,30 @@
#
#
#
# [udp_highway]
#
# 0 or 1.
#
# 0: Disable the Xahau UDP Superhighway (XUSH). [default]
# 1: Enable the Xahau UDP Superhighway (XUSH).
#
# The UDP Superhighway is a best-effort transport that runs alongside the
# peer protocol. When it is enabled the server also listens for UDP
# datagrams on its peer port number, and every transaction it relays to its
# peers is also sent, over UDP, to a small random set of other servers that
# have the highway enabled. It never replaces the peer protocol: anything
# sent over the highway is also relayed normally.
#
# To receive highway traffic, inbound UDP must be allowed to the peer port
# (in addition to inbound TCP).
#
# A server that keeps its address private (peer_private = 1, or any server
# configured as a validator) only exchanges highway traffic with the peers
# listed in [ips_fixed], and never advertises highway endpoints. Fixed peers
# are never advertised to other servers.
#
#
#
# [peers_max]
#
# The largest number of desired peer connections (incoming or outgoing).
@@ -674,6 +814,38 @@
#
#
#
# [early_manifest_sync]
#
# Controls whether, while acquiring its first ledger, the server fetches and
# reads the on-ledger validator manifests ahead of the rest of that ledger's
# state. Doing so lets it resolve validators' current signing keys, including
# rotations and revocations published on-ledger, within seconds of starting
# a sync rather than once the whole state has arrived.
#
# The manifests read are those of the master keys on the server's own
# validator lists, fetched by key, and as many more from the on-ledger
# manifest directory as the manifest cache keeps.
#
# The cost is a dozen or so request/response rounds with peers. With more
# than one peer serving the ledger these overlap with fetching the rest of
# its state; with only one, they come first.
#
# It also lets a server that starts with nothing but the master keys of its
# validators and a few peers find its way. Until it has validated a ledger,
# while it holds manifests for too few of its validators to make a quorum,
# it reads them from up to three of the ledgers its peers report, the most
# widely reported first, every 15 seconds. Every manifest read is checked
# against its master key's signature, so a ledger reported by a peer that
# is not on the network can leave something out but cannot add anything.
#
# Legal values are:
# 1 - Fetch the manifests first, and from peers' ledgers if needed
# 0 - Fetch the ledger's state in the usual order, and read the manifests
# from it once it is complete
#
# The default is 1. A ledger without on-ledger manifests costs only the few
# nodes on the paths to where their directory and objects would be.
#
#
#
# [ledger_history]
@@ -1416,6 +1588,19 @@
# contains breaking changes that require a new API version number.
# They are not ready for public consumption.
#
# [hook_validate_rpc]
#
# 0 or 1.
#
# 0: Disable the hook_validate RPC method
# 1: Enable the hook_validate RPC method, which runs the Hook guard
# checker and WASM VM validation against caller-supplied code using
# the current open ledger's rules.
#
# The default is 0 on networked nodes and 1 in standalone mode (-a).
# When enabled the method is available to non-admin (user role) clients,
# so consider the CPU cost before enabling it on a public-facing node.
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# 10. Example Settings
-1
View File
@@ -151,4 +151,3 @@ D686F2538F410C9D0D856788E98E3579595DAF7B38D38887F81ECAC934B06040 HooksUpdate1
4B8466415FAB32FFA89D9DCBE166A42340115771DF611A7160F8D7439C87ECD8 fixNSDelete
EDB4EE4C524E16BDD91D9A529332DED08DCAAA51CC6DC897ACFA1A0ED131C5B6 fix240819
8063140E9260799D6716756B891CEC3E7006C4E4F277AB84670663A88F94B9C4 fixPageCap
88693F108C3CD8A967F3F4253A32DEF5E35F9406ACD2A11B88B11D90865763A9 fix240911
+1
View File
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ target_link_libraries (ripple_syslibs
crypt32
>
$<$<NOT:$<BOOL:${MSVC}>>:dl>
$<$<NOT:$<BOOL:${MSVC}>>:resolv>
$<$<NOT:$<OR:$<BOOL:${MSVC}>,$<BOOL:${APPLE}>>>:rt>)
if (NOT MSVC)
+1
View File
@@ -47,5 +47,6 @@
#define MEM_OVERLAP -43
#define TOO_MANY_STATE_MODIFICATIONS -44
#define TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES -45
#define TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY -46
#define HOOK_ERROR_CODES
#endif //HOOK_ERROR_CODES
+6
View File
@@ -339,6 +339,12 @@ prepare(
uint32_t read_ptr,
uint32_t read_len);
extern int64_t
dice(uint32_t sides);
extern int64_t
util_random(uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
#include "error.h"
#include "extern.h"
#include "sfcodes.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "sfcodes.h"
#include "tts.h"
#include "ls_flags.h"
+14
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
#define sfHookApiVersion ((1U << 16U) + 20U)
#define sfHookStateScale ((1U << 16U) + 21U)
#define sfLedgerFixType ((1U << 16U) + 22U)
#define sfEntropyCount ((1U << 16U) + 99U)
#define sfEntropyDenominator ((1U << 16U) + 100U)
#define sfNetworkID ((2U << 16U) + 1U)
#define sfFlags ((2U << 16U) + 2U)
#define sfSourceTag ((2U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -80,6 +82,7 @@
#define sfRewardTime ((2U << 16U) + 98U)
#define sfRewardLgrFirst ((2U << 16U) + 99U)
#define sfRewardLgrLast ((2U << 16U) + 100U)
#define sfAppLoaderSequence ((2U << 16U) + 101U)
#define sfIndexNext ((3U << 16U) + 1U)
#define sfIndexPrevious ((3U << 16U) + 2U)
#define sfBookNode ((3U << 16U) + 3U)
@@ -105,6 +108,9 @@
#define sfMPTAmount ((3U << 16U) + 26U)
#define sfIssuerNode ((3U << 16U) + 27U)
#define sfSubjectNode ((3U << 16U) + 28U)
#define sfLastNoteTime ((3U << 16U) + 94U)
#define sfLastTxnTime ((3U << 16U) + 95U)
#define sfTime ((3U << 16U) + 96U)
#define sfTouchCount ((3U << 16U) + 97U)
#define sfAccountIndex ((3U << 16U) + 98U)
#define sfAccountCount ((3U << 16U) + 99U)
@@ -152,6 +158,8 @@
#define sfEscrowID ((5U << 16U) + 35U)
#define sfURITokenID ((5U << 16U) + 36U)
#define sfDomainID ((5U << 16U) + 37U)
#define sfNextRandomDigest ((5U << 16U) + 89U)
#define sfRandomData ((5U << 16U) + 90U)
#define sfManifestID ((5U << 16U) + 91U)
#define sfHookOnOutgoing ((5U << 16U) + 93U)
#define sfHookOnIncoming ((5U << 16U) + 94U)
@@ -222,6 +230,10 @@
#define sfProvider ((7U << 16U) + 30U)
#define sfMPTokenMetadata ((7U << 16U) + 31U)
#define sfCredentialType ((7U << 16U) + 32U)
#define sfNote ((7U << 16U) + 93U)
#define sfNoteSignature ((7U << 16U) + 94U)
#define sfJsonTxDelta ((7U << 16U) + 95U)
#define sfAppLoader ((7U << 16U) + 96U)
#define sfHookName ((7U << 16U) + 97U)
#define sfRemarkValue ((7U << 16U) + 98U)
#define sfRemarkName ((7U << 16U) + 99U)
@@ -289,6 +301,7 @@
#define sfXChainCreateAccountAttestationCollectionElement ((14U << 16U) + 31U)
#define sfPriceData ((14U << 16U) + 32U)
#define sfCredential ((14U << 16U) + 33U)
#define sfRandomDigestEntry ((14U << 16U) + 88U)
#define sfManifest ((14U << 16U) + 90U)
#define sfAmountEntry ((14U << 16U) + 91U)
#define sfMintURIToken ((14U << 16U) + 92U)
@@ -321,6 +334,7 @@
#define sfAuthorizeCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 26U)
#define sfUnauthorizeCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 27U)
#define sfAcceptedCredentials ((15U << 16U) + 28U)
#define sfRandomDigests ((15U << 16U) + 91U)
#define sfAmounts ((15U << 16U) + 92U)
#define sfHookEmissions ((15U << 16U) + 93U)
#define sfImportVLKeys ((15U << 16U) + 94U)
+2
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#define ttNFTOKEN_MODIFY 70
#define ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET 71
#define ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE 72
#define ttENTROPY 89
#define ttNOTE_CLAIM 90
#define ttMANIFEST_SET 91
#define ttCRON 92
#define ttCRON_SET 93
+5 -1
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#define uint256 std::string
#define featureHooksUpdate1 "1"
#define featureHooksUpdate2 "1"
#define featureRNG "1"
#define fix20250131 "1"
#define fixGuardDepth32 "1"
namespace hook_api {
@@ -385,7 +386,9 @@ enum class hook_return_code : int64_t {
MEM_OVERLAP = -43, // one or more specified buffers are the same memory
TOO_MANY_STATE_MODIFICATIONS = -44, // more than 256 modified state
// entires in the combined hook chains
TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES = -45
TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES = -45,
TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY = -46 // featureRNG: no seed for this ledger, or too few
// validators contributed to it
};
enum class ExitType : uint8_t {
@@ -398,6 +401,7 @@ enum class ExitType : uint8_t {
const uint16_t max_state_modifications = 256;
const uint8_t max_slots = 255;
const uint8_t max_nonce = 255;
const uint16_t max_rng_draws = 256; // featureRNG, per Hook execution
const uint8_t max_emit = 255;
const uint8_t max_params = 16;
const double fee_base_multiplier = 1.1f;
+5 -1
View File
@@ -1096,7 +1096,11 @@ validateGuards(
{
int name_len = parseLeb128(wasm, i, &i);
CHECK_SHORT_HOOK();
if (name_len == 4)
// Only compare the name if all four bytes are in bounds. A
// name running past the end is rejected as a short hook below
// either way, so this does not change which hooks are valid.
if (name_len == 4 &&
static_cast<std::size_t>(i) + 4 <= wasm.size())
{
if (wasm[i] == 'h' && wasm[i + 1] == 'o' &&
wasm[i + 2] == 'o' && wasm[i + 3] == 'k')
+8
View File
@@ -298,4 +298,12 @@ HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
int64_t, prepare, (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len),
featureHooksUpdate2)
HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
int64_t, dice, (uint32_t sides),
featureRNG)
HOOK_API_DEFINITION(
int64_t, util_random, (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len),
featureRNG)
// clang-format on
+66
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2025 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#ifndef RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_APPLOADER_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_APPLOADER_H_INCLUDED
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
namespace ripple {
/** Validation of an AppLoader document (sfAppLoader), the bootstrap page of
a Progressive Web App served from an account.
Consensus cannot afford a real HTML parser, so this is a shallow sanity
gate and nothing more. A document must be non-empty and at most
maxAppLoaderLength bytes; well-formed UTF-8; free of C0 control
characters other than TAB, LF, FF and CR, and of DEL; begin, after an
optional BOM and whitespace, with an HTML doctype or an <html start tag;
and contain an <html start tag followed later by a </html> end tag with
nothing but whitespace after the last one. Nothing parses comments,
scripts or attributes, and content is not policed.
Consensus critical: a change to what it accepts needs an amendment.
*/
namespace appLoader {
enum class Result : std::uint8_t {
ok = 0,
empty,
tooLarge,
badUTF8,
badControlChar,
noDoctype, // does not open with a doctype or <html tag
noHtmlElement, // no <html start tag
unclosed, // no </html> end tag after it
trailingGarbage, // non-whitespace after the last </html>
};
/** Total: every input yields a result. `data` may be null iff size is 0. */
Result
validate(std::uint8_t const* data, std::size_t size);
char const*
to_string(Result r);
} // namespace appLoader
} // namespace ripple
#endif
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#ifndef RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_CREDITNOTE_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_CREDITNOTE_H_INCLUDED
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <string_view>
namespace ripple {
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Credit notes (featureCreditNote)
//
// A note is a bearer instrument the issuer signs blind, typically offline:
// "whoever holds this may take Amount from my account until Expiration".
// It is a JsonTx document in the sense of featureJsonTx - the same character
// set, number rules and signing prefix as a plaintext-signed transaction - so
// anything that can sign a JsonTx preimage can sign a note, and the bytes the
// issuer read are the bytes the ledger checks. There is no canonical form and
// no delta: NoteClaim carries the note verbatim.
//
// The document is exactly one object with exactly these five members, in any
// order, spelled exactly so (no case folding - what you see is what you get):
//
// "NetworkID" bare integer the network the note redeems on
// "Account" r-address the issuer; who pays
// "Amount" bare integer drops of the native currency, or
// object {"currency","issuer","value"}, all strings,
// an issued currency as a Payment spells it
// "IssueTime" ISO 8601 Date().toISOString(), as sfTime renders
// "Expiration" ISO 8601 after IssueTime, at most creditNoteMaxLifeMs
// later
//
// TransactionType is not a member, and IssueTime is not a transaction field,
// so no note is a valid transaction preimage and no transaction preimage is
// a valid note: the shared signing prefix needs no further separation.
//
// Replay protection is the issuer's AccountRoot sfLastNoteTime: a note can
// be redeemed only while its IssueTime is strictly greater, and redeeming
// records its IssueTime there. Each note redeems at most once, and redeeming
// one retires every unredeemed note the issuer signed before it.
//
// CONSENSUS SURFACE. Everything in parseCreditNote decides whether a note is
// valid, and is a consensus rule once featureCreditNote activates.
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct CreditNote
{
std::uint32_t networkID = 0;
AccountID account;
STAmount amount;
std::uint64_t issueTime = 0; // milliseconds since the ripple epoch
std::uint64_t expiration = 0; // milliseconds since the ripple epoch
};
/** Parses and validates the exact bytes of a note.
Accepts only the document described above, after jsontx_strict has
accepted it as a JsonTx document. Checks the shape, the account and
currency spellings, that Amount is positive and legal, and that the
validity window is well formed and no longer than creditNoteMaxLifeMs.
Everything that needs a ledger - the signing key's authority, the window
against the close time, sfLastNoteTime, funds and trust lines - is left to
the NoteClaim transactor. Throws std::runtime_error with the reason.
*/
CreditNote
parseCreditNote(std::string_view raw);
} // namespace ripple
#endif
+25 -2
View File
@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ negativeUNL() noexcept;
Keylet const&
UNLReport() noexcept;
/** The (fixed) index of the featureRNG random number generator object. */
Keylet const&
random() noexcept;
/** The beginning of an order book */
struct book_t
{
@@ -328,6 +332,14 @@ xChainCreateAccountClaimID(STXChainBridge const& bridge, std::uint64_t seq);
Keylet
did(AccountID const& account) noexcept;
/** An AppLoader belonging to an account.
There is at most one per account, so the key is derived from the owner's
AccountID alone.
*/
Keylet
appLoader(AccountID const& account) noexcept;
Keylet
oracle(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t const& documentID) noexcept;
@@ -376,6 +388,16 @@ permissionedDomain(uint256 const& domainID) noexcept;
Keylet
manifest(PublicKey const& pk) noexcept;
/** The directory listing every master key's ltMANIFEST object.
One entry per master key, made when its first manifest is published and
kept for good: a newer manifest, a revocation included, replaces the object
at the same key and keeps its place. The copy at the ephemeral key is not
listed; it is named by the master object.
*/
Keylet const&
manifestDir() noexcept;
} // namespace keylet
// Everything below is deprecated and should be removed in favor of keylets:
@@ -406,7 +428,7 @@ struct keyletDesc
// This list should include all of the keylet functions that take a single
// AccountID parameter.
std::array<keyletDesc<AccountID const&>, 6> const directAccountKeylets{
std::array<keyletDesc<AccountID const&>, 7> const directAccountKeylets{
{{&keylet::account, jss::AccountRoot, false},
{&keylet::ownerDir, jss::DirectoryNode, true},
{&keylet::signers, jss::SignerList, true},
@@ -414,7 +436,8 @@ std::array<keyletDesc<AccountID const&>, 6> const directAccountKeylets{
// test it anyway, since the invariant checks for it.
{&keylet::nftpage_min, jss::NFTokenPage, true},
{&keylet::nftpage_max, jss::NFTokenPage, true},
{&keylet::did, jss::DID, true}}};
{&keylet::did, jss::DID, true},
{&keylet::appLoader, jss::AppLoader, true}}};
MPTID
makeMptID(std::uint32_t sequence, AccountID const& account);
+182
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Ripple Labs Inc.
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#ifndef RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_JSONTXSIGNATURES_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_JSONTXSIGNATURES_H_INCLUDED
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include <utility>
namespace ripple {
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// jsontx: plaintext-JSON signing support (featureJsonTx)
//
// A JsonTx is authorised by an ed25519 signature over
//
// jsontx_sign_prefix || preimage
//
// where the preimage is the exact JSON text the signer read. The node rebuilds
// the preimage from the binary transaction plus sfJsonTxDelta, a small delta
// against a canonical form the node derives itself. The delta is
// attacker-controlled: it is not covered by the signature it helps
// reconstruct. Every bound below is therefore explicit, and unsanitize_jsontx
// accepts only the exact encoding sanitize_jsontx would have produced.
//
// CONSENSUS SURFACE. Once featureJsonTx activates, everything that decides
// whether a preimage verifies is a consensus rule and can only change behind
// a further amendment. That is:
//
// - every constant and every function in this file, including the delta
// encoder's exact output (jsontx_verify compares it byte for byte);
// - STObject::getJson(JsonOptions::none) and the getJson of every ST type
// that can appear in a transaction (STAmount, STUInt64, STPathSet,
// STIssue, STVector256, ...), because the node's canonical form is
// derived from it;
// - Json::FastWriter, which serializes that JSON before canonicalization;
// - STParsedJSON, only in so far as the submit RPC builds the transaction
// from the canonical form: a change there changes which preimages can be
// submitted, not which verify.
//
// None of that code was consensus-critical before. A change to how any field
// renders as JSON - including one merged from upstream rippled - changes
// which signatures verify and must be amendment-gated. JSONTxSignatures_test
// pins this for every field of every transaction format.
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
inline constexpr std::size_t jsontx_max_text = 8192; // canonical and original
inline constexpr std::size_t jsontx_max_diff = 2048; // delta bytes
inline constexpr std::size_t jsontx_max_ops =
jsontx_max_diff / 2; // delta instructions
inline constexpr std::size_t jsontx_min_copy = 4; // encoder match threshold
inline constexpr std::size_t jsontx_max_cand = 64; // encoder candidate cap
inline constexpr std::size_t jsontx_max_depth = 32; // JSON nesting
// The largest magnitude a bare JSON integer may have: 2^53 - 1, the range
// RFC 8259 section 6 calls interoperable and RFC 7493 (I-JSON) section 2.2
// requires. Past it an IEEE 754 double - which is what JSON.parse and most
// other parsers produce - can no longer hold every integer, so the number a
// wallet shows after parsing the preimage may not be the number that
// executes. Larger values are written as strings, which is how getJson
// renders every amount and UInt64 anyway.
inline constexpr std::uint64_t jsontx_max_int = (std::uint64_t{1} << 53) - 1;
// Domain separation. Without it the signed message is bare JSON text, and any
// wallet feature that signs a user-visible text message with the account key
// (several do, over the raw bytes) could be driven to sign a live Payment
// presented as a "log in" message. 0xFF can never occur in UTF-8, so no text
// signer can produce these bytes; the rest follows HashPrefix convention.
inline constexpr std::string_view jsontx_sign_prefix{
"\xFF"
"JTX",
4};
// The exact message a JsonTx signer signs for `preimage`.
std::string
jsontx_signing_data(std::string_view preimage);
// ASCII-only case folding; never consults the locale.
std::string
jsontx_lower(std::string_view s);
// Case-insensitive field-name -> canonical SField, over the serializable
// fields doServerDefinitions publishes. sfInvalid if unknown.
SField const&
jsontx_field(std::string const& name);
// days from 1970-01-01 (Howard Hinnant's civil calendar algorithm)
constexpr std::int64_t
jsontx_days(int y, unsigned m, unsigned d)
{
y -= m <= 2;
std::int64_t const era = (y >= 0 ? y : y - 399) / 400;
unsigned const yoe = static_cast<unsigned>(y - era * 400);
unsigned const doy = (153 * (m + (m > 2 ? -3 : 9)) + 2) / 5 + d - 1;
unsigned const doe = yoe * 365 + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100 + doy;
return era * 146097 + doe - 719468;
}
inline constexpr std::int64_t jsontx_epoch_day = jsontx_days(2000, 1, 1);
static_assert(jsontx_epoch_day == 10957); // matches chrono.h epoch_offset
// 9999-12-31T23:59:59.999Z: past this toISOString() switches to expanded years
// and the fixed 24 character shape no longer holds
inline constexpr std::uint64_t jsontx_max_time =
(static_cast<std::uint64_t>(jsontx_days(9999, 12, 31) - jsontx_epoch_day) *
86400 +
86399) *
1000 +
999;
// Strict Date().toISOString() -> milliseconds since the ripple epoch.
std::uint64_t
jsontx_iso(std::string_view s);
// The exact inverse over [0, jsontx_max_time].
std::string
jsontx_iso_str(std::uint64_t ms);
// How STUInt64::getJson spells v for field f (hex, or base ten for
// sMD_BaseTen fields).
std::string
jsontx_u64_str(SField const& f, std::uint64_t v);
// Validates that `raw` is a JsonTx document: exactly one JSON object, nothing
// before or after it but whitespace, printable ASCII only, no escapes, no
// comments, no booleans or nulls, no duplicate keys, integers spelled
// -?(0|[1-9][0-9]*), never -0, and no larger in magnitude than
// jsontx_max_int, nesting at most jsontx_max_depth. Throws.
void
jsontx_strict(std::string_view raw);
// The canonical form of `raw` alone: whitespace stripped, field names in
// their Xahau spelling, members ordered by field code, numbers formatted per
// field type, and - at the root only - an omitted Sequence written as
// "Sequence":0 when the document has a Time or a TicketSequence. Throws on
// anything it cannot canonicalize.
std::string
jsontx_canonical(std::string_view raw);
// Returns { canonical, delta } where applying delta to canonical with
// unsanitize_jsontx reproduces `raw` byte for byte. Throws.
std::pair<std::string, std::string>
sanitize_jsontx(std::string_view raw);
// Applies an UNTRUSTED delta to a canonical form the node derived itself.
std::string
unsanitize_jsontx(std::string_view sanitized, std::string_view diff);
// The complete untrusted-side check, shared by the submit RPC and the
// relay/consensus path. Returns the reconstructed preimage or throws.
std::string
jsontx_verify(STTx const& stx, std::string_view diff);
// As above with the delta taken from sfJsonTxDelta. This is what
// checkValidity calls in place of STTx::checkSign for a transaction
// carrying a delta.
std::string
jsontx_verify(STTx const& stx);
} // namespace ripple
#endif
+48
View File
@@ -96,6 +96,25 @@ std::size_t constexpr maxDIDAttestationLength = 256;
/** The maximum length of a domain */
std::size_t constexpr maxDomainLength = 256;
/** The maximum length of an AppLoader document.
The AppLoader holds the bootstrap document of a Progressive Web App
served from an account. It is deliberately capped: the blob lives in a
ledger object that carries no owner reserve at all, so the only things
standing between it and unbounded ledger growth are this limit and the
per-byte transaction fee below.
*/
std::size_t constexpr maxAppLoaderLength = 4096;
/** Drops of transaction fee charged per byte of AppLoader document.
Storage is paid for through the fee rather than through an owner
reserve, so that a loader can be published by an account sitting at its
reserve floor. The fee is charged on every AccountSet that carries the
field, including overwrites.
*/
std::uint64_t constexpr appLoaderFeeDropsPerByte = 1;
/** The maximum length of a URI inside a Credential */
std::size_t constexpr maxCredentialURILength = 256;
@@ -154,6 +173,35 @@ std::size_t constexpr maxPriceScale = 20;
*/
std::size_t constexpr maxTrim = 25;
/** sfTime validity window (featureJsonTx).
A transaction carrying sfTime (milliseconds since the ripple epoch) is
accepted only while the parent ledger's close time lies within
[Time - txTimeMaxFuture, Time + txTimeMaxAge]. The upper bound is the
stand-in for LastLedgerSequence: once a validated ledger closes later
than Time + txTimeMaxAge the transaction can never apply. The lower bound
keeps the validity period of a signed transaction short and limits how
far ahead of the network a fast client clock can push sfLastTxnTime.
Both are consensus rules once featureJsonTx activates.
*/
std::uint64_t constexpr txTimeMaxAgeMs = 300'000;
std::uint64_t constexpr txTimeMaxFutureMs = 120'000;
/** Credit notes (featureCreditNote).
A note is a JsonTx document the issuer signs blind, possibly offline,
that entitles whoever bears it to Amount from the issuer's account
between its IssueTime and its Expiration. The cap on its text keeps a
NoteClaim small and the parser's work bounded; the cap on its life
bounds both how long a lost note stays live and how far an issuer's
sfLastNoteTime can be pushed ahead by one of their own notes.
Both are consensus rules once featureCreditNote activates.
*/
std::size_t constexpr maxCreditNoteBytes = 512;
std::uint64_t constexpr creditNoteMaxLifeMs = 3'600'000;
} // namespace ripple
#endif
+12
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ public:
SeqProxy
getSeqProxy() const;
/** True if replay protection comes from sfTime rather than a sequence.
That is: sfTime is present, Sequence is 0 and there is no
TicketSequence. Such a transaction neither checks nor consumes the
account's Sequence; it must instead carry a Time strictly greater
than the account's sfLastTxnTime, and records its Time there. Its
SeqProxy is sequence(0), so anything that derives an object id from
the SeqProxy must use seqID() instead.
*/
bool
isTimeSequenced() const;
boost::container::flat_set<AccountID>
getMentionedAccounts() const;
+1
View File
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ enum TEFcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE,
tefPAST_MANIFEST_SEQ,
tefREVOKED_MANIFEST,
tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE,
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+21
View File
@@ -152,6 +152,26 @@ public:
return static_cast<bool>(mHookEmissions);
}
/** featureRNG: the RNG state this transaction's first Hook draw saw.
Every value the transaction's Hooks drew is derived from it. */
void
setRandomData(uint256 const& randomData)
{
mRandomData = randomData;
}
bool
hasRandomData() const
{
return static_cast<bool>(mRandomData);
}
uint256 const&
getRandomData() const
{
return *mRandomData;
}
STAmount
getDeliveredAmount() const
{
@@ -176,6 +196,7 @@ private:
std::optional<STAmount> mDelivered;
std::optional<STArray> mHookExecutions;
std::optional<STArray> mHookEmissions;
std::optional<uint256> mRandomData;
STArray mNodes;
};
+6 -2
View File
@@ -34,9 +34,13 @@
// If you add an amendment here, then do not forget to increment `numFeatures`
// in include/xrpl/protocol/Feature.h.
XRPL_FEATURE(JsonTx, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(CreditNote, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(RNG, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(PWALoader, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (20261005, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
XRPL_FEATURE(EscrowDestinationCancel, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (20260929, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (20260929, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
XRPL_FEATURE(HookOnV2_1, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(OnChainManifests, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (HookMap, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
@@ -88,7 +92,6 @@ XRPL_FIX (ReduceImport, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYe
XRPL_FEATURE(Touch, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(Remarks, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (FloatDivide, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
XRPL_FIX (240911, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
XRPL_FIX (PageCap, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
XRPL_FIX (240819, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
XRPL_FIX (NSDelete, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
@@ -164,6 +167,7 @@ XRPL_FEATURE(CryptoConditionsSuite, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::Obsolete)
// pre-amendment code has been removed and the identifiers are deprecated.
// All known amendments and amendments that may appear in a validated
// ledger must be registered either here or above with the "active" amendments
XRPL_RETIRE(fix240911)
XRPL_RETIRE(fixXahauV2)
XRPL_RETIRE(fixXahauV1)
XRPL_RETIRE(MultiSign)
@@ -142,6 +142,22 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltIMPORT_VLSEQ, 0x0049, ImportVLSequence, import_vlseq, ({
{sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq, soeOPTIONAL},
}))
/** The bootstrap document of a Progressive Web App (featurePWALoader).
At most one per account, keyed on the owner alone (keylet::appLoader).
It is in no owner directory and takes no reserve: its storage is paid
for by a per-byte fee on the AccountSet that writes it, and
DeleteAccount erases it explicitly. AppLoaderSequence equals the owner's
AccountRoot AppLoaderSequence as of the AccountSet that wrote it.
*/
LEDGER_ENTRY(ltAPP_LOADER, 0x004c, AppLoader, app_loader, ({
{sfOwner, soeREQUIRED},
{sfAppLoader, soeREQUIRED},
{sfAppLoaderSequence, soeREQUIRED},
{sfPreviousTxnID, soeREQUIRED},
{sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq, soeREQUIRED},
}))
/** The ledger object which tracks the current negative UNL state.
\note This is a singleton: only one such object exists in the ledger.
@@ -180,6 +196,26 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY_DUPLICATE(ltUNL_REPORT, 0x0052, UNLReport, unl_report, ({
{sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq, soeREQUIRED},
}))
/** featureRNG: the consensus random number generator.
A singleton. sfRandomData is seeded from validator reveals by the
ttENTROPY transactions applied at the start of each ledger, and then
iterated by every Hook API draw for the rest of that ledger.
sfRandomData and sfRandomDigests are never written to metadata, and
Hooks cannot load this object.
\sa keylet::random
*/
LEDGER_ENTRY(ltRANDOM, 0x526E, Random, random, ({
{sfLedgerSequence, soeREQUIRED},
{sfRandomData, soeREQUIRED},
{sfEntropyCount, soeREQUIRED},
{sfEntropyDenominator, soeREQUIRED},
{sfRandomDigests, soeREQUIRED},
{sfPreviousTxnID, soeREQUIRED},
{sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq, soeREQUIRED},
}))
/** A ledger object which contains a signer list for an account.
\sa keylet::signers
@@ -262,7 +298,10 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltACCOUNT_ROOT, 0x0061, AccountRoot, account, ({
{sfHookStateScale, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfCron, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfAMMID, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfAppLoaderSequence, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfManifestID, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfLastTxnTime, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfLastNoteTime, soeOPTIONAL},
}))
/** A ledger object which contains a list of object identifiers.
@@ -609,6 +648,7 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltMANIFEST, 0x004D, Manifest, manifest_entry, ({
{sfMasterSignature, soeREQUIRED},
{sfSignature, soeOPTIONAL}, /* absent if the master is revoked */
{sfManifestID, soeOPTIONAL}, /* pointer to the identical other copy on the other key */
{sfOwnerNode, soeOPTIONAL}, /* master copy only: its page in keylet::manifestDir() */
{sfPreviousTxnID, soeREQUIRED},
{sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq, soeREQUIRED},
}))
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookExecutionIndex, UINT16, 19)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookApiVersion, UINT16, 20)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookStateScale, UINT16, 21)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfLedgerFixType, UINT16, 22)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfEntropyCount, UINT16, 99)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfEntropyDenominator, UINT16, 100)
// 32-bit integers (common)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfNetworkID, UINT32, 1)
@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfImportSequence, UINT32, 97)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRewardTime, UINT32, 98)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRewardLgrFirst, UINT32, 99)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRewardLgrLast, UINT32, 100)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAppLoaderSequence, UINT32, 101)
// 64-bit integers (common)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfIndexNext, UINT64, 1)
@@ -153,6 +156,10 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfOutstandingAmount, UINT64, 25, SField::sMD_BaseTen|SFie
TYPED_SFIELD(sfMPTAmount, UINT64, 26, SField::sMD_BaseTen|SField::sMD_Default)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfIssuerNode, UINT64, 27)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfSubjectNode, UINT64, 28)
// featureCreditNote: IssueTime of the last note this account redeemed
TYPED_SFIELD(sfLastNoteTime, UINT64, 94)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfLastTxnTime, UINT64, 95)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfTime, UINT64, 96)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfTouchCount, UINT64, 97)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAccountIndex, UINT64, 98)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAccountCount, UINT64, 99)
@@ -210,6 +217,9 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfOfferID, UINT256, 34)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfEscrowID, UINT256, 35)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfURITokenID, UINT256, 36)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfDomainID, UINT256, 37)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfNextRandomDigest, UINT256, 89)
// RNG running state: never written to metadata (see featureRNG)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRandomData, UINT256, 90, SField::sMD_Never)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfManifestID, UINT256, 91)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookOnOutgoing, UINT256, 93)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookOnIncoming, UINT256, 94)
@@ -294,6 +304,13 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfAssetClass, VL, 29)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfProvider, VL, 30)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfMPTokenMetadata, VL, 31)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfCredentialType, VL, 32)
// featureCreditNote: the note text and the issuer's signature over it. Both
// are covered by the bearer's TxnSignature (neither is notSigning) so a
// redemption cannot be re-pointed at a different note in flight.
TYPED_SFIELD(sfNote, VL, 93)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfNoteSignature, VL, 94)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfJsonTxDelta, VL, 95, SField::sMD_Default, SField::notSigning)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAppLoader, VL, 96)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfHookName, VL, 97)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemarkValue, VL, 98)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemarkName, VL, 99)
@@ -383,6 +400,7 @@ UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfXChainClaimAttestationCollectionElement, OBJECT, 30)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfXChainCreateAccountAttestationCollectionElement, OBJECT, 31)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfPriceData, OBJECT, 32)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfCredential, OBJECT, 33)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfRandomDigestEntry, OBJECT, 88)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfManifest, OBJECT, 90)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAmountEntry, OBJECT, 91)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfMintURIToken, OBJECT, 92)
@@ -423,6 +441,8 @@ UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAuthAccounts, ARRAY, 25)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAuthorizeCredentials, ARRAY, 26)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfUnauthorizeCredentials, ARRAY, 27)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAcceptedCredentials, ARRAY, 28)
// RNG validator commitments: never written to metadata (see featureRNG)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfRandomDigests, ARRAY, 91, SField::sMD_Never)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfAmounts, ARRAY, 92)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfHookEmissions, ARRAY, 93)
UNTYPED_SFIELD(sfImportVLKeys, ARRAY, 94)
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttACCOUNT_SET, 3, AccountSet, ({
{sfTickSize, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfNFTokenMinter, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfHookStateScale, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfAppLoader, soeOPTIONAL},
}))
/** This transaction type cancels an existing escrow. */
@@ -500,6 +501,39 @@ TRANSACTION(ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE, 72, PermissionedDomainDelete, ({
{sfDomainID, soeREQUIRED},
}))
/** featureRNG: a validator's entropy contribution for one ledger.
Each proposing UNLReport validator places exactly one of these in its own
initial position when it closes the ledger. It reveals the secret behind
the validator's commitment currently stored in the Random object (if any)
and commits to the secret it will reveal next time. It never enters the
open ledger, so a reveal only becomes public after the revealing
validator's transaction set is locked.
*/
TRANSACTION(ttENTROPY, 89, Entropy, ({
{sfLedgerSequence, soeREQUIRED},
{sfPublicKey, soeREQUIRED},
{sfNextRandomDigest, soeREQUIRED},
{sfRandomData, soeOPTIONAL},
}))
/** featureCreditNote: redeem a credit note.
The bearer (sfAccount) submits the exact bytes the issuer signed (sfNote,
a JsonTx document naming NetworkID, Account, Amount, IssueTime and
Expiration), the issuer's ed25519 signature over
jsontx_sign_prefix || sfNote (sfNoteSignature) and the key that made it
(sfPublicKey, the issuer's master or regular key). Amount moves from the
note's Account to the bearer; the note's IssueTime is recorded in the
issuer's AccountRoot as sfLastNoteTime, and only notes issued after it
can still be redeemed.
*/
TRANSACTION(ttNOTE_CLAIM, 90, NoteClaim, ({
{sfNote, soeREQUIRED},
{sfNoteSignature, soeREQUIRED},
{sfPublicKey, soeREQUIRED},
}))
/* sfAccount is supplied by TxFormats::commonFields; listing it here as well
makes the SOTemplate reject the format at construction. */
TRANSACTION(ttMANIFEST_SET, 91, SetManifest, ({
+10 -2
View File
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ JSS(amendment_blocked); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(amm_account); // in: amm_info
JSS(amount); // out: AccountChannels, amm_info
JSS(amount2); // out: amm_info
JSS(anchored_through); // out: CatalogueLoad
JSS(api_version); // in: many, out: Version
JSS(api_version_low); // out: Version
JSS(applied); // out: SubmitTransaction
@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ JSS(closed); // out: NetworkOPs, LedgerToJson,
// handlers/Ledger
JSS(closed_ledger); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(cluster); // out: PeerImp
JSS(code); // out: errors
JSS(code); // in: HookValidate; out: errors
JSS(command); // in: RPCHandler
JSS(complete); // out: NetworkOPs, InboundLedger
JSS(complete_ledgers); // out: NetworkOPs, PeerImp
@@ -378,6 +379,8 @@ JSS(index); // in: LedgerEntry,
// LedgerEntry, TxHistory, LedgerData
JSS(info); // out: ServerInfo, ConsensusInfo, FetchInfo
JSS(initial_sync_duration_us);
JSS(instruction_count_cbak); // out: HookValidate
JSS(instruction_count_hook); // out: HookValidate
JSS(internal_command); // in: Internal
JSS(invalid_API_version); // out: Many, when a request has an invalid
// version
@@ -451,6 +454,7 @@ JSS(local); // out: resource/Logic.h
JSS(local_txs); // out: GetCounts
JSS(local_static_keys); // out: ValidatorList
JSS(locked_balance); // out: AccountLines
JSS(log); // out: HookValidate
JSS(low); // out: BookChanges
JSS(lock_count); // out: AccountLines
JSS(lowest_sequence); // out: AccountInfo
@@ -589,7 +593,6 @@ JSS(queue_data); // out: AccountInfo
JSS(queued); // out: SubmitTransaction
JSS(queued_duration_us);
JSS(quote_asset); // in: get_aggregate_price
JSS(random); // out: Random
JSS(raw_meta); // out: AcceptedLedgerTx
JSS(receive_currencies); // out: AccountCurrencies
JSS(reference_level); // out: TxQ
@@ -607,6 +610,7 @@ JSS(reserve_base_native); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(reserve_inc); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(reserve_inc_xrp); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(reserve_inc_native); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(reset); // in/out: PWAInfo
JSS(response); // websocket
JSS(result); // RPC
JSS(ripple_lines); // out: NetworkOPs
@@ -637,6 +641,7 @@ JSS(server_status); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(server_version); // out: NetworkOPs
JSS(settle_delay); // out: AccountChannels
JSS(severity); // in: LogLevel
JSS(sig);
JSS(signature); // out: NetworkOPs, ChannelAuthorize
JSS(signature_verified); // out: ChannelVerify
JSS(signing_key); // out: NetworkOPs
@@ -741,6 +746,7 @@ JSS(TRANSACTION_FLAGS_INDICES); // out: RPC server_definitions
JSS(type_hex); // out: STPathSet
JSS(unl); // out: UnlList
JSS(unlimited); // out: Connection.h
JSS(unpinned); // out: CatalogueUnpin
JSS(uptime); // out: GetCounts
JSS(uri); // out: ValidatorSites
JSS(url); // in/out: Subscribe, Unsubscribe
@@ -748,6 +754,7 @@ JSS(url_password); // in: Subscribe
JSS(url_username); // in: Subscribe
JSS(urlgravatar); //
JSS(username); // in: Subscribe
JSS(valid); // out: HookValidate
JSS(validated); // out: NetworkOPs, RPCHelpers, AccountTx*
// Tx
JSS(validator_list_expires); // out: NetworkOps, ValidatorList
@@ -769,6 +776,7 @@ JSS(validator_sites); // out: ValidatorSites
JSS(value); // out: STAmount
JSS(version); // out: RPCVersion
JSS(vetoed); // out: AmendmentTableImpl
JSS(vm_error); // out: HookValidate
JSS(volume_a); // out: BookChanges
JSS(volume_b); // out: BookChanges
JSS(vote); // in: Feature
+20
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/BasicConfig.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/net/IPEndpoint.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <boost/asio/ip/address.hpp>
#include <boost/asio/ip/network_v4.hpp>
#include <boost/asio/ip/network_v6.hpp>
@@ -57,6 +58,12 @@ struct Port
std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> admin_nets_v6;
std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v4> secure_gateway_nets_v4;
std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> secure_gateway_nets_v6;
// "pwa" ports only; see the "pwa ports" section of xahaud-example.cfg.
std::set<std::string> pwa_domains; // zones, lower case, no trailing dot
std::set<AccountID> pwa_allowlist; // if non-empty, only these are served
std::set<AccountID> pwa_blocklist; // never served; wins over allowlist
bool pwa_custom_domains = false; // serve hosts named by TXT records
std::optional<beast::IP::Endpoint> pwa_resolver; // for those; else system
std::string user;
std::string password;
std::string admin_user;
@@ -93,8 +100,18 @@ struct Port
return protocol.count("udp") > 0;
}
bool
has_peer() const
{
return protocol.count("peer") > 0;
}
// Maximum UDP packet size (default 64KB)
std::size_t udp_packet_size = 65536;
// If this is a peer port, also listen for UDP Superhighway (XUSH)
// datagrams on the same port number.
bool udp_highway = false;
};
std::ostream&
@@ -126,6 +143,9 @@ struct ParsedPort
std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> admin_nets_v6;
std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v4> secure_gateway_nets_v4;
std::vector<boost::asio::ip::network_v6> secure_gateway_nets_v6;
std::set<std::string> pwa_domains;
bool pwa_custom_domains = false;
std::optional<beast::IP::Endpoint> pwa_resolver;
};
void
+1 -1
View File
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ Door<Handler>::Door(
port_.protocol.count("peer") > 0)
, plain_(
port_.protocol.count("http") > 0 || port_.protocol.count("ws") > 0 ||
port_.protocol.count("ws2"))
port_.protocol.count("ws2") || port_.protocol.count("pwa"))
{
reOpen();
}
+10
View File
@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ ServerImpl<Handler>::ports(std::vector<Port> const& ports)
sp->run();
}
// UDP Superhighway (XUSH) datagrams arrive on the peer port
// number. TCP and UDP port numbers are independent, so this
// needs no socket sharing with the TCP door.
if (internalPort.has_peer() && internalPort.udp_highway)
{
if (auto sp = ios_.emplace<UDPDoor<Handler>>(
handler_, io_context_, internalPort, j_))
sp->run();
}
}
}
return eps;
+10 -5
View File
@@ -78,10 +78,9 @@ public:
error_code ec;
// Create UDP endpoint from port configuration
auto const addr = port_.ip.to_v4();
boost::asio::ip::udp::endpoint udp_endpoint(addr, port_.port);
boost::asio::ip::udp::endpoint udp_endpoint(port_.ip, port_.port);
socket_.open(boost::asio::ip::udp::v4(), ec);
socket_.open(udp_endpoint.protocol(), ec);
if (ec)
{
JLOG(j_.error()) << "UDP socket open failed: " << ec.message();
@@ -94,17 +93,22 @@ public:
{
JLOG(j_.error())
<< "UDP set reuse_address failed: " << ec.message();
close();
return;
}
socket_.bind(udp_endpoint, ec);
if (ec)
{
JLOG(j_.error()) << "UDP socket bind failed: " << ec.message();
// Close the socket so that run() does not start receiving on an
// unbound socket, which would silently bind an ephemeral port.
