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Author SHA1 Message Date
tequ
630fd33e6f Change AMM to Supported::no 2026-06-12 22:33:33 +09:00
14 changed files with 79 additions and 419 deletions

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@@ -95,16 +95,8 @@ if [[ "$4" == "" ]]; then
echo "Non GH, local building, no Action runner magic"
else
# GH Action, runner
if [[ "$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)" == "release" ]]; then
echo "building on the release branch... placing it in builds/candidate"
mkdir /data/builds/candidate
cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/candidate/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
else
echo "building non-release branch, placing it in builds root"
cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
fi
cp /io/release-build/xahaud /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
cp /io/release-build/release.info /data/builds/$(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4.releaseinfo
echo "Published build to: http://build.xahau.tech/"
echo $(date +%Y).$(date +%-m).$(date +%-d)-$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)+$4
fi

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@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
// If you add an amendment here, then do not forget to increment `numFeatures`
// in include/xrpl/protocol/Feature.h.
XRPL_FIX (HookMap, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultYes)
XRPL_FIX (GuardDepth32, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(NamedHooks, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(IOURewardClaim, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)

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@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltCHECK, 0x0043, Check, check, ({
*/
LEDGER_ENTRY(ltHOOK_DEFINITION, 'D', HookDefinition, hook_definition, ({
{sfHookHash, soeREQUIRED},
{sfHookOn, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfHookOn, soeREQUIRED},
{sfHookOnIncoming, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfHookOnOutgoing, soeOPTIONAL},
{sfHookCanEmit, soeOPTIONAL},

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@@ -293,8 +293,6 @@ JSS(effective); // out: ValidatorList
// in: UNL
JSS(elapsed_seconds);
JSS(enabled); // out: AmendmentTable
JSS(ledger_enabled); // out: ServerDefinitions (amendment on-ledger)
JSS(cfg_forced); // out: ServerDefinitions ([features] config stanza)
JSS(engine_result); // out: NetworkOPs, TransactionSign, Submit
JSS(engine_result_code); // out: NetworkOPs, TransactionSign, Submit
JSS(engine_result_message); // out: NetworkOPs, TransactionSign, Submit

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@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
//==============================================================================
#include <test/jtx.h>
#include <test/jtx/AMM.h>
#include <xrpld/app/tx/applySteps.h>
#include <xrpld/ledger/Dir.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
@@ -4317,93 +4316,6 @@ struct Escrow_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env.close();
}
void
testIOUAMM(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("IOU AMM");
using namespace test::jtx;
using namespace std::chrono;
Account alice{"alice"};
Account bob{"bob"};
Account gw{"gw"};
auto const USD = gw["USD"];
// AMMCreate fails - insufficient balance
Env env(*this, features | featureAMM | featureAMMClawback);
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob, gw);
env.close();
env.trust(USD(100000), alice);
env.close();
env(pay(gw, alice, USD(1000)));
env.close();
env(escrow(alice, bob, USD(1000)), finish_time(env.now() + 1s));
env.close();
// AMMCreate fails - insufficient balance
AMM ammFail(env, alice, XRP(1000), USD(1000), ter(tecUNFUNDED_AMM));
env(pay(gw, alice, USD(1000)));
env.close();
AMM ammAlice(env, alice, XRP(1000), USD(1000));
BEAST_EXPECT(ammAlice.ammExists());
// Single Asset Deposit fails - insufficient balance
ammAlice.deposit(
alice,
USD(1000),
std::nullopt,
std::nullopt,
std::nullopt,
ter(tecUNFUNDED_AMM));
// Double Asset Deposit fails - insufficient balance
ammAlice.deposit(
alice,
USD(1000),
XRP(1000),
std::nullopt,
std::nullopt,
ter(tecUNFUNDED_AMM));
auto const lptoken = ammAlice.getLPTokensBalance(alice);
// lock all LP tokens
env(escrow(alice, bob, STAmount{lptoken, ammAlice.lptIssue()}),
finish_time(env.now() + 1s));
env.close();
// Withdraw
ammAlice.withdraw(
alice, USD(1000), std::nullopt, std::nullopt, ter(tecAMM_BALANCE));
ammAlice.withdrawAll(alice, USD(1000), ter(tecAMM_BALANCE));
env(ammAlice.bid(BidArg{
.account = alice,
.bidMax = 100,
.assets = {{USD, XRP}},
}),
ter(tecAMM_INVALID_TOKENS));
ammAlice.vote(
alice,
1'000,
std::nullopt,
std::nullopt,
{{USD, XRP}},
ter(tecAMM_INVALID_TOKENS));
// Cannot escrow clawbackable tokens, so we cannot ammClawback escrowed
// tokens
// env(amm::ammClawback(gw, alice, USD, XRP, USD(100)),
// ter(tecAMM_BALANCE));
// env(amm::ammClawback(gw, alice, USD, XRP, std::nullopt),
// ter(tecAMM_BALANCE));
}
static uint256
getEscrowIndex(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t uSequence)
{
@@ -4817,7 +4729,6 @@ struct Escrow_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
testIOUTLINSF(features);
testIOUPrecisionLoss(features);
testIOUClawback(features);
testIOUAMM(features);
}
public:

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@@ -3632,9 +3632,8 @@ public:
auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
auto const bob = Account{"bob"};
auto const claire = Account{"claire"};
Env env{*this, features};
env.fund(XRP(100000), alice, bob, claire);
env.fund(XRP(100000), alice, bob);
env.close();
// Compute hook hash for the accept hook
@@ -3774,84 +3773,6 @@ public:
BEAST_EXPECT(result2.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(result2.value() == newData.size());
}
{
// fixHookMap: foreign state set without grant after state previous
// modified
HookStateMap stateMap;
auto hookCtx = makeStubHookContext(
applyCtx, alice.id(), bob.id(), {}, stateMap);
AccountID const aliceid = alice.id();
// Pre-populate stateMap
stateMap[alice.id()] = {
100, // availableForReserves
1, // namespaceCount
1, // hookStateScale
{}};
auto& api = hookCtx.api();
// setup a hook on alice, and on claire, no grants
env(hook(alice, {{hso(genesis::AcceptHook)}}, 0), fee(XRP(1)));
env(hook(claire, {{hso(genesis::AcceptHook)}}, 0), fee(XRP(1)));
env.close();
// First modification
auto result1 =
api.state_foreign_set(testKey, testNs, aliceid, testData);
BEAST_EXPECT(result1.has_value());
// Second modification this time using bob as hookacc (should hit
// cache)
auto hookCtx2 = makeStubHookContext(
applyCtx, claire.id(), bob.id(), {}, stateMap);
// check the state entry is carried into the second context
// does the map contain the account?
BEAST_EXPECT(
hookCtx2.result.stateMap.find(aliceid) !=
hookCtx2.result.stateMap.end());
// the name space?
BEAST_EXPECT(
std::get<3>(hookCtx2.result.stateMap[aliceid]).find(testNs) !=
std::get<3>(hookCtx2.result.stateMap[aliceid]).end());
// the key entry?
BEAST_EXPECT(
std::get<3>(hookCtx2.result.stateMap[aliceid])[testNs].find(
testKey) !=
std::get<3>(hookCtx2.result.stateMap[aliceid])[testNs].end());
// is the entry marked as modified?
BEAST_EXPECT(
std::get<3>(hookCtx2.result.stateMap[aliceid])[testNs][testKey]
.first);
auto& api2 = hookCtx2.api();
Bytes newData{0x04, 0x05};
auto result2 =
api2.state_foreign_set(testKey, testNs, aliceid, newData);
if (features[fixHookMap])
{
// new behaviour: grant is missing, cannot write
BEAST_EXPECT(!result2.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(result2.error() == NOT_AUTHORIZED);
BEAST_EXPECT(hookCtx2.result.foreignStateSetDisabled);
}
else
{
// old behaviour: allow this illegal write due to the entry
// being modified previously in the map
BEAST_EXPECT(result2.has_value());
BEAST_EXPECT(result2.value() == newData.size());
}
}
}
void
@@ -4911,7 +4832,6 @@ public:
test_state(features);
test_state_foreign(features);
test_state_foreign_set(features - fixHookMap);
test_state_foreign_set(features);
test_state_foreign_set_max(features);
test_state_set(features);

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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ namespace ripple {
namespace test {
namespace jtx {
[[maybe_unused]] static Number
static Number
number(STAmount const& a)
{
if (isXRP(a))

