LoanSet.cpp

#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/LoanSet.h>
//
#include <xrpld/app/misc/LendingHelpers.h>
 
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
 
namespace xrpl {
 
bool
LoanSet::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
    return checkLendingProtocolDependencies(ctx);
}
 
std::uint32_t
LoanSet::getFlagsMask(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
    return tfLoanSetMask;
}
 
NotTEC
LoanSet::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
    using namespace Lending;
 
    auto const& tx = ctx.tx;
 
    // Special case for Batch inner transactions
    if (tx.isFlag(tfInnerBatchTxn) && ctx.rules.enabled(featureBatch) &&
        !tx.isFieldPresent(sfCounterparty))
    {
        auto const parentBatchId = ctx.parentBatchId.value_or(uint256{0});
        JLOG(ctx.j.debug()) << "BatchTrace[" << parentBatchId << "]: "
                            << "no Counterparty for inner LoanSet transaction.";
        return temBAD_SIGNER;
    }
 
    // These extra hoops are because STObjects cannot be Proxy'd from STObject.
    auto const counterPartySig = [&tx]() -> std::optional<STObject const> {
        if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfCounterpartySignature))
            return tx.getFieldObject(sfCounterpartySignature);
        return std::nullopt;
    }();
    if (!tx.isFlag(tfInnerBatchTxn) && !counterPartySig)
    {
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn())
            << "LoanSet transaction must have a CounterpartySignature.";
        return temBAD_SIGNER;
    }
 
    if (counterPartySig)
    {
        if (auto const ret =
                xrpl::detail::preflightCheckSigningKey(*counterPartySig, ctx.j))
            return ret;
    }
 
    if (auto const data = tx[~sfData]; data && !data->empty() &&
        !validDataLength(tx[~sfData], maxDataPayloadLength))
        return temINVALID;
    for (auto const& field :
         {&sfLoanServiceFee, &sfLatePaymentFee, &sfClosePaymentFee})
    {
        if (!validNumericMinimum(tx[~*field]))
            return temINVALID;
    }
    // Principal Requested is required
    if (auto const p = tx[sfPrincipalRequested]; p <= 0)
        return temINVALID;
    else if (!validNumericRange(tx[~sfLoanOriginationFee], p))
        return temINVALID;
    if (!validNumericRange(tx[~sfInterestRate], maxInterestRate))
        return temINVALID;
    if (!validNumericRange(tx[~sfOverpaymentFee], maxOverpaymentFee))
        return temINVALID;
    if (!validNumericRange(tx[~sfLateInterestRate], maxLateInterestRate))
        return temINVALID;
    if (!validNumericRange(tx[~sfCloseInterestRate], maxCloseInterestRate))
        return temINVALID;
    if (!validNumericRange(
            tx[~sfOverpaymentInterestRate], maxOverpaymentInterestRate))
        return temINVALID;
 
    if (auto const paymentTotal = tx[~sfPaymentTotal];
        paymentTotal && *paymentTotal <= 0)
        return temINVALID;
 
    if (auto const paymentInterval = tx[~sfPaymentInterval];
        !validNumericMinimum(paymentInterval, LoanSet::minPaymentInterval))
        return temINVALID;
    // Grace period is between min default value and payment interval
    else if (auto const gracePeriod = tx[~sfGracePeriod];  //
             !validNumericRange(
                 gracePeriod,
                 paymentInterval.value_or(LoanSet::defaultPaymentInterval),
                 defaultGracePeriod))
        return temINVALID;
 
    // Copied from preflight2
    if (counterPartySig)
    {
        if (auto const ret = xrpl::detail::preflightCheckSimulateKeys(
                ctx.flags, *counterPartySig, ctx.j))
            return *ret;
    }
 
    if (auto const brokerID = ctx.tx[~sfLoanBrokerID];
        brokerID && *brokerID == beast::zero)
        return temINVALID;
 
    return tesSUCCESS;
}
 
NotTEC
LoanSet::checkSign(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
    if (auto ret = Transactor::checkSign(ctx))
        return ret;
 