JLOG(j_.error()) << "UDP socket bind to " << udp_endpoint
<< " failed: " << ec.message();
close();
return;
}
JLOG(j_.info()) << "UDP-RPC listening on " << udp_endpoint;
JLOG(j_.info()) << "UDP listening on " << udp_endpoint;
}
endpoint_type
@@ -169,6 +173,7 @@ private:
handler_.onUDPMessage(
std::string(recv_buffer_.data(), bytes_transferred),
tcp_endpoint,
port_,
[this, tcp_endpoint](std::string const& response) {
do_send(response, tcp_endpoint);
});
+180
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2025 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <xrpl/basics/Slice.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/UTF8.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AppLoader.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <string_view>
namespace ripple {
namespace appLoader {
namespace {
// HTML "ASCII whitespace": TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE.
inline bool
isSpace(std::uint8_t c) noexcept
{
return c == 0x09 || c == 0x0A || c == 0x0C || c == 0x0D || c == 0x20;
}
inline std::uint8_t
lower(std::uint8_t c) noexcept
{
return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ? static_cast<std::uint8_t>(c + 32) : c;
}
// Case-insensitive match of lower-case `lit` at `pos`; never reads past
// the end.
bool
matchAt(
std::uint8_t const* data,
std::size_t size,
std::size_t pos,
std::string_view lit) noexcept
{
if (pos > size || size - pos < lit.size())
return false;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < lit.size(); ++i)
if (lower(data[pos + i]) != static_cast<std::uint8_t>(lit[i]))
return false;
return true;
}
std::size_t
findFrom(
std::uint8_t const* data,
std::size_t size,
std::size_t from,
std::string_view lit) noexcept
{
for (std::size_t i = from; i + lit.size() <= size; ++i)
if (matchAt(data, size, i, lit))
return i;
return size;
}
// So that "<htmlish>" is not mistaken for "<html>".
inline bool
isTagNameEnd(std::uint8_t c) noexcept
{
return isSpace(c) || c == '>' || c == '/';
}
} // namespace
Result
validate(std::uint8_t const* data, std::size_t size)
{
if (size == 0 || data == nullptr)
return Result::empty;
if (size > maxAppLoaderLength)
return Result::tooLarge;
if (!isValidUTF8(Slice(data, size)))
return Result::badUTF8;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
if (!isSpace(data[i]) && (data[i] < 0x20 || data[i] == 0x7F))
return Result::badControlChar;
std::size_t begin = 0;
if (size >= 3 && data[0] == 0xEF && data[1] == 0xBB && data[2] == 0xBF)
begin = 3;
while (begin < size && isSpace(data[begin]))
++begin;
if (begin == size)
return Result::empty;
// "<!doctype" followed by whitespace is the only doctype form any
// browser treats as standards-mode HTML.
bool const doctype = matchAt(data, size, begin, "<!doctype") &&
begin + 9 < size && isSpace(data[begin + 9]);
bool const html = matchAt(data, size, begin, "<html") && begin + 5 < size &&
isTagNameEnd(data[begin + 5]);
if (!doctype && !html)
return Result::noDoctype;
std::size_t open = begin;
for (;;)
{
open = findFrom(data, size, open, "<html");
if (open == size)
return Result::noHtmlElement;
if (open + 5 < size && isTagNameEnd(data[open + 5]))
break;
++open;
}
// The LAST well-formed </html>, so that one quoted inside a script
// does not shadow the real one. Linear: each probe resumes one past
// the previous match.
// closeEnd == 0 means none found: a well-formed </html> always ends
// past position 0.
std::size_t closeEnd = 0;
for (std::size_t probe = open;;)
{
std::size_t const found = findFrom(data, size, probe, "</html");
if (found == size)
break;
std::size_t j = found + 6;
while (j < size && isSpace(data[j]))
++j;
if (j < size && data[j] == '>')
closeEnd = j + 1;
probe = found + 1;
}
if (closeEnd == 0)
return Result::unclosed;
for (std::size_t i = closeEnd; i < size; ++i)
if (!isSpace(data[i]))
return Result::trailingGarbage;
return Result::ok;
}
char const*
to_string(Result r)
{
switch (r)
{
case Result::ok:
return "ok";
case Result::empty:
return "empty document";
case Result::tooLarge:
return "document exceeds maxAppLoaderLength";
case Result::badUTF8:
return "malformed UTF-8";
case Result::badControlChar:
return "forbidden control character";
case Result::noDoctype:
return "does not open with a doctype or <html> tag";
case Result::noHtmlElement:
return "missing <html> start tag";
case Result::unclosed:
return "missing or misplaced </html> end tag";
case Result::trailingGarbage:
return "content after </html>";
}
return "unknown";
}
} // namespace appLoader
} // namespace ripple
+363
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <xrpl/basics/contract.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/CreditNote.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/JSONTxSignatures.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/UintTypes.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <array>
#include <limits>
#include <stdexcept>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
namespace {
[[noreturn]] void
fail(std::string const& why)
{
Throw<std::runtime_error>("creditnote: " + why);
}
constexpr bool
digit(char c)
{
return c >= '0' && c <= '9';
}
constexpr bool
space(char c)
{
return c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n';
}
// A note's values are strings, bare integers, and - for an issued Amount -
// one object of strings. Nothing else.
struct Val
{
enum class Kind : std::uint8_t { string, number, object };
Kind kind = Kind::object;
std::string text; // string contents, or the number token
std::vector<std::string> keys; // object member names, in source order
std::vector<Val> items; // object member values
};
// A reader for the note language only. jsontx_strict has already accepted
// the document - one object, printable ASCII, no escapes, no duplicates,
// bounded integers - so this reader's job is shape, not sanitation; it still
// refuses anything outside that language rather than assume it.
class Reader
{
std::string_view s_;
std::size_t p_ = 0;
void
skip()
{
while (p_ < s_.size() && space(s_[p_]))
++p_;
}
char
peek() const
{
if (p_ >= s_.size())
fail("unexpected end of note");
return s_[p_];
}
void
expect(char c, char const* what)
{
if (peek() != c)
fail(what);
++p_;
}
std::string
string()
{
expect('"', "expected a string");
std::size_t const b = p_;
for (;;)
{
if (p_ >= s_.size())
fail("unterminated string");
auto const c = static_cast<unsigned char>(s_[p_]);
if (c == '"')
break;
if (c == '\\' || c < 0x20 || c > 0x7E)
fail("strings are printable ASCII without escapes");
++p_;
}
std::string r(s_.substr(b, p_ - b));
++p_; // closing quote
return r;
}
std::string
number()
{
std::size_t const b = p_;
if (peek() == '-')
++p_;
if (!digit(peek()))
fail("malformed number");
if (s_[p_] == '0')
{
++p_;
if (p_ < s_.size() && digit(s_[p_]))
fail("malformed number");
}
else
{
while (p_ < s_.size() && digit(s_[p_]))
++p_;
}
if (p_ < s_.size() && (s_[p_] == '.' || s_[p_] == 'e' || s_[p_] == 'E'))
fail("numbers are integers");
return std::string(s_.substr(b, p_ - b));
}
Val
value(int depth)
{
skip();
char const c = peek();
if (c == '{')
return object(depth + 1);
Val v;
if (c == '"')
{
v.kind = Val::Kind::string;
v.text = string();
return v;
}
if (c == '-' || digit(c))
{
v.kind = Val::Kind::number;
v.text = number();
return v;
}
fail("unexpected token");
}
Val
object(int depth)
{
// the note, and at most one object inside it (an issued Amount)
if (depth > 2)
fail("nested too deeply");
Val v;
v.kind = Val::Kind::object;
expect('{', "expected an object");
skip();
if (peek() == '}')
{
++p_;
return v;
}
for (;;)
{
skip();
auto key = string();
if (std::find(v.keys.begin(), v.keys.end(), key) != v.keys.end())
fail("duplicate member " + key);
skip();
expect(':', "expected ':'");
v.items.push_back(value(depth));
v.keys.push_back(std::move(key));
skip();
char const c = peek();
if (c == ',')
{
++p_;
continue;
}
if (c == '}')
{
++p_;
return v;
}
fail("expected ',' or '}'");
}
}
public:
explicit Reader(std::string_view s) : s_(s)
{
}
Val
parse()
{
skip();
if (p_ >= s_.size() || s_[p_] != '{')
fail("a note is a JSON object");
auto root = object(1);
skip();
if (p_ != s_.size())
fail("trailing data after note");
return root;
}
};
Val const&
member(Val const& obj, std::string_view key)
{
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < obj.keys.size(); ++i)
if (obj.keys[i] == key)
return obj.items[i];
fail("missing " + std::string(key));
}
std::string const&
str(Val const& obj, std::string_view key)
{
auto const& v = member(obj, key);
if (v.kind != Val::Kind::string)
fail(std::string(key) + " must be a string");
return v.text;
}
// A non-negative bare integer, already known to be well formed and at most
// jsontx_max_int, as a number.
std::uint64_t
unsignedValue(Val const& v, std::string_view key)
{
if (v.kind != Val::Kind::number)
fail(std::string(key) + " must be a bare integer");
if (v.text.empty() || v.text[0] == '-')
fail(std::string(key) + " must not be negative");
std::uint64_t n = 0;
for (char const c : v.text)
n = n * 10 + static_cast<std::uint64_t>(c - '0');
return n;
}
} // namespace
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CreditNote
parseCreditNote(std::string_view raw)
{
if (raw.size() > maxCreditNoteBytes)
fail("note too large");
// The note is a JsonTx document first: same character set, integer
// rules and bounds as a plaintext-signed transaction preimage.
jsontx_strict(raw);
auto const root = Reader(raw).parse();
static constexpr std::array<std::string_view, 5> allowed{
"NetworkID", "Account", "Amount", "IssueTime", "Expiration"};
// Exactly the five, each exactly once (the reader refused duplicates).
// Anything else - including a TransactionType - is not a note.
if (root.keys.size() != allowed.size())
fail(
"a note has exactly NetworkID, Account, Amount, IssueTime and "
"Expiration");
for (auto const& k : root.keys)
if (std::find(allowed.begin(), allowed.end(), k) == allowed.end())
fail("unknown member " + k);
CreditNote note;
{
auto const n = unsignedValue(member(root, "NetworkID"), "NetworkID");
if (n > std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max())
fail("NetworkID out of range");
note.networkID = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(n);
}
{
auto const id = parseBase58<AccountID>(str(root, "Account"));
if (!id || *id == noAccount() || isXRP(*id))
fail("Account is not an r-address");
note.account = *id;
}
{
auto const& a = member(root, "Amount");
if (a.kind == Val::Kind::number)
{
// drops of the native currency; at most jsontx_max_int, which
// is below the total supply
auto const drops = unsignedValue(a, "Amount");
note.amount = STAmount{XRPAmount{static_cast<std::int64_t>(drops)}};
}
else if (a.kind == Val::Kind::object)
{
if (a.keys.size() != 3)
fail(
"an issued Amount has exactly currency, issuer and "
"value");
Currency currency;
if (!to_currency(currency, str(a, "currency")) || isXRP(currency) ||
isBadCurrency(currency))
fail("bad currency");
auto const issuer = parseBase58<AccountID>(str(a, "issuer"));
if (!issuer || *issuer == noAccount() || isXRP(*issuer))
fail("issuer is not an r-address");
try
{
note.amount =
amountFromString(Issue{currency, *issuer}, str(a, "value"));
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
fail("bad value");
}
}
else
{
fail("Amount is drops or an issued amount");
}
if (note.amount.signum() <= 0 || !isLegalNet(note.amount))
fail("Amount must be positive");
}
note.issueTime = jsontx_iso(str(root, "IssueTime"));
note.expiration = jsontx_iso(str(root, "Expiration"));
if (note.expiration <= note.issueTime)
fail("Expiration must be after IssueTime");
if (note.expiration - note.issueTime > creditNoteMaxLifeMs)
fail(
"a note lives at most " +
std::to_string(creditNoteMaxLifeMs / 60000) + " minutes");
return note;
}
} // namespace ripple
+24
View File
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ enum class LedgerNameSpace : std::uint16_t {
IMPORT_VLSEQ = 'I',
UNL_REPORT = 'R',
CRON = 'L',
APP_LOADER = 'W',
AMM = 'A',
BRIDGE = LEDGER_NAMESPACE2(0x01, 'H'),
XCHAIN_CLAIM_ID = 'Q',
@@ -90,8 +91,10 @@ enum class LedgerNameSpace : std::uint16_t {
MPTOKEN_ISSUANCE = '~',
MPTOKEN = 't',
MANIFEST = 'M',
MANIFEST_DIR = LEDGER_NAMESPACE2(0x01, 'M'),
CREDENTIAL = LEDGER_NAMESPACE2(0x01, 'D'),
PERMISSIONED_DOMAIN = 'm',
RANDOM = 0x526E, // Rn
// No longer used or supported. Left here to reserve the space
// to avoid accidental reuse.
@@ -276,6 +279,13 @@ UNLReport() noexcept
return ret;
}
Keylet const&
random() noexcept
{
static Keylet const ret{ltRANDOM, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::RANDOM)};
return ret;
}
Keylet
book_t::operator()(Book const& b) const
{
@@ -613,6 +623,12 @@ did(AccountID const& account) noexcept
return {ltDID, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::DID, account)};
}
Keylet
appLoader(AccountID const& account) noexcept
{
return {ltAPP_LOADER, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::APP_LOADER, account)};
}
Keylet
oracle(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t const& documentID) noexcept
{
@@ -677,6 +693,14 @@ manifest(PublicKey const& pk) noexcept
return {ltMANIFEST, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::MANIFEST, pk.slice())};
}
Keylet const&
manifestDir() noexcept
{
static Keylet const ret{
ltDIR_NODE, indexHash(LedgerNameSpace::MANIFEST_DIR)};
return ret;
}
} // namespace keylet
} // namespace ripple
@@ -143,6 +143,14 @@ InnerObjectFormats::InnerObjectFormats()
{sfAccount, soeOPTIONAL},
});
add(sfRandomDigestEntry.jsonName,
sfRandomDigestEntry.getCode(),
{
{sfPublicKey, soeREQUIRED},
{sfNextRandomDigest, soeREQUIRED},
{sfLedgerSequence, soeREQUIRED},
});
add(sfAmountEntry.jsonName,
sfAmountEntry.getCode(),
{
+992
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,992 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Ripple Labs Inc.
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <xrpl/basics/contract.h>
#include <xrpl/json/json_writer.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/JSONTxSignatures.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <charconv>
#include <stdexcept>
#include <unordered_map>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
namespace {
[[noreturn]] void
fail(std::string const& why)
{
Throw<std::runtime_error>("jsontx: " + why);
}
// Not std::isdigit: that consults the locale, and every comparison in this
// file decides whether a signature verifies.
constexpr bool
digit(char c)
{
return c >= '0' && c <= '9';
}
// json's whitespace set, exactly
constexpr bool
space(char c)
{
return c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n';
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The preimage parser.
//
// Not Json::Reader. The vendored jsoncpp reader accepts comments, stops once
// it has a root value rather than requiring end of input, keeps the last of
// two identical keys, and holds numbers as 32-bit ints or doubles - so a bare
// integer past 2^32 is refused outright and a fractional token is rounded by
// sscanf. Each of those is a way for the text a signer reads to differ from
// what executes, or for a valid transaction to be unsignable. This parser
// accepts a deliberately small language instead:
//
// - exactly one object, with only whitespace around it;
// - printable ASCII only (0x20-0x7E) inside strings, and no backslash at
// all. Every string a transaction renders through getJson is plain
// printable ASCII (hex, base58, decimal, currency codes, type names), and
// jsontx_verify requires the preimage's strings to equal those byte for
// byte, so nothing an escape or a non-ASCII byte could spell would ever
// verify. Refusing them outright also rules out bidi overrides,
// homoglyphs and terminal control sequences in the text being approved;
// - integers spelled -?(0|[1-9][0-9]*), never -0, and within
// +/-jsontx_max_int, kept as their exact digits rather than converted to
// anything;
// - no true, false or null: no transaction field renders as one;
// - no two members of one object with the same name.
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct Node
{
enum class Kind : std::uint8_t { object, array, string, number };
Kind kind = Kind::object;
std::string text; // string contents, or the number token
std::vector<std::string> keys; // object member names, in source order
std::vector<Node> items; // object member values, or array items
};
class Reader
{
std::string_view s_;
std::size_t p_ = 0;
void
skip()
{
while (p_ < s_.size() && space(s_[p_]))
++p_;
}
char
peek() const
{
if (p_ >= s_.size())
fail("unexpected end of document");
return s_[p_];
}
void
expect(char c, char const* what)
{
if (peek() != c)
fail(what);
++p_;
}
std::string
string()
{
++p_; // opening quote
std::size_t const b = p_;
for (;;)
{
if (p_ >= s_.size())
fail("unterminated string");
auto const c = static_cast<unsigned char>(s_[p_]);
if (c == '"')
break;
if (c == '\\')
fail("escape sequences are not allowed");
if (c < 0x20 || c > 0x7E)
fail("strings must be printable ASCII");
++p_;
}
std::string r(s_.substr(b, p_ - b));
++p_; // closing quote
return r;
}
std::string
number()
{
std::size_t const b = p_;
if (s_[p_] == '-')
++p_;
if (p_ >= s_.size() || !digit(s_[p_]))
fail("number must be a plain integer");
if (s_[p_] == '0')
++p_;
else
while (p_ < s_.size() && digit(s_[p_]))
++p_;
// a fraction, an exponent, a leading zero or anything else glued on
if (p_ < s_.size() && !space(s_[p_]) && s_[p_] != ',' &&
s_[p_] != '}' && s_[p_] != ']')
fail("number must be a plain integer");
std::string tok(s_.substr(b, p_ - b));
if (tok == "-0")
fail("number must be a plain integer");
// The interoperable range, symmetric about zero. Sixteen digits is
// the most 2^53 - 1 has, so the length test also keeps from_chars
// well away from overflow.
std::string_view const mag =
std::string_view(tok).substr(tok.front() == '-' ? 1 : 0);
std::uint64_t v = 0;
if (mag.size() > 16 ||
std::from_chars(mag.data(), mag.data() + mag.size(), v).ec !=
std::errc{} ||
v > jsontx_max_int)
fail(
"integer outside +/-(2^53 - 1); write larger values as "
"strings");
return tok;
}
void
value(Node& n, std::size_t depth)
{
switch (peek())
{
case '{':
object(n, depth + 1);
return;
case '[':
array(n, depth + 1);
return;
case '"':
n.kind = Node::Kind::string;
n.text = string();
return;
case 't':
case 'f':
fail("boolean values are not allowed");
case 'n':
fail("null values are not allowed");
case '/':
fail("comments are not allowed");
default:
if (peek() == '-' || digit(peek()))
{
n.kind = Node::Kind::number;
n.text = number();
return;
}
fail("unexpected character");
}
}
void
object(Node& n, std::size_t depth)
{
if (depth > jsontx_max_depth)
fail("document nested too deeply");
n.kind = Node::Kind::object;
++p_; // '{'
skip();
if (peek() != '}')
{
for (;;)
{
skip();
if (peek() != '"')
fail("member name must be a string");
n.keys.push_back(string());
skip();
expect(':', "expected ':'");
skip();
value(n.items.emplace_back(), depth);
skip();
if (peek() == ',')
{
++p_;
continue;
}
break;
}
}
expect('}', "expected ',' or '}'");
// Two identical names are one member to jsoncpp (the last wins) and
// may be either to whatever the signer's wallet parsed.
std::vector<std::string_view> ks(n.keys.begin(), n.keys.end());
std::sort(ks.begin(), ks.end());
if (std::adjacent_find(ks.begin(), ks.end()) != ks.end())
fail("duplicate member name");
}
void
array(Node& n, std::size_t depth)
{
if (depth > jsontx_max_depth)
fail("document nested too deeply");
n.kind = Node::Kind::array;
++p_; // '['
skip();
if (peek() != ']')
{
for (;;)
{
skip();
value(n.items.emplace_back(), depth);
skip();
if (peek() == ',')
{
++p_;
continue;
}
break;
}
}
expect(']', "expected ',' or ']'");
}
public:
explicit Reader(std::string_view s) : s_(s)
{
}
Node
parse()
{
Node root;
skip();
if (p_ >= s_.size() || s_[p_] != '{')
fail("document must be an object");
object(root, 1);
skip();
if (p_ != s_.size())
fail(
s_[p_] == '/' ? "comments are not allowed"
: "trailing data after document");
return root;
}
};
Node
parse(std::string_view raw)
{
if (raw.size() > jsontx_max_text)
fail("document too large");
return Reader(raw).parse();
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Canonicalization, directed by field type.
//
// Keys of a transaction or inner object are SField names, matched
// case-insensitively and re-emitted in their canonical spelling, ordered by
// field code. A field's type decides what its value may be and how it is
// written. The handful of non-field objects a transaction renders (an issued
// amount, an Issue, a path step) have their keys sorted bytewise and hold
// only scalars.
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void
quoted(std::string& o, std::string_view s)
{
o += '"';
o += s;
o += '"';
}
std::uint64_t
unsignedValue(Node const& v, SField const& f)
{
std::uint64_t n = 0;
auto const& t = v.text;
auto const r = std::from_chars(t.data(), t.data() + t.size(), n);
if (t.front() == '-' || r.ec != std::errc{} || r.ptr != t.data() + t.size())
fail("'" + f.fieldName + "' is out of range");
return n;
}
char const*
kindName(Node::Kind k)
{
switch (k)
{
case Node::Kind::object:
return "an object";
case Node::Kind::array:
return "an array";
case Node::Kind::string:
return "a string";
case Node::Kind::number:
return "a number";
}
return "?"; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
void
require(Node const& v, Node::Kind k, std::string const& what)
{
if (v.kind != k)
fail(what + " must be " + kindName(k) + ", not " + kindName(v.kind));
}
void
emitFields(Node const& n, std::string& o, bool root = false);
// A string or a number, where the ledger wants a string: numbers become the
// quoted spelling of their exact digits.
void
emitScalar(Node const& v, std::string& o, std::string const& what)
{
if (v.kind != Node::Kind::string && v.kind != Node::Kind::number)
fail(what + " must be a string or a number");
quoted(o, v.text);
}
// {"currency":..,"issuer":..,"value":..} and the like
void
emitPlain(Node const& n, std::string const& what, std::string& o)
{
require(n, Node::Kind::object, what);
std::vector<std::size_t> idx(n.keys.size());
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < idx.size(); ++i)
idx[i] = i;
std::sort(idx.begin(), idx.end(), [&n](auto a, auto b) {
return n.keys[a] < n.keys[b];
});
o += '{';
for (auto const i : idx)
{
if (o.back() != '{')
o += ',';
quoted(o, n.keys[i]);
o += ':';
emitScalar(n.items[i], o, what + "." + n.keys[i]);
}
o += '}';
}
void
emitField(SField const& f, Node const& v, std::string& o)
{
std::string const& name = f.fieldName;
switch (f.fieldType)
{
case STI_OBJECT:
case STI_XCHAIN_BRIDGE: // renders its members under field names
require(v, Node::Kind::object, "'" + name + "'");
emitFields(v, o);
return;
case STI_ARRAY:
require(v, Node::Kind::array, "'" + name + "'");
o += '[';
for (auto const& e : v.items)
{
if (o.back() != '[')
o += ',';
// each element is {"InnerFieldName": {...}}
require(e, Node::Kind::object, "an element of '" + name + "'");
if (e.keys.size() != 1)
fail(
"an element of '" + name +
"' must have exactly one member");
emitFields(e, o);
}
o += ']';
return;
case STI_PATHSET:
require(v, Node::Kind::array, "'" + name + "'");
o += '[';
for (auto const& path : v.items)
{
if (o.back() != '[')
o += ',';
require(path, Node::Kind::array, "a path in '" + name + "'");
o += '[';
for (auto const& step : path.items)
{
if (o.back() != '[')
o += ',';
emitPlain(step, "a path step in '" + name + "'", o);
}
o += ']';
}
o += ']';
return;
case STI_VECTOR256:
require(v, Node::Kind::array, "'" + name + "'");
o += '[';
for (auto const& e : v.items)
{
if (o.back() != '[')
o += ',';
require(e, Node::Kind::string, "an element of '" + name + "'");
quoted(o, e.text);
}
o += ']';
return;
case STI_AMOUNT:
case STI_ISSUE:
if (v.kind == Node::Kind::object)
emitPlain(v, "'" + name + "'", o);
else
emitScalar(v, o, "'" + name + "'");
return;
case STI_UINT8:
case STI_UINT16:
case STI_UINT32:
if (v.kind == Node::Kind::string) // e.g. TransactionType
{
quoted(o, v.text);
return;
}
require(v, Node::Kind::number, "'" + name + "'");
{
std::uint64_t const max = f.fieldType == STI_UINT8 ? 0xFFu
: f.fieldType == STI_UINT16 ? 0xFFFFu
: 0xFFFF'FFFFu;
if (unsignedValue(v, f) > max)
fail("'" + name + "' is out of range");
}
o += v.text; // already minimal: the parser refuses leading zeros
return;
case STI_UINT64:
if (f == sfTime)
{
// Spelled Date().toISOString() in the preimage and stored as
// milliseconds. Re-emitting the round-tripped spelling rather
// than the input is what makes this a fixed point.
require(v, Node::Kind::string, "'" + name + "'");
quoted(o, jsontx_iso_str(jsontx_iso(v.text)));
return;
}
if (v.kind == Node::Kind::string)
{
quoted(o, v.text);
return;
}
require(v, Node::Kind::number, "'" + name + "'");
quoted(o, jsontx_u64_str(f, unsignedValue(v, f)));
return;
default: // hashes, blobs, accounts, currencies, numbers
emitScalar(v, o, "'" + name + "'");
return;
}
}
void
emitFields(Node const& n, std::string& o, bool root)
{
std::vector<std::pair<SField const*, Node const*>> ks;
ks.reserve(n.keys.size() + 1);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < n.keys.size(); ++i)
{
auto const& f = jsontx_field(n.keys[i]);
if (f == sfInvalid)
fail("unknown field '" + n.keys[i] + "'");
ks.emplace_back(&f, &n.items[i]);
}
// An omitted Sequence is Sequence 0 when something else sequences the
// transaction: a Time (time-sequenced) or a TicketSequence. Both need
// Sequence 0, and neither can mean anything else by it. The canonical
// form always carries the field, because the node's own rendering does:
// getJson emits every required field. Written this way the two spellings
// of such a preimage - with and without "Sequence": 0 - canonicalize to
// the same bytes, and the delta simply skips the ones the signer left
// out.
//
// Only a constant may be implied here, never anything read from the
// ledger such as the account's next sequence: the transaction must be a
// pure function of the preimage, or the binding check means nothing.
//
// With neither field, nothing is implied: an absent Sequence is left
// absent, and the submit RPC refuses the document for want of one.
if (root)
{
auto const has = [&ks](SField const& f) {
return std::any_of(ks.begin(), ks.end(), [&f](auto const& k) {
return *k.first == f;
});
};
if (!has(sfSequence) && (has(sfTime) || has(sfTicketSequence)))
{
static Node const zero{Node::Kind::number, "0", {}, {}};
ks.emplace_back(&sfSequence, &zero);
}
}
// field codes are unique, so this order is total
std::sort(ks.begin(), ks.end(), [](auto const& a, auto const& b) {
return a.first->fieldCode < b.first->fieldCode;
});
o += '{';
for (std::size_t j = 0; j < ks.size(); ++j)
{
auto const& [f, v] = ks[j];
if (j && f == ks[j - 1].first) // e.g. "Fee" and "fee"
fail("duplicate field '" + f->fieldName + "'");
if (o.back() != '{')
o += ',';
quoted(o, f->fieldName);
o += ':';
emitField(*f, *v, o);
}
o += '}';
}
std::string
canonical(Node const& root)
{
std::string out;
emitFields(root, out, true);
// Usually far smaller than the input, but a bare number in a field the
// ledger wants as a string gains two quote characters, so a document of
// bare amounts can grow past the cap. unsanitize_jsontx refuses a
// canonical form that large, so refuse it here too.
if (out.size() > jsontx_max_text)
fail("canonical form too large");
return out;
}
void
varint(std::string& o, std::uint64_t v)
{
do
{
std::uint8_t const c = v & 0x7F;
v >>= 7;
o += static_cast<char>(c | (v ? 0x80 : 0));
} while (v);
}
} // namespace
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string
jsontx_signing_data(std::string_view preimage)
{
std::string r;
r.reserve(jsontx_sign_prefix.size() + preimage.size());
r += jsontx_sign_prefix;
r += preimage;
return r;
}
// Not boost::algorithm::to_lower_copy or std::tolower: both consult the global
// locale, under which a byte such as 0xC9 folds on one node and not another.
std::string
jsontx_lower(std::string_view s)
{
std::string r(s);
for (auto& c : r)
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
c = static_cast<char>(c - 'A' + 'a');
return r;
}
SField const&
jsontx_field(std::string const& name)
{
static auto const tbl = [] {
std::unordered_map<std::string, SField const*> m;
for (auto const& [code, f] : SField::knownCodeToField)
if (f->isUseful() && f->isBinary() && f->fieldType < 10000 &&
!f->fieldName.empty())
{
// Two fields folding to one key would make the lookup depend
// on iteration order. None do today; keep it that way.
if (!m.emplace(jsontx_lower(f->fieldName), f).second)
LogicError(
"jsontx: field names collide case-insensitively: " +
f->fieldName);
}
return m;
}();
auto const i = tbl.find(jsontx_lower(name));
return i == tbl.end() ? sfInvalid : *i->second;
}
std::uint64_t
jsontx_iso(std::string_view s)
{
static constexpr char pat[] = "0000-00-00T00:00:00.000Z";
if (s.size() != 24)
fail("Time must be an ISO 8601 instant");
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < 24; ++i)
if (pat[i] == '0' ? !digit(s[i]) : s[i] != pat[i])
fail("malformed Time");
auto const n = [&s](std::size_t i, std::size_t c) {
int v = 0;
while (c--)
v = v * 10 + (s[i++] - '0');
return v;
};
int const y = n(0, 4), mo = n(5, 2), d = n(8, 2), h = n(11, 2),
mi = n(14, 2), se = n(17, 2), ms = n(20, 3);
if (mo < 1 || mo > 12)
fail("Time month out of range");
bool const leap = (y % 4 == 0 && y % 100 != 0) || y % 400 == 0;
int const dim =
mo == 2 ? (leap ? 29 : 28) : ((mo % 2 == 1) == (mo <= 7) ? 31 : 30);
// 60 is refused: JS cannot emit a leap second and the ledger cannot
// represent one
if (d < 1 || d > dim || h > 23 || mi > 59 || se > 59)
fail("Time out of range");
std::int64_t const t = (jsontx_days(y, mo, d) - jsontx_epoch_day) * 86400 +
h * 3600 + mi * 60 + se;
if (t < 0)
fail("Time precedes the ripple epoch");
return static_cast<std::uint64_t>(t) * 1000 + ms;
}
std::string
jsontx_iso_str(std::uint64_t ms)
{
if (ms > jsontx_max_time)
fail("Time out of range");
std::int64_t const z =
static_cast<std::int64_t>(ms / 86400000) + jsontx_epoch_day + 719468;
unsigned const tod = static_cast<unsigned>(ms / 1000 % 86400);
std::int64_t const era = (z >= 0 ? z : z - 146096) / 146097;
unsigned const doe = static_cast<unsigned>(z - era * 146097);
unsigned const yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36524 - doe / 146096) / 365;
unsigned const doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100);
unsigned const mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153;
unsigned const d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1;
unsigned const m = mp + (mp < 10 ? 3 : -9);
std::int64_t const y =
static_cast<std::int64_t>(yoe) + era * 400 + (m <= 2);
// jsontx_max_time bounds y to [2000, 9999], so every field fits its
// width. Hand-rolled: this spelling is part of the signed preimage and a
// library's padding rules are not.
char buf[24];
auto const pad = [&buf](std::size_t at, std::uint64_t v, std::size_t w) {
while (w--)
{
buf[at + w] = static_cast<char>('0' + v % 10);
v /= 10;
}
};
pad(0, static_cast<std::uint64_t>(y), 4);
buf[4] = '-';
pad(5, m, 2);
buf[7] = '-';
pad(8, d, 2);
buf[10] = 'T';
pad(11, tod / 3600, 2);
buf[13] = ':';
pad(14, tod / 60 % 60, 2);
buf[16] = ':';
pad(17, tod % 60, 2);
buf[19] = '.';
pad(20, ms % 1000, 3);
buf[23] = 'Z';
return std::string(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
std::string
jsontx_u64_str(SField const& f, std::uint64_t v)
{
char buf[20];
auto const r = std::to_chars(
buf, buf + sizeof(buf), v, f.shouldMeta(SField::sMD_BaseTen) ? 10 : 16);
return std::string(buf, r.ptr);
}
void
jsontx_strict(std::string_view raw)
{
(void)parse(raw);
}
std::string
jsontx_canonical(std::string_view raw)
{
return canonical(parse(raw));
}
std::pair<std::string, std::string>
sanitize_jsontx(std::string_view raw)
{
std::string out = canonical(parse(raw));
// Greedy copy/insert delta over `raw`, sourcing from `out`.
// op 0x00 <varint len> <bytes> literal
// op 0x01 <varint off> <varint len> copy from canonical
//
// This encoder is normative - unsanitize_jsontx only accepts its exact
// output - so it must emit identical bytes on every node and stdlib.
// Candidates for a 4-gram are tried in ascending offset order and ties
// keep the lowest offset. The index is a sorted vector of
// (gram << 32 | offset): offsets are unique, so the order is total and
// std::sort is deterministic.
std::string diff, lit;
std::size_t ops = 0;
auto const gram = [](std::string_view s, std::size_t i) {
return std::uint32_t(std::uint8_t(s[i])) << 24 |
std::uint32_t(std::uint8_t(s[i + 1])) << 16 |
std::uint32_t(std::uint8_t(s[i + 2])) << 8 |
std::uint32_t(std::uint8_t(s[i + 3]));
};
auto const flush = [&] {
if (lit.empty())
return;
diff += char(0);
varint(diff, lit.size());
diff += lit;
lit.clear();
++ops;
};
std::vector<std::uint64_t> idx;
if (out.size() >= jsontx_min_copy)
{
idx.reserve(out.size() - jsontx_min_copy + 1);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i + jsontx_min_copy <= out.size(); ++i)
idx.push_back(std::uint64_t(gram(out, i)) << 32 | i);
std::sort(idx.begin(), idx.end());
}
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < raw.size();)
{
std::size_t bo = 0, bl = 0;
if (i + jsontx_min_copy <= raw.size())
{
std::uint64_t const g = gram(raw, i);
auto it = std::lower_bound(idx.begin(), idx.end(), g << 32);
for (std::size_t tried = 0;
it != idx.end() && (*it >> 32) == g && tried < jsontx_max_cand;
++it, ++tried)
{
std::size_t const off = *it & 0xFFFF'FFFFu;
std::size_t l = 0;
while (i + l < raw.size() && off + l < out.size() &&
out[off + l] == raw[i + l])
++l;
if (l > bl)
bl = l, bo = off;
}
}
if (bl >= jsontx_min_copy)
{
flush();
diff += char(1);
varint(diff, bo);
varint(diff, bl);
++ops;
i += bl;
}
else
lit += raw[i++];
}
flush();
// The bounds unsanitize_jsontx applies, applied here so that a document
// this accepts is never one the verifier then refuses.
if (diff.size() > jsontx_max_diff || ops > jsontx_max_ops)
fail("formatting differs too much from canonical form");
return {std::move(out), std::move(diff)};
}
// Copies read only from `sanitized`, never from the output being built, so a
// short delta cannot expand geometrically. Offsets and lengths are range
// checked before use, varints are length- and minimality-bounded, and the two
// encodings the encoder can never emit - an unmerged literal run, and a copy
// abutting the previous copy in the source - are refused.
std::string
unsanitize_jsontx(std::string_view sanitized, std::string_view diff)
{
if (sanitized.size() > jsontx_max_text || diff.size() > jsontx_max_diff)
fail("oversize delta input");
std::string out;
std::size_t p = 0, ops = 0, prevEnd = 0;
int prev = -1;
auto const read = [&](std::uint64_t max) -> std::uint64_t {
std::uint64_t v = 0;
for (int s = 0; s <= 21; s += 7) // four bytes at most
{
if (p >= diff.size())
fail("truncated delta");
std::uint8_t const c = diff[p++];
v |= std::uint64_t(c & 0x7F) << s;
if (c & 0x80)
continue;
if (s && !(c & 0x7F))
fail("non-minimal varint");
if (v > max)
fail("delta value out of range");
return v;
}
fail("overlong varint");
};
while (p < diff.size())
{
if (++ops > jsontx_max_ops)
fail("too many delta ops");
std::uint8_t const op = diff[p++];
if (op > 1)
fail("unknown delta op");
if (op == 0) // literal
{
if (prev == 0)
fail("unmerged literal run");
auto const n = read(jsontx_max_text);
if (n == 0 || n > diff.size() - p)
fail("bad literal length");
if (out.size() + n > jsontx_max_text)
fail("delta expands too far");
out += diff.substr(p, n);
p += n;
}
else // copy from the canonical form
{
auto const off = read(sanitized.size());
auto const n = read(sanitized.size() - off);
if (n < jsontx_min_copy)
fail("undersize copy");
if (prev == 1 && off == prevEnd)
fail("unmerged copy run");
if (out.size() + n > jsontx_max_text)
fail("delta expands too far");
out += sanitized.substr(off, n);
prevEnd = off + n;
}
prev = op;
}
if (out.empty())
fail("empty delta");
return out;
}
std::string
jsontx_verify(STTx const& stx, std::string_view diff)
{
// The cheap refusals first: this runs on every relay of a transaction
// carrying a delta, before any signature is known to be good.
if (!stx.isFieldPresent(sfTxnSignature) || stx.isFieldPresent(sfSigners))
fail("expects a lone TxnSignature");
auto const pkb = stx.getSigningPubKey();
if (publicKeyType(makeSlice(pkb)) != KeyType::ed25519)
fail("SigningPubKey must be ed25519");
if (diff.size() > jsontx_max_diff)
fail("oversize delta");
// No transaction serializes to more than twice its canonical text
// (JSONTxSignatures_test checks every field of every format; the worst
// is a bare three-letter currency code, about 1.3x). Allowing twice that
// again, plus the delta and signature this counts but the canonical form
// does not, loses nothing that could verify, and spares getJson on an
// arbitrarily large object.
if (stx.getSerializer().size() > 4 * jsontx_max_text + jsontx_max_diff)
fail("transaction too large");
// Out comes everything the signer did not have in front of them: the
// signature and the delta carrier. SigningPubKey stays; it being inside
// the preimage binds key to signature and stops a third party re-signing
// a captured preimage under their own key.
auto txj = stx.STObject::getJson(JsonOptions::none);
txj.removeMember(sfTxnSignature.fieldName);
txj.removeMember(sfJsonTxDelta.fieldName);
// sfTime is milliseconds on the wire and an ISO 8601 instant in the
// preimage: a bijection over the representable range, so the delta
// carries nothing for the field.
if (stx.isFieldPresent(sfTime))
txj[sfTime.fieldName] = jsontx_iso_str(stx.getFieldU64(sfTime));
// canonical form, derived only from data the node already holds
auto const san = jsontx_canonical(Json::FastWriter{}.write(txj));
// reconstruct the signed preimage under the caps above
auto const raw = unsanitize_jsontx(san, diff);
// The signature before the binding check purely for cost: the binding
// check re-canonicalizes and re-encodes, and without the key an attacker
// cannot get past this line. Both must pass.
if (!verify(
PublicKey(makeSlice(pkb)),
makeSlice(jsontx_signing_data(raw)),
makeSlice(stx.getFieldVL(sfTxnSignature))))
fail("signature does not verify");
// Bind the preimage to the transaction. This is the load-bearing check:
// a delta of pure literals can reconstruct ANY text, so without it every
// JsonTx signature the key ever produced would authorise this
// transaction. Comparing the delta too makes it a pure function of the
// preimage, which rules out a second delta reconstructing the same bytes
// and yielding a second valid transaction id.
auto const [san2, diff2] = sanitize_jsontx(raw);
if (san2 != san || diff2 != diff)
fail("preimage does not match transaction");
return raw;
}
std::string
jsontx_verify(STTx const& stx)
{
if (!stx.isFieldPresent(sfJsonTxDelta))
fail("no delta");
auto const delta = stx.getFieldVL(sfJsonTxDelta);
return jsontx_verify(
stx,
std::string_view(
reinterpret_cast<char const*>(delta.data()), delta.size()));
}
} // namespace ripple
+18 -1
View File
@@ -198,6 +198,13 @@ STTx::getSeqProxy() const
return SeqProxy{SeqProxy::ticket, *ticketSeq};
}
bool
STTx::isTimeSequenced() const
{
return isFieldPresent(sfTime) && getFieldU32(sfSequence) == 0 &&
!isFieldPresent(sfTicketSequence);
}
void
STTx::sign(PublicKey const& publicKey, SecretKey const& secretKey)
{
@@ -214,6 +221,15 @@ STTx::checkSign(
RequireFullyCanonicalSig requireCanonicalSig,
Rules const& rules) const
{
// sfJsonTxDelta is a non-signing field, so the binary signing hash does
// not cover it: a binary signature stays valid with any delta appended.
