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19 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Legleux
8585055d6e fix output 2026-02-27 17:20:40 -08:00
Michael Legleux
a35308399d readable ui output 2026-02-27 17:16:57 -08:00
Michael Legleux
8068a7b513 Trigger run 2026-02-27 15:57:17 -08:00
Vito Tumas
1a7f824b89 refactor: Splits invariant checks into multiple classes (#6440)
The invariant check system had grown into a single monolithic file pair containing 24 invariant checker classes. The large `InvariantCheck.cpp` file was a frequent source of merge conflicts and difficult to navigate. This refactoring improves maintainability and readability with zero behavioral changes.

In particular, this change:
- Splits `InvariantCheck.h` and `InvariantCheck.cpp` into 10 focused header/source pairs organized by domain under a new `invariants/` subdirectory.
- Extracts the shared `Privilege` enum and `hasPrivilege()` function into a dedicated `InvariantCheckPrivilege.h` header, so domain-specific files can reference them independently.
2026-02-27 21:02:39 +00:00
Sergey Kuznetsov
b58c681189 chore: Make nix hook optional (#6431)
This change makes the `nix` pre-commit hook optional in development environments, and enforced only inside Github Actions.
2026-02-27 13:36:10 -05:00
Mayukha Vadari
404f35d556 test: Grep for failures in CI (#6339)
This change adjusts the CI tests to make it easier to spot errors, without needing to sift through the thousands of lines of output.
2026-02-27 03:01:38 +00:00
Alex Kremer
2e595b6031 chore: Enable clang-tidy checks without issues (#6414)
This change enables all clang-tidy checks that are already passing. It also modifies the clang-tidy CI job, so it runs against all files if .clang-tidy changed.
2026-02-26 18:26:58 +00:00
Bart
3a8a18c2ca refactor: Use uint256 directly as key instead of void pointer (#6313)
This change replaces `void const*` by `uint256 const&` for database fetches.

Object hashes are expressed using the `uint256` data type, and are converted to `void *` when calling the `fetch` or `fetchBatch` functions. However, in these fetch functions they are converted back to `uint256`, making the conversion process unnecessary. In a few cases the underlying pointer is needed, but that can then be easy obtained via `[hash variable].data()`.
2026-02-25 18:23:34 -05:00
Ayaz Salikhov
65e63ebef3 chore: Update cleanup-workspace to delete old .conan2 dir on macOS (#6412) 2026-02-25 01:12:16 +00:00
Valentin Balaschenko
bdd106d992 Explicitly trim the heap after cache sweeps (#6022)
Limited to Linux/glibc builds.
2026-02-24 21:33:13 +00:00
Valentin Balaschenko
24cbaf76a5 ci: Update prepare-runner action to fix macOS build environment (empty)
Updates XRPLF/actions prepare-runner to version 2cbf48101 which fixes
pip upgrade failures on macOS runners with Homebrew-managed Python.

* This commit was cherry-picked from "release-3.1", but ended up empty
  because the changes are already present. It is included only for
  accounting - to indicate that all changes/commits from the previous
  release will be in the next one.
2026-02-24 12:52:32 -05:00
Valentin Balaschenko
3a805cc646 Disable featureBatch and fixBatchInnerSigs amendments (#6402) 2026-02-24 12:49:59 -05:00
Sergey Kuznetsov
0fd237d707 chore: Add nix development environment (#6314)
---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-23 20:10:07 -05:00
dependabot[bot]
3542daa4cc ci: [DEPENDABOT] bump actions/upload-artifact from 4.6.2 to 6.0.0 (#6396)
Bumps [actions/upload-artifact](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact) from 4.6.2 to 6.0.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](ea165f8d65...b7c566a772)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/upload-artifact
  dependency-version: 6.0.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-20 22:48:01 +00:00
dependabot[bot]
fd9f57ec97 ci: [DEPENDABOT] bump actions/checkout from 4.3.0 to 6.0.2 (#6397)
Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 4.3.0 to 6.0.2.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/checkout/compare/v4.3.0...de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/checkout
  dependency-version: 6.0.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-20 22:09:48 +00:00
dependabot[bot]
625becff18 ci: [DEPENDABOT] bump actions/setup-python from 5.6.0 to 6.2.0 (#6395)
Bumps [actions/setup-python](https://github.com/actions/setup-python) from 5.6.0 to 6.2.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/setup-python/releases)
- [Commits](a26af69be9...a309ff8b42)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/setup-python
  dependency-version: 6.2.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-20 21:29:05 +00:00
dependabot[bot]
4bcbc6e50f ci: [DEPENDABOT] bump tj-actions/changed-files from 46.0.5 to 47.0.4 (#6394)
Bumps [tj-actions/changed-files](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files) from 46.0.5 to 47.0.4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/blob/main/HISTORY.md)
- [Commits](ed68ef82c0...7dee1b0c15)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: tj-actions/changed-files
  dependency-version: 47.0.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-20 19:59:37 +00:00
dependabot[bot]
0bc4a0cfe8 ci: [DEPENDABOT] bump codecov/codecov-action from 5.4.3 to 5.5.2 (#6398)
Bumps [codecov/codecov-action](https://github.com/codecov/codecov-action) from 5.4.3 to 5.5.2.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/codecov/codecov-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/codecov/codecov-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](18283e04ce...671740ac38)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: codecov/codecov-action
  dependency-version: 5.5.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-20 19:11:26 +00:00
Ayaz Salikhov
cb54adefed ci: Build docs in PRs and in private repos (#6400) 2026-02-20 13:41:43 -05:00
103 changed files with 6022 additions and 5760 deletions

View File

@@ -1,105 +1,143 @@
---
Checks: "-*,
bugprone-argument-comment
bugprone-argument-comment,
bugprone-assert-side-effect,
bugprone-bad-signal-to-kill-thread,
bugprone-bool-pointer-implicit-conversion,
bugprone-casting-through-void,
bugprone-chained-comparison,
bugprone-compare-pointer-to-member-virtual-function,
bugprone-copy-constructor-init,
bugprone-dangling-handle,
bugprone-dynamic-static-initializers,
bugprone-fold-init-type,
bugprone-forward-declaration-namespace,
bugprone-inaccurate-erase,
bugprone-incorrect-enable-if,
bugprone-incorrect-roundings,
bugprone-infinite-loop,
bugprone-integer-division,
bugprone-lambda-function-name,
bugprone-macro-parentheses,
bugprone-macro-repeated-side-effects,
bugprone-misplaced-operator-in-strlen-in-alloc,
bugprone-misplaced-pointer-arithmetic-in-alloc,
bugprone-misplaced-widening-cast,
bugprone-multi-level-implicit-pointer-conversion,
bugprone-multiple-new-in-one-expression,
bugprone-multiple-statement-macro,
bugprone-no-escape,
bugprone-non-zero-enum-to-bool-conversion,
bugprone-parent-virtual-call,
bugprone-posix-return,
bugprone-redundant-branch-condition,
bugprone-shared-ptr-array-mismatch,
bugprone-signal-handler,
bugprone-signed-char-misuse,
bugprone-sizeof-container,
bugprone-spuriously-wake-up-functions,
bugprone-standalone-empty,
bugprone-string-constructor,
bugprone-string-integer-assignment,
bugprone-string-literal-with-embedded-nul,
bugprone-stringview-nullptr,
bugprone-suspicious-enum-usage,
bugprone-suspicious-include,
bugprone-suspicious-memory-comparison,
bugprone-suspicious-memset-usage,
bugprone-suspicious-realloc-usage,
bugprone-suspicious-semicolon,
bugprone-suspicious-string-compare,
bugprone-swapped-arguments,
bugprone-terminating-continue,
bugprone-throw-keyword-missing,
bugprone-undefined-memory-manipulation,
bugprone-undelegated-constructor,
bugprone-unhandled-exception-at-new,
bugprone-unique-ptr-array-mismatch,
bugprone-unsafe-functions,
bugprone-virtual-near-miss,
cppcoreguidelines-no-suspend-with-lock,
cppcoreguidelines-virtual-class-destructor,
hicpp-ignored-remove-result,
misc-definitions-in-headers,
misc-header-include-cycle,
misc-misplaced-const,
misc-static-assert,
misc-throw-by-value-catch-by-reference,
misc-unused-alias-decls,
misc-unused-using-decls,
readability-duplicate-include,
readability-enum-initial-value,
readability-misleading-indentation,
readability-non-const-parameter,
readability-redundant-declaration,
readability-reference-to-constructed-temporary,
modernize-deprecated-headers,
modernize-make-shared,
modernize-make-unique,
performance-implicit-conversion-in-loop,
performance-move-constructor-init,
performance-trivially-destructible
"
# bugprone-assert-side-effect,
# bugprone-bad-signal-to-kill-thread,
# bugprone-bool-pointer-implicit-conversion,
# bugprone-casting-through-void,
# bugprone-chained-comparison,
# bugprone-compare-pointer-to-member-virtual-function,
# bugprone-copy-constructor-init,
# bugprone-crtp-constructor-accessibility,
# bugprone-dangling-handle,
# bugprone-dynamic-static-initializers,
# ---
# checks that have some issues that need to be resolved:
#
# bugprone-empty-catch,
# bugprone-fold-init-type,
# bugprone-forward-declaration-namespace,
# bugprone-inaccurate-erase,
# bugprone-crtp-constructor-accessibility,
# bugprone-inc-dec-in-conditions,
# bugprone-incorrect-enable-if,
# bugprone-incorrect-roundings,
# bugprone-infinite-loop,
# bugprone-integer-division,
# bugprone-lambda-function-name,
# bugprone-macro-parentheses,
# bugprone-macro-repeated-side-effects,
# bugprone-misplaced-operator-in-strlen-in-alloc,
# bugprone-misplaced-pointer-arithmetic-in-alloc,
# bugprone-misplaced-widening-cast,
# bugprone-move-forwarding-reference,
# bugprone-multi-level-implicit-pointer-conversion,
# bugprone-multiple-new-in-one-expression,
# bugprone-multiple-statement-macro,
# bugprone-no-escape,
# bugprone-non-zero-enum-to-bool-conversion,
# bugprone-optional-value-conversion,
# bugprone-parent-virtual-call,
# bugprone-pointer-arithmetic-on-polymorphic-object,
# bugprone-posix-return,
# bugprone-redundant-branch-condition,
# bugprone-reserved-identifier,
# bugprone-return-const-ref-from-parameter,
# bugprone-shared-ptr-array-mismatch,
# bugprone-signal-handler,
# bugprone-signed-char-misuse,
# bugprone-sizeof-container,
# bugprone-sizeof-expression,
# bugprone-spuriously-wake-up-functions,
# bugprone-standalone-empty,
# bugprone-string-constructor,
# bugprone-string-integer-assignment,
# bugprone-string-literal-with-embedded-nul,
# bugprone-stringview-nullptr,
# bugprone-suspicious-enum-usage,
# bugprone-suspicious-include,
# bugprone-suspicious-memory-comparison,
# bugprone-suspicious-memset-usage,
# bugprone-suspicious-missing-comma,
# bugprone-suspicious-realloc-usage,
# bugprone-suspicious-semicolon,
# bugprone-suspicious-string-compare,
# bugprone-suspicious-stringview-data-usage,
# bugprone-swapped-arguments,
# bugprone-switch-missing-default-case,
# bugprone-terminating-continue,
# bugprone-throw-keyword-missing,
# bugprone-too-small-loop-variable,
# bugprone-undefined-memory-manipulation,
# bugprone-undelegated-constructor,
# bugprone-unhandled-exception-at-new,
# bugprone-unhandled-self-assignment,
# bugprone-unique-ptr-array-mismatch,
# bugprone-unsafe-functions,
# bugprone-move-forwarding-reference,
# bugprone-unused-local-non-trivial-variable,
# bugprone-unused-raii,
# bugprone-return-const-ref-from-parameter,
# bugprone-switch-missing-default-case,
# bugprone-sizeof-expression,
# bugprone-suspicious-stringview-data-usage,
# bugprone-suspicious-missing-comma,
# bugprone-pointer-arithmetic-on-polymorphic-object,
# bugprone-optional-value-conversion,
# bugprone-too-small-loop-variable,
# bugprone-unused-return-value,
# bugprone-use-after-move,
# bugprone-virtual-near-miss,
# cppcoreguidelines-init-variables,
# bugprone-unhandled-self-assignment,
# bugprone-unused-raii,
#
# cppcoreguidelines-misleading-capture-default-by-value,
# cppcoreguidelines-no-suspend-with-lock,
# cppcoreguidelines-init-variables,
# cppcoreguidelines-pro-type-member-init,
# cppcoreguidelines-pro-type-static-cast-downcast,
# cppcoreguidelines-rvalue-reference-param-not-moved,
# cppcoreguidelines-use-default-member-init,
# cppcoreguidelines-virtual-class-destructor,
# hicpp-ignored-remove-result,
# cppcoreguidelines-rvalue-reference-param-not-moved,
#
# llvm-namespace-comment,
# misc-const-correctness,
# misc-definitions-in-headers,
# misc-header-include-cycle,
# misc-include-cleaner,
# misc-misplaced-const,
# misc-redundant-expression,
# misc-static-assert,
# misc-throw-by-value-catch-by-reference,
# misc-unused-alias-decls,
# misc-unused-using-decls,
#
# readability-avoid-nested-conditional-operator,
# readability-avoid-return-with-void-value,
# readability-braces-around-statements,
# readability-container-contains,
# readability-container-size-empty,
# readability-convert-member-functions-to-static,
# readability-const-return-type,
# readability-else-after-return,
# readability-implicit-bool-conversion,
# readability-inconsistent-declaration-parameter-name,
# readability-identifier-naming,
# readability-make-member-function-const,
# readability-math-missing-parentheses,
# readability-redundant-inline-specifier,
# readability-redundant-member-init,
# readability-redundant-casting,
# readability-redundant-string-init,
# readability-simplify-boolean-expr,
# readability-static-definition-in-anonymous-namespace,
# readability-suspicious-call-argument,
# readability-use-std-min-max,
# readability-static-accessed-through-instance,
#
# modernize-concat-nested-namespaces,
# modernize-deprecated-headers,
# modernize-make-shared,
# modernize-make-unique,
# modernize-pass-by-value,
# modernize-type-traits,
# modernize-use-designated-initializers,
@@ -111,79 +149,50 @@ Checks: "-*,
# modernize-use-starts-ends-with,
# modernize-use-std-numbers,
# modernize-use-using,
#
# performance-faster-string-find,
# performance-for-range-copy,
# performance-implicit-conversion-in-loop,
# performance-inefficient-vector-operation,
# performance-move-const-arg,
# performance-move-constructor-init,
# performance-no-automatic-move,
# performance-trivially-destructible,
# readability-avoid-nested-conditional-operator,
# readability-avoid-return-with-void-value,
# readability-braces-around-statements,
# readability-const-return-type,
# readability-container-contains,
# readability-container-size-empty,
# readability-convert-member-functions-to-static,
# readability-duplicate-include,
# readability-else-after-return,
# readability-enum-initial-value,
# readability-implicit-bool-conversion,
# readability-inconsistent-declaration-parameter-name,
# readability-identifier-naming,
# readability-make-member-function-const,
# readability-math-missing-parentheses,
# readability-misleading-indentation,
# readability-non-const-parameter,
# readability-redundant-casting,
# readability-redundant-declaration,
# readability-redundant-inline-specifier,
# readability-redundant-member-init,
# readability-redundant-string-init,
# readability-reference-to-constructed-temporary,
# readability-simplify-boolean-expr,
# readability-static-accessed-through-instance,
# readability-static-definition-in-anonymous-namespace,
# readability-suspicious-call-argument,
# readability-use-std-min-max
# ---
#
# CheckOptions:
# readability-braces-around-statements.ShortStatementLines: 2
# readability-identifier-naming.MacroDefinitionCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.StructCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.UnionCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.EnumCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.EnumConstantCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.ScopedEnumConstantCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalConstantCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalConstantPrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalVariableCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalVariablePrefix: "g"
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprFunctionCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprMethodCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassMethodCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassMemberCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassConstantCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassConstantPrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticConstantCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticConstantPrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticVariableCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticVariablePrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprVariableCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprVariablePrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.LocalConstantCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.LocalVariableCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.TemplateParameterCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.ParameterCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.FunctionCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.MemberCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.PrivateMemberSuffix: _
# readability-identifier-naming.ProtectedMemberSuffix: _
# readability-identifier-naming.PublicMemberSuffix: ""
# readability-identifier-naming.FunctionIgnoredRegexp: ".*tag_invoke.*"
# bugprone-unsafe-functions.ReportMoreUnsafeFunctions: true
CheckOptions:
# readability-braces-around-statements.ShortStatementLines: 2
# readability-identifier-naming.MacroDefinitionCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.StructCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.UnionCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.EnumCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.EnumConstantCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.ScopedEnumConstantCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalConstantCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalConstantPrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalVariableCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.GlobalVariablePrefix: "g"
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprFunctionCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprMethodCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassMethodCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassMemberCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassConstantCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.ClassConstantPrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticConstantCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticConstantPrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticVariableCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.StaticVariablePrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprVariableCase: UPPER_CASE
# readability-identifier-naming.ConstexprVariablePrefix: "k"
# readability-identifier-naming.LocalConstantCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.LocalVariableCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.TemplateParameterCase: CamelCase
# readability-identifier-naming.ParameterCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.FunctionCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.MemberCase: camelBack
# readability-identifier-naming.PrivateMemberSuffix: _
# readability-identifier-naming.ProtectedMemberSuffix: _
# readability-identifier-naming.PublicMemberSuffix: ""
# readability-identifier-naming.FunctionIgnoredRegexp: ".*tag_invoke.*"
bugprone-unsafe-functions.ReportMoreUnsafeFunctions: true
# bugprone-unused-return-value.CheckedReturnTypes: ::std::error_code;::std::error_condition;::std::errc
# misc-include-cleaner.IgnoreHeaders: '.*/(detail|impl)/.*;.*(expected|unexpected).*;.*ranges_lower_bound\.h;time.h;stdlib.h;__chrono/.*;fmt/chrono.h;boost/uuid/uuid_hash.hpp'
#

View File

@@ -32,10 +32,13 @@ We will further set additional CMake arguments as follows:
"""
def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config) -> list:
def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config, distro: str = "") -> list:
configurations = []
os_entries = config.os
if distro:
os_entries = [o for o in os_entries if o["distro_name"] == distro]
for architecture, os, build_type, cmake_args in itertools.product(
config.architecture, config.os, config.build_type, config.cmake_args
config.architecture, os_entries, config.build_type, config.cmake_args
):
# The default CMake target is 'all' for Linux and MacOS and 'install'
# for Windows, but it can get overridden for certain configurations.
@@ -223,7 +226,7 @@ def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config) -> list:
if (n := os["compiler_version"]) != "":
config_name += f"-{n}"
config_name += (
f"-{architecture['platform'][architecture['platform'].find('/')+1:]}"
f"-{architecture['platform'][architecture['platform'].find('/') + 1 :]}"
)
config_name += f"-{build_type.lower()}"
if "-Dcoverage=ON" in cmake_args:
@@ -236,23 +239,21 @@ def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config) -> list:
# names get truncated.
# Add Address and Thread (both coupled with UB) sanitizers for specific bookworm distros.
# GCC-Asan rippled-embedded tests are failing because of https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/856
if os[
"distro_version"
] == "bookworm" and f"{os['compiler_name']}-{os['compiler_version']}" in [
"clang-20",
"gcc-13",
]:
if (
os["distro_version"] == "bookworm"
and f"{os['compiler_name']}-{os['compiler_version']}" == "clang-20"
):
# Add ASAN + UBSAN configuration.
configurations.append(
{
"config_name": config_name + "-asan",
"config_name": config_name + "-asan-ubsan",
"cmake_args": cmake_args,
"cmake_target": cmake_target,
"build_only": build_only,
"build_type": build_type,
"os": os,
"architecture": architecture,
"sanitizers": "address",
"sanitizers": "address,undefinedbehavior",
}
)
# TSAN is deactivated due to seg faults with latest compilers.
@@ -315,21 +316,32 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
required=False,
type=Path,
)
parser.add_argument(
"-d",
"--distro",
help="Filter OS entries to only include those with this distro_name (e.g. 'debian', 'rhel', 'ubuntu').",
required=False,
type=str,
default="",
)
args = parser.parse_args()
matrix = []
if args.config is None or args.config == "":
matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "linux.json")
args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "linux.json"), args.distro
)
matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "macos.json")
args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "macos.json"), args.distro
)
matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "windows.json")
args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "windows.json"), args.distro
)
else:
matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(args.all, read_config(args.config))
matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
args.all, read_config(args.config), args.distro
)
# Generate the strategy matrix.
print(f"matrix={json.dumps({'include': matrix})}")
# print(json.dumps(matrix, indent=2))

View File

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Determine changed files
# This step checks whether any files have changed that should
# cause the next jobs to run. We do it this way rather than
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ jobs:
# that Github considers any skipped jobs to have passed, and in
# turn the required checks as well.
id: changes
uses: tj-actions/changed-files@ed68ef82c095e0d48ec87eccea555d944a631a4c # v46.0.5
uses: tj-actions/changed-files@7dee1b0c1557f278e5c7dc244927139d78c0e22a # v47.0.4
with:
files: |
# These paths are unique to `on-pr.yml`.
@@ -128,12 +128,23 @@ jobs:
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [linux, macos, windows]
include:
- os: linux
distro: debian
- os: linux
distro: rhel
- os: linux
distro: ubuntu
- os: macos
distro: ""
- os: windows
distro: ""
with:
# Enable ccache only for events targeting the XRPLF repository, since
# other accounts will not have access to our remote cache storage.
ccache_enabled: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' }}
os: ${{ matrix.os }}
distro: ${{ matrix.distro }}
secrets:
CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}

View File

@@ -77,7 +77,17 @@ jobs:
strategy:
fail-fast: ${{ github.event_name == 'merge_group' }}
matrix:
os: [linux, macos, windows]
include:
- os: linux
distro: debian
- os: linux
distro: rhel
- os: linux
distro: ubuntu
- os: macos
distro: ""
- os: windows
distro: ""
with:
# Enable ccache only for events targeting the XRPLF repository, since
# other accounts will not have access to our remote cache storage.
@@ -86,6 +96,7 @@ jobs:
# not identical to a regular compilation.
ccache_enabled: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/heads/release') }}
os: ${{ matrix.os }}
distro: ${{ matrix.distro }}
strategy_matrix: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && 'all' || 'minimal' }}
secrets:
CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ on:
jobs:
# Call the workflow in the XRPLF/actions repo that runs the pre-commit hooks.
run-hooks:
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@320be44621ca2a080f05aeb15817c44b84518108
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@56de1bdf19639e009639a50b8d17c28ca954f267
with:
runs_on: ubuntu-latest
container: '{ "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/tools-rippled-pre-commit:sha-ab4d1f0" }'
container: '{ "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/tools-rippled-pre-commit:sha-41ec7c1" }'

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ name: Build and publish documentation
on:
push:
branches:
- "develop"
- "release*"
paths:
- ".github/workflows/publish-docs.yml"
- "*.md"
- "**/*.md"
- "docs/**"
- "include/**"
- "src/libxrpl/**"
- "src/xrpld/**"
pull_request:
paths:
- ".github/workflows/publish-docs.yml"
- "*.md"
@@ -23,7 +35,9 @@ defaults:
env:
BUILD_DIR: build
NPROC_SUBTRACT: 2
# ubuntu-latest has only 2 CPUs for private repositories
# https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/runners/github-hosted-runners#standard-github-hosted-runners-for--private-repositories
NPROC_SUBTRACT: ${{ github.event.repository.private && '1' || '2' }}
jobs:
publish:
@@ -33,7 +47,7 @@ jobs:
contents: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Get number of processors
uses: XRPLF/actions/get-nproc@cf0433aa74563aead044a1e395610c96d65a37cf
@@ -65,7 +79,7 @@ jobs:
cmake --build . --target docs --parallel ${BUILD_NPROC}
- name: Publish documentation
if: ${{ github.ref_type == 'branch' && github.ref_name == github.event.repository.default_branch }}
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' }}
uses: peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@4f9cc6602d3f66b9c108549d475ec49e8ef4d45e # v4.0.0
with:
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

View File

@@ -76,8 +76,7 @@ jobs:
name: ${{ inputs.config_name }}
runs-on: ${{ fromJSON(inputs.runs_on) }}
container: ${{ inputs.image != '' && inputs.image || null }}
# Sanitizer builds on GCC are taking longer than 60mins. Hence increasing the timeout to 90mins.
timeout-minutes: ${{ inputs.sanitizers != '' && 360 || 60 }}
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
# Use a namespace to keep the objects separate for each configuration.
CCACHE_NAMESPACE: ${{ inputs.config_name }}
@@ -102,10 +101,10 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Cleanup workspace (macOS and Windows)
if: ${{ runner.os == 'macOS' || runner.os == 'Windows' }}
uses: XRPLF/actions/cleanup-workspace@cf0433aa74563aead044a1e395610c96d65a37cf
uses: XRPLF/actions/cleanup-workspace@c7d9ce5ebb03c752a354889ecd870cadfc2b1cd4
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@2cbf481018d930656e9276fcc20dc0e3a0be5b6d
@@ -178,7 +177,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Upload the binary (Linux)
if: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && runner.os == 'Linux' }}
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6.0.0
with:
name: xrpld-${{ inputs.config_name }}
path: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/xrpld
@@ -206,22 +205,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Set sanitizer options
if: ${{ !inputs.build_only && env.SANITIZERS_ENABLED == 'true' }}
run: |
ASAN_OPTS="include=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-asan-options.txt:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp"
if [[ "${{ inputs.config_name }}" == *gcc* ]]; then
ASAN_OPTS="${ASAN_OPTS}:alloc_dealloc_mismatch=0"
fi
echo "ASAN_OPTIONS=${ASAN_OPTS}" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "TSAN_OPTIONS=include=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-tsan-options.txt:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/tsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "UBSAN_OPTIONS=include=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-ubsan-options.txt:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/ubsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "LSAN_OPTIONS=include=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-lsan-options.txt:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/lsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "ASAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:detect_container_overflow=0:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "TSAN_OPTIONS=second_deadlock_stack=1:halt_on_error=0:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/tsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "UBSAN_OPTIONS=suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/ubsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "LSAN_OPTIONS=suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/lsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
- name: Run the separate tests
# We continue on error here because we want to try the Embedded tests before
# failing. This will give us details on all the failures at once.
continue-on-error: true
if: ${{ !inputs.build_only }}
working-directory: ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}
id: separate_tests
# Windows locks some of the build files while running tests, and parallel jobs can collide
env:
BUILD_TYPE: ${{ inputs.build_type }}
@@ -237,15 +228,22 @@ jobs:
working-directory: ${{ runner.os == 'Windows' && format('{0}/{1}', env.BUILD_DIR, inputs.build_type) || env.BUILD_DIR }}
env:
BUILD_NPROC: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
PARALLELISM: ${{ env.SANITIZERS_ENABLED == 'true' && steps.nproc.outputs.nproc || steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
run: |
./xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs "${PARALLELISM}"
set -o pipefail
./xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs "${BUILD_NPROC}" 2>&1 | tee unittest.log
# Pipeline should fail if the separate tests failed.
- name: Check results of the SeparateTests
if: ${{ !inputs.build_only && steps.separate_tests.outcome == 'failure' }}
run: exit 1
- name: Show test failure summary
if: ${{ failure() && !inputs.build_only }}
working-directory: ${{ runner.os == 'Windows' && format('{0}/{1}', env.BUILD_DIR, inputs.build_type) || env.BUILD_DIR }}
run: |
if [ ! -f unittest.log ]; then
echo "unittest.log not found; embedded tests may not have run."
exit 0
fi
if ! grep -E "failed" unittest.log; then
echo "Log present but no failure lines found in unittest.log."
fi
- name: Debug failure (Linux)
if: ${{ failure() && runner.os == 'Linux' && !inputs.build_only }}
run: |
@@ -269,7 +267,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Upload coverage report
if: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && !inputs.build_only && env.COVERAGE_ENABLED == 'true' }}
uses: codecov/codecov-action@18283e04ce6e62d37312384ff67231eb8fd56d24 # v5.4.3
uses: codecov/codecov-action@671740ac38dd9b0130fbe1cec585b89eea48d3de # v5.5.2
with:
disable_search: true
disable_telem: true