    // Counter signer is optional. If it's not specified, it's assumed to be
    // `LoanBroker.Owner`. Note that we have not checked whether the
    // loanbroker exists at this point.
    auto const counterSigner = [&]() -> std::optional<AccountID> {
        if (auto const c = ctx.tx.at(~sfCounterparty))
            return c;
 
        if (auto const broker =
                ctx.view.read(keylet::loanbroker(ctx.tx[sfLoanBrokerID])))
            return broker->at(sfOwner);
        return std::nullopt;
    }();
    if (!counterSigner)
        return temBAD_SIGNER;
 
    // Counterparty signature is optional. Presence is checked in preflight.
    if (!ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfCounterpartySignature))
        return tesSUCCESS;
    auto const counterSig = ctx.tx.getFieldObject(sfCounterpartySignature);
    return Transactor::checkSign(
        ctx.view,
        ctx.flags,
        ctx.parentBatchId,
        *counterSigner,
        counterSig,
        ctx.j);
}
 
XRPAmount
LoanSet::calculateBaseFee(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
{
    auto const normalCost = Transactor::calculateBaseFee(view, tx);
 
    // Compute the additional cost of each signature in the
    // CounterpartySignature, whether a single signature or a multisignature
    XRPAmount const baseFee = view.fees().base;
 
    // Counterparty signature is optional, but getFieldObject will return an
    // empty object if it's not present.
    auto const counterSig = tx.getFieldObject(sfCounterpartySignature);
    // Each signer adds one more baseFee to the minimum required fee
    // for the transaction. Note that unlike the base class, the single signer
    // is counted if present. It will only be absent in a batch inner
    // transaction.
    std::size_t const signerCount = [&counterSig]() {
        // Compute defensively. Assure that "tx" cannot be accessed and cause
        // confusion or miscalculations.
        return counterSig.isFieldPresent(sfSigners)
            ? counterSig.getFieldArray(sfSigners).size()
            : (counterSig.isFieldPresent(sfTxnSignature) ? 1 : 0);
    }();
 
    return normalCost + (signerCount * baseFee);
}
 
std::vector<OptionaledField<STNumber>> const&
LoanSet::getValueFields()
{
    static std::vector<OptionaledField<STNumber>> const valueFields{
        ~sfPrincipalRequested,
        ~sfLoanOriginationFee,
        ~sfLoanServiceFee,
        ~sfLatePaymentFee,
        ~sfClosePaymentFee
        // Overpayment fee is really a rate. Don't check it here.
    };
 
    return valueFields;
}
 
static std::uint32_t
getStartDate(ReadView const& view)
{
    return view.header().closeTime.time_since_epoch().count();
}
 
TER
LoanSet::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
    auto const& tx = ctx.tx;
 
    {
        // Check for numeric overflow of the schedule before we load any
        // objects. The Grace Period for the last payment ends at:
        //     startDate + (paymentInterval * paymentTotal) + gracePeriod.
        // If that value is larger than "maxTime", the value
        // overflows, and we kill the transaction.
        using timeType = decltype(sfNextPaymentDueDate)::type::value_type;
        static_assert(std::is_same_v<timeType, std::uint32_t>);
        timeType constexpr maxTime = std::numeric_limits<timeType>::max();
        static_assert(maxTime == 4'294'967'295);
 
        auto const timeAvailable = maxTime - getStartDate(ctx.view);
 
        auto const interval =
            ctx.tx.at(~sfPaymentInterval).value_or(defaultPaymentInterval);
        auto const total =
            ctx.tx.at(~sfPaymentTotal).value_or(defaultPaymentTotal);
        auto const grace =
            ctx.tx.at(~sfGracePeriod).value_or(defaultGracePeriod);
 