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@@ -186,13 +186,10 @@ public:
bool expectObsolete =
(votes.at(feature[jss::name].asString()) ==
VoteBehavior::Obsolete);
// "enabled" is now the effective value (ledger_voted || forced);
// this default env votes nothing onto the ledger, so assert on the
// canonical on-ledger flag.
BEAST_EXPECTS(
feature.isMember(jss::ledger_enabled) &&
!feature[jss::ledger_enabled].asBool(),
feature[jss::name].asString() + " ledger_enabled");
feature.isMember(jss::enabled) &&
!feature[jss::enabled].asBool(),
feature[jss::name].asString() + " enabled");
BEAST_EXPECTS(
feature.isMember(jss::vetoed) &&
feature[jss::vetoed].isBool() == !expectObsolete &&
@@ -240,12 +237,10 @@ public:
bool expectObsolete =
(votes.at((*it)[jss::name].asString()) ==
VoteBehavior::Obsolete);
// expectEnabled reflects the on-ledger amendment table, so compare
// against ledger_enabled (enabled is now ledger_voted || forced).
BEAST_EXPECTS(
(*it).isMember(jss::ledger_enabled) &&
(*it)[jss::ledger_enabled].asBool() == expectEnabled,
(*it)[jss::name].asString() + " ledger_enabled");
(*it).isMember(jss::enabled) &&
(*it)[jss::enabled].asBool() == expectEnabled,
(*it)[jss::name].asString() + " enabled");
if (expectEnabled)
BEAST_EXPECTS(
!(*it).isMember(jss::vetoed),
@@ -365,78 +360,12 @@ public:
}
}
void
testConfigForced(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Config-forced features ([features] stanza)");
using namespace test::jtx;
// jtx enables amendments by inserting them into config.features (the
// same presets mechanism as the [features] config stanza), so passing
// a single-feature bitset gives us exactly one config-forced amendment
// and votes nothing onto the ledger. server_definitions must then
// report that one as effectively enabled, distinguishing the source:
// enabled = ledger_enabled || cfg_forced
// ledger_enabled = false (never voted onto the ledger)
// cfg_forced = true (forced via config) for the one feature only
auto const forced = featurePriceOracle;
auto const forcedHex = to_string(forced);
Env env{*this, FeatureBitset(forced)};
auto jrr = env.rpc("server_definitions")[jss::result];
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(jrr.isMember(jss::features)))
return;
bool sawForced = false;
for (auto it = jrr[jss::features].begin();
it != jrr[jss::features].end();
++it)
{
auto const& f = *it;
auto const name = f[jss::name].asString();
// every entry now carries the split flags
if (!BEAST_EXPECTS(
f.isMember(jss::enabled) &&
f.isMember(jss::ledger_enabled) &&
f.isMember(jss::cfg_forced),
name + " split flags"))
return;
// nothing is enabled on-ledger in a fresh env
BEAST_EXPECTS(
!f[jss::ledger_enabled].asBool(), name + " ledger_enabled");
if (it.key().asString() == forcedHex)
{
sawForced = true;
BEAST_EXPECTS(
f[jss::cfg_forced].asBool(), name + " cfg_forced");
// ledger_enabled(false) || cfg_forced(true) == true
BEAST_EXPECTS(f[jss::enabled].asBool(), name + " enabled");
}
else
{
BEAST_EXPECTS(
!f[jss::cfg_forced].asBool(), name + " cfg_forced");
// not forced and not on-ledger => not effectively enabled
BEAST_EXPECTS(
f[jss::enabled].asBool() == f[jss::ledger_enabled].asBool(),
name + " enabled==ledger_enabled");
}
}
BEAST_EXPECT(sawForced);
}
void
testServerFeatures(FeatureBitset features)
{
testNoParams(features);
testSomeEnabled(features);
testWithMajorities(features);
testConfigForced(features);
}
void

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@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include <queue>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
#include <wasmedge/wasmedge.h>
@@ -175,8 +174,6 @@ struct HookResult
false; // hook_again allows strong pre-apply to nominate
// additional weak post-apply execution
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> provisionalMeta;
std::set<std::pair<AccountID, uint256 /* namespace */>>
foreignStateGrantCache; // add found grants here to avoid rechecking
};
class HookExecutor;