// Were that accepted, anyone relaying a binary-signed transaction could
// mint as many new transaction ids for it as there are deltas. A delta
// means the signature is over the JSON preimage, which jsontx_verify
// checks; a binary signature never authorises one.
if (isFieldPresent(sfJsonTxDelta))
return Unexpected("Binary signature cannot authorise a JsonTx.");
try
{
// Determine whether we're single- or multi-signing by looking
@@ -684,7 +700,8 @@ isPseudoTx(STObject const& tx)
auto tt = safe_cast<TxType>(*t);
return tt == ttAMENDMENT || tt == ttFEE || tt == ttUNL_MODIFY ||
tt == ttEMIT_FAILURE || tt == ttUNL_REPORT || tt == ttCRON;
tt == ttEMIT_FAILURE || tt == ttUNL_REPORT || tt == ttCRON ||
tt == ttENTROPY;
}
} // namespace ripple
+1
View File
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ transResults()
MAKE_ERROR(tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE, "The LedgerFixType field has an invalid value."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefPAST_MANIFEST_SEQ, "The submitted manifest's sequence is not newer than the current."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefREVOKED_MANIFEST, "The submitted manifest is for a revoked master key."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE, "A key the submitted manifest names is already in use by another manifest."),
MAKE_ERROR(telLOCAL_ERROR, "Local failure."),
MAKE_ERROR(telBAD_DOMAIN, "Domain too long."),
+2
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ TxFormats::TxFormats()
{sfNetworkID, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfHookParameters, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfHookName, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfTime, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfJsonTxDelta, soeOPTIONAL},
};
#pragma push_macro("UNWRAP")
+9
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ TxMeta::TxMeta(
if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfHookEmissions))
setHookEmissions(obj.getFieldArray(sfHookEmissions));
if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfRandomData))
setRandomData(obj.getFieldH256(sfRandomData));
}
TxMeta::TxMeta(uint256 const& txid, std::uint32_t ledger, STObject const& obj)
@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ TxMeta::TxMeta(uint256 const& txid, std::uint32_t ledger, STObject const& obj)
if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfHookEmissions))
setHookEmissions(obj.getFieldArray(sfHookEmissions));
if (obj.isFieldPresent(sfRandomData))
setRandomData(obj.getFieldH256(sfRandomData));
}
TxMeta::TxMeta(uint256 const& txid, std::uint32_t ledger, Blob const& vec)
@@ -245,6 +251,9 @@ TxMeta::getAsObject() const
if (hasHookEmissions())
metaData.setFieldArray(sfHookEmissions, getHookEmissions());
if (hasRandomData())
metaData.setFieldH256(sfRandomData, getRandomData());
return metaData;
}
+69
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,10 @@
#include <xrpl/beast/core/LexicalCast.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/rfc2616.h>
#include <xrpl/server/Port.h>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/case_conv.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/classification.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/predicate.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/split.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/trim.hpp>
#include <sstream>
#include <stdexcept>
@@ -66,6 +69,14 @@ operator<<(std::ostream& os, Port const& p)
}
}
if (!p.pwa_domains.empty())
{
os << "domains:";
for (auto const& d : p.pwa_domains)
os << " " << d;
os << ", ";
}
if (p.secure_gateway_nets_v4.size() || p.secure_gateway_nets_v6.size())
{
os << "secure_gateway nets:";
@@ -311,6 +322,64 @@ parse_Port(ParsedPort& port, Section const& section, std::ostream& log)
port.secure_gateway_nets_v4,
port.secure_gateway_nets_v6);
// pwa ports: the zone(s) documents are served under, normalised like a
// Host header: lower case, no trailing dot, LDH labels of 1..63, with
// room left for the longest "pwa<AccountIndex>" label in front.
if (auto const optResult = section.get("domain"))
{
std::vector<std::string> domains;
boost::algorithm::split(
domains, *optResult, boost::algorithm::is_any_of(","));
for (auto& domain : domains)
{
boost::algorithm::trim(domain);
boost::algorithm::to_lower(domain);
if (!domain.empty() && domain.back() == '.')
domain.pop_back();
if (domain.empty())
continue;
bool valid = domain.size() + 24 <= 253;
std::vector<std::string> labels;
boost::algorithm::split(
labels, domain, boost::algorithm::is_any_of("."));
for (auto const& l : labels)
valid = valid && !l.empty() && l.size() <= 63 &&
l.front() != '-' && l.back() != '-' &&
l.find_first_not_of(
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-") ==
std::string::npos;
if (!valid)
{
log << "Invalid value '" << domain << "' for key 'domain' in ["
<< section.name()
<< "]: expected a DNS zone such as pwapp.example";
Throw<std::exception>();
}
port.pwa_domains.insert(domain);
}
}
// Custom domains on pwa ports, and the IPv4 recursive resolver to use for
// their TXT records (default: the system resolver).
if (auto const v = section.get("custom_domains"))
if (!beast::lexicalCastChecked(port.pwa_custom_domains, *v))
{
log << "Invalid value '" << *v << "' for key 'custom_domains' in ["
<< section.name() << "]: expected 0 or 1";
Throw<std::exception>();
}
if (auto const v = section.get("resolver"))
{
auto const ep = beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string_checked(*v);
if (!ep || !ep->is_v4() || ep->address().is_unspecified())
{
log << "Invalid value '" << *v << "' for key 'resolver' in ["
<< section.name() << "]: expected an IPv4 address[:port]";
Throw<std::exception>();
}
port.pwa_resolver = ep->port() ? *ep : ep->at_port(53);
}
set(port.user, "user", section);
set(port.password, "password", section);
set(port.admin_user, "admin_user", section);
+19
View File
@@ -578,6 +578,25 @@ public:
ter(tecNO_TARGET));
env.close();
}
// HookName removed with a HookName-only update
// The sfHooks entry keeps an STI_NOTPRESENT placeholder for
// sfHookName, which preclaim must treat as "no name".
{
Json::Value jv;
jv[jss::Account] = issuer.human();
jv[jss::TransactionType] = jss::SetHook;
jv[jss::Flags] = 0;
jv[jss::Hooks] = Json::Value{Json::arrayValue};
jv[jss::Hooks][0U][jss::Hook][jss::HookName] = "";
env(jv, fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
env(reward::claim(alice),
reward::issuer(issuer),
fee(XRP(1)),
ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
}
// Vaild HookOn
{
auto hookObj = hso(jtx::genesis::AcceptHook, overrideFlag);
+449
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <test/jtx.h>
#include <xrpld/core/Config.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/strHex.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/CreditNote.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/JSONTxSignatures.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <chrono>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
struct CreditNote_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
// helpers
// The open ledger's parent close time in milliseconds since the ripple
// epoch: the clock NoteClaim checks the note's window against. A fresh
// Env starts seconds after the epoch, too early to backdate a note from
// (the subtraction would wrap), so a young clock is first moved an hour on.
static std::uint64_t
nowMs(jtx::Env& env)
{
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
if (env.current()->parentCloseTime().time_since_epoch() < 1h)
env.close(1h);
return static_cast<std::uint64_t>(env.current()
->parentCloseTime()
.time_since_epoch()
.count()) *
1000;
}
static std::optional<std::uint64_t>
lastNoteTime(jtx::Env& env, jtx::Account const& a)
{
auto const sle = env.le(a);
if (!sle || !sle->isFieldPresent(sfLastNoteTime))
return std::nullopt;
return sle->getFieldU64(sfLastNoteTime);
}
// The note laid out the way a browser's JSON.stringify would.
static std::string
noteText(
jtx::Env& env,
jtx::Account const& issuer,
std::string const& amount,
std::uint64_t issueTime,
std::uint64_t expiration)
{
return "{\"NetworkID\":" +
std::to_string(env.app().config().NETWORK_ID) + ",\"Account\":\"" +
issuer.human() + "\",\"Amount\":" + amount + ",\"IssueTime\":\"" +
jsontx_iso_str(issueTime) + "\",\"Expiration\":\"" +
jsontx_iso_str(expiration) + "\"}";
}
static std::string
iou(jtx::IOU const& currency, std::string const& value)
{
return "{\"currency\":\"" + to_string(currency.currency) +
"\",\"issuer\":\"" + currency.account.human() + "\",\"value\":\"" +
value + "\"}";
}
static Buffer
noteSign(jtx::Account const& signer, std::string const& text)
{
return sign(
signer.pk(), signer.sk(), makeSlice(jsontx_signing_data(text)));
}
// A NoteClaim from `bearer` carrying `text`, signed by `signer`'s key.
static Json::Value
claim(
jtx::Account const& bearer,
std::string const& text,
jtx::Account const& signer)
{
Json::Value jv;
jv[jss::TransactionType] = "NoteClaim";
jv[jss::Account] = bearer.human();
jv[sfNote.fieldName] = strHex(text);
jv[sfNoteSignature.fieldName] = strHex(noteSign(signer, text));
jv[sfPublicKey.fieldName] = strHex(signer.pk().slice());
return jv;
}
// A fresh ten-minute note issued a minute ago.
static std::string
freshNote(
jtx::Env& env,
jtx::Account const& issuer,
std::string const& amount,
std::int64_t offsetMs = 0)
{
auto const issue = static_cast<std::uint64_t>(
static_cast<std::int64_t>(nowMs(env)) - 60'000 + offsetMs);
return noteText(env, issuer, amount, issue, issue + 600'000);
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
void
testParse()
{
testcase("parse");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, supported_amendments()};
Account const alice{"alice", KeyType::ed25519};
Account const gw{"gw"};
auto const USD = gw["USD"];
auto const ok = [&](std::string const& text) {
try
{
parseCreditNote(text);
return true;
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
return false;
}
};
std::uint64_t const t = 800'000'000'000ULL;
auto const good = noteText(env, alice, "10000000", t, t + 600'000);
BEAST_EXPECT(ok(good));
{
auto const n = parseCreditNote(good);
BEAST_EXPECT(n.account == alice.id());
BEAST_EXPECT(n.amount == STAmount{XRPAmount{10'000'000}});
BEAST_EXPECT(n.issueTime == t);
BEAST_EXPECT(n.expiration == t + 600'000);
}
// whitespace is the issuer's to choose; the bytes are what is signed
BEAST_EXPECT(
ok(" {\n \"NetworkID\": 0 ,\n\"Account\":\"" + alice.human() +
"\",\"Amount\":1,\"IssueTime\":\"" + jsontx_iso_str(t) +
"\",\"Expiration\":\"" + jsontx_iso_str(t + 1) + "\" }\n"));
// issued amounts
BEAST_EXPECT(ok(noteText(env, alice, iou(USD, "10"), t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(ok(noteText(env, alice, iou(USD, "0.5"), t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, iou(USD, "0"), t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, iou(USD, "-1"), t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(
env,
alice,
"{\"currency\":\"USD\",\"issuer\":\"" + gw.human() + "\"}",
t,
t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(
env,
alice,
"{\"currency\":\"XAH\",\"issuer\":\"" + gw.human() +
"\",\"value\":\"1\"}",
t,
t + 600'000)));
// shape
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, "0", t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, "-5", t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, "\"10\"", t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, "1.5", t, t + 600'000)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(""));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok("[]"));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(good + " x"));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(good.substr(0, good.size() - 1)));
// exactly the five members, spelled exactly so
BEAST_EXPECT(
!ok(good.substr(0, good.size() - 1) + ",\"Memo\":\"hi\"}"));
BEAST_EXPECT(
!ok(good.substr(0, good.size() - 1) +
",\"TransactionType\":\"Payment\"}"));
{
auto bad = good;
bad.replace(bad.find("\"Account\""), 9, "\"account\"");
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(bad));
}
{
auto bad = good;
bad.replace(bad.find("\"IssueTime\""), 11, "\"Expiration\"");
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(bad)); // duplicate Expiration
}
// window
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, "1", t, t)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(noteText(env, alice, "1", t + 1, t)));
BEAST_EXPECT(ok(noteText(env, alice, "1", t, t + creditNoteMaxLifeMs)));
BEAST_EXPECT(
!ok(noteText(env, alice, "1", t, t + creditNoteMaxLifeMs + 1)));
// a time the way sfTime renders, or nothing
BEAST_EXPECT(
!ok("{\"NetworkID\":0,\"Account\":\"" + alice.human() +
"\",\"Amount\":1,\"IssueTime\":" + std::to_string(t) +
",\"Expiration\":\"" + jsontx_iso_str(t + 1) + "\"}"));
// size
{
std::string big = good;
big.insert(1, std::string(maxCreditNoteBytes, ' '));
BEAST_EXPECT(!ok(big));
}
}
void
testDisabled()
{
testcase("disabled");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, supported_amendments() - featureCreditNote};
Account const alice{"alice", KeyType::ed25519};
Account const bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close();
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, "10000000"), alice),
ter(temDISABLED));
}
void
testXAH()
{
testcase("native");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, supported_amendments()};
Account const alice{"alice", KeyType::ed25519};
Account const bob{"bob"};
Account const carol{"carol"}; // secp256k1
Account const dave{"dave", KeyType::ed25519}; // never funded
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob, carol);
env.close();
auto const text = freshNote(env, alice, "10000000");
// a well-formed ed25519 signature by a key the issuer does not hold
env(claim(bob, text, dave), ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
// signature over different bytes
{
auto jv = claim(bob, text, alice);
jv[sfNote.fieldName] = strHex(freshNote(env, alice, "10000001"));
env(jv, ter(temBAD_SIGNATURE));
}
// not ed25519
env(claim(bob, text, carol), ter(temMALFORMED));
// wrong network
{
auto bad = text;
auto const nid = "\"NetworkID\":" +
std::to_string(env.app().config().NETWORK_ID);
bad.replace(bad.find(nid), nid.size(), "\"NetworkID\":9");
env(claim(bob, bad, alice), ter(temMALFORMED));
}
// redeeming your own note
env(claim(alice, text, alice), ter(temREDUNDANT));
// too early, expired
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, "10000000", 120'000), alice),
ter(terPRE_SEQ));
{
auto const t = nowMs(env) - 700'000;
env(claim(
bob,
noteText(env, alice, "10000000", t, t + 600'000),
alice),
ter(tecEXPIRED));
}
// issuer cannot cover it above their reserve
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, "10000000000"), alice),
ter(tecUNFUNDED_PAYMENT));
BEAST_EXPECT(!lastNoteTime(env, alice));
// the note redeems, and once
auto const issued = parseCreditNote(text).issueTime;
STAmount const before = env.balance(bob);
STAmount const fee{env.current()->fees().base};
env(claim(bob, text, alice));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob) == before + XRP(10).value() - fee);
BEAST_EXPECT(lastNoteTime(env, alice) == issued);
env(claim(bob, text, alice), ter(tefPAST_SEQ));
env(claim(carol, text, alice), ter(tefPAST_SEQ));
// a note issued before the redeemed one is retired with it ...
env(claim(
bob,
noteText(env, alice, "1000000", issued - 1, issued + 600'000),
alice),
ter(tefPAST_SEQ));
// ... and one issued after it still redeems
auto const later =
noteText(env, alice, "1000000", issued + 1, issued + 600'000);
env(claim(carol, later, alice));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(lastNoteTime(env, alice) == issued + 1);
}
void
testRegularKey()
{
testcase("regular key");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, supported_amendments()};
Account const alice{"alice"}; // secp256k1 master
Account const alie{"alie", KeyType::ed25519};
Account const bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close();
// alice's master is secp256k1, which cannot sign a note
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, "1000000"), alice),
ter(temMALFORMED));
// an ed25519 key she does not hold yet
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, "1000000"), alie),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
// Close before the regkey: a tec stays in the open ledger and is
// re-applied at close in canonical order, where it could land after
// the regkey and redeem.
env.close();
// as her regular key it signs for her
env(regkey(alice, alie));
env.close();
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, "1000000"), alie));
env.close();
// and a disabled master no longer does
Account const carol{"carol", KeyType::ed25519};
env.fund(XRP(10000), carol);
env(regkey(carol, alie));
env(fset(carol, asfDisableMaster), sig(carol));
env.close();
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, carol, "1000000"), carol),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, carol, "1000000", 1), alie));
env.close();
}
void
testIOU()
{
testcase("issued currency");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, supported_amendments()};
Account const alice{"alice", KeyType::ed25519};
Account const bob{"bob"};
Account const gw{"gw", KeyType::ed25519};
auto const USD = gw["USD"];
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob, gw);
env.close();
env(trust(alice, USD(1000)));
env(pay(gw, alice, USD(100)));
env.close();
// bob has no trust line; none is created
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, iou(USD, "10")), alice),
ter(tecNO_LINE));
env(trust(bob, USD(1000)));
env.close();
// more than alice holds
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, iou(USD, "101")), alice),
ter(tecUNFUNDED_PAYMENT));
env.close();
// frozen line
env(trust(gw, bob["USD"](0), tfSetFreeze));
env.close();
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, iou(USD, "10")), alice),
ter(tecFROZEN));
// The rejected claim must close before the unfreeze: otherwise the
// close re-applies both in canonical order and, with the unfreeze
// first, the note redeems after all.
env.close();
env(trust(gw, bob["USD"](0), tfClearFreeze));
env.close();
// transit: bob receives 10, alice pays 10 plus the transfer fee
env(rate(gw, 1.25));
env.close();
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, alice, iou(USD, "10")), alice));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob, USD) == USD(10));
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(alice, USD) == USD(87.5));
// issue: the gateway's own note, no fee
env(claim(bob, freshNote(env, gw, iou(USD, "5")), gw));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob, USD) == USD(15));
// redemption: a note cashed by the gateway, no line needed on its side
env(claim(gw, freshNote(env, alice, iou(USD, "7"), 1000), alice));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(alice, USD) == USD(80.5));
}
void
run() override
{
testParse();
testDisabled();
testXAH();
testRegularKey();
testIOU();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(CreditNote, app, ripple);
} // namespace test
} // namespace ripple
+258
View File
@@ -3043,6 +3043,91 @@ public:
BEAST_EXPECT(acct->value() == alice.id());
}
void
test_otxn_field_emit_failure(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Test otxn_field on emit failure callback");
using namespace jtx;
using namespace hook_api;
auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
auto const bob = Account{"bob"};
// the cleanup pseudo carries sfLedgerSequence / sfTransactionHash,
// the original emitted txn carries sfDestination
STTx const pseudo = STTx(ttEMIT_FAILURE, [&](STObject& obj) {
obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, 1);
obj.setFieldH256(sfTransactionHash, uint256{5});
});
STTx const emitted = STTx(ttPAYMENT, [&](STObject& obj) {
obj[sfAccount] = alice.id();
obj[sfDestination] = bob.id();
});
for (bool const withFix : {false, true})
{
Env env{
*this,
withFix ? features | fix20261005 : features - fix20261005};
OpenView ov{*env.current()};
ApplyContext applyCtx = createApplyContext(env, ov, pseudo);
StubHookContext stubCtx{.emitFailure = emitted};
auto hookCtx =
makeStubHookContext(applyCtx, alice.id(), alice.id(), stubCtx);
auto& api = hookCtx.api();
// present on both: read from the emitted txn either way
{
auto const result = api.otxn_field(sfAccount.getCode());
BEAST_EXPECT(result.has_value());
auto const* acct =
dynamic_cast<STAccount const*>(result.value());
BEAST_EXPECT(acct && acct->value() == alice.id());
}
// only on the emitted txn: before the fix presence was checked
// on the pseudo, so the field was reported missing
{
auto const result = api.otxn_field(sfDestination.getCode());
if (withFix)
{
BEAST_EXPECT(result.has_value());
auto const* dest =
dynamic_cast<STAccount const*>(result.value());
BEAST_EXPECT(dest && dest->value() == bob.id());
}
else
{
BEAST_EXPECT(
!result.has_value() && result.error() == DOESNT_EXIST);
}
}
// only on the pseudo: before the fix this throws out of
// getField on the emitted txn
if (withFix)
{
auto const result = api.otxn_field(sfLedgerSequence.getCode());
BEAST_EXPECT(
!result.has_value() && result.error() == DOESNT_EXIST);
}
else
{
bool threw = false;
try
{
(void)api.otxn_field(sfLedgerSequence.getCode());
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
threw = true;
}
BEAST_EXPECT(threw);
}
}
}
void
test_otxn_id(FeatureBitset features)
{
@@ -3741,6 +3826,174 @@ public:
}
}
void
test_state_foreign_read_accounting(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Test state_foreign read does not consume write resources");
using namespace jtx;
using namespace hook_api;
using namespace hook;
bool const hasFix = features[fix20261005];
bool const hasExtended = features[featureExtendedHookState];
Env env{*this, features};
auto const fees = env.current()->fees();
auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
auto const bob = Account{"bob"};
auto const carol = Account{"carol"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
// exactly one state reserve slot available
env.fund(fees.accountReserve(0) + fees.increment, bob);
// no state reserve slot available
env.fund(fees.accountReserve(0), carol);
env.close();
uint256 const readKey{1};
uint256 const writeKey{2};
uint256 const ns{3};
Bytes const existingData{0xAA, 0xBB};
Bytes writeData{0x01};
OpenView ov{*env.current()};
// Place an existing state entry (and its namespace directory) on
// ledger for each account, so state_foreign's cache-miss path reads it.
auto insertState = [&](AccountID const& acc) {
auto const dirKeylet = keylet::hookStateDir(acc, ns);
auto dir = std::make_shared<SLE>(dirKeylet);
dir->setFieldH256(sfRootIndex, dirKeylet.key);
dir->setFieldV256(
sfIndexes,
STVector256{std::vector<uint256>{
keylet::hookState(acc, readKey, ns).key}});
ov.rawInsert(dir);
auto hs =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::hookState(acc, readKey, ns));
hs->setFieldVL(sfHookStateData, existingData);
hs->setFieldH256(sfHookStateKey, readKey);
hs->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, 0);
ov.rawInsert(hs);
};
insertState(alice.id());
insertState(bob.id());
insertState(carol.id());
STTx invokeTx = STTx(ttINVOKE, [&](STObject& obj) {});
ApplyContext applyCtx = createApplyContext(env, ov, invokeTx);
auto availableSlots = [&](AccountID const& acc) -> int64_t {
auto const sle = ov.read(keylet::account(acc));
int64_t avail = sle->getFieldAmount(sfBalance).xrp().drops() -
fees.accountReserve(sle->getFieldU32(sfOwnerCount)).drops();
return avail / fees.increment.drops();
};
{
// A read must not consume the shared modification limit.
HookStateMap stateMap;
auto hookCtx = makeStubHookContext(
applyCtx, alice.id(), alice.id(), {}, stateMap);
auto& api = hookCtx.api();
stateMap.modified_entry_count = max_state_modifications - 1;
auto const read = api.state_foreign(readKey, ns, alice.id());
BEAST_EXPECT(read.has_value() && read.value() == existingData);
int64_t const slots = availableSlots(alice.id());
BEAST_EXPECT(slots > 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(
stateMap.modified_entry_count ==
max_state_modifications - (hasFix ? 1 : 0));
BEAST_EXPECT(
std::get<0>(stateMap[alice.id()]) == slots - (hasFix ? 0 : 1));
auto const write =
api.state_foreign_set(writeKey, ns, alice.id(), writeData);
if (hasFix)
{
BEAST_EXPECT(write.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(
stateMap.modified_entry_count == max_state_modifications);
}
else
{
BEAST_EXPECT(!write.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(write.error() == TOO_MANY_STATE_MODIFICATIONS);
}
}
{
// A read must not consume the reserve budget.
HookStateMap stateMap;
auto hookCtx =
makeStubHookContext(applyCtx, bob.id(), bob.id(), {}, stateMap);
auto& api = hookCtx.api();
BEAST_EXPECT(availableSlots(bob.id()) == 1);
auto const read = api.state_foreign(readKey, ns, bob.id());
BEAST_EXPECT(read.has_value() && read.value() == existingData);
BEAST_EXPECT(std::get<0>(stateMap[bob.id()]) == (hasFix ? 1 : 0));
auto const write =
api.state_foreign_set(writeKey, ns, bob.id(), writeData);
if (hasFix)
{
BEAST_EXPECT(write.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(std::get<0>(stateMap[bob.id()]) == 0);
}
else
{
BEAST_EXPECT(!write.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(write.error() == RESERVE_INSUFFICIENT);
}
// Modifying the entry that was read needs no new reserve and
// is still charged as a modification.
auto const before = stateMap.modified_entry_count;
Bytes overwrite{0x02};
auto const update =
api.state_foreign_set(readKey, ns, bob.id(), overwrite);
BEAST_EXPECT(update.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(stateMap.modified_entry_count == before + 1);
}
{
// A read on an account with no spare reserve must succeed;
// previously ExtendedHookState's sanity check rejected it.
HookStateMap stateMap;
auto hookCtx = makeStubHookContext(
applyCtx, carol.id(), carol.id(), {}, stateMap);
auto& api = hookCtx.api();
BEAST_EXPECT(availableSlots(carol.id()) == 0);
auto const read = api.state_foreign(readKey, ns, carol.id());
if (hasExtended && !hasFix)
{
BEAST_EXPECT(!read.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(read.error() == INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
else
{
BEAST_EXPECT(read.has_value() && read.value() == existingData);
BEAST_EXPECT(stateMap.modified_entry_count == (hasFix ? 0 : 1));
}
// Writing a new key still fails on reserve either way.
auto const write =
api.state_foreign_set(writeKey, ns, carol.id(), writeData);
BEAST_EXPECT(!write.has_value());
if (!write.has_value())
BEAST_EXPECT(write.error() == RESERVE_INSUFFICIENT);
}
}
void
test_state_foreign_set_max(FeatureBitset features)
{
@@ -4958,6 +5211,7 @@ public:
test_fee_base(features);
test_otxn_field(features);
test_otxn_field_emit_failure(features);
test_ledger_keylet(features);
@@ -5012,6 +5266,10 @@ public:
test_state(features);
test_state_foreign(features);
test_state_foreign_read_accounting(features);
test_state_foreign_read_accounting(features - fix20261005);
test_state_foreign_read_accounting(
features - fix20261005 - featureExtendedHookState);
test_state_foreign_set(features - fixHookMap);
test_state_foreign_set(features);
test_state_foreign_set_max(features);
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+474
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <xrpld/app/rdb/Wallet.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/StringUtilities.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base64.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/contract.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STExchange.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
@@ -975,9 +976,482 @@ public:
".example.com"));
}
struct Validator
{
SecretKey masterSecret;
PublicKey master;
SecretKey signingSecret;
PublicKey signing;
};
static Validator
makeValidator()
{
auto const ms = randomSecretKey();
auto const ss = randomSecretKey();
return {
ms,
derivePublicKey(KeyType::ed25519, ms),
ss,
derivePublicKey(KeyType::secp256k1, ss)};
}
/** The same master key with a fresh ephemeral key. */
static Validator
rotate(Validator const& v)
{
auto const ss = randomSecretKey();
return {
v.masterSecret,
v.master,
ss,
derivePublicKey(KeyType::secp256k1, ss)};
}
/** Another master key claiming the same ephemeral key. */
static Validator
impostor(Validator const& v)
{
auto const ms = randomSecretKey();
return {
ms,
derivePublicKey(KeyType::ed25519, ms),
v.signingSecret,
v.signing};
}
Manifest
manifestFor(Validator const& v, int seq, bool invalidSig = false)
{
return makeManifest(
v.masterSecret,
KeyType::ed25519,
v.signingSecret,
KeyType::secp256k1,
seq,
invalidSig);
}
static std::size_t
offered(ManifestCache const& cache)
{
std::size_t n = 0;
cache.for_each_gossip_manifest(
[](std::size_t) {}, [&n](Manifest const&) { ++n; });
return n;
}
void
testGossipAdmission()
{
testcase("gossip admission");
using D = ManifestDisposition;
auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
// Gossip for a master key not held, before its ephemeral key has
// signed anything: held back, not admitted.
auto const a = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(a, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == a.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(a.master));
// Its first validation releases it, once.
auto const seq = cache.sequence();
auto const released = cache.noteValidation(a.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->masterKey == a.master);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == a.master);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(a.master) == gossip);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(a.signing));
// Seen first, then gossiped: admitted at once.
auto const b = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(b.signing));
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(b, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
// A master key held from gossip rotates without its new key having
// been seen...
auto const b2 = rotate(b);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(b2, 2), gossip) == D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(b2.signing) == b.master);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(b.signing) == b.signing);
// ...and is revoked from gossip too, since that only takes trust away.
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
makeRevocation(b.masterSecret, KeyType::ed25519), gossip) ==
D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(b.master));
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(b2.signing) == b2.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(b.master) == gossip);
// A revocation for a master key not held names no ephemeral key that
// could have been seen, so gossip cannot introduce one...
auto const c = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
makeRevocation(c.masterSecret, KeyType::ed25519), gossip) ==
D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(c.master));
// ...but a list can.
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(makeRevocation(
c.masterSecret, KeyType::ed25519)) == D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(c.master) == ManifestSource::list);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(c.master));
// A forgery waits unverified, and is dropped when released.
auto const d = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(d, 1, true), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(d.signing));
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(d.master));
// A key is remembered for three to four epochs of the filter.
auto const e = makeValidator();
cache.noteValidation(e.signing);
clock.advance(ManifestCache::seenInterval * 3);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(e, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
auto const f = makeValidator();
cache.noteValidation(f.signing);
clock.advance(ManifestCache::seenInterval * 4);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(f, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
}
void
testPendingSubstitution()
{
testcase("pending ring: forged replacement");
using D = ManifestDisposition;
auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
// Same master and signing key, higher sequence, bad master signature.
{
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
auto const v = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2, true), gossip) ==
D::unseen);
auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
}
// Different master claiming the same signing key, bad master signature.
{
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
auto const v = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
manifestFor(impostor(v), 2, true), gossip) == D::unseen);
auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->masterKey == v.master);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
}
// A forgery that arrives first, for the same master key with a
// higher sequence, does not keep out the genuine manifest.
{
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
auto const v = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2, true), gossip) ==
D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
}
// Nor does one that arrives first for another master key.
{
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
auto const v = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
manifestFor(impostor(v), 2, true), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->masterKey == v.master);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(v.signing) == v.master);
}
// A genuine manifest waiting is not displaced by an older genuine one.
{
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
auto const v = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 2);
}
}
void
testGossipCapacity()
{
testcase("gossip capacity and decay");
using D = ManifestDisposition;
auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
std::vector<Validator> held;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < ManifestCache::gossipCapacity; ++i)
{
held.push_back(makeValidator());
cache.noteValidation(held.back().signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(held.back(), 1), gossip) ==
D::accepted);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity);
// Every entry is exactly as active as a newcomer: none gives way.
auto const newcomer = makeValidator();
cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(newcomer, 1), gossip) == D::full);
// Four half-lives on, all but the first have gone on validating. The
// first has decayed to a sixteenth of a sighting, the rest stand at
// seventeen sixteenths, and a newcomer is worth a whole one: it
// displaces the first and nothing else.
clock.advance(ManifestCache::halfLife * 4);
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < held.size(); ++i)
cache.noteValidation(held[i].signing);
auto const seq = cache.sequence();
cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(newcomer, 1), gossip) ==
D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(held[0].master));
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(held[0].signing) == held[0].signing);
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < held.size(); ++i)
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[i].master) == gossip);
BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity);
// The newcomer is now the least active, but no less active than
// another newcomer, which therefore finds no room.
auto const late = makeValidator();
cache.noteValidation(late.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(late, 1), gossip) == D::full);
// Far enough on that the weights are rebased. Their order survives:
// the one entry that stopped validating is the one displaced.
clock.advance(ManifestCache::halfLife * 300);
for (std::size_t i = 2; i < held.size(); ++i)
cache.noteValidation(held[i].signing);
cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
cache.noteValidation(late.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(late, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(held[1].master));
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(newcomer.master) == gossip);
for (std::size_t i = 2; i < held.size(); ++i)
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[i].master) == gossip);
}
void
testPinning()
{
testcase("pinning");
using D = ManifestDisposition;
auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
std::vector<Validator> held;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < ManifestCache::gossipCapacity; ++i)
{
held.push_back(makeValidator());
cache.noteValidation(held.back().signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(held.back(), 1), gossip) ==
D::accepted);
}
// Pinned, a gossip entry is retained as list and frees its slot.
auto const seq = cache.sequence();
cache.pin({held[0].master});
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[0].master) == ManifestSource::list);
auto const newcomer = makeValidator();
cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(newcomer, 1), gossip) ==
D::accepted);
for (auto const& v : held)
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(v.master));
// Unpinned, it falls back into a full tier, which sheds its least
// active entry: one of those that stopped validating.
clock.advance(ManifestCache::halfLife);
cache.noteValidation(held[0].signing);
cache.noteValidation(newcomer.signing);
cache.pin({});
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(held[0].master) == gossip);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(newcomer.master) == gossip);
std::size_t remaining = 0;
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < held.size(); ++i)
remaining += cache.getTier(held[i].master) ? 1 : 0;
BEAST_EXPECT(remaining == held.size() - 2);
BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity);
// A master key a list vouched for stays in the list tier however it
// is updated later, and is offered alongside gossip.
auto const listed = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(listed, 1)) == D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(rotate(listed), 2), gossip) ==
D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(listed.master) == ManifestSource::list);
BEAST_EXPECT(offered(cache) == ManifestCache::gossipCapacity + 1);
}
void
testPrecedence()
{
testcase("tier precedence on key conflicts");
using D = ManifestDisposition;
auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
// Gossip binds an ephemeral key to a master key...
auto const a = makeValidator();
cache.noteValidation(a.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(a, 1), gossip) == D::accepted);
// ...and a list binding the same key to another master key wins,
// evicting it, where before it would have been refused.
auto const b = impostor(a);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(b, 1)) == D::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == b.master);
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(a.master));
// Gossip cannot do the same to the list...
auto const c = impostor(a);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(c, 1), gossip) ==
D::badEphemeralKey);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == b.master);
// ...and between equals the first holds, as it always has.
auto const d = impostor(a);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(d, 1)) == D::badEphemeralKey);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(a.signing) == b.master);
}
void
testPending()
{
testcase("pending");
using D = ManifestDisposition;
auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
{
// A newer manifest for a key already waiting replaces it.
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
auto const v = makeValidator();
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 2), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(manifestFor(v, 3), gossip) == D::unseen);
auto const released = cache.noteValidation(v.signing);
BEAST_EXPECT(released && released->sequence == 3);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getSequence(v.master) == 3);
}
{
// The ring holds pendingCapacity; the first to arrive makes way
// for the one after.
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{
beast::Journal{beast::Journal::getNullSink()}, clock};
std::vector<Validator> waiting;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i <= ManifestCache::pendingCapacity; ++i)
{
waiting.push_back(makeValidator());
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
manifestFor(waiting.back(), 1), gossip) == D::unseen);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.noteValidation(waiting.front().signing));
BEAST_EXPECT(!cache.getTier(waiting.front().master));
std::size_t released = 0;
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < waiting.size(); ++i)
released += cache.noteValidation(waiting[i].signing) ? 1 : 0;
BEAST_EXPECT(released == ManifestCache::pendingCapacity);
}
}
void
run() override
{
testGossipAdmission();
testGossipCapacity();
testPendingSubstitution();
testPinning();
testPrecedence();
testPending();
ManifestCache cache;
{
testcase("apply");
+400
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2025 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <test/jtx.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/StringUtilities.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AppLoader.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/digest.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <string>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
class PWALoader_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
static appLoader::Result
check(std::string const& s)
{
return appLoader::validate(
reinterpret_cast<std::uint8_t const*>(s.data()), s.size());
}
static std::string
docOfSize(std::size_t len)
{
std::string const head = "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>";
std::string const tail = "</body></html>";
if (len < head.size() + tail.size())
return head + tail;
return head + std::string(len - head.size() - tail.size(), 'x') + tail;
}
static std::string
doc()
{
return "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>hi</body></html>";
}
// AccountSet carrying sfAppLoader.
static Json::Value
set(jtx::Account const& a, std::string const& d)
{
auto jt = jtx::noop(a);
jt[sfAppLoader.fieldName] = strHex(d);
return jt;
}
// validate() is consensus critical: these pin its edges, so a refactor
// that moves any of them fails here rather than forking the network.
void
testValidator()
{
testcase("validator");
using R = appLoader::Result;
using namespace std::string_literals;
for (auto const& s :
{"<!DOCTYPE html><html></html>"s,
"<!doctype html><html></html>"s,
"<html></html>"s,
"<HTML></HTML>"s,
"<html lang=\"en\" class=\"root\"></html>"s,
" \n\t<html></html>\n\n "s,
"<html></html >"s,
"<html></html\n>"s,
"\xEF\xBB\xBF<html></html>"s,
"\xEF\xBB\xBF<!DOCTYPE html><html></html>"s,
"<html><body>\xE6\xBC\xA2\xE5\xAD\x97</body></html>"s,
"<html><script>var s=\"</html>\";</script></html>"s,
"<html>\t\n\r\f</html>"s,
"<html></html> \n"s,
"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<!-- c --><html></html>"s,
"<html>\xC2\x85</html>"s, // C1 controls are not rejected
docOfSize(maxAppLoaderLength)})
BEAST_EXPECTS(check(s) == R::ok, s);
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, R>> const bad{
{""s, R::empty},
{" \n"s, R::empty},
{"\xEF\xBB\xBF"s, R::empty},
{docOfSize(maxAppLoaderLength + 1), R::tooLarge},
{"<html>\xC0\xAF</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
{"<html>\xED\xA0\x80</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
{"<html>\xEF\xBF\xBE</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
{"<html>\xE6\xBC</html>"s, R::badUTF8},
{"<html></html>\xE6"s, R::badUTF8},
{"<html>\0</html>"s, R::badControlChar},
{"<html>\x1B</html>"s, R::badControlChar},
{"<html>\x7F</html>"s, R::badControlChar},
{"hello"s, R::noDoctype},
{"<div>frag</div>"s, R::noDoctype},
{"<htmlish></html>"s, R::noDoctype},
{"<!DOCTYPEhtml><html></html>"s, R::noDoctype},
{"<!DOCTYPE"s, R::noDoctype},
{"<!DOCTYPE html>"s, R::noHtmlElement},
{"<!DOCTYPE html><htmlish></html>"s, R::noHtmlElement},
{"<html>"s, R::unclosed},
{"<html></html"s, R::unclosed},
{"<html></htmlx>"s, R::unclosed},
{"<html></html>trailing"s, R::trailingGarbage},
{"<html></html><p>"s, R::trailingGarbage},
{"<html></html>\xC2\xA0"s, R::trailingGarbage}, // NBSP
};
for (auto const& [s, r] : bad)
BEAST_EXPECTS(
check(s) == r, s + ": " + appLoader::to_string(check(s)));
}
void
testEnabled()
{
testcase("amendment gate");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, supported_amendments() - featurePWALoader};
Account const alice{"alice"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
env.close();
env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)), ter(temDISABLED));
env(set(alice, ""), fee(XRP(1)), ter(temDISABLED));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::appLoader(alice.id())));
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoaderSequence));
}
void
testSetAndRemove()
{
testcase("set, overwrite, remove, sequence");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this};
Account const alice{"alice"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
env.close();
auto const kl = keylet::appLoader(alice.id());
auto seq = [&] {
return (*env.le(alice))[~sfAppLoaderSequence].value_or(0);
};
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl));
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoaderSequence));
// Create: the object, with the owner's new sequence; nothing inline
// on the AccountRoot, no reserve, not in the owner directory.
env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
auto sle = env.le(kl);
if (BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
{
BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfAppLoader] == makeSlice(doc()));
BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfOwner] == alice.id());
BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 1);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(seq() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoader));
BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(alice))[sfOwnerCount] == 0);
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.rpc(
"json",
"account_objects",
R"({"account":")" + alice.human() +
R"("})")[jss::result][jss::account_objects]
.size() == 0);
auto const txid = (*sle)[sfPreviousTxnID];
// Overwrite: new content, next sequence, rethreaded.
env(set(alice, "<html><body>v2</body></html>"), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
sle = env.le(kl);
if (BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
{
BEAST_EXPECT(
(*sle)[sfAppLoader] ==
makeSlice(std::string("<html><body>v2</body></html>")));
BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 2);
BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfPreviousTxnID] != txid);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(seq() == 2);
// An AccountSet without the field leaves everything alone.
env(noop(alice));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(kl))[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 2 && seq() == 2);
// Remove with an empty blob: the object goes, the sequence still
// advances (so a copy of sequence 2 is known to be stale), and
// removing again is a no-op that advances it again.
env(set(alice, ""), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl) && seq() == 3);
env(set(alice, ""), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl) && seq() == 4);
// Republish: the sequence carries on.
env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(kl))[sfAppLoaderSequence] == 5 && seq() == 5);
// ledger_entry reaches it by account or by index.
for (auto const& req :
{R"({"app_loader":")" + alice.human() + R"("})",
R"({"index":")" + to_string(kl.key) + R"("})"})
{
auto const r = env.rpc("json", "ledger_entry", req)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECTS(
r[jss::node][sfLedgerEntryType.fieldName] == jss::AppLoader &&
r[jss::node][sfAppLoaderSequence.fieldName] == 5,
req);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.rpc(
"json",
"ledger_entry",
R"({"app_loader":"nope"})")[jss::result][jss::error] ==
"malformedAddress");
}
void
testFee()
{
testcase("fee: base plus one drop per byte");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this};
Account const alice{"alice"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
env.close();
auto const base = env.current()->fees().base;
auto const kl = keylet::appLoader(alice.id());
auto const expected = base + XRPAmount{1024};
env(set(alice, docOfSize(1024)),
fee(expected - XRPAmount{1}),
ter(telINSUF_FEE_P));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl));
auto const before = env.balance(alice);
env(set(alice, docOfSize(1024)), fee(expected));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.le(kl) && before - env.balance(alice) == drops(expected));
// Overwrites pay again; removal is base fee only.
env(set(alice, docOfSize(100)),
fee(base + XRPAmount{99}),
ter(telINSUF_FEE_P));
env(set(alice, docOfSize(100)), fee(base + XRPAmount{100}));
env(set(alice, ""), fee(base));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(kl));
// Publishing takes no reserve: an account at its reserve floor can.
Account const poor{"poor"};
auto const reserve = env.current()->fees().accountReserve(0);
env.fund(drops(reserve + base + XRPAmount{100}), noripple(poor));
env.close();
env(set(poor, docOfSize(100)), fee(base + XRPAmount{100}));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::appLoader(poor.id())));
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(poor) == drops(reserve));
env.require(owners(poor, 0));
}
void
testMalformed()
{
testcase("malformed documents are temMALFORMED");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this};
Account const alice{"alice"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
env.close();
for (auto const& d :
{std::string("hello"),
std::string("<html>"),
std::string("<html></html>x"),
std::string("<html>\0</html>", 14),
std::string("<html>\xC0\xAF</html>"),
docOfSize(maxAppLoaderLength + 1)})
{
env(set(alice, d), fee(XRP(1)), ter(temMALFORMED));
env.close();
}
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::appLoader(alice.id())));
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAppLoaderSequence));
}
void
testAccountDelete()
{
testcase("account delete erases the loader");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this};
Account const alice{"alice"}, bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), alice, bob);
env.close();
env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
for (int i = 0; i < 256; ++i)
env.close();
// Not in the owner directory, so it cannot block deletion; erased
// explicitly, or AccountRootsDeletedClean would fire on the orphan.
env(acctdelete(alice, bob),
fee(drops(env.current()->fees().increment)));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice));
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::appLoader(alice.id())));
}
void
testValidateRPC()
{
testcase("pwa_validate");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this};
Account const alice{"alice"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), alice);
env.close();
auto validate = [&](std::string const& d, std::string const& domain) {
Json::Value p(Json::objectValue);
p[jss::account] = alice.human();
p[jss::hash] = to_string(sha512Half(makeSlice(d)));
if (!domain.empty())
p[jss::domain] = domain;
return env.rpc("json", "pwa_validate", to_string(p))[jss::result];
};
BEAST_EXPECT(validate(doc(), "")["reason"] == "no loader");
env(set(alice, doc()), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
auto r = validate(doc(), "");
BEAST_EXPECT(r["valid"] == true && r["app_loader_sequence"] == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::ledger_index] == env.closed()->seq());
BEAST_EXPECT(
validate("<html></html>", "")["reason"] == "hash mismatch");
// domain: the account's Domain, or a host beneath it, ignoring case.
BEAST_EXPECT(
validate(doc(), "pwa.test")["reason"] ==
"domain not endorsed by account");
auto jt = noop(alice);
jt[sfDomain.fieldName] = strHex(std::string("Pwa.Test"));
env(jt);
env.close();
for (auto const d :
{"pwa.test", "PWA.TEST.", "pwaabcd.pwa.test", "a.b.pwa.test"})
BEAST_EXPECTS(validate(doc(), d)["valid"] == true, d);
for (auto const d : {"other.test", "xpwa.test", "pwa.test.evil"})
BEAST_EXPECTS(validate(doc(), d)["valid"] == false, d);
// Malformed input.
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.rpc(
"json",
"pwa_validate",
R"({"account":"x","hash":"00"})")[jss::result][jss::error] ==
"actMalformed");
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.rpc(
"pwa_validate", alice.human(), "zz")[jss::result][jss::error] ==
"invalidParams");
}
public:
void
run() override
{
testValidator();
testEnabled();
testSetAndRemove();
testFee();
testMalformed();
testAccountDelete();
testValidateRPC();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(PWALoader, app, ripple);
} // namespace test
} // namespace ripple
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+111
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <xrpld/app/misc/RotatingBloomFilter.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstdint>
#include <string>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
class RotatingBloomFilter_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
using time_point = std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point;
void
testWindow()
{
testcase("window");
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
RotatingBloomFilter<1024, 4, 4> filter{10s};
time_point const t{};
std::string const a{"a"};
std::string const b{"b"};
filter.insert(a, t);
BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t));
BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(b, t));
// Remembered to the end of the third epoch after its own, and
// forgotten at the start of the fourth.
BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t + 39s));
BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(a, t + 40s));
// Inserting again extends it.
filter.insert(a, t + 35s);
BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t + 69s));
BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(a, t + 70s));
// A clock that jumps finds everything expired.
filter.insert(b, t + 70s);
BEAST_EXPECT(!filter.contains(b, t + 1h));
// An insertion that read the clock before another thread rotated its
// slot lands in the newer epoch rather than being lost.
filter.insert(b, t + 1h + 40s);
filter.insert(a, t + 1h);
BEAST_EXPECT(filter.contains(a, t + 1h + 40s));
}
void
testFalsePositives()
{
testcase("false positives");
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
using Filter = RotatingBloomFilter<std::size_t{1} << 14, 4, 4>;
static_assert(Filter::bytes == 8192);
Filter filter{120s};
time_point const t{};
std::uint64_t const inserted = 1000;
for (std::uint64_t i = 0; i < inserted; ++i)
filter.insert(i, t);
bool all = true;
for (std::uint64_t i = 0; i < inserted; ++i)
all = all && filter.contains(i, t);
BEAST_EXPECT(all);
// About 0.24% in theory for a thousand elements in one generation.
std::uint64_t const probes = 100000;
std::uint64_t hits = 0;
for (std::uint64_t i = inserted; i < inserted + probes; ++i)
hits += filter.contains(i, t) ? 1 : 0;
BEAST_EXPECT(hits < probes / 100);
}
public:
void
run() override
{
testWindow();
testFalsePositives();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(RotatingBloomFilter, app, ripple);
} // namespace test
} // namespace ripple
+146
View File
@@ -33,9 +33,11 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
#include <chrono>
#include <exception>
#include <limits>
#include <string>
#include <thread>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
@@ -93,6 +95,27 @@ class SHAMapStore_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
return cfg;
}
// Online delete with DatabasePinned over in-memory backends. Unlike
// pinnedPersistent, the hot store keeps nodes (type=rwdb is the null
// node store), so ledgers closed in the test can be fetched. There is
// no database_path, so every SHAMapStoreImp opens its own private
// state.db: a second instance built by a test does not see (or trip
// over) the rotation state of the Env's own.
static auto
pinnedInMemory(
std::unique_ptr<Config> cfg,
std::string const& nodePath,
std::string const& pinnedPath)
{
cfg = onlineDelete(std::move(cfg));
auto& section = cfg->section(ConfigSection::nodeDatabase());
section.set("type", "memory");
section.set("path", nodePath);
section.set("pinned_type", "memory");
section.set("pinned_path", pinnedPath);
return cfg;
}
bool
goodLedger(
jtx::Env& env,
@@ -1153,6 +1176,127 @@ public:
}
}
// catalogue_unpin of everything (or a rolled-back first load) leaves the
// pinned set empty. That must persist as "no pins", not as a string that
// fails to parse on the next start.
void
testPinnedRangeRestoreEmpty()
{
testcase("pinned range restore of an empty set");
using namespace jtx;
beast::temp_dir tempDir;
auto const tempPath = boost::filesystem::path(tempDir.path());
auto const nodePath = (tempPath / "node").string();
auto const pinnedPath = (tempPath / "pinned").string();
Env env(*this, envconfig(pinnedInMemory, nodePath, pinnedPath));
NodeStoreScheduler scheduler(env.app().getJobQueue());
auto const journal = env.app().journal("SHAMapStoreTest");
try
{
SHAMapStoreImp restoreCheck(env.app(), scheduler, journal);
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> ranges;
ranges.insert(range(100u, 200u));
restoreCheck.setPinnedRanges(ranges);
restoreCheck.setPinnedRanges(RangeSet<std::uint32_t>{});
restoreCheck.start();
restoreCheck.stop();
pass();
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
{
fail(
std::string("restart with no pinned ranges threw: ") +
e.what());
}
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.app().getLedgerMaster().getPinnedLedgersRangeSet().empty());
}
// A crash between a pinned-range checkpoint and the backend committing
// the last ledgers leaves the recorded interval's tail missing. Startup
// trims it back to the last ledger present instead of refusing to start.
void
testPinnedRangeRestoreTrimsMissingTail()
{
testcase("pinned range restore trims a missing tail");
using namespace jtx;
beast::temp_dir tempDir;
auto const tempPath = boost::filesystem::path(tempDir.path());
auto const nodePath = (tempPath / "node").string();
auto const pinnedPath = (tempPath / "pinned").string();
Env env(*this, envconfig(pinnedInMemory, nodePath, pinnedPath));
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
env.close();
auto& rdb = env.app().getRelationalDatabase();
auto const last = env.app().getLedgerMaster().getValidLedgerIndex();
auto const first = last - 2;
// Ledger saves may complete asynchronously; wait for the SQL rows.
for (int i = 0; i < 100 && rdb.getHashByIndex(last).isZero(); ++i)
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(10));
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(
rdb.getHashByIndex(first).isNonZero() &&
rdb.getHashByIndex(last).isNonZero()))
return;
NodeStoreScheduler scheduler(env.app().getJobQueue());
auto const journal = env.app().journal("SHAMapStoreTest");
try
{
SHAMapStoreImp restoreCheck(env.app(), scheduler, journal);
// Recorded through last + 10, but only [first, last] exist.
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> recorded;
recorded.insert(range(first, last + 10));
restoreCheck.setPinnedRanges(recorded);
restoreCheck.start();
restoreCheck.stop();
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
{
fail(std::string("restart with a missing tail threw: ") + e.what());
return;
}
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> expected;
expected.insert(range(first, last));
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.app().getLedgerMaster().getPinnedLedgersRangeSet() == expected);
// A missing tail longer than the trim limit (65536 ledgers) is not
// an interrupted load: it means the wrong pinned store, so startup
// still refuses.
try
{
SHAMapStoreImp restoreCheck(env.app(), scheduler, journal);
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> recorded;
recorded.insert(range(first, last + 70000));
restoreCheck.setPinnedRanges(recorded);
restoreCheck.start();
restoreCheck.stop();
fail("Expected startup failure for an over-long missing tail");
}
catch (std::runtime_error const& e)
{
BEAST_EXPECT(
std::string(e.what()).find("Persisted pinned interval") !=
std::string::npos);
}
}
// Helper: compare two RangeSet<uint32_t> for set-equality. The
// test cares about which sequences are in the result, not the
// particular interval representation.
@@ -1302,6 +1446,8 @@ public:
testNullFactoryDropsWrites();
testRotate();
testPinnedRangeRestoreRequiresPinnedData();
testPinnedRangeRestoreEmpty();
testPinnedRangeRestoreTrimsMissingTail();
}
};
+119
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <xrpl/hook/Enum.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/JSONTxSignatures.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PayChan.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Sign.h>
@@ -6146,6 +6147,15 @@ private:
pass();
}
void
testEntropyTSH(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("entropy tsh");
// pseudo transaction
pass();
}
// | otxn | tfBurnable | tsh | mint | burn | buy | sell | cancel
// | O | false | O | N/A | S | N/A | S | S
// | O | false | I | N/A | N | N/A | W | N/A
@@ -8428,6 +8438,115 @@ private:
return *hash;
}
// NoteClaim
// | otxn | tsh | claim |
// | B | B | S | bearer
// | B | I | S | note issuer (pays the note)
void
testNoteClaimTSH(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
using namespace std::literals;
testcase("note claim TSH");
features = features | featureCreditNote;
// A fresh ten-minute XAH note from `issuer`, issued a minute ago and
// laid out the way CreditNote_test builds them.
auto const makeNote = [](Env& env, Account const& issuer) {
// a fresh Env's clock is too young to backdate a note from
if (env.current()->parentCloseTime().time_since_epoch() < 1h)
env.close(1h);
auto const nowMs =
static_cast<std::uint64_t>(env.current()
->parentCloseTime()
.time_since_epoch()
.count()) *
1000;
auto const issue = nowMs - 60'000;
return "{\"NetworkID\":" +
std::to_string(env.app().config().NETWORK_ID) +
",\"Account\":\"" + issuer.human() +
"\",\"Amount\":10000000,\"IssueTime\":\"" +
jsontx_iso_str(issue) + "\",\"Expiration\":\"" +
jsontx_iso_str(issue + 600'000) + "\"}";
};
// A NoteClaim from `bearer` redeeming `text`, signed by `issuer`.
auto const claim = [](Account const& bearer,
Account const& issuer,
std::string const& text) {
Json::Value jv;
jv[jss::TransactionType] = "NoteClaim";
jv[jss::Account] = bearer.human();
jv[sfNote.fieldName] = strHex(text);
jv[sfNoteSignature.fieldName] = strHex(sign(
issuer.pk(),
issuer.sk(),
makeSlice(jsontx_signing_data(text))));
jv[sfPublicKey.fieldName] = strHex(issuer.pk().slice());
return jv;
};
// otxn: bearer
// tsh bearer
// w/s: strong
for (bool const testStrong : {true, false})
{
test::jtx::Env env{
*this,
network::makeNetworkConfig(21337, "10", "1000000", "200000"),
features};
auto const issuer = Account("alice", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const bearer = Account("bob");
env.fund(XRP(1000), issuer, bearer);
env.close();
if (!testStrong)
addWeakTSH(env, bearer);
setTSHHook(env, bearer, testStrong);
env(claim(bearer, issuer, makeNote(env, issuer)),
fee(XRP(1)),
ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
testTSHStrongWeak(env, tshSTRONG, __LINE__);
}
// otxn: bearer
// tsh issuer
// w/s: strong
//
// The issuer is who pays, so their hook may roll the redemption back.
for (bool const testStrong : {true, false})
{
test::jtx::Env env{
*this,
network::makeNetworkConfig(21337, "10", "1000000", "200000"),
features};
auto const issuer = Account("alice", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const bearer = Account("bob");
env.fund(XRP(1000), issuer, bearer);
env.close();
if (!testStrong)
addWeakTSH(env, issuer);
setTSHHook(env, issuer, testStrong);
env(claim(bearer, issuer, makeNote(env, issuer)),
fee(XRP(1)),
ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
testTSHStrongWeak(env, tshSTRONG, __LINE__);
}
}
// SetManifest
// | otxn | tsh | manifest |
// | M | M | N/A |
+325
View File
@@ -2134,6 +2134,118 @@ public:
}
}
{
/// Rename and remove the HookName with HookName-only updates
Env env{*this, features};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
env.close();
// Create with hook name
auto jvh = hso(accept_wasm);
jvh[jss::HookName] = "41424344";
env(ripple::test::jtx::hook(alice, {{jvh}}, 0),
M("Create named hook"),
HSFEE);
env.close();
auto const hookNameOnlyUpdate = [&](std::string const& name) {
Json::Value jv;
jv[jss::Account] = alice.human();
jv[jss::TransactionType] = jss::SetHook;
jv[jss::Flags] = 0;
jv[jss::Hooks] = Json::Value{Json::arrayValue};
Json::Value iv;
iv[jss::HookName] = name;
jv[jss::Hooks][0U][jss::Hook] = iv;
return jv;
};
// Rename: update carrying only a non-empty sfHookName
env(hookNameOnlyUpdate("4142434445"),
M("Rename hook with a HookName-only update"),
HSFEE);
env.close();
{
auto const hooks = env.le(keylet::hook(alice));
BEAST_EXPECT(hooks && hooks->isFieldPresent(sfHooks));
auto const& hooksArray = hooks->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray[0].isFieldPresent(sfHookName));
BEAST_EXPECT(
strHex(hooksArray[0].getFieldVL(sfHookName)) ==
"4142434445");
}
// Remove: update carrying only an empty sfHookName
env(hookNameOnlyUpdate(""),
M("Remove hook name with a HookName-only update"),
HSFEE);
// In the same open ledger as the removal: the open view hands
// the next transaction the very sfHooks entry the SetHook just
// modified, so the fee calculation and the hook chain must
// tolerate the removed name. This is the path that crashed the
// node at submit, and crashed every validator replaying the
// pair while building the ledger.
{
auto jv = invoke::invoke(alice);
auto const expectedFee =
calculateBaseFee(*env.current(), *env.jt(jv).stx);
BEAST_EXPECT(expectedFee == drops(19));
env(jv,
M("Invoke in the same open ledger as the removal"),
HSFEE);
}
env.close();
{
auto const hookExecutions =
env.meta()->getFieldArray(sfHookExecutions);
BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(
hookExecutions[0].getFieldH256(sfHookHash) == accept_hash);
}
{
auto const hooks = env.le(keylet::hook(alice));
BEAST_EXPECT(hooks && hooks->isFieldPresent(sfHooks));
auto const& hooksArray = hooks->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(!hooksArray[0].isFieldPresent(sfHookName));
}
// The now non-named hook must still be charged for and
// executed by transactions in later ledgers, where the entry
// is re-read from its serialized form.
{
auto jv = invoke::invoke(alice);
auto const expectedFee =
calculateBaseFee(*env.current(), *env.jt(jv).stx);
BEAST_EXPECT(expectedFee == drops(19));
env(jv, M("Invoke after removing the hook name"), HSFEE);
env.close();
auto const hookExecutions =
env.meta()->getFieldArray(sfHookExecutions);
BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(
hookExecutions[0].getFieldH256(sfHookHash) == accept_hash);
}
// Removing the name of a hook that has none must be a no-op,
// not a thrown FieldErr (-> tefEXCEPTION): makeFieldAbsent on
// the untemplated entry throws when the field is missing.
env(hookNameOnlyUpdate(""),
M("Remove hook name again (no-op)"),
HSFEE);
env.close();
{
auto const hooks = env.le(keylet::hook(alice));
BEAST_EXPECT(hooks && hooks->isFieldPresent(sfHooks));
auto const& hooksArray = hooks->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
BEAST_EXPECT(hooksArray.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(!hooksArray[0].isFieldPresent(sfHookName));
}
}
// Install named hook
auto jvh = hso(accept_wasm);
jvh[jss::HookName] = "41424344";
@@ -4675,6 +4787,218 @@ public:
}
}
void
test_emit_failure_callback(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Test emit failure callback");
using namespace jtx;
// An emitted txn that is never applied expires into a ttEMIT_FAILURE
// cleanup pseudo, which removes its ltEMITTED_TXN entry and then
// runs the emitting Hook's cbak. Before fix20261005 the callback
// re-read that (already erased) entry and dereferenced null, taking
// the process down, so only the fixed behaviour can be run here.
Env env{*this, features | fix20261005};
auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
env.close();
TestHook hook_wasm = wasm[R"[test.hook](
#include <stdint.h>
extern int32_t _g (uint32_t id, uint32_t maxiter);
extern int64_t accept (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
extern int64_t rollback (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
extern int64_t emit (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
extern int64_t hook_account (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
extern int64_t etxn_reserve (uint32_t);
extern int64_t etxn_fee_base (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
extern int64_t etxn_details (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
extern int64_t ledger_seq (void);
extern int64_t otxn_id (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
extern int64_t otxn_type (void);
extern int64_t otxn_field (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t field_id);
extern int64_t state_set (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
#define SBUF(x) (uint32_t)(x), sizeof(x)
#define ASSERT(x)\
if (!(x))\
rollback((uint32_t)#x, sizeof(#x), __LINE__);
#define DOESNT_EXIST (-5)
#define ttINVOKE 99
#define sfAccount ((8U << 16U) + 1U)
#define sfLedgerSequence ((2U << 16U) + 6U)
uint8_t key[32] = { [31] = 1U };
// an Invoke from the hook account, emitted with a callback
uint8_t txn[229] =
{
/* size, upto, field name */
/* 3, 0, tt = Invoke */ 0x12U, 0x00U, 0x63U,
/* 5, 3, flags */ 0x22U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 5, 8, sequence */ 0x24U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 6, 13, firstledgersequence */ 0x20U, 0x1AU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 6, 19, lastledgersequence */ 0x20U, 0x1BU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 9, 25, fee */ 0x68U, 0x40U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 35, 34, signingpubkey */ 0x73U, 0x21U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
/* 22, 69, account */ 0x81U, 0x14U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
/* 138, 91, emit details */
/* 0, 229, */
};
#define FLS_OUT (txn + 15U)
#define LLS_OUT (txn + 21U)
#define FEE_OUT (txn + 26U)
#define ACCOUNT_OUT (txn + 71U)
#define EMIT_OUT (txn + 91U)
#define SET_UINT32(ptr, value)\
{\
uint32_t v = (value);\
(ptr)[0] = v >> 24U; (ptr)[1] = v >> 16U; (ptr)[2] = v >> 8U; (ptr)[3] = v;\
}
#define SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(ptr, amount)\
{\
uint64_t a = (amount);\
(ptr)[0] = 0x40U + ((a >> 56U) & 0x3FU);\
(ptr)[1] = a >> 48U; (ptr)[2] = a >> 40U; (ptr)[3] = a >> 32U;\
(ptr)[4] = a >> 24U; (ptr)[5] = a >> 16U; (ptr)[6] = a >> 8U; (ptr)[7] = a;\
}
#define ACC_EQ(a, b)\
(*(uint64_t*)(a) == *(uint64_t*)(b) &&\
*(uint64_t*)((a) + 8U) == *(uint64_t*)((b) + 8U) &&\
*(uint32_t*)((a) + 16U) == *(uint32_t*)((b) + 16U))
int64_t cbak(uint32_t r)
{
_g(1,1);
// 1 = the emitted txn failed (ttEMIT_FAILURE)
ASSERT(r == 1);
// the otxn is the original emitted txn, not the pseudo
ASSERT(otxn_type() == ttINVOKE);
uint8_t me[20];
ASSERT(hook_account(SBUF(me)) == 20);
uint8_t acc[20];
ASSERT(otxn_field(SBUF(acc), sfAccount) == 20);
ASSERT(ACC_EQ(acc, me));
// carried by the pseudo but not by the emitted txn
ASSERT(otxn_field(0, 0, sfLedgerSequence) == DOESNT_EXIST);
// record the id of the emitted txn that failed
uint8_t id[32];
ASSERT(otxn_id(SBUF(id), 0) == 32);
ASSERT(state_set(SBUF(id), SBUF(key)) == 32);
return accept(0,0,0);
}
int64_t hook(uint32_t r)
{
_g(1,1);
ASSERT(etxn_reserve(1) == 1);
// FirstLedgerSequence is the current ledger, so by the time
// the emission directory is processed for the next ledger it
// has already passed: the txn is never applied and expires
// once LastLedgerSequence is behind the ledger
uint32_t seq = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();
SET_UINT32(FLS_OUT, seq);
SET_UINT32(LLS_OUT, seq + 1);
ASSERT(hook_account(ACCOUNT_OUT, 20) == 20);
ASSERT(etxn_details(EMIT_OUT, 138U) == 138);
int64_t fee = etxn_fee_base(SBUF(txn));
ASSERT(fee > 0);
SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(FEE_OUT, fee);
uint8_t emithash[32];
ASSERT(emit(SBUF(emithash), SBUF(txn)) == 32);
return accept(0,0,0);
}
)[test.hook]"];
HASH_WASM(hook);
env(ripple::test::jtx::hook(alice, {{hso(hook_wasm, overrideFlag)}}, 0),
M("set emit failure callback"),
HSFEE);
env.close();
env(invoke::invoke(alice),
M("emit failure callback: emit"),
fee(XRP(1)),
ter(tesSUCCESS));
// the emitted txn, from the ltEMITTED_TXN this created
std::optional<uint256> emittedID;
{
auto const meta = env.meta(); // closes the ledger
BEAST_REQUIRE(meta);
for (auto const& node : meta->getFieldArray(sfAffectedNodes))
{
if (node.getFName() != sfCreatedNode ||
node.getFieldU16(sfLedgerEntryType) != ltEMITTED_TXN)
continue;
auto const& nf = const_cast<ripple::STObject&>(node)
.getField(sfNewFields)
.downcast<STObject>();
auto const& et = const_cast<ripple::STObject&>(nf)
.getField(sfEmittedTxn)
.downcast<STObject>();
Serializer s;
et.add(s);
SerialIter sit(s.slice());
emittedID = STTx(sit).getTransactionID();
}
}
BEAST_REQUIRE(emittedID);
auto const emittedKeylet = keylet::emittedTxn(*emittedID);
BEAST_REQUIRE(env.le(emittedKeylet));
// close until the cleanup pseudo has been applied
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> failureMeta;
for (int i = 0; i < 5 && !failureMeta; ++i)
{
env.close();
for (auto const& [tx, meta] : env.closed()->txs)
{
// the emitted txn itself never makes it into a ledger
BEAST_EXPECT(tx->getTransactionID() != *emittedID);
if (tx->getTxnType() == ttEMIT_FAILURE &&
tx->getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash) == *emittedID)
failureMeta = meta;
}
}
BEAST_REQUIRE(failureMeta);
// the cleanup removed the entry and its directory slot
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(emittedKeylet));
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::emittedDir()));
// the callback ran to accept() with the original emitted txn
BEAST_REQUIRE(failureMeta->isFieldPresent(sfHookExecutions));
auto const hookExecutions =
failureMeta->getFieldArray(sfHookExecutions);
BEAST_REQUIRE(hookExecutions.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions[0].getFieldH256(sfHookHash) == hook_hash);
BEAST_EXPECT(
hookExecutions[0].getAccountID(sfHookAccount) == alice.id());
BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions[0].getFieldU64(sfHookReturnCode) == 0);
BEAST_EXPECT(hookExecutions[0].getFieldU8(sfHookResult) == 3);
uint256 key;
key.data()[31] = 1;
auto const state =
env.le(keylet::hookState(alice.id(), key, uint256{beast::zero}));
BEAST_REQUIRE(state);
BEAST_EXPECT(
state->getFieldVL(sfHookStateData) ==
Blob(emittedID->begin(), emittedID->end()));
}
void
test_etxn_details(FeatureBitset features)
{
@@ -16192,6 +16516,7 @@ public:
testGuards(features);
test_emit(features); //
test_emit_failure_callback(features);
test_prepare(features);
// test_etxn_burden(features); // tested above
// test_etxn_generation(features); // tested above
+304
View File
@@ -35007,6 +35007,310 @@ std::map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>> wasm = {
0x65U, 0x64U, 0x2EU, 0x00U,
}},
{R"[test.hook](
#include <stdint.h>
extern int32_t _g (uint32_t id, uint32_t maxiter);
extern int64_t accept (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
extern int64_t rollback (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len, int64_t error_code);
extern int64_t emit (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
extern int64_t hook_account (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
extern int64_t etxn_reserve (uint32_t);
extern int64_t etxn_fee_base (uint32_t read_ptr, uint32_t read_len);
extern int64_t etxn_details (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len);
extern int64_t ledger_seq (void);
extern int64_t otxn_id (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
extern int64_t otxn_type (void);
extern int64_t otxn_field (uint32_t write_ptr, uint32_t write_len, uint32_t field_id);
extern int64_t state_set (uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t);
#define SBUF(x) (uint32_t)(x), sizeof(x)
#define ASSERT(x)\
if (!(x))\
rollback((uint32_t)#x, sizeof(#x), __LINE__);
#define DOESNT_EXIST (-5)
#define ttINVOKE 99
#define sfAccount ((8U << 16U) + 1U)
#define sfLedgerSequence ((2U << 16U) + 6U)
uint8_t key[32] = { [31] = 1U };
// an Invoke from the hook account, emitted with a callback
uint8_t txn[229] =
{
/* size, upto, field name */
/* 3, 0, tt = Invoke */ 0x12U, 0x00U, 0x63U,
/* 5, 3, flags */ 0x22U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 5, 8, sequence */ 0x24U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 6, 13, firstledgersequence */ 0x20U, 0x1AU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 6, 19, lastledgersequence */ 0x20U, 0x1BU, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 9, 25, fee */ 0x68U, 0x40U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
/* 35, 34, signingpubkey */ 0x73U, 0x21U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
/* 22, 69, account */ 0x81U, 0x14U, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
/* 138, 91, emit details */
/* 0, 229, */
};
#define FLS_OUT (txn + 15U)
#define LLS_OUT (txn + 21U)
#define FEE_OUT (txn + 26U)
#define ACCOUNT_OUT (txn + 71U)
#define EMIT_OUT (txn + 91U)
#define SET_UINT32(ptr, value)\
{\
uint32_t v = (value);\
(ptr)[0] = v >> 24U; (ptr)[1] = v >> 16U; (ptr)[2] = v >> 8U; (ptr)[3] = v;\
}
#define SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(ptr, amount)\
{\
uint64_t a = (amount);\
(ptr)[0] = 0x40U + ((a >> 56U) & 0x3FU);\
(ptr)[1] = a >> 48U; (ptr)[2] = a >> 40U; (ptr)[3] = a >> 32U;\
(ptr)[4] = a >> 24U; (ptr)[5] = a >> 16U; (ptr)[6] = a >> 8U; (ptr)[7] = a;\
}
#define ACC_EQ(a, b)\
(*(uint64_t*)(a) == *(uint64_t*)(b) &&\
*(uint64_t*)((a) + 8U) == *(uint64_t*)((b) + 8U) &&\
*(uint32_t*)((a) + 16U) == *(uint32_t*)((b) + 16U))
int64_t cbak(uint32_t r)
{
_g(1,1);
// 1 = the emitted txn failed (ttEMIT_FAILURE)
ASSERT(r == 1);
// the otxn is the original emitted txn, not the pseudo
ASSERT(otxn_type() == ttINVOKE);
uint8_t me[20];
ASSERT(hook_account(SBUF(me)) == 20);
uint8_t acc[20];
ASSERT(otxn_field(SBUF(acc), sfAccount) == 20);
ASSERT(ACC_EQ(acc, me));
// carried by the pseudo but not by the emitted txn
ASSERT(otxn_field(0, 0, sfLedgerSequence) == DOESNT_EXIST);
// record the id of the emitted txn that failed
uint8_t id[32];
ASSERT(otxn_id(SBUF(id), 0) == 32);
ASSERT(state_set(SBUF(id), SBUF(key)) == 32);
return accept(0,0,0);
}
int64_t hook(uint32_t r)
{
_g(1,1);
ASSERT(etxn_reserve(1) == 1);
// FirstLedgerSequence is the current ledger, so by the time
// the emission directory is processed for the next ledger it
// has already passed: the txn is never applied and expires
// once LastLedgerSequence is behind the ledger
uint32_t seq = (uint32_t)ledger_seq();
SET_UINT32(FLS_OUT, seq);
SET_UINT32(LLS_OUT, seq + 1);
ASSERT(hook_account(ACCOUNT_OUT, 20) == 20);
ASSERT(etxn_details(EMIT_OUT, 138U) == 138);
int64_t fee = etxn_fee_base(SBUF(txn));
ASSERT(fee > 0);
SET_NATIVE_AMOUNT(FEE_OUT, fee);
uint8_t emithash[32];
ASSERT(emit(SBUF(emithash), SBUF(txn)) == 32);
return accept(0,0,0);
}
)[test.hook]",
{
0x00U, 0x61U, 0x73U, 0x6DU, 0x01U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x01U, 0x2CU,
0x07U, 0x60U, 0x02U, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x60U, 0x03U, 0x7FU,
0x7FU, 0x7EU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x00U, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x02U,
0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x03U, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U,
0x7EU, 0x60U, 0x04U, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x60U,
0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x02U, 0xCEU, 0x01U, 0x0DU, 0x03U, 0x65U,
0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x02U, 0x5FU, 0x67U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU,
0x76U, 0x08U, 0x72U, 0x6FU, 0x6CU, 0x6CU, 0x62U, 0x61U, 0x63U, 0x6BU,
0x00U, 0x01U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x09U, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U,
0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x74U, 0x79U, 0x70U, 0x65U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x03U, 0x65U,
0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x0CU, 0x68U, 0x6FU, 0x6FU, 0x6BU, 0x5FU, 0x61U, 0x63U,
0x63U, 0x6FU, 0x75U, 0x6EU, 0x74U, 0x00U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU,
0x76U, 0x0AU, 0x6FU, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x66U, 0x69U, 0x65U,
0x6CU, 0x64U, 0x00U, 0x04U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x07U, 0x6FU,
0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x69U, 0x64U, 0x00U, 0x04U, 0x03U, 0x65U,
0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x09U, 0x73U, 0x74U, 0x61U, 0x74U, 0x65U, 0x5FU, 0x73U,
0x65U, 0x74U, 0x00U, 0x05U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x06U, 0x61U,
0x63U, 0x63U, 0x65U, 0x70U, 0x74U, 0x00U, 0x01U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU,
0x76U, 0x0CU, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x72U, 0x65U, 0x73U,
0x65U, 0x72U, 0x76U, 0x65U, 0x00U, 0x06U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U,
0x0AU, 0x6CU, 0x65U, 0x64U, 0x67U, 0x65U, 0x72U, 0x5FU, 0x73U, 0x65U,
0x71U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x0CU, 0x65U, 0x74U,
0x78U, 0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x64U, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x61U, 0x69U, 0x6CU, 0x73U,
0x00U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x0DU, 0x65U, 0x74U, 0x78U,
0x6EU, 0x5FU, 0x66U, 0x65U, 0x65U, 0x5FU, 0x62U, 0x61U, 0x73U, 0x65U,
0x00U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x65U, 0x6EU, 0x76U, 0x04U, 0x65U, 0x6DU, 0x69U,
0x74U, 0x00U, 0x05U, 0x03U, 0x03U, 0x02U, 0x06U, 0x06U, 0x05U, 0x03U,
0x01U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x06U, 0x08U, 0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x90U,
0x8DU, 0x04U, 0x0BU, 0x07U, 0x0FU, 0x02U, 0x04U, 0x63U, 0x62U, 0x61U,
0x6BU, 0x00U, 0x0DU, 0x04U, 0x68U, 0x6FU, 0x6FU, 0x6BU, 0x00U, 0x0EU,
0x0AU, 0x85U, 0x87U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x88U, 0x83U, 0x00U, 0x02U, 0x01U,
0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x23U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
0xE0U, 0x00U, 0x6BU, 0x22U, 0x01U, 0x24U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
0x00U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x10U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x46U, 0x0DU,
0x00U, 0x41U, 0xD5U, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x07U, 0x42U,
0xC5U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU,
0x02U, 0x40U, 0x10U, 0x82U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0xE3U,
0x00U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xB3U, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x41U, 0x18U, 0x42U, 0xC8U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0xC0U, 0x00U,
0x6AU, 0x41U, 0x14U, 0x10U, 0x83U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U,
0x14U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xBCU, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x41U, 0x1DU, 0x42U, 0xCBU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x6AU,
0x41U, 0x14U, 0x41U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x20U, 0x10U, 0x84U, 0x80U, 0x80U,
0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x14U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xF1U, 0x89U,
0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x27U, 0x42U, 0xCDU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U,
0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x02U, 0x40U,
0x20U, 0x01U, 0x29U, 0x03U, 0x20U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x29U, 0x03U, 0x40U,
0x52U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x29U, 0x03U, 0x28U, 0x20U, 0x01U,
0x29U, 0x03U, 0x48U, 0x52U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x28U, 0x02U,
0x30U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x28U, 0x02U, 0x50U, 0x46U, 0x0DU, 0x01U, 0x0BU,
0x41U, 0xE1U, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x10U, 0x42U, 0xCEU,
0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U,
0x40U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x86U, 0x80U, 0x08U, 0x10U,
0x84U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x7BU, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U,
0x41U, 0x80U, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x33U, 0x42U, 0xD1U,
0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U,
0x40U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x85U, 0x80U,
0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x20U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xEFU,
0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x1BU, 0x42U, 0xD5U, 0x00U, 0x10U,
0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x20U,
0x01U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x41U, 0x80U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
0x20U, 0x10U, 0x86U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x20U, 0x51U,
0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x8AU, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x25U,
0x42U, 0xD6U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU,
0x0BU, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x87U, 0x80U,
0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x21U, 0x02U, 0x20U, 0x01U, 0x41U, 0xE0U, 0x00U,
0x6AU, 0x24U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x0BU,
0xF6U, 0x83U, 0x00U, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x7FU, 0x01U, 0x7EU, 0x01U, 0x7FU,
0x23U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x20U, 0x6BU, 0x22U,
0x01U, 0x24U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x41U,
0x01U, 0x10U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x02U, 0x40U,
0x41U, 0x01U, 0x10U, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x01U,
0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xDCU, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
0x15U, 0x42U, 0xDFU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x89U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x22U, 0x02U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xB2U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x08U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xB1U, 0x8BU,
0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x10U, 0x88U,
0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xB0U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U,
0x02U, 0x42U, 0x18U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xAFU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U,
0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0xA7U, 0x41U, 0x01U, 0x6AU, 0x22U,
0x03U, 0x3AU, 0x00U, 0xB8U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U,
0x20U, 0x03U, 0x41U, 0x08U, 0x76U, 0x3AU, 0x00U, 0xB7U, 0x8BU, 0x80U,
0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x03U, 0x41U, 0x10U, 0x76U, 0x3AU,
0x00U, 0xB6U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x03U,
0x41U, 0x18U, 0x76U, 0x3AU, 0x00U, 0xB5U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x02U, 0x40U, 0x41U, 0xE7U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x14U,
0x10U, 0x83U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x14U, 0x51U, 0x0DU,
0x00U, 0x41U, 0x98U, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x24U, 0x42U,
0xE8U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU,
0x02U, 0x40U, 0x41U, 0xFBU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x8AU,
0x01U, 0x10U, 0x8AU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x8AU, 0x01U,
0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xCBU, 0x88U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U,
0x24U, 0x42U, 0xE9U, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x02U, 0x40U, 0x41U, 0xA0U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x41U, 0xE5U, 0x01U, 0x10U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x22U,
0x02U, 0x42U, 0x00U, 0x55U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xD9U, 0x8AU, 0x80U,
0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x08U, 0x42U, 0xEBU, 0x00U, 0x10U, 0x81U, 0x80U,
0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x1AU, 0x0BU, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x3CU,
0x00U, 0xC1U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U,
0x42U, 0x08U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xC0U, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U,
0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x10U, 0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xBFU,
0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U, 0x20U, 0x02U, 0x42U, 0x18U,
0x88U, 0x3CU, 0x00U, 0xBEU, 0x8BU, 0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0x00U,
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0x80U, 0x80U, 0x00U, 0x42U, 0x20U, 0x51U, 0x0DU, 0x00U, 0x41U, 0xAFU,
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0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
0x00U, 0x00U, 0x00U,
}},
};
}
} // namespace ripple
+312 -9
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/HashRouter.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/ManifestLedger.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.h>
#include <xrpld/app/tx/apply.h>
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetManifest.h>
@@ -553,9 +554,99 @@ struct SetManifest_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
submit(env, makeManifest(master, ephemeral, 1));
env.close();
// Every refusal over a key in use is tef. The transaction is unsigned
// and consumes no sequence, so anyone holding it could resubmit it in
// every ledger; a tec would charge the master account each time.
auto const masterBalance = env.balance(master);
auto const otherBalance = env.balance(other);
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(other, ephemeral, 1))) ==
"tecDUPLICATE");
"tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE");
// A newer manifest that keeps the current ephemeral key. Every
// manifest cache refuses it, so the ledger must too, or it would stay
// ahead of what any node believes.
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(master, ephemeral, 2))) ==
"tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE");
// A master key that is already another account's ephemeral key: the
// two kinds of manifest keylet share one namespace.
auto const third = Account("third", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const thirdEph = Account("thirdEph", KeyType::ed25519);
env.fund(XRP(1000), third);
env.close();
auto const thirdBalance = env.balance(third);
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(other, third, 1))) ==
"tesSUCCESS");
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(third, thirdEph, 1))) ==
"tefMANIFEST_KEY_IN_USE");
env.close();
// Nothing was charged and nothing was written.
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(master) == masterBalance);
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(third) == thirdBalance);
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(other) < otherBalance);
if (auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(master.pk()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence) == 1);
if (auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(third.pk()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->getAccountID(sfAccount) == other.id());
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::manifest(thirdEph.pk())));
BEAST_EXPECT(
!env.le(keylet::account(third.id()))->isFieldPresent(sfManifestID));
}
void
testAccountDelete(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("account delete");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, makeConfig(), features};
auto const master = Account("master", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const ephemeral = Account("ephemeral", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const plain = Account("plain", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const dest = Account("dest");
env.fund(XRP(1000), master, plain, dest);
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(submit(env, makeManifest(master, ephemeral, 1))) ==
"tesSUCCESS");
env.close();
// Old enough to delete, so the manifest is the only obstacle.
incLgrSeqForAccDel(env, master);
incLgrSeqForAccDel(env, plain);
// An on-ledger manifest outlives its account: neither copy is in the
// owner directory, and the master copy stays listed in the manifest
// directory for good.
env(acctdelete(master, dest),
fee(drops(env.current()->fees().increment)),
ter(tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::account(master.id())));
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::manifest(master.pk())));
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::manifest(ephemeral.pk())));
// An account of the same age without one goes as usual.
env(acctdelete(plain, dest),
fee(drops(env.current()->fees().increment)),
ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::account(plain.id())));
}
void
@@ -880,6 +971,11 @@ struct SetManifest_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedger(*env.closed(), all) == 4);
// Read from the ledger and pinned by nothing, all four are held as
// ledger lookup cache entries.
for (auto const& m : masters)
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(m.pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
// The raw form is what a republishing node needs: the exact bytes the
// master key signed, plus the sequence to compare against the ledger.
auto const raw = cache.getRawManifest(masters[0].pk());
@@ -895,33 +991,237 @@ struct SetManifest_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
auto const seq = cache.sequence();
cache.pin({masters[0].pk(), masters[1].pk()});
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() > seq);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(masters[0].pk()) == ManifestSource::list);
auto const seq2 = cache.sequence();
cache.pin({masters[0].pk(), masters[1].pk()});
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.sequence() == seq2);
// Everything is offered: two pinned plus two under the gossip limit.
// Only the pinned two are offered. The other two are on the ledger,
// where any peer that is not amendment blocked can read them.
std::size_t reserved = 0;
std::vector<PublicKey> offered;
cache.for_each_gossip_manifest(
[&](std::size_t n) { reserved = n; },
[&](Manifest const& m) { offered.push_back(m.masterKey); });
BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 4);
BEAST_EXPECT(offered.size() == 4);
BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 2);
BEAST_EXPECT(
hash_set<PublicKey>(offered.begin(), offered.end()) == all);
hash_set<PublicKey>(offered.begin(), offered.end()) ==
hash_set<PublicKey>({masters[0].pk(), masters[1].pk()}));
// A pinned key with no manifest is counted in the reservation but not
// offered, since the reservation is only an upper bound.
// Unpinned, a master key falls back to the lookup cache. A pinned key
// with no manifest is neither offered nor counted.
cache.pin({masters[0].pk(), ephemeral.pk()});
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(masters[1].pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
offered.clear();
cache.for_each_gossip_manifest(
[&](std::size_t n) { reserved = n; },
[&](Manifest const& m) { offered.push_back(m.masterKey); });
BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 5);
BEAST_EXPECT(offered.size() == 4);
BEAST_EXPECT(reserved == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(offered.size() == 1);
}
void
testLedgerOutranksGossip(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("ledger outranks gossip");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, makeConfig(), features};
auto const master = Account("master", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const eph1 = Account("eph1", KeyType::ed25519);
auto const eph2 = Account("eph2", KeyType::ed25519);
env.fund(XRP(1000), master);
env.close();
submit(env, makeManifest(master, eph1, 1));
env.close();
auto const fromPeer = [](std::string const& s) {
auto mo = deserializeManifest(s);
return std::move(*mo);
};
auto const gossip = ManifestSource::gossip;
{
// Gossip repeating what the ledger holds is stale, and it is the
// ledger's copy that is kept, as a lookup cache entry.
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
cache.noteValidation(eph1.pk());
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
fromPeer(makeManifest(master, eph1, 1)),
gossip,
env.closed().get()) == ManifestDisposition::stale);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(master.pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph1.pk()) == master.pk());
}
submit(
env,
makeManifest(
master, eph1, std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max()));
env.close();
{
// Revoked on-ledger, a master key cannot come back by gossip with
// a fresh ephemeral key, even one seen validating, and even in a
// cache that never held it.
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
cache.noteValidation(eph2.pk());
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
fromPeer(makeManifest(master, eph2, 5)),
gossip,
env.closed().get()) == ManifestDisposition::stale);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(master.pk()));
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getTier(master.pk()) == ManifestSource::ledger);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph2.pk()) == eph2.pk());
}
{
// A cache that took the gossip without a ledger to check it
// against learns of the revocation at its next refresh, though it
// never misses on the ephemeral key.
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
cache.noteValidation(eph2.pk());
BEAST_EXPECT(
cache.applyManifest(
fromPeer(makeManifest(master, eph2, 5)), gossip) ==
ManifestDisposition::accepted);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph2.pk()) == master.pk());
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedger(*env.closed()) == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(master.pk()));
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(eph2.pk()) == eph2.pk());
}
}
void
testDirectory(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("manifest directory");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this, makeConfig(), features};
auto const revoke = std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max();
std::vector<Account> masters;
std::vector<Account> ephs;
for (int i = 0; i < 40; ++i)
{
masters.emplace_back("dm" + std::to_string(i), KeyType::ed25519);
ephs.emplace_back("de" + std::to_string(i), KeyType::ed25519);
env.fund(XRP(1000), masters.back());
}
env.close();
for (int i = 0; i < 40; ++i)
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(
submit(env, makeManifest(masters[i], ephs[i], 1))) ==
"tesSUCCESS");
env.close();
auto const listed = [&]() {
std::map<PublicKey, std::uint32_t> out;
forEachLedgerManifest(
*env.closed(), [&](std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& sle) {
out.emplace(
PublicKey{makeSlice(sle->getFieldVL(sfPublicKey))},
sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence));
});
return out;
};
auto const pageOf = [&](Account const& a) {
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(a.pk()));
return sle && sle->isFieldPresent(sfOwnerNode)
? std::optional<std::uint64_t>{sle->getFieldU64(sfOwnerNode)}
: std::nullopt;
};
// Each master object listed once, on the page it records; the
// ephemeral copies are not listed.
{
auto const all = listed();
BEAST_EXPECT(all.size() == 40);
for (auto const& m : masters)
BEAST_EXPECT(all.count(m.pk()) && all.at(m.pk()) == 1);
for (auto const& e : ephs)
{
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::manifest(e.pk()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFieldPresent(sfOwnerNode));
}
}
std::vector<std::optional<std::uint64_t>> pages;
for (auto const& m : masters)
{
pages.push_back(pageOf(m));
BEAST_EXPECT(pages.back());
}
// Rotated to a new ephemeral key...
std::vector<Account> rotated;
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i)
{
rotated.emplace_back("dr" + std::to_string(i), KeyType::ed25519);
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(
submit(env, makeManifest(masters[i], rotated.back(), 2))) ==
"tesSUCCESS");
}
env.close();
// ...revoked...
for (int i = 10; i < 15; ++i)
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(
submit(env, makeManifest(masters[i], ephs[i], revoke))) ==
"tesSUCCESS");
env.close();
// ...or replaced unsuccessfully, which changes nothing.