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ on:
type: string
default: "minimal"
distro:
description: 'Filter to only include configs for this distro (e.g. "debian", "rhel", "ubuntu"). Leave empty for no filtering.'
required: false
type: string
default: ""
secrets:
CODECOV_TOKEN:
description: "The Codecov token to use for uploading coverage reports."
@@ -38,9 +44,11 @@ jobs:
with:
os: ${{ inputs.os }}
strategy_matrix: ${{ inputs.strategy_matrix }}
distro: ${{ inputs.distro }}
# Build and test the binary for each configuration.
build-test-config:
name: ${{ matrix.config_name }}
needs:
- generate-matrix
uses: ./.github/workflows/reusable-build-test-config.yml

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Check levelization
run: .github/scripts/levelization/generate.sh
- name: Check for differences

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Check definitions
run: .github/scripts/rename/definitions.sh .
- name: Check copyright notices

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@2cbf481018d930656e9276fcc20dc0e3a0be5b6d
@@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ jobs:
id: run_clang_tidy
continue-on-error: true
env:
FILES: ${{ inputs.files }}
TARGETS: ${{ inputs.files != '' && inputs.files || 'src tests' }}
run: |
run-clang-tidy -j ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }} -p "$BUILD_DIR" $FILES 2>&1 | tee clang-tidy-output.txt
run-clang-tidy -j ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }} -p "${BUILD_DIR}" ${TARGETS} 2>&1 | tee clang-tidy-output.txt
- name: Upload clang-tidy output
if: steps.run_clang_tidy.outcome != 'success'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6.0.0
with:
name: clang-tidy-results
path: clang-tidy-output.txt

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ jobs:
if: ${{ inputs.check_only_changed }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
any_changed: ${{ steps.changed_files.outputs.any_changed }}
clang_tidy_config_changed: ${{ steps.changed_clang_tidy.outputs.any_changed }}
any_cpp_changed: ${{ steps.changed_files.outputs.any_changed }}
all_changed_files: ${{ steps.changed_files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Get changed C++ files
id: changed_files
uses: tj-actions/changed-files@ed68ef82c095e0d48ec87eccea555d944a631a4c # v46.0.5
uses: tj-actions/changed-files@7dee1b0c1557f278e5c7dc244927139d78c0e22a # v47.0.4
with:
files: |
**/*.cpp
@@ -38,10 +39,17 @@ jobs:
**/*.ipp
separator: " "
- name: Get changed clang-tidy configuration
id: changed_clang_tidy
uses: tj-actions/changed-files@7dee1b0c1557f278e5c7dc244927139d78c0e22a # v47.0.4
with:
files: |
.clang-tidy
run-clang-tidy:
needs: [determine-files]
if: ${{ always() && !cancelled() && (!inputs.check_only_changed || needs.determine-files.outputs.any_changed == 'true') }}
if: ${{ always() && !cancelled() && (!inputs.check_only_changed || needs.determine-files.outputs.any_cpp_changed == 'true' || needs.determine-files.outputs.clang_tidy_config_changed == 'true') }}
uses: ./.github/workflows/reusable-clang-tidy-files.yml
with:
files: ${{ inputs.check_only_changed && needs.determine-files.outputs.all_changed_files || '' }}
files: ${{ (needs.determine-files.outputs.clang_tidy_config_changed == 'true' && '') || (inputs.check_only_changed && needs.determine-files.outputs.all_changed_files || '') }}
create_issue_on_failure: ${{ inputs.create_issue_on_failure }}

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ on:
required: false
type: string
default: "minimal"
distro:
description: 'Filter to only include configs for this distro (e.g. "debian", "rhel", "ubuntu"). Leave empty for no filtering.'
required: false
type: string
default: ""
outputs:
matrix:
description: "The generated strategy matrix."
@@ -29,10 +34,10 @@ jobs:
matrix: ${{ steps.generate.outputs.matrix }}
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6.2.0
with:
python-version: 3.13
@@ -42,4 +47,5 @@ jobs:
env:
GENERATE_CONFIG: ${{ inputs.os != '' && format('--config={0}.json', inputs.os) || '' }}
GENERATE_OPTION: ${{ inputs.strategy_matrix == 'all' && '--all' || '' }}
run: ./generate.py ${GENERATE_OPTION} ${GENERATE_CONFIG} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
GENERATE_DISTRO: ${{ inputs.distro != '' && format('--distro={0}', inputs.distro) || '' }}
run: ./generate.py ${GENERATE_OPTION} ${GENERATE_CONFIG} ${GENERATE_DISTRO} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"

View File

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/ubuntu-noble:gcc-13-sha-5dd7158
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Generate build version number
id: version

View File

@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Cleanup workspace (macOS and Windows)
if: ${{ runner.os == 'macOS' || runner.os == 'Windows' }}
uses: XRPLF/actions/cleanup-workspace@cf0433aa74563aead044a1e395610c96d65a37cf
uses: XRPLF/actions/cleanup-workspace@c7d9ce5ebb03c752a354889ecd870cadfc2b1cd4
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@2cbf481018d930656e9276fcc20dc0e3a0be5b6d

6
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ gmon.out
# Locally patched Conan recipes
external/conan-center-index/
# Local conan directory
.conan
# XCode IDE.
*.pbxuser
!default.pbxuser
@@ -72,5 +75,8 @@ DerivedData
/.claude
/CLAUDE.md
# Direnv's directory
/.direnv
# clangd cache
/.cache

View File

@@ -57,6 +57,24 @@ repos:
- .git/COMMIT_EDITMSG
stages: [commit-msg]
- repo: local
hooks:
- id: nix-fmt
name: Format Nix files
entry: |
bash -c '
if command -v nix &> /dev/null || [ "$GITHUB_ACTIONS" = "true" ]; then
nix --extra-experimental-features "nix-command flakes" fmt "$@"
else
echo "Skipping nix-fmt: nix not installed and not in GitHub Actions"
exit 0
fi
' --
language: system
types:
- nix
pass_filenames: true
exclude: |
(?x)^(
external/.*|

View File

@@ -251,6 +251,29 @@ pip3 install pre-commit
pre-commit install
```
## Clang-tidy
All code must pass `clang-tidy` checks according to the settings in [`.clang-tidy`](./.clang-tidy).
There is a Continuous Integration job that runs clang-tidy on pull requests. The CI will check:
- All changed C++ files (`.cpp`, `.h`, `.ipp`) when only code files are modified
- **All files in the repository** when the `.clang-tidy` configuration file is changed
This ensures that configuration changes don't introduce new warnings across the codebase.
### Running clang-tidy locally
Before running clang-tidy, you must build the project to generate required files (particularly protobuf headers). Refer to [`BUILD.md`](./BUILD.md) for build instructions.
Then run clang-tidy on your local changes:
```
run-clang-tidy -p build src tests
```
This will check all source files in the `src` and `tests` directories using the compile commands from your `build` directory.
## Contracts and instrumentation
We are using [Antithesis](https://antithesis.com/) for continuous fuzzing,

View File

@@ -17,10 +17,12 @@ find_dependency(Boost
chrono
container
context
coroutine
date_time
filesystem
program_options
regex
system
thread)
#[=========================================================[
OpenSSL

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ target_compile_definitions(
BOOST_FILESYSTEM_NO_DEPRECATED
>
$<$<NOT:$<BOOL:${boost_show_deprecated}>>:
BOOST_COROUTINES2_NO_DEPRECATION_WARNING
BOOST_COROUTINES_NO_DEPRECATION_WARNING
BOOST_BEAST_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
BOOST_FILESYSTEM_DEPRECATED
>

View File

@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ include(XrplSanitizers)
find_package(Boost REQUIRED
COMPONENTS chrono
container
context
coroutine
date_time
filesystem
json
program_options
regex
system
thread)
add_library(xrpl_boost INTERFACE)
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ target_link_libraries(
INTERFACE Boost::headers
Boost::chrono
Boost::container
Boost::context
Boost::coroutine
Boost::date_time
Boost::filesystem
Boost::json
@@ -31,26 +32,6 @@ target_link_libraries(
if (Boost_COMPILER)
target_link_libraries(xrpl_boost INTERFACE Boost::disable_autolinking)
endif ()
# GCC 14+ has a false positive -Wuninitialized warning in Boost.Coroutine2's
# state.hpp when compiled with -O3. This is due to GCC's intentional behavior
# change (Bug #98871, #119388) where warnings from inlined system header code
# are no longer suppressed by -isystem. The warning occurs in operator|= in
# boost/coroutine2/detail/state.hpp when inlined from push_control_block::destroy().
# See: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=119388
if (is_gcc AND CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_VERSION VERSION_GREATER_EQUAL 14)
target_compile_options(xrpl_boost INTERFACE -Wno-uninitialized)
endif ()
# Boost.Context's ucontext backend has ASAN fiber-switching annotations
# (start/finish_switch_fiber) that are compiled in when BOOST_USE_ASAN is defined.
# This tells ASAN about coroutine stack switches, preventing false positive
# stack-use-after-scope errors. BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT ensures the ucontext backend
# is selected (fcontext does not support ASAN annotations).
# These defines must match what Boost was compiled with (see conan/profiles/sanitizers).
if (enable_asan)
target_compile_definitions(xrpl_boost INTERFACE BOOST_USE_ASAN BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT)
endif ()
if (SANITIZERS_ENABLED AND is_clang)
# TODO: gcc does not support -fsanitize-blacklist...can we do something else for gcc ?
if (NOT Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS AND TARGET Boost::headers)

View File

@@ -7,21 +7,16 @@ include(default)
{% if compiler == "gcc" %}
{% if "address" in sanitizers or "thread" in sanitizers or "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
{% set sanitizer_list = [] %}
{% set defines = [] %}
{% set model_code = "" %}
{% set extra_cxxflags = ["-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-O1", "-Wno-stringop-overflow"] %}
{% if "address" in sanitizers %}
{% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("address") %}
{% set model_code = "-mcmodel=large" %}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_ASAN")%}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
{% elif "thread" in sanitizers %}
{% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("thread") %}
{% set model_code = "-mcmodel=medium" %}
{% set _ = extra_cxxflags.append("-Wno-tsan") %}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_TSAN")%}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
{% endif %}
{% if "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
@@ -34,22 +29,16 @@ include(default)
tools.build:cxxflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}} {{" ".join(extra_cxxflags)}}']
tools.build:sharedlinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
tools.build:exelinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
tools.build:defines+={{defines}}
{% endif %}
{% elif compiler == "apple-clang" or compiler == "clang" %}
{% if "address" in sanitizers or "thread" in sanitizers or "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
{% set sanitizer_list = [] %}
{% set defines = [] %}
{% set extra_cxxflags = ["-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-O1"] %}
{% if "address" in sanitizers %}
{% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("address") %}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_ASAN")%}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
{% elif "thread" in sanitizers %}
{% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("thread") %}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_TSAN")%}
{% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
{% endif %}
{% if "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
@@ -63,24 +52,8 @@ include(default)
tools.build:cxxflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}} {{" ".join(extra_cxxflags)}}']
tools.build:sharedlinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
tools.build:exelinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
tools.build:defines+={{defines}}
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
tools.info.package_id:confs+=["tools.build:cxxflags", "tools.build:exelinkflags", "tools.build:sharedlinkflags", "tools.build:defines"]
[options]
{% if sanitizers %}
{% if "address" in sanitizers %}
# Build Boost.Context with ucontext backend (not fcontext) so that
# ASAN fiber-switching annotations (__sanitizer_start/finish_switch_fiber)
# are compiled into the library. fcontext (assembly) has no ASAN support.
# define=BOOST_USE_ASAN=1 is critical: it must be defined when building
# Boost.Context itself so the ucontext backend compiles in the ASAN annotations.
boost/*:extra_b2_flags=context-impl=ucontext address-sanitizer=on define=BOOST_USE_ASAN=1
boost/*:without_context=False
# Boost stacktrace fails to build with some sanitizers
boost/*:without_stacktrace=True
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
tools.info.package_id:confs+=["tools.build:cxxflags", "tools.build:exelinkflags", "tools.build:sharedlinkflags"]

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import re
import os
from conan.tools.cmake import CMake, CMakeToolchain, cmake_layout
@@ -58,9 +57,6 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
"tests": False,
"unity": False,
"xrpld": False,
"boost/*:without_context": False,
"boost/*:without_coroutine": True,
"boost/*:without_coroutine2": False,
"date/*:header_only": True,
"ed25519/*:shared": False,
"grpc/*:shared": False,
@@ -129,14 +125,6 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
self.options["boost"].visibility = "global"
if self.settings.compiler in ["clang", "gcc"]:
self.options["boost"].without_cobalt = True
self.options["boost"].without_context = False
self.options["boost"].without_coroutine = True
self.options["boost"].without_coroutine2 = False
# Check if environment variable exists
if "SANITIZERS" in os.environ:
sanitizers = os.environ["SANITIZERS"]
if "address" in sanitizers.lower():
self.default_options["fPIC"] = False
def requirements(self):
# Conan 2 requires transitive headers to be specified
@@ -208,8 +196,7 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
"boost::headers",
"boost::chrono",
"boost::container",
"boost::context",
"boost::coroutine2",
"boost::coroutine",
"boost::date_time",
"boost::filesystem",
"boost::json",

View File

@@ -99,10 +99,8 @@ words:
- endmacro
- exceptioned
- Falco
- fcontext
- finalizers
- firewalled
- flackiness
- fmtdur
- fsanitize
- funclets
@@ -113,7 +111,6 @@ words:
- gpgcheck
- gpgkey
- hotwallet
- hwaddress
- hwrap
- ifndef
- inequation
@@ -176,8 +173,10 @@ words:
- nftokens
- nftpage
- nikb
- nixfmt
- nixos
- nixpkgs
- nonxrp
- norecover
- noripple
- nudb
- nullptr
@@ -237,7 +236,6 @@ words:
- soci
- socidb
- sslws
- stackful
- statsd
- STATSDCOLLECTOR
- stissue

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ environment complete with Git, Python, Conan, CMake, and a C++ compiler.
This document exists to help readers set one up on any of the Big Three
platforms: Linux, macOS, or Windows.
As an alternative to system packages, the Nix development shell can be used to provide a development environment. See [using nix development shell](./nix.md) for more details.
[BUILD.md]: ../../BUILD.md
## Linux

95
docs/build/nix.md vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
# Using Nix Development Shell for xrpld Development
This guide explains how to use Nix to set up a reproducible development environment for xrpld. Using Nix eliminates the need to manually install utilities and ensures consistent tooling across different machines.
## Benefits of Using Nix
- **Reproducible environment**: Everyone gets the same versions of tools and compilers
- **No system pollution**: Dependencies are isolated and don't affect your system packages
- **Multiple compiler versions**: Easily switch between different GCC and Clang versions
- **Quick setup**: Get started with a single command
- **Works on Linux and macOS**: Consistent experience across platforms
## Install Nix
Please follow [the official installation instructions of nix package manager](https://nixos.org/download/) for your system.
## Entering the Development Shell
### Basic Usage
From the root of the xrpld repository, enter the default development shell:
```bash
nix --experimental-features 'nix-command flakes' develop
```
This will:
- Download and set up all required development tools (CMake, Ninja, Conan, etc.)
- Configure the appropriate compiler for your platform:
- **macOS**: Apple Clang (default system compiler)
- **Linux**: GCC 15
The first time you run this command, it will take a few minutes to download and build the environment. Subsequent runs will be much faster.
> [!TIP]
> To avoid typing `--experimental-features 'nix-command flakes'` every time, you can permanently enable flakes by creating `~/.config/nix/nix.conf`:
>
> ```bash
> mkdir -p ~/.config/nix
> echo "experimental-features = nix-command flakes" >> ~/.config/nix/nix.conf
> ```
>
> After this, you can simply use `nix develop` instead.
> [!NOTE]
> The examples below assume you've enabled flakes in your config. If you haven't, add `--experimental-features 'nix-command flakes'` after each `nix` command.
### Choosing a different compiler
A compiler can be chosen by providing its name with the `.#` prefix, e.g. `nix develop .#gcc15`.
Use `nix flake show` to see all the available development shells.
Use `nix develop .#no_compiler` to use the compiler from your system.
### Example Usage
```bash
# Use GCC 14
nix develop .#gcc14
# Use Clang 19
nix develop .#clang19
# Use default for your platform
nix develop
```
### Using a different shell
`nix develop` opens bash by default. If you want to use another shell this could be done by adding `-c` flag. For example:
```bash
nix develop -c zsh
```
## Building xrpld with Nix
Once inside the Nix development shell, follow the standard [build instructions](../../BUILD.md#steps). The Nix shell provides all necessary tools (CMake, Ninja, Conan, etc.).
## Automatic Activation with direnv
[direnv](https://direnv.net/) or [nix-direnv](https://github.com/nix-community/nix-direnv) can automatically activate the Nix development shell when you enter the repository directory.
## Conan and Prebuilt Packages
Please note that there is no guarantee that binaries from conan cache will work when using nix. If you encounter any errors, please use `--build '*'` to force conan to compile everything from source:
```bash
conan install .. --output-folder . --build '*' --settings build_type=Release
```
## Updating `flake.lock` file
To update `flake.lock` to the latest revision use `nix flake update` command.

View File

@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ cmake --build . --parallel 4
**IMPORTANT**: ASAN with Boost produces many false positives. Use these options:
```bash
export ASAN_OPTIONS="include=sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-asan-options.txt:suppressions=sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp"
export LSAN_OPTIONS="include=sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-lsan-options.txt:suppressions=sanitizers/suppressions/lsan.supp"
export ASAN_OPTIONS="print_stacktrace=1:detect_container_overflow=0:suppressions=path/to/asan.supp:halt_on_error=0:log_path=asan.log"
export LSAN_OPTIONS="suppressions=path/to/lsan.supp:halt_on_error=0:log_path=lsan.log"
# Run tests
./xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs=5
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ export LSAN_OPTIONS="include=sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-lsan-options.txt:su
### ThreadSanitizer (TSan)
```bash
export TSAN_OPTIONS="include=sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-tsan-options.txt:suppressions=sanitizers/suppressions/tsan.supp"
export TSAN_OPTIONS="suppressions=path/to/tsan.supp halt_on_error=0 log_path=tsan.log"
# Run tests
./xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs=5
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ More details [here](https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerLe
### UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer (UBSan)
```bash
export UBSAN_OPTIONS="include=sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-ubsan-options.txt:suppressions=sanitizers/suppressions/ubsan.supp"
export UBSAN_OPTIONS="suppressions=path/to/ubsan.supp:print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=0:log_path=ubsan.log"
# Run tests
./xrpld --unittest --unittest-jobs=5

26
flake.lock generated Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
{
"nodes": {
"nixpkgs": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1769461804,
"narHash": "sha256-6h5sROT/3CTHvzPy9koKBmoCa2eJKh4fzQK8eYFEgl8=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "b579d443b37c9c5373044201ea77604e37e748c8",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"id": "nixpkgs",
"ref": "nixos-unstable",
"type": "indirect"
}
},
"root": {
"inputs": {
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
}
}
},
"root": "root",
"version": 7
}