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@@ -1920,114 +1920,88 @@ HookAPI::state_foreign_set(
if (hookCtx.result.foreignStateSetDisabled)
return Unexpected(PREVIOUS_FAILURE_PREVENTS_RETRY);
bool const hasFix = hookCtx.applyCtx.view().rules().enabled(fixHookMap);
if (!hasFix)
// first check if we've already modified this state
auto cacheEntry = lookup_state_cache(account, ns, key);
if (cacheEntry && cacheEntry->get().first)
{
// first check if we've already modified this state
auto cacheEntry = lookup_state_cache(account, ns, key);
if (cacheEntry && cacheEntry->get().first)
{
// if a cache entry already exists and it has already been modified
// don't check grants again
if (auto ret = set_state_cache(account, ns, key, data, true);
!ret.has_value())
return Unexpected(ret.error());
// if a cache entry already exists and it has already been modified
// don't check grants again
if (auto ret = set_state_cache(account, ns, key, data, true);
!ret.has_value())
return Unexpected(ret.error());
return data.size();
}
return data.size();
}
// check if we've used a grant to modify this state entry before, if not
// look up possible grants
if (!hasFix ||
hookCtx.result.foreignStateGrantCache.find({account, ns}) ==
hookCtx.result.foreignStateGrantCache.end())
// cache miss or cache was present but entry was not marked as previously
// modified therefore before continuing we need to check grants
auto const sle =
hookCtx.applyCtx.view().read(ripple::keylet::hook(account));
if (!sle)
return Unexpected(INTERNAL_ERROR);
bool found_auth = false;
// we do this by iterating the hooks installed on the foreign account and in
// turn their grants and namespaces
auto const& hooks = sle->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
for (auto const& hookObj : hooks)
{
auto const sle =
hookCtx.applyCtx.view().read(ripple::keylet::hook(account));
// skip blank entries
if (!hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookHash))
continue;
if (!sle)
if (!hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookGrants))
continue;
auto const& hookGrants = hookObj.getFieldArray(sfHookGrants);
if (hookGrants.size() < 1)
continue;
// the grant allows the hook to modify the granter's namespace only
if (hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookNamespace))
{
if (hasFix)
{
hookCtx.result.foreignStateSetDisabled = true;
return Unexpected(NOT_AUTHORIZED);
}
return Unexpected(INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (hookObj.getFieldH256(sfHookNamespace) != ns)
continue;
}
else
{
// fetch the hook definition
auto const def =
hookCtx.applyCtx.view().read(ripple::keylet::hookDefinition(
hookObj.getFieldH256(sfHookHash)));
if (!def) // should never happen except in a rare race condition
continue;
if (def->getFieldH256(sfHookNamespace) != ns)
continue;
}
// RH TODO: test this code path more completely
bool found_auth = false;
// we do this by iterating the hooks installed on the foreign account
// and in turn their grants and namespaces
auto const& hooks = sle->getFieldArray(sfHooks);
for (auto const& hookObj : hooks)
// this is expensive search so we'll disallow after one failed attempt
for (auto const& hookGrantObj : hookGrants)
{
// skip blank entries
if (!hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookHash))
continue;
bool hasAuthorizedField = hookGrantObj.isFieldPresent(sfAuthorize);
if (!hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookGrants))
continue;
auto const& hookGrants = hookObj.getFieldArray(sfHookGrants);
if (hookGrants.size() < 1)
continue;
// the grant allows the hook to modify the granter's namespace only
if (hookObj.isFieldPresent(sfHookNamespace))
if (hookGrantObj.getFieldH256(sfHookHash) ==
hookCtx.result.hookHash &&
(!hasAuthorizedField ||
hookGrantObj.getAccountID(sfAuthorize) ==
hookCtx.result.account))
{
if (hookObj.getFieldH256(sfHookNamespace) != ns)
continue;
}
else
{
// fetch the hook definition
auto const def =
hookCtx.applyCtx.view().read(ripple::keylet::hookDefinition(
hookObj.getFieldH256(sfHookHash)));
if (!def) // should never happen except in a rare race
// condition
continue;
if (def->getFieldH256(sfHookNamespace) != ns)
continue;
}
// this is expensive search so we'll disallow after one failed
// attempt
for (auto const& hookGrantObj : hookGrants)
{
bool hasAuthorizedField =
hookGrantObj.isFieldPresent(sfAuthorize);
if (hookGrantObj.getFieldH256(sfHookHash) ==
hookCtx.result.hookHash &&
(!hasAuthorizedField ||
hookGrantObj.getAccountID(sfAuthorize) ==
hookCtx.result.account))
{
found_auth = true;
break;
}
}
if (found_auth)
found_auth = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found_auth)
{
// hook only gets one attempt
hookCtx.result.foreignStateSetDisabled = true;
return Unexpected(NOT_AUTHORIZED);
}
if (found_auth)
break;
}
// add the grant to the cache
hookCtx.result.foreignStateGrantCache.emplace(account, ns);
if (!found_auth)
{
// hook only gets one attempt
hookCtx.result.foreignStateSetDisabled = true;
return Unexpected(NOT_AUTHORIZED);
}
if (auto ret = set_state_cache(account, ns, key, data, true);