BEAST_EXPECT(
engineResult(
submit(env, makeManifest(masters[0], rotated[0], 2))) ==
"tefPAST_MANIFEST_SEQ");
env.close();
// Still each master key once, at its latest, on the same page.
auto const all = listed();
BEAST_EXPECT(all.size() == 40);
for (int i = 0; i < 40; ++i)
{
auto const expected = i < 10 ? 2u : i < 15 ? revoke : 1u;
BEAST_EXPECT(
all.count(masters[i].pk()) &&
all.at(masters[i].pk()) == expected);
BEAST_EXPECT(pageOf(masters[i]) == pages[i]);
}
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i)
{
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::manifest(ephs[i].pk())));
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::manifest(rotated[i].pk())));
}
for (int i = 10; i < 15; ++i)
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(keylet::manifest(ephs[i].pk())));
// Read from the directory alone, with no key to start from.
TestStopwatch clock;
ManifestCache cache{env.journal, clock};
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedgerDirectory(*env.closed()) == 40);
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(rotated[0].pk()) == masters[0].pk());
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(ephs[0].pk()) == ephs[0].pk());
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.getMasterKey(ephs[20].pk()) == masters[20].pk());
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.revoked(masters[10].pk()));
BEAST_EXPECT(cache.applyLedgerDirectory(*env.closed()) == 0);
}
void
@@ -961,10 +1261,13 @@ public:
testRetrieval(sa);
testSigningKeyRetrieval(sa);
testMalformed(sa);
testAccountDelete(sa);
testEnvelopeRejections(sa);
testCanonicalFee(sa);
testCorruptLedger(sa);
testGossipSelection(sa);
testLedgerOutranksGossip(sa);
testDirectory(sa);
testDisabled(sa);
}
};
+18 -2
View File
@@ -5055,7 +5055,15 @@ public:
run() override
{
using namespace test::jtx;
FeatureBitset const all{supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis};
// featureRNG is excluded: makeConfig() runs as a validator whenever
// voting settings are given, and a validator puts a ttENTROPY with a
// fresh random commitment into every ledger. That makes the
// transaction set hash, and so the canonical order in which
// different accounts' transactions apply when the ledger closes,
// differ from run to run, which breaks tests that assert balances
// depending on that order (e.g. unexpected balance change).
FeatureBitset const all{
supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis - featureRNG};
testQueueSeq(all);
testQueueTicket(all);
testTecResult(all);
@@ -5082,7 +5090,15 @@ public:
runMetaInfo()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
FeatureBitset const all{supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis};
// featureRNG is excluded: makeConfig() runs as a validator whenever
// voting settings are given, and a validator puts a ttENTROPY with a
// fresh random commitment into every ledger. That makes the
// transaction set hash, and so the canonical order in which
// different accounts' transactions apply when the ledger closes,
// differ from run to run, which breaks tests that assert balances
// depending on that order (e.g. unexpected balance change).
FeatureBitset const all{
supported_amendments() - featureXahauGenesis - featureRNG};
testAcctInQueueButEmpty(all);
testRPC(all);
testExpirationReplacement(all);
+193 -6
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAccount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/digest.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <limits>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
@@ -4676,11 +4677,12 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// validate account fields
STAmount const postUser = preUser + netReward;
bool const has240819 = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819);
bool const has20261005 = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix20261005);
BEAST_EXPECT(expectAccountFields(
env,
user,
preLedger,
has240819 ? preLedger : preLedger + 1,
(has240819 && !has20261005) ? preLedger : preLedger + 1,
has240819 ? (preUser - feesXRP) : postUser,
preTime));
}
@@ -5567,8 +5569,7 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env.close();
// calculate rewards
bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819) &&
env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240911);
bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819);
STAmount const netReward =
rewardUserAmount(*acctSle, preLedger, rateDrops);
BEAST_EXPECT(netReward == (hasFix ? XRP(3.329999) : XRP(3.329999)));
@@ -5659,8 +5660,7 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env.close();
// calculate rewards
bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819) &&
env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240911);
bool const hasFix = env.current()->rules().enabled(fix240819);
STAmount const netReward =
rewardUserAmount(*acctSle, preLedger, rateDrops);
BEAST_EXPECT(netReward == (hasFix ? XRP(3.479999) : XRP(6.663333)));
@@ -5678,9 +5678,196 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
postUser == (hasFix ? XRP(2002.479999) : XRP(2005.663333)));
}
void
test20261005(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace jtx;
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
testcase("test fix20261005");
bool const has240819 = features[fix240819];
bool const has20261005 = features[fix20261005];
bool const nofix = !(has240819 && has20261005);
Env env{
*this, makeNetworkConfig(21337), features - featureXahauGenesis};
STAmount const feesXRP = XRP(1);
Account const user = Account("user");
env.fund(XRP(200), user);
env.close();
// setup governance
Account const alice = Account("alice");
Account const bob = Account("bob");
Account const carol = Account("carol");
Account const david = Account("david");
Account const edward = Account("edward");
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob, carol, david, edward);
env.close();
std::vector<AccountID> initial_members_ids{
alice.id(), bob.id(), carol.id(), david.id(), edward.id()};
setupGov(env, initial_members_ids);
{
std::vector<uint8_t> vote_data{
0x00U, 0x80U, 0xC6U, 0xA4U, 0x7EU, 0x8DU, 0x03U, 0x55U};
updateTopic(
env, alice, bob, carol, david, edward, 'R', 'D', vote_data);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(hasUNLReport(env) == false);
env(claimReward(user, env.master), fee(feesXRP), ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
env(noop(user),
fee(env.balance(user) - drops(500'000)),
ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(user) == drops(500'000));
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(user) < XRP(1));
std::uint32_t const drainMarker =
env.le(keylet::account(user))->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast);
for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i)
env.close(10s);
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(user) < XRP(1));
env(pay(alice, user, XRP(1000)));
env.close();
std::uint32_t const fundMarker =
env.le(keylet::account(user))->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast);
bool const markerFrozen = has240819 && !has20261005;
if (markerFrozen)
BEAST_EXPECT(fundMarker == drainMarker);
else
BEAST_EXPECT(fundMarker > drainMarker);
STAmount const preUser = env.balance(user);
env(claimReward(user, env.master), fee(feesXRP), ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
env.close();
STAmount const postUser = env.balance(user);
if (nofix)
BEAST_EXPECT(postUser > preUser + XRP(1));
else
BEAST_EXPECT(postUser < preUser + XRP(1));
}
void
testRewardAccumulatorOverflow(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace jtx;
testcase("reward accumulator overflow");
bool const has20261005 = features[fix20261005];
Env env{
*this, makeNetworkConfig(21337), features - featureXahauGenesis};
STAmount const feesXRP = XRP(1);
Account const user = Account("user");
env.fund(XRP(10000), user);
env.close();
// setup governance
Account const alice = Account("alice");
Account const bob = Account("bob");
Account const carol = Account("carol");
Account const david = Account("david");
Account const edward = Account("edward");
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob, carol, david, edward);
env.close();
std::vector<AccountID> initial_members_ids{
alice.id(), bob.id(), carol.id(), david.id(), edward.id()};
setupGov(env, initial_members_ids);
{
std::vector<uint8_t> vote_data{
0x00U, 0x80U, 0xC6U, 0xA4U, 0x7EU, 0x8DU, 0x03U, 0x55U};
updateTopic(
env, alice, bob, carol, david, edward, 'R', 'D', vote_data);
}
// opt in so the account carries the reward fields
env(claimReward(user, env.master), fee(feesXRP), ter(tesSUCCESS));
env.close();
env.close();
auto const preSle = env.le(keylet::account(user));
BEAST_REQUIRE(preSle);
BEAST_REQUIRE(preSle->isFieldPresent(sfRewardLgrLast));
BEAST_REQUIRE(preSle->isFieldPresent(sfRewardAccumulator));
std::uint32_t const preMarker = preSle->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast);
BEAST_EXPECT(preMarker < env.current()->seq());
constexpr std::uint64_t maxAccum =
std::numeric_limits<std::uint64_t>::max();
// Push the accumulator to the brink in the open ledger so that any
// non-zero bal * lgrElapsed wraps around in finishApply.
env.app().openLedger().modify(
[&](OpenView& view, beast::Journal) -> bool {
auto const sle = view.read(keylet::account(user));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto replacement = std::make_shared<SLE>(*sle);
replacement->setFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator, maxAccum);
view.rawReplace(replacement);
return true;
});
BEAST_EXPECT(
env.le(keylet::account(user))->getFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator) ==
maxAccum);
// Any balance change on user runs the reward block in finishApply.
env(pay(alice, user, XRP(1)), ter(tesSUCCESS));
// Check the open ledger before close() rebuilds it without the
// injected accumulator.
auto const postSle = env.le(keylet::account(user));
BEAST_REQUIRE(postSle);
// the overflowing contribution is never added
BEAST_EXPECT(postSle->getFieldU64(sfRewardAccumulator) == maxAccum);
// with the fix the marker advances so the span can't be reused;
// without it the marker is left behind
if (has20261005)
BEAST_EXPECT(
postSle->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast) == env.current()->seq());
else
BEAST_EXPECT(postSle->getFieldU32(sfRewardLgrLast) == preMarker);
env.close();
}
void
testRewardHookWithFeats(FeatureBitset features)
{
test20261005(features);
testRewardAccumulatorOverflow(features);
testLastCloseTime(features);
testInvalidRate0(features);
testInvalidRateGreater1(features);
@@ -5723,7 +5910,7 @@ struct XahauGenesis_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
testGovernHookWithFeats(sa);
testRewardHookWithFeats(sa);
testRewardHookWithFeats(sa - fix240819);
testRewardHookWithFeats(sa - fix240819 - fix240911);
testRewardHookWithFeats(sa - fix20261005);
}
};
+62
View File
@@ -1052,6 +1052,67 @@ public:
BEAST_EXPECT(sim.synchronized());
}
void
testForcedInclusion()
{
using namespace csf;
using namespace std::chrono;
testcase("forced inclusion");
// Transaction n * 1000 + k belongs to peer n - 1. Each one is placed
// only in a single peer's open set and never relayed, so without
// forced inclusion it has one vote in five and stays out.
auto const owner = [](Tx const& tx) -> std::optional<PeerID> {
if (tx.id() < 1000)
return std::nullopt;
return PeerID{tx.id() / 1000 - 1};
};
auto const run = [&](bool withHook) {
ConsensusParms const parms{};
Sim sim;
PeerGroup peers = sim.createGroup(5);
peers.trustAndConnect(
peers, round<milliseconds>(0.2 * parms.ledgerGRANULARITY));
for (Peer* p : peers)
{
if (withHook)
p->txOwner = owner;
std::uint32_t const base =
(static_cast<std::uint32_t>(p->id) + 1) * 1000;
p->openTxs.insert(Tx{base + 1});
if (p->id == PeerID{4})
{
// more of its own than it may force
p->openTxs.insert(Tx{base + 2});
p->openTxs.insert(Tx{base + 3});
// one that names another owner, who does not hold it
p->openTxs.insert(Tx{1999});
}
}
sim.run(1);
BEAST_EXPECT(sim.synchronized());
return peers[0]->lastClosedLedger.txs();
};
{
auto const txs = run(false);
BEAST_EXPECT(txs.empty());
}
{
auto const txs = run(true);
// every owner's own transaction, and only the lowest of the
// several peer 4 put in its position
TxSetType const expected{
Tx{1001}, Tx{2001}, Tx{3001}, Tx{4001}, Tx{5001}};
BEAST_EXPECTS(txs == expected, to_string(txs));
}
}
void
run() override
{
@@ -1068,6 +1129,7 @@ public:
testHubNetwork();
testPreferredByBranch();
testPauseForLaggards();
testForcedInclusion();
}
};
+99
View File
@@ -421,6 +421,72 @@ port_wss_admin
}
}
void
testEarlyManifestSync()
{
testcase("early_manifest_sync");
// On unless turned off.
{
Config c;
c.loadFromString("");
BEAST_EXPECT(c.EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC);
}
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, bool>> const values{
{"0", false}, {"false", false}, {"1", true}, {"TRUE", true}};
for (auto const& [value, expected] : values)
{
Config c;
c.loadFromString("[early_manifest_sync]\n" + value + "\n");
BEAST_EXPECT(c.EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC == expected);
}
try
{
Config c;
c.loadFromString("[early_manifest_sync]\nsometimes\n");
fail();
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
pass();
}
}
void
testUdpHighway()
{
testcase("udp_highway");
// The UDP Superhighway is opt-in: off unless turned on.
{
Config c;
c.loadFromString("");
BEAST_EXPECT(!c.UDP_HIGHWAY);
}
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, bool>> const values{
{"0", false}, {"false", false}, {"1", true}, {"TRUE", true}};
for (auto const& [value, expected] : values)
{
Config c;
c.loadFromString("[udp_highway]\n" + value + "\n");
BEAST_EXPECT(c.UDP_HIGHWAY == expected);
}
try
{
Config c;
c.loadFromString("[udp_highway]\nsometimes\n");
fail();
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
pass();
}
}
void
testNetworkID()
{
@@ -1056,6 +1122,36 @@ trustthesevalidators.gov
}
}
// Standalone forces ledger_history to zero, but [node_db] type=rwdb
// (the null node store) sizes its retained-ledger window from it and
// SHAMapStoreImp throws on zero. cfg/rippled.cfg ships exactly this
// configuration, and jtx never calls Config::setup, so pin it here.
void
testSetupStandaloneRwdb()
{
testcase("setup standalone rwdb keeps ledger_history");
for (std::string const type : {"rwdb", "NuDB"})
{
detail::RippledCfgGuard const cfg(
*this,
"testSetupStandaloneRwdb_" + type,
"",
"",
true,
"[node_db]\ntype=" + type + "\npath=main\n");
Config config;
config.setup(
cfg.configFile(),
/*bQuiet*/ true,
/* bSilent */ true,
/* bStandalone */ true);
BEAST_EXPECT(config.standalone());
BEAST_EXPECT(config.nullBackend() == (type == "rwdb"));
BEAST_EXPECT(config.LEDGER_HISTORY == (type == "rwdb" ? 256 : 0));
}
}
void
testPort()
{
@@ -1747,6 +1843,7 @@ r.ripple.com:51235
testValidatorsFile();
testSetup(false);
testSetup(true);
testSetupStandaloneRwdb();
testPort();
testZeroPort();
testWhitespace();
@@ -1758,6 +1855,8 @@ r.ripple.com:51235
testDatabasePinnedValidation();
testOverlay();
testNetworkID();
testEarlyManifestSync();
testUdpHighway();
}
};
+15
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <boost/container/flat_map.hpp>
#include <boost/container/flat_set.hpp>
#include <algorithm>
#include <functional>
#include <optional>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
@@ -257,6 +259,11 @@ struct Peer
// Simulation parameters
ConsensusParms consensusParms;
//! Names the peer a transaction belongs to, for Consensus forced
//! inclusion (as featureRNG uses for entropy contributions). Unset, it
//! behaves exactly like an adaptor without the forcedTxOwner hook.
std::function<std::optional<PeerID>(Tx const&)> txOwner;
//! The collectors to report events to
CollectorRefs& collectors;
@@ -655,6 +662,14 @@ struct Peer
return consensusParms;
}
std::optional<PeerID>
forcedTxOwner(Tx const& tx, Ledger const&) const
{
if (!txOwner)
return std::nullopt;
return txOwner(tx);
}
// Not interested in tracking consensus mode changes for now
void
onModeChange(ConsensusMode, ConsensusMode)
+86
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/InnerObjectFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/predicate.hpp>
@@ -1234,6 +1235,90 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
void
testAppLoader()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
static std::string const good = "<html></html>";
auto insert = [](ApplyContext& ac,
AccountID const& owner,
uint256 const& key,
std::string const& blob,
std::uint32_t seq) {
auto sle = std::make_shared<SLE>(Keylet{ltAPP_LOADER, key});
sle->setAccountID(sfOwner, owner);
sle->setFieldVL(sfAppLoader, Slice(blob.data(), blob.size()));
sle->setFieldU32(sfAppLoaderSequence, seq);
ac.view().insert(sle);
auto root = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(owner));
root->setFieldU32(sfAppLoaderSequence, seq);
ac.view().update(root);
return true;
};
Preclose publish = [](Account const& A1, Account const&, Env& env) {
auto jt = noop(A1);
jt[sfAppLoader.fieldName] = strHex(good);
env(jt, fee(XRP(1)));
return bool(env.le(keylet::appLoader(A1.id())));
};
auto bad = [&](char const* log,
Precheck const& pre,
std::uint16_t txType = ttACCOUNT_SET,
Preclose const& preclose = {}) {
doInvariantCheck(
{{log}},
pre,
XRPAmount{},
STTx{TxType(txType), [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
preclose);
};
testcase << "AppLoader at the wrong key";
bad("AppLoader is not keyed at its owner's keylet",
[&](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
return insert(ac, A1, keylet::appLoader(A2).key, good, 1);
});
testcase << "AppLoader with invalid blob";
bad("AppLoader blob does not validate",
[&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
return insert(ac, A1, keylet::appLoader(A1).key, "nope", 1);
});
testcase << "AppLoader blob over the size limit";
bad("AppLoader blob does not validate",
[&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
return insert(
ac,
A1,
keylet::appLoader(A1).key,
"<html>" + std::string(maxAppLoaderLength, 'x') + "</html>",
1);
});
testcase << "AppLoader sequence differs from its owner's";
bad(
"AppLoader sequence does not match its owner's",
[&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::appLoader(A1));
sle->setFieldU32(sfAppLoaderSequence, 7);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
ttACCOUNT_SET,
publish);
testcase << "AppLoader changed by the wrong transaction type";
bad(
"AppLoader changed by a transaction other than AccountSet or "
"AccountDelete",
[&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::appLoader(A1));
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
ttPAYMENT,
publish);
}
void
testLockedBalance()
{
@@ -1289,6 +1374,7 @@ public:
testNFTokenPageInvariants();
testPermissionedDomainInvariants();
testLockedBalance();
testAppLoader();
}
};
+8
View File
@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ public:
// Write the batch
storeBatch(*backend, batch);
// Durability on demand: RocksDB drains its write queue and
// syncs its WAL; in-memory backends have nothing to wait for;
// NuDB commits on its own thread and cannot promise it.
backend->store(batch.front());
bool const durable = backend->syncDurable();
BEAST_EXPECT(durable == (type != "nudb"));
backend->sync();
{
// Read it back in
Batch copy;
+542
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,542 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <test/jtx.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/HashRouter.h>
#include <xrpld/core/JobQueue.h>
#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/OverlayImpl.h>
#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/XUSH.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/net/IPAddressConversion.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/resource/ResourceManager.h>
#include <xrpl/resource/detail/Tuning.h>
#include <boost/asio/ip/udp.hpp>
#include <algorithm>
#include <array>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstring>
#include <optional>
#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <thread>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
// Tests the UDP Superhighway (XUSH) handling in OverlayImpl: inbound datagram
// processing, outbound publishing and the XUSHPEER advertisement timer.
class OverlayXUSH_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
using udp = boost::asio::ip::udp;
static std::unique_ptr<Config>
highway(std::unique_ptr<Config> cfg)
{
cfg->UDP_HIGHWAY = true;
return cfg;
}
static beast::IP::Endpoint
ep(std::string const& s)
{
return beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string(s);
}
static std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>
asSet(std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> const& v)
{
return {v.begin(), v.end()};
}
static Slice
slice(Buffer const& b)
{
return Slice(b.data(), b.size());
}
static std::string
str(Buffer const& b)
{
return std::string(reinterpret_cast<char const*>(b.data()), b.size());
}
static Buffer
serialize(STTx const& stx)
{
Serializer s;
stx.add(s);
return Buffer(s.data(), s.size());
}
// A pseudo-transaction, which servers never submit
static STTx
pseudoTx()
{
return STTx(ttAMENDMENT, [](auto& obj) {
obj.setAccountID(sfAccount, AccountID());
obj.setFieldH256(sfAmendment, uint256(2));
obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, 5);
});
}
// A local UDP socket that highway datagrams can be sent to
struct Sink
{
boost::asio::io_context io;
udp::socket socket;
explicit Sink(boost::asio::ip::address const& addr)
: socket(io, udp::endpoint(addr, 0))
{
socket.non_blocking(true);
}
beast::IP::Endpoint
endpoint() const
{
auto const local = socket.local_endpoint();
return beast::IP::Endpoint(local.address(), local.port());
}
void
sendTo(Buffer const& datagram, std::uint16_t port)
{
socket.send_to(
boost::asio::buffer(datagram.data(), datagram.size()),
udp::endpoint(socket.local_endpoint().address(), port));
}
std::optional<std::string>
receive(std::chrono::milliseconds timeout = std::chrono::seconds(5))
{
auto const deadline = std::chrono::steady_clock::now() + timeout;
std::array<char, 4096> buf;
while (std::chrono::steady_clock::now() < deadline)
{
udp::endpoint from;
boost::system::error_code ec;
auto const n =
socket.receive_from(boost::asio::buffer(buf), from, 0, ec);
if (!ec)
return std::string(buf.data(), n);
if (ec != boost::asio::error::would_block &&
ec != boost::asio::error::try_again)
return std::nullopt;
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(5));
}
return std::nullopt;
}
// Receives datagrams until one of the given type arrives
std::optional<std::string>
receive(xush::MessageType type)
{
while (auto d = receive())
{
if (xush::classify(makeSlice(*d)) == type)
return d;
}
return std::nullopt;
}
};
struct Fixture
{
jtx::Env env;
OverlayImpl& overlay;
PeerFinder::Manager& peerFinder;
Resource::Manager& resources;
Fixture(beast::unit_test::suite& suite, bool enabled)
: env(suite, enabled ? jtx::envconfig(highway) : jtx::envconfig())
, overlay(dynamic_cast<OverlayImpl&>(env.app().overlay()))
, peerFinder(overlay.peerFinder())
, resources(env.app().getResourceManager())
{
}
// Delivers a datagram as if it had been received from `remote`
void
deliver(Buffer const& datagram, beast::IP::Endpoint const& remote)
{
overlay.processXUSH(
str(datagram), beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(remote));
}
void
deliver(
std::vector<Buffer> const& datagrams,
beast::IP::Endpoint const& remote)
{
for (auto const& d : datagrams)
deliver(d, remote);
}
// Tracks the resource balance charged to `remote`
Resource::Consumer
probe(beast::IP::Endpoint const& remote)
{
return resources.newInboundEndpoint(remote);
}
std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>
targets()
{
return asSet(peerFinder.highway_targets(1000));
}
// Whether `probe` was charged at least `fee` since `before`. Balances
// are normalized by the decay window, so a charge of `fee` raises the
// balance by at least fee / decayWindowSeconds.
static bool
charged(Resource::Consumer& probe, int before, int fee)
{
return probe.balance() - before >=
fee / Resource::decayWindowSeconds;
}
bool
isBad(uint256 const& txid)
{
env.app().getJobQueue().rendezvous();
return env.app().getHashRouter().getFlags(txid) & SF_BAD;
}
};
void
testDisabled()
{
testcase("disabled");
using namespace jtx;
Fixture f(*this, false);
auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.1:51235");
// Nothing is learned or sent while the highway is disabled
f.deliver(xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
Sink sink(boost::asio::ip::make_address("127.0.0.1"));
f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink", {sink.endpoint()});
BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
Account const alice("alice");
f.env.fund(XRP(10000), alice);
f.env.close();
Buffer const blob(64);
f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(blob), uint256(1));
BEAST_EXPECT(!sink.receive(std::chrono::milliseconds(200)));
}
void
testPeers()
{
testcase("XUSHPEER");
Fixture f(*this, true);
auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.2:51235");
auto probe = f.probe(remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
f.deliver(
xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235"), ep("1.1.1.1:51235")}),
remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(
f.targets() == asSet({ep("8.8.8.8:51235"), ep("1.1.1.1:51235")}));
auto const balance = probe.balance();
// Unknown datagram types are ignored and cost almost nothing
f.deliver(Buffer("XUSHPING", 8), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(!Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 100));
// A malformed advertisement is charged for
Buffer malformed(xush::tagSize + 2);
std::memcpy(malformed.data(), "XUSHPEER\x05\x00", malformed.size());
f.deliver(malformed, remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 200));
BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().size() == 2);
}
void
testTransaction()
{
testcase("XUSHTXNF transaction");
using namespace jtx;
Fixture f(*this, true);
auto& env = f.env;
auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.3:51235");
Account const alice("alice");
Account const bob("bob");
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close();
auto const jt = env.jt(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)));
auto const txid = jt.stx->getTransactionID();
// Fragments arrive out of order and are reassembled
auto datagrams = xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(*jt.stx)), txid, 40);
BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() > 2);
std::reverse(datagrams.begin(), datagrams.end());
f.deliver(datagrams, remote);
env.app().getJobQueue().rendezvous();
BEAST_EXPECT(!f.isBad(txid));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob) == XRP(10100));
// Delivering it again is harmless
f.deliver(datagrams, remote);
env.app().getJobQueue().rendezvous();
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob) == XRP(10100));
}
void
testBadTransactions()
{
testcase("XUSHTXNF bad transactions");
using namespace jtx;
Fixture f(*this, true);
auto& env = f.env;
auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.4:51235");
auto probe = f.probe(remote);
Account const alice("alice");
Account const bob("bob");
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close();
auto const good = env.jt(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)));
auto const blob = serialize(*good.stx);
auto const txid = good.stx->getTransactionID();
// The ID in the header must match the transaction
auto balance = probe.balance();
f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(1)), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 400));
BEAST_EXPECT(!f.isBad(txid));
// Garbage that doesn't parse as a transaction
balance = probe.balance();
f.deliver(
xush::encodeTxn(makeSlice(std::string("garbage")), uint256(2)),
remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 400));
// Fragments of one transaction that disagree with each other
balance = probe.balance();
f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(3), 40).front(), remote);
f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(3), 60).front(), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 400));
// A malformed fragment
balance = probe.balance();
f.deliver(Buffer("XUSHTXNF", 8), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 200));
// Pseudo-transactions are never accepted
balance = probe.balance();
auto const pseudo = pseudoTx();
f.deliver(
xush::encodeTxn(
slice(serialize(pseudo)), pseudo.getTransactionID()),
remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 2000));
// An expired transaction is remembered as bad
auto const expired =
env.jt(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)), last_ledger_seq(1));
auto const expiredId = expired.stx->getTransactionID();
balance = probe.balance();
f.deliver(
xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(*expired.stx)), expiredId), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(f.isBad(expiredId));
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 150));
// A badly signed transaction is remembered as bad
auto corrupted = good.stx->getJson(JsonOptions::none);
corrupted[jss::TxnSignature] = std::string(128, '0');
STTx const badSig(parse(corrupted));
auto const badSigId = badSig.getTransactionID();
balance = probe.balance();
f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(badSig)), badSigId), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(f.isBad(badSigId));
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 2000));
// A known bad transaction is charged for again
balance = probe.balance();
f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(serialize(badSig)), badSigId), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(Fixture::charged(probe, balance, 150));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(bob) == XRP(10000));
}
void
testDisconnect()
{
testcase("resource limit");
Fixture f(*this, true);
auto const remote = ep("203.0.113.5:51235");
auto probe = f.probe(remote);
// A sender that keeps misbehaving is ignored
Buffer const blob(64);
for (int i = 0; i < 10000 && probe.balance() < Resource::dropThreshold;
++i)
f.deliver(xush::encodeTxn(slice(blob), uint256(1)), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(probe.balance() >= Resource::dropThreshold);
f.deliver(xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}), remote);
BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets().empty());
// Other senders are not affected
f.deliver(
xush::encodePeers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}), ep("203.0.113.6:51235"));
BEAST_EXPECT(f.targets() == asSet({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}));
}
void
testPublish()
{
testcase("publish");
using namespace jtx;
Fixture f(*this, true);
auto& env = f.env;
Account const alice("alice");
Account const bob("bob");
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close();
Sink sink4(boost::asio::ip::make_address("127.0.0.1"));
f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink4", {sink4.endpoint()});
std::optional<Sink> sink6;
try
{
sink6.emplace(boost::asio::ip::make_address("::1"));
f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink6", {sink6->endpoint()});
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
log << "IPv6 loopback unavailable, skipping" << std::endl;
}
// A transaction relayed by NetworkOPs is published on the highway
env(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)));
auto const stx = env.tx();
auto const blob = serialize(*stx);
auto check = [&](Sink& sink) {
auto const d = sink.receive(xush::MessageType::txn);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(d))
return;
auto const fragment = xush::decodeTxnFragment(makeSlice(*d));
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(fragment))
return;
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->txid == stx->getTransactionID());
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->count == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->payload == slice(blob));
};
check(sink4);
if (sink6)
check(*sink6);
// Large transactions are fragmented
Buffer big(5000);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < big.size(); ++i)
big.data()[i] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(i);
f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(big), uint256(7));
xush::Reassembler reassembler;
std::optional<Buffer> rebuilt;
while (!rebuilt)
{
auto const d = sink4.receive(xush::MessageType::txn);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(d))
break;
auto const fragment = xush::decodeTxnFragment(makeSlice(*d));
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(fragment && fragment->txid == uint256(7)))
break;
auto result = reassembler.add(
sink4.endpoint(),
*fragment,
xush::Reassembler::clock_type::now());
if (result.status == xush::Reassembler::Status::complete)
rebuilt = std::move(result.txn);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(rebuilt && *rebuilt == big);
// Transactions too large for the highway are not sent
Buffer const huge(xush::maxTxnSize + 1);
f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(huge), uint256(8));
f.overlay.publishTxXUSH(slice(big), uint256(9));
auto const d = sink4.receive(xush::MessageType::txn);
if (BEAST_EXPECT(d))
{
auto const fragment = xush::decodeTxnFragment(makeSlice(*d));
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment && fragment->txid == uint256(9));
}
}
void
testSendPeers()
{
testcase("advertise");
Fixture f(*this, true);
Sink sink(boost::asio::ip::make_address("127.0.0.1"));
f.peerFinder.addFixedPeer("sink", {sink.endpoint()});
// Learned endpoints are advertised to targets once per second, but
// fixed peers are never advertised.
f.peerFinder.add_highway_peers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
auto const d = sink.receive(xush::MessageType::peers);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(d))
return;
auto const endpoints = xush::decodePeers(makeSlice(*d));
BEAST_EXPECT(
endpoints && asSet(*endpoints) == asSet({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")}));
}
public:
void
run() override
{
testDisabled();
testPeers();
testTransaction();
testBadTransactions();
testDisconnect();
testPublish();
testSendPeers();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(OverlayXUSH, overlay, ripple);
} // namespace test
} // namespace ripple
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//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <xrpld/overlay/Message.h>
#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/ProtocolMessage.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/messages.h>
#include <boost/asio/buffer.hpp>
#include <boost/beast/core/multi_buffer.hpp>
#include <boost/system/error_code.hpp>
#include <cstdint>
#include <memory>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
/** Receive-side framing tests for invokeProtocolMessage.
PeerImp::onReadMessage hands its entire read buffer to
invokeProtocolMessage, which must decode exactly one frame and report
exactly that frame's size as consumed. A single read routinely contains
several frames, so the payload parser must never look past the payload
size declared in the frame header.
*/
class ProtocolMessage_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
using Compressed = compression::Compressed;
/** Minimal stand-in for the PeerImp handler interface. */
struct Handler
{
bool compression = false;
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<::google::protobuf::Message>> received;
std::vector<std::uint16_t> types;
bool
compressionEnabled() const
{
return compression;
}
void
onMessageBegin(
std::uint16_t,
std::shared_ptr<::google::protobuf::Message> const&,
std::size_t,
std::size_t,
bool)
{
}
template <class T>
void
onMessage(std::shared_ptr<T> const& m)
{
received.push_back(m);
}
void
onMessageEnd(
std::uint16_t type,
std::shared_ptr<::google::protobuf::Message> const&)
{
types.push_back(type);
}
void
onMessageUnknown(std::uint16_t type)
{
types.push_back(type);
}
};
/** Loads wire bytes into a multi_buffer as one or two committed
segments, split at `split` (no split if split is 0 or past the end).
*/
static void
load(
boost::beast::multi_buffer& rb,
std::vector<std::uint8_t> const& wire,
std::size_t split = 0)
{
auto commit = [&rb](std::uint8_t const* p, std::size_t n) {
if (n != 0)
rb.commit(boost::asio::buffer_copy(
rb.prepare(n), boost::asio::buffer(p, n)));
};
if (split == 0 || split >= wire.size())
{
commit(wire.data(), wire.size());
return;
}
commit(wire.data(), split);
commit(wire.data() + split, wire.size() - split);
}
/** Mirrors the consume loop in PeerImp::onReadMessage. */
static boost::system::error_code
drain(boost::beast::multi_buffer& rb, Handler& handler)
{
std::size_t hint = 0;
while (rb.size() > 0)
{
auto const [consumed, ec] =
invokeProtocolMessage(rb.data(), handler, hint);
if (ec)
return ec;
if (consumed == 0)
break;
rb.consume(consumed);
}
return {};
}
static std::vector<std::uint8_t>
frame(
::google::protobuf::Message const& m,
protocol::MessageType type,
Compressed compressed = Compressed::Off)
{
Message msg(m, type);
return msg.getBuffer(compressed);
}
static protocol::TMPing
makePing(protocol::TMPing::pingType type, std::uint32_t seq)
{
protocol::TMPing ping;
ping.set_type(type);
ping.set_seq(seq);
return ping;
}
template <class T>
std::shared_ptr<T>
receivedAs(Handler const& h, std::size_t i)
{
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(i < h.received.size()))
return {};
auto p = std::dynamic_pointer_cast<T>(h.received[i]);
BEAST_EXPECT(p);
return p;
}
void
testCoalescedUncompressed()
{
testcase("Coalesced uncompressed frames");
auto const first = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPING, 7);
auto second = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPONG, 99);
second.set_nettime(5);
auto wire = frame(first, protocol::mtPING);
auto const firstSize = wire.size();
auto const tail = frame(second, protocol::mtPING);
wire.insert(wire.end(), tail.begin(), tail.end());
// Both frames delivered by a single read, with every possible
// segmentation of the read buffer (0 means one contiguous segment).
for (std::size_t split = 0; split < wire.size(); ++split)
{
boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
load(rb, wire, split);
Handler h;
auto const ec = drain(rb, h);
BEAST_EXPECTS(
!ec, "split " + std::to_string(split) + ": " + ec.message());
BEAST_EXPECT(rb.size() == 0);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.size() == 2))
continue;
auto const a = receivedAs<protocol::TMPing>(h, 0);
auto const b = receivedAs<protocol::TMPing>(h, 1);
if (!a || !b)
continue;
BEAST_EXPECT(a->type() == protocol::TMPing::ptPING);
BEAST_EXPECT(a->seq() == 7);
BEAST_EXPECT(!a->has_nettime());
BEAST_EXPECT(b->type() == protocol::TMPing::ptPONG);
BEAST_EXPECT(b->seq() == 99);
BEAST_EXPECT(b->nettime() == 5);
}
// The first frame on its own, followed by a partial second frame,
// is delivered alone and the remainder is left for the next read.
{
boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
std::vector<std::uint8_t> partial(
wire.begin(), wire.begin() + firstSize + 3);
load(rb, partial);
Handler h;
BEAST_EXPECT(!drain(rb, h));
BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(rb.size() == 3);
}
}
void
testUncompressedThenCompressed()
{
testcase("Uncompressed frame followed by compressed frame");
auto const ping = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPING, 1234);
protocol::TMTransaction tx;
tx.set_rawtransaction(std::string(4096, 'x'));
tx.set_status(protocol::tsNEW);
auto wire = frame(ping, protocol::mtPING);
auto const txFrame = frame(tx, protocol::mtTRANSACTION, Compressed::On);
// The second frame must really be compressed for this test to mean
// anything: its header is what the first parse used to run into.
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(!txFrame.empty() && (txFrame[0] & 0x80)))
return;
wire.insert(wire.end(), txFrame.begin(), txFrame.end());
for (std::size_t split = 0; split < wire.size(); split += 7)
{
boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
load(rb, wire, split);
Handler h;
h.compression = true;
auto const ec = drain(rb, h);
BEAST_EXPECTS(
!ec, "split " + std::to_string(split) + ": " + ec.message());
BEAST_EXPECT(rb.size() == 0);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.size() == 2))
continue;
auto const p = receivedAs<protocol::TMPing>(h, 0);
auto const t = receivedAs<protocol::TMTransaction>(h, 1);
if (!p || !t)
continue;
BEAST_EXPECT(p->type() == protocol::TMPing::ptPING);
BEAST_EXPECT(p->seq() == 1234);
BEAST_EXPECT(t->rawtransaction() == tx.rawtransaction());
BEAST_EXPECT(t->status() == protocol::tsNEW);
}
}
void
testDeclaredSizeIsAuthoritative()
{
testcase("Declared payload size bounds the parse");
auto const ping = makePing(protocol::TMPing::ptPING, 7);
auto wire = frame(ping, protocol::mtPING);
// Shrink the declared payload size by one byte without removing the
// byte from the stream. The declared payload alone is a truncated
// TMPing, so the frame must be rejected rather than completed from
// bytes that lie beyond it.