16
flake.nix Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
description = "Nix related things for xrpld";
inputs = {
nixpkgs.url = "nixpkgs/nixos-unstable";
};
outputs =
{ nixpkgs, ... }:
let
forEachSystem = (import ./nix/utils.nix { inherit nixpkgs; }).forEachSystem;
in
{
devShells = forEachSystem (import ./nix/devshell.nix);
formatter = forEachSystem ({ pkgs, ... }: pkgs.nixfmt);
};
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstdint>
#include <string_view>
namespace xrpl {
// cSpell:ignore ptmalloc
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Allocator interaction note:
// - This facility invokes glibc's malloc_trim(0) on Linux/glibc to request that
// ptmalloc return free heap pages to the OS.
// - If an alternative allocator (e.g. jemalloc or tcmalloc) is linked or
// preloaded (LD_PRELOAD), calling glibc's malloc_trim typically has no effect
// on the *active* heap. The call is harmless but may not reclaim memory
// because those allocators manage their own arenas.
// - Only glibc sbrk/arena space is eligible for trimming; large mmap-backed
// allocations are usually returned to the OS on free regardless of trimming.
// - Call at known reclamation points (e.g., after cache sweeps / online delete)
// and consider rate limiting to avoid churn.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct MallocTrimReport
{
bool supported{false};
int trimResult{-1};
std::int64_t rssBeforeKB{-1};
std::int64_t rssAfterKB{-1};
std::chrono::microseconds durationUs{-1};
std::int64_t minfltDelta{-1};
std::int64_t majfltDelta{-1};
[[nodiscard]] std::int64_t
deltaKB() const noexcept
{
if (rssBeforeKB < 0 || rssAfterKB < 0)
return 0;
return rssAfterKB - rssBeforeKB;
}
};
/**
* @brief Attempt to return freed memory to the operating system.
*
* On Linux with glibc malloc, this issues ::malloc_trim(0), which may release
* free space from ptmalloc arenas back to the kernel. On other platforms, or if
* a different allocator is in use, this function is a no-op and the report will
* indicate that trimming is unsupported or had no effect.
*
* @param tag Identifier for logging/debugging purposes.
* @param journal Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return Report containing before/after metrics and the trim result.
*
* @note If an alternative allocator (jemalloc/tcmalloc) is linked or preloaded,
* calling glibc's malloc_trim may have no effect on the active heap. The
* call is harmless but typically does not reclaim memory under those
* allocators.
*
* @note Only memory served from glibc's sbrk/arena heaps is eligible for trim.
* Large allocations satisfied via mmap are usually returned on free
* independently of trimming.
*
* @note Intended for use after operations that free significant memory (e.g.,
* cache sweeps, ledger cleanup, online delete). Consider rate limiting.
*/
MallocTrimReport
mallocTrim(std::string_view tag, beast::Journal journal);
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -9,10 +9,6 @@
#include <ostream>
#include <string>
#ifdef _MSC_VER
#include <boost/multiprecision/cpp_int.hpp>
#endif // !defined(_MSC_VER)
namespace xrpl {
class Number;
@@ -20,37 +16,18 @@ class Number;
std::string
to_string(Number const& amount);
/** Returns a rough estimate of log10(value).
*
* The return value is a pair (log, rem), where log is the estimated log10,
* and rem is value divided by 10^log. If rem is 1, then value is an exact
* power of ten, and log is the exact log10(value).
*
* This function only works for positive values.
*/
template <typename T>
constexpr std::pair<int, T>
logTenEstimate(T value)
{
int log = 0;
T remainder = value;
while (value >= 10)
{
if (value % 10 == 0)
remainder = remainder / 10;
value /= 10;
++log;
}
return {log, remainder};
}
template <typename T>
constexpr std::optional<int>
logTen(T value)
{
auto const est = logTenEstimate(value);
if (est.second == 1)
return est.first;
int log = 0;
while (value >= 10 && value % 10 == 0)
{
value /= 10;
++log;
}
if (value == 1)
return log;
return std::nullopt;
}
@@ -64,10 +41,12 @@ isPowerOfTen(T value)
/** MantissaRange defines a range for the mantissa of a normalized Number.
*
* The mantissa is in the range [min, max], where
* * min is a power of 10, and
* * max = min * 10 - 1.
*
* The mantissa_scale enum indicates whether the range is "small" or "large".
* This intentionally restricts the number of MantissaRanges that can be
* used to two: one for each scale.
* instantiated to two: one for each scale.
*
* The "small" scale is based on the behavior of STAmount for IOUs. It has a min
* value of 10^15, and a max value of 10^16-1. This was sufficient for
@@ -81,8 +60,8 @@ isPowerOfTen(T value)
* "large" scale.
*
* The "large" scale is intended to represent all values that can be represented
* by an STAmount - IOUs, XRP, and MPTs. It has a min value of 2^63/10+1
* (truncated), and a max value of 2^63-1.
* by an STAmount - IOUs, XRP, and MPTs. It has a min value of 10^18, and a max
* value of 10^19-1.
*
* Note that if the mentioned amendments are eventually retired, this class
* should be left in place, but the "small" scale option should be removed. This
@@ -94,50 +73,25 @@ struct MantissaRange
enum mantissa_scale { small, large };
explicit constexpr MantissaRange(mantissa_scale scale_)
: max(getMax(scale_))
, min(computeMin(max))
, referenceMin(getReferenceMin(scale_, min))
, log(computeLog(min))
, scale(scale_)
: min(getMin(scale_)), max(min * 10 - 1), log(logTen(min).value_or(-1)), scale(scale_)
{
// Since this is constexpr, if any of these throw, it won't compile
if (min * 10 <= max)
throw std::out_of_range("min * 10 <= max");
if (max / 10 >= min)
throw std::out_of_range("max / 10 >= min");
if ((min - 1) * 10 > max)
throw std::out_of_range("(min - 1) * 10 > max");
// This is a little hacky
if ((max + 10) / 10 < min)
throw std::out_of_range("(max + 10) / 10 < min");
}
// Explicitly delete copy and move operations
MantissaRange(MantissaRange const&) = delete;
MantissaRange(MantissaRange&&) = delete;
MantissaRange&
operator=(MantissaRange const&) = delete;
MantissaRange&
operator=(MantissaRange&&) = delete;
rep max;
rep min;
// This is not a great name. Used to determine if mantissas are in range,
// but have fewer digits than max
rep referenceMin;
rep max;
int log;
mantissa_scale scale;
private:
static constexpr rep
getMax(mantissa_scale scale)
getMin(mantissa_scale scale_)
{
switch (scale)
switch (scale_)
{
case small:
return 9'999'999'999'999'999ULL;
return 1'000'000'000'000'000ULL;
case large:
return std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::max();
return 1'000'000'000'000'000'000ULL;
default:
// Since this can never be called outside a non-constexpr
// context, this throw assures that the build fails if an
@@ -145,52 +99,12 @@ private:
throw std::runtime_error("Unknown mantissa scale");
}
}
static constexpr rep
computeMin(rep max)
{
return max / 10 + 1;
}
static constexpr rep
getReferenceMin(mantissa_scale scale, rep min)
{
switch (scale)
{
case large:
return 1'000'000'000'000'000'000ULL;
default:
if (isPowerOfTen(min))
return min;
throw std::runtime_error("Unknown/bad mantissa scale");
}
}
static constexpr rep
computeLog(rep min)
{
auto const estimate = logTenEstimate(min);
return estimate.first + (estimate.second == 1 ? 0 : 1);
}
};
// Like std::integral, but only 64-bit integral types.
template <class T>
concept Integral64 = std::is_same_v<T, std::int64_t> || std::is_same_v<T, std::uint64_t>;
namespace detail {
#ifdef _MSC_VER
using uint128_t = boost::multiprecision::uint128_t;
using int128_t = boost::multiprecision::int128_t;
#else // !defined(_MSC_VER)
using uint128_t = __uint128_t;
using int128_t = __int128_t;
#endif // !defined(_MSC_VER)
template <class T>
concept UnsignedMantissa = std::is_unsigned_v<T> || std::is_same_v<T, uint128_t>;
} // namespace detail
/** Number is a floating point type that can represent a wide range of values.
*
* It can represent all values that can be represented by an STAmount -
@@ -218,7 +132,9 @@ concept UnsignedMantissa = std::is_unsigned_v<T> || std::is_same_v<T, uint128_t>
* 1. Normalization can be disabled by using the "unchecked" ctor tag. This
* should only be used at specific conversion points, some constexpr
* values, and in unit tests.
* 2. The max of the "large" range, 2^63-1, TODO: explain the large range.
* 2. The max of the "large" range, 10^19-1, is the largest 10^X-1 value that
* fits in an unsigned 64-bit number. (10^19-1 < 2^64-1 and
* 10^20-1 > 2^64-1). This avoids under- and overflows.
*
* ---- External Interface ----
*
@@ -232,7 +148,7 @@ concept UnsignedMantissa = std::is_unsigned_v<T> || std::is_same_v<T, uint128_t>
*
* Note:
* 1. 2^63-1 is between 10^18 and 10^19-1, which are the limits of the "large"
* mantissa range. TODO: update this explanation.
* mantissa range.
* 2. The functions mantissa() and exponent() return the external view of the
* Number value, specifically using a signed 63-bit mantissa. This may
* require altering the internal representation to fit into that range
@@ -292,7 +208,8 @@ class Number
using rep = std::int64_t;
using internalrep = MantissaRange::rep;
rep mantissa_{0};
bool negative_{false};
internalrep mantissa_{0};
int exponent_{std::numeric_limits<int>::lowest()};
public:
@@ -300,11 +217,9 @@ public:
constexpr static int minExponent = -32768;
constexpr static int maxExponent = 32768;
#if MAXREP
constexpr static internalrep maxRep = std::numeric_limits<rep>::max();
static_assert(maxRep == 9'223'372'036'854'775'807);
static_assert(-maxRep == std::numeric_limits<rep>::min() + 1);
#endif
// May need to make unchecked private
struct unchecked
@@ -383,7 +298,8 @@ public:
friend constexpr bool
operator==(Number const& x, Number const& y) noexcept
{
return x.mantissa_ == y.mantissa_ && x.exponent_ == y.exponent_;
return x.negative_ == y.negative_ && x.mantissa_ == y.mantissa_ &&
x.exponent_ == y.exponent_;
}
friend constexpr bool
@@ -397,8 +313,8 @@ public:
{
// If the two amounts have different signs (zero is treated as positive)
// then the comparison is true iff the left is negative.
bool const lneg = x.mantissa_ < 0;
bool const rneg = y.mantissa_ < 0;
bool const lneg = x.negative_;
bool const rneg = y.negative_;
if (lneg != rneg)
return lneg;
@@ -426,7 +342,7 @@ public:
constexpr int
signum() const noexcept
{
return mantissa_ < 0 ? -1 : (mantissa_ ? 1 : 0);
return negative_ ? -1 : (mantissa_ ? 1 : 0);
}
Number
@@ -465,9 +381,6 @@ public:
friend Number
root2(Number f);
friend Number
power(Number const& f, unsigned n, unsigned d);
// Thread local rounding control. Default is to_nearest
enum rounding_mode { to_nearest, towards_zero, downward, upward };
static rounding_mode
@@ -532,48 +445,22 @@ private:
static_assert(isPowerOfTen(smallRange.min));
static_assert(smallRange.min == 1'000'000'000'000'000LL);
static_assert(smallRange.max == 9'999'999'999'999'999LL);
static_assert(smallRange.referenceMin == smallRange.min);
static_assert(smallRange.log == 15);
#if MAXREP
static_assert(smallRange.min < maxRep);
static_assert(smallRange.max < maxRep);
#endif
constexpr static MantissaRange largeRange{MantissaRange::large};
static_assert(!isPowerOfTen(largeRange.min));
static_assert(largeRange.min == 922'337'203'685'477'581ULL);
static_assert(largeRange.max == internalrep(9'223'372'036'854'775'807ULL));
static_assert(largeRange.max == std::numeric_limits<rep>::max());
static_assert(largeRange.referenceMin == 1'000'000'000'000'000'000ULL);
static_assert(isPowerOfTen(largeRange.min));
static_assert(largeRange.min == 1'000'000'000'000'000'000ULL);
static_assert(largeRange.max == internalrep(9'999'999'999'999'999'999ULL));
static_assert(largeRange.log == 18);
// There are 2 values that will not fit in largeRange without some extra
// work
// * 9223372036854775808
// * 9223372036854775809
// They both end up < min, but with a leftover. If they round up, everything
// will be fine. If they don't, well need to bring them up into range.
// Guard::bringIntoRange handles this situation.
#if MAXREP
static_assert(largeRange.min < maxRep);
static_assert(largeRange.max > maxRep);
#endif
// The range for the mantissa when normalized.
// Use reference_wrapper to avoid making copies, and prevent accidentally
// changing the values inside the range.
static thread_local std::reference_wrapper<MantissaRange const> range_;
// And one is needed because it needs to choose between oneSmall and
// oneLarge based on the current range
static Number
one(MantissaRange const& range);
static Number
root(MantissaRange const& range, Number f, unsigned d);
void
normalize(MantissaRange const& range);
void
normalize();
@@ -596,14 +483,11 @@ private:
friend void
doNormalize(
bool& negative,
T& mantissa,
int& exponent,
T& mantissa_,
int& exponent_,
MantissaRange::rep const& minMantissa,
MantissaRange::rep const& maxMantissa);
bool
isnormal(MantissaRange const& range) const noexcept;
bool
isnormal() const noexcept;
@@ -620,56 +504,7 @@ private:
static internalrep
externalToInternal(rep mantissa);
/** Breaks down the number into components, potentially de-normalizing it.
*
* Ensures that the mantissa always has range_.log + 1 digits.
*
*/
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep = internalrep>
std::tuple<bool, Rep, int>
toInternal(MantissaRange const& range) const;
/** Breaks down the number into components, potentially de-normalizing it.
*
* Ensures that the mantissa always has range_.log + 1 digits.
*
*/
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep = internalrep>
std::tuple<bool, Rep, int>
toInternal() const;
/** Rebuilds the number from components.
*
* If "normalized" is true, the values are expected to be normalized - all
* in their valid ranges.
*
* If "normalized" is false, the values are expected to be "near
* normalized", meaning that the mantissa has to be modified at most once to
* bring it back into range.
*
*/
template <bool expectNormal = true, detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep = internalrep>
void
fromInternal(bool negative, Rep mantissa, int exponent, MantissaRange const* pRange);
/** Rebuilds the number from components.
*
* If "normalized" is true, the values are expected to be normalized - all
* in their valid ranges.
*
* If "normalized" is false, the values are expected to be "near
* normalized", meaning that the mantissa has to be modified at most once to
* bring it back into range.
*
*/
template <bool expectNormal = true, detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep = internalrep>
void
fromInternal(bool negative, Rep mantissa, int exponent);
class Guard;
public:
constexpr static internalrep largestMantissa = largeRange.max;
};
inline constexpr Number::Number(
@@ -677,7 +512,7 @@ inline constexpr Number::Number(
internalrep mantissa,
int exponent,
unchecked) noexcept
: mantissa_{(negative ? -1 : 1) * static_cast<rep>(mantissa)}, exponent_{exponent}
: negative_(negative), mantissa_{mantissa}, exponent_{exponent}
{
}
@@ -688,6 +523,12 @@ inline constexpr Number::Number(internalrep mantissa, int exponent, unchecked) n
constexpr static Number numZero{};
inline Number::Number(bool negative, internalrep mantissa, int exponent, normalized)
: Number(negative, mantissa, exponent, unchecked{})
{
normalize();
}
inline Number::Number(internalrep mantissa, int exponent, normalized)
: Number(false, mantissa, exponent, normalized{})
{
@@ -710,7 +551,17 @@ inline Number::Number(rep mantissa) : Number{mantissa, 0}
inline constexpr Number::rep
Number::mantissa() const noexcept
{
return mantissa_;
auto m = mantissa_;
if (m > maxRep)
{
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
!isnormal() || (m % 10 == 0 && m / 10 <= maxRep),
"xrpl::Number::mantissa",
"large normalized mantissa has no remainder");
m /= 10;
}
auto const sign = negative_ ? -1 : 1;
return sign * static_cast<Number::rep>(m);
}
/** Returns the exponent of the external view of the Number.
@@ -721,7 +572,16 @@ Number::mantissa() const noexcept
inline constexpr int
Number::exponent() const noexcept
{
return exponent_;
auto e = exponent_;
if (mantissa_ > maxRep)
{
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
!isnormal() || (mantissa_ % 10 == 0 && mantissa_ / 10 <= maxRep),
"xrpl::Number::exponent",
"large normalized mantissa has no remainder");
++e;
}
return e;
}
inline constexpr Number
@@ -736,7 +596,7 @@ Number::operator-() const noexcept
if (mantissa_ == 0)
return Number{};
auto x = *this;
x.mantissa_ = -1 * x.mantissa_;
x.negative_ = !x.negative_;
return x;
}
@@ -817,61 +677,42 @@ Number::min() noexcept
inline Number
Number::max() noexcept
{
return Number{false, range_.get().max, maxExponent, unchecked{}};
return Number{false, std::min(range_.get().max, maxRep), maxExponent, unchecked{}};
}
inline Number
Number::lowest() noexcept
{
return Number{true, range_.get().max, maxExponent, unchecked{}};
}
inline bool
Number::isnormal(MantissaRange const& range) const noexcept
{
auto const abs_m = mantissa_ < 0 ? -mantissa_ : mantissa_;
return *this == Number{} ||
(range.min <= abs_m && abs_m <= range.max && //
minExponent <= exponent_ && exponent_ <= maxExponent);
return Number{true, std::min(range_.get().max, maxRep), maxExponent, unchecked{}};
}
inline bool
Number::isnormal() const noexcept
{
return isnormal(range_);
MantissaRange const& range = range_;
auto const abs_m = mantissa_;
return *this == Number{} ||
(range.min <= abs_m && abs_m <= range.max && (abs_m <= maxRep || abs_m % 10 == 0) &&
minExponent <= exponent_ && exponent_ <= maxExponent);
}
template <Integral64 T>
std::pair<T, int>
Number::normalizeToRange(T minMantissa, T maxMantissa) const
{
bool negative = mantissa_ < 0;
auto const sign = negative ? -1 : 1;
internalrep mantissa = sign * mantissa_;
bool negative = negative_;
internalrep mantissa = mantissa_;
int exponent = exponent_;
if constexpr (std::is_unsigned_v<T>)
{
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
!negative,
"xrpl::Number::normalizeToRange",
"Number is non-negative for unsigned range.");
// To avoid logical errors in release builds, throw if the Number is
// negative for an unsigned range.
if (negative)
throw std::runtime_error(
"Number::normalizeToRange: Number is negative for "
"unsigned range.");
}
Number::normalize(negative, mantissa, exponent, minMantissa, maxMantissa);
// Cast mantissa to signed type first (if T is a signed type) to avoid
// unsigned integer overflow when multiplying by negative sign
T signedMantissa = static_cast<T>(mantissa);
if (negative)
signedMantissa = -signedMantissa;
return std::make_pair(signedMantissa, exponent);
auto const sign = negative ? -1 : 1;
return std::make_pair(static_cast<T>(sign * mantissa), exponent);
}
inline constexpr Number

View File

@@ -359,7 +359,6 @@ public:
base_uint&
operator&=(base_uint const& b)
{
XRPL_ASSERT(WIDTH == b.WIDTH, "input size mismatch");
for (int i = 0; i < WIDTH; i++)
data_[i] &= b.data_[i];

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/sanitizers.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/type_name.h>
#include <exception>
@@ -25,7 +24,7 @@ LogThrow(std::string const& title);
control to the next matching exception handler, if any.
Otherwise, std::terminate will be called.
*/
[[noreturn]] XRPL_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS inline void
[[noreturn]] inline void
Rethrow()
{
LogThrow("Re-throwing exception");
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ Rethrow()
}
template <class E, class... Args>
[[noreturn]] XRPL_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS inline void
[[noreturn]] inline void
Throw(Args&&... args)
{
static_assert(

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
// Helper to disable ASan/HwASan for specific functions
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
#define XRPL_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS __attribute__((no_sanitize("address", "hwaddress")))
#else
#define XRPL_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS
#endif

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/ByteUtilities.h>
namespace xrpl {
template <class F>
@@ -8,15 +10,17 @@ JobQueue::Coro::Coro(Coro_create_t, JobQueue& jq, JobType type, std::string cons
, type_(type)
, name_(name)
, running_(false)
, coro_([this, fn = std::forward<F>(f)](
boost::coroutines2::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::push_type& do_yield) {
yield_ = &do_yield;
yield();
fn(shared_from_this());
, coro_(
[this, fn = std::forward<F>(f)](
boost::coroutines::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::push_type& do_yield) {
yield_ = &do_yield;
yield();
fn(shared_from_this());
#ifndef NDEBUG
finished_ = true;
finished_ = true;
#endif
})
},
boost::coroutines::attributes(megabytes(1)))
{
}
@@ -76,7 +80,6 @@ JobQueue::Coro::resume()
coro_();
detail::getLocalValues().release();
detail::getLocalValues().reset(saved);
std::lock_guard lk(mutex_run_);
running_ = false;
cv_.notify_all();

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
#include <xrpl/core/detail/Workers.h>
#include <xrpl/json/json_value.h>
#include <boost/coroutine2/all.hpp>
#include <boost/coroutine/all.hpp>
#include <set>
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ public:
std::mutex mutex_;
std::mutex mutex_run_;
std::condition_variable cv_;
boost::coroutines2::coroutine<void>::pull_type coro_;
boost::coroutines2::coroutine<void>::push_type* yield_;
boost::coroutines::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::pull_type coro_;
boost::coroutines::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::push_type* yield_;
#ifndef NDEBUG
bool finished_ = false;
#endif

View File

@@ -64,11 +64,6 @@ public:
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k) const;
/** Check only local items without delegating to base.
Returns std::nullopt if key not found locally. */
std::optional<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>>
readLocal(Keylet const& k) const;
std::shared_ptr<SLE>
peek(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k);

View File

@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ public:
bool sslVerify,
beast::Journal j);
static void
cleanupSSLContext();
static void
get(bool bSSL,
boost::asio::io_context& io_context,

View File

@@ -77,16 +77,16 @@ public:
If the object is not found or an error is encountered, the
result will indicate the condition.
@note This will be called concurrently.
@param key A pointer to the key data.
@param hash The hash of the object.
@param pObject [out] The created object if successful.
@return The result of the operation.
*/
virtual Status
fetch(void const* key, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pObject) = 0;
fetch(uint256 const& hash, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pObject) = 0;
/** Fetch a batch synchronously. */
virtual std::pair<std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>, Status>
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256 const*> const& hashes) = 0;
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes) = 0;
/** Store a single object.
Depending on the implementation this may happen immediately

View File

@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ missing_field_error(std::string const& name)
}
inline Json::Value
missing_field_error(Json::StaticString const& name)
missing_field_error(Json::StaticString name)
{
return missing_field_error(std::string(name));
}
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ object_field_error(std::string const& name)
}
inline Json::Value
object_field_error(Json::StaticString const& name)
object_field_error(Json::StaticString name)
{
return object_field_error(std::string(name));
}
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ invalid_field_message(std::string const& name)
}
inline std::string
invalid_field_message(Json::StaticString const& name)
invalid_field_message(Json::StaticString name)
{
return invalid_field_message(std::string(name));
}
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ invalid_field_error(std::string const& name)
}
inline Json::Value
invalid_field_error(Json::StaticString const& name)
invalid_field_error(Json::StaticString name)
{
return invalid_field_error(std::string(name));
}
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ expected_field_message(std::string const& name, std::string const& type)
}
inline std::string
expected_field_message(Json::StaticString const& name, std::string const& type)
expected_field_message(Json::StaticString name, std::string const& type)
{
return expected_field_message(std::string(name), type);
}
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ expected_field_error(std::string const& name, std::string const& type)
}
inline Json::Value
expected_field_error(Json::StaticString const& name, std::string const& type)
expected_field_error(Json::StaticString name, std::string const& type)
{
return expected_field_error(std::string(name), type);
}

View File

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ std::size_t constexpr maxMPTokenMetadataLength = 1024;
/** The maximum amount of MPTokenIssuance */
std::uint64_t constexpr maxMPTokenAmount = 0x7FFF'FFFF'FFFF'FFFFull;
static_assert(Number::largestMantissa >= maxMPTokenAmount);
static_assert(Number::maxRep >= maxMPTokenAmount);
/** The maximum length of Data payload */
std::size_t constexpr maxDataPayloadLength = 256;

View File

@@ -539,8 +539,6 @@ STAmount::fromNumber(A const& a, Number const& number)
return STAmount{asset, intValue, 0, negative};
}
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
working.signum() >= 0, "xrpl::STAmount::fromNumber", "non-negative Number to normalize");
auto const [mantissa, exponent] = working.normalizeToRange(cMinValue, cMaxValue);
return STAmount{asset, mantissa, exponent, negative};

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ systemName()
/** Number of drops in the genesis account. */
constexpr XRPAmount INITIAL_XRP{100'000'000'000 * DROPS_PER_XRP};
static_assert(INITIAL_XRP.drops() == 100'000'000'000'000'000);
static_assert(Number::largestMantissa >= INITIAL_XRP.drops());
static_assert(Number::maxRep >= INITIAL_XRP.drops());
/** Returns true if the amount does not exceed the initial XRP in existence. */
inline bool

View File

@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
// Add new amendments to the top of this list.
// Keep it sorted in reverse chronological order.
XRPL_FIX (PermissionedDomainInvariant, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (ExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (BatchInnerSigs, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (BatchInnerSigs, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(LendingProtocol, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(PermissionDelegationV1_1, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (DirectoryLimit, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ XRPL_FEATURE(TokenEscrow, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo
XRPL_FIX (EnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (AMMv1_3, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(PermissionedDEX, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(Batch, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(Batch, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(SingleAssetVault, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (PayChanCancelAfter, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
// Check flags in Credential transactions

View File

@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltLOAN, 0x0089, Loan, loan, ({
// The unrounded true total value of the loan.
//
// - TrueTotalPrincipalOutstanding can be computed using the algorithm
// in the xrpl::detail::loanPrincipalFromPeriodicPayment function.
// in the ripple::detail::loanPrincipalFromPeriodicPayment function.
//
// - TrueTotalInterestOutstanding = TrueTotalLoanValue -
// TrueTotalPrincipalOutstanding

View File

@@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ public:
return id_;
}
/**
* Get the SHAMapNodeID of a child node at the specified branch.
*
* @param m The branch number (0-15) indicating which child to descend to.
* In the SHAMap's 16-way radix tree, each inner node has up to
* 16 children, indexed by the corresponding nibble (4 bits) of
* the key at the current depth.
* @return SHAMapNodeID of the child node at branch m.
* @throws std::logic_error if this node is at the maximum leaf depth (64)
* or if the node's id doesn't match its depth mask.
*/
SHAMapNodeID
getChildNodeID(unsigned int m) const;

View File

@@ -1,732 +0,0 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <tuple>
#include <unordered_set>
namespace xrpl {
class ReadView;
#if GENERATING_DOCS
/**
* @brief Prototype for invariant check implementations.
*
* __THIS CLASS DOES NOT EXIST__ - or rather it exists in documentation only to
* communicate the interface required of any invariant checker. Any invariant
* check implementation should implement the public methods documented here.
*
*/
class InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
{
public:
explicit InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE() = default;
/**
* @brief called for each ledger entry in the current transaction.
*
* @param isDelete true if the SLE is being deleted
* @param before ledger entry before modification by the transaction
* @param after ledger entry after modification by the transaction
*/
void
visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
/**
* @brief called after all ledger entries have been visited to determine
* the final status of the check
*
* @param tx the transaction being applied
* @param tec the current TER result of the transaction
* @param fee the fee actually charged for this transaction
* @param view a ReadView of the ledger being modified
* @param j journal for logging
*
* @return true if check passes, false if it fails
*/
bool
finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const tec,
XRPAmount const fee,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j);
};
#endif
/**
* @brief Invariant: We should never charge a transaction a negative fee or a
* fee that is larger than what the transaction itself specifies.
*
* We can, in some circumstances, charge less.
*/
class TransactionFeeCheck
{
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: A transaction must not create XRP and should only destroy
* the XRP fee.
*
* We iterate through all account roots, payment channels and escrow entries
* that were modified and calculate the net change in XRP caused by the
* transactions.
*/
class XRPNotCreated
{
std::int64_t drops_ = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: we cannot remove an account ledger entry
*
* We iterate all account roots that were modified, and ensure that any that
* were present before the transaction was applied continue to be present
* afterwards unless they were explicitly deleted by a successful
* AccountDelete transaction.
*/
class AccountRootsNotDeleted
{
std::uint32_t accountsDeleted_ = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: a deleted account must not have any objects left
*
* We iterate all deleted account roots, and ensure that there are no
* objects left that are directly accessible with that account's ID.
*
* There should only be one deleted account, but that's checked by
* AccountRootsNotDeleted. This invariant will handle multiple deleted account
* roots without a problem.
*/
class AccountRootsDeletedClean
{
// Pair is <before, after>. Before is used for most of the checks, so that
// if, for example, an object ID field is cleared, but the object is not
// deleted, it can still be found. After is used specifically for any checks
// that are expected as part of the deletion, such as zeroing out the
// balance.
std::vector<std::pair<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>, std::shared_ptr<SLE const>>> accountsDeleted_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: An account XRP balance must be in XRP and take a value
* between 0 and INITIAL_XRP drops, inclusive.
*
* We iterate all account roots modified by the transaction and ensure that
* their XRP balances are reasonable.
*/
class XRPBalanceChecks
{
bool bad_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: corresponding modified ledger entries should match in type
* and added entries should be a valid type.
*/
class LedgerEntryTypesMatch
{
bool typeMismatch_ = false;
bool invalidTypeAdded_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Trust lines using XRP are not allowed.
*
* We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
* that they are against a valid issuer.
*/
class NoXRPTrustLines
{
bool xrpTrustLine_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Trust lines with deep freeze flag are not allowed if normal
* freeze flag is not set.
*
* We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
* that they don't have deep freeze flag set without normal freeze flag set.
*/
class NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze
{
bool deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: frozen trust line balance change is not allowed.
*
* We iterate all affected trust lines and ensure that they don't have
* unexpected change of balance if they're frozen.
*/
class TransfersNotFrozen
{
struct BalanceChange
{
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const line;
int const balanceChangeSign;
};
struct IssuerChanges
{
std::vector<BalanceChange> senders;
std::vector<BalanceChange> receivers;
};
using ByIssuer = std::map<Issue, IssuerChanges>;
ByIssuer balanceChanges_;
std::map<AccountID, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const> possibleIssuers_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
private:
bool
isValidEntry(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
STAmount
calculateBalanceChange(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
bool isDelete);
void
recordBalance(Issue const& issue, BalanceChange change);
void
recordBalanceChanges(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after, STAmount const& balanceChange);
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
findIssuer(AccountID const& issuerID, ReadView const& view);
bool
validateIssuerChanges(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuer,
IssuerChanges const& changes,
STTx const& tx,
beast::Journal const& j,
bool enforce);
bool
validateFrozenState(
BalanceChange const& change,
bool high,
STTx const& tx,
beast::Journal const& j,
bool enforce,
bool globalFreeze);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: offers should be for non-negative amounts and must not
* be XRP to XRP.
*
* Examine all offers modified by the transaction and ensure that there are
* no offers which contain negative amounts or which exchange XRP for XRP.
*/
class NoBadOffers
{
bool bad_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: an escrow entry must take a value between 0 and
* INITIAL_XRP drops exclusive.
*/
class NoZeroEscrow
{
bool bad_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: a new account root must be the consequence of a payment,
* must have the right starting sequence, and the payment
* may not create more than one new account root.
*/
class ValidNewAccountRoot
{
std::uint32_t accountsCreated_ = 0;
std::uint32_t accountSeq_ = 0;
bool pseudoAccount_ = false;
std::uint32_t flags_ = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Validates several invariants for NFToken pages.
*
* The following checks are made:
* - The page is correctly associated with the owner.
* - The page is correctly ordered between the next and previous links.
* - The page contains at least one and no more than 32 NFTokens.
* - The NFTokens on this page do not belong on a lower or higher page.
* - The NFTokens are correctly sorted on the page.
* - Each URI, if present, is not empty.
*/
class ValidNFTokenPage
{
bool badEntry_ = false;
bool badLink_ = false;
bool badSort_ = false;
bool badURI_ = false;
bool invalidSize_ = false;
bool deletedFinalPage_ = false;
bool deletedLink_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Validates counts of NFTokens after all transaction types.
*
* The following checks are made:
* - The number of minted or burned NFTokens can only be changed by
* NFTokenMint or NFTokenBurn transactions.
* - A successful NFTokenMint must increase the number of NFTokens.
* - A failed NFTokenMint must not change the number of minted NFTokens.
* - An NFTokenMint transaction cannot change the number of burned NFTokens.
* - A successful NFTokenBurn must increase the number of burned NFTokens.
* - A failed NFTokenBurn must not change the number of burned NFTokens.
* - An NFTokenBurn transaction cannot change the number of minted NFTokens.
*/
class NFTokenCountTracking
{
std::uint32_t beforeMintedTotal = 0;
std::uint32_t beforeBurnedTotal = 0;
std::uint32_t afterMintedTotal = 0;
std::uint32_t afterBurnedTotal = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Token holder's trustline balance cannot be negative after
* Clawback.
*
* We iterate all the trust lines affected by this transaction and ensure
* that no more than one trustline is modified, and also holder's balance is
* non-negative.
*/
class ValidClawback
{
std::uint32_t trustlinesChanged = 0;
std::uint32_t mptokensChanged = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
class ValidMPTIssuance
{
std::uint32_t mptIssuancesCreated_ = 0;
std::uint32_t mptIssuancesDeleted_ = 0;
std::uint32_t mptokensCreated_ = 0;
std::uint32_t mptokensDeleted_ = 0;
// non-MPT transactions may attempt to create
// MPToken by an issuer
bool mptCreatedByIssuer_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Permissioned Domains must have some rules and
* AcceptedCredentials must have length between 1 and 10 inclusive.
*
* Since only permissions constitute rules, an empty credentials list
* means that there are no rules and the invariant is violated.
*
* Credentials must be sorted and no duplicates allowed
*
*/
class ValidPermissionedDomain
{
struct SleStatus
{
std::size_t credentialsSize_{0};
bool isSorted_ = false;
bool isUnique_ = false;
bool isDelete_ = false;
};
std::vector<SleStatus> sleStatus_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Pseudo-accounts have valid and consistent properties
*
* Pseudo-accounts have certain properties, and some of those properties are
* unique to pseudo-accounts. Check that all pseudo-accounts are following the
* rules, and that only pseudo-accounts look like pseudo-accounts.
*
*/
class ValidPseudoAccounts
{
std::vector<std::string> errors_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
class ValidPermissionedDEX
{
bool regularOffers_ = false;
bool badHybrids_ = false;
hash_set<uint256> domains_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
class ValidAMM
{
std::optional<AccountID> ammAccount_;
std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceBefore_;
bool ammPoolChanged_;
public:
enum class ZeroAllowed : bool { No = false, Yes = true };
ValidAMM() : ammPoolChanged_{false}
{
}
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
private:
bool
finalizeBid(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeVote(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeCreate(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeDelete(bool enforce, TER res, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeDeposit(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
// Includes clawback
bool
finalizeWithdraw(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeDEX(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
generalInvariant(STTx const&, ReadView const&, ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed, beast::Journal const&)
const;
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Some fields are unmodifiable
*
* Check that any fields specified as unmodifiable are not modified when the
* object is modified. Creation and deletion are ignored.
*
*/
class NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields
{
// Pair is <before, after>.
std::set<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> changedEntries_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Loan brokers are internally consistent
*
* 1. If `LoanBroker.OwnerCount = 0` the `DirectoryNode` will have at most one
* node (the root), which will only hold entries for `RippleState` or
* `MPToken` objects.
*
*/
class ValidLoanBroker
{
// Not all of these elements will necessarily be populated. Remaining items
// will be looked up as needed.
struct BrokerInfo
{
SLE::const_pointer brokerBefore = nullptr;
// After is used for most of the checks, except
// those that check changed values.
SLE::const_pointer brokerAfter = nullptr;
};
// Collect all the LoanBrokers found directly or indirectly through
// pseudo-accounts. Key is the brokerID / index. It will be used to find the
// LoanBroker object if brokerBefore and brokerAfter are nullptr
std::map<uint256, BrokerInfo> brokers_;
// Collect all the modified trust lines. Their high and low accounts will be
// loaded to look for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> lines_;
// Collect all the modified MPTokens. Their accounts will be loaded to look
// for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> mpts_;
bool
goodZeroDirectory(ReadView const& view, SLE::const_ref dir, beast::Journal const& j) const;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Loans are internally consistent
*
* 1. If `Loan.PaymentRemaining = 0` then `Loan.PrincipalOutstanding = 0`
*
*/
class ValidLoan
{
// Pair is <before, after>. After is used for most of the checks, except
// those that check changed values.
std::vector<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> loans_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/*
* @brief Invariants: Vault object and MPTokenIssuance for vault shares
*
* - vault deleted and vault created is empty
* - vault created must be linked to pseudo-account for shares and assets
* - vault must have MPTokenIssuance for shares
* - vault without shares outstanding must have no shares
* - loss unrealized does not exceed the difference between assets total and
* assets available
* - assets available do not exceed assets total
* - vault deposit increases assets and share issuance, and adds to:
* total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
* - vault withdrawal and clawback reduce assets and share issuance, and
* subtracts from: total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
* - vault set must not alter the vault assets or shares balance
* - no vault transaction can change loss unrealized (it's updated by loan
* transactions)
*
*/
class ValidVault
{
Number static constexpr zero{};
struct Vault final
{
uint256 key = beast::zero;
Asset asset = {};
AccountID pseudoId = {};
AccountID owner = {};
uint192 shareMPTID = beast::zero;
Number assetsTotal = 0;
Number assetsAvailable = 0;
Number assetsMaximum = 0;
Number lossUnrealized = 0;
Vault static make(SLE const&);
};
struct Shares final
{
MPTIssue share = {};
std::uint64_t sharesTotal = 0;
std::uint64_t sharesMaximum = 0;
Shares static make(SLE const&);
};
std::vector<Vault> afterVault_ = {};
std::vector<Shares> afterMPTs_ = {};
std::vector<Vault> beforeVault_ = {};
std::vector<Shares> beforeMPTs_ = {};
std::unordered_map<uint256, Number> deltas_ = {};
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
// additional invariant checks can be declared above and then added to this
// tuple
using InvariantChecks = std::tuple<
TransactionFeeCheck,
AccountRootsNotDeleted,
AccountRootsDeletedClean,
LedgerEntryTypesMatch,
XRPBalanceChecks,
XRPNotCreated,
NoXRPTrustLines,
NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze,
TransfersNotFrozen,
NoBadOffers,
NoZeroEscrow,
ValidNewAccountRoot,
ValidNFTokenPage,
NFTokenCountTracking,
ValidClawback,
ValidMPTIssuance,
ValidPermissionedDomain,
ValidPermissionedDEX,
ValidAMM,
NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields,
ValidPseudoAccounts,
ValidLoanBroker,
ValidLoan,
ValidVault>;
/**
* @brief get a tuple of all invariant checks
*
* @return std::tuple of instances that implement the required invariant check
* methods
*
* @see xrpl::InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
*/
inline InvariantChecks
getInvariantChecks()
{
return InvariantChecks{};
}
} // namespace xrpl

