Changes the error to `malformedAddress` for `permissioned_domain` in the `ledger_entry` rpc, when the account is not a string. This change makes it more clear to a user what is wrong with their request.
What the LoadManager class does is stall detection, which is not the same as deadlock detection. In the condition of severe CPU starvation, LoadManager will currently intentionally crash rippled reporting `LogicError: Deadlock detected`. This error message is misleading as the condition being detected is not a deadlock. This change fixes and refactors the code in response.
Requiring manual updates of numFeatures is an annoying manual process that is easily forgotten, and leads to frequent merge conflicts. This change takes advantage of the `XRPL_FEATURE` and `XRPL_FIX` macros, and adds a new `XRPL_RETIRE` macro to automatically set `numFeatures`.
The codebase is filled with includes that are unused, and which thus can be removed. At the same time, the files often do not include all headers that contain the definitions used in those files. This change uses clang-format and clang-tidy to clean up the includes, with minor manual intervention to ensure the code compiles on all platforms.
Due to rounding, the LPTokenBalance of the last LP might not match the LP's trustline balance. This was fixed for `AMMWithdraw` in `fixAMMv1_1` by adjusting the LPTokenBalance to be the same as the trustline balance. Since `AMMClawback` is also performing a withdrawal, we need to adjust LPTokenBalance as well in `AMMClawback.`
This change includes:
1. Refactored `verifyAndAdjustLPTokenBalance` function in `AMMUtils`, which both`AMMWithdraw` and `AMMClawback` call to adjust LPTokenBalance.
2. Added the unit test `testLastHolderLPTokenBalance` to test the scenario.
3. Modify the existing unit tests for `fixAMMClawbackRounding`.
* Add AMM bid/create/deposit/swap/withdraw/vote invariants:
- Deposit, Withdrawal invariants: `sqrt(asset1Balance * asset2Balance) >= LPTokens`.
- Bid: `sqrt(asset1Balance * asset2Balance) > LPTokens` and the pool balances don't change.
- Create: `sqrt(asset1Balance * assetBalance2) == LPTokens`.
- Swap: `asset1BalanceAfter * asset2BalanceAfter >= asset1BalanceBefore * asset2BalanceBefore`
and `LPTokens` don't change.
- Vote: `LPTokens` and pool balances don't change.
- All AMM and swap transactions: amounts and tokens are greater than zero, except on withdrawal if all tokens
are withdrawn.
* Add AMM deposit and withdraw rounding to ensure AMM invariant:
- On deposit, tokens out are rounded downward and deposit amount is rounded upward.
- On withdrawal, tokens in are rounded upward and withdrawal amount is rounded downward.
* Add Order Book Offer invariant to verify consumed amounts. Consumed amounts are less than the offer.
* Fix Bid validation. `AuthAccount` can't have duplicate accounts or the submitter account.
Combine multiple related debug log data points into a single
message. Allows quick correlation of events that
previously were either not logged or, if logged, strewn
across multiple lines, making correlation difficult.
The Heartbeat Timer and consensus ledger accept processing
each have this capability.
Also guarantees that log entries will be written if the
node is a validator, regardless of log severity level.
Otherwise, the level of these messages is at INFO severity.
* Add logging for amendment voting decision process
* When counting "received validations" to determine quorum, count the number of validators actually voting, not the total number of possible votes.
The current comment in the example cfg file incorrectly mentions both "may" and "must". This change fixes this comment to clarify that the default port of hosts is 2459 and that specifying it is therefore optional. It further sets the default port to 2459 instead of the legacy 51235.
This change enhances the filtering in the ledger, ledger_data, and account_objects methods by also supporting filtering by the canonical name of the LedgerEntryType using case-insensitive matching.
Rewrites the code so that the lock is not held during the callback. Instead it locks twice, once before, and once after. This is safe due to the structure of the code, but is checked after the second lock. This allows mutex_ to be changed back to a regular mutex.