        // The grace period can't be larger than the interval. Check it first,
        // mostly so that unit tests can test that specific case.
        if (grace > timeAvailable)
        {
            JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Grace period exceeds protocol time limit.";
            return tecKILLED;
        }
 
        if (interval > timeAvailable)
        {
            JLOG(ctx.j.warn())
                << "Payment interval exceeds protocol time limit.";
            return tecKILLED;
        }
 
        if (total > timeAvailable)
        {
            JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Payment total exceeds protocol time limit.";
            return tecKILLED;
        }
 
        auto const timeLastPayment = timeAvailable - grace;
 
        if (timeLastPayment / interval < total)
        {
            JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Last payment due date, or grace period for "
                                  "last payment exceeds protocol time limit.";
            return tecKILLED;
        }
    }
 
    auto const account = tx[sfAccount];
    auto const brokerID = tx[sfLoanBrokerID];
 
    auto const brokerSle = ctx.view.read(keylet::loanbroker(brokerID));
    if (!brokerSle)
    {
        // This can only be hit if there's a counterparty specified, otherwise
        // it'll fail in the signature check
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "LoanBroker does not exist.";
        return tecNO_ENTRY;
    }
    auto const brokerOwner = brokerSle->at(sfOwner);
    auto const counterparty = tx[~sfCounterparty].value_or(brokerOwner);
    if (account != brokerOwner && counterparty != brokerOwner)
    {
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Neither Account nor Counterparty are the owner "
                              "of the LoanBroker.";
        return tecNO_PERMISSION;
    }
    auto const brokerPseudo = brokerSle->at(sfAccount);
 
    auto const borrower = counterparty == brokerOwner ? account : counterparty;
    if (auto const borrowerSle = ctx.view.read(keylet::account(borrower));
        !borrowerSle)
    {
        // It may not be possible to hit this case, because it'll fail the
        // signature check with terNO_ACCOUNT.
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Borrower does not exist.";
        return terNO_ACCOUNT;
    }
 
    auto const vault = ctx.view.read(keylet::vault(brokerSle->at(sfVaultID)));
    if (!vault)
        // Should be impossible
        return tefBAD_LEDGER;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
 
    if (vault->at(sfAssetsMaximum) != 0 &&
        vault->at(sfAssetsTotal) >= vault->at(sfAssetsMaximum))
    {
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn())
            << "Vault at maximum assets limit. Can't add another loan.";
        return tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED;
    }
 
    Asset const asset = vault->at(sfAsset);
 
    auto const vaultPseudo = vault->at(sfAccount);
 
    // Check that relevant values can be represented as the vault asset type.
    // This check is almost duplicated in doApply, but that check is done after
    // the overall loan scale is known. This is mostly only relevant for
    // integral (non-IOU) types
    {
        for (auto const& field : getValueFields())
        {
            if (auto const value = tx[field];
                value && STAmount{asset, *value} != *value)
            {
                JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << field.f->getName() << " (" << *value
                                   << ") can not be represented as a(n) "
                                   << to_string(asset) << ".";
                return tecPRECISION_LOSS;
            }
        }
    }
 
    if (auto const ter = canAddHolding(ctx.view, asset))
        return ter;
 
    // vaultPseudo is going to send funds, so it can't be frozen.
    if (auto const ret = checkFrozen(ctx.view, vaultPseudo, asset))
    {
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Vault pseudo-account is frozen.";
        return ret;
    }
 
    // brokerPseudo is the fallback account to receive LoanPay fees, even if the
    // broker owner is unable to accept them. Don't create the loan if it is
    // deep frozen.
    if (auto const ret = checkDeepFrozen(ctx.view, brokerPseudo, asset))
    {
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Broker pseudo-account is frozen.";
        return ret;
    }
 