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#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <optional>
namespace xrpl {
class ValidAMM
{
std::optional<AccountID> ammAccount_;
std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceBefore_;
bool ammPoolChanged_;
public:
enum class ZeroAllowed : bool { No = false, Yes = true };
ValidAMM() : ammPoolChanged_{false}
{
}
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
private:
bool
finalizeBid(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeVote(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeCreate(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeDelete(bool enforce, TER res, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeDeposit(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
// Includes clawback
bool
finalizeWithdraw(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
finalizeDEX(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
bool
generalInvariant(STTx const&, ReadView const&, ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed, beast::Journal const&)
const;
};
} // namespace xrpl

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#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <map>
#include <vector>
namespace xrpl {
/**
* @brief Invariant: frozen trust line balance change is not allowed.
*
* We iterate all affected trust lines and ensure that they don't have
* unexpected change of balance if they're frozen.
*/
class TransfersNotFrozen
{
struct BalanceChange
{
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const line;
int const balanceChangeSign;
};
struct IssuerChanges
{
std::vector<BalanceChange> senders;
std::vector<BalanceChange> receivers;
};
using ByIssuer = std::map<Issue, IssuerChanges>;
ByIssuer balanceChanges_;
std::map<AccountID, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const> possibleIssuers_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
private:
bool
isValidEntry(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
STAmount
calculateBalanceChange(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
bool isDelete);
void
recordBalance(Issue const& issue, BalanceChange change);
void
recordBalanceChanges(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after, STAmount const& balanceChange);
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
findIssuer(AccountID const& issuerID, ReadView const& view);
bool
validateIssuerChanges(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuer,
IssuerChanges const& changes,
STTx const& tx,
beast::Journal const& j,
bool enforce);
bool
validateFrozenState(
BalanceChange const& change,
bool high,
STTx const& tx,
beast::Journal const& j,
bool enforce,
bool globalFreeze);
};
} // namespace xrpl

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#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/AMMInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/FreezeInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/LoanInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/NFTInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDEXInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDomainInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <tuple>
namespace xrpl {
#if GENERATING_DOCS
/**
* @brief Prototype for invariant check implementations.
*
* __THIS CLASS DOES NOT EXIST__ - or rather it exists in documentation only to
* communicate the interface required of any invariant checker. Any invariant
* check implementation should implement the public methods documented here.
*
*/
class InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
{
public:
explicit InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE() = default;
/**
* @brief called for each ledger entry in the current transaction.
*
* @param isDelete true if the SLE is being deleted
* @param before ledger entry before modification by the transaction
* @param after ledger entry after modification by the transaction
*/
void
visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
/**
* @brief called after all ledger entries have been visited to determine
* the final status of the check
*
* @param tx the transaction being applied
* @param tec the current TER result of the transaction
* @param fee the fee actually charged for this transaction
* @param view a ReadView of the ledger being modified
* @param j journal for logging
*
* @return true if check passes, false if it fails
*/
bool
finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const tec,
XRPAmount const fee,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j);
};
#endif
/**
* @brief Invariant: We should never charge a transaction a negative fee or a
* fee that is larger than what the transaction itself specifies.
*
* We can, in some circumstances, charge less.
*/
class TransactionFeeCheck
{
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: A transaction must not create XRP and should only destroy
* the XRP fee.
*
* We iterate through all account roots, payment channels and escrow entries
* that were modified and calculate the net change in XRP caused by the
* transactions.
*/
class XRPNotCreated
{
std::int64_t drops_ = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: we cannot remove an account ledger entry
*
* We iterate all account roots that were modified, and ensure that any that
* were present before the transaction was applied continue to be present
* afterwards unless they were explicitly deleted by a successful
* AccountDelete transaction.
*/
class AccountRootsNotDeleted
{
std::uint32_t accountsDeleted_ = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: a deleted account must not have any objects left
*
* We iterate all deleted account roots, and ensure that there are no
* objects left that are directly accessible with that account's ID.
*
* There should only be one deleted account, but that's checked by
* AccountRootsNotDeleted. This invariant will handle multiple deleted account
* roots without a problem.
*/
class AccountRootsDeletedClean
{
// Pair is <before, after>. Before is used for most of the checks, so that
// if, for example, an object ID field is cleared, but the object is not
// deleted, it can still be found. After is used specifically for any checks
// that are expected as part of the deletion, such as zeroing out the
// balance.
std::vector<std::pair<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>, std::shared_ptr<SLE const>>> accountsDeleted_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: An account XRP balance must be in XRP and take a value
* between 0 and INITIAL_XRP drops, inclusive.
*
* We iterate all account roots modified by the transaction and ensure that
* their XRP balances are reasonable.
*/
class XRPBalanceChecks
{
bool bad_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: corresponding modified ledger entries should match in type
* and added entries should be a valid type.
*/
class LedgerEntryTypesMatch
{
bool typeMismatch_ = false;
bool invalidTypeAdded_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Trust lines using XRP are not allowed.
*
* We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
* that they are against a valid issuer.
*/
class NoXRPTrustLines
{
bool xrpTrustLine_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Trust lines with deep freeze flag are not allowed if normal
* freeze flag is not set.
*
* We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
* that they don't have deep freeze flag set without normal freeze flag set.
*/
class NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze
{
bool deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: offers should be for non-negative amounts and must not
* be XRP to XRP.
*
* Examine all offers modified by the transaction and ensure that there are
* no offers which contain negative amounts or which exchange XRP for XRP.
*/
class NoBadOffers
{
bool bad_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: an escrow entry must take a value between 0 and
* INITIAL_XRP drops exclusive.
*/
class NoZeroEscrow
{
bool bad_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: a new account root must be the consequence of a payment,
* must have the right starting sequence, and the payment
* may not create more than one new account root.
*/
class ValidNewAccountRoot
{
std::uint32_t accountsCreated_ = 0;
std::uint32_t accountSeq_ = 0;
bool pseudoAccount_ = false;
std::uint32_t flags_ = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Token holder's trustline balance cannot be negative after
* Clawback.
*
* We iterate all the trust lines affected by this transaction and ensure
* that no more than one trustline is modified, and also holder's balance is
* non-negative.
*/
class ValidClawback
{
std::uint32_t trustlinesChanged = 0;
std::uint32_t mptokensChanged = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Pseudo-accounts have valid and consistent properties
*
* Pseudo-accounts have certain properties, and some of those properties are
* unique to pseudo-accounts. Check that all pseudo-accounts are following the
* rules, and that only pseudo-accounts look like pseudo-accounts.
*
*/
class ValidPseudoAccounts
{
std::vector<std::string> errors_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Some fields are unmodifiable
*
* Check that any fields specified as unmodifiable are not modified when the
* object is modified. Creation and deletion are ignored.
*
*/
class NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields
{
// Pair is <before, after>.
std::set<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> changedEntries_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
// additional invariant checks can be declared above and then added to this
// tuple
using InvariantChecks = std::tuple<
TransactionFeeCheck,
AccountRootsNotDeleted,
AccountRootsDeletedClean,
LedgerEntryTypesMatch,
XRPBalanceChecks,
XRPNotCreated,
NoXRPTrustLines,
NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze,
TransfersNotFrozen,
NoBadOffers,
NoZeroEscrow,
ValidNewAccountRoot,
ValidNFTokenPage,
NFTokenCountTracking,
ValidClawback,
ValidMPTIssuance,
ValidPermissionedDomain,
ValidPermissionedDEX,
ValidAMM,
NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields,
ValidPseudoAccounts,
ValidLoanBroker,
ValidLoan,
ValidVault>;
/**
* @brief get a tuple of all invariant checks
*
* @return std::tuple of instances that implement the required invariant check
* methods
*
* @see xrpl::InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
*/
inline InvariantChecks
getInvariantChecks()
{
return InvariantChecks{};
}
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <type_traits>
namespace xrpl {
/*
assert(enforce)
There are several asserts (or XRPL_ASSERTs) in invariant check files that check
a variable named `enforce` when an invariant fails. At first glance, those
asserts may look incorrect, but they are not.
Those asserts take advantage of two facts:
1. `asserts` are not (normally) executed in release builds.
2. Invariants should *never* fail, except in tests that specifically modify
the open ledger to break them.
This makes `assert(enforce)` sort of a second-layer of invariant enforcement
aimed at _developers_. It's designed to fire if a developer writes code that
violates an invariant, and runs it in unit tests or a develop build that _does
not have the relevant amendments enabled_. It's intentionally a pain in the neck
so that bad code gets caught and fixed as early as possible.
*/
enum Privilege {
noPriv = 0x0000, // The transaction can not do any of the enumerated operations
createAcct = 0x0001, // The transaction can create a new ACCOUNT_ROOT object.
createPseudoAcct = 0x0002, // The transaction can create a pseudo account,
// which implies createAcct
mustDeleteAcct = 0x0004, // The transaction must delete an ACCOUNT_ROOT object
mayDeleteAcct = 0x0008, // The transaction may delete an ACCOUNT_ROOT
// object, but does not have to
overrideFreeze = 0x0010, // The transaction can override some freeze rules
changeNFTCounts = 0x0020, // The transaction can mint or burn an NFT
createMPTIssuance = 0x0040, // The transaction can create a new MPT issuance
destroyMPTIssuance = 0x0080, // The transaction can destroy an MPT issuance
mustAuthorizeMPT = 0x0100, // The transaction MUST create or delete an MPT
// object (except by issuer)
mayAuthorizeMPT = 0x0200, // The transaction MAY create or delete an MPT
// object (except by issuer)
mayDeleteMPT = 0x0400, // The transaction MAY delete an MPT object. May not create.
mustModifyVault = 0x0800, // The transaction must modify, delete or create, a vault
mayModifyVault = 0x1000, // The transaction MAY modify, delete or create, a vault
};
constexpr Privilege
operator|(Privilege lhs, Privilege rhs)
{
return safe_cast<Privilege>(
safe_cast<std::underlying_type_t<Privilege>>(lhs) |
safe_cast<std::underlying_type_t<Privilege>>(rhs));
}
bool
hasPrivilege(STTx const& tx, Privilege priv);
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <map>
#include <vector>
namespace xrpl {
/**
* @brief Invariants: Loan brokers are internally consistent
*
* 1. If `LoanBroker.OwnerCount = 0` the `DirectoryNode` will have at most one
* node (the root), which will only hold entries for `RippleState` or
* `MPToken` objects.
*
*/
class ValidLoanBroker
{
// Not all of these elements will necessarily be populated. Remaining items
// will be looked up as needed.
struct BrokerInfo
{
SLE::const_pointer brokerBefore = nullptr;
// After is used for most of the checks, except
// those that check changed values.
SLE::const_pointer brokerAfter = nullptr;
};
// Collect all the LoanBrokers found directly or indirectly through
// pseudo-accounts. Key is the brokerID / index. It will be used to find the
// LoanBroker object if brokerBefore and brokerAfter are nullptr
std::map<uint256, BrokerInfo> brokers_;
// Collect all the modified trust lines. Their high and low accounts will be
// loaded to look for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> lines_;
// Collect all the modified MPTokens. Their accounts will be loaded to look
// for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> mpts_;
bool
goodZeroDirectory(ReadView const& view, SLE::const_ref dir, beast::Journal const& j) const;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariants: Loans are internally consistent
*
* 1. If `Loan.PaymentRemaining = 0` then `Loan.PrincipalOutstanding = 0`
*
*/
class ValidLoan
{
// Pair is <before, after>. After is used for most of the checks, except
// those that check changed values.
std::vector<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> loans_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <cstdint>
namespace xrpl {
class ValidMPTIssuance
{
std::uint32_t mptIssuancesCreated_ = 0;
std::uint32_t mptIssuancesDeleted_ = 0;
std::uint32_t mptokensCreated_ = 0;
std::uint32_t mptokensDeleted_ = 0;
// non-MPT transactions may attempt to create
// MPToken by an issuer
bool mptCreatedByIssuer_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <cstdint>
namespace xrpl {
/**
* @brief Invariant: Validates several invariants for NFToken pages.
*
* The following checks are made:
* - The page is correctly associated with the owner.
* - The page is correctly ordered between the next and previous links.
* - The page contains at least one and no more than 32 NFTokens.
* - The NFTokens on this page do not belong on a lower or higher page.
* - The NFTokens are correctly sorted on the page.
* - Each URI, if present, is not empty.
*/
class ValidNFTokenPage
{
bool badEntry_ = false;
bool badLink_ = false;
bool badSort_ = false;
bool badURI_ = false;
bool invalidSize_ = false;
bool deletedFinalPage_ = false;
bool deletedLink_ = false;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
/**
* @brief Invariant: Validates counts of NFTokens after all transaction types.
*
* The following checks are made:
* - The number of minted or burned NFTokens can only be changed by
* NFTokenMint or NFTokenBurn transactions.
* - A successful NFTokenMint must increase the number of NFTokens.
* - A failed NFTokenMint must not change the number of minted NFTokens.
* - An NFTokenMint transaction cannot change the number of burned NFTokens.
* - A successful NFTokenBurn must increase the number of burned NFTokens.
* - A failed NFTokenBurn must not change the number of burned NFTokens.
* - An NFTokenBurn transaction cannot change the number of minted NFTokens.
*/
class NFTokenCountTracking
{
std::uint32_t beforeMintedTotal = 0;
std::uint32_t beforeBurnedTotal = 0;
std::uint32_t afterMintedTotal = 0;
std::uint32_t afterBurnedTotal = 0;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
namespace xrpl {
class ValidPermissionedDEX
{
bool regularOffers_ = false;
bool badHybrids_ = false;
hash_set<uint256> domains_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <vector>
namespace xrpl {
/**
* @brief Invariants: Permissioned Domains must have some rules and
* AcceptedCredentials must have length between 1 and 10 inclusive.
*
* Since only permissions constitute rules, an empty credentials list
* means that there are no rules and the invariant is violated.
*
* Credentials must be sorted and no duplicates allowed
*
*/
class ValidPermissionedDomain
{
struct SleStatus
{
std::size_t credentialsSize_{0};
bool isSorted_ = false;
bool isUnique_ = false;
bool isDelete_ = false;
};
std::vector<SleStatus> sleStatus_;
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <unordered_map>
#include <vector>
namespace xrpl {
/*
* @brief Invariants: Vault object and MPTokenIssuance for vault shares
*
* - vault deleted and vault created is empty
* - vault created must be linked to pseudo-account for shares and assets
* - vault must have MPTokenIssuance for shares
* - vault without shares outstanding must have no shares
* - loss unrealized does not exceed the difference between assets total and
* assets available
* - assets available do not exceed assets total
* - vault deposit increases assets and share issuance, and adds to:
* total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
* - vault withdrawal and clawback reduce assets and share issuance, and
* subtracts from: total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
* - vault set must not alter the vault assets or shares balance
* - no vault transaction can change loss unrealized (it's updated by loan
* transactions)
*
*/
class ValidVault
{
Number static constexpr zero{};
struct Vault final
{
uint256 key = beast::zero;
Asset asset = {};
AccountID pseudoId = {};
AccountID owner = {};
uint192 shareMPTID = beast::zero;
Number assetsTotal = 0;
Number assetsAvailable = 0;
Number assetsMaximum = 0;
Number lossUnrealized = 0;
Vault static make(SLE const&);
};
struct Shares final
{
MPTIssue share = {};
std::uint64_t sharesTotal = 0;
std::uint64_t sharesMaximum = 0;
Shares static make(SLE const&);
};
std::vector<Vault> afterVault_ = {};
std::vector<Shares> afterMPTs_ = {};
std::vector<Vault> beforeVault_ = {};
std::vector<Shares> beforeMPTs_ = {};
std::unordered_map<uint256, Number> deltas_ = {};
public:
void
visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
bool
finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
};
} // namespace xrpl

140
nix/devshell.nix Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
{ pkgs, ... }:
let
commonPackages = with pkgs; [
ccache
cmake
conan
gcovr
git
gnumake
llvmPackages_21.clang-tools
ninja
perl # needed for openssl
pkg-config
pre-commit
python314
];
# Supported compiler versions
gccVersion = pkgs.lib.range 13 15;
clangVersions = pkgs.lib.range 18 21;
defaultCompiler = if pkgs.stdenv.isDarwin then "apple-clang" else "gcc";
defaultGccVersion = pkgs.lib.last gccVersion;
defaultClangVersion = pkgs.lib.last clangVersions;
strToCompilerEnv =
compiler: version:
(
if compiler == "gcc" then
let
gccPkg = pkgs."gcc${toString version}Stdenv" or null;
in
if gccPkg != null && builtins.elem version gccVersion then
gccPkg
else
throw "Invalid GCC version: ${toString version}. Must be one of: ${toString gccVersion}"
else if compiler == "clang" then
let
clangPkg = pkgs."llvmPackages_${toString version}".stdenv or null;
in
if clangPkg != null && builtins.elem version clangVersions then
clangPkg
else
throw "Invalid Clang version: ${toString version}. Must be one of: ${toString clangVersions}"
else if compiler == "apple-clang" || compiler == "none" then
pkgs.stdenvNoCC
else
throw "Invalid compiler: ${compiler}. Must be one of: gcc, clang, apple-clang, none"
);
# Helper function to create a shell with a specific compiler
makeShell =
{
compiler ? defaultCompiler,
version ? (
if compiler == "gcc" then
defaultGccVersion
else if compiler == "clang" then
defaultClangVersion
else
null
),
}:
let
compilerStdEnv = strToCompilerEnv compiler version;
compilerName =
if compiler == "apple-clang" then
"clang"
else if compiler == "none" then
null
else
compiler;
gccOnMacWarning =
if pkgs.stdenv.isDarwin && compiler == "gcc" then
''
echo "WARNING: Using GCC on macOS with Conan may not work."
echo " Consider using 'nix develop .#clang' or the default shell instead."
echo ""
''
else
"";
compilerVersion =
if compilerName != null then
''
echo "Compiler: "
${compilerName} --version
''
else
''
echo "No compiler specified - using system compiler"
'';
shellAttrs = {
packages = commonPackages;
shellHook = ''
echo "Welcome to xrpld development shell";
${gccOnMacWarning}${compilerVersion}
'';
};
in
pkgs.mkShell.override { stdenv = compilerStdEnv; } shellAttrs;
# Generate shells for each compiler version
gccShells = builtins.listToAttrs (
map (version: {
name = "gcc${toString version}";
value = makeShell {
compiler = "gcc";
version = version;
};
}) gccVersion
);
clangShells = builtins.listToAttrs (
map (version: {
name = "clang${toString version}";
value = makeShell {
compiler = "clang";
version = version;
};
}) clangVersions
);
in
gccShells
// clangShells
// {
# Default shells
default = makeShell { };
gcc = makeShell { compiler = "gcc"; };
clang = makeShell { compiler = "clang"; };
# No compiler
no-compiler = makeShell { compiler = "none"; };
apple-clang = makeShell { compiler = "apple-clang"; };
}

19
nix/utils.nix Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
{ nixpkgs }:
{
forEachSystem =
function:
nixpkgs.lib.genAttrs
[
"x86_64-linux"
"aarch64-linux"
"x86_64-darwin"
"aarch64-darwin"
]
(
system:
function {
inherit system;
pkgs = import nixpkgs { inherit system; };
}
);
}

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
# The idea is to empty this file gradually by fixing the underlying issues and removing suppresions.
# The idea is to empty this file gradually by fixing the underlying issues and removing suppressions.
#
# ASAN_OPTIONS="suppressions=sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp:include=sanitizers/suppressions/runtime-asan-options.txt"
# ASAN_OPTIONS="print_stacktrace=1:detect_container_overflow=0:suppressions=sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp:halt_on_error=0"
#
# Boost coroutines cause multiple ASAN false positives due to swapcontext/fiber stack switching.
# ASAN cannot correctly track stack memory across coroutine context switches, leading to:
# - stack-use-after-return errors
# - stack-use-after-scope errors
# - stack-buffer-overflow errors in seemingly unrelated code (e.g., std::chrono::steady_clock::now())
# - stack-buffer-underflow errors in seemingly unrelated code (e.g., xxhasher::retrieveHash(), clock_gettime)
# - bad-free errors in boost::context::basic_fixedsize_stack::deallocate (ASan loses track of
# malloc allocations after fiber/context switches, reporting "free on address not malloc()-ed")
# The detect_container_overflow=0 option disables false positives from:
# - Boost intrusive containers (slist_iterator.hpp, hashtable.hpp, aged_unordered_container.h)
# - Boost context/coroutine stack switching (Workers.cpp, thread.h)
#
# These are now handled by:
# 1. Using Boost.Coroutine2 with the ucontext backend (BOOST_USE_ASAN + BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT)
# 2. Runtime options in runtime-asan-options.txt:
# - alloc_dealloc_mismatch=0: Suppresses false "bad-free" errors from fiber stack deallocation, on GCC. For Clang we don't instrument boost
# - detect_stack_use_after_return=0: Prevents false positives from fake stack tracking
# - use_sigaltstack=0: Avoids conflicts with coroutine stack switching
interceptor_via_fun:swapcontext
interceptor_via_fun:makecontext
interceptor_via_fun:boost::context::fiber::~fiber
interceptor_name:boost/context/fiber_ucontext.hpp
interceptor_name:boost/context/fixedsize_stack.hpp
interceptor_name:Coro.ipp
# See: https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerContainerOverflow
interceptor_name:clock_gettime
# Boost
interceptor_name:boost/asio
# Leaks in Doctest tests: xrpl.test.*
interceptor_name:src/libxrpl/net/HTTPClient.cpp
interceptor_name:src/libxrpl/net/RegisterSSLCerts.cpp
interceptor_name:src/tests/libxrpl/net/HTTPClient.cpp
interceptor_name:xrpl/net/AutoSocket.h
interceptor_name:xrpl/net/HTTPClient.h
interceptor_name:xrpl/net/HTTPClientSSLContext.h
interceptor_name:xrpl/net/RegisterSSLCerts.h
# Suppress false positive stack-buffer errors in thread stack allocation
# Related to ASan's __asan_handle_no_return warnings (github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/189)
# These occur during multi-threaded test initialization on macOS
interceptor_name:memcpy
interceptor_name:__bzero
interceptor_name:nudb
interceptor_name:__asan_memset
interceptor_name:__asan_memcpy

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
# The idea is to empty this file gradually by fixing the underlying issues and removing suppresions.
# Suppress leaks detected by asan in rippled code.
leak:src/libxrpl/net/HTTPClient.cpp
leak:src/libxrpl/net/RegisterSSLCerts.cpp
leak:src/tests/libxrpl/net/HTTPClient.cpp
leak:xrpl/net/AutoSocket.h
leak:xrpl/net/HTTPClient.h
leak:xrpl/net/HTTPClientSSLContext.h
leak:xrpl/net/RegisterSSLCerts.h
leak:ripple::HTTPClient
leak:ripple::HTTPClientImp
# Suppress leaks detected by asan in boost code.
# These are false positives from Boost.Asio SSL internals that use OpenSSL BIO structures.
# The BIO structures are managed by OpenSSL's internal reference counting and freed at process exit.
#leak:boost::asio
#leak:boost/asio
# OpenSSL BIO memory is managed internally and freed at process exit
leak:CRYPTO_malloc
leak:bio_make_pair
leak:BIO_new_bio_pair
leak:boost::asio
leak:boost/asio

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
detect_container_overflow=0
detect_stack_use_after_return=0
halt_on_error=0
print_summary=true
use_sigaltstack=0

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
halt_on_error=0

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
halt_on_error=0
second_deadlock_stack=1

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
halt_on_error=0

View File

@@ -20,15 +20,10 @@ signal:test/beast/beast_PropertyStream_test.cpp
signal:xrpld/core/detail/Workers.cpp
signal:xrpld/core/JobQueue.cpp
# src:beast/utility/beast_Journal.cpp
# src:beast/utility/beast_PropertyStream.cpp
# src:core/detail/Workers.cpp
# src:core/JobQueue.cpp
# src:libxrpl/beast/utility/beast_Journal.cpp
# src:test/beast/beast_PropertyStream_test.cpp
# src:src/test/app/Invariants_test.cpp
# Boost coroutines cause false positive stack-buffer-underflow in xxhasher
# This is a known ASAN limitation with stackful coroutines
# See: https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/189
src:beast/hash/xxhasher.h
src:beast/utility/beast_Journal.cpp
src:beast/utility/beast_PropertyStream.cpp
src:core/detail/Workers.cpp
src:core/JobQueue.cpp
src:libxrpl/beast/utility/beast_Journal.cpp
src:test/beast/beast_PropertyStream_test.cpp
src:src/test/app/Invariants_test.cpp

View File

@@ -140,7 +140,6 @@ unsigned-integer-overflow:src/libxrpl/protocol/tokens.cpp
unsigned-integer-overflow:src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMap.cpp
unsigned-integer-overflow:src/test/app/Batch_test.cpp
unsigned-integer-overflow:src/test/app/Invariants_test.cpp
unsigned-integer-overflow:src/test/app/Loan_test.cpp
unsigned-integer-overflow:src/test/app/NFToken_test.cpp
unsigned-integer-overflow:src/test/app/Offer_test.cpp
unsigned-integer-overflow:src/test/app/Path_test.cpp