std::uint32_t declared = (std::uint32_t(wire[0]) << 24) |
(std::uint32_t(wire[1]) << 16) | (std::uint32_t(wire[2]) << 8) |
std::uint32_t(wire[3]);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(declared > 0))
return;
--declared;
wire[0] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared >> 24);
wire[1] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared >> 16);
wire[2] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared >> 8);
wire[3] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(declared);
boost::beast::multi_buffer rb;
load(rb, wire);
Handler h;
auto const ec = drain(rb, h);
BEAST_EXPECT(ec == boost::system::errc::bad_message);
BEAST_EXPECT(h.received.empty());
}
public:
void
run() override
{
testCoalescedUncompressed();
testUncompressedThenCompressed();
testDeclaredSizeIsAuthoritative();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(ProtocolMessage, overlay, ripple);
} // namespace test
} // namespace ripple
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//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <xrpld/overlay/detail/XUSH.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstring>
#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
namespace test {
class XUSH_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
using Status = xush::Reassembler::Status;
static beast::IP::Endpoint
ep(std::string const& s)
{
return beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string(s);
}
static Slice
slice(Buffer const& b)
{
return Slice(b.data(), b.size());
}
static Buffer
makeTxn(std::size_t size)
{
Buffer b(size);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
b.data()[i] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(i * 31 + 7);
return b;
}
static void
putU32(std::uint8_t* p, std::uint32_t v)
{
p[0] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v >> 24);
p[1] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v >> 16);
p[2] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v >> 8);
p[3] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(v);
}
// A XUSHTXNF datagram with an arbitrary (possibly invalid) header
static Buffer
rawFragment(
uint256 const& txid,
std::uint32_t totalSize,
std::uint32_t count,
std::uint32_t index,
std::size_t payloadSize)
{
Buffer b(xush::txnHeaderSize + payloadSize);
std::memset(b.data(), 0xAB, b.size());
std::memcpy(b.data(), "XUSHTXNF", xush::tagSize);
std::memcpy(b.data() + xush::tagSize, txid.data(), txid.size());
putU32(b.data() + 40, totalSize);
putU32(b.data() + 44, count);
putU32(b.data() + 48, index);
return b;
}
// A XUSHPEER datagram with arbitrary (possibly invalid) counts
static Buffer
rawPeers(std::uint8_t n4, std::uint8_t n6, std::size_t bodySize)
{
Buffer b(xush::tagSize + 2 + bodySize);
std::memset(b.data(), 0, b.size());
std::memcpy(b.data(), "XUSHPEER", xush::tagSize);
b.data()[8] = n4;
b.data()[9] = n6;
return b;
}
void
testClassify()
{
testcase("classify");
using namespace xush;
auto type = [](std::string const& s) { return classify(makeSlice(s)); };
BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPEER") == MessageType::peers);
BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPEER and more") == MessageType::peers);
BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHTXNF") == MessageType::txn);
BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPING") == MessageType::unknown);
BEAST_EXPECT(type("XUSHPEE") == MessageType::unknown);
BEAST_EXPECT(type("") == MessageType::unknown);
BEAST_EXPECT(type("{\"command\":\"ping\"}") == MessageType::unknown);
}
void
testPeers()
{
testcase("XUSHPEER");
using namespace xush;
std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> const endpoints{
ep("1.2.3.4:51235"), ep("[2001:db8::1]:21337"), ep("5.6.7.8:1")};
auto const datagram = encodePeers(endpoints);
BEAST_EXPECT(datagram.size() == tagSize + 2 + 2 * 8 + 20);
BEAST_EXPECT(classify(slice(datagram)) == MessageType::peers);
if (auto const decoded = decodePeers(slice(datagram));
BEAST_EXPECT(decoded))
{
BEAST_EXPECT(
std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>(
decoded->begin(), decoded->end()) ==
std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>(
endpoints.begin(), endpoints.end()));
}
// An empty advertisement is valid
if (auto const decoded = decodePeers(slice(encodePeers({})));
BEAST_EXPECT(decoded))
BEAST_EXPECT(decoded->empty());
// At most maxAdvertisedPeers are advertised, and the result fits in
// a single datagram even if they are all IPv6
{
std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> many;
for (std::uint16_t i = 1; i <= maxAdvertisedPeers + 10; ++i)
many.emplace_back(
boost::asio::ip::make_address("2001:db8::1"), i);
auto const big = encodePeers(many);
BEAST_EXPECT(big.size() <= maxDatagramSize);
auto const decoded = decodePeers(slice(big));
BEAST_EXPECT(decoded && decoded->size() == maxAdvertisedPeers);
}
// Truncated or padded
BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(Slice(datagram.data(), datagram.size() - 1)));
{
Buffer padded(datagram.size() + 1);
std::memcpy(padded.data(), datagram.data(), datagram.size());
BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(padded)));
}
BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(Slice(datagram.data(), tagSize + 1)));
// Too many endpoints, even with a consistent size
BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(rawPeers(
maxAdvertisedPeers + 1, 0, (maxAdvertisedPeers + 1) * 8))));
BEAST_EXPECT(decodePeers(
slice(rawPeers(maxAdvertisedPeers, 0, maxAdvertisedPeers * 8))));
// A port that doesn't fit in 16 bits
{
auto bad = rawPeers(1, 0, 8);
putU32(bad.data() + tagSize + 2 + 4, 0x10000);
BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(bad)));
putU32(bad.data() + tagSize + 2 + 4, 0xFFFF);
BEAST_EXPECT(decodePeers(slice(bad)));
}
// Wrong tag
BEAST_EXPECT(!decodePeers(slice(rawFragment(uint256{1}, 1, 1, 0, 1))));
}
void
testTxnEncoding()
{
testcase("XUSHTXNF encoding");
using namespace xush;
uint256 const txid{42};
// A typical transaction fits in a single datagram
{
auto const txn = makeTxn(200);
auto const datagrams = encodeTxn(slice(txn), txid);
BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams[0].size() == txnHeaderSize + 200);
auto const fragment = decodeTxnFragment(slice(datagrams[0]));
if (BEAST_EXPECT(fragment))
{
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->txid == txid);
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->totalSize == 200);
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->count == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->index == 0);
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->payload == slice(txn));
}
}
// Larger transactions are split, and no datagram is too large
for (auto const size :
{maxFragmentPayload,
maxFragmentPayload + 1,
3 * maxFragmentPayload,
3 * maxFragmentPayload + 17})
{
auto const txn = makeTxn(size);
auto const datagrams = encodeTxn(slice(txn), txid);
auto const count =
(size + maxFragmentPayload - 1) / maxFragmentPayload;
BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() == count);
std::size_t total = 0;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < datagrams.size(); ++i)
{
BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams[i].size() <= maxDatagramSize);
auto const fragment = decodeTxnFragment(slice(datagrams[i]));
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(fragment))
continue;
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->index == i);
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->count == count);
BEAST_EXPECT(fragment->totalSize == size);
BEAST_EXPECT(
fragment->payload ==
Slice(
txn.data() + i * maxFragmentPayload,
fragment->payload.size()));
total += fragment->payload.size();
}
BEAST_EXPECT(total == size);
}
// Limits
BEAST_EXPECT(encodeTxn(Slice{}, txid).empty());
BEAST_EXPECT(encodeTxn(slice(Buffer(maxTxnSize + 1)), txid).empty());
{
auto const datagrams = encodeTxn(slice(Buffer(maxTxnSize)), txid);
BEAST_EXPECT(!datagrams.empty());
BEAST_EXPECT(datagrams.size() <= maxFragments);
}
}
void
testTxnDecoding()
{
testcase("XUSHTXNF decoding");
using namespace xush;
uint256 const id{7};
auto decode = [](Buffer const& b) {
return decodeTxnFragment(slice(b)).has_value();
};
BEAST_EXPECT(decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 2, 1, 5)));
BEAST_EXPECT(decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 1, 0, 10)));
BEAST_EXPECT(decode(rawFragment(id, maxTxnSize, maxFragments, 0, 1)));
// No payload
BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 1, 0, 0)));
// Bad total size
BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 0, 1, 0, 1)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, maxTxnSize + 1, 2, 0, 1)));
// Bad fragment count
BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 0, 0, 1)));
BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 11, 0, 1)));
BEAST_EXPECT(
!decode(rawFragment(id, maxTxnSize, maxFragments + 1, 0, 1)));
// Bad index
BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 2, 2, 1)));
// Payload larger than the transaction
BEAST_EXPECT(!decode(rawFragment(id, 10, 2, 0, 11)));
// Wrong tag
BEAST_EXPECT(!decodeTxnFragment(slice(encodePeers({}))));
}
void
testReassembly()
{
testcase("reassembly");
using namespace xush;
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
auto const now = Reassembler::clock_type::now();
auto const alice = ep("1.2.3.4:5000");
auto const bob = ep("5.6.7.8:5000");
auto const carol = ep("9.9.9.9:5000");
uint256 const id1{1};
uint256 const id2{2};
auto const txn1 = makeTxn(2 * maxFragmentPayload + 100);
auto const txn2 = makeTxn(2 * maxFragmentPayload + 200);
auto const d1 = encodeTxn(slice(txn1), id1);
auto const d2 = encodeTxn(slice(txn2), id2);
BEAST_EXPECT(d1.size() == 3 && d2.size() == 3);
auto f1 = [&](std::size_t i) {
return *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d1[i]));
};
auto f2 = [&](std::size_t i) {
return *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d2[i]));
};
// Out of order, with a repeated fragment
{
Reassembler r;
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(2), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
auto const result = r.add(alice, f1(1), now);
BEAST_EXPECT(result.status == Status::complete);
BEAST_EXPECT(result.txn == txn1);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.bytes() == 0);
}
// A transaction in a single datagram needs no state
{
Reassembler r;
auto const small = makeTxn(100);
auto const d = encodeTxn(slice(small), id2);
auto const result =
r.add(alice, *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d[0])), now);
BEAST_EXPECT(result.status == Status::complete);
BEAST_EXPECT(result.txn == small);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
// ... but must be consistent
auto bad = *decodeTxnFragment(slice(d[0]));
bad.totalSize += 1;
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, bad, now).status == Status::invalid);
}
// Senders are kept apart
{
Reassembler r;
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(bob, f1(2), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(2), now).status == Status::complete);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
}
// A header that disagrees with earlier fragments
{
Reassembler r;
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
auto bad = f1(1);
bad.count += 1;
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, bad, now).status == Status::invalid);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.bytes() == 0);
}
// More bytes than the advertised total size
{
Reassembler r;
auto first = f1(0);
first.count = 2;
first.totalSize = maxFragmentPayload + 10;
auto second = f1(1);
second.count = 2;
second.totalSize = first.totalSize;
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, first, now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, second, now).status == Status::invalid);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
}
// Every fragment present but fewer bytes than the total size
{
Reassembler r;
auto first = f1(0);
first.count = 2;
first.totalSize = 2 * maxFragmentPayload + 5;
auto second = f1(1);
second.count = 2;
second.totalSize = first.totalSize;
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, first, now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, second, now).status == Status::invalid);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 0);
}
// Partial transactions time out
{
Reassembler r(
Reassembler::defaultMaxPending,
Reassembler::defaultMaxBytes,
30s);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::pending);
// Not yet
BEAST_EXPECT(
r.add(bob, f2(0), now + 30s).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
// Now: the first transaction has to start over
BEAST_EXPECT(
r.add(bob, f2(1), now + 31s).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(
r.add(alice, f1(2), now + 31s).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
}
// The number of partial transactions is limited
{
Reassembler r(2, Reassembler::defaultMaxBytes, 30s);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(bob, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(carol, f1(0), now).status == Status::overloaded);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 2);
// Fragments of transactions already being rebuilt are accepted
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(2), now).status == Status::complete);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(carol, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
}
// The number of bytes buffered is limited
{
Reassembler r(
Reassembler::defaultMaxPending,
maxFragmentPayload + Reassembler::fragmentOverhead,
30s);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(0), now).status == Status::pending);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(alice, f1(1), now).status == Status::overloaded);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.add(bob, f1(0), now).status == Status::overloaded);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.pending() == 1);
BEAST_EXPECT(
r.bytes() ==
maxFragmentPayload + Reassembler::fragmentOverhead);
}
}
public:
void
run() override
{
testClassify();
testPeers();
testTxnEncoding();
testTxnDecoding();
testReassembly();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(XUSH, overlay, ripple);
} // namespace test
} // namespace ripple
+276
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <test/unit_test/SuiteJournal.h>
#include <xrpld/peerfinder/PeerfinderManager.h>
#include <xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Tuning.h>
#include <xrpld/peerfinder/make_Manager.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/BasicConfig.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/insight/NullCollector.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/net/IPAddressConversion.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
#include <boost/asio/io_context.hpp>
#include <memory>
#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
namespace PeerFinder {
// Tests the UDP Superhighway (XUSH) endpoint set kept by PeerFinder::Manager
class HighwayPeers_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
test::SuiteJournal journal_{"HighwayPeers_test", *this};
struct Fixture
{
boost::asio::io_context io;
TestStopwatch clock;
BasicConfig basicConfig;
std::unique_ptr<Manager> manager;
Fixture(beast::Journal journal, bool enabled, bool peerPrivate)
: manager(make_Manager(
io,
clock,
journal,
basicConfig,
beast::insight::NullCollector::New(),
false))
{
Config config;
config.udpHighway = enabled;
config.peerPrivate = peerPrivate;
manager->setConfig(config);
}
~Fixture()
{
manager->stop();
}
};
static beast::IP::Endpoint
ep(std::string const& s)
{
return beast::IP::Endpoint::from_string(s);
}
// A distinct public IPv4 endpoint
static beast::IP::Endpoint
publicEp(std::uint32_t i)
{
return beast::IP::Endpoint(
boost::asio::ip::address_v4(0x2C000000 + i), 51235);
}
static std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>
asSet(std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> const& v)
{
return {v.begin(), v.end()};
}
void
testDisabled()
{
testcase("disabled");
Fixture f(journal_, false, false);
f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.1:51235")});
f.manager->add_highway_peers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
f.manager->onRedirects(
beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("8.8.4.4:51235")),
{beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("1.1.1.1:51235"))});
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).empty());
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_adverts(100).empty());
}
void
testLearning()
{
testcase("learning");
Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
// Only valid public endpoints are learned from other servers
f.manager->add_highway_peers(
{ep("8.8.8.8:51235"),
ep("10.0.0.1:51235"),
ep("127.0.0.1:51235"),
ep("9.9.9.9:0"),
ep("0.0.0.0:51235")});
BEAST_EXPECT(
asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
// Fixed peers are trusted, even with a private address, but they
// are never advertised
f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
BEAST_EXPECT(
asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
(std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{
ep("8.8.8.8:51235"), ep("10.0.0.2:51235")}));
BEAST_EXPECT(
asSet(f.manager->highway_adverts(100)) ==
std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
// A learned endpoint that is later configured as fixed stops being
// advertised
f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed2", {ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_adverts(100).empty());
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 2);
// Redirects are learned too
f.manager->onRedirects(
beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("8.8.4.4:51235")),
{beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("1.1.1.1:51235"))});
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 3);
}
void
testSampling()
{
testcase("sampling");
Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> endpoints;
for (std::uint32_t i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
endpoints.push_back(publicEp(i));
f.manager->add_highway_peers(endpoints);
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i)
{
auto const targets = f.manager->highway_targets(16);
BEAST_EXPECT(targets.size() == 16);
BEAST_EXPECT(asSet(targets).size() == 16);
}
BEAST_EXPECT(
asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(1000)) == asSet(endpoints));
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(0).empty());
}
void
testPrivate()
{
testcase("private");
Fixture f(journal_, true, true);
f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
f.manager->add_highway_peers({ep("8.8.8.8:51235")});
// A private server only talks to its fixed peers, and advertises
// nothing
BEAST_EXPECT(
asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_adverts(100).empty());
}
void
testExpiry()
{
testcase("expiry");
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
auto const ttl = Tuning::highwayPeerSecondsToLive;
auto const advertised = ep("8.8.8.8:51235");
auto const redirected = ep("1.1.1.1:51235");
auto const fixed = ep("10.0.0.2:51235");
f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {fixed});
f.manager->add_highway_peers({advertised});
f.manager->add_highway_peers({redirected});
// Advertisements don't extend the life of an entry, but
// authenticated sources (here, a redirect) do
f.clock.advance(ttl / 2);
f.manager->add_highway_peers({advertised, redirected});
f.manager->onRedirects(
beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(ep("8.8.4.4:51235")),
{beast::IP::to_asio_endpoint(redirected)});
f.clock.advance(ttl / 2);
f.manager->once_per_second();
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 3);
f.clock.advance(1s);
f.manager->once_per_second();
BEAST_EXPECT(
asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
(std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{redirected, fixed}));
f.clock.advance(ttl / 2);
f.manager->once_per_second();
BEAST_EXPECT(
asSet(f.manager->highway_targets(100)) ==
std::set<beast::IP::Endpoint>{fixed});
// An expired entry can be learned again
f.manager->add_highway_peers({advertised});
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(100).size() == 2);
}
void
testLimit()
{
testcase("limit");
Fixture f(journal_, true, false);
auto const max = Tuning::highwayPeersMax;
std::vector<beast::IP::Endpoint> endpoints;
for (std::uint32_t i = 0; i < max + 100; ++i)
endpoints.push_back(publicEp(i));
f.manager->add_highway_peers(endpoints);
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(max + 100).size() == max);
// Fixed peers don't count towards the limit
f.manager->addFixedPeer("fixed", {ep("10.0.0.2:51235")});
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(max + 100).size() == max + 1);
// Disabling the highway forgets everything
Config config;
config.udpHighway = false;
f.manager->setConfig(config);
BEAST_EXPECT(f.manager->highway_targets(max + 100).empty());
}
public:
void
run() override
{
testDisabled();
testLearning();
testSampling();
testPrivate();
testExpiry();
testLimit();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(HighwayPeers, peerfinder, ripple);
} // namespace PeerFinder
} // namespace ripple
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+640 -1
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@@ -18,16 +18,22 @@
//==============================================================================
#include <test/jtx.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/Ledger.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerMaster.h>
#include <xrpld/core/ConfigSections.h>
#include <xrpld/nodestore/detail/DatabasePinnedImp.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/temp_dir.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdlib>
#include <cstring>
#include <fstream>
#include <grpc/impl/codegen/compression_types.h>
#include <iterator>
#include <optional>
#include <thread>
namespace ripple {
@@ -102,14 +108,28 @@ struct CatalogueEnvOpts
};
// envconfig with pinned_type set so catalogue_load passes the config guard.
// Uses rwdb for in-process speed (allowed in standalone).
//
// envconfig() selects [node_db] type=rwdb, which is the tree-only null node
// store: SHAMapStore never builds DatabasePinned on it, so catalogue_load
// would refuse to run. Use the in-memory "memory" store for the hot side
// instead. It is shared by path within the process, so each config gets its
// own path (SHAMapStore creates the directory; nothing is written to it).
// The pinned side uses rwdb, an in-memory persistent backend.
inline std::unique_ptr<Config>
catalogueEnvconfig(CatalogueEnvOpts const& opts = {})
{
auto cfg = test::jtx::envconfig();
auto& nodeDb = cfg->section(ConfigSection::nodeDatabase());
if (opts.withPinnedType)
{
nodeDb.set("type", "memory");
nodeDb.set(
"path",
(boost::filesystem::temp_directory_path() /
boost::filesystem::unique_path("catalogue-test-%%%%-%%%%-%%%%"))
.string());
nodeDb.set("pinned_type", "rwdb");
}
nodeDb.set("online_delete", opts.onlineDelete);
return cfg;
}
@@ -1067,6 +1087,621 @@ class Catalogue_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
}
public:
// ---- Editing uncompressed catalogues -----------------------------------
//
// Ledger record: seq, hash, txHash, accountHash, parentHash, drops,
// closeFlags, closeTimeResolution, closeTime, parentCloseTime; then the
// state map and the tx map, each a run of leaf records ending in
// tnTERMINAL. A leaf record is type (1), key (32), and, unless it is a
// tnREMOVE, size (4) and data.
static constexpr std::size_t catLedgerHeaderSize =
4 + 32 * 4 + 8 + sizeof(int) + 4 + 8 + 8;
struct CatLedgerRecord
{
std::size_t header; // first byte of the ledger header
std::size_t state; // first byte of the state map
std::size_t tx; // first byte of the tx map
std::size_t end; // one past the tx map's tnTERMINAL
};
// Position just past the map that starts at `pos`.
static std::size_t
skipCatalogueMap(std::vector<std::uint8_t> const& bytes, std::size_t pos)
{
while (pos < bytes.size())
{
auto const type = bytes[pos++];
if (type == 255) // tnTERMINAL
return pos;
pos += 32;
if (type == 254) // tnREMOVE
continue;
if (pos + 4 > bytes.size())
break;
std::uint32_t size = 0;
std::memcpy(&size, &bytes[pos], 4);
pos += 4 + size;
}
return bytes.size();
}
// Position of the size field of the first leaf (not a removal) in the
// map that starts at `pos`, if the map has one.
static std::optional<std::size_t>
firstLeafSizeField(std::vector<std::uint8_t> const& bytes, std::size_t pos)
{
while (pos < bytes.size())
{
auto const type = bytes[pos];
if (type == 255)
return std::nullopt;
if (type != 254)
return pos + 1 + 32;
pos += 1 + 32;
}
return std::nullopt;
}
static std::vector<CatLedgerRecord>
indexCatalogue(std::vector<std::uint8_t> const& bytes)
{
std::vector<CatLedgerRecord> records;
std::size_t pos = sizeof(TestCATLHeader);
while (pos + catLedgerHeaderSize <= bytes.size())
{
CatLedgerRecord r;
r.header = pos;
r.state = pos + catLedgerHeaderSize;
r.tx = skipCatalogueMap(bytes, r.state);
r.end = skipCatalogueMap(bytes, r.tx);
records.push_back(r);
pos = r.end;
}
return records;
}
static std::vector<std::uint8_t>
readCatalogue(std::string const& path)
{
std::ifstream in(path, std::ios::binary);
return {
std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(in),
std::istreambuf_iterator<char>()};
}
static void
writeCatalogue(std::string const& path, std::vector<std::uint8_t> const& b)
{
std::ofstream out(path, std::ios::binary | std::ios::trunc);
out.write(reinterpret_cast<char const*>(b.data()), b.size());
}
static Json::Value
loadCatalogue(test::jtx::Env& env, std::string const& path, bool ignoreHash)
{
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::input_file] = path;
if (ignoreHash)
params[jss::ignore_hash] = true;
return env.client().invoke("catalogue_load", params)[jss::result];
}
static bool
errorContains(Json::Value const& result, std::string const& what)
{
return result[jss::status] == "error" &&
result[jss::error_message].asString().find(what) !=
std::string::npos;
}
void
testCatalogueLoadFailures(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("catalogue_load: failures part way through a file");
using namespace test::jtx;
using beast::severities::kDisabled;
boost::filesystem::path tempDir =
boost::filesystem::temp_directory_path() /
boost::filesystem::unique_path();
boost::filesystem::create_directories(tempDir);
auto const goodPath = (tempDir / "good.catl").string();
// An uncompressed catalogue of ledgers 3-6, so records can be edited.
{
Env env{*this, catalogueEnvconfig(), features, nullptr, kDisabled};
prepareLedgerData(env, 3);
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::min_ledger] = 3;
params[jss::max_ledger] = 6;
params[jss::output_file] = goodPath;
params[jss::compression_level] = 0;
auto const result =
env.client().invoke("catalogue_create", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
}
auto const good = readCatalogue(goodPath);
auto const records = indexCatalogue(good);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(
records.size() == 4 && records.back().end == good.size()))
return;
// Write `bytes` to a new file, load it into a fresh server, and hand
// the result and the resulting pinned set to `check`.
int fileNo = 0;
auto loadEdited = [&](std::vector<std::uint8_t> const& bytes,
bool ignoreHash,
auto&& check) {
auto const path =
(tempDir / ("edited" + std::to_string(++fileNo) + ".catl"))
.string();
writeCatalogue(path, bytes);
Env env{*this, catalogueEnvconfig(), features, nullptr, kDisabled};
auto const result = loadCatalogue(env, path, ignoreHash);
check(
result, env.app().getLedgerMaster().getPinnedLedgersRangeSet());
};
auto const hashField = offsetof(TestCATLHeader, hash);
auto const maxLedgerField = offsetof(TestCATLHeader, max_ledger);
// Offsets within a ledger header record.
constexpr std::size_t accountHashAt = 4 + 32 * 2;
constexpr std::size_t dropsAt = 4 + 32 * 4;
// The stored checksum is wrong but every ledger is intact: all four
// load, then the whole-file check fails and the run is rolled back.
{
auto bytes = good;
bytes[hashField] ^= 0xff;
loadEdited(
bytes, false, [&](auto const& result, auto const& pinned) {
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(
result, "catalogue hash verification failed"));
BEAST_EXPECT(pinned.empty());
});
}
// A ledger part way through is corrupt. The load stops there, the
// rest of the file is still hashed, the checksum fails, and the
// ledgers loaded before it are rolled back too.
{
auto bytes = good;
bytes[records[2].header + dropsAt] ^= 0x01;
loadEdited(
bytes, false, [&](auto const& result, auto const& pinned) {
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(
result, "catalogue hash verification failed"));
BEAST_EXPECT(pinned.empty());
});
}
// A checksum failure only rolls back what this run added: ledgers
// that were already pinned stay pinned.
{
auto bytes = good;
bytes[hashField] ^= 0xff;
auto const badPath = (tempDir / "badsum.catl").string();
writeCatalogue(badPath, bytes);
Env env{*this, catalogueEnvconfig(), features, nullptr, kDisabled};
BEAST_EXPECT(
loadCatalogue(env, goodPath, false)[jss::status] ==
jss::success);
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(
loadCatalogue(env, badPath, false),
"catalogue hash verification failed"));
auto& lm = env.app().getLedgerMaster();
BEAST_EXPECT(to_string(lm.getPinnedLedgersRangeSet()) == "3-6");
// The pinned store: an empty batch is a no-op, an in-memory
// backend is durable on demand, and a fetch made for
// online_delete's copy pass (duplicate == true) finds nodes
// that exist only in the pinned store.
auto* const pinnedDb = dynamic_cast<NodeStore::DatabasePinnedImp*>(
&env.app().getNodeStore());
if (BEAST_EXPECT(pinnedDb))
{
pinnedDb->storePinnedBatch({});
BEAST_EXPECT(pinnedDb->syncPinned());
auto const stateRoot =
uint256::fromVoid(&good[records[0].header + accountHashAt]);
BEAST_EXPECT(env.app().getNodeStore().fetchNodeObject(
stateRoot, 0, NodeStore::FetchType::synchronous, true));
}
}
// Out of sequence: ledger 4's record claims to be ledger 9.
{
auto bytes = good;
std::uint32_t const nine = 9;
std::memcpy(&bytes[records[1].header], &nine, 4);
loadEdited(
bytes, true, [&](auto const& result, auto const& pinned) {
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(result, "out of sequence"));
BEAST_EXPECT(boost::icl::contains(pinned, 3u));
BEAST_EXPECT(!boost::icl::contains(pinned, 4u));
});
}
// The header promises a ledger 7 the file does not contain. Ledgers
// 3-6 load (hash checks are off) before the file runs out.
{
auto bytes = good;
std::uint32_t const seven = 7;
std::memcpy(&bytes[maxLedgerField], &seven, 4);
loadEdited(
bytes, true, [&](auto const& result, auto const& pinned) {
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(
result, "Unexpected end of catalogue file"));
BEAST_EXPECT(to_string(pinned) == "3-6");
});
}
// An absurd leaf size in each kind of map is rejected while parsing.
auto withHugeLeaf = [&](std::size_t sizeField) {
auto bytes = good;
std::uint32_t const huge = 0xFFFFFFFF;
std::memcpy(&bytes[sizeField], &huge, 4);
return bytes;
};
// ... in the base ledger's state map.
if (auto const field = firstLeafSizeField(good, records[0].state);
BEAST_EXPECT(field))
{
loadEdited(
withHugeLeaf(*field),
true,
[&](auto const& result, auto const& pinned) {
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(
result, "Failed to load base ledger state"));
BEAST_EXPECT(pinned.empty());
});
}
// ... in a later ledger's state delta.
{
std::optional<std::size_t> index;
std::optional<std::size_t> field;
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < records.size() && !field; ++i)
if ((field = firstLeafSizeField(good, records[i].state)))
index = i;
if (BEAST_EXPECT(field))
{
std::uint32_t const seq = 3 + *index;
loadEdited(
withHugeLeaf(*field),
true,
[&](auto const& result, auto const& pinned) {
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(
result, "Failed to apply ledger delta"));
BEAST_EXPECT(boost::icl::contains(pinned, seq - 1));
BEAST_EXPECT(!boost::icl::contains(pinned, seq));
});
}
}
// ... in a ledger's transaction map.
{
std::optional<std::size_t> index;
std::optional<std::size_t> field;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < records.size() && !field; ++i)
if ((field = firstLeafSizeField(good, records[i].tx)))
index = i;
if (BEAST_EXPECT(field))
{
std::uint32_t const seq = 3 + *index;
loadEdited(
withHugeLeaf(*field),
true,
[&](auto const& result, auto const& pinned) {
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(
result, "Failed to apply ledger delta"));
BEAST_EXPECT(!boost::icl::contains(pinned, seq));
});
}
}
boost::filesystem::remove_all(tempDir);
}
void
testCataloguePinnedStoreRequired(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("catalogue_load / catalogue_unpin: pinned store required");
using namespace test::jtx;
using beast::severities::kDisabled;
// pinned_type is set, but [node_db] type=rwdb is the null node
// store, on which SHAMapStore never builds the pinned store.
{
auto cfg = test::jtx::envconfig();
auto& nodeDb = cfg->section(ConfigSection::nodeDatabase());
nodeDb.set("pinned_type", "rwdb");
nodeDb.set("online_delete", "256");
Env env{*this, std::move(cfg), features, nullptr, kDisabled};
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::input_file] = "/nonexistent.catl";
auto const result =
env.client().invoke("catalogue_load", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(
errorContains(result, "requires the pinned node store"));
}
// catalogue_unpin needs pinned_type configured at all.
{
Env env{
*this,
catalogueEnvconfig({.withPinnedType = false}),
features,
nullptr,
kDisabled};
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::ledger_index_min] = 1;
params[jss::ledger_index_max] = 2;
auto const result =
env.client().invoke("catalogue_unpin", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(errorContains(result, "pinned_type"));
}
}
void
testCatalogueChainLinkage(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("catalogue_load: Ledgers must chain");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env{
*this,
catalogueEnvconfig(),
features,
nullptr,
beast::severities::kDisabled,
};
prepareLedgerData(env, 3);
boost::filesystem::path tempDir =
boost::filesystem::temp_directory_path() /
boost::filesystem::unique_path();
boost::filesystem::create_directories(tempDir);
auto cataloguePath = (tempDir / "test.catl").string();
// Uncompressed, so ledger records can be located and edited.
{
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::min_ledger] = 3;
params[jss::max_ledger] = 6;
params[jss::output_file] = cataloguePath;
params[jss::compression_level] = 0;
auto const result =
env.client().invoke("catalogue_create", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
}
std::vector<std::uint8_t> bytes;
{
std::ifstream in(cataloguePath, std::ios::binary);
bytes.assign(
std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(in),
std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
}
// Ledger record: seq, hash, txHash, accountHash, parentHash, drops,
// closeFlags, closeTimeResolution, closeTime, parentCloseTime; then
// the state map and tx map as leaf records ending in tnTERMINAL.
constexpr std::size_t ledgerHeaderSize =
4 + 32 * 4 + 8 + sizeof(int) + 4 + 8 + 8;
auto skipMap = [&](std::size_t pos) -> std::size_t {
while (pos < bytes.size())
{
auto const type = bytes[pos++];
if (type == 255) // tnTERMINAL
return pos;
pos += 32;
if (type == 254) // tnREMOVE
continue;
if (pos + 4 > bytes.size())
break;
std::uint32_t size = 0;
std::memcpy(&size, &bytes[pos], 4);
pos += 4 + size;
}
return bytes.size();
};
// Skip the base ledger (3) to reach ledger 4.
std::size_t pos = sizeof(TestCATLHeader) + ledgerHeaderSize;
pos = skipMap(skipMap(pos));
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(pos + ledgerHeaderSize <= bytes.size()))
return;
LedgerInfo info;
std::size_t p = pos;
auto take = [&](void* dst, std::size_t n) {
std::memcpy(dst, &bytes[p], n);
p += n;
};
std::uint64_t drops = 0, closeTime = 0, parentCloseTime = 0;
std::uint32_t resolution = 0;
take(&info.seq, 4);
std::size_t const hashOffset = p;
take(info.hash.data(), 32);
take(info.txHash.data(), 32);
take(info.accountHash.data(), 32);
std::size_t const parentOffset = p;
take(info.parentHash.data(), 32);
take(&drops, 8);
take(&info.closeFlags, sizeof(info.closeFlags));
take(&resolution, 4);
take(&closeTime, 8);
take(&parentCloseTime, 8);
info.drops = drops;
info.closeTime = NetClock::time_point{NetClock::duration{closeTime}};
info.parentCloseTime =
NetClock::time_point{NetClock::duration{parentCloseTime}};
info.closeTimeResolution = NetClock::duration{resolution};
BEAST_EXPECT(info.seq == 4);
// Sanity: the record parses to a ledger whose hash checks out.
BEAST_EXPECT(calculateLedgerHash(info) == info.hash);
// Re-parent ledger 4 and fix up its hash, so the file stays
// internally consistent ledger by ledger; only the chain check can
// catch it.
info.parentHash = ~info.parentHash;
info.hash = calculateLedgerHash(info);
std::memcpy(&bytes[parentOffset], info.parentHash.data(), 32);
std::memcpy(&bytes[hashOffset], info.hash.data(), 32);
{
std::ofstream out(
cataloguePath, std::ios::binary | std::ios::trunc);
out.write(
reinterpret_cast<char const*>(bytes.data()), bytes.size());
}
Env loadEnv{
*this,
catalogueEnvconfig(),
features,
nullptr,
beast::severities::kDisabled,
};
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::input_file] = cataloguePath;
params[jss::ignore_hash] = true; // the file was edited
auto const result =
loadEnv.client().invoke("catalogue_load", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == "error");
BEAST_EXPECT(
result[jss::error_message].asString().find(
"does not chain to its predecessor") != std::string::npos);
// The base ledger verified and stays pinned; nothing after it does.
auto const pinned =
loadEnv.app().getLedgerMaster().getPinnedLedgersRangeSet();
BEAST_EXPECT(boost::icl::contains(pinned, 3u));
BEAST_EXPECT(!boost::icl::contains(pinned, 4u));
boost::filesystem::remove_all(tempDir);
}
void
testCatalogueUnpin(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("catalogue_unpin");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env{
*this,
catalogueEnvconfig(),
features,
nullptr,
beast::severities::kDisabled,
};
prepareLedgerData(env, 5);
boost::filesystem::path tempDir =
boost::filesystem::temp_directory_path() /
boost::filesystem::unique_path();
boost::filesystem::create_directories(tempDir);
auto cataloguePath = (tempDir / "test.catl").string();
{
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::min_ledger] = 3;
params[jss::max_ledger] = 8;
params[jss::output_file] = cataloguePath;
auto const result =
env.client().invoke("catalogue_create", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
}
{
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::input_file] = cataloguePath;
auto const result =
env.client().invoke("catalogue_load", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
}
auto& lm = env.app().getLedgerMaster();
BEAST_EXPECT(to_string(lm.getPinnedLedgersRangeSet()) == "3-8");
auto unpin = [&](std::optional<Json::Value> min,
std::optional<Json::Value> max) {
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
if (min)
params[jss::ledger_index_min] = *min;
if (max)
params[jss::ledger_index_max] = *max;
return env.client().invoke("catalogue_unpin", params)[jss::result];
};
// Bad parameters
BEAST_EXPECT(unpin({}, {})[jss::status] == "error");
BEAST_EXPECT(unpin(5, {})[jss::status] == "error");
BEAST_EXPECT(unpin(6, 5)[jss::status] == "error");
BEAST_EXPECT(unpin(-1, 5)[jss::status] == "error");
BEAST_EXPECT(unpin("x", 5)[jss::status] == "error");
BEAST_EXPECT(to_string(lm.getPinnedLedgersRangeSet()) == "3-8");
// Cut a hole
{
auto const result = unpin(5, 6);
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::unpinned] == "5-6");
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::complete_ledgers_pinned] == "3-4,7-8");
BEAST_EXPECT(lm.isPinned(4) && lm.isPinned(7));
BEAST_EXPECT(!lm.isPinned(5) && !lm.isPinned(6));
}
// A range only partly pinned unpins just the pinned part
{
auto const result = unpin(1, 4);
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::unpinned] == "3-4");
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::complete_ledgers_pinned] == "7-8");
}
// Nothing pinned in range: success, nothing unpinned. (Unsigned
// JSON values are accepted as well as non-negative signed ones.)
{
auto const result = unpin(Json::UInt(5), Json::UInt(6));
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::unpinned] == "empty");
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::complete_ledgers_pinned] == "7-8");
}
// Unpinning the rest leaves nothing pinned. (state.db then records
// an empty set, which must not stop the next start; see
// SHAMapStore_test.)
{
auto const result = unpin(1, 100);
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::unpinned] == "7-8");
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::complete_ledgers_pinned] == "empty");
BEAST_EXPECT(lm.getPinnedLedgersRangeSet().empty());
}
// Re-loading the file pins it again
{
Json::Value params{Json::objectValue};
params[jss::input_file] = cataloguePath;
auto const result =
env.client().invoke("catalogue_load", params)[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(result[jss::status] == jss::success);
BEAST_EXPECT(to_string(lm.getPinnedLedgersRangeSet()) == "3-8");
}
boost::filesystem::remove_all(tempDir);
}
void
run() override
{
@@ -1081,6 +1716,10 @@ public:
testCatalogueFileSize(all);
testCatalogueCompression(all);
testCatalogueStatus(all);
testCatalogueChainLinkage(all);
testCatalogueUnpin(all);
testCatalogueLoadFailures(all);
testCataloguePinnedStoreRequired(all);
}
};
+198
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <test/jtx.h>
#include <xrpld/core/Config.h>
#include <xrpl/hook/Enum.h>
#include <xrpl/json/to_string.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <cctype>
#include <string>
namespace ripple {
// A valid hook exporting both hook() and cbak() (emit test hook).
static char const validHex[] =
"0061736D0100000001250660027F7F017F60037F7F7E017E60017F017E600001"
"7E60027F7F017E60047F7F7F7F017E028F010903656E76025F67000003656E76"
"06616363657074000103656E760C6574786E5F72657365727665000203656E76"
"0A6C65646765725F736571000303656E760C686F6F6B5F6163636F756E740004"
"03656E760C6574786E5F64657461696C73000403656E760D6574786E5F666565"
"5F62617365000403656E7604656D6974000503656E7608726F6C6C6261636B00"
"01030302020205030100020627067F0141908A040B7F0041820A0B7F00418008"
"0B7F0041908A040B7F004180080B7F004180080B070F02046362616B00090468"
"6F6F6B000A0AA883000299800000410141011080808080001A41004100420010"
"81808080000B88830002037F017E23808080800041206B220124808080800041"
"0141011080808080001A41011082808080001A4100108380808000A722024105"
"6A22034118742003410874418080FC07717220034108764180FE037120034118"
"767272360295888080004100200241016A22034118742003410874418080FC07"
"717220034108764180FE03712003411876727236028F8880800041C788808000"
"41141084808080001A41DB88808000418A011085808080001A41004180888080"
"0041E50110868080800022043C00A188808000410020044208883C00A0888080"
"00410020044210883C009F88808000410020044218883C009E88808000410020"
"044220883C009D88808000410020044228883C009C8880800041002004423088"
"3C009B8880800041002004423888A7413F7141C000723A009A88808000024002"
"402001412041808880800041E501108780808000427F550D0041E58980800041"
"0D42D30010888080800021040C010B41F289808000411042D400108180808000"
"21040B200141206A24808080800020040B0B900202004180080BE50112006322"
"000000002400000000201A00000000201B000000006840000000000000007321"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0081140000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"000041E5090B1D456D6974206661696C65642E00456D69742073756363656564"
"65642E00";
class HookValidate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
static Json::Value
call(test::jtx::Env& env, std::string const& code)
{
Json::Value params(Json::objectValue);
params[jss::code] = code;
return env.rpc("json", "hook_validate", to_string(params))[jss::result];
}
static std::unique_ptr<Config>
withRpc(std::unique_ptr<Config> cfg, bool enabled)
{
cfg->HOOK_VALIDATE_RPC = enabled;
return cfg;
}
void
testDisabled()
{
testcase("Disabled");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env{*this, envconfig(withRpc, false)};
auto const r = call(env, validHex);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "notSupported");
}
void
testParams()
{
testcase("Parameter validation");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env{*this, envconfig(withRpc, true)};
{
// missing code
auto const r = env.rpc("json", "hook_validate", "{}")[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
}
{
// code not a string
auto const r =
env.rpc("json", "hook_validate", "{\"code\": 1}")[jss::result];
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
}
{
// empty, odd-length and non-hex input
for (auto const& bad : {"", "0", "0061736Z"})
{
auto const r = call(env, bad);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
}
}
{
// one byte over the maximum hook size
auto const r =
call(env, std::string(2 * (hook::maxHookWasmSize() + 1), '0'));
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::error] == "invalidParams");
}
}
void
testValidate()
{
testcase("Validate");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env{*this, envconfig(withRpc, true)};
{
auto const r = call(env, validHex);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == true);
BEAST_EXPECT(r.isMember(jss::instruction_count_hook));
BEAST_EXPECT(r.isMember(jss::instruction_count_cbak));
BEAST_EXPECT(!r.isMember(jss::vm_error));
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::log].isArray());
}
{
// the lowercase hex the toolchains emit is accepted too
std::string lower = validHex;
for (auto& c : lower)
c = std::tolower(static_cast<unsigned char>(c));
auto const r = call(env, lower);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == true);
}
{
// not webassembly
auto const r = call(env, std::string(140, '0'));
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == false);
BEAST_EXPECT(!r.isMember(jss::instruction_count_hook));
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::log].isArray() && r[jss::log].size() > 0);
}
{
std::string bad = validHex;
bad[2] = 'F'; // corrupt magic header
auto const r = call(env, bad);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == false);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::log].isArray() && r[jss::log].size() > 0);
}
{
// truncated module
std::string const truncated = std::string(validHex).substr(0, 200);
auto const r = call(env, truncated);
BEAST_EXPECT(r[jss::valid] == false);
}
}
void
testConfigDefault()
{
testcase("Config default");
auto load = [](bool standalone, char const* content) {
Config cfg;
cfg.setupControl(true, true, standalone);
cfg.loadFromString(content);
return cfg.HOOK_VALIDATE_RPC;
};
BEAST_EXPECT(load(true, ""));
BEAST_EXPECT(!load(true, "[hook_validate_rpc]\n0\n"));
BEAST_EXPECT(!load(false, ""));
BEAST_EXPECT(load(false, "[hook_validate_rpc]\n1\n"));
}
void
run() override
{
testConfigDefault();
testDisabled();
testParams();
testValidate();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(HookValidate, rpc, ripple);
} // namespace ripple
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+94
View File
@@ -1934,6 +1934,56 @@ static RPCCallTestData const rpcCallTestArray[] = {
RPCCallTestData::bad_cast,
R"()"},
// catalogue_unpin
// ------------------------------------------------------------
{"catalogue_unpin: minimal.",
__LINE__,
{"catalogue_unpin", "5000001", "6000000"},
RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
R"({
"method" : "catalogue_unpin",
"params" : [
{
"api_version" : %API_VER%,
"ledger_index_max" : 6000000,
"ledger_index_min" : 5000001
}
]
})"},
{"catalogue_unpin: too few arguments.",
__LINE__,
{"catalogue_unpin", "5000001"},
RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
R"({
"method" : "catalogue_unpin",
"params" : [
{
"error" : "badSyntax",
"error_code" : 1,
"error_message" : "Syntax error."
}
]
})"},
{"catalogue_unpin: too many arguments.",
__LINE__,
{"catalogue_unpin", "1", "2", "3"},
RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
R"({
"method" : "catalogue_unpin",
"params" : [
{
"error" : "badSyntax",
"error_code" : 1,
"error_message" : "Syntax error."
}
]
})"},
{"catalogue_unpin: non-integer bound.",
__LINE__,
{"catalogue_unpin", "first", "6000000"},
RPCCallTestData::bad_cast,
R"()"},
// channel_authorize
// -----------------------------------------------------------
{"channel_authorize: minimal.",
@@ -2998,6 +3048,50 @@ static RPCCallTestData const rpcCallTestArray[] = {
RPCCallTestData::bad_cast,
R"()"},
// hook_validate
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------
{"hook_validate: minimal.",
__LINE__,
{"hook_validate", "0061736D01000000"},
RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
R"({
"method" : "hook_validate",
"params" : [
{
"api_version" : %API_VER%,
"code" : "0061736D01000000"
}
]
})"},
{"hook_validate: too few arguments.",
__LINE__,
{"hook_validate"},
RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
R"({
"method" : "hook_validate",
"params" : [
{
"error" : "badSyntax",
"error_code" : 1,
"error_message" : "Syntax error."
}
]
})"},
{"hook_validate: too many arguments.",
__LINE__,
{"hook_validate", "00", "00"},
RPCCallTestData::no_exception,
R"({
"method" : "hook_validate",
"params" : [
{
"error" : "badSyntax",
"error_code" : 1,
"error_message" : "Syntax error."
}
]
})"},
// json
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------
{"json: minimal.",
+95
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
#include <boost/utility/in_place_factory.hpp>
#include <chrono>
#include <condition_variable>
#include <mutex>
#include <optional>
#include <stdexcept>
#include <thread>
@@ -158,6 +160,7 @@ public:
onUDPMessage(
std::string const& message,
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint const& remoteEndpoint,
Port const& port,
std::function<void(std::string const&)> sendResponse)
{
}
@@ -371,6 +374,7 @@ public:
onUDPMessage(
std::string const& message,
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint const& remoteEndpoint,
Port const& port,
std::function<void(std::string const&)> sendResponse)
{
}
@@ -404,6 +408,96 @@ public:
pass();
}
// Records the datagrams delivered to onUDPMessage
struct UDPHandler : TestHandler
{
std::mutex mutex;
std::condition_variable cv;
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, bool>> received;
void
onUDPMessage(
std::string const& message,
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint const& remoteEndpoint,
Port const& port,
std::function<void(std::string const&)> sendResponse)
{
std::lock_guard lock(mutex);
received.emplace_back(message, port.has_peer());
cv.notify_all();
}
bool
wait(std::size_t count, std::chrono::milliseconds timeout)
{
std::unique_lock lock(mutex);
return cv.wait_for(
lock, timeout, [&] { return received.size() >= count; });
}
};
// A peer port with udp_highway set also accepts UDP datagrams on the
// same port number; one without it does not.
void
udpHighwayTests()
{
testcase("UDP Superhighway door");
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
using udp = boost::asio::ip::udp;
TestSink sink{*this};
TestThread thread;
sink.threshold(beast::severities::Severity::kAll);
beast::Journal journal{sink};
auto const addr = boost::asio::ip::make_address(getEnvLocalhostAddr());
auto run = [&](bool highway) {
UDPHandler handler;
auto s = make_Server(handler, thread.get_io_context(), journal);
std::vector<Port> ports(1);
ports.back().name = "peer";
ports.back().ip = addr;
ports.back().port = 0;
ports.back().protocol.insert("peer");
ports.back().udp_highway = highway;
auto const eps = s->ports(ports);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(eps.size() == 1))
return;
// The TCP door picked the port number; the UDP door shares it.
auto const port = eps.begin()->second.port();
BEAST_EXPECT(port != 0);
boost::asio::io_context io;
udp::socket client(io, udp::endpoint(addr, 0));
std::string const message = "XUSHTEST";
client.send_to(
boost::asio::buffer(message), udp::endpoint(addr, port));
if (highway)
{
if (BEAST_EXPECT(handler.wait(1, 5s)))
{
std::lock_guard lock(handler.mutex);
BEAST_EXPECT(handler.received.front().first == message);
BEAST_EXPECT(handler.received.front().second);
}
}
else
{
BEAST_EXPECT(!handler.wait(1, 200ms));
}
s = nullptr;
};
run(true);
run(false);
}
void
testBadConfig()
{
@@ -547,6 +641,7 @@ public:
{
basicTests();
stressTest();
udpHighwayTests();
testBadConfig();
}
};
+79
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <optional>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
namespace tests {
@@ -131,6 +133,7 @@ public:
testCanonicalizeMergesInnerChildren(journal);
testCanonicalizeSharesDuplicateContent(journal);
testGetLinkedNode(journal);
testUpsertAndFlushToSink(journal);
}
void
@@ -284,6 +287,82 @@ public:
BEAST_EXPECT(liveLinked > 0);
}
void
testUpsertAndFlushToSink(beast::Journal const& journal)
{
testcase("upsertGiveItem and flushDirty to a sink");
tests::TestNodeFamily f(journal);
SHAMap a{SHAMapType::FREE, f}; // built with upsertGiveItem
SHAMap b{SHAMapType::FREE, f}; // reference: addItem/updateGiveItem
// Distinct first nibbles: a root with three leaf children.
constexpr uint256 h1(
"092891fe4ef6cee585fdc6fda0e09eb4d386363158ec3321b8123e5a772c6ca7");
constexpr uint256 h2(
"436ccbac3347baa1f1e53baeef1f43334da88f1f6d70d963b833afd6dfa289fe");
constexpr uint256 h3(
"b92891fe4ef6cee585fdc6fda1e09eb4d386363158ec3321b8123e5a772c6ca8");
auto const nm = SHAMapNodeType::tnTRANSACTION_NM;
// Absent keys are added.