    // borrower is eventually going to have to pay back the loan, so it can't be
    // frozen now. It is also going to receive funds, so it can't be deep
    // frozen, but being frozen is a prerequisite for being deep frozen, so
    // checking the one is sufficient.
    if (auto const ret = checkFrozen(ctx.view, borrower, asset))
    {
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Borrower account is frozen.";
        return ret;
    }
    // brokerOwner is going to receive funds if there's an origination fee, so
    // it can't be deep frozen
    if (auto const ret = checkDeepFrozen(ctx.view, brokerOwner, asset))
    {
        JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Broker owner account is frozen.";
        return ret;
    }
 
    return tesSUCCESS;
}
 
TER
LoanSet::doApply()
{
    auto const& tx = ctx_.tx;
    auto& view = ctx_.view();
 
    auto const brokerID = tx[sfLoanBrokerID];
 
    auto const brokerSle = view.peek(keylet::loanbroker(brokerID));
    if (!brokerSle)
        return tefBAD_LEDGER;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
    auto const brokerOwner = brokerSle->at(sfOwner);
    auto const brokerOwnerSle = view.peek(keylet::account(brokerOwner));
    if (!brokerOwnerSle)
        return tefBAD_LEDGER;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
 
    auto const vaultSle = view.peek(keylet ::vault(brokerSle->at(sfVaultID)));
    if (!vaultSle)
        return tefBAD_LEDGER;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
    auto const vaultPseudo = vaultSle->at(sfAccount);
    Asset const vaultAsset = vaultSle->at(sfAsset);
 
    auto const counterparty = tx[~sfCounterparty].value_or(brokerOwner);
    auto const borrower = counterparty == brokerOwner ? account_ : counterparty;
    auto const borrowerSle = view.peek(keylet::account(borrower));
    if (!borrowerSle)
    {
        return tefBAD_LEDGER;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
    }
 
    auto const brokerPseudo = brokerSle->at(sfAccount);
    auto const brokerPseudoSle = view.peek(keylet::account(brokerPseudo));
    if (!brokerPseudoSle)
    {
        return tefBAD_LEDGER;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
    }
    auto const principalRequested = tx[sfPrincipalRequested];
 
    auto vaultAvailableProxy = vaultSle->at(sfAssetsAvailable);
    auto vaultTotalProxy = vaultSle->at(sfAssetsTotal);
    auto const vaultScale = getAssetsTotalScale(vaultSle);
    if (vaultAvailableProxy < principalRequested)
    {
        JLOG(j_.warn())
            << "Insufficient assets available in the Vault to fund the loan.";
        return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
    }
 
    TenthBips32 const interestRate{tx[~sfInterestRate].value_or(0)};
 
    auto const paymentInterval =
        tx[~sfPaymentInterval].value_or(defaultPaymentInterval);
    auto const paymentTotal = tx[~sfPaymentTotal].value_or(defaultPaymentTotal);
 
    auto const properties = computeLoanProperties(
        vaultAsset,
        principalRequested,
        interestRate,
        paymentInterval,
        paymentTotal,
        TenthBips16{brokerSle->at(sfManagementFeeRate)},
        vaultScale);
 
    LoanState const state = constructLoanState(
        properties.loanState.valueOutstanding,
        principalRequested,
        properties.loanState.managementFeeDue);
 
    auto const vaultMaximum = *vaultSle->at(sfAssetsMaximum);
    XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
        vaultMaximum == 0 || vaultMaximum > *vaultTotalProxy,
        "xrpl::LoanSet::doApply",
        "Vault is below maximum limit");
    if (vaultMaximum != 0 && state.interestDue > vaultMaximum - vaultTotalProxy)
    {
        JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Loan would exceed the maximum assets of the vault";
        return tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED;
    }
    // Check that relevant values won't lose precision. This is mostly only
    // relevant for IOU assets.
    {
        for (auto const& field : getValueFields())
        {
            if (auto const value = tx[field];
                value && !isRounded(vaultAsset, *value, properties.loanScale))
            {
                JLOG(j_.warn())
                    << field.f->getName() << " (" << *value
                    << ") has too much precision. Total loan value is "
                    << properties.loanState.valueOutstanding
                    << " with a scale of " << properties.loanScale;
                return tecPRECISION_LOSS;
            }
        }
    }
 
    if (auto const ret = checkLoanGuards(
            vaultAsset,
            principalRequested,
            interestRate != beast::zero,
            paymentTotal,
            properties,
            j_))
        return ret;
 