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/LocalValue.h>
namespace xrpl {
namespace detail {
} // namespace detail
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/MallocTrim.h>
#include <boost/predef.h>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstdio>
#include <fstream>
#include <sstream>
#if defined(__GLIBC__) && BOOST_OS_LINUX
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <unistd.h>
// Require RUSAGE_THREAD for thread-scoped page fault tracking
#ifndef RUSAGE_THREAD
#error "MallocTrim rusage instrumentation requires RUSAGE_THREAD on Linux/glibc"
#endif
namespace {
bool
getRusageThread(struct rusage& ru)
{
return ::getrusage(RUSAGE_THREAD, &ru) == 0; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
} // namespace
#endif
namespace xrpl {
namespace detail {
// cSpell:ignore statm
#if defined(__GLIBC__) && BOOST_OS_LINUX
inline int
mallocTrimWithPad(std::size_t padBytes)
{
return ::malloc_trim(padBytes);
}
long
parseStatmRSSkB(std::string const& statm)
{
// /proc/self/statm format: size resident shared text lib data dt
// We want the second field (resident) which is in pages
std::istringstream iss(statm);
long size, resident;
if (!(iss >> size >> resident))
return -1;
// Convert pages to KB
long const pageSize = ::sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
if (pageSize <= 0)
return -1;
return (resident * pageSize) / 1024;
}
#endif // __GLIBC__ && BOOST_OS_LINUX
} // namespace detail
MallocTrimReport
mallocTrim(std::string_view tag, beast::Journal journal)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
MallocTrimReport report;
#if !(defined(__GLIBC__) && BOOST_OS_LINUX)
JLOG(journal.debug()) << "malloc_trim not supported on this platform (tag=" << tag << ")";
#else
// Keep glibc malloc_trim padding at 0 (default): 12h Mainnet tests across 0/256KB/1MB/16MB
// showed no clear, consistent benefit from custom padding—0 provided the best overall balance
// of RSS reduction and trim-latency stability without adding a tuning surface.
constexpr std::size_t TRIM_PAD = 0;
report.supported = true;
if (journal.debug())
{
auto readFile = [](std::string const& path) -> std::string {
std::ifstream ifs(path, std::ios::in | std::ios::binary);
if (!ifs.is_open())
return {};
// /proc files are often not seekable; read as a stream.
std::ostringstream oss;
oss << ifs.rdbuf();
return oss.str();
};
std::string const tagStr{tag};
std::string const statmPath = "/proc/self/statm";
auto const statmBefore = readFile(statmPath);
long const rssBeforeKB = detail::parseStatmRSSkB(statmBefore);
struct rusage ru0{};
bool const have_ru0 = getRusageThread(ru0);
auto const t0 = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
report.trimResult = detail::mallocTrimWithPad(TRIM_PAD);
auto const t1 = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
struct rusage ru1{};
bool const have_ru1 = getRusageThread(ru1);
auto const statmAfter = readFile(statmPath);
long const rssAfterKB = detail::parseStatmRSSkB(statmAfter);
// Populate report fields
report.rssBeforeKB = rssBeforeKB;
report.rssAfterKB = rssAfterKB;
report.durationUs = std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::microseconds>(t1 - t0);
if (have_ru0 && have_ru1)
{
report.minfltDelta = ru1.ru_minflt - ru0.ru_minflt;
report.majfltDelta = ru1.ru_majflt - ru0.ru_majflt;
}
std::int64_t const deltaKB = (rssBeforeKB < 0 || rssAfterKB < 0)
? 0
: (static_cast<std::int64_t>(rssAfterKB) - static_cast<std::int64_t>(rssBeforeKB));
JLOG(journal.debug()) << "malloc_trim tag=" << tagStr << " result=" << report.trimResult
<< " pad=" << TRIM_PAD << " bytes"
<< " rss_before=" << rssBeforeKB << "kB"
<< " rss_after=" << rssAfterKB << "kB"
<< " delta=" << deltaKB << "kB"
<< " duration_us=" << report.durationUs.count()
<< " minflt_delta=" << report.minfltDelta
<< " majflt_delta=" << report.majfltDelta;
}
else
{
report.trimResult = detail::mallocTrimWithPad(TRIM_PAD);
}
#endif
return report;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -11,16 +11,18 @@
#include <numeric>
#include <stdexcept>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include <type_traits>
#include <utility>
#ifdef _MSC_VER
#pragma message("Using boost::multiprecision::uint128_t and int128_t")
#endif
using uint128_t = xrpl::detail::uint128_t;
using int128_t = xrpl::detail::int128_t;
#include <boost/multiprecision/cpp_int.hpp>
using uint128_t = boost::multiprecision::uint128_t;
using int128_t = boost::multiprecision::int128_t;
#else // !defined(_MSC_VER)
using uint128_t = __uint128_t;
using int128_t = __int128_t;
#endif // !defined(_MSC_VER)
namespace xrpl {
@@ -59,6 +61,9 @@ Number::setMantissaScale(MantissaRange::mantissa_scale scale)
// precision to an operation. This enables the final result
// to be correctly rounded to the internal precision of Number.
template <class T>
concept UnsignedMantissa = std::is_unsigned_v<T> || std::is_same_v<T, uint128_t>;
class Number::Guard
{
std::uint64_t digits_; // 16 decimal guard digits
@@ -94,7 +99,7 @@ public:
round() noexcept;
// Modify the result to the correctly rounded value
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa T>
template <UnsignedMantissa T>
void
doRoundUp(
bool& negative,
@@ -102,22 +107,22 @@ public:
int& exponent,
internalrep const& minMantissa,
internalrep const& maxMantissa,
std::string_view location);
std::string location);
// Modify the result to the correctly rounded value
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa T>
template <UnsignedMantissa T>
void
doRoundDown(bool& negative, T& mantissa, int& exponent, internalrep const& minMantissa);
// Modify the result to the correctly rounded value
void
doRound(rep& drops, std::string_view location);
doRound(rep& drops, std::string location);
private:
void
doPush(unsigned d) noexcept;
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa T>
template <UnsignedMantissa T>
void
bringIntoRange(bool& negative, T& mantissa, int& exponent, internalrep const& minMantissa);
};
@@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ Number::Guard::round() noexcept
return 0;
}
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa T>
template <UnsignedMantissa T>
void
Number::Guard::bringIntoRange(
bool& negative,
@@ -223,13 +228,13 @@ Number::Guard::bringIntoRange(
{
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
negative = false;
negative = zero.negative_;
mantissa = zero.mantissa_;
exponent = zero.exponent_;
}
}
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa T>
template <UnsignedMantissa T>
void
Number::Guard::doRoundUp(
bool& negative,
@@ -237,7 +242,7 @@ Number::Guard::doRoundUp(
int& exponent,
internalrep const& minMantissa,
internalrep const& maxMantissa,
std::string_view location)
std::string location)
{
auto r = round();
if (r == 1 || (r == 0 && (mantissa & 1) == 1))
@@ -245,7 +250,7 @@ Number::Guard::doRoundUp(
++mantissa;
// Ensure mantissa after incrementing fits within both the
// min/maxMantissa range and is a valid "rep".
if (mantissa > maxMantissa)
if (mantissa > maxMantissa || mantissa > maxRep)
{
mantissa /= 10;
++exponent;
@@ -253,10 +258,10 @@ Number::Guard::doRoundUp(
}
bringIntoRange(negative, mantissa, exponent, minMantissa);
if (exponent > maxExponent)
Throw<std::overflow_error>(std::string{location});
throw std::overflow_error(location);
}
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa T>
template <UnsignedMantissa T>
void
Number::Guard::doRoundDown(
bool& negative,
@@ -279,13 +284,12 @@ Number::Guard::doRoundDown(
// Modify the result to the correctly rounded value
void
Number::Guard::doRound(rep& drops, std::string_view location)
Number::Guard::doRound(rep& drops, std::string location)
{
auto r = round();
if (r == 1 || (r == 0 && (drops & 1) == 1))
{
auto const& range = range_.get();
if (drops >= range.max)
if (drops >= maxRep)
{
static_assert(sizeof(internalrep) == sizeof(rep));
// This should be impossible, because it's impossible to represent
@@ -294,7 +298,7 @@ Number::Guard::doRound(rep& drops, std::string_view location)
// or "(maxRep + 1) / 10", neither of which will round up when
// converting to rep, though the latter might overflow _before_
// rounding.
Throw<std::overflow_error>(std::string{location}); // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
throw std::overflow_error(location); // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
++drops;
}
@@ -314,131 +318,23 @@ Number::externalToInternal(rep mantissa)
// If the mantissa is already positive, just return it
if (mantissa >= 0)
return mantissa;
// If the mantissa is negative, but fits within the positive range of rep,
// return it negated
if (mantissa >= -std::numeric_limits<rep>::max())
return -mantissa;
// Cast to unsigned before negating to avoid undefined behavior
// when v == INT64_MIN (negating INT64_MIN in signed is UB)
return -static_cast<internalrep>(mantissa);
}
/** Breaks down the number into components, potentially de-normalizing it.
*
* Ensures that the mantissa always has range_.log digits.
*
*/
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep>
std::tuple<bool, Rep, int>
Number::toInternal(MantissaRange const& range) const
{
auto exponent = exponent_;
bool const negative = mantissa_ < 0;
auto const sign = negative ? -1 : 1;
Rep mantissa = static_cast<Rep>(sign * mantissa_);
auto const referenceMin = range.referenceMin;
auto const minMantissa = range.min;
if (mantissa != 0 && mantissa >= minMantissa && mantissa < referenceMin)
{
// Ensure the mantissa has the correct number of digits
mantissa *= 10;
--exponent;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
mantissa >= referenceMin && mantissa < referenceMin * 10,
"xrpl::Number::toInternal()",
"Number is within reference range and has 'log' digits");
}
return {negative, mantissa, exponent};
}
/** Breaks down the number into components, potentially de-normalizing it.
*
* Ensures that the mantissa always has range_.log digits.
*
*/
template <detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep>
std::tuple<bool, Rep, int>
Number::toInternal() const
{
return toInternal(range_);
}
/** Rebuilds the number from components.
*
* If "normalized" is true, the values are expected to be normalized - all
* in their valid ranges.
*
* If "normalized" is false, the values are expected to be "near
* normalized", meaning that the mantissa has to be modified at most once to
* bring it back into range.
*
*/
template <bool expectNormal, detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep>
void
Number::fromInternal(bool negative, Rep mantissa, int exponent, MantissaRange const* pRange)
{
if constexpr (std::is_same_v<std::bool_constant<expectNormal>, std::false_type>)
{
if (!pRange)
throw std::runtime_error("Missing range to Number::fromInternal!");
auto const& range = *pRange;
auto const maxMantissa = range.max;
auto const minMantissa = range.min;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
mantissa >= minMantissa, "xrpl::Number::fromInternal", "mantissa large enough");
if (mantissa > maxMantissa || mantissa < minMantissa)
{
normalize(negative, mantissa, exponent, range.min, maxMantissa);
}
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
mantissa >= minMantissa && mantissa <= maxMantissa,
"xrpl::Number::fromInternal",
"mantissa in range");
}
auto const sign = negative ? -1 : 1;
mantissa_ = sign * static_cast<rep>(mantissa);
exponent_ = exponent;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
(pRange && isnormal(*pRange)) || isnormal(),
"xrpl::Number::fromInternal",
"Number is normalized");
}
/** Rebuilds the number from components.
*
* If "normalized" is true, the values are expected to be normalized - all in
* their valid ranges.
*
* If "normalized" is false, the values are expected to be "near normalized",
* meaning that the mantissa has to be modified at most once to bring it back
* into range.
*
*/
template <bool expectNormal, detail::UnsignedMantissa Rep>
void
Number::fromInternal(bool negative, Rep mantissa, int exponent)
{
MantissaRange const* pRange = nullptr;
if constexpr (std::is_same_v<std::bool_constant<expectNormal>, std::false_type>)
{
pRange = &Number::range_.get();
}
fromInternal(negative, mantissa, exponent, pRange);
// If the mantissa doesn't fit within the positive range, convert to
// int128_t, negate that, and cast it back down to the internalrep
// In practice, this is only going to cover the case of
// std::numeric_limits<rep>::min().
int128_t temp = mantissa;
return static_cast<internalrep>(-temp);
}
constexpr Number
Number::oneSmall()
{
return Number{
false, Number::smallRange.referenceMin, -Number::smallRange.log, Number::unchecked{}};
return Number{false, Number::smallRange.min, -Number::smallRange.log, Number::unchecked{}};
};
constexpr Number oneSml = Number::oneSmall();
@@ -446,89 +342,103 @@ constexpr Number oneSml = Number::oneSmall();
constexpr Number
Number::oneLarge()
{
return Number{
false, Number::largeRange.referenceMin, -Number::largeRange.log, Number::unchecked{}};
return Number{false, Number::largeRange.min, -Number::largeRange.log, Number::unchecked{}};
};
constexpr Number oneLrg = Number::oneLarge();
Number
Number::one(MantissaRange const& range)
Number::one()
{
if (&range == &smallRange)
if (&range_.get() == &smallRange)
return oneSml;
XRPL_ASSERT(&range == &largeRange, "Number::one() : valid range");
XRPL_ASSERT(&range_.get() == &largeRange, "Number::one() : valid range_");
return oneLrg;
}
Number
Number::one()
{
return one(range_);
}
// Use the member names in this static function for now so the diff is cleaner
// TODO: Rename the function parameters to get rid of the "_" suffix
template <class T>
void
doNormalize(
bool& negative,
T& mantissa,
int& exponent,
T& mantissa_,
int& exponent_,
MantissaRange::rep const& minMantissa,
MantissaRange::rep const& maxMantissa)
{
auto constexpr minExponent = Number::minExponent;
auto constexpr maxExponent = Number::maxExponent;
auto constexpr maxRep = Number::maxRep;
using Guard = Number::Guard;
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
if (mantissa == 0 || (mantissa < minMantissa && exponent <= minExponent))
if (mantissa_ == 0)
{
mantissa = zero.mantissa_;
exponent = zero.exponent_;
negative = false;
mantissa_ = zero.mantissa_;
exponent_ = zero.exponent_;
negative = zero.negative_;
return;
}
auto m = mantissa;
while ((m < minMantissa) && (exponent > minExponent))
auto m = mantissa_;
while ((m < minMantissa) && (exponent_ > minExponent))
{
m *= 10;
--exponent;
--exponent_;
}
Guard g;
if (negative)
g.set_negative();
while (m > maxMantissa)
{
if (exponent >= maxExponent)
if (exponent_ >= maxExponent)
throw std::overflow_error("Number::normalize 1");
g.push(m % 10);
m /= 10;
++exponent;
++exponent_;
}
if ((exponent < minExponent) || (m == 0))
if ((exponent_ < minExponent) || (m < minMantissa))
{
mantissa = zero.mantissa_;
exponent = zero.exponent_;
negative = false;
mantissa_ = zero.mantissa_;
exponent_ = zero.exponent_;
negative = zero.negative_;
return;
}
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(m <= maxMantissa, "xrpl::doNormalize", "intermediate mantissa fits in int64");
mantissa = m;
g.doRoundUp(negative, mantissa, exponent, minMantissa, maxMantissa, "Number::normalize 2");
// When using the largeRange, "m" needs fit within an int64, even if
// the final mantissa_ is going to end up larger to fit within the
// MantissaRange. Cut it down here so that the rounding will be done while
// it's smaller.
//
// Example: 9,900,000,000,000,123,456 > 9,223,372,036,854,775,807,
// so "m" will be modified to 990,000,000,000,012,345. Then that value
// will be rounded to 990,000,000,000,012,345 or
// 990,000,000,000,012,346, depending on the rounding mode. Finally,
// mantissa_ will be "m*10" so it fits within the range, and end up as
// 9,900,000,000,000,123,450 or 9,900,000,000,000,123,460.
// mantissa() will return mantissa_ / 10, and exponent() will return
// exponent_ + 1.
if (m > maxRep)
{
if (exponent_ >= maxExponent)
throw std::overflow_error("Number::normalize 1.5");
g.push(m % 10);
m /= 10;
++exponent_;
}
// Before modification, m should be within the min/max range. After
// modification, it must be less than maxRep. In other words, the original
// value should have been no more than maxRep * 10.
// (maxRep * 10 > maxMantissa)
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(m <= maxRep, "xrpl::doNormalize", "intermediate mantissa fits in int64");
mantissa_ = m;
g.doRoundUp(negative, mantissa_, exponent_, minMantissa, maxMantissa, "Number::normalize 2");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
mantissa >= minMantissa && mantissa <= maxMantissa,
mantissa_ >= minMantissa && mantissa_ <= maxMantissa,
"xrpl::doNormalize",
"final mantissa fits in range");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
exponent >= minExponent && exponent <= maxExponent,
"xrpl::doNormalize",
"final exponent fits in range");
}
template <>
@@ -567,20 +477,11 @@ Number::normalize<unsigned long>(
doNormalize(negative, mantissa, exponent, minMantissa, maxMantissa);
}
void
Number::normalize(MantissaRange const& range)
{
auto [negative, mantissa, exponent] = toInternal(range);
normalize(negative, mantissa, exponent, range.min, range.max);
fromInternal(negative, mantissa, exponent, &range);
}
void
Number::normalize()
{
normalize(range_);
auto const& range = range_.get();
normalize(negative_, mantissa_, exponent_, range.min, range.max);
}
// Copy the number, but set a new exponent. Because the mantissa doesn't change,
@@ -590,33 +491,21 @@ Number
Number::shiftExponent(int exponentDelta) const
{
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(isnormal(), "xrpl::Number::shiftExponent", "normalized");
Number result = *this;
result.exponent_ += exponentDelta;
if (result.exponent_ >= maxExponent)
auto const newExponent = exponent_ + exponentDelta;
if (newExponent >= maxExponent)
throw std::overflow_error("Number::shiftExponent");
if (result.exponent_ < minExponent)
if (newExponent < minExponent)
{
return Number{};
}
Number const result{negative_, mantissa_, newExponent, unchecked{}};
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(result.isnormal(), "xrpl::Number::shiftExponent", "result is normalized");
return result;
}
Number::Number(bool negative, internalrep mantissa, int exponent, normalized)
{
auto const& range = range_.get();
normalize(negative, mantissa, exponent, range.min, range.max);
fromInternal(negative, mantissa, exponent, &range);
}
Number&
Number::operator+=(Number const& y)
{
auto const& range = range_.get();
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
if (y == zero)
return *this;
@@ -631,8 +520,7 @@ Number::operator+=(Number const& y)
return *this;
}
XRPL_ASSERT(
isnormal(range) && y.isnormal(range), "xrpl::Number::operator+=(Number) : is normal");
XRPL_ASSERT(isnormal() && y.isnormal(), "xrpl::Number::operator+=(Number) : is normal");
// *n = negative
// *s = sign
// *m = mantissa
@@ -640,10 +528,13 @@ Number::operator+=(Number const& y)
// Need to use uint128_t, because large mantissas can overflow when added
// together.
auto [xn, xm, xe] = toInternal<uint128_t>(range);
auto [yn, ym, ye] = y.toInternal<uint128_t>(range);
bool xn = negative_;
uint128_t xm = mantissa_;
auto xe = exponent_;
bool yn = y.negative_;
uint128_t ym = y.mantissa_;
auto ye = y.exponent_;
Guard g;
if (xe < ye)
{
@@ -668,13 +559,14 @@ Number::operator+=(Number const& y)
} while (xe > ye);
}
auto const& range = range_.get();
auto const& minMantissa = range.min;
auto const& maxMantissa = range.max;
if (xn == yn)
{
xm += ym;
if (xm > maxMantissa)
if (xm > maxMantissa || xm > maxRep)
{
g.push(xm % 10);
xm /= 10;
@@ -694,7 +586,7 @@ Number::operator+=(Number const& y)
xe = ye;
xn = yn;
}
while (xm < minMantissa)
while (xm < minMantissa && xm * 10 <= maxRep)
{
xm *= 10;
xm -= g.pop();
@@ -703,8 +595,10 @@ Number::operator+=(Number const& y)
g.doRoundDown(xn, xm, xe, minMantissa);
}
normalize(xn, xm, xe, minMantissa, maxMantissa);
fromInternal(xn, xm, xe, &range);
negative_ = xn;
mantissa_ = static_cast<internalrep>(xm);
exponent_ = xe;
normalize();
return *this;
}
@@ -739,8 +633,6 @@ divu10(uint128_t& u)
Number&
Number::operator*=(Number const& y)
{
auto const& range = range_.get();
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
if (*this == zero)
return *this;
@@ -754,11 +646,15 @@ Number::operator*=(Number const& y)
// *m = mantissa
// *e = exponent
auto [xn, xm, xe] = toInternal(range);
bool xn = negative_;
int xs = xn ? -1 : 1;
internalrep xm = mantissa_;
auto xe = exponent_;
auto [yn, ym, ye] = y.toInternal(range);
bool yn = y.negative_;
int ys = yn ? -1 : 1;
internalrep ym = y.mantissa_;
auto ye = y.exponent_;
auto zm = uint128_t(xm) * uint128_t(ym);
auto ze = xe + ye;
@@ -768,10 +664,11 @@ Number::operator*=(Number const& y)
if (zn)
g.set_negative();
auto const& range = range_.get();
auto const& minMantissa = range.min;
auto const& maxMantissa = range.max;
while (zm > maxMantissa)
while (zm > maxMantissa || zm > maxRep)
{
// The following is optimization for:
// g.push(static_cast<unsigned>(zm % 10));
@@ -788,17 +685,17 @@ Number::operator*=(Number const& y)
minMantissa,
maxMantissa,
"Number::multiplication overflow : exponent is " + std::to_string(xe));
negative_ = zn;
mantissa_ = xm;
exponent_ = xe;
normalize(zn, xm, xe, minMantissa, maxMantissa);
fromInternal(zn, xm, xe, &range);
normalize();
return *this;
}
Number&
Number::operator/=(Number const& y)
{
auto const& range = range_.get();
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
if (y == zero)
throw std::overflow_error("Number: divide by 0");
@@ -811,12 +708,17 @@ Number::operator/=(Number const& y)
// *m = mantissa
// *e = exponent
auto [np, nm, ne] = toInternal(range);
bool np = negative_;
int ns = (np ? -1 : 1);
auto nm = mantissa_;
auto ne = exponent_;
auto [dp, dm, de] = y.toInternal(range);
bool dp = y.negative_;
int ds = (dp ? -1 : 1);
auto dm = y.mantissa_;
auto de = y.exponent_;
auto const& range = range_.get();
auto const& minMantissa = range.min;
auto const& maxMantissa = range.max;
@@ -828,7 +730,7 @@ Number::operator/=(Number const& y)
// f can be up to 10^(38-19) = 10^19 safely
static_assert(smallRange.log == 15);
static_assert(largeRange.log == 18);
bool small = range.scale == MantissaRange::small;
bool small = Number::getMantissaScale() == MantissaRange::small;
uint128_t const f = small ? 100'000'000'000'000'000 : 10'000'000'000'000'000'000ULL;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(f >= minMantissa * 10, "Number::operator/=", "factor expected size");
@@ -878,8 +780,10 @@ Number::operator/=(Number const& y)
}
}
normalize(zn, zm, ze, minMantissa, maxMantissa);
fromInternal(zn, zm, ze, &range);
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(isnormal(range), "xrpl::Number::operator/=", "result is normalized");
negative_ = zn;
mantissa_ = static_cast<internalrep>(zm);
exponent_ = ze;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(isnormal(), "xrpl::Number::operator/=", "result is normalized");
return *this;
}
@@ -892,7 +796,7 @@ operator rep() const
Guard g;
if (drops != 0)
{
if (drops < 0)
if (negative_)
{
g.set_negative();
drops = -drops;
@@ -904,7 +808,7 @@ operator rep() const
}
for (; offset > 0; --offset)
{
if (drops >= largeRange.min)
if (drops > maxRep / 10)
throw std::overflow_error("Number::operator rep() overflow");
drops *= 10;
}
@@ -934,22 +838,19 @@ Number::truncate() const noexcept
std::string
to_string(Number const& amount)
{
auto const& range = Number::range_.get();
// keep full internal accuracy, but make more human friendly if possible
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
if (amount == zero)
return "0";
// The mantissa must have a set number of decimal places for this to work
auto [negative, mantissa, exponent] = amount.toInternal(range);
auto exponent = amount.exponent_;
auto mantissa = amount.mantissa_;
bool const negative = amount.negative_;
// Use scientific notation for exponents that are too small or too large
auto const rangeLog = range.log;
if (((exponent != 0 && amount.exponent() != 0) &&
((exponent < -(rangeLog + 10)) || (exponent > -(rangeLog - 10)))))
auto const rangeLog = Number::mantissaLog();
if (((exponent != 0) && ((exponent < -(rangeLog + 10)) || (exponent > -(rangeLog - 10)))))
{
// Remove trailing zeroes from the mantissa.
while (mantissa != 0 && mantissa % 10 == 0 && exponent < Number::maxExponent)
{
mantissa /= 10;
@@ -957,11 +858,8 @@ to_string(Number const& amount)
}
std::string ret = negative ? "-" : "";
ret.append(std::to_string(mantissa));
if (exponent != 0)
{
ret.append(1, 'e');
ret.append(std::to_string(exponent));
}
ret.append(1, 'e');
ret.append(std::to_string(exponent));
return ret;
}
@@ -1045,11 +943,20 @@ power(Number const& f, unsigned n)
return r;
}
// Returns f^(1/d)
// Uses NewtonRaphson iterations until the result stops changing
// to find the non-negative root of the polynomial g(x) = x^d - f
// This function, and power(Number f, unsigned n, unsigned d)
// treat corner cases such as 0 roots as advised by Annex F of
// the C standard, which itself is consistent with the IEEE
// floating point standards.
Number
Number::root(MantissaRange const& range, Number f, unsigned d)
root(Number f, unsigned d)
{
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
auto const one = Number::one(range);
auto const one = Number::one();
if (f == one || d == 1)
return f;
@@ -1066,28 +973,21 @@ Number::root(MantissaRange const& range, Number f, unsigned d)
if (f == zero)
return f;
auto const [e, di] = [&]() {
auto const [negative, mantissa, exponent] = f.toInternal(range);
// Scale f into the range (0, 1) such that the scale change (e) is a
// multiple of the root (d)
auto e = exponent + range.log + 1;
auto const di = static_cast<int>(d);
auto ex = [e = e, di = di]() // Euclidean remainder of e/d
{
int k = (e >= 0 ? e : e - (di - 1)) / di;
int k2 = e - k * di;
if (k2 == 0)
return 0;
return di - k2;
}();
e += ex;
f = f.shiftExponent(-e); // f /= 10^e;
return std::make_tuple(e, di);
// Scale f into the range (0, 1) such that f's exponent is a multiple of d
auto e = f.exponent_ + Number::mantissaLog() + 1;
auto const di = static_cast<int>(d);
auto ex = [e = e, di = di]() // Euclidean remainder of e/d
{
int k = (e >= 0 ? e : e - (di - 1)) / di;
int k2 = e - k * di;
if (k2 == 0)
return 0;
return di - k2;
}();
e += ex;
f = f.shiftExponent(-e); // f /= 10^e;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(e % di == 0, "xrpl::root(Number, unsigned)", "e is divisible by d");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(f.isnormal(range), "xrpl::root(Number, unsigned)", "f is normalized");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(f.isnormal(), "xrpl::root(Number, unsigned)", "f is normalized");
bool neg = false;
if (f < zero)
{
@@ -1120,33 +1020,15 @@ Number::root(MantissaRange const& range, Number f, unsigned d)
// return r * 10^(e/d) to reverse scaling
auto const result = r.shiftExponent(e / di);
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
result.isnormal(range), "xrpl::root(Number, unsigned)", "result is normalized");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(result.isnormal(), "xrpl::root(Number, unsigned)", "result is normalized");
return result;
}
// Returns f^(1/d)
// Uses NewtonRaphson iterations until the result stops changing
// to find the non-negative root of the polynomial g(x) = x^d - f
// This function, and power(Number f, unsigned n, unsigned d)
// treat corner cases such as 0 roots as advised by Annex F of
// the C standard, which itself is consistent with the IEEE
// floating point standards.
Number
root(Number f, unsigned d)
{
auto const& range = Number::range_.get();
return Number::root(range, f, d);
}
Number
root2(Number f)
{
auto const& range = Number::range_.get();
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
auto const one = Number::one(range);
auto const one = Number::one();
if (f == one)
return f;
@@ -1155,18 +1037,12 @@ root2(Number f)
if (f == zero)
return f;
auto const e = [&]() {
auto const [negative, mantissa, exponent] = f.toInternal(range);
// Scale f into the range (0, 1) such that f's exponent is a
// multiple of d
auto e = exponent + range.log + 1;
if (e % 2 != 0)
++e;
f = f.shiftExponent(-e); // f /= 10^e;
return e;
}();
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(f.isnormal(range), "xrpl::root2(Number)", "f is normalized");
// Scale f into the range (0, 1) such that f's exponent is a multiple of d
auto e = f.exponent_ + Number::mantissaLog() + 1;
if (e % 2 != 0)
++e;
f = f.shiftExponent(-e); // f /= 10^e;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(f.isnormal(), "xrpl::root2(Number)", "f is normalized");
// Quadratic least squares curve fit of f^(1/d) in the range [0, 1]
auto const D = 105;
@@ -1188,7 +1064,7 @@ root2(Number f)
// return r * 10^(e/2) to reverse scaling
auto const result = r.shiftExponent(e / 2);
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(result.isnormal(range), "xrpl::root2(Number)", "result is normalized");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(result.isnormal(), "xrpl::root2(Number)", "result is normalized");
return result;
}
@@ -1198,10 +1074,8 @@ root2(Number f)
Number
power(Number const& f, unsigned n, unsigned d)
{
auto const& range = Number::range_.get();
constexpr Number zero = Number{};
auto const one = Number::one(range);
auto const one = Number::one();
if (f == one)
return f;
@@ -1223,7 +1097,7 @@ power(Number const& f, unsigned n, unsigned d)
d /= g;
if ((n % 2) == 1 && (d % 2) == 0 && f < zero)
throw std::overflow_error("Number::power nan");
return Number::root(range, power(f, n), d);
return root(power(f, n), d);
}
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -193,17 +193,17 @@ Value::Value(ValueType type) : type_(type), allocated_(0)
}
}
Value::Value(Int value) : type_(intValue), allocated_(0)
Value::Value(Int value) : type_(intValue)
{
value_.int_ = value;
}
Value::Value(UInt value) : type_(uintValue), allocated_(0)
Value::Value(UInt value) : type_(uintValue)
{
value_.uint_ = value;
}
Value::Value(double value) : type_(realValue), allocated_(0)
Value::Value(double value) : type_(realValue)
{
value_.real_ = value;
}
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ Value::Value(StaticString const& value) : type_(stringValue), allocated_(false)
value_.string_ = const_cast<char*>(value.c_str());
}
Value::Value(bool value) : type_(booleanValue), allocated_(0)
Value::Value(bool value) : type_(booleanValue)
{
value_.bool_ = value;
}

View File

@@ -335,28 +335,6 @@ ApplyStateTable::read(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k) const
return sle;
}
std::optional<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>>
ApplyStateTable::readLocal(Keylet const& k) const
{
auto const iter = items_.find(k.key);
if (iter == items_.end())
return std::nullopt;
auto const& item = iter->second;
auto const& sle = item.second;
switch (item.first)
{
case Action::erase:
return nullptr;
case Action::cache:
case Action::insert:
case Action::modify:
break;
};
if (!k.check(*sle))
return nullptr;
return sle;
}
std::shared_ptr<SLE>
ApplyStateTable::peek(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k)
{

View File

@@ -49,24 +49,7 @@ ApplyViewBase::succ(key_type const& key, std::optional<key_type> const& last) co
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
ApplyViewBase::read(Keylet const& k) const
{
// Iteratively walk up the chain of ApplyViewBase layers
// instead of recursing through items_.read(*base_, k).
auto const* current = this;
while (current)
{
if (auto result = current->items_.readLocal(k))
return *result;
// Check if the base is another ApplyViewBase layer
auto const* next = dynamic_cast<ApplyViewBase const*>(current->base_);
if (!next)
return current->base_->read(k);
current = next;
}
// Unreachable: current starts as `this` (non-null) and the loop
// always returns before current could become null.
UNREACHABLE("xrpl::ApplyViewBase::read : unreachable");
return nullptr;
return items_.read(*base_, k);
}
auto

View File

@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@ HTTPClient::initializeSSLContext(
httpClientSSLContext.emplace(sslVerifyDir, sslVerifyFile, sslVerify, j);
}
void
HTTPClient::cleanupSSLContext()
{
httpClientSSLContext.reset();
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Fetch a web page via http or https.