BEAST_EXPECT(a.upsertGiveItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h1, IntToVUC(1))));
BEAST_EXPECT(a.upsertGiveItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h2, IntToVUC(2))));
BEAST_EXPECT(a.upsertGiveItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h3, IntToVUC(3))));
// A present key has its data replaced.
BEAST_EXPECT(a.upsertGiveItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h2, IntToVUC(20))));
// A change of leaf type is refused and leaves the item untouched.
BEAST_EXPECT(!a.upsertGiveItem(
SHAMapNodeType::tnTRANSACTION_MD,
make_shamapitem(h1, IntToVUC(10))));
BEAST_EXPECT(b.addItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h1, IntToVUC(1))));
BEAST_EXPECT(b.addItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h2, IntToVUC(2))));
BEAST_EXPECT(b.addItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h3, IntToVUC(3))));
BEAST_EXPECT(b.updateGiveItem(nm, make_shamapitem(h2, IntToVUC(20))));
{
auto const v20 = IntToVUC(20);
auto const& item = a.peekItem(h2);
BEAST_EXPECT(
item && item->slice() == Slice(v20.data(), v20.size()));
auto const v1 = IntToVUC(1);
auto const& item1 = a.peekItem(h1);
BEAST_EXPECT(
item1 && item1->slice() == Slice(v1.data(), v1.size()));
}
// Flush to a sink. Do not call getHash() on `a` first: it unshares
// the map and the flush would then have nothing to write.
auto const cacheBefore = f.getTreeNodeCache()->size();
std::vector<uint256> written;
bool sinkArgsOk = true;
SHAMap::FlushSink const sink =
[&](NodeObjectType t, Blob&& data, uint256 const& hash) {
sinkArgsOk =
sinkArgsOk && t == hotTRANSACTION_NODE && !data.empty();
written.push_back(hash);
};
a.flushDirty(hotTRANSACTION_NODE, sink);
BEAST_EXPECT(sinkArgsOk);
BEAST_EXPECT(written.size() == 4); // root + three leaves
// Unlike flushDirty(t), nothing was canonicalized into the cache.
BEAST_EXPECT(f.getTreeNodeCache()->size() == cacheBefore);
// The upserted map matches the reference, and its root was written.
BEAST_EXPECT(a.getHash() == b.getHash());
BEAST_EXPECT(
std::find(
written.begin(), written.end(), a.getHash().as_uint256()) !=
written.end());
// Everything is now shared: a second flush writes nothing.
written.clear();
a.flushDirty(hotTRANSACTION_NODE, sink);
BEAST_EXPECT(written.empty());
}
void
testGetLinkedNode(beast::Journal const& journal)
{
+124 -3
View File
@@ -41,8 +41,11 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/random.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/core/LexicalCast.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/rngfill.h>
#include <xrpl/crypto/csprng.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/digest.h>
#include <algorithm>
@@ -348,6 +351,10 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
make_shamapitem(tx.first->getTransactionID(), s.slice()));
}
// featureRNG: our entropy contribution, if we add one. It is not tracked
// by the censorship detector: it is only valid for this ledger.
std::optional<uint256> entropyTxID;
// Keep enough validation history for the next flag ledger's score table
// even when we don't vote this round (not proposing / wrong LCL).
// Otherwise toKeep_ goes stale, validations older than
@@ -389,6 +396,26 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
app_.getValidations(),
initialSet);
}
// featureRNG: our entropy contribution goes into our own initial
// position, never the open ledger, so it only becomes public once our
// transaction set for this ledger is fixed.
if (prevLedger->rules().enabled(featureRNG))
{
if (auto const entropyTx = makeEntropyTx(prevLedger))
{
Serializer s;
entropyTx->add(s);
entropyTxID = entropyTx->getTransactionID();
if (!initialSet->addItem(
SHAMapNodeType::tnTRANSACTION_NM,
make_shamapitem(*entropyTxID, s.slice())))
{
entropyTxID.reset();
JLOG(j_.warn()) << "RNG: failed to add entropy txn";
}
}
}
}
// Now we need an immutable snapshot
@@ -400,9 +427,10 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
RCLCensorshipDetector<TxID, LedgerIndex>::TxIDSeqVec proposed;
initialSet->visitLeaves(
[&proposed,
seq](boost::intrusive_ptr<SHAMapItem const> const& item) {
proposed.emplace_back(item->key(), seq);
[&proposed, &entropyTxID, seq](
boost::intrusive_ptr<SHAMapItem const> const& item) {
if (item->key() != entropyTxID)
proposed.emplace_back(item->key(), seq);
});
censorshipDetector_.propose(std::move(proposed));
@@ -422,6 +450,99 @@ RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onClose(
validatorKeys_.nodeID}};
}
std::optional<STTx>
RCLConsensus::Adaptor::makeEntropyTx(
std::shared_ptr<Ledger const> const& prevLedger)
{
if (!validatorKeys_.keys)
return std::nullopt;
auto const& masterKey = validatorKeys_.keys->masterPublicKey;
// The commitment the ledger currently holds for us, if any.
std::optional<uint256> commitment;
if (auto const sle = prevLedger->read(keylet::random()))
{
for (auto const& entry : sle->getFieldArray(sfRandomDigests))
{
if (makeSlice(entry.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey)) == masterKey.slice())
{
commitment = entry.getFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest);
break;
}
}
}
// We only ever hold the secret from our last contribution, which has
// never been published. Reveal it iff the ledger holds its commitment.
// Otherwise (first contribution, restart, or our last contribution was
// not included) we only commit this time, and our previous secret,
// whatever became of it, is never used again.
std::optional<uint256> reveal;
if (commitment && rngSecret_ && rngSecret_->first == *commitment)
reveal = rngSecret_->second;
uint256 secret;
beast::rngfill(secret.begin(), secret.size(), crypto_prng());
uint256 const nextCommitment = sha512Half(secret);
rngSecret_.emplace(nextCommitment, secret);
auto const seq = prevLedger->info().seq + 1;
JLOG(j_.debug()) << "RNG: entropy txn for ledger " << seq
<< (reveal ? " (reveal and commit)" : " (commit only)");
return STTx(ttENTROPY, [&](auto& obj) {
obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, seq);
obj.setFieldVL(sfPublicKey, masterKey.slice());
obj.setFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest, nextCommitment);
if (reveal)
obj.setFieldH256(sfRandomData, *reveal);
});
}
std::optional<NodeID>
RCLConsensus::Adaptor::forcedTxOwner(
RCLCxTx const& tx,
RCLCxLedger const& prevLedger) const
{
if (!prevLedger.ledger_ || !prevLedger.ledger_->rules().enabled(featureRNG))
return std::nullopt;
try
{
SerialIter sit(tx.tx_->slice());
STTx const stx(sit);
if (stx.getTxnType() != ttENTROPY ||
stx.getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence) != prevLedger.seq() + 1)
return std::nullopt;
auto const pk = stx.getFieldVL(sfPublicKey);
if (!publicKeyType(makeSlice(pk)))
return std::nullopt;
// Only the exact bytes makeEntropyTx would build, so an owner cannot
// force extra fields (memos and the like) in with its contribution.
STTx const canonical(ttENTROPY, [&](auto& obj) {
obj.setFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence, prevLedger.seq() + 1);
obj.setFieldVL(sfPublicKey, pk);
obj.setFieldH256(
sfNextRandomDigest, stx.getFieldH256(sfNextRandomDigest));
if (stx.isFieldPresent(sfRandomData))
obj.setFieldH256(sfRandomData, stx.getFieldH256(sfRandomData));
});
if (canonical.getTransactionID() != tx.id())
return std::nullopt;
return calcNodeID(PublicKey(makeSlice(pk)));
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
return std::nullopt;
}
}
void
RCLConsensus::Adaptor::onForceAccept(
Result const& result,
+23
View File
@@ -34,10 +34,12 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/RippleLedgerHash.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STValidation.h>
#include <atomic>
#include <memory>
#include <mutex>
#include <optional>
#include <set>
#include <sstream>
#include <string>
@@ -91,6 +93,11 @@ class RCLConsensus
RCLCensorshipDetector<TxID, LedgerIndex> censorshipDetector_;
NegativeUNLVote nUnlVote_;
// featureRNG: the secret behind the commitment in our most recent
// entropy contribution, as {commitment, secret}. Only touched by
// onClose, which runs under the consensus lock.
std::optional<std::pair<uint256, uint256>> rngSecret_;
public:
using Ledger_t = RCLCxLedger;
using NodeID_t = NodeID;
@@ -182,7 +189,23 @@ class RCLConsensus
return parms_;
}
/** featureRNG: if tx is a validator's entropy contribution for the
ledger after prevLedger, the NodeID of that validator.
Consensus votes for such a transaction while it is in its owner's
own position during the opening window of the establish phase.
*/
std::optional<NodeID>
forcedTxOwner(RCLCxTx const& tx, RCLCxLedger const& prevLedger) const;
private:
/** featureRNG: build our entropy contribution for the ledger after
prevLedger, revealing our previous secret if the ledger holds its
commitment, and committing to a fresh one.
*/
std::optional<STTx>
makeEntropyTx(std::shared_ptr<Ledger const> const& prevLedger);
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
// The following members implement the generic Consensus requirements
// and are marked private to indicate ONLY Consensus<Adaptor> will call
+59 -4
View File
@@ -23,17 +23,22 @@
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerMaster.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
#include <xrpld/app/main/Application.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/HashRouter.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/ValidatorList.h>
#include <xrpld/app/rdb/Wallet.h>
#include <xrpld/consensus/LedgerTiming.h>
#include <xrpld/core/JobQueue.h>
#include <xrpld/core/TimeKeeper.h>
#include <xrpld/overlay/Overlay.h>
#include <xrpld/overlay/predicates.h>
#include <xrpld/perflog/PerfLog.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/StringUtilities.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/messages.h>
#include <memory>
#include <mutex>
#include <thread>
@@ -167,6 +172,40 @@ RCLValidationsAdaptor::acquire(LedgerHash const& hash)
return RCLValidatedLedger(std::move(ledger), j_);
}
namespace {
/** Announce a manifest the cache accepted other than from peer gossip.
Not to the peers it was held back from: OverlayImpl::onManifests records
each of them against the manifest's hash.
*/
void
relayManifest(Application& app, Manifest const& manifest)
{
app.getOPs().pubManifest(manifest);
// As OverlayImpl::onManifests does for gossip it accepts directly.
if (app.validators().listed(manifest.masterKey))
{
auto db = app.getWalletDB().checkoutDb();
addValidatorManifest(*db, manifest.serialized);
}
auto const toSkip = app.getHashRouter().shouldRelay(manifest.hash());
if (!toSkip)
return;
protocol::TMManifests tm;
tm.add_list()->set_stobject(
manifest.serialized.data(), manifest.serialized.size());
app.overlay().foreach(send_if_not(
std::make_shared<Message>(tm, protocol::mtMANIFESTS),
peer_in_set(*toSkip)));
}
} // namespace
void
handleNewValidation(
Application& app,
@@ -191,13 +230,29 @@ handleNewValidation(
// Resolving now also means this validation is classified in the round it
// arrived in rather than written off along with every other one until the
// trusted set is next recomputed.
if (app.validatorManifests().getMasterKey(signingKey) == signingKey)
auto& manifests = app.validatorManifests();
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> view;
if (manifests.getMasterKey(signingKey) == signingKey)
{
if (auto const view = app.openLedger().current();
view && view->rules().enabled(featureOnChainManifests))
app.validatorManifests().applyLedgerSigningKey(*view, signingKey);
view = app.openLedger().current();
if (view && !view->rules().enabled(featureOnChainManifests))
view.reset();
}
// Every caller has verified this validation's signature and found it
// current, so its ephemeral key is live. That is what admits a manifest
// gossiped for the key, and what keeps the manifest it belongs to from
// being evicted. A manifest that arrived before the key was ever seen is
// released here, and relayed: the peers that held it back are waiting on
// the same validation.
if (auto const released = manifests.noteValidation(signingKey, view.get()))
relayManifest(app, *released);
// The ledger tier's miss path.
if (view && manifests.getMasterKey(signingKey) == signingKey)
manifests.applyLedgerSigningKey(*view, signingKey);
// Ensure validation is marked as trusted if signer currently trusted
auto masterKey = app.validators().getTrustedKey(signingKey);
+14
View File
@@ -491,6 +491,16 @@ public:
Expected<uint256, HookReturnCode>
ledger_nonce() const;
/// RNG APIs (featureRNG)
// A uniform integer in [0, sides).
Expected<uint64_t, HookReturnCode>
dice(uint32_t sides) const;
// len (1 to 512) random bytes.
Expected<Bytes, HookReturnCode>
util_random(uint32_t len) const;
Expected<Keylet, HookReturnCode>
ledger_keylet(Keylet const& klLo, Keylet const& klHi) const;
@@ -630,6 +640,10 @@ private:
Rules const& rules,
int recursion_depth = 0) // used internally
const;
// featureRNG: advance the ledger's RNG state and return one output block.
Expected<uint256, HookReturnCode>
rng_next() const;
};
} // namespace hook
+7 -2
View File
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ bool
canHook(
STTx const& tx,
ripple::uint256 hookOn,
std::optional<ripple::Slice> hookName);
std::optional<ripple::Blob> hookName);
bool
canEmit(ripple::TxType txType, ripple::uint256 hookCanEmit);
@@ -129,7 +129,11 @@ apply(
uint32_t wasmParam,
uint8_t hookChainPosition,
// result of apply() if this is weak exec
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta);
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta,
// fix20261005: the original emitted transaction for a ttEMIT_FAILURE
// callback, captured before the cleanup pseudo removed its
// ltEMITTED_TXN entry. Ignored before the fix.
std::optional<ripple::STObject> const& emitFailureTxn = std::nullopt);
struct HookContext;
@@ -207,6 +211,7 @@ struct HookContext
uint16_t emit_nonce_counter{
0}; // incremented whenever nonce is called to ensure unique nonces
uint16_t ledger_nonce_counter{0};
uint16_t rng_draws{0}; // featureRNG: dice/random calls this execution
int64_t expected_etxn_count{-1}; // make this a 64bit int so the uint32
// from the hookapi cant overflow it
std::map<ripple::uint256, bool> nonce_used{};
+191 -7
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/TransactionMaster.h>
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Import.h>
#include <xrpld/ledger/ApplyViewImpl.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STParsedJSON.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <limits>
namespace hook {
@@ -1581,6 +1584,18 @@ HookAPI::otxn_field(uint32_t field_id) const
if (fieldType == sfInvalid)
return Unexpected(INVALID_FIELD);
// fix20261005: on an emit failure callback the field is read from the
// original emitted transaction, so check presence there rather than on
// the ttEMIT_FAILURE pseudo (which carries sfLedgerSequence and
// sfTransactionHash the emitted txn lacks, and lacks most of its fields).
if (hookCtx.emitFailure &&
hookCtx.applyCtx.view().rules().enabled(fix20261005))
{
if (!hookCtx.emitFailure->isFieldPresent(fieldType))
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
return &hookCtx.emitFailure->getField(fieldType);
}
if (!hookCtx.applyCtx.tx.isFieldPresent(fieldType))
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
@@ -1895,6 +1910,147 @@ HookAPI::ledger_nonce() const
return hash;
}
// featureRNG
//
// The ledger's RNG state lives in the Random object. The ttENTROPY
// transactions applied at the start of the ledger seed it from validator
// reveals; after that every draw from any Hook replaces it with
// H(step, state). So the state iterates between API calls, between Hook
// executions and between transactions, including transactions that end in a
// tec: ApplyContext::discard keeps the advance, so a rollback cannot preserve
// an RNG state for whatever executes next.
//
// No Hook can read the state, so none can work out what a later draw will
// return, even one that ran earlier in the same transaction: slot_set and
// ledger_keylet refuse the Random object, slot_set refuses ttENTROPY
// transactions, the object is left out of provisional metadata (meta_slot),
// and its state and commitment fields are never written to any metadata.
//
// Each draw returns H(output, state, txid, hook account, hook hash, chain
// position, strong, callback, wasm param). Those extra inputs keep outputs
// distinct for different executions even if they somehow saw the same state.
//
// The state the transaction's first draw saw is written to the transaction's
// final metadata (sfRandomData), never its provisional metadata.
Expected<uint256, HookReturnCode>
HookAPI::rng_next() const
{
static constexpr std::uint32_t rngOutputTag = 0x524E474F; // 'RNGO'
static constexpr std::uint32_t rngStepTag = 0x524E4749; // 'RNGI'
auto& applyCtx = hookCtx.applyCtx;
auto& view = applyCtx.view();
if (!view.rules().enabled(featureRNG))
return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
if (hookCtx.rng_draws >= hook_api::max_rng_draws)
return Unexpected(TOO_MANY_NONCES);
auto sle = view.peek(keylet::random());
if (!sle)
return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
// A closed ledger may only draw on its own seed. Open ledger application
// is a preview, so it may run on the last closed ledger's state; the
// final result is decided when the ledger closes.
auto const seq = view.seq();
auto const seededFor = sle->getFieldU32(sfLedgerSequence);
if (seededFor != seq && !(view.open() && seededFor + 1 == seq))
return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
// At least 80% of the UNLReport must have contributed (at least one
// validator if there is no UNLReport). Both fields are 16 bits on the
// ledger; they are widened here so the scaled comparison cannot overflow.
std::uint32_t const count = sle->getFieldU16(sfEntropyCount);
std::uint32_t const denominator = sle->getFieldU16(sfEntropyDenominator);
if (count == 0 || count * 5 < denominator * 4)
return Unexpected(TOO_LITTLE_ENTROPY);
uint256 const state = sle->getFieldH256(sfRandomData);
if (auto* avi = dynamic_cast<ApplyViewImpl*>(&view))
avi->setRandomData(state);
auto const& hr = hookCtx.result;
uint256 const out = ripple::sha512Half(
rngOutputTag,
state,
applyCtx.tx.getTransactionID(),
hr.account,
hr.hookHash,
static_cast<std::uint8_t>(hr.hookChainPosition),
static_cast<std::uint8_t>(hr.isStrong ? 1 : 0),
static_cast<std::uint8_t>(hr.isCallback ? 1 : 0),
hr.wasmParam);
sle->setFieldH256(sfRandomData, ripple::sha512Half(rngStepTag, state));
view.update(sle);
++hookCtx.rng_draws;
return out;
}
Expected<uint64_t, HookReturnCode>
HookAPI::dice(uint32_t sides) const
{
if (sides == 0)
return Unexpected(INVALID_ARGUMENT);
auto block = rng_next();
if (!block)
return Unexpected(block.error());
// Rejection sampling over big-endian 64-bit words, so every side is
// exactly equally likely. A word is rejected with probability below
// 2^-32, so the bound on blocks is never reached in practice; it only
// keeps the loop finite.
std::uint64_t const max = std::numeric_limits<std::uint64_t>::max();
std::uint64_t const excess = (max % sides + 1) % sides; // 2^64 mod sides
std::uint64_t word = 0;
uint256 b = *block;
for (int i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
{
for (std::size_t w = 0; w < 4; ++w)
{
word = 0;
for (std::size_t k = 0; k < 8; ++k)
word = (word << 8) | b.data()[w * 8 + k];
if (word <= max - excess)
return word % sides;
}
b = ripple::sha512Half(b);
}
return word % sides;
}
Expected<Bytes, HookReturnCode>
HookAPI::util_random(uint32_t len) const
{
if (len == 0)
return Unexpected(TOO_SMALL);
if (len > 512)
return Unexpected(TOO_BIG);
auto block = rng_next();
if (!block)
return Unexpected(block.error());
Bytes out;
out.reserve(len);
uint256 b = *block;
while (true)
{
auto const n = std::min<std::size_t>(32, len - out.size());
out.insert(out.end(), b.data(), b.data() + n);
if (out.size() >= len)
break;
b = ripple::sha512Half(b);
}
return out;
}
Expected<Keylet, HookReturnCode>
HookAPI::ledger_keylet(Keylet const& klLo, Keylet const& klHi) const
{
@@ -1905,6 +2061,10 @@ HookAPI::ledger_keylet(Keylet const& klLo, Keylet const& klHi) const
std::optional<ripple::uint256> found =
hookCtx.applyCtx.view().succ(klLo.key, klHi.key.next());
// featureRNG: the RNG object is invisible to Hooks, even by key.
if (found && *found == keylet::random().key)
found = hookCtx.applyCtx.view().succ(*found, klHi.key.next());
if (!found)
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
@@ -2149,6 +2309,12 @@ HookAPI::slot_set(Bytes const& data, uint32_t slot_no) const
if (kl->key == beast::zero)
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
// featureRNG: the RNG state must never be readable by a Hook, or an
// earlier Hook could compute what later draws will return. Matched on
// the key because a Hook-supplied keylet type can be ltANY.
if (kl->key == keylet::random().key)
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
auto const sle = hookCtx.applyCtx.view().read(*kl);
if (!sle)
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
@@ -2172,6 +2338,11 @@ HookAPI::slot_set(Bytes const& data, uint32_t slot_no) const
slot_value = p->first->getSTransaction();
else
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
// featureRNG: validator reveals are never readable by Hooks.
if (*slot_value &&
(*slot_value)->getFieldU16(sfTransactionType) == ttENTROPY)
return Unexpected(DOESNT_EXIST);
}
else
return Unexpected(INVALID_ARGUMENT);
@@ -2828,11 +2999,19 @@ HookAPI::set_state_cache(
if (availableForReserves < hookStateScale && modified)
return Unexpected(RESERVE_INSUFFICIENT);
// Prior to fix20261005 the first-account branch charged write
// resources (a state modification, a reserve slot and, if needed, a
// namespace slot) even when the entry was only being read into the
// cache (modified == false). Every other branch only charges for
// writes. With the fix, reads into the cache are free; a later write
// of the same key is charged by the existing-key branch below.
bool const chargeWrite = modified || !view.rules().enabled(fix20261005);
int64_t namespaceCount = accSLE->isFieldPresent(sfHookNamespaces)
? accSLE->getFieldV256(sfHookNamespaces).size()
: 0;
if (createNamespace)
if (createNamespace && chargeWrite)
{
// overflow should never ever happen but check anyway
if (namespaceCount + 1 < namespaceCount)
@@ -2842,15 +3021,20 @@ HookAPI::set_state_cache(
return Unexpected(TOO_MANY_NAMESPACES);
}
stateMap.modified_entry_count++;
if (chargeWrite)
{
stateMap.modified_entry_count++;
// sanity check
if (view.rules().enabled(featureExtendedHookState) &&
availableForReserves < hookStateScale)
return Unexpected(INTERNAL_ERROR);
// sanity check
if (view.rules().enabled(featureExtendedHookState) &&
availableForReserves < hookStateScale)
return Unexpected(INTERNAL_ERROR);
availableForReserves -= hookStateScale;
}
stateMap[acc] = {
availableForReserves - hookStateScale,
availableForReserves,
namespaceCount,
hookStateScale,
{{ns, {{key, {modified, data}}}}}};
+90 -10
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/Slice.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/CreditNote.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/ErrorCodes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
@@ -472,6 +473,25 @@ getTransactionalStakeHolders(STTx const& tx, ReadView const& rv)
case ttCRON_SET: {
break;
}
case ttNOTE_CLAIM: {
// The note's issuer is who pays, so they are a strong stake
// holder: their hook can roll a redemption back. The note has
// already passed preflight by the time hooks run, so a parse
// failure here only means no issuer hook executes.
if (!tx.isFieldPresent(sfNote))
break;
try
{
auto const raw = tx.getFieldVL(sfNote);
auto const note = parseCreditNote(std::string_view(
reinterpret_cast<char const*>(raw.data()), raw.size()));
ADD_TSH(note.account, tshSTRONG);
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
}
break;
}
case ttMANIFEST_SET: {
// The ephemeral key's logical account, meaning the r-address its
// public key hashes to, is a weak stake holder: the manifest names
@@ -558,7 +578,8 @@ getTransactionalStakeHolders(STTx const& tx, ReadView const& rv)
case ttFEE:
case ttUNL_MODIFY:
case ttEMIT_FAILURE:
case ttUNL_REPORT: {
case ttUNL_REPORT:
case ttENTROPY: {
break;
}
default: {
@@ -813,7 +834,7 @@ bool
hook::canHook(
STTx const& tx,
ripple::uint256 hookOn,
std::optional<ripple::Slice> hookName)
std::optional<ripple::Blob> hookName)
{
if (!canHookTT(tx.getTxnType(), hookOn))
return false;
@@ -827,7 +848,7 @@ hook::canHook(
// transaction, so we can't hook without the hook name
return false;
return tx[sfHookName] == *hookName;
return tx.getFieldVL(sfHookName) == *hookName;
}
ripple::uint256
@@ -1041,8 +1062,29 @@ hook::apply(
bool isStrong,
uint32_t wasmParam,
uint8_t hookChainPosition,
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta)
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& provisionalMeta,
std::optional<ripple::STObject> const& emitFailureTxn)
{
std::optional<ripple::STObject> emitFailure;
if (isCallback && (wasmParam & 1))
{
if (applyCtx.view().rules().enabled(fix20261005))
{
// fix20261005: by the time the callback runs the ttEMIT_FAILURE
// pseudo has already erased the ltEMITTED_TXN entry from this
// view, so it can't be read back here. The caller captures the
// original emitted transaction before base application.
emitFailure = emitFailureTxn;
}
else
{
// pre-fix: reads the entry the pseudo has already erased
emitFailure = (*(applyCtx.view().peek(keylet::emittedTxn(
applyCtx.tx.getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash)))))
.downcast<STObject>();
}
}
HookContext hookCtx = {
.applyCtx = applyCtx,
// we will return this context object (RVO / move constructed)
@@ -1074,12 +1116,7 @@ hook::apply(
.foreignStateSetDisabled = false,
.provisionalMeta = provisionalMeta,
.foreignStateGrantCache = {}},
.emitFailure = isCallback && wasmParam & 1
? std::optional<ripple::STObject>(
(*(applyCtx.view().peek(keylet::emittedTxn(
applyCtx.tx.getFieldH256(sfTransactionHash)))))
.downcast<STObject>())
: std::optional<ripple::STObject>(),
.emitFailure = std::move(emitFailure),
.module = nullptr,
.api_ = nullptr};
@@ -2866,6 +2903,49 @@ DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(
HOOK_TEARDOWN();
}
// featureRNG: a uniform integer in [0, sides)
DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(int64_t, dice, uint32_t sides)
{
HOOK_SETUP();
auto const result = api.dice(sides);
if (!result)
return result.error();
return result.value();
HOOK_TEARDOWN();
}
// featureRNG: write_len (1 to 512) random bytes
DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(
int64_t,
util_random,
uint32_t write_ptr,
uint32_t write_len)
{
HOOK_SETUP();
if (NOT_IN_BOUNDS(write_ptr, write_len, memory_length))
return OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
auto const result = api.util_random(write_len);
if (!result)
return result.error();
auto const& bytes = result.value();
WRITE_WASM_MEMORY_AND_RETURN(
write_ptr,
write_len,
bytes.data(),
bytes.size(),
memory,
memory_length);
HOOK_TEARDOWN();
}
DEFINE_HOOK_FUNCTION(
int64_t,
ledger_keylet,
+3 -2
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ namespace ripple {
AcceptedLedger::AcceptedLedger(
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& ledger,
Application& app)
Application& app,
bool withJson)
: mLedger(ledger)
{
transactions_.reserve(256);
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ AcceptedLedger::AcceptedLedger(
auto insertAll = [&](auto const& txns) {
for (auto const& item : txns)
transactions_.emplace_back(std::make_unique<AcceptedLedgerTx>(
ledger, item.first, item.second));
ledger, item.first, item.second, withJson));
};
transactions_.reserve(256);
+7 -1
View File
@@ -44,9 +44,15 @@ namespace ripple {
class AcceptedLedger : public CountedObject<AcceptedLedger>
{
public:
/** @param withJson build each transaction's publishable JSON. Pass
false only for ledgers that will never be published from this
object (e.g. pinned catalogue history being saved to SQL);
getJson() on such transactions returns a null value.
*/
AcceptedLedger(
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& ledger,
Application& app);
Application& app,
bool withJson = true);
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const&
getLedger() const
+7 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ namespace ripple {
AcceptedLedgerTx::AcceptedLedgerTx(
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& ledger,
std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const& txn,
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& met)
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const& met,
bool withJson)
: mTxn(txn)
, mMeta(txn->getTransactionID(), ledger->seq(), *met)
, mAffected(mMeta.getAffectedAccounts())
@@ -41,6 +42,11 @@ AcceptedLedgerTx::AcceptedLedgerTx(
met->add(s);
mRawMeta = std::move(s.modData());
// The JSON (full tx + meta + hex raw meta per transaction) is only
// needed for publishing. Bulk SQL saves of pinned history skip it.
if (!withJson)
return;
mJson = Json::objectValue;
mJson[jss::transaction] = mTxn->getJson(JsonOptions::none);
+3 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ public:
AcceptedLedgerTx(
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& ledger,
std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const&,
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const&);
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const&,
bool withJson = true);
std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const&
getTxn() const
@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ public:
std::string
getEscMeta() const;
/** Null if constructed with withJson == false. */
Json::Value const&
getJson() const
{
+34
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,11 @@
#include <xrpld/app/main/Application.h>
#include <xrpld/overlay/PeerSet.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/CountedObject.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <atomic>
#include <mutex>
#include <optional>
#include <set>
#include <utility>
@@ -175,6 +179,36 @@ private:
clock_type::time_point mLastAction;
std::shared_ptr<Ledger> mLedger;
/** Whether this ledger is to be read for manifests as soon as it can be:
early, before the rest of the state map, if [early_manifest_sync]
allows, and otherwise once it is complete. */
bool
wantManifests();
/** Read the manifests from the ledger, now that they can be.
Dispatches the read at most once per ledger, however many paths reach
here.
@param listed Master keys to read by key, whether or not the part of
the directory read lists them. If unseated, the master keys on the
validator lists are collected in the job, so that a caller holding
mtx_ need not take the validator list's lock.
@param maxPages Most manifest directory pages to read
*/
void
syncManifests(
std::optional<hash_set<PublicKey>> listed,
std::uint64_t maxPages);
/** The manifests have been read, or are being, from this ledger.
Atomic because done() can be reached from trigger() after it has
released mtx_.
*/
std::atomic<bool> mManifestsSynced{false};
bool mHaveHeader;
bool mHaveState;
bool mHaveTransactions;
+13
View File
@@ -228,6 +228,19 @@ public:
isPinned(std::uint32_t seq);
void
unpinLedger(std::uint32_t seq);
/** Remove `ranges` from the pinned set.
@param dropFromComplete of the ledgers actually unpinned, those to
also remove from complete_ledgers now (used to roll back a
load). Otherwise unpinned ledgers stay complete until online
delete releases them.
@return the ledgers that were pinned and no longer are.
*/
RangeSet<std::uint32_t>
unpinLedgers(
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> const& ranges,
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> const& dropFromComplete = {});
bool
isValidated(ReadView const& ledger);
bool
+126
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#ifndef RIPPLE_APP_LEDGER_MANIFESTSYNC_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_APP_LEDGER_MANIFESTSYNC_H_INCLUDED
#include <xrpld/shamap/SHAMap.h>
#include <xrpld/shamap/SHAMapNodeID.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
namespace ripple {
/** Manifest directory pages read while a ledger is still being acquired.
Enough entries to fill the manifest cache's ledger tier, which is all a
bulk read of the directory can admit. The master keys a node actually
depends on are fetched by key instead, wherever they are listed, so a
directory grown long by anyone able to fund an account cannot make the
early phase of a sync arbitrarily long.
*/
std::uint64_t constexpr manifestSyncPages = 16;
/** The nodes a partly synced state map still needs to read its manifests.
Walks the manifest directory as far as the nodes held allow: the root page;
every other page, all at once, since the root names the last of them and
pages are only ever added after it; each master object listed; and the
ephemeral object each unrevoked one names, which is what a validation is
resolved through. Where a key cannot be read, the first node on its path
that is not held is reported, once however many keys it blocks.
Asking peers for the nodes reported and calling again converges in a
handful of rounds -- roughly the depth of the map plus one round each for
the pages and for the objects they list -- on a set of nodes far smaller
than the map. After that every read forEachLedgerManifest() and
ManifestCache::applyLedgerDirectory() make succeeds on the partial map.
A map with no manifest directory converges on the path to where its root
would be, and nothing else.
@param stateMap State map, with at least its root node
@param max Most nodes to report
@param keys Further keys to read, with the ephemeral object any manifest
among them names: in practice keylet::manifest() of each master key on
the node's validator lists, which needs no directory to find
@param maxPages Most directory pages to read, the root page included
@return nodes needed, as getMissingNodes() reports them; empty once every
manifest can be read
*/
std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>>
missingManifestNodes(
SHAMap const& stateMap,
std::size_t max,
std::vector<uint256> const& keys = {},
std::uint64_t maxPages = dirNodeMaxPages);
/** Ledgers to read manifests from, chosen by how many peers report them.
A node that has never validated a ledger, and holds no manifest for enough
of the validators it trusts, cannot tell which validations to believe. The
closed ledgers its peers report are then its only evidence of where the
network is, and any recent ledger of the network holds the manifests
published on it.
Choosing wrongly costs little. Every manifest read from a ledger is
verified as from any other source and the cache only moves forward, so a
ledger a peer made up can at worst leave something out. Reading several
candidates, rather than trusting the single most reported, is what keeps
one misreporting peer among a few from deciding what is read.
@param reported The closed ledger each peer last reported, one entry per
peer. Zero entries are ignored.
@param skip Ledgers already read, or being read
@param max Most ledgers to return
@return distinct ledgers, the most widely reported first. Ties go to the
larger hash, as when NetworkOPs picks a ledger by peer count, so the
first is usually a ledger being acquired anyway.
*/
std::vector<uint256>
pickManifestCandidates(
std::vector<uint256> const& reported,
hash_set<uint256> const& skip,
std::size_t max);
/** How many validators need a manifest before a node can trust a ledger.
@param validators The validators that count: the trusted set once
ValidatorList has worked it out, and every listed one before that
@param trusted Whether `validators` is the trusted set, and so whether
`quorum` has been worked out from it
@param quorum ValidatorList::quorum(). Before the trusted set exists this
is a placeholder, so the usual 80% of `validators` is assumed instead.
@return the number needed; never more than `validators`
*/
std::size_t
manifestQuorum(std::size_t validators, bool trusted, std::size_t quorum);
} // namespace ripple
#endif
@@ -106,6 +106,41 @@ applyTransactions(
bool certainRetry = true;
std::size_t count = 0;
// featureRNG: validator entropy contributions are applied before anything
// else, so this ledger's seed is final before any Hook can draw from it.
// Pseudo-transactions otherwise sort to an arbitrary position. Each is
// attempted exactly once; one that fails is never retried later, where it
// could change the seed after Hooks had drawn from it.
if (view.rules().enabled(featureRNG))
{
for (auto it = txns.begin(); it != txns.end();)
{
if (it->second->getTxnType() != ttENTROPY)
{
++it;
continue;
}
auto const txid = it->first.getTXID();
try
{
if (applyTransaction(
app, view, *it->second, false, tapNONE, j) ==
ApplyTransactionResult::Success)
++count;
else
failed.insert(txid);
}
catch (std::exception const& ex)
{
JLOG(j.warn())
<< "Transaction " << txid << " throws: " << ex.what();
failed.insert(txid);
}
it = txns.erase(it);
}
}
// Attempt to apply all of the retriable transactions
for (int pass = 0; pass < LEDGER_TOTAL_PASSES; ++pass)
{
@@ -21,14 +21,18 @@
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/InboundLedger.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/InboundLedgers.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerMaster.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/ManifestSync.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/TransactionStateSF.h>
#include <xrpld/app/main/Application.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/ValidatorList.h>
#include <xrpld/core/JobQueue.h>
#include <xrpld/overlay/Overlay.h>
#include <xrpld/shamap/SHAMapNodeID.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <xrpl/resource/Fees.h>
@@ -39,6 +43,16 @@
namespace ripple {
/** Master keys on any of this node's validator lists, trusted or not. */
static hash_set<PublicKey>
listedMasterKeys(Application& app)
{
hash_set<PublicKey> keys;
app.validators().for_each_listed(
[&keys](PublicKey const& pk, bool) { keys.insert(pk); });
return keys;
}
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
enum {
@@ -457,6 +471,19 @@ InboundLedger::done()
mLedger->read(keylet::fees()),
"ripple::InboundLedger::done : valid ledger fees");
mLedger->setImmutable();
// The state map arrived whole before the early walk in trigger()
// finished, as it does when most of it is held locally already, or
// when [early_manifest_sync] turns the early walk off. Read the
// manifests from the whole map instead, now that it is immutable.
// Only as many directory pages as the early walk reads: past those
// the ledger tier is full, and the listed master keys are read by
// key whatever the directory holds. The keys are collected in the
// job: this runs under mtx_, and the validator list has a lock of
// its own.
if (!mManifestsSynced && wantManifests())
syncManifests(std::nullopt, manifestSyncPages);
switch (mReason)
{
case Reason::HISTORY:
@@ -636,6 +663,63 @@ InboundLedger::trigger(std::shared_ptr<Peer> const& peer, TriggerReason reason)
}
else
{
// Partial sync. A node that has not yet validated a ledger cannot
// tell which validations to trust until it knows each trusted
// validator's current ephemeral key, and on-ledger is where a
// rotation or a revocation is published. So the manifests come
// first: just the nodes on the paths to the manifest directory and
// the objects it lists, which can be read and ingested long before
// the rest of the state map arrives.
//
// The master keys on this node's validator lists are fetched by
// key as well as through the directory. They are what a node with
// no manifests at all needs, and reading them by key does not
// depend on how long the directory has grown.
if (!mManifestsSynced && app_.config().EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC &&
wantManifests())
{
sl.unlock();
auto listed = listedMasterKeys(app_);
std::vector<uint256> targets;
targets.reserve(listed.size());
for (auto const& pk : listed)
targets.push_back(keylet::manifest(pk).key);
auto nodes = missingManifestNodes(
mLedger->stateMap(),
missingNodesFind,
targets,
manifestSyncPages);
sl.lock();
if (!failed_ && !complete_ && !mHaveState && !mManifestsSynced)
{
if (nodes.empty())
{
syncManifests(std::move(listed), manifestSyncPages);
}
else
{
filterNodes(nodes, reason);
// All recently asked for: fall through to the rest of
// the map rather than wait on them.
if (!nodes.empty())
{
tmGL.set_itype(protocol::liAS_NODE);
for (auto const& id : nodes)
*(tmGL.add_nodeids()) = id.first.getRawString();
JLOG(journal_.trace())
<< "Sending manifest node request ("
<< nodes.size() << ") to "
<< (peer ? "selected peer" : "all peers");
mPeerSet->sendRequest(tmGL, peer);
return;
}
}
}
}
AccountStateSF filter(
mLedger->stateMap().family().db(), app_.getLedgerMaster());
@@ -764,6 +848,73 @@ InboundLedger::trigger(std::shared_ptr<Peer> const& peer, TriggerReason reason)
}
}
bool
InboundLedger::wantManifests()
{
// Not for history, and not once a ledger has been validated: from then on
// the manifests are kept current from each new ledger as it closes.
return mReason != Reason::HISTORY &&
!app_.getLedgerMaster().haveValidated();
}
void
InboundLedger::syncManifests(
std::optional<hash_set<PublicKey>> listed,
std::uint64_t maxPages)
{
if (mManifestsSynced.exchange(true))
return;
// Reading verifies a signature per manifest, so it runs as its own job.
// The ledger is held by shared_ptr, and reading a map while nodes are
// still being added to it is what getMissingNodes() already does.
app_.getJobQueue().addJob(
jtMANIFEST,
"InboundLedger::syncManifests",
[ledger = mLedger,
listed = std::move(listed),
maxPages,
&app = app_,
j = journal_]() mutable {
auto const keys =
listed ? std::move(*listed) : listedMasterKeys(app);
auto& cache = app.validatorManifests();
std::size_t accepted = 0;
std::size_t unreadable = 0;
// By key first, one at a time: on a partial map a key whose path
// is not held throws, and must not cost the keys after it. One
// can be missing if the lists changed after the nodes were found.
for (auto const& pk : keys)
{
try
{
accepted += cache.applyLedger(*ledger, {pk});
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
++unreadable;
}
}
try
{
accepted += cache.applyLedgerDirectory(*ledger, maxPages);
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
{
JLOG(j.warn())
<< "Could not read the manifest directory of ledger "
<< ledger->info().seq << " during sync: " << e.what();
}
JLOG(j.info()) << "Read manifests from ledger "
<< ledger->info().seq << " during sync: " << accepted
<< " accepted, " << keys.size() << " listed, "
<< unreadable << " not yet readable";
});
}
void
InboundLedger::filterNodes(
std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>>& nodes,
+16 -1
View File
@@ -501,7 +501,9 @@ LedgerMaster::storeLedger(std::shared_ptr<Ledger const> ledger, bool pin)
std::lock_guard sl(mPinnedLock);
mPinnedLedgers.insert(range(seq, seq));
}
JLOG(m_journal.info()) << "Pinned ledger : " << seq;
// catalogue_load pins every ledger it imports; at info this would
// emit one line per ledger for the whole file.