    // Check that the other computed values are valid
    if (properties.loanState.managementFeeDue < 0 ||
        properties.loanState.valueOutstanding <= 0 ||
        properties.periodicPayment <= 0)
    {
        // LCOV_EXCL_START
        JLOG(j_.warn())
            << "Computed loan properties are invalid. Does not compute."
            << " Management fee: " << properties.loanState.managementFeeDue
            << ". Total Value: " << properties.loanState.valueOutstanding
            << ". PeriodicPayment: " << properties.periodicPayment;
        return tecINTERNAL;
        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
    }
 
    auto const originationFee = tx[~sfLoanOriginationFee].value_or(Number{});
 
    auto const loanAssetsToBorrower = principalRequested - originationFee;
 
    auto const newDebtDelta = principalRequested + state.interestDue;
    auto const newDebtTotal = brokerSle->at(sfDebtTotal) + newDebtDelta;
    if (auto const debtMaximum = brokerSle->at(sfDebtMaximum);
        debtMaximum != 0 && debtMaximum < newDebtTotal)
    {
        JLOG(j_.warn())
            << "Loan would exceed the maximum debt limit of the LoanBroker.";
        return tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED;
    }
    TenthBips32 const coverRateMinimum{brokerSle->at(sfCoverRateMinimum)};
    {
        // Round the minimum required cover up to be conservative. This ensures
        // CoverAvailable never drops below the theoretical minimum, protecting
        // the broker's solvency.
        NumberRoundModeGuard mg(Number::upward);
        if (brokerSle->at(sfCoverAvailable) <
            tenthBipsOfValue(newDebtTotal, coverRateMinimum))
        {
            JLOG(j_.warn())
                << "Insufficient first-loss capital to cover the loan.";
            return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
        }
    }
 
    adjustOwnerCount(view, borrowerSle, 1, j_);
    {
        auto const ownerCount = borrowerSle->at(sfOwnerCount);
        auto const balance = account_ == borrower
            ? mPriorBalance
            : borrowerSle->at(sfBalance).value().xrp();
        if (balance < view.fees().accountReserve(ownerCount))
            return tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE;
    }
 
    // Account for the origination fee using two payments
    //
    // 1. Transfer loanAssetsAvailable (principalRequested - originationFee)
    // from vault pseudo-account to the borrower.
    // Create a holding for the borrower if one does not already exist.
 
    XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
        borrower == account_ || borrower == counterparty,
        "xrpl::LoanSet::doApply",
        "borrower signed transaction");
    if (auto const ter = addEmptyHolding(
            view,
            borrower,
            borrowerSle->at(sfBalance).value().xrp(),
            vaultAsset,
            j_);
        ter && ter != tecDUPLICATE)
        // ignore tecDUPLICATE. That means the holding already exists, and
        // is fine here
        return ter;
 
    if (auto const ter =
            requireAuth(view, vaultAsset, borrower, AuthType::StrongAuth))
        return ter;
 
    // 2. Transfer originationFee, if any, from vault pseudo-account to
    // LoanBroker owner.
    if (originationFee != beast::zero)
    {
        // Create the holding if it doesn't already exist (necessary for MPTs).
        // The owner may have deleted their MPT / line at some point.
        XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
            brokerOwner == account_ || brokerOwner == counterparty,
            "xrpl::LoanSet::doApply",
            "broker owner signed transaction");
 
        if (auto const ter = addEmptyHolding(
                view,
                brokerOwner,
                brokerOwnerSle->at(sfBalance).value().xrp(),
                vaultAsset,
                j_);
            ter && ter != tecDUPLICATE)
            // ignore tecDUPLICATE. That means the holding already exists,
            // and is fine here
            return ter;
    }
 
    if (auto const ter =
            requireAuth(view, vaultAsset, brokerOwner, AuthType::StrongAuth))
        return ter;
 
    if (auto const ter = accountSendMulti(
            view,
            vaultPseudo,
            vaultAsset,
            {{borrower, loanAssetsToBorrower}, {brokerOwner, originationFee}},
            j_,
            WaiveTransferFee::Yes))
        return ter;
 
    // Get shortcuts to the loan property values
    auto const startDate = getStartDate(view);
    auto loanSequenceProxy = brokerSle->at(sfLoanSequence);
 
    // Create the loan
    auto loan =
        std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::loan(brokerID, *loanSequenceProxy));
 
    // Prevent copy/paste errors
    auto setLoanField =
        [&loan, &tx](auto const& field, std::uint32_t const defValue = 0) {
            // at() is smart enough to unseat a default field set to the default
            // value
            loan->at(field) = tx[field].value_or(defValue);
        };
 
    // Set required and fixed tx fields
    loan->at(sfLoanScale) = properties.loanScale;
    loan->at(sfStartDate) = startDate;
    loan->at(sfPaymentInterval) = paymentInterval;
    loan->at(sfLoanSequence) = *loanSequenceProxy;
    loan->at(sfLoanBrokerID) = brokerID;
    loan->at(sfBorrower) = borrower;
    // Set all other transaction fields directly from the transaction
    if (tx.isFlag(tfLoanOverpayment))
        loan->setFlag(lsfLoanOverpayment);
    setLoanField(~sfLoanOriginationFee);
    setLoanField(~sfLoanServiceFee);
    setLoanField(~sfLatePaymentFee);
    setLoanField(~sfClosePaymentFee);
    setLoanField(~sfOverpaymentFee);
    setLoanField(~sfInterestRate);
    setLoanField(~sfLateInterestRate);
    setLoanField(~sfCloseInterestRate);
    setLoanField(~sfOverpaymentInterestRate);
    setLoanField(~sfGracePeriod, defaultGracePeriod);
    // Set dynamic / computed fields to their initial values
    loan->at(sfPrincipalOutstanding) = principalRequested;
    loan->at(sfPeriodicPayment) = properties.periodicPayment;
    loan->at(sfTotalValueOutstanding) = properties.loanState.valueOutstanding;
    loan->at(sfManagementFeeOutstanding) =
        properties.loanState.managementFeeDue;
    loan->at(sfPreviousPaymentDueDate) = 0;
    loan->at(sfNextPaymentDueDate) = startDate + paymentInterval;
    loan->at(sfPaymentRemaining) = paymentTotal;
    view.insert(loan);
 
    // Update the balances in the vault
    vaultAvailableProxy -= principalRequested;
    vaultTotalProxy += state.interestDue;
    XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
        *vaultAvailableProxy <= *vaultTotalProxy,
        "xrpl::LoanSet::doApply",
        "assets available must not be greater than assets outstanding");
    view.update(vaultSle);
 
    // Update the balances in the loan broker
    adjustImpreciseNumber(
        brokerSle->at(sfDebtTotal), newDebtDelta, vaultAsset, vaultScale);
    // The broker's owner count is solely for the number of outstanding loans,
    // and is distinct from the broker's pseudo-account's owner count
    adjustOwnerCount(view, brokerSle, 1, j_);
    loanSequenceProxy += 1;
    // The sequence should be extremely unlikely to roll over, but fail if it
    // does
    if (loanSequenceProxy == 0)
        return tecMAX_SEQUENCE_REACHED;
    view.update(brokerSle);
 
    // Put the loan into the pseudo-account's directory
    if (auto const ter = dirLink(view, brokerPseudo, loan, sfLoanBrokerNode))
        return ter;
    // Borrower is the owner of the loan
    if (auto const ter = dirLink(view, borrower, loan, sfOwnerNode))
        return ter;
 
    return tesSUCCESS;
}
 
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
}  // namespace xrpl