View File

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ DatabaseNodeImp::fetchNodeObject(
try
{
status = backend_->fetch(hash.data(), &nodeObject);
status = backend_->fetch(hash, &nodeObject);
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
{
@@ -68,18 +68,10 @@ DatabaseNodeImp::fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes)
using namespace std::chrono;
auto const before = steady_clock::now();
std::vector<uint256 const*> batch{};
batch.reserve(hashes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < hashes.size(); ++i)
{
auto const& hash = hashes[i];
batch.push_back(&hash);
}
// Get the node objects that match the hashes from the backend. To protect
// against the backends returning fewer or more results than expected, the
// container is resized to the number of hashes.
auto results = backend_->fetchBatch(batch).first;
auto results = backend_->fetchBatch(hashes).first;
XRPL_ASSERT(
results.size() == hashes.size() || results.empty(),
"number of output objects either matches number of input hashes or is empty");

View File

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ DatabaseRotatingImp::fetchNodeObject(
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> nodeObject;
try
{
status = backend->fetch(hash.data(), &nodeObject);
status = backend->fetch(hash, &nodeObject);
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
{

View File

@@ -116,10 +116,9 @@ public:
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Status
fetch(void const* key, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pObject) override
fetch(uint256 const& hash, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pObject) override
{
XRPL_ASSERT(db_, "xrpl::NodeStore::MemoryBackend::fetch : non-null database");
uint256 const hash(uint256::fromVoid(key));
std::lock_guard _(db_->mutex);
@@ -134,14 +133,14 @@ public:
}
std::pair<std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>, Status>
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256 const*> const& hashes) override
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes) override
{
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>> results;
results.reserve(hashes.size());
for (auto const& h : hashes)
{
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> nObj;
Status status = fetch(h->begin(), &nObj);
Status status = fetch(h, &nObj);
if (status != ok)
results.push_back({});
else

View File

@@ -179,17 +179,17 @@ public:
}
Status
fetch(void const* key, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pno) override
fetch(uint256 const& hash, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pno) override
{
Status status;
pno->reset();
nudb::error_code ec;
db_.fetch(
key,
[key, pno, &status](void const* data, std::size_t size) {
hash.data(),
[&hash, pno, &status](void const* data, std::size_t size) {
nudb::detail::buffer bf;
auto const result = nodeobject_decompress(data, size, bf);
DecodedBlob decoded(key, result.first, result.second);
DecodedBlob decoded(hash.data(), result.first, result.second);
if (!decoded.wasOk())
{
status = dataCorrupt;
@@ -207,14 +207,14 @@ public:
}
std::pair<std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>, Status>
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256 const*> const& hashes) override
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes) override
{
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>> results;
results.reserve(hashes.size());
for (auto const& h : hashes)
{
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> nObj;
Status status = fetch(h->begin(), &nObj);
Status status = fetch(h, &nObj);
if (status != ok)
results.push_back({});
else

View File

@@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ public:
}
Status
fetch(void const*, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>*) override
fetch(uint256 const&, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>*) override
{
return notFound;
}
std::pair<std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>, Status>
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256 const*> const& hashes) override
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes) override
{
return {};
}

View File

@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ public:
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Status
fetch(void const* key, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pObject) override
fetch(uint256 const& hash, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pObject) override
{
XRPL_ASSERT(m_db, "xrpl::NodeStore::RocksDBBackend::fetch : non-null database");
pObject->reset();
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ public:
Status status(ok);
rocksdb::ReadOptions const options;
rocksdb::Slice const slice(static_cast<char const*>(key), m_keyBytes);
rocksdb::Slice const slice(std::bit_cast<char const*>(hash.data()), m_keyBytes);
std::string string;
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ public:
if (getStatus.ok())
{
DecodedBlob decoded(key, string.data(), string.size());
DecodedBlob decoded(hash.data(), string.data(), string.size());
if (decoded.wasOk())
{
@@ -295,14 +295,14 @@ public:
}
std::pair<std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>, Status>
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256 const*> const& hashes) override
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes) override
{
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>> results;
results.reserve(hashes.size());
for (auto const& h : hashes)
{
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> nObj;
Status status = fetch(h->begin(), &nObj);
Status status = fetch(h, &nObj);
if (status != ok)
results.push_back({});
else
@@ -332,9 +332,8 @@ public:
EncodedBlob encoded(e);
wb.Put(
rocksdb::Slice(reinterpret_cast<char const*>(encoded.getKey()), m_keyBytes),
rocksdb::Slice(
reinterpret_cast<char const*>(encoded.getData()), encoded.getSize()));
rocksdb::Slice(std::bit_cast<char const*>(encoded.getKey()), m_keyBytes),
rocksdb::Slice(std::bit_cast<char const*>(encoded.getData()), encoded.getSize()));
}
rocksdb::WriteOptions const options;

View File

@@ -1003,12 +1003,7 @@ amountFromJson(SField const& name, Json::Value const& v)
else if (v.isString())
{
std::string val = v.asString();
// Pre-allocate to avoid reallocation during split. This function is often
// called deep in the RPC stack (via JSON parsing) where stack space is
// limited. ASAN detected stack-buffer-overflow here at ~95% coroutine
// stack usage (1001376/1048576 bytes). Coroutine stack increased to 2MB.
std::vector<std::string> elements;
elements.reserve(3);
boost::split(elements, val, boost::is_any_of("\t\n\r ,/"));
if (elements.size() > 3)

View File

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ make_name(std::string const& object, std::string const& field)
if (field.empty())
return object;
return {object + "." + field};
return object + "." + field;
}
static inline Json::Value

View File

@@ -6,11 +6,7 @@
namespace xrpl {
// Returns a depth mask by value to avoid potential lifetime issues in
// multi-threaded contexts. Returning by const reference to a static member
// could trigger stack-use-after-scope errors when the reference is used in
// temporary expressions with operator& in concurrent coroutine scenarios.
static uint256 const
static uint256 const&
depthMask(unsigned int depth)
{
enum { mask_size = 65 };
@@ -76,8 +72,7 @@ SHAMapNodeID::getChildNodeID(unsigned int m) const
if (depth_ >= SHAMap::leafDepth)
Throw<std::logic_error>("Request for child node ID of " + to_string(*this));
auto const idAtDepth = id_ & depthMask(depth_);
if (id_ != idAtDepth)
if (id_ != (id_ & depthMask(depth_)))
Throw<std::logic_error>("Incorrect mask for " + to_string(*this));
SHAMapNodeID node{depth_ + 1, id_};

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/ApplyContext.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/json/to_string.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/ApplyContext.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/InvariantCheck.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheck.h>
namespace xrpl {

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/AMMInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/AMM/AMMHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/AMM/AMMUtils.h>
namespace xrpl {
void
ValidAMM::visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
if (isDelete)
return;
if (after)
{
auto const type = after->getType();
// AMM object changed
if (type == ltAMM)
{
ammAccount_ = after->getAccountID(sfAccount);
lptAMMBalanceAfter_ = after->getFieldAmount(sfLPTokenBalance);
}
// AMM pool changed
else if (
(type == ltRIPPLE_STATE && after->getFlags() & lsfAMMNode) ||
(type == ltACCOUNT_ROOT && after->isFieldPresent(sfAMMID)))
{
ammPoolChanged_ = true;
}
}
if (before)
{
// AMM object changed
if (before->getType() == ltAMM)
{
lptAMMBalanceBefore_ = before->getFieldAmount(sfLPTokenBalance);
}
}
}
static bool
validBalances(
STAmount const& amount,
STAmount const& amount2,
STAmount const& lptAMMBalance,
ValidAMM::ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed)
{
bool const positive =
amount > beast::zero && amount2 > beast::zero && lptAMMBalance > beast::zero;
if (zeroAllowed == ValidAMM::ZeroAllowed::Yes)
return positive ||
(amount == beast::zero && amount2 == beast::zero && lptAMMBalance == beast::zero);
return positive;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalizeVote(bool enforce, beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (lptAMMBalanceAfter_ != lptAMMBalanceBefore_ || ammPoolChanged_)
{
// LPTokens and the pool can not change on vote
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMVote invariant failed: " << lptAMMBalanceBefore_.value_or(STAmount{})
<< " " << lptAMMBalanceAfter_.value_or(STAmount{}) << " "
<< ammPoolChanged_;
if (enforce)
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalizeBid(bool enforce, beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (ammPoolChanged_)
{
// The pool can not change on bid
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMBid invariant failed: pool changed";
if (enforce)
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
// LPTokens are burnt, therefore there should be fewer LPTokens
else if (
lptAMMBalanceBefore_ && lptAMMBalanceAfter_ &&
(*lptAMMBalanceAfter_ > *lptAMMBalanceBefore_ || *lptAMMBalanceAfter_ <= beast::zero))
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMBid invariant failed: " << *lptAMMBalanceBefore_ << " "
<< *lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
if (enforce)
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalizeCreate(
STTx const& tx,
ReadView const& view,
bool enforce,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (!ammAccount_)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMCreate invariant failed: AMM object is not created";
if (enforce)
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
else
{
auto const [amount, amount2] = ammPoolHolds(
view,
*ammAccount_,
tx[sfAmount].get<Issue>(),
tx[sfAmount2].get<Issue>(),
fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
j);
// Create invariant:
// sqrt(amount * amount2) == LPTokens
// all balances are greater than zero
if (!validBalances(amount, amount2, *lptAMMBalanceAfter_, ZeroAllowed::No) ||
ammLPTokens(amount, amount2, lptAMMBalanceAfter_->issue()) != *lptAMMBalanceAfter_)
{
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMCreate invariant failed: " << amount << " " << amount2 << " "
<< *lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
if (enforce)
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalizeDelete(bool enforce, TER res, beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (ammAccount_)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
std::string const msg = (res == tesSUCCESS) ? "AMM object is not deleted on tesSUCCESS"
: "AMM object is changed on tecINCOMPLETE";
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMDelete invariant failed: " << msg;
if (enforce)
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalizeDEX(bool enforce, beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (ammAccount_)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMM swap invariant failed: AMM object changed";
if (enforce)
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::generalInvariant(
xrpl::STTx const& tx,
xrpl::ReadView const& view,
ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
auto const [amount, amount2] = ammPoolHolds(
view,
*ammAccount_,
tx[sfAsset].get<Issue>(),
tx[sfAsset2].get<Issue>(),
fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
j);
// Deposit and Withdrawal invariant:
// sqrt(amount * amount2) >= LPTokens
// all balances are greater than zero
// unless on last withdrawal
auto const poolProductMean = root2(amount * amount2);
bool const nonNegativeBalances =
validBalances(amount, amount2, *lptAMMBalanceAfter_, zeroAllowed);
bool const strongInvariantCheck = poolProductMean >= *lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
// Allow for a small relative error if strongInvariantCheck fails
auto weakInvariantCheck = [&]() {
return *lptAMMBalanceAfter_ != beast::zero &&
withinRelativeDistance(poolProductMean, Number{*lptAMMBalanceAfter_}, Number{1, -11});
};
if (!nonNegativeBalances || (!strongInvariantCheck && !weakInvariantCheck()))
{
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMM " << tx.getTxnType()
<< " invariant failed: " << tx.getHash(HashPrefix::transactionID) << " "
<< ammPoolChanged_ << " " << amount << " " << amount2 << " "
<< poolProductMean << " " << lptAMMBalanceAfter_->getText() << " "
<< ((*lptAMMBalanceAfter_ == beast::zero)
? Number{1}
: ((*lptAMMBalanceAfter_ - poolProductMean) / poolProductMean));
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalizeDeposit(
xrpl::STTx const& tx,
xrpl::ReadView const& view,
bool enforce,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (!ammAccount_)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMDeposit invariant failed: AMM object is deleted";
if (enforce)
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
else if (!generalInvariant(tx, view, ZeroAllowed::No, j) && enforce)
return false;
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalizeWithdraw(
xrpl::STTx const& tx,
xrpl::ReadView const& view,
bool enforce,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (!ammAccount_)
{
// Last Withdraw or Clawback deleted AMM
}
else if (!generalInvariant(tx, view, ZeroAllowed::Yes, j))
{
if (enforce)
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidAMM::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const result,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
// Delete may return tecINCOMPLETE if there are too many
// trustlines to delete.
if (result != tesSUCCESS && result != tecINCOMPLETE)
return true;
bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(fixAMMv1_3);
switch (tx.getTxnType())
{
case ttAMM_CREATE:
return finalizeCreate(tx, view, enforce, j);
case ttAMM_DEPOSIT:
return finalizeDeposit(tx, view, enforce, j);
case ttAMM_CLAWBACK:
case ttAMM_WITHDRAW:
return finalizeWithdraw(tx, view, enforce, j);
case ttAMM_BID:
return finalizeBid(enforce, j);
case ttAMM_VOTE:
return finalizeVote(enforce, j);
case ttAMM_DELETE:
return finalizeDelete(enforce, result, j);
case ttCHECK_CASH:
case ttOFFER_CREATE:
case ttPAYMENT:
return finalizeDEX(enforce, j);
default:
break;
}
return true;
}
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/FreezeInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
namespace xrpl {
void
TransfersNotFrozen::visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
/*
* A trust line freeze state alone doesn't determine if a transfer is
* frozen. The transfer must be examined "end-to-end" because both sides of
* the transfer may have different freeze states and freeze impact depends
* on the transfer direction. This is why first we need to track the
* transfers using IssuerChanges senders/receivers.
*
* Only in validateIssuerChanges, after we collected all changes can we
* determine if the transfer is valid.
*/
if (!isValidEntry(before, after))
{
return;
}
auto const balanceChange = calculateBalanceChange(before, after, isDelete);
if (balanceChange.signum() == 0)
{
return;
}
recordBalanceChanges(after, balanceChange);
}
bool
TransfersNotFrozen::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const ter,
XRPAmount const fee,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
/*
* We check this invariant regardless of deep freeze amendment status,
* allowing for detection and logging of potential issues even when the
* amendment is disabled.
*
* If an exploit that allows moving frozen assets is discovered,
* we can alert operators who monitor fatal messages and trigger assert in
* debug builds for an early warning.
*
* In an unlikely event that an exploit is found, this early detection
* enables encouraging the UNL to expedite deep freeze amendment activation
* or deploy hotfixes via new amendments. In case of a new amendment, we'd
* only have to change this line setting 'enforce' variable.
* enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureDeepFreeze) ||
* view.rules().enabled(fixFreezeExploit);
*/
[[maybe_unused]] bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureDeepFreeze);
for (auto const& [issue, changes] : balanceChanges_)
{
auto const issuerSle = findIssuer(issue.account, view);
// It should be impossible for the issuer to not be found, but check
// just in case so rippled doesn't crash in release.
if (!issuerSle)
{
// The comment above starting with "assert(enforce)" explains this
// assert.
XRPL_ASSERT(
enforce,
"xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::finalize : enforce "
"invariant.");
if (enforce)
{
return false;
}
continue;
}
if (!validateIssuerChanges(issuerSle, changes, tx, j, enforce))
{
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
bool
TransfersNotFrozen::isValidEntry(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
// `after` can never be null, even if the trust line is deleted.
XRPL_ASSERT(after, "xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::isValidEntry : valid after.");
if (!after)
{
return false;
}
if (after->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT)
{
possibleIssuers_.emplace(after->at(sfAccount), after);
return false;
}
/* While LedgerEntryTypesMatch invariant also checks types, all invariants
* are processed regardless of previous failures.
*
* This type check is still necessary here because it prevents potential
* issues in subsequent processing.
*/
return after->getType() == ltRIPPLE_STATE && (!before || before->getType() == ltRIPPLE_STATE);
}
STAmount
TransfersNotFrozen::calculateBalanceChange(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
bool isDelete)
{
auto const getBalance = [](auto const& line, auto const& other, bool zero) {
STAmount amt = line ? line->at(sfBalance) : other->at(sfBalance).zeroed();
return zero ? amt.zeroed() : amt;
};
/* Trust lines can be created dynamically by other transactions such as
* Payment and OfferCreate that cross offers. Such trust line won't be
* created frozen, but the sender might be, so the starting balance must be
* treated as zero.
*/
auto const balanceBefore = getBalance(before, after, false);
/* Same as above, trust lines can be dynamically deleted, and for frozen
* trust lines, payments not involving the issuer must be blocked. This is
* achieved by treating the final balance as zero when isDelete=true to
* ensure frozen line restrictions are enforced even during deletion.
*/
auto const balanceAfter = getBalance(after, before, isDelete);
return balanceAfter - balanceBefore;
}
void
TransfersNotFrozen::recordBalance(Issue const& issue, BalanceChange change)
{
XRPL_ASSERT(
change.balanceChangeSign,
"xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::recordBalance : valid trustline "
"balance sign.");
auto& changes = balanceChanges_[issue];
if (change.balanceChangeSign < 0)
changes.senders.emplace_back(std::move(change));
else
changes.receivers.emplace_back(std::move(change));
}
void
TransfersNotFrozen::recordBalanceChanges(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
STAmount const& balanceChange)
{
auto const balanceChangeSign = balanceChange.signum();
auto const currency = after->at(sfBalance).getCurrency();
// Change from low account's perspective, which is trust line default
recordBalance({currency, after->at(sfHighLimit).getIssuer()}, {after, balanceChangeSign});
// Change from high account's perspective, which reverses the sign.
recordBalance({currency, after->at(sfLowLimit).getIssuer()}, {after, -balanceChangeSign});
}
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
TransfersNotFrozen::findIssuer(AccountID const& issuerID, ReadView const& view)
{
if (auto it = possibleIssuers_.find(issuerID); it != possibleIssuers_.end())
{
return it->second;
}
return view.read(keylet::account(issuerID));
}
bool
TransfersNotFrozen::validateIssuerChanges(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuer,
IssuerChanges const& changes,
STTx const& tx,
beast::Journal const& j,
bool enforce)
{
if (!issuer)
{
return false;
}
bool const globalFreeze = issuer->isFlag(lsfGlobalFreeze);
if (changes.receivers.empty() || changes.senders.empty())
{
/* If there are no receivers, then the holder(s) are returning
* their tokens to the issuer. Likewise, if there are no
* senders, then the issuer is issuing tokens to the holder(s).
* This is allowed regardless of the issuer's freeze flags. (The
* holder may have contradicting freeze flags, but that will be
* checked when the holder is treated as issuer.)
*/
return true;
}
for (auto const& actors : {changes.senders, changes.receivers})
{
for (auto const& change : actors)
{
bool const high = change.line->at(sfLowLimit).getIssuer() == issuer->at(sfAccount);
if (!validateFrozenState(change, high, tx, j, enforce, globalFreeze))
{
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
}
bool
TransfersNotFrozen::validateFrozenState(
BalanceChange const& change,
bool high,
STTx const& tx,
beast::Journal const& j,
bool enforce,
bool globalFreeze)
{
bool const freeze =
change.balanceChangeSign < 0 && change.line->isFlag(high ? lsfLowFreeze : lsfHighFreeze);
bool const deepFreeze = change.line->isFlag(high ? lsfLowDeepFreeze : lsfHighDeepFreeze);
bool const frozen = globalFreeze || deepFreeze || freeze;
bool const isAMMLine = change.line->isFlag(lsfAMMNode);
if (!frozen)
{
return true;
}
// AMMClawbacks are allowed to override some freeze rules
if ((!isAMMLine || globalFreeze) && hasPrivilege(tx, overrideFreeze))
{
JLOG(j.debug()) << "Invariant check allowing funds to be moved "
<< (change.balanceChangeSign > 0 ? "to" : "from")
<< " a frozen trustline for AMMClawback " << tx.getTransactionID();
return true;
}
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Attempting to move frozen funds for "
<< tx.getTransactionID();
// The comment above starting with "assert(enforce)" explains this assert.
XRPL_ASSERT(
enforce,
"xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::validateFrozenState : enforce "
"invariant.");
if (enforce)
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
} // namespace xrpl

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#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/LoanInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STNumber.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
namespace xrpl {
void
ValidLoanBroker::visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
if (after)
{
if (after->getType() == ltLOAN_BROKER)
{
auto& broker = brokers_[after->key()];
broker.brokerBefore = before;
broker.brokerAfter = after;
}
else if (after->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT && after->isFieldPresent(sfLoanBrokerID))
{
auto const& loanBrokerID = after->at(sfLoanBrokerID);
// create an entry if one doesn't already exist
brokers_.emplace(loanBrokerID, BrokerInfo{});
}
else if (after->getType() == ltRIPPLE_STATE)
{
lines_.emplace_back(after);
}
else if (after->getType() == ltMPTOKEN)
{
mpts_.emplace_back(after);
}
}
}
bool
ValidLoanBroker::goodZeroDirectory(
ReadView const& view,
SLE::const_ref dir,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
auto const next = dir->at(~sfIndexNext);
auto const prev = dir->at(~sfIndexPrevious);
if ((prev && *prev) || (next && *next))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker with zero "
"OwnerCount has multiple directory pages";
return false;
}
auto indexes = dir->getFieldV256(sfIndexes);
if (indexes.size() > 1)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker with zero "
"OwnerCount has multiple indexes in the Directory root";
return false;
}
if (indexes.size() == 1)
{
auto const index = indexes.value().front();
auto const sle = view.read(keylet::unchecked(index));
if (!sle)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker directory corrupt";
return false;
}
if (sle->getType() != ltRIPPLE_STATE && sle->getType() != ltMPTOKEN)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker with zero "
"OwnerCount has an unexpected entry in the directory";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
bool
ValidLoanBroker::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
// Loan Brokers will not exist on ledger if the Lending Protocol amendment
// is not enabled, so there's no need to check it.
for (auto const& line : lines_)
{
for (auto const& field : {&sfLowLimit, &sfHighLimit})
{
auto const account = view.read(keylet::account(line->at(*field).getIssuer()));
// This Invariant doesn't know about the rules for Trust Lines, so
// if the account is missing, don't treat it as an error. This
// loop is only concerned with finding Broker pseudo-accounts
if (account && account->isFieldPresent(sfLoanBrokerID))
{
auto const& loanBrokerID = account->at(sfLoanBrokerID);
// create an entry if one doesn't already exist
brokers_.emplace(loanBrokerID, BrokerInfo{});
}
}
}
for (auto const& mpt : mpts_)
{
auto const account = view.read(keylet::account(mpt->at(sfAccount)));
// This Invariant doesn't know about the rules for MPTokens, so
// if the account is missing, don't treat is as an error. This
// loop is only concerned with finding Broker pseudo-accounts
if (account && account->isFieldPresent(sfLoanBrokerID))
{
auto const& loanBrokerID = account->at(sfLoanBrokerID);
// create an entry if one doesn't already exist
brokers_.emplace(loanBrokerID, BrokerInfo{});
}
}
for (auto const& [brokerID, broker] : brokers_)
{
auto const& after =
broker.brokerAfter ? broker.brokerAfter : view.read(keylet::loanbroker(brokerID));
if (!after)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker missing";
return false;
}
auto const& before = broker.brokerBefore;
// https://github.com/Tapanito/XRPL-Standards/blob/xls-66-lending-protocol/XLS-0066d-lending-protocol/README.md#3123-invariants
// If `LoanBroker.OwnerCount = 0` the `DirectoryNode` will have at most
// one node (the root), which will only hold entries for `RippleState`
// or `MPToken` objects.
if (after->at(sfOwnerCount) == 0)
{
auto const dir = view.read(keylet::ownerDir(after->at(sfAccount)));
if (dir)
{
if (!goodZeroDirectory(view, dir, j))
{
return false;
}
}
}
if (before && before->at(sfLoanSequence) > after->at(sfLoanSequence))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker sequence number "
"decreased";
return false;
}
if (after->at(sfDebtTotal) < 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker debt total is negative";
return false;
}
if (after->at(sfCoverAvailable) < 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker cover available is negative";
return false;
}
auto const vault = view.read(keylet::vault(after->at(sfVaultID)));
if (!vault)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker vault ID is invalid";
return false;
}
auto const& vaultAsset = vault->at(sfAsset);
if (after->at(sfCoverAvailable) < accountHolds(
view,
after->at(sfAccount),
vaultAsset,
FreezeHandling::fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
AuthHandling::ahIGNORE_AUTH,
j))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker cover available "
"is less than pseudo-account asset balance";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void
ValidLoan::visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
if (after && after->getType() == ltLOAN)
{
loans_.emplace_back(before, after);
}
}
bool
ValidLoan::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
// Loans will not exist on ledger if the Lending Protocol amendment
// is not enabled, so there's no need to check it.
for (auto const& [before, after] : loans_)
{
// https://github.com/Tapanito/XRPL-Standards/blob/xls-66-lending-protocol/XLS-0066d-lending-protocol/README.md#3223-invariants
// If `Loan.PaymentRemaining = 0` then the loan MUST be fully paid off
if (after->at(sfPaymentRemaining) == 0 &&
(after->at(sfTotalValueOutstanding) != beast::zero ||
after->at(sfPrincipalOutstanding) != beast::zero ||
after->at(sfManagementFeeOutstanding) != beast::zero))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan with zero payments "
"remaining has not been paid off";
return false;
}
// If `Loan.PaymentRemaining != 0` then the loan MUST NOT be fully paid
// off
if (after->at(sfPaymentRemaining) != 0 &&
after->at(sfTotalValueOutstanding) == beast::zero &&
after->at(sfPrincipalOutstanding) == beast::zero &&
after->at(sfManagementFeeOutstanding) == beast::zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan with zero payments "
"remaining has not been paid off";
return false;
}
if (before && (before->isFlag(lsfLoanOverpayment) != after->isFlag(lsfLoanOverpayment)))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Overpayment flag changed";
return false;
}
// Must not be negative - STNumber
for (auto const field :
{&sfLoanServiceFee,
&sfLatePaymentFee,
&sfClosePaymentFee,
&sfPrincipalOutstanding,
&sfTotalValueOutstanding,
&sfManagementFeeOutstanding})
{
if (after->at(*field) < 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: " << field->getName() << " is negative ";
return false;
}
}
// Must be positive - STNumber
for (auto const field : {
&sfPeriodicPayment,
})
{
if (after->at(*field) <= 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: " << field->getName()
<< " is zero or negative ";
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
}
} // namespace xrpl