JLOG(m_journal.debug()) << "Pinned ledger : " << seq;
}
return true;
}
@@ -586,6 +588,19 @@ LedgerMaster::unpinLedger(std::uint32_t seq)
mPinnedLedgers.erase(range(seq, seq));
}
RangeSet<std::uint32_t>
LedgerMaster::unpinLedgers(
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> const& ranges,
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> const& dropFromComplete)
{
std::scoped_lock lock(mCompleteLock, mPinnedLock);
RangeSet<std::uint32_t> removed = mPinnedLedgers & ranges;
mPinnedLedgers -= removed;
if (!dropFromComplete.empty())
mCompleteLedgers -= (removed & dropFromComplete);
return removed;
}
bool
LedgerMaster::isValidated(ReadView const& ledger)
{
+12
View File
@@ -161,6 +161,18 @@ public:
if (!sleAcct)
return false;
// A time-sequenced transaction's SeqProxy is sequence(0), which
// the sequence test below would call past and sweep at once. It
// is spent once the account has recorded its Time or a later one
// - applied, or superseded - and otherwise lives out holdLedgers
// like anything else (preclaim refuses it once it expires).
if (auto const time = txn.getTX()->at(~sfTime);
time && txn.getTX()->isTimeSequenced())
{
auto const last = sleAcct->at(~sfLastTxnTime);
return last && *last >= *time;
}
SeqProxy const acctSeq =
SeqProxy::sequence(sleAcct->getFieldU32(sfSequence));
SeqProxy const seqProx = txn.getSeqProxy();
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/ManifestSync.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/Manifest.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <limits>
#include <optional>
namespace ripple {
static_assert(
manifestSyncPages * dirNodeMaxEntries >= ManifestCache::ledgerCapacity,
"the early read must be able to fill the ledger tier");
std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>>
missingManifestNodes(
SHAMap const& stateMap,
std::size_t max,
std::vector<uint256> const& keys,
std::uint64_t maxPages)
{
std::vector<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>> missing;
// By hash: several keys blocked by the same node report it once.
hash_set<uint256> reported;
hash_set<uint256> visited;
auto const& root = keylet::manifestDir();
// The manifest directory's own pages: the only directory nodes whose
// entries are followed. The ledger walked is not validated, and one a
// peer made up could otherwise lead the walk from directory to directory
// through as much of the map as it cared to serve.
hash_set<uint256> pages{root.key};
// A stack, so the keys asked for by name go last and are read first: they
// are the ones that decide whether this node can trust a validation.
std::vector<uint256> pending{root.key};
pending.insert(pending.end(), keys.rbegin(), keys.rend());
maxPages = std::clamp<std::uint64_t>(maxPages, 1, dirNodeMaxPages);
while (!pending.empty() && missing.size() < max)
{
auto const key = pending.back();
pending.pop_back();
if (!visited.insert(key).second)
continue;
std::optional<std::pair<SHAMapNodeID, uint256>> gap;
auto const item = stateMap.peekItemPartial(key, gap);
if (gap)
{
if (reported.insert(gap->second).second)
missing.push_back(*gap);
continue;
}
if (!item)
continue;
std::optional<SLE const> sle;
try
{
sle.emplace(SerialIter{item->slice()}, item->key());
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
// Not this walk's to judge: the node verified against its hash,
// so a full read of the ledger would meet the same object.
continue;
}
if (sle->getType() == ltDIR_NODE)
{
if (!pages.contains(key))
continue;
for (auto const& k : sle->getFieldV256(sfIndexes))
pending.push_back(k);
// The root names the last page, every page in use has an index no
// greater, and the directory only ever grows at its end. Asking
// for them all now saves a round trip per page; an index not in
// use costs at most the node that shows it absent.
if (key == root.key)
{
auto const last = std::min<std::uint64_t>(
sle->getFieldU64(sfIndexPrevious), maxPages - 1);
for (std::uint64_t i = 1; i <= last; ++i)
{
auto const pageKey = keylet::page(root, i).key;
pages.insert(pageKey);
pending.push_back(pageKey);
}
}
}
else if (
sle->getType() == ltMANIFEST &&
sle->isFieldPresent(sfSigningPubKey) &&
sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence) !=
std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max())
{
auto const signing = sle->getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey);
if (publicKeyType(makeSlice(signing)))
pending.push_back(
keylet::manifest(PublicKey{makeSlice(signing)}).key);
}
}
return missing;
}
std::vector<uint256>
pickManifestCandidates(
std::vector<uint256> const& reported,
hash_set<uint256> const& skip,
std::size_t max)
{
hash_map<uint256, std::size_t> counts;
for (auto const& hash : reported)
if (hash.isNonZero() && !skip.contains(hash))
++counts[hash];
std::vector<std::pair<std::size_t, uint256>> ranked;
ranked.reserve(counts.size());
for (auto const& [hash, count] : counts)
ranked.emplace_back(count, hash);
auto const keep = std::min(max, ranked.size());
std::partial_sort(
ranked.begin(),
ranked.begin() + keep,
ranked.end(),
[](auto const& a, auto const& b) { return a > b; });
std::vector<uint256> picked;
picked.reserve(keep);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < keep; ++i)
picked.push_back(ranked[i].second);
return picked;
}
std::size_t
manifestQuorum(std::size_t validators, bool trusted, std::size_t quorum)
{
if (trusted)
return std::min(quorum, validators);
// ceil(0.8 * validators), in integers.
return (validators * 4 + 4) / 5;
}
} // namespace ripple
+5 -12
View File
@@ -228,11 +228,7 @@ public:
boost::asio::signal_set m_signals;
// Once we get C++20, we could use `std::atomic_flag` for `isTimeToStop`
// and eliminate the need for the condition variable and the mutex.
std::condition_variable stoppingCondition_;
mutable std::mutex stoppingMutex_;
std::atomic<bool> isTimeToStop = false;
std::atomic_flag isTimeToStop;
std::atomic<bool> checkSigs_;
@@ -1585,10 +1581,7 @@ ApplicationImp::run()
getLoadManager().activateDeadlockDetector();
}
{
std::unique_lock<std::mutex> lk{stoppingMutex_};
stoppingCondition_.wait(lk, [this] { return isTimeToStop.load(); });
}
isTimeToStop.wait(false, std::memory_order_relaxed);
JLOG(m_journal.debug()) << "Application stopping";
@@ -1675,14 +1668,14 @@ ApplicationImp::run()
void
ApplicationImp::signalStop(std::string msg)
{
if (!isTimeToStop.exchange(true))
if (!isTimeToStop.test_and_set(std::memory_order_acquire))
{
if (msg.empty())
JLOG(m_journal.warn()) << "Server stopping";
else
JLOG(m_journal.warn()) << "Server stopping: " << msg;
stoppingCondition_.notify_all();
isTimeToStop.notify_all();
}
}
@@ -1701,7 +1694,7 @@ ApplicationImp::checkSigs(bool check)
bool
ApplicationImp::isStopping() const
{
return isTimeToStop.load();
return isTimeToStop.test(std::memory_order_relaxed);
}
int
+1
View File
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ printHelp(const po::options_description& desc)
" gateway_balances [<ledger>] <issuer_account> [ <hotwallet> [ "
"<hotwallet> ]]\n"
" get_counts\n"
" hook_validate <hex>\n"
" json <method> <json>\n"
" ledger [<id>|current|closed|validated] [full]\n"
" ledger_accept\n"
+27 -3
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ operator<(CanonicalTXSet::Key const& lhs, CanonicalTXSet::Key const& rhs)
if (lhs.account_ > rhs.account_)
return false;
// Empty for everything but a time-sequenced transaction, so this sorts
// those after the rest of the account's and leaves the rest alone.
if (lhs.time_ != rhs.time_)
return lhs.time_ < rhs.time_;
if (lhs.seqProxy_ < rhs.seqProxy_)
return true;
@@ -48,12 +53,28 @@ CanonicalTXSet::accountKey(AccountID const& account)
return ret;
}
CanonicalTXSet::Key
CanonicalTXSet::makeKey(
uint256 const& account,
STTx const& tx,
uint256 const& id)
{
return Key(
account,
tx.getSeqProxy(),
tx.isTimeSequenced()
? std::optional<std::uint64_t>(tx.getFieldU64(sfTime))
: std::nullopt,
id);
}
void
CanonicalTXSet::insert(std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const& txn)
{
map_.insert(std::make_pair(
Key(accountKey(txn->getAccountID(sfAccount)),
txn->getSeqProxy(),
makeKey(
accountKey(txn->getAccountID(sfAccount)),
*txn,
txn->getTransactionID()),
txn));
}
@@ -71,10 +92,13 @@ CanonicalTXSet::popAcctTransaction(std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const& tx)
//
// 3. After handling all transactions with Sequences, return Tickets
// with the lowest Ticket ID first.
//
// 4. After those, return time-sequenced transactions with the oldest
// Time first.
std::shared_ptr<STTx const> result;
uint256 const effectiveAccount{accountKey(tx->getAccountID(sfAccount))};
Key const after(effectiveAccount, tx->getSeqProxy(), beast::zero);
Key const after = makeKey(effectiveAccount, *tx, beast::zero);
auto const itrNext{map_.lower_bound(after)};
if (itrNext != map_.end() &&
itrNext->first.getAccount() == effectiveAccount)
+33 -3
View File
@@ -25,13 +25,31 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SeqProxy.h>
#include <optional>
namespace ripple {
/** Holds transactions which were deferred to the next pass of consensus.
"Canonical" refers to the order in which transactions are applied.
- Puts transactions from the same account in SeqProxy order
- Puts transactions from the same account in SeqProxy order: Sequences,
then Tickets
- Then the account's time-sequenced transactions (featureJsonTx), oldest
Time first
Without a time-sequenced transaction in the set this is the SeqProxy
order it always was. A Time on a transaction with a Sequence or a Ticket
changes nothing: only time-sequenced transactions check or record
sfLastTxnTime, so oldest first is all their order has to satisfy.
They go after the Tickets for the reason Tickets go after Sequences. A
time-sequenced transaction does not say which Sequence it followed, but
what it does can depend on it - a TicketCreate numbers its Tickets from
the account Sequence. A transaction with a Sequence or a Ticket that
really came after it fails terPRE_SEQ or terPRE_TICKET here and is
retried; one that came before it, applied second, could have its
Sequence or Ticket taken and fail for good.
*/
// VFALCO TODO rename to SortedTxSet
@@ -41,8 +59,11 @@ private:
class Key
{
public:
Key(uint256 const& account, SeqProxy seqProx, uint256 const& id)
: account_(account), txId_(id), seqProxy_(seqProx)
Key(uint256 const& account,
SeqProxy seqProx,
std::optional<std::uint64_t> time,
uint256 const& id)
: account_(account), txId_(id), seqProxy_(seqProx), time_(time)
{
}
@@ -95,6 +116,11 @@ private:
uint256 account_;
uint256 txId_;
SeqProxy seqProxy_;
// sfTime of a time-sequenced transaction, and nothing for any other.
// Compared before seqProxy_: an empty optional is less than every
// Time, so time-sequenced transactions come after the rest of their
// account's, and among themselves oldest first.
std::optional<std::uint64_t> time_;
};
friend bool
@@ -104,6 +130,10 @@ private:
uint256
accountKey(AccountID const& account);
// The Key for tx under the salted account key, id breaking ties
static Key
makeKey(uint256 const& account, STTx const& tx, uint256 const& id);
public:
using const_iterator =
std::map<Key, std::shared_ptr<STTx const>>::const_iterator;
+432 -122
View File
@@ -20,13 +20,20 @@
#ifndef RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFEST_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFEST_H_INCLUDED
#include <xrpld/app/misc/RotatingBloomFilter.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/UnorderedContainers.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <array>
#include <atomic>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstdint>
#include <functional>
#include <limits>
#include <memory>
#include <mutex>
#include <optional>
#include <shared_mutex>
@@ -36,6 +43,8 @@
namespace ripple {
class ReadView;
class STLedgerEntry;
using SLE = STLedgerEntry;
/*
Validator key manifests
@@ -64,8 +73,9 @@ class ReadView;
master public key, and (b) the most senior of all valid manifests it has
seen for that validator, if any. On startup, the [validator_token] config
entry (which contains the manifest for this validator) is decoded and
added to the manifest cache. Other manifests are added as "gossip"
received from rippled peers.
added to the manifest cache. Other manifests arrive in published validator
lists, from ltMANIFEST ledger objects, and as "gossip" received from
rippled peers; see ManifestCache for how each is retained.
When an ephemeral key is compromised, a new signing key pair is created,
along with a new manifest vouching for it (with a higher sequence number),
@@ -242,7 +252,17 @@ enum class ManifestDisposition {
badEphemeralKey,
/// Timely, but invalid signature
invalid
invalid,
/// Gossip introducing a master key not held, whose ephemeral key has not
/// recently signed a validation this node verified, or which names no
/// ephemeral key at all. Not admitted and not relayed; if it names an
/// ephemeral key it is held pending, unverified, until that key is seen.
unseen,
/// Gossip with nowhere to go: every manifest held from gossip has been
/// more active than this one could claim to be.
full
};
inline std::string
@@ -260,6 +280,58 @@ to_string(ManifestDisposition m)
return "badEphemeralKey";
case ManifestDisposition::invalid:
return "invalid";
case ManifestDisposition::unseen:
return "unseen";
case ManifestDisposition::full:
return "full";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
/** Where a held manifest came from, in increasing order of precedence.
The source never makes a manifest valid. Whatever its source, a manifest
is accepted only if its signatures verify and its sequence is newer than
the one held. The source decides how long the cache keeps it, and which
side loses when two held manifests claim the same key.
*/
enum class ManifestSource : std::uint8_t {
/** Relayed by a peer: the legacy transport, open to anyone.
A master key not already held from gossip is admitted only if its
ephemeral key has recently signed a validation this node verified, and
only into one of ManifestCache::gossipCapacity slots, which go to the
most active.
*/
gossip = 0,
/** Read from an ltMANIFEST ledger object.
The ledger is the store and this is a lookup cache over it, of
ManifestCache::ledgerCapacity entries: dropping one costs a SHAMap
read the next time it is wanted, and loses nothing. Revocations are
expected to live here, since a validator revokes on-ledger.
*/
ledger = 1,
/** Carried in a validator list, the config, or the wallet those were
saved to. Never evicted.
*/
list = 2,
};
inline std::string
to_string(ManifestSource s)
{
switch (s)
{
case ManifestSource::gossip:
return "gossip";
case ManifestSource::ledger:
return "ledger";
case ManifestSource::list:
return "list";
default:
return "unknown";
}
@@ -267,65 +339,51 @@ to_string(ManifestDisposition m)
class DatabaseCon;
/** Remembers manifests with the highest sequence number. */
/** Remembers manifests with the highest sequence number.
Every master key held is retained in one of three tiers:
- list: the master key is pinned (trusted), configured, or a validator
list or the wallet carried a manifest for it. Never evicted, whatever
transport later delivered a newer manifest for it.
- ledger: otherwise, if the manifest held was read from the ledger. A
lookup cache over the ledger, capped at ledgerCapacity; when full the
least active entry is dropped, to be read again on demand.
- gossip: otherwise. Capped at gossipCapacity. A master key enters only
if its ephemeral key is in seen_, a rotating bloom filter of ephemeral
keys that recently signed a validation this node verified, and only by
displacing an entry less active than a single fresh sighting.
Activity is the number of validations seen from the held ephemeral key,
decayed exponentially with a half-life of halfLife. It is what decides
eviction in both capped tiers.
Gossip that fails the bloom filter is held, unverified, in a fixed ring of
pendingCapacity entries keyed by ephemeral key. The first validation
signed by that key releases it into the cache. Without this a validator's
manifest, which normally arrives before its first validation, would be
refused everywhere and never offered again.
A held manifest that conflicts with a new one over a key, and is held in a
lower tier than the new one would be, is evicted rather than the new one
refused. A manifest is never evicted by one ranked at or below it.
Ledger access goes through readLedger() alone, so a source other than a
full SHAMap can be substituted there.
*/
class ManifestCache
{
private:
beast::Journal j_;
std::shared_mutex mutable mutex_;
/** Active manifests stored by master public key. */
hash_map<PublicKey, Manifest> map_;
/** Master public keys stored by current ephemeral public key. */
hash_map<PublicKey, PublicKey> signingToMasterKeys_;
/** Master keys always offered to a peer, whatever their recency.
Set by pin(); in practice the master keys on the configured validator
lists, which are the manifests consensus actually depends on.
*/
hash_set<PublicKey> pinned_;
/** Recency of use, keyed by master public key.
The structure of this map is guarded by mutex_ exactly as map_ is:
entries are created next to it in applyManifest() and are never
removed. The counters themselves are atomic, so recording a hit is a
write to an atomic rather than a structural modification and is legal
while only a shared lock is held.
This is deliberately not a second mutex. A second mutex would have to
be ordered against mutex_, and that ordering would be an unenforced
invariant that any future caller could invert.
*/
hash_map<PublicKey, std::atomic<std::uint64_t>> mutable lastUsed_;
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> mutable tick_{0};
/** Ephemeral keys already probed against the ledger, and where.
Bounds the reads driven by incoming validations to one per key per
ledger. A key that resolves does not come back here: the mapping then
lives in signingToMasterKeys_ and applyLedgerSigningKey() answers from
it before reaching this map.
Unlike lastUsed_ this is written structurally, so it is guarded by
mutex_ in exclusive mode.
*/
hash_map<PublicKey, std::uint32_t> probed_;
/** Record that a manifest was looked up.
@pre The caller holds mutex_, shared or exclusive.
*/
void
touch(PublicKey const& masterKey) const;
std::atomic<std::uint32_t> seq_{0};
public:
/** Ceiling on the unpinned manifests offered to a newly connected peer. */
static constexpr std::size_t gossipLimit = 64;
/** Manifests held for gossip-tier master keys. */
static constexpr std::size_t gossipCapacity = 64;
/** Manifests held for ledger-tier master keys: a lookup cache. */
static constexpr std::size_t ledgerCapacity = 512;
/** Gossip manifests waiting, unverified, for their ephemeral key. */
static constexpr std::size_t pendingCapacity = 64;
/** Ceiling on remembered ephemeral key probes before they are dropped.
@@ -334,11 +392,202 @@ public:
*/
static constexpr std::size_t probeLimit = 4096;
explicit ManifestCache(
beast::Journal j = beast::Journal(beast::Journal::getNullSink()))
: j_(j)
/** Time over which a master key's validation activity halves. */
static constexpr std::chrono::seconds halfLife{300};
/** Epoch of seen_. A key is remembered for three to four of them. */
static constexpr std::chrono::seconds seenInterval{120};
/** Ephemeral keys recently seen signing a verified validation.
2 KiB (16 Kibit) per generation, 4 generations: 8 KiB in all. Around
0.2% false positives per live generation with a thousand distinct keys
in it.
*/
using SeenFilter = RotatingBloomFilter<std::size_t{1} << 14, 4, 4>;
private:
struct Slot
{
}
Slot(
ManifestSource source_,
ManifestSource tier_,
bool vouched_,
double weight_)
: source(source_), tier(tier_), vouched(vouched_), weight(weight_)
{
}
/// Where the manifest held for this master key came from.
ManifestSource source;
/// What it is retained as; see tierOf().
ManifestSource tier;
/// A validator list, the config or the wallet once carried a manifest
/// for this master key. Survives later updates from other sources.
bool vouched;
/** Validations seen from the held ephemeral key, decayed.
Stored as the sum, over the times t it was seen, of
2^((t - weightBase_) / halfLife). Every slot shares weightBase_, so
comparing two stored weights compares their decayed values at any
common instant, without computing a decay.
Atomic so that a sighting is recorded under a shared lock.
Everything else in a slot changes only under an exclusive one.
*/
std::atomic<double> weight;
};
struct Pending
{
/// Arrival order; the lowest is replaced first.
std::uint64_t order = 0;
std::optional<Manifest> manifest;
/// manifest has been checked with Manifest::verify(), and passed.
bool verified = false;
};
beast::Journal j_;
Stopwatch& clock_;
std::shared_mutex mutable mutex_;
/** Active manifests stored by master public key. */
hash_map<PublicKey, Manifest> map_;
/** Master public keys stored by current ephemeral public key. */
hash_map<PublicKey, PublicKey> signingToMasterKeys_;
/** Retention state, by master public key. In step with map_. */
hash_map<PublicKey, Slot> slots_;
/** Number of slots_ in each tier, indexed by ManifestSource. */
std::array<std::size_t, 3> tierSize_{};
/** Master keys retained as list regardless of source; set by pin(). */
hash_set<PublicKey> pinned_;
/** Master keys of the configured validator token and revocation. */
hash_set<PublicKey> configured_;
std::array<Pending, pendingCapacity> pending_;
std::uint64_t pendingOrder_ = 0;
std::size_t pendingSize_ = 0;
/** Ephemeral keys already probed against the ledger, and where.
Bounds the reads driven by incoming validations to one per key per
ledger. Guarded by mutex_ in exclusive mode.
*/
hash_map<PublicKey, std::uint32_t> probed_;
/** Reference instant for Slot::weight. Moved forward by rebase(). */
Stopwatch::time_point weightBase_;
SeenFilter seen_{seenInterval};
std::atomic<std::uint32_t> seq_{0};
/** Tier a master key is retained in, given where its manifest came from.
@pre The caller holds mutex_, shared or exclusive.
*/
ManifestSource
tierOf(PublicKey const& master, ManifestSource source, bool vouched) const;
/** Weight of a single sighting at now. @pre mutex_ held. */
double
unit(Stopwatch::time_point now) const;
/** Whether weightBase_ is far enough behind to need moving now.
@pre mutex_ held.
*/
bool
overdue(Stopwatch::time_point now) const;
/** Move weightBase_ toward now, rescaling every weight to match.
@pre mutex_ held exclusively.
*/
void
rebase(Stopwatch::time_point now);
/** The least active entry in a tier, other than exclude.
@pre mutex_ held.
*/
std::optional<std::pair<PublicKey, double>>
coldest(ManifestSource tier, PublicKey const* exclude) const;
/** Whether master could enter tier, competing with weight.
A capped tier that is full admits by evicting its least active entry.
The lookup cache always does; the gossip tier only if that entry is
less active than weight.
@pre mutex_ held.
*/
bool
admissible(ManifestSource tier, PublicKey const& master, double weight)
const;
/** Evict what admissible() said could be evicted.
@pre mutex_ held exclusively.
*/
bool
makeRoom(ManifestSource tier, PublicKey const& master, double weight);
/** Forget a master key entirely. @pre mutex_ held exclusively. */
void
erase(PublicKey const& master);
/** Move a slot to another tier. @pre mutex_ held exclusively. */
void
retier(Slot& slot, ManifestSource tier);
/** Hold gossip until its ephemeral key is seen.
@param verified m has already been checked with Manifest::verify().
Only a verified manifest may displace one already waiting for
the same ephemeral key.
@pre mutex_ held exclusively; m names an ephemeral key.
*/
void
addPending(Manifest m, bool verified);
/** @pre mutex_ held. */
bool
hasPending(PublicKey const& signingKey) const;
/** @pre mutex_ held exclusively. */
std::optional<Manifest>
takePending(PublicKey const& signingKey);
/** Adopt a gossip entry the ledger turns out to hold verbatim.
It is then a ledger lookup cache entry, and frees its gossip slot.
@pre mutex_ held exclusively.
*/
void
adopt(Manifest const& m);
/** The ledger object for a manifest, keyed by its master or ephemeral key.
The one place the cache reads the ledger.
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
readLedger(ReadView const& view, PublicKey const& key) const;
public:
explicit ManifestCache(
beast::Journal j = beast::Journal(beast::Journal::getNullSink()),
Stopwatch& clock = stopwatch());
/** A monotonically increasing number used to detect new manifests. */
std::uint32_t
@@ -408,24 +657,65 @@ public:
bool
revoked(PublicKey const& pk) const;
/** Returns the tier a master key is held in, if it is held.
@par Thread Safety
May be called concurrently
*/
std::optional<ManifestSource>
getTier(PublicKey const& pk) const;
/** Add manifest to cache.
@param m Manifest to add
@param source Where it came from. The default is the trusted path
taken by validator lists, the config and the wallet.
@param view For gossip, a ledger to consult first. A master key whose
ledger object is at the same or a later sequence -- above all, a
revocation -- has that object ingested instead, and the gossip is
stale. Ignored for other sources.
@return `ManifestDisposition::accepted` if successful, or
`stale` or `invalid` otherwise
the disposition explaining why admission was refused
@par Thread Safety
May be called concurrently
*/
ManifestDisposition
applyManifest(Manifest m);
applyManifest(
Manifest m,
ManifestSource source = ManifestSource::list,
ReadView const* view = nullptr);
/** Set the master keys that are always offered to peers.
/** Record a verified, current validation signed by an ephemeral key.
Replaces any previous set. Bumps sequence() when the set actually
changes, so a cached gossip message built from it is rebuilt.
Marks the key as seen for gossip admission, adds to the activity of the
master key it belongs to, and releases a pending manifest for it.
@param signingKey Ephemeral key that signed the validation
@param view Passed on to applyManifest() for a released manifest
@return the manifest released and accepted, if any, for the caller to
relay
@par Thread Safety
May be called concurrently
*/
std::optional<Manifest>
noteValidation(PublicKey const& signingKey, ReadView const* view = nullptr);
/** Set the master keys retained as list, whatever their source.
Replaces any previous set. A key that leaves falls back to the tier of
its source, which sheds its least active entries if that puts it over
capacity. Bumps sequence() when the set actually changes, so a cached
gossip message built from it is rebuilt.
@param keys Master public keys to pin
@@ -458,8 +748,7 @@ public:
manifest found and feeds it through applyManifest(), so an on-chain
manifest is subject to exactly the same staleness, revocation and
key-reuse rules -- and the same signature check -- as one arriving by
peer gossip or in a published list. It is a third source of manifests,
not a more trusted one.
peer gossip or in a published list.
Probes a known key set rather than scanning the ledger's transactions:
this costs one SHAMap read per key, and picks up manifests published in
@@ -477,22 +766,39 @@ public:
std::size_t
applyLedger(ReadView const& view, hash_set<PublicKey> const& masterKeys);
/** Refresh from the ledger everything held or pinned.
Probes every pinned and configured master key, and every master key
held in any tier. This is what brings in a revocation, which is
published on-ledger by master key and nowhere else, for a master key
whose ephemeral key the cache already resolves and so never misses on.
@return the number of manifests newly accepted
@par Thread Safety
May be called concurrently
*/
std::size_t
applyLedger(ReadView const& view);
/** Resolve an ephemeral signing key against a manifest published on-ledger.
applyLedger() probes a known master key set, which cannot help a key
this node has no manifest for: the master key is exactly what is
missing. SetManifest writes a second copy of every manifest keyed by
its ephemeral key, so that case is one read rather than a search.
The miss path of the ledger tier. applyLedger() probes a known master
key set, which cannot help a key this node has no manifest for: the
master key is exactly what is missing. SetManifest writes a second copy
of every manifest keyed by its ephemeral key, so that case is one read
rather than a search.
Anything found is fed through applyManifest(), so an on-chain manifest
faces the same signature check and the same staleness, revocation and
key-reuse rules as one arriving by gossip. The ledger is a transport
here, not an authority: the answer is read back out of the cache rather
than taken from the ledger object, because applyManifest() may decline
it.
key-reuse rules as one arriving by gossip. The answer is read back out
of the cache rather than taken from the ledger object, because
applyManifest() may decline it.
A key is probed at most once per ledger, and a key that resolves is
answered from the cache thereafter without any ledger read.
answered from the cache thereafter without any ledger read, until it
is evicted.
@param view Ledger to read from
@param signingKey Ephemeral public key to resolve
@@ -506,6 +812,37 @@ public:
std::optional<PublicKey>
applyLedgerSigningKey(ReadView const& view, PublicKey const& signingKey);
/** Ingest the manifests listed in the ledger's manifest directory.
Every master key with a manifest on-ledger is listed in
keylet::manifestDir(), so unlike applyLedger() this needs no key to
start from. Pinned, configured and held master keys are refreshed as
applyLedger() would; any other is admitted to the ledger tier only
while it has room, so a bulk read fills the lookup cache without
churning it.
The view need not be complete: one in which the directory and the
objects it lists can be read will do. That is what lets a node read
them during sync, before it holds the rest of the state map. The
ledger need not be validated either: every manifest read is verified
as from any other source, and the cache only ever moves forward, so
the worst an unvalidated ledger can do is leave something out.
@param view Ledger to read from
@param maxPages Most directory pages to read; see
forEachLedgerManifest()
@return the number of manifests newly accepted
@par Thread Safety
May be called concurrently
*/
std::size_t
applyLedgerDirectory(
ReadView const& view,
std::uint64_t maxPages = std::numeric_limits<std::uint64_t>::max());
/** Populate manifest cache with manifests in database and config.
@param dbCon Database connection with dbTable
@@ -542,11 +879,15 @@ public:
void
load(DatabaseCon& dbCon, std::string const& dbTable);
/** Save cached manifests to database.
/** Save list-tier manifests to database.
Ledger-tier manifests are on the ledger already, revocations included,
and gossip-tier ones are not worth carrying across a restart.
@param dbCon Database connection with `ValidatorManifests` table
@param isTrusted Function that returns true if manifest is trusted
@param isTrusted Function that returns true if manifest is trusted.
Called without the cache locked, so it may call back into it.
@par Thread Safety
@@ -614,19 +955,16 @@ public:
/** Invokes the callback for the manifests worth offering a new peer.
Offering the whole cache means offering everything the node has ever
seen, which grows without bound and is mostly of no use to the peer.
This offers the pinned set plus up to gossipLimit further manifests,
most recently used first. A manifest left out still reaches the peer by
ordinary relay if it turns out to be needed.
The list and gossip tiers: at most the listed validators plus
gossipCapacity. The ledger tier is left out, since any peer that is
not amendment blocked can read it from the ledger.
@note Do not call ManifestCache member functions from within the
callback. This can re-lock the mutex from the same thread, which is UB.
@note Do not write ManifestCache member variables from
within the callback. This can lead to data races.
@param pf Pre-function called with the maximum number of times f will be
called (useful for memory allocations)
@param pf Pre-function called with the number of times f will be called
@param f Function called for each manifest
@@ -640,40 +978,12 @@ public:
{
std::shared_lock lock{mutex_};
// Rank the unpinned entries by recency and keep the head. Pointers
// into map_ stay valid: it is node based and the shared lock is held
// throughout.
std::vector<std::pair<std::uint64_t, PublicKey const*>> ranked;
ranked.reserve(map_.size());
for (auto const& [key, manifest] : map_)
{
(void)manifest;
if (pinned_.count(key))
continue;
auto const used = lastUsed_.find(key);
ranked.emplace_back(
used == lastUsed_.end()
? 0
: used->second.load(std::memory_order_relaxed),
&key);
}
pf(tierSize_[static_cast<std::size_t>(ManifestSource::list)] +
tierSize_[static_cast<std::size_t>(ManifestSource::gossip)]);
auto const keep = std::min(gossipLimit, ranked.size());
std::partial_sort(
ranked.begin(),
ranked.begin() + keep,
ranked.end(),
[](auto const& a, auto const& b) { return a.first > b.first; });
// An upper bound: a pinned key need not have a manifest yet.
pf(pinned_.size() + keep);
for (auto const& key : pinned_)
if (auto const iter = map_.find(key); iter != map_.end())
f(iter->second);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < keep; ++i)
f(map_.find(*ranked[i].second)->second);
for (auto const& [key, slot] : slots_)
if (slot.tier != ManifestSource::ledger)
f(map_.find(key)->second);
}
};
+101
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#ifndef RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFESTLEDGER_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_APP_MISC_MANIFESTLEDGER_H_INCLUDED
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <functional>
#include <memory>
namespace ripple {
class ApplyView;
class ReadView;
struct Manifest;
/** Write a manifest to the ledger, replacing any earlier one for its master.
A manifest is stored twice so that it can be found from either key:
keylet::manifest(masterKey) -> obj1, sfManifestID -> obj2
keylet::manifest(signingKey) -> obj2, sfManifestID -> obj1
A revocation has no signing key, so it is stored only as obj1, with no
sfManifestID. The master key's account points at obj1 with its own
sfManifestID.
obj1 is listed in keylet::manifestDir() and records its page there in
sfOwnerNode. The entry is made with the master key's first manifest and is
never removed: every later manifest for the master key, a revocation
included, is written at the same key, so the entry stays and the page is
carried from the old obj1 to the new. Removing and re-adding it instead
would move it between pages on every key rotation for no gain. obj2 is not
listed; it moves with the ephemeral key, and a reader finds it from obj1.
Both of the old objects are erased and both new ones written afresh, so the
two copies can never drift apart.
@param view View to write to
@param account The master key's account root, which is updated
@param manifest The manifest as signed, in its serialized STObject form
@param parsed The same manifest, deserialized and checked by the caller
@param j Journal for reporting a corrupt ledger
@return tesSUCCESS; tecDIR_FULL if the directory cannot take another
master key; tefBAD_LEDGER if the existing objects are inconsistent
*/
TER
writeManifestObjects(
ApplyView& view,
std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& account,
STObject const& manifest,
Manifest const& parsed,
beast::Journal j);
/** Visit every master key's manifest object listed in keylet::manifestDir().
Each master key is visited once, with its current object: a revocation if
it has been revoked. Entries that do not name an ltMANIFEST object are
skipped.
The view need not be complete. It must be able to read the directory and
the objects listed in it, which is all this reads; a view over a partially
synced state map that holds them will do.
@param view View to read from
@param f Called with each master manifest object
@param maxPages Most directory pages to read, the root page included.
Pages are only ever appended, so this reads the oldest entries. A
partial view need hold no more pages than this.
*/
void
forEachLedgerManifest(
ReadView const& view,
std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&)> const& f,
std::uint64_t maxPages = dirNodeMaxPages);
} // namespace ripple
#endif
+128 -7
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerMaster.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/LedgerToJson.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/LocalTxs.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/ManifestSync.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/OpenLedger.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/OrderBookDB.h>
#include <xrpld/app/ledger/TransactionMaster.h>
@@ -319,6 +320,13 @@ private:
void
publishNewerManifests(ReadView const& ledger);
/** Read manifests from ledgers peers report, while too few of this node's
validators can be resolved to trust any ledger. See
[early_manifest_sync].
*/
void
bootstrapManifests();
public:
bool
beginConsensus(
@@ -667,6 +675,12 @@ private:
std::atomic<OperatingMode> mMode;
std::atomic<bool> needNetworkLedger_{false};
/** State of bootstrapManifests(), which only the heartbeat calls. */
std::mutex manifestBootstrapMutex_;
hash_set<uint256> manifestBootstrapTried_;
std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point manifestBootstrapNext_{};
std::atomic<bool> amendmentBlocked_{false};
std::atomic<bool> amendmentWarned_{false};
std::atomic<bool> unlBlocked_{false};
@@ -1027,6 +1041,8 @@ NetworkOPsImp::processHeartbeatTimer()
}
CLOG(clog.ss()) << ". ";
bootstrapManifests();
setHeartbeatTimer();
}
@@ -1246,6 +1262,105 @@ NetworkOPsImp::publishNewerManifests(ReadView const& ledger)
}
}
namespace {
/** How often a node that cannot resolve enough of its validators looks for
ledgers to read their manifests from. */
constexpr std::chrono::seconds manifestBootstrapInterval{15};
/** Most ledgers it starts reading at each look. */
constexpr std::size_t manifestBootstrapWidth = 3;
/** Ledgers remembered as read, past which the record starts over. */
constexpr std::size_t manifestBootstrapMemory = 256;
} // namespace
void
NetworkOPsImp::bootstrapManifests()
{
// Only until a ledger has been validated: from then on the manifests are
// kept current from each ledger as it closes, in beginConsensus().
if (!app_.config().EARLY_MANIFEST_SYNC || m_ledgerMaster.haveValidated())
return;
std::vector<uint256> picked;
{
auto const now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
std::lock_guard lock(manifestBootstrapMutex_);
if (now < manifestBootstrapNext_)
return;
manifestBootstrapNext_ = now + manifestBootstrapInterval;
// The validators whose manifests matter: the trusted ones once the
// trusted set has been worked out, every listed one before that.
auto keys = app_.validators().getTrustedMasterKeys();
bool const trusted = !keys.empty();
if (!trusted)
app_.validators().for_each_listed(
[&keys](PublicKey const& pk, bool) { keys.insert(pk); });
if (keys.empty())
return;
// Enough of them to make a quorum.
std::size_t const needed =
manifestQuorum(keys.size(), trusted, app_.validators().quorum());
auto const& manifests = app_.validatorManifests();
std::size_t resolved = 0;
for (auto const& pk : keys)
if (manifests.getManifest(pk))
++resolved;
if (resolved >= needed)
return;
std::vector<uint256> reported;
for (auto const& peer : app_.overlay().getActivePeers())
reported.push_back(peer->getClosedLedgerHash());
if (manifestBootstrapTried_.size() > manifestBootstrapMemory)
manifestBootstrapTried_.clear();
picked = pickManifestCandidates(
reported, manifestBootstrapTried_, manifestBootstrapWidth);
if (picked.empty())
return;
manifestBootstrapTried_.insert(picked.begin(), picked.end());
JLOG(m_journal.info())
<< "Manifests held for " << resolved << " of " << keys.size()
<< " validators, " << needed << " needed: reading manifests from "
<< picked.size() << " ledger(s) reported by " << reported.size()
<< " peer(s)";
}
// Each is acquired as consensus would acquire it. Before a ledger has
// been validated, InboundLedger reads the manifests first, by key and from
// the directory, and only then fetches the rest. The first pick is
// usually the ledger checkLastClosedLedger() is already acquiring. Ledgers
// of the same network share nearly all their nodes, so each further one
// costs little more than what changed; one that only a peer has fails and
// costs nothing more.
//
// Runs on the heartbeat, ahead of re-arming it, so nothing here may throw.
for (auto const& hash : picked)
{
JLOG(m_journal.debug()) << "Reading manifests from ledger " << hash;
try
{
app_.getInboundLedgers().acquire(
hash, 0, InboundLedger::Reason::CONSENSUS);
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
{
JLOG(m_journal.warn()) << "Could not start reading manifests from "
<< "ledger " << hash << ": " << e.what();
}
}
}
void
NetworkOPsImp::processTransaction(
std::shared_ptr<Transaction>& transaction,
@@ -1610,6 +1725,12 @@ NetworkOPsImp::apply(std::unique_lock<std::mutex>& batchLock)
tx.set_deferred(e.result == terQUEUED);
// FIXME: This should be when we received it
app_.overlay().relay(e.transaction->getID(), tx, *toSkip);
// Also fan it out over the UDP Superhighway, if enabled.
// shouldRelay() above ensures we do this at most once.
app_.overlay().publishTxXUSH(
s.slice(), e.transaction->getID());
e.transaction->setBroadcast();
}
}
@@ -2081,13 +2202,13 @@ NetworkOPsImp::beginConsensus(
app_.validators().setNegativeUNL(prevLedger->negativeUNL());
// Pull in any manifests published on-ledger before the trusted set is
// recomputed, so a validator that rotated its ephemeral key on-chain is
// resolved to the new signing key in this same round. The master keys come
// from the published lists, so this needs no bootstrap: only the ephemeral
// half of the mapping ever comes from a manifest.
// resolved to the new signing key in this same round. Every master key the
// cache holds or pins is probed, not only the trusted ones: a revocation is
// published on-ledger by master key alone, and a master key whose ephemeral
// key the cache already resolves would otherwise never be looked up again.
if (prevLedger->rules().enabled(featureOnChainManifests))
{
app_.validatorManifests().applyLedger(
*prevLedger, app_.validators().getTrustedMasterKeys());
app_.validatorManifests().applyLedger(*prevLedger);
// The reverse of applyLedger above. Manifests reach us by peer gossip
// and in published validator lists, both of which can arrive before
@@ -2103,8 +2224,8 @@ NetworkOPsImp::beginConsensus(
app_.overlay(),
app_.getHashRouter());
// Pin the trusted master keys so they are always offered to a new peer and
// cannot be crowded out of the gossip set by more recently used manifests.
// Pin the trusted master keys: their manifests are retained in the list
// tier and offered to every new peer, whichever source delivered them.
app_.validatorManifests().pin(app_.validators().getTrustedMasterKeys());
if (!changes.added.empty() || !changes.removed.empty())
+207
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2026 XRPL-Labs
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#ifndef RIPPLE_APP_MISC_ROTATINGBLOOMFILTER_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_APP_MISC_ROTATINGBLOOMFILTER_H_INCLUDED
#include <xrpl/basics/hardened_hash.h>
#include <array>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
#include <limits>
#include <mutex>
namespace ripple {
/** Approximate membership of everything inserted recently, in fixed space.
Time is cut into epochs of a fixed interval. Each of the Generations
filters holds the insertions of one epoch: an insertion goes to the filter
for the current epoch, and a query consults every filter whose epoch is
one of the last Generations. An element is therefore reported for at least
(Generations - 1) and at most Generations intervals after it was last
inserted, and then forgotten.
A filter is cleared lazily, when its slot is first wanted for a newer
epoch. Nothing has to tick: an idle filter costs nothing, and a clock that
jumps forward simply finds every slot expired.
Within the window there are no false negatives. False positives occur at
the usual bloom rate for one epoch's insertions, once per live generation.
The footprint is Generations * Bits / 8 bytes however much is inserted:
saturating the filter raises the false positive rate and never grows it.
Bit positions come from a hash seeded randomly per instance, so nobody
without the seed can choose elements that set a particular set of bits.
@par Thread Safety
Safe to call concurrently. The internal mutex is never held while calling
out, so this is a leaf in any lock order.
*/
template <std::size_t Bits, std::size_t Hashes, std::size_t Generations>
class RotatingBloomFilter
{
static_assert(
Bits >= 64 && (Bits & (Bits - 1)) == 0,
"Bits must be a power of two, at least 64");
static_assert(
Bits <= (std::size_t{1} << 32),
"bit positions are computed in 32 bits");
static_assert(Hashes >= 1 && Hashes <= 16);
static_assert(
Generations >= 2,
"a single generation would forget everything at each rotation");
public:
using clock_type = std::chrono::steady_clock;
using time_point = clock_type::time_point;
using duration = clock_type::duration;
/** Size of the filter state, in bytes. */
static constexpr std::size_t bytes = Generations * Bits / 8;
explicit RotatingBloomFilter(duration interval)
: interval_(interval > duration::zero() ? interval : duration{1})
{
epochs_.fill(none);
}
RotatingBloomFilter(RotatingBloomFilter const&) = delete;
RotatingBloomFilter&
operator=(RotatingBloomFilter const&) = delete;
/** Length of one epoch. */
duration
interval() const
{
return interval_;
}
template <class T>
void
insert(T const& item, time_point now)
{
auto const positions = probe(item);
auto const epoch = epochOf(now);
auto const slot = slotOf(epoch);
std::lock_guard lock{mutex_};
// The slot last held an earlier epoch, now out of the window or about
// to be: it is reused for this one. A slot already ahead of us (the
// caller read the clock before another thread rotated) keeps its bits,
// and ours are added to them: that can only remember the element a
// little longer than asked, never forget it early.
if (epochs_[slot] < epoch)
{
bits_[slot].fill(0);
epochs_[slot] = epoch;
}
for (auto const p : positions)
bits_[slot][p / 64] |= std::uint64_t{1} << (p % 64);
}
template <class T>
bool
contains(T const& item, time_point now) const
{
auto const positions = probe(item);
auto const oldest =
epochOf(now) - static_cast<std::int64_t>(Generations);
std::lock_guard lock{mutex_};
for (std::size_t g = 0; g < Generations; ++g)
{
if (epochs_[g] == none || epochs_[g] <= oldest)
continue;
bool all = true;
for (auto const p : positions)
{
if ((bits_[g][p / 64] & (std::uint64_t{1} << (p % 64))) == 0)
{
all = false;
break;
}
}
if (all)
return true;
}
return false;
}
private:
static constexpr std::size_t words = Bits / 64;
static constexpr std::int64_t none =
std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::min();
std::int64_t
epochOf(time_point now) const
{
// Floor division, so a clock reading before its own epoch still maps
// to consecutive epochs.
auto const t = now.time_since_epoch().count();
auto const i = interval_.count();
return t >= 0 ? t / i : -((-t + i - 1) / i);
}
static std::size_t
slotOf(std::int64_t epoch)
{
auto const g = static_cast<std::int64_t>(Generations);
return static_cast<std::size_t>(((epoch % g) + g) % g);
}
/** Bit positions for an element: Kirsch-Mitzenmacher double hashing.
Hashes positions from a single 64 bit hash, as h1 + i * h2. Forcing h2
odd makes it invertible modulo the power of two table size, so the
positions for one element are all distinct.
*/
template <class T>
std::array<std::uint32_t, Hashes>
probe(T const& item) const
{
std::uint64_t const h = hash_(item);
auto const h1 = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(h);
auto const h2 = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(h >> 32) | 1u;
constexpr auto mask = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(Bits - 1);
std::array<std::uint32_t, Hashes> positions;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < Hashes; ++i)
positions[i] = (h1 + static_cast<std::uint32_t>(i) * h2) & mask;
return positions;
}
hardened_hash<> const hash_;
duration const interval_;
std::mutex mutable mutex_;
std::array<std::int64_t, Generations> epochs_;
std::array<std::array<std::uint64_t, words>, Generations> bits_{};
};
} // namespace ripple
#endif
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