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@@ -148,31 +148,6 @@ ammLPHolds(
// Put balance in account terms.
amount.negate();
}
// If tokens can be escrowed then they can be locked in the trustline
// which means we must never spend them until the escrow is released.
if (view.rules().enabled(featurePaychanAndEscrowForTokens) &&
sle->isFieldPresent(sfLockedBalance))
{
STAmount const lockedBalance = sle->getFieldAmount(sfLockedBalance);
STAmount const spendableBalance = amount -
(lpAccount > ammAccount ? -lockedBalance : lockedBalance);
// RH NOTE: this is defensively programmed, it should never fire
// if something bad does happen the trustline acts as a frozen line.
if (spendableBalance < beast::zero || spendableBalance > amount)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error())
<< "SpendableBalance has illegal value in accountHolds "
<< spendableBalance;
amount.clear(Issue{currency, ammAccount});
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
else
amount = spendableBalance;
}
amount.setIssuer(ammAccount);
JLOG(j.trace()) << "ammLPHolds:"

View File

@@ -259,6 +259,7 @@ AMMClawback::equalWithdrawMatchingOneAmount(
STAmount const& amount)
{
auto frac = Number{amount} / amountBalance;
auto amount2Withdraw = amount2Balance * frac;
auto const lpTokensWithdraw =
toSTAmount(lptAMMBalance.issue(), lptAMMBalance * frac);

View File

@@ -375,12 +375,10 @@ accountHolds(
// if something bad does happen the trustline acts as a frozen line.
if (spendableBalance < beast::zero || spendableBalance > amount)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error())
<< "SpendableBalance has illegal value in accountHolds "
<< spendableBalance;
amount.clear(Issue{currency, issuer});
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
else
amount = spendableBalance;

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
#include <xrpld/app/main/Application.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/AmendmentTable.h>
#include <xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.h>
#include <xrpld/core/Config.h>
#include <xrpld/rpc/detail/TransactionSign.h>
#include <xrpl/json/json_value.h>
#include <xrpl/json/json_writer.h>
@@ -546,39 +545,6 @@ doServerDefinitions(RPC::JsonContext& context)
features[to_string(h)][jss::majority] =
t.time_since_epoch().count();
// Amendment activation has two independent sources; surface both so a
// consumer isn't misled by a node that force-enables amendments:
// ledger_enabled : recorded in the on-ledger Amendments object
// (network-canonical; what the table reports as
// "enabled")
// cfg_forced : force-activated via the [features] config stanza
// (node-local; active in the Rules regardless of the
// ledger, casts no votes, never written on-ledger)
// enabled : effective for transaction processing on this
// server, i.e. ledger_enabled || cfg_forced
for (auto const& name : features.getMemberNames())
{
Json::Value& entry = features[name];
bool const ledgerEnabled = entry[jss::enabled].asBool();
entry[jss::ledger_enabled] = ledgerEnabled;
entry[jss::cfg_forced] = false;
// entry[jss::enabled] is left == ledgerEnabled here; only
// cfg_forced amendments below flip it.
}
for (auto const& h : context.app.config().features)
{
Json::Value& entry = features[to_string(h)];
if (!entry.isMember(jss::name))
{
if (auto const fname = featureToName(h); !fname.empty())
entry[jss::name] = fname;
}
if (!entry.isMember(jss::ledger_enabled))
entry[jss::ledger_enabled] = false;
entry[jss::cfg_forced] = true;
entry[jss::enabled] = true; // ledger_enabled || cfg_forced
}
lastFeatures = features;
{
const std::string out = Json::FastWriter().write(features);