Use the agreed exportSigSetHash sidecar map, not the live ExportSigCollector, as the network-mode ttEXPORT signer snapshot. Preserve export convergence state through RNG onPreBuild cleanup so buildLCL apply can see the gate result, and require a UNLReport-backed validator view before non-standalone Export finalization. Add regression coverage for agreed-vs-live collector mutation and onPreBuild export-state preservation.
A drift review (10-section adversarial pass + skeptical verification) found the design doc had fallen behind two recent code changes: the UNLReport-only gate (8368e12ab) and the F1 active-view alignment filter (fb9e2710c).
- Fallback Semantics: add the second fallback trigger -- a non-UNLReport-backed view mints consensus_fallback regardless of alignment.
- Validator Set And Quorum: note the config-fallback view is !fromUNLReport and forces consensus_fallback entropy.
- Entropy Alignment Rules: state the UNLReport precondition for non-fallback tiers; correct the alignment-count formula to the active-view-filtered count (non-active proposers and a non-active local +1 excluded -- the F1 fix); separate the two distinct counts (the peer-alignment GATE count vs the agreed entropySetMap_ leaf count that drives the tier LABEL); flag the explicit-final unfiltered exception.
- Worked examples: note they assume a UNLReport-anchored view (else all fall back).
- Export Principles: document that export success also requires full observation (peersSeen == txConverged), not just quorum alignment.
- Review Checklist: add items for the UNLReport-anchored-tier and alignment-count-universe (F1) invariants.
Doc-only. Raw drift findings kept in .ai-docs (gitignored).
The explicit-final proposal path counts participants/alignment over the unfiltered trusted-proposer set (ctx.peerPositions) plus an unconditional local +1, not the active validator view -- the same gap the F1 fix closed for the main entropy gate (inspectTxConvergedSidecarPeers). It is default-off/experimental with no robust timing model found (per the existing TBD, may never ship); if it is ever enabled it must apply the same active-view membership filter. Comment-only.
Follow-up to F1 (fb9e2710c).
testInvalidEntropyRequirements rejects four invalid dice/random requirements then returned accept(0,0,0) on success. But a valid dice(6,..) returns 0..5, so a regression that let the min_tier=0 requirement through (returning a value that happened to be 0) would still pass ~1/6 of the time -- the weakest spot is exactly the min_tier lower bound it most needs to prove (review finding). Return sentinel 42 (distinct from any dice/random result and from INVALID_ARGUMENT) and assert ==42, so any leaked requirement returns its own non-42 code and fails. WASM block recompiled; ConsensusEntropy 138 tests, 0 failures.
Follow-up to F1 (fb9e2710c).
The entropy/export bless-vs-fallback gate counted alignment over ALL tx-converged trusted proposers (currPeerPositions_), while the thresholds and the entropy leaf set are computed over the active validator view. A node that locally trusts proposers outside the on-ledger UNLReport active set could pad alignedParticipants(), inflating the counting universe N above originalViewSize and eroding the Tier-2 intersection margin (2t - N) below the Byzantine floor f -- so two equivocation cohorts padded by non-active aligners could each clear the gate (review finding F1). Backstopped by the 80% validation quorum, but the proof's universe and the code's universe must match.
inspectTxConvergedSidecarPeers now takes an active-view membership predicate and counts only member peers toward alignment; the local +1 is gated on localIsActiveValidator(). Both the RNG entropy gate and the export-sig gate pass ext.isUNLReportMember / ext.localIsActiveValidator, mirroring buildEntropySet / hasQuorumOfCommits' containsNode filter. New method on ConsensusExtensions + CSF Peer + the FakeExtensions stub.
Regression test (Sidecar peer alignment helper): a trusted-but-non-active aligned proposer pushes unfiltered aligned to 2 but filtered aligned stays 1, and a non-active local node's +1 is suppressed -- padding cannot satisfy the gate. ConsensusExtensions 900, ConsensusRng 386, Consensus 1399, all green.
Note: the explicit-final proposal path (ConsensusExtensionsTick.h ~:934) counts over prevProposers and is NOT yet filtered (separate, experimental path).
The tier-2 anchor pin (20d52d8b6) used an 8/6 (original/effective) nUNL config whose rationale was wrong: it computed cohort overlap against the original view (2*4-8=0), but aligned cohorts form in the EFFECTIVE view, so two 4-of-6 cohorts overlap by 2*4-6=2 > floor(8/5)=1 -- 8/6 is NOT actually forkable, the original-view anchor is merely conservative there. The test still caught the originalViewSize->size() regression, but the stated reason was misleading (review catch).
Switch to 10 active / 2 disabled (original 10, effective 8), a genuinely forkable case: a 5-of-8 cohort (what the effective-size threshold would admit) overlaps only 2*5-8=2, which does NOT exceed the f=floor(10/5)=2 faulty the original UNL still tolerates -> an equivocator could mint two distinct tier-2 digests. The correct original anchor requires 7 (overlap 6 > 2) and keeps the band closed (tier2==quorum==7); a regression to size() drops the floor to 5 and re-opens the forkable [5,7) band. Assertions and rationale updated to match; suite green (897, 0 failures).
tier2Threshold() anchors to originalViewSize (pre-nUNL), not the effective post-nUNL size(): nUNL shrinks the effective view while leaving faulty nodes in it, so a sub-quorum fraction of the effective view can exceed the Byzantine bound. A one-line regression to size() would relabel a forkable cohort as participant_aligned -- and no existing test caught it (the only nUNL test never calls tier2Threshold()/selectEntropy, and the only tier-2 selection test has no nUNL, so original == effective there).
Add testTier2ThresholdAnchorsToOriginalView: 8 active validators, 2 disabled via NegativeUNL (original 8, effective 6), asserting tier2Threshold()==5 (from the original 8) not 4 (from the effective 6), with quorum/gate cross-checks. Mutation-verified: flipping the production read to size() turns exactly this test red (tier2Threshold + entropyGateThreshold) while the existing tier-2 selection test stays green.
Also: pointer comment at tier2Threshold() linking the invariant to its guard test, and a design-doc fix -- the worked example used n=5, where the band is empty (quorum == participant_aligned == 4) so it illustrated an unreachable tier; now n=6.
The 5/6 phase asserted validator_quorum on whichever single ledger the validated tip happened to sit on. But the ledger right at the node-5 drop can be a transient consensus_fallback (EntropyTier=1, count=0) — deterministic and by design, while the commit/reveal pipeline re-primes — so when the tip landed there the assert failed (tier=1, observed ~1 run in 4). Same class of bug as the old post-recovery flake: depending on exactly where the tip lands.
Now settle 4 ledgers past the drop, then scan the post-drop validated ledgers for a clean validator_quorum (tier 3, count >= quorum). The window is entirely 5-node cohorts, so a tier-3 there has count == 5 (faithful to '5/6 still tier 3'); the transition fallback is tolerated, not asserted on. Verified 3/3: each run found tier=3 count=5.
Also harden _closed_entropy() to raise on != 1 ConsensusEntropy pseudo-tx (mirroring get_entropy_tx) instead of silently skipping — a duplicate/missing injection now fails with a clear error rather than resurfacing as a generic 'no tier-2 ledger'.
Codex review minors: assert_validator_quorum at the 5/6 boundary (EntropyTier=3 AND count >= quorum AND non-zero digest, not just tier==3 — catches a bad tier/count pairing); added explicit assert_validator_quorum / assert_consensus_fallback helpers and an entropy_fields() warning that its is_fallback (tier != 3) lumps participant_aligned in with fallback (safe only where no tier-2 band exists).
Robustness: tier 2 is below the validation quorum, so the validated tip stalls and which provisional ledgers it later reaches is timing-dependent (the post-recovery inspection was fragile). Replaced it with direct inspection of the surviving cohort's CLOSED ledger via ledger('closed') DURING the window; recovery is now a pure liveness check.
Verified on a live testnet: PASS — EntropyTier=2 count=4 confirmed on 4 distinct provisional ledgers (seq 7-10).
A 6-node smoke (the smallest NON-degenerate tier-2 size: tier2 floor 4, quorum 5) driving the 4/6 band. n=5 has no band (tier2 == quorum), which is why the existing degradation smoke only ever sees tier 3 / fallback.
Tier 2 is below the 80% validation quorum, so the 4/6 cohort's ledgers are provisional: the scenario confirms tier-2 injection from the cohort's logs during the window, then verifies the on-ledger EntropyTier=2 count=4 POST-RECOVERY once those ledgers become canonical and validate (the mechanism the degradation smoke also relies on). Adds the assert_participant_aligned helper and the node_count:6 suite entry.
Verified on a live testnet: PASS — 12 tier-2 injections in the 4/6 window, seq 7 & 8 validated as participant_aligned (count 4).