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#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
namespace xrpl {
void
ValidMPTIssuance::visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
if (after && after->getType() == ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE)
{
if (isDelete)
mptIssuancesDeleted_++;
else if (!before)
mptIssuancesCreated_++;
}
if (after && after->getType() == ltMPTOKEN)
{
if (isDelete)
mptokensDeleted_++;
else if (!before)
{
mptokensCreated_++;
MPTIssue const mptIssue{after->at(sfMPTokenIssuanceID)};
if (mptIssue.getIssuer() == after->at(sfAccount))
mptCreatedByIssuer_ = true;
}
}
}
bool
ValidMPTIssuance::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const result,
XRPAmount const _fee,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
if (result == tesSUCCESS)
{
auto const& rules = view.rules();
[[maybe_unused]]
bool enforceCreatedByIssuer =
rules.enabled(featureSingleAssetVault) || rules.enabled(featureLendingProtocol);
if (mptCreatedByIssuer_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPToken created for the MPT issuer";
// The comment above starting with "assert(enforce)" explains this
// assert.
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
enforceCreatedByIssuer, "xrpl::ValidMPTIssuance::finalize", "no issuer MPToken");
if (enforceCreatedByIssuer)
return false;
}
auto const txnType = tx.getTxnType();
if (hasPrivilege(tx, createMPTIssuance))
{
if (mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction "
"succeeded without creating a MPT issuance";
}
else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ != 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction "
"succeeded while removing MPT issuances";
}
else if (mptIssuancesCreated_ > 1)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction "
"succeeded but created multiple issuances";
}
return mptIssuancesCreated_ == 1 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0;
}
if (hasPrivilege(tx, destroyMPTIssuance))
{
if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
"succeeded without removing a MPT issuance";
}
else if (mptIssuancesCreated_ > 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
"succeeded while creating MPT issuances";
}
else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ > 1)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
"succeeded but deleted multiple issuances";
}
return mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 1;
}
bool const lendingProtocolEnabled = view.rules().enabled(featureLendingProtocol);
// ttESCROW_FINISH may authorize an MPT, but it can't have the
// mayAuthorizeMPT privilege, because that may cause
// non-amendment-gated side effects.
bool const enforceEscrowFinish = (txnType == ttESCROW_FINISH) &&
(view.rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault) || lendingProtocolEnabled);
if (hasPrivilege(tx, mustAuthorizeMPT | mayAuthorizeMPT) || enforceEscrowFinish)
{
bool const submittedByIssuer = tx.isFieldPresent(sfHolder);
if (mptIssuancesCreated_ > 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize "
"succeeded but created MPT issuances";
return false;
}
else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ > 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize "
"succeeded but deleted issuances";
return false;
}
else if (lendingProtocolEnabled && mptokensCreated_ + mptokensDeleted_ > 1)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize succeeded "
"but created/deleted bad number mptokens";
return false;
}
else if (submittedByIssuer && (mptokensCreated_ > 0 || mptokensDeleted_ > 0))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize submitted by issuer "
"succeeded but created/deleted mptokens";
return false;
}
else if (
!submittedByIssuer && hasPrivilege(tx, mustAuthorizeMPT) &&
(mptokensCreated_ + mptokensDeleted_ != 1))
{
// if the holder submitted this tx, then a mptoken must be
// either created or deleted.
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize submitted by holder "
"succeeded but created/deleted bad number of mptokens";
return false;
}
return true;
}
if (txnType == ttESCROW_FINISH)
{
// ttESCROW_FINISH may authorize an MPT, but it can't have the
// mayAuthorizeMPT privilege, because that may cause
// non-amendment-gated side effects.
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
!enforceEscrowFinish, "xrpl::ValidMPTIssuance::finalize", "not escrow finish tx");
return true;
}
if (hasPrivilege(tx, mayDeleteMPT) && mptokensDeleted_ == 1 && mptokensCreated_ == 0 &&
mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0)
return true;
}
if (mptIssuancesCreated_ != 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPT issuance was created";
}
else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ != 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPT issuance was deleted";
}
else if (mptokensCreated_ != 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPToken was created";
}
else if (mptokensDeleted_ != 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPToken was deleted";
}
return mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0 && mptokensCreated_ == 0 &&
mptokensDeleted_ == 0;
}
} // namespace xrpl

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#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/NFTInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/nftPageMask.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/NFT/NFTokenUtils.h>
namespace xrpl {
void
ValidNFTokenPage::visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
static constexpr uint256 const& pageBits = nft::pageMask;
static constexpr uint256 const accountBits = ~pageBits;
if ((before && before->getType() != ltNFTOKEN_PAGE) ||
(after && after->getType() != ltNFTOKEN_PAGE))
return;
auto check = [this, isDelete](std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& sle) {
uint256 const account = sle->key() & accountBits;
uint256 const hiLimit = sle->key() & pageBits;
std::optional<uint256> const prev = (*sle)[~sfPreviousPageMin];
// Make sure that any page links...
// 1. Are properly associated with the owning account and
// 2. The page is correctly ordered between links.
if (prev)
{
if (account != (*prev & accountBits))
badLink_ = true;
if (hiLimit <= (*prev & pageBits))
badLink_ = true;
}
if (auto const next = (*sle)[~sfNextPageMin])
{
if (account != (*next & accountBits))
badLink_ = true;
if (hiLimit >= (*next & pageBits))
badLink_ = true;
}
{
auto const& nftokens = sle->getFieldArray(sfNFTokens);
// An NFTokenPage should never contain too many tokens or be empty.
if (std::size_t const nftokenCount = nftokens.size();
(!isDelete && nftokenCount == 0) || nftokenCount > dirMaxTokensPerPage)
invalidSize_ = true;
// If prev is valid, use it to establish a lower bound for
// page entries. If prev is not valid the lower bound is zero.
uint256 const loLimit = prev ? *prev & pageBits : uint256(beast::zero);
// Also verify that all NFTokenIDs in the page are sorted.
uint256 loCmp = loLimit;
for (auto const& obj : nftokens)
{
uint256 const tokenID = obj[sfNFTokenID];
if (!nft::compareTokens(loCmp, tokenID))
badSort_ = true;
loCmp = tokenID;
// None of the NFTs on this page should belong on lower or
// higher pages.
if (uint256 const tokenPageBits = tokenID & pageBits;
tokenPageBits < loLimit || tokenPageBits >= hiLimit)
badEntry_ = true;
if (auto uri = obj[~sfURI]; uri && uri->empty())
badURI_ = true;
}
}
};
if (before)
{
check(before);
// While an account's NFToken directory contains any NFTokens, the last
// NFTokenPage (with 96 bits of 1 in the low part of the index) should
// never be deleted.
if (isDelete && (before->key() & nft::pageMask) == nft::pageMask &&
before->isFieldPresent(sfPreviousPageMin))
{
deletedFinalPage_ = true;
}
}
if (after)
check(after);
if (!isDelete && before && after)
{
// If the NFTokenPage
// 1. Has a NextMinPage field in before, but loses it in after, and
// 2. This is not the last page in the directory
// Then we have identified a corruption in the links between the
// NFToken pages in the NFToken directory.
if ((before->key() & nft::pageMask) != nft::pageMask &&
before->isFieldPresent(sfNextPageMin) && !after->isFieldPresent(sfNextPageMin))
{
deletedLink_ = true;
}
}
}
bool
ValidNFTokenPage::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const result,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
if (badLink_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT page is improperly linked.";
return false;
}
if (badEntry_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT found in incorrect page.";
return false;
}
if (badSort_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFTs on page are not sorted.";
return false;
}
if (badURI_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT contains empty URI.";
return false;
}
if (invalidSize_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT page has invalid size.";
return false;
}
if (view.rules().enabled(fixNFTokenPageLinks))
{
if (deletedFinalPage_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Last NFT page deleted with "
"non-empty directory.";
return false;
}
if (deletedLink_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Lost NextMinPage link.";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void
NFTokenCountTracking::visitEntry(
bool,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
if (before && before->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT)
{
beforeMintedTotal += (*before)[~sfMintedNFTokens].value_or(0);
beforeBurnedTotal += (*before)[~sfBurnedNFTokens].value_or(0);
}
if (after && after->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT)
{
afterMintedTotal += (*after)[~sfMintedNFTokens].value_or(0);
afterBurnedTotal += (*after)[~sfBurnedNFTokens].value_or(0);
}
}
bool
NFTokenCountTracking::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const result,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
if (!hasPrivilege(tx, changeNFTCounts))
{
if (beforeMintedTotal != afterMintedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: the number of minted tokens "
"changed without a mint transaction!";
return false;
}
if (beforeBurnedTotal != afterBurnedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: the number of burned tokens "
"changed without a burn transaction!";
return false;
}
return true;
}
if (tx.getTxnType() == ttNFTOKEN_MINT)
{
if (result == tesSUCCESS && beforeMintedTotal >= afterMintedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: successful minting didn't increase "
"the number of minted tokens.";
return false;
}
if (result != tesSUCCESS && beforeMintedTotal != afterMintedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: failed minting changed the "
"number of minted tokens.";
return false;
}
if (beforeBurnedTotal != afterBurnedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: minting changed the number of "
"burned tokens.";
return false;
}
}
if (tx.getTxnType() == ttNFTOKEN_BURN)
{
if (result == tesSUCCESS)
{
if (beforeBurnedTotal >= afterBurnedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: successful burning didn't increase "
"the number of burned tokens.";
return false;
}
}
if (result != tesSUCCESS && beforeBurnedTotal != afterBurnedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: failed burning changed the "
"number of burned tokens.";
return false;
}
if (beforeMintedTotal != afterMintedTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: burning changed the number of "
"minted tokens.";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDEXInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STArray.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
namespace xrpl {
void
ValidPermissionedDEX::visitEntry(
bool,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
if (after && after->getType() == ltDIR_NODE)
{
if (after->isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
domains_.insert(after->getFieldH256(sfDomainID));
}
if (after && after->getType() == ltOFFER)
{
if (after->isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
domains_.insert(after->getFieldH256(sfDomainID));
else
regularOffers_ = true;
// if a hybrid offer is missing domain or additional book, there's
// something wrong
if (after->isFlag(lsfHybrid) &&
(!after->isFieldPresent(sfDomainID) || !after->isFieldPresent(sfAdditionalBooks) ||
after->getFieldArray(sfAdditionalBooks).size() > 1))
badHybrids_ = true;
}
}
bool
ValidPermissionedDEX::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const result,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
auto const txType = tx.getTxnType();
if ((txType != ttPAYMENT && txType != ttOFFER_CREATE) || result != tesSUCCESS)
return true;
// For each offercreate transaction, check if
// permissioned offers are valid
if (txType == ttOFFER_CREATE && badHybrids_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: hybrid offer is malformed";
return false;
}
if (!tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
return true;
auto const domain = tx.getFieldH256(sfDomainID);
if (!view.exists(keylet::permissionedDomain(domain)))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain doesn't exist";
return false;
}
// for both payment and offercreate, there shouldn't be another domain
// that's different from the domain specified
for (auto const& d : domains_)
{
if (d != domain)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction"
" consumed wrong domains";
return false;
}
}
if (regularOffers_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain transaction"
" affected regular offers";
return false;
}
return true;
}
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDomainInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STArray.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
namespace xrpl {
void
ValidPermissionedDomain::visitEntry(
bool isDel,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
if (before && before->getType() != ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN)
return;
if (after && after->getType() != ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN)
return;
auto check = [isDel](std::vector<SleStatus>& sleStatus, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& sle) {
auto const& credentials = sle->getFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials);
auto const sorted = credentials::makeSorted(credentials);
SleStatus ss{credentials.size(), false, !sorted.empty(), isDel};
// If array have duplicates then all the other checks are invalid
if (ss.isUnique_)
{
unsigned i = 0;
for (auto const& cred : sorted)
{
auto const& credTx = credentials[i++];
ss.isSorted_ =
(cred.first == credTx[sfIssuer]) && (cred.second == credTx[sfCredentialType]);
if (!ss.isSorted_)
break;
}
}
sleStatus.emplace_back(std::move(ss));
};
if (after)
check(sleStatus_, after);
}
bool
ValidPermissionedDomain::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const result,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
auto check = [](SleStatus const& sleStatus, beast::Journal const& j) {
if (!sleStatus.credentialsSize_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain with "
"no rules.";
return false;
}
if (sleStatus.credentialsSize_ > maxPermissionedDomainCredentialsArraySize)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain bad "
"credentials size "
<< sleStatus.credentialsSize_;
return false;
}
if (!sleStatus.isUnique_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain credentials "
"aren't unique";
return false;
}
if (!sleStatus.isSorted_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain credentials "
"aren't sorted";
return false;
}
return true;
};
if (view.rules().enabled(fixPermissionedDomainInvariant))
{
// No permissioned domains should be affected if the transaction failed
if (result != tesSUCCESS)
// If nothing changed, all is good. If there were changes, that's
// bad.
return sleStatus_.empty();
if (sleStatus_.size() > 1)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction affected more "
"than 1 permissioned domain entry.";
return false;
}
switch (tx.getTxnType())
{
case ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET: {
if (sleStatus_.empty())
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: no domain objects affected by "
"PermissionedDomainSet";
return false;
}
auto const& sleStatus = sleStatus_[0];
if (sleStatus.isDelete_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain object "
"deleted by PermissionedDomainSet";
return false;
}
return check(sleStatus, j);
}
case ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE: {
if (sleStatus_.empty())
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: no domain objects affected by "
"PermissionedDomainDelete";
return false;
}
if (!sleStatus_[0].isDelete_)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain object "
"modified, but not deleted by "
"PermissionedDomainDelete";
return false;
}
return true;
}
default: {
if (!sleStatus_.empty())
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: " << sleStatus_.size()
<< " domain object(s) affected by an "
"unauthorized transaction. "
<< tx.getTxnType();
return false;
}
return true;
}
}
}
else
{
if (tx.getTxnType() != ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET || result != tesSUCCESS ||
sleStatus_.empty())
return true;
return check(sleStatus_[0], j);
}
}
} // namespace xrpl

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@@ -0,0 +1,926 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.h>
//
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STNumber.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
namespace xrpl {
ValidVault::Vault
ValidVault::Vault::make(SLE const& from)
{
XRPL_ASSERT(from.getType() == ltVAULT, "ValidVault::Vault::make : from Vault object");
ValidVault::Vault self;
self.key = from.key();
self.asset = from.at(sfAsset);
self.pseudoId = from.getAccountID(sfAccount);
self.owner = from.at(sfOwner);
self.shareMPTID = from.getFieldH192(sfShareMPTID);
self.assetsTotal = from.at(sfAssetsTotal);
self.assetsAvailable = from.at(sfAssetsAvailable);
self.assetsMaximum = from.at(sfAssetsMaximum);
self.lossUnrealized = from.at(sfLossUnrealized);
return self;
}
ValidVault::Shares
ValidVault::Shares::make(SLE const& from)
{
XRPL_ASSERT(
from.getType() == ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE,
"ValidVault::Shares::make : from MPTokenIssuance object");
ValidVault::Shares self;
self.share = MPTIssue(makeMptID(from.getFieldU32(sfSequence), from.getAccountID(sfIssuer)));
self.sharesTotal = from.at(sfOutstandingAmount);
self.sharesMaximum = from[~sfMaximumAmount].value_or(maxMPTokenAmount);
return self;
}
void
ValidVault::visitEntry(
bool isDelete,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
{
// If `before` is empty, this means an object is being created, in which
// case `isDelete` must be false. Otherwise `before` and `after` are set and
// `isDelete` indicates whether an object is being deleted or modified.
XRPL_ASSERT(
after != nullptr && (before != nullptr || !isDelete),
"xrpl::ValidVault::visitEntry : some object is available");
// Number balanceDelta will capture the difference (delta) between "before"
// state (zero if created) and "after" state (zero if destroyed), so the
// invariants can validate that the change in account balances matches the
// change in vault balances, stored to deltas_ at the end of this function.
Number balanceDelta{};
std::int8_t sign = 0;
if (before)
{
switch (before->getType())
{
case ltVAULT:
beforeVault_.push_back(Vault::make(*before));
break;
case ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE:
// At this moment we have no way of telling if this object holds
// vault shares or something else. Save it for finalize.
beforeMPTs_.push_back(Shares::make(*before));
balanceDelta = static_cast<std::int64_t>(before->getFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount));
sign = 1;
break;
case ltMPTOKEN:
balanceDelta = static_cast<std::int64_t>(before->getFieldU64(sfMPTAmount));
sign = -1;
break;
case ltACCOUNT_ROOT:
case ltRIPPLE_STATE:
balanceDelta = before->getFieldAmount(sfBalance);
sign = -1;
break;
default:;
}
}
if (!isDelete && after)
{
switch (after->getType())
{
case ltVAULT:
afterVault_.push_back(Vault::make(*after));
break;
case ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE:
// At this moment we have no way of telling if this object holds
// vault shares or something else. Save it for finalize.
afterMPTs_.push_back(Shares::make(*after));
balanceDelta -=
Number(static_cast<std::int64_t>(after->getFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount)));
sign = 1;
break;
case ltMPTOKEN:
balanceDelta -= Number(static_cast<std::int64_t>(after->getFieldU64(sfMPTAmount)));
sign = -1;
break;
case ltACCOUNT_ROOT:
case ltRIPPLE_STATE:
balanceDelta -= Number(after->getFieldAmount(sfBalance));
sign = -1;
break;
default:;
}
}
uint256 const key = (before ? before->key() : after->key());
// Append to deltas if sign is non-zero, i.e. an object of an interesting
// type has been updated. A transaction may update an object even when
// its balance has not changed, e.g. transaction fee equals the amount
// transferred to the account. We intentionally do not compare balanceDelta
// against zero, to avoid missing such updates.
if (sign != 0)
deltas_[key] = balanceDelta * sign;
}
bool
ValidVault::finalize(
STTx const& tx,
TER const ret,
XRPAmount const fee,
ReadView const& view,
beast::Journal const& j)
{
bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault);
if (!isTesSuccess(ret))
return true; // Do not perform checks
if (afterVault_.empty() && beforeVault_.empty())
{
if (hasPrivilege(tx, mustModifyVault))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: vault operation succeeded without modifying "
"a vault";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault noop invariant");
return !enforce;
}
return true; // Not a vault operation
}
else if (!(hasPrivilege(tx, mustModifyVault) || hasPrivilege(tx, mayModifyVault)))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: vault updated by a wrong transaction type";
XRPL_ASSERT(
enforce,
"xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : illegal vault transaction "
"invariant");
return !enforce; // Also not a vault operation
}
if (beforeVault_.size() > 1 || afterVault_.size() > 1)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: vault operation updated more than single vault";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : single vault invariant");
return !enforce; // That's all we can do here
}
auto const txnType = tx.getTxnType();
// We do special handling for ttVAULT_DELETE first, because it's the only
// vault-modifying transaction without an "after" state of the vault
if (afterVault_.empty())
{
if (txnType != ttVAULT_DELETE)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: vault deleted by a wrong transaction type";
XRPL_ASSERT(
enforce,
"xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : illegal vault deletion "
"invariant");
return !enforce; // That's all we can do here
}
// Note, if afterVault_ is empty then we know that beforeVault_ is not
// empty, as enforced at the top of this function
auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
// At this moment we only know a vault is being deleted and there
// might be some MPTokenIssuance objects which are deleted in the
// same transaction. Find the one matching this vault.
auto const deletedShares = [&]() -> std::optional<Shares> {
for (auto const& e : beforeMPTs_)
{
if (e.share.getMptID() == beforeVault.shareMPTID)
return std::move(e);
}
return std::nullopt;
}();
if (!deletedShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must also "
"delete shares";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : shares deletion invariant");
return !enforce; // That's all we can do here
}
bool result = true;
if (deletedShares->sharesTotal != 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must have no "
"shares outstanding";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsTotal != zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must have no "
"assets outstanding";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable != zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must have no "
"assets available";
result = false;
}
return result;
}
else if (txnType == ttVAULT_DELETE)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: vault deletion succeeded without "
"deleting a vault";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault deletion invariant");
return !enforce; // That's all we can do here
}
// Note, `afterVault_.empty()` is handled above
auto const& afterVault = afterVault_[0];
XRPL_ASSERT(
beforeVault_.empty() || beforeVault_[0].key == afterVault.key,
"xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : single vault operation");
auto const updatedShares = [&]() -> std::optional<Shares> {
// At this moment we only know that a vault is being updated and there
// might be some MPTokenIssuance objects which are also updated in the
// same transaction. Find the one matching the shares to this vault.
// Note, we expect updatedMPTs collection to be extremely small. For
// such collections linear search is faster than lookup.
for (auto const& e : afterMPTs_)
{
if (e.share.getMptID() == afterVault.shareMPTID)
return e;
}
auto const sleShares = view.read(keylet::mptIssuance(afterVault.shareMPTID));
return sleShares ? std::optional<Shares>(Shares::make(*sleShares)) : std::nullopt;
}();
bool result = true;
// Universal transaction checks
if (!beforeVault_.empty())
{
auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
if (afterVault.asset != beforeVault.asset || afterVault.pseudoId != beforeVault.pseudoId ||
afterVault.shareMPTID != beforeVault.shareMPTID)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: violation of vault immutable data";
result = false;
}
}
if (!updatedShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: updated vault must have shares";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault has shares invariant");
return !enforce; // That's all we can do here
}
if (updatedShares->sharesTotal == 0)
{
if (afterVault.assetsTotal != zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: updated zero sized "
"vault must have no assets outstanding";
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.assetsAvailable != zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: updated zero sized "
"vault must have no assets available";
result = false;
}
}
else if (updatedShares->sharesTotal > updatedShares->sharesMaximum)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: updated shares must not exceed maximum "
<< updatedShares->sharesMaximum;
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.assetsAvailable < zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets available must be positive";
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.assetsAvailable > afterVault.assetsTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets available must "
"not be greater than assets outstanding";
result = false;
}
else if (afterVault.lossUnrealized > afterVault.assetsTotal - afterVault.assetsAvailable)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: loss unrealized must not exceed "
"the difference between assets outstanding and available";
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.assetsTotal < zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets outstanding must be positive";
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.assetsMaximum < zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets maximum must be positive";
result = false;
}
// Thanks to this check we can simply do `assert(!beforeVault_.empty()` when
// enforcing invariants on transaction types other than ttVAULT_CREATE
if (beforeVault_.empty() && txnType != ttVAULT_CREATE)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: vault created by a wrong transaction type";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault creation invariant");
return !enforce; // That's all we can do here
}
if (!beforeVault_.empty() && afterVault.lossUnrealized != beforeVault_[0].lossUnrealized &&
txnType != ttLOAN_MANAGE && txnType != ttLOAN_PAY)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: vault transaction must not change loss "
"unrealized";
result = false;
}
auto const beforeShares = [&]() -> std::optional<Shares> {
if (beforeVault_.empty())
return std::nullopt;
auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
for (auto const& e : beforeMPTs_)
{
if (e.share.getMptID() == beforeVault.shareMPTID)
return std::move(e);
}
return std::nullopt;
}();
if (!beforeShares &&
(tx.getTxnType() == ttVAULT_DEPOSIT || //
tx.getTxnType() == ttVAULT_WITHDRAW || //
tx.getTxnType() == ttVAULT_CLAWBACK))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: vault operation succeeded "
"without updating shares";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : shares noop invariant");
return !enforce; // That's all we can do here
}
auto const& vaultAsset = afterVault.asset;
auto const deltaAssets = [&](AccountID const& id) -> std::optional<Number> {
auto const get = //
[&](auto const& it, std::int8_t sign = 1) -> std::optional<Number> {
if (it == deltas_.end())
return std::nullopt;
return it->second * sign;
};
return std::visit(
[&]<typename TIss>(TIss const& issue) {
if constexpr (std::is_same_v<TIss, Issue>)
{
if (isXRP(issue))
return get(deltas_.find(keylet::account(id).key));
return get(
deltas_.find(keylet::line(id, issue).key), id > issue.getIssuer() ? -1 : 1);
}
else if constexpr (std::is_same_v<TIss, MPTIssue>)
{
return get(deltas_.find(keylet::mptoken(issue.getMptID(), id).key));
}
},
vaultAsset.value());
};
auto const deltaAssetsTxAccount = [&]() -> std::optional<Number> {
auto ret = deltaAssets(tx[sfAccount]);
// Nothing returned or not XRP transaction
if (!ret.has_value() || !vaultAsset.native())
return ret;
// Delegated transaction; no need to compensate for fees
if (auto const delegate = tx[~sfDelegate];
delegate.has_value() && *delegate != tx[sfAccount])
return ret;
*ret += fee.drops();
if (*ret == zero)
return std::nullopt;
return ret;
};
auto const deltaShares = [&](AccountID const& id) -> std::optional<Number> {
auto const it = [&]() {
if (id == afterVault.pseudoId)
return deltas_.find(keylet::mptIssuance(afterVault.shareMPTID).key);
return deltas_.find(keylet::mptoken(afterVault.shareMPTID, id).key);
}();
return it != deltas_.end() ? std::optional<Number>(it->second) : std::nullopt;
};
auto const vaultHoldsNoAssets = [&](Vault const& vault) {
return vault.assetsAvailable == 0 && vault.assetsTotal == 0;
};
// Technically this does not need to be a lambda, but it's more
// convenient thanks to early "return false"; the not-so-nice
// alternatives are several layers of nested if/else or more complex
// (i.e. brittle) if statements.
result &= [&]() {
switch (txnType)
{
case ttVAULT_CREATE: {
bool result = true;
if (!beforeVault_.empty())
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: create operation must not have "
"updated a vault";
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.assetsAvailable != zero || afterVault.assetsTotal != zero ||
afterVault.lossUnrealized != zero || updatedShares->sharesTotal != 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: created vault must be empty";
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.pseudoId != updatedShares->share.getIssuer())
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: shares issuer and vault "
"pseudo-account must be the same";
result = false;
}
auto const sleSharesIssuer =
view.read(keylet::account(updatedShares->share.getIssuer()));
if (!sleSharesIssuer)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: shares issuer must exist";
return false;
}
if (!isPseudoAccount(sleSharesIssuer))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: shares issuer must be a "
"pseudo-account";
result = false;
}
if (auto const vaultId = (*sleSharesIssuer)[~sfVaultID];
!vaultId || *vaultId != afterVault.key)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) //
<< "Invariant failed: shares issuer pseudo-account "
"must point back to the vault";
result = false;
}
return result;
}
case ttVAULT_SET: {
bool result = true;
XRPL_ASSERT(
!beforeVault_.empty(), "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : set updated a vault");
auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
if (vaultDeltaAssets)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: set must not change vault balance";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsTotal != afterVault.assetsTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: set must not change assets "
"outstanding";
result = false;
}
if (afterVault.assetsMaximum > zero &&
afterVault.assetsTotal > afterVault.assetsMaximum)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: set assets outstanding must not "
"exceed assets maximum";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable != afterVault.assetsAvailable)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: set must not change assets "
"available";
result = false;
}
if (beforeShares && updatedShares &&
beforeShares->sharesTotal != updatedShares->sharesTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: set must not change shares "
"outstanding";
result = false;
}
return result;
}
case ttVAULT_DEPOSIT: {
bool result = true;
XRPL_ASSERT(
!beforeVault_.empty(), "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : deposit updated a vault");
auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
if (!vaultDeltaAssets)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must change vault balance";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
if (*vaultDeltaAssets > tx[sfAmount])
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must not change vault "
"balance by more than deposited amount";
result = false;
}
if (*vaultDeltaAssets <= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must increase vault balance";
result = false;
}
// Any payments (including deposits) made by the issuer
// do not change their balance, but create funds instead.
bool const issuerDeposit = [&]() -> bool {
if (vaultAsset.native())
return false;
return tx[sfAccount] == vaultAsset.getIssuer();
}();
if (!issuerDeposit)
{
auto const accountDeltaAssets = deltaAssetsTxAccount();
if (!accountDeltaAssets)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must change depositor "
"balance";
return false;
}
if (*accountDeltaAssets >= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must decrease depositor "
"balance";
result = false;
}
if (*accountDeltaAssets * -1 != *vaultDeltaAssets)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must change vault and "
"depositor balance by equal amount";
result = false;
}
}
if (afterVault.assetsMaximum > zero &&
afterVault.assetsTotal > afterVault.assetsMaximum)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit assets outstanding must not "
"exceed assets maximum";
result = false;
}
auto const accountDeltaShares = deltaShares(tx[sfAccount]);
if (!accountDeltaShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must change depositor "
"shares";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
if (*accountDeltaShares <= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must increase depositor "
"shares";
result = false;
}
auto const vaultDeltaShares = deltaShares(afterVault.pseudoId);
if (!vaultDeltaShares || *vaultDeltaShares == zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must change vault shares";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
if (*vaultDeltaShares * -1 != *accountDeltaShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: deposit must change depositor and "
"vault shares by equal amount";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsTotal + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deposit and assets "
"outstanding must add up";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsAvailable)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deposit and assets "
"available must add up";
result = false;
}
return result;
}
case ttVAULT_WITHDRAW: {
bool result = true;
XRPL_ASSERT(
!beforeVault_.empty(),
"xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : withdrawal updated a "
"vault");
auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
if (!vaultDeltaAssets)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal must "
"change vault balance";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
if (*vaultDeltaAssets >= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal must "
"decrease vault balance";
result = false;
}
// Any payments (including withdrawal) going to the issuer
// do not change their balance, but destroy funds instead.
bool const issuerWithdrawal = [&]() -> bool {
if (vaultAsset.native())
return false;
auto const destination = tx[~sfDestination].value_or(tx[sfAccount]);
return destination == vaultAsset.getIssuer();
}();
if (!issuerWithdrawal)
{
auto const accountDeltaAssets = deltaAssetsTxAccount();
auto const otherAccountDelta = [&]() -> std::optional<Number> {
if (auto const destination = tx[~sfDestination];
destination && *destination != tx[sfAccount])
return deltaAssets(*destination);
return std::nullopt;
}();
if (accountDeltaAssets.has_value() == otherAccountDelta.has_value())
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: withdrawal must change one "
"destination balance";
return false;
}
auto const destinationDelta = //
accountDeltaAssets ? *accountDeltaAssets : *otherAccountDelta;
if (destinationDelta <= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: withdrawal must increase "
"destination balance";
result = false;
}
if (*vaultDeltaAssets * -1 != destinationDelta)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: withdrawal must change vault "
"and destination balance by equal amount";
result = false;
}
}
auto const accountDeltaShares = deltaShares(tx[sfAccount]);
if (!accountDeltaShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: withdrawal must change depositor "
"shares";
return false;
}
if (*accountDeltaShares >= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: withdrawal must decrease depositor "
"shares";
result = false;
}
auto const vaultDeltaShares = deltaShares(afterVault.pseudoId);
if (!vaultDeltaShares || *vaultDeltaShares == zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: withdrawal must change vault shares";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
if (*vaultDeltaShares * -1 != *accountDeltaShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: withdrawal must change depositor "
"and vault shares by equal amount";
result = false;
}
// Note, vaultBalance is negative (see check above)
if (beforeVault.assetsTotal + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal and "
"assets outstanding must add up";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsAvailable)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal and "
"assets available must add up";
result = false;
}
return result;
}
case ttVAULT_CLAWBACK: {
bool result = true;
XRPL_ASSERT(
!beforeVault_.empty(), "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : clawback updated a vault");
auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
if (vaultAsset.native() || vaultAsset.getIssuer() != tx[sfAccount])
{
// The owner can use clawback to force-burn shares when the
// vault is empty but there are outstanding shares
if (!(beforeShares && beforeShares->sharesTotal > 0 &&
vaultHoldsNoAssets(beforeVault) && beforeVault.owner == tx[sfAccount]))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback may only be performed "
"by the asset issuer, or by the vault owner of an "
"empty vault";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
}
auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
if (vaultDeltaAssets)
{
if (*vaultDeltaAssets >= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback must decrease vault "
"balance";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsTotal + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsTotal)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback and assets outstanding "
"must add up";
result = false;
}
if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable + *vaultDeltaAssets !=
afterVault.assetsAvailable)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback and assets available "
"must add up";
result = false;
}
}
else if (!vaultHoldsNoAssets(beforeVault))
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback must change vault balance";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
auto const accountDeltaShares = deltaShares(tx[sfHolder]);
if (!accountDeltaShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback must change holder shares";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
if (*accountDeltaShares >= zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback must decrease holder "
"shares";
result = false;
}
auto const vaultDeltaShares = deltaShares(afterVault.pseudoId);
if (!vaultDeltaShares || *vaultDeltaShares == zero)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback must change vault shares";
return false; // That's all we can do
}
if (*vaultDeltaShares * -1 != *accountDeltaShares)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << //
"Invariant failed: clawback must change holder and "
"vault shares by equal amount";
result = false;
}
return result;
}
case ttLOAN_SET:
case ttLOAN_MANAGE:
case ttLOAN_PAY: {
// TBD
return true;
}
default:
// LCOV_EXCL_START
UNREACHABLE("xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : unknown transaction type");
return false;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
}();
if (!result)
{
// The comment at the top of this file starting with "assert(enforce)"
// explains this assert.
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault invariants");
return !enforce;
}
return true;
}
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/PermissionedDomain/PermissionedDomainSet.h>
//
#include <xrpl/ledger/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/PermissionedDomain/PermissionedDomainSet.h>
#include <optional>
namespace xrpl {

