Reuse SidecarPeerAlignment::quorumAligned for export sidecar gates, name the shared sidecar convergence timeout, and centralize the RNG commitment tuple.
Also make ExportLimits::maxExportsPerHook the value enforced by xport_reserve, with a static assertion against the hook ABI constant.
Bound proposal-carried export signature blobs before hashing them during proposal precheck, and apply the same size cap at export signature harvest as defense in depth.
Cap the unverified export-signature cache by distinct tx hash while leaving verified signatures and existing entries ungated, so real exports can still reach quorum.
Domain-separate Hook RNG using the actual strong/weak execution role at draw time, and document the residual commit/reveal withholding bias across all entropy tiers.
Codex final-review minors, both comment-only (no behavior change): EntropyTier participant_aligned no longer says "reserved for a future" tier (it is implemented in this stack); and the commit-timeout path comment said "fixed UNL quorum" but the code now uses entropyGateThreshold() (min(quorum, tier2)).
Replace the zero-entropy fallback with a deterministic consensus-bound
digest so every RNG-enabled ledger carries usable entropy:
- sha512Half(HashPrefix::entropyFallback, prevLedgerHash, baseTxSetHash,
seq) — all inputs are already consensus-agreed at injection time, so
no new agreement machinery is needed and the digest is identical on
every node building the same ledger
- new sfEntropyTier (UINT8) on the ttCONSENSUS_ENTROPY pseudo-tx and
ConsensusEntropy ledger entry: EntropyCount says how many validators
contributed, EntropyTier says which gate the result passed
(validator_quorum vs consensus_fallback; participant_aligned reserved)
- the fallback digest derives from the BASE (pre-injection) tx set hash
to avoid circularity; entropy pseudo-tx dedup is now type-based since
an explicit-final synthetic set can carry a pseudo-tx whose txID
implicit nodes cannot re-derive
- unparseable-entropy-set residual now falls back instead of skipping
injection, so a fresh ConsensusEntropy entry exists every ledger
- CSF Peer mirrors the fallback analog; sims assert deterministic
non-zero fallback digests across same-LCL peers
- testnet scenarios updated: degraded windows expect labeled fallback
entropy, never validator-tier
The fallback tier is user-influenceable via tx submission (quiet-ledger
grinding) and is labeled accordingly — hook-facing gating lands with the
min_tier/min_count API change.
Due to rounding, the LPTokenBalance of the last LP might not match the LP's trustline balance. This was fixed for `AMMWithdraw` in `fixAMMv1_1` by adjusting the LPTokenBalance to be the same as the trustline balance. Since `AMMClawback` is also performing a withdrawal, we need to adjust LPTokenBalance as well in `AMMClawback.`
This change includes:
1. Refactored `verifyAndAdjustLPTokenBalance` function in `AMMUtils`, which both`AMMWithdraw` and `AMMClawback` call to adjust LPTokenBalance.
2. Added the unit test `testLastHolderLPTokenBalance` to test the scenario.
3. Modify the existing unit tests for `fixAMMClawbackRounding`.
* Add AMM bid/create/deposit/swap/withdraw/vote invariants:
- Deposit, Withdrawal invariants: `sqrt(asset1Balance * asset2Balance) >= LPTokens`.
- Bid: `sqrt(asset1Balance * asset2Balance) > LPTokens` and the pool balances don't change.
- Create: `sqrt(asset1Balance * assetBalance2) == LPTokens`.
- Swap: `asset1BalanceAfter * asset2BalanceAfter >= asset1BalanceBefore * asset2BalanceBefore`
and `LPTokens` don't change.
- Vote: `LPTokens` and pool balances don't change.
- All AMM and swap transactions: amounts and tokens are greater than zero, except on withdrawal if all tokens
are withdrawn.
* Add AMM deposit and withdraw rounding to ensure AMM invariant:
- On deposit, tokens out are rounded downward and deposit amount is rounded upward.
- On withdrawal, tokens in are rounded upward and withdrawal amount is rounded downward.
* Add Order Book Offer invariant to verify consumed amounts. Consumed amounts are less than the offer.
* Fix Bid validation. `AuthAccount` can't have duplicate accounts or the submitter account.
Cap pending ttEXPORT work in open/apply ledgers, including hook-emitted exports when TxQ drains the emitted directory into the open ledger. Enforce the same bound for per-account shadow tickets so durable pending imports cannot grow unbounded.