View File

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ private:
std::vector<std::string> emptyCfgKeys;
struct publisher
{
publisher(FetchListConfig const& c) : cfg{c}, isRetry{false}
publisher(FetchListConfig const& c) : cfg{c}
{
}
std::shared_ptr<TrustedPublisherServer> server;

View File

@@ -5340,20 +5340,20 @@ class Vault_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env.close();
// 2. Mantissa larger than uint64 max
env.set_parse_failure_expected(true);
try
{
tx[sfAssetsMaximum] = "18446744073709551617e5"; // uint64 max + 1
env(tx, THISLINE);
BEAST_EXPECT(false);
BEAST_EXPECTS(false, "Expected parse_error for mantissa larger than uint64 max");
}
catch (parse_error const& e)
{
using namespace std::string_literals;
BEAST_EXPECT(
e.what() ==
"invalidParamsField 'tx_json.AssetsMaximum' has invalid "
"data."s);
e.what() == "invalidParamsField 'tx_json.AssetsMaximum' has invalid data."s);
}
env.set_parse_failure_expected(false);
}
}

View File

@@ -32,10 +32,9 @@ public:
test_limits()
{
auto const scale = Number::getMantissaScale();
auto const minMantissa = Number::minMantissa();
testcase << "test_limits " << to_string(scale) << ", " << minMantissa;
testcase << "test_limits " << to_string(scale);
bool caught = false;
auto const minMantissa = Number::minMantissa();
try
{
Number x = Number{false, minMantissa * 10, 32768, Number::normalized{}};
@@ -59,9 +58,8 @@ public:
__LINE__);
test(Number{false, minMantissa, -32769, Number::normalized{}}, Number{}, __LINE__);
test(
// Use 1501 to force rounding up
Number{false, minMantissa, 32000, Number::normalized{}} * 1'000 +
Number{false, 1'501, 32000, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, 1'500, 32000, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, minMantissa + 2, 32003, Number::normalized{}},
__LINE__);
// 9,223,372,036,854,775,808
@@ -170,12 +168,8 @@ public:
{Number{true, 9'999'999'999'999'999'999ULL, -37, Number::normalized{}},
Number{1'000'000'000'000'000'000, -18},
Number{false, 9'999'999'999'999'999'990ULL, -19, Number::normalized{}}},
{Number{Number::largestMantissa},
Number{6, -1},
Number{Number::largestMantissa / 10, 1}},
{Number{Number::largestMantissa - 1},
Number{1, 0},
Number{Number::largestMantissa}},
{Number{Number::maxRep}, Number{6, -1}, Number{Number::maxRep / 10, 1}},
{Number{Number::maxRep - 1}, Number{1, 0}, Number{Number::maxRep}},
// Test extremes
{
// Each Number operand rounds up, so the actual mantissa is
@@ -185,18 +179,11 @@ public:
Number{2, 19},
},
{
// Does not round. Mantissas are going to be >
// largestMantissa, so if added together as uint64_t's, the
// result will overflow. With addition using uint128_t,
// there's no problem. After normalizing, the resulting
// mantissa ends up less than largestMantissa.
Number{false, Number::largestMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, Number::largestMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, Number::largestMantissa * 2, 0, Number::normalized{}},
},
{
// These mantissas round down, so adding them together won't
// have any consequences.
// Does not round. Mantissas are going to be > maxRep, so if
// added together as uint64_t's, the result will overflow.
// With addition using uint128_t, there's no problem. After
// normalizing, the resulting mantissa ends up less than
// maxRep.
Number{false, 9'999'999'999'999'999'990ULL, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, 9'999'999'999'999'999'990ULL, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, 1'999'999'999'999'999'998ULL, 1, Number::normalized{}},
@@ -285,16 +272,14 @@ public:
{Number{1'000'000'000'000'000'001, -18},
Number{1'000'000'000'000'000'000, -18},
Number{1'000'000'000'000'000'000, -36}},
{Number{Number::largestMantissa},
Number{6, -1},
Number{Number::largestMantissa - 1}},
{Number{false, Number::largestMantissa + 1, 0, Number::normalized{}},
{Number{Number::maxRep}, Number{6, -1}, Number{Number::maxRep - 1}},
{Number{false, Number::maxRep + 1, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{1, 0},
Number{Number::largestMantissa / 10 + 1, 1}},
{Number{false, Number::largestMantissa + 1, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{Number::maxRep / 10 + 1, 1}},
{Number{false, Number::maxRep + 1, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{3, 0},
Number{Number::largestMantissa}},
{power(2, 63), Number{3, 0}, Number{Number::largestMantissa}},
Number{Number::maxRep}},
{power(2, 63), Number{3, 0}, Number{Number::maxRep}},
});
auto test = [this](auto const& c) {
for (auto const& [x, y, z] : c)
@@ -317,15 +302,14 @@ public:
auto const scale = Number::getMantissaScale();
testcase << "test_mul " << to_string(scale);
// Case: Factor 1, Factor 2, Expected product, Line number
using Case = std::tuple<Number, Number, Number, int>;
using Case = std::tuple<Number, Number, Number>;
auto test = [this](auto const& c) {
for (auto const& [x, y, z, line] : c)
for (auto const& [x, y, z] : c)
{
auto const result = x * y;
std::stringstream ss;
ss << x << " * " << y << " = " << result << ". Expected: " << z;
BEAST_EXPECTS(result == z, ss.str() + " line: " + std::to_string(line));
BEAST_EXPECTS(result == z, ss.str());
}
};
auto tests = [&](auto const& cSmall, auto const& cLarge) {
@@ -335,100 +319,70 @@ public:
test(cLarge);
};
auto const maxMantissa = Number::maxMantissa();
auto const maxInternalMantissa = static_cast<std::uint64_t>(static_cast<std::int64_t>(
power(10, Number::mantissaLog()))) *
10 -
1;
saveNumberRoundMode save{Number::setround(Number::to_nearest)};
{
auto const cSmall = std::to_array<Case>({
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{2000000000000000, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{2000000000000000, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-2000000000000000, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{-2000000000000000, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{2000000000000000, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{2000000000000000, -15}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{1000000000000000, -14},
__LINE__},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__},
Number{1000000000000000, -14}},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{0}},
// Maximum mantissa range
{Number{9'999'999'999'999'999, 0},
Number{9'999'999'999'999'999, 0},
Number{9'999'999'999'999'998, 16},
__LINE__},
Number{9'999'999'999'999'998, 16}},
});
auto const cLarge = std::to_array<Case>({
// Note that items with extremely large mantissas need to be
// calculated, because otherwise they overflow uint64. Items
// from C with larger mantissa
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1999999999999999862, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999862, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{false, 9'999'999'999'999'999'579ULL, -18, Number::normalized{}},
__LINE__},
Number{false, 9'999'999'999'999'999'579ULL, -18, Number::normalized{}}},
{Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__},
Number{0}},
// Items from cSmall expanded for the larger mantissa,
// except duplicates. Sadly, it looks like sqrt(2)^2 != 2
// with higher precision
{Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{2000000000000000001, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{2000000000000000001, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1999999999999999998, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999998, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{1999999999999999999, -18},
__LINE__},
{Number{3214285714285714278, -18},
Number{3111111111111111119, -18},
Number{10, 0},
__LINE__},
// Maximum internal mantissa range - rounds up to 1e19
{Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{1, 38},
__LINE__},
// Maximum actual mantissa range - same as int64 range
Number{1999999999999999999, -18}},
{Number{3214285714285714278, -18}, Number{3111111111111111119, -18}, Number{10, 0}},
// Maximum mantissa range - rounds up to 1e19
{Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'85, 19},
__LINE__},
Number{1, 38}},
// Maximum int64 range
{Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'85, 19},
__LINE__},
{Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'85, 19}},
});
tests(cSmall, cLarge);
}
@@ -436,90 +390,66 @@ public:
testcase << "test_mul " << to_string(Number::getMantissaScale()) << " towards_zero";
{
auto const cSmall = std::to_array<Case>(
{{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{9999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__}});
Number{9999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{0}}});
auto const cLarge = std::to_array<Case>(
// Note that items with extremely large mantissas need to be
// calculated, because otherwise they overflow uint64. Items
// from C with larger mantissa
{
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1999999999999999861, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999861, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{false, 9999999999999999579ULL, -18, Number::normalized{}},
__LINE__},
Number{false, 9999999999999999579ULL, -18, Number::normalized{}}},
{Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__},
Number{0}},
// Items from cSmall expanded for the larger mantissa,
// except duplicates. Sadly, it looks like sqrt(2)^2 != 2
// with higher precision
{Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{2, 0},
__LINE__},
Number{2, 0}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1999999999999999997, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999997, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{1999999999999999999, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999999, -18}},
{Number{3214285714285714278, -18},
Number{3111111111111111119, -18},
Number{10, 0},
__LINE__},
// Maximum internal mantissa range - rounds down to
// maxMantissa/10e1
Number{10, 0}},
// Maximum mantissa range - rounds down to maxMantissa/10e1
// 99'999'999'999'999'999'800'000'000'000'000'000'100
{Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxInternalMantissa / 10 - 1, 20, Number::normalized{}},
__LINE__},
// Maximum actual mantissa range - same as int64
{Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'84, 19},
__LINE__},
Number{false, maxMantissa / 10 - 1, 20, Number::normalized{}}},
// Maximum int64 range
// 85'070'591'730'234'615'847'396'907'784'232'501'249
{Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'84, 19},
__LINE__},
{Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'84, 19}},
});
tests(cSmall, cLarge);
}
@@ -527,90 +457,66 @@ public:
testcase << "test_mul " << to_string(Number::getMantissaScale()) << " downward";
{
auto const cSmall = std::to_array<Case>(
{{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-2000000000000000, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{-2000000000000000, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{9999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__}});
Number{9999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{0}}});
auto const cLarge = std::to_array<Case>(
// Note that items with extremely large mantissas need to be
// calculated, because otherwise they overflow uint64. Items
// from C with larger mantissa
{
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1999999999999999862, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999862, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999861, -18}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{false, 9'999'999'999'999'999'579ULL, -18, Number::normalized{}},
__LINE__},
Number{false, 9'999'999'999'999'999'579ULL, -18, Number::normalized{}}},
{Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__},
Number{0}},
// Items from cSmall expanded for the larger mantissa,
// except duplicates. Sadly, it looks like sqrt(2)^2 != 2
// with higher precision
{Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{2, 0},
__LINE__},
Number{2, 0}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1999999999999999998, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999998, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{1999999999999999999, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999999, -18}},
{Number{3214285714285714278, -18},
Number{3111111111111111119, -18},
Number{10, 0},
__LINE__},
// Maximum internal mantissa range - rounds down to
// maxMantissa/10-1
Number{10, 0}},
// Maximum mantissa range - rounds down to maxMantissa/10e1
// 99'999'999'999'999'999'800'000'000'000'000'000'100
{Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxInternalMantissa / 10 - 1, 20, Number::normalized{}},
__LINE__},
// Maximum mantissa range - same as int64
{Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'84, 19},
__LINE__},
Number{false, maxMantissa / 10 - 1, 20, Number::normalized{}}},
// Maximum int64 range
// 85'070'591'730'234'615'847'396'907'784'232'501'249
{Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'84, 19},
__LINE__},
{Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'84, 19}},
});
tests(cSmall, cLarge);
}
@@ -618,89 +524,66 @@ public:
testcase << "test_mul " << to_string(Number::getMantissaScale()) << " upward";
{
auto const cSmall = std::to_array<Case>(
{{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{2000000000000000, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{2000000000000000, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1999999999999999, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999, -15}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{2000000000000000, -15},
__LINE__},
Number{2000000000000000, -15}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{1000000000000000, -14},
__LINE__},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__}});
Number{1000000000000000, -14}},
{Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{1000000000000000, -32768}, Number{0}}});
auto const cLarge = std::to_array<Case>(
// Note that items with extremely large mantissas need to be
// calculated, because otherwise they overflow uint64. Items
// from C with larger mantissa
{
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}, __LINE__},
{Number{7}, Number{8}, Number{56}},
{Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1999999999999999861, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999861, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{-1414213562373095, -15},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{1999999999999999862, -18}},
{Number{3214285714285706, -15},
Number{3111111111111119, -15},
Number{999999999999999958, -17},
__LINE__},
Number{999999999999999958, -17}},
{Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{1000000000000000000, -32768},
Number{0},
__LINE__},
Number{0}},
// Items from cSmall expanded for the larger mantissa,
// except duplicates. Sadly, it looks like sqrt(2)^2 != 2
// with higher precision
{Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{2000000000000000001, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{2000000000000000001, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1999999999999999997, -18},
__LINE__},
Number{-1999999999999999997, -18}},
{Number{-1414213562373095048, -18},
Number{-1414213562373095049, -18},
Number{2, 0},
__LINE__},
Number{2, 0}},
{Number{3214285714285714278, -18},
Number{3111111111111111119, -18},
Number{1000000000000000001, -17},
__LINE__},
// Maximum internal mantissa range - rounds up to
// minMantissa*10 1e19*1e19=1e38
{Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{1, 38},
__LINE__},
// Maximum mantissa range - same as int64
Number{1000000000000000001, -17}},
// Maximum mantissa range - rounds up to minMantissa*10
// 1e19*1e19=1e38
{Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'85, 19},
__LINE__},
Number{1, 38}},
// Maximum int64 range
// 85'070'591'730'234'615'847'396'907'784'232'501'249
{Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{Number::largestMantissa, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'85, 19},
__LINE__},
{Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{Number::maxRep, 0},
Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'85, 19}},
});
tests(cSmall, cLarge);
}
@@ -931,11 +814,6 @@ public:
};
*/
auto const maxInternalMantissa = static_cast<std::uint64_t>(static_cast<std::int64_t>(
power(10, Number::mantissaLog()))) *
10 -
1;
auto const cSmall = std::to_array<Case>(
{{Number{2}, 2, Number{1414213562373095049, -18}},
{Number{2'000'000}, 2, Number{1414213562373095049, -15}},
@@ -947,16 +825,16 @@ public:
{Number{0}, 5, Number{0}},
{Number{5625, -4}, 2, Number{75, -2}}});
auto const cLarge = std::to_array<Case>({
{Number{false, maxInternalMantissa - 9, -1, Number::normalized{}},
{Number{false, Number::maxMantissa() - 9, -1, Number::normalized{}},
2,
Number{false, 999'999'999'999'999'999, -9, Number::normalized{}}},
{Number{false, maxInternalMantissa - 9, 0, Number::normalized{}},
{Number{false, Number::maxMantissa() - 9, 0, Number::normalized{}},
2,
Number{false, 3'162'277'660'168'379'330, -9, Number::normalized{}}},
{Number{Number::largestMantissa},
{Number{Number::maxRep},
2,
Number{false, 3'037'000'499'976049692, -9, Number::normalized{}}},
{Number{Number::largestMantissa},
{Number{Number::maxRep},
4,
Number{false, 55'108'98747006743627, -14, Number::normalized{}}},
});
@@ -1005,8 +883,6 @@ public:
}
};
auto const maxInternalMantissa = power(10, Number::mantissaLog()) * 10 - 1;
auto const cSmall = std::to_array<Number>({
Number{2},
Number{2'000'000},
@@ -1016,10 +892,7 @@ public:
Number{5, -1},
Number{0},
Number{5625, -4},
Number{Number::largestMantissa},
maxInternalMantissa,
Number{Number::minMantissa(), 0, Number::unchecked{}},
Number{Number::maxMantissa(), 0, Number::unchecked{}},
Number{Number::maxRep},
});
test(cSmall);
bool caught = false;
@@ -1370,18 +1243,18 @@ public:
case MantissaRange::large:
// Test the edges
// ((exponent < -(28)) || (exponent > -(8)))))
test(Number::min(), "922337203685477581e-32768");
test(Number::min(), "1e-32750");
test(Number::max(), "9223372036854775807e32768");
test(Number::lowest(), "-9223372036854775807e32768");
{
NumberRoundModeGuard mg(Number::towards_zero);
auto const maxMantissa = Number::maxMantissa();
BEAST_EXPECT(maxMantissa == 9'223'372'036'854'775'807ULL);
BEAST_EXPECT(maxMantissa == 9'999'999'999'999'999'999ULL);
test(
Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}}, "9223372036854775807");
Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}}, "9999999999999999990");
test(
Number{true, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}}, "-9223372036854775807");
Number{true, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}}, "-9999999999999999990");
test(
Number{std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::max(), 0}, "9223372036854775807");
@@ -1617,7 +1490,7 @@ public:
Number const initalXrp{INITIAL_XRP};
BEAST_EXPECT(initalXrp.exponent() > 0);
Number const maxInt64{Number::largestMantissa};
Number const maxInt64{Number::maxRep};
BEAST_EXPECT(maxInt64.exponent() > 0);
// 85'070'591'730'234'615'865'843'651'857'942'052'864 - 38 digits
BEAST_EXPECT((power(maxInt64, 2) == Number{85'070'591'730'234'62, 22}));
@@ -1634,217 +1507,21 @@ public:
Number const initalXrp{INITIAL_XRP};
BEAST_EXPECT(initalXrp.exponent() <= 0);
Number const maxInt64{Number::largestMantissa};
Number const maxInt64{Number::maxRep};
BEAST_EXPECT(maxInt64.exponent() <= 0);
// 85'070'591'730'234'615'847'396'907'784'232'501'249 - 38 digits
BEAST_EXPECT((power(maxInt64, 2) == Number{85'070'591'730'234'615'85, 19}));
NumberRoundModeGuard mg(Number::towards_zero);
{
auto const maxInternalMantissa =
static_cast<std::uint64_t>(
static_cast<std::int64_t>(power(10, Number::mantissaLog()))) *
10 -
1;
// Rounds down to fit under 2^63
Number const max = Number{false, maxInternalMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}};
// No alterations by the accessors
BEAST_EXPECT(max.mantissa() == maxInternalMantissa / 10);
BEAST_EXPECT(max.exponent() == 1);
// 99'999'999'999'999'999'800'000'000'000'000'000'100 - also 38
// digits
BEAST_EXPECT(
(power(max, 2) ==
Number{false, maxInternalMantissa / 10 - 1, 20, Number::normalized{}}));
}
{
auto const maxMantissa = Number::maxMantissa();
Number const max = Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}};
// No alterations by the accessors
BEAST_EXPECT(max.mantissa() == maxMantissa);
BEAST_EXPECT(max.exponent() == 0);
// 85'070'591'730'234'615'847'396'907'784'232'501'249 - also 38
// digits
BEAST_EXPECT(
(power(max, 2) ==
Number{false, 85'070'591'730'234'615'84, 19, Number::normalized{}}));
}
}
}
void
testNormalizeToRange()
{
// Test edge-cases of normalizeToRange
auto const scale = Number::getMantissaScale();
testcase << "normalizeToRange " << to_string(scale);
auto test = [this](
Number const& n,
auto const rangeMin,
auto const rangeMax,
auto const expectedMantissa,
auto const expectedExponent,
auto const line) {
auto const normalized = n.normalizeToRange(rangeMin, rangeMax);
BEAST_EXPECTS(
normalized.first == expectedMantissa,
"Number " + to_string(n) + " scaled to " + std::to_string(rangeMax) +
". Expected mantissa:" + std::to_string(expectedMantissa) +
", got: " + std::to_string(normalized.first) + " @ " + std::to_string(line));
BEAST_EXPECTS(
normalized.second == expectedExponent,
"Number " + to_string(n) + " scaled to " + std::to_string(rangeMax) +
". Expected exponent:" + std::to_string(expectedExponent) +
", got: " + std::to_string(normalized.second) + " @ " + std::to_string(line));
};
std::int64_t constexpr iRangeMin = 100;
std::int64_t constexpr iRangeMax = 999;
std::uint64_t constexpr uRangeMin = 100;
std::uint64_t constexpr uRangeMax = 999;
constexpr static MantissaRange largeRange{MantissaRange::large};
std::int64_t constexpr iBigMin = largeRange.min;
std::int64_t constexpr iBigMax = largeRange.max;
auto const testSuite = [&](Number const& n,
auto const expectedSmallMantissa,
auto const expectedSmallExponent,
auto const expectedLargeMantissa,
auto const expectedLargeExponent,
auto const line) {
test(n, iRangeMin, iRangeMax, expectedSmallMantissa, expectedSmallExponent, line);
test(n, iBigMin, iBigMax, expectedLargeMantissa, expectedLargeExponent, line);
// Only test non-negative. testing a negative number with an
// unsigned range will assert, and asserts can't be tested.
if (n.signum() >= 0)
{
test(n, uRangeMin, uRangeMax, expectedSmallMantissa, expectedSmallExponent, line);
test(
n,
largeRange.min,
largeRange.max,
expectedLargeMantissa,
expectedLargeExponent,
line);
}
};
{
// zero
Number const n{0};
testSuite(
n,
0,
std::numeric_limits<int>::lowest(),
0,
std::numeric_limits<int>::lowest(),
__LINE__);
}
{
// Small positive number
Number const n{2};
testSuite(n, 200, -2, 2'000'000'000'000'000'000, -18, __LINE__);
}
{
// Negative number
Number const n{-2};
testSuite(n, -200, -2, -2'000'000'000'000'000'000, -18, __LINE__);
}
{
// Biggest valid mantissa
Number const n{Number::largestMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}};
if (scale == MantissaRange::small)
// With the small mantissa range, the value rounds up. Because
// it rounds up, when scaling up to the full int64 range, it
// can't go over the max, so it is one digit smaller than the
// full value.
testSuite(n, 922, 16, 922'337'203'685'477'600, 1, __LINE__);
else
testSuite(n, 922, 16, Number::largestMantissa, 0, __LINE__);
}
{
// Biggest valid mantissa + 1
Number const n{Number::largestMantissa + 1, 0, Number::normalized{}};
if (scale == MantissaRange::small)
// With the small mantissa range, the value rounds up. Because
// it rounds up, when scaling up to the full int64 range, it
// can't go over the max, so it is one digit smaller than the
// full value.
testSuite(n, 922, 16, 922'337'203'685'477'600, 1, __LINE__);
else
testSuite(n, 922, 16, 922'337'203'685'477'581, 1, __LINE__);
}
{
// Biggest valid mantissa + 2
Number const n{Number::largestMantissa + 2, 0, Number::normalized{}};
if (scale == MantissaRange::small)
// With the small mantissa range, the value rounds up. Because
// it rounds up, when scaling up to the full int64 range, it
// can't go over the max, so it is one digit smaller than the
// full value.
testSuite(n, 922, 16, 922'337'203'685'477'600, 1, __LINE__);
else
testSuite(n, 922, 16, 922'337'203'685'477'581, 1, __LINE__);
}
{
// Biggest valid mantissa + 3
Number const n{Number::largestMantissa + 3, 0, Number::normalized{}};
if (scale == MantissaRange::small)
// With the small mantissa range, the value rounds up. Because
// it rounds up, when scaling up to the full int64 range, it
// can't go over the max, so it is one digit smaller than the
// full value.
testSuite(n, 922, 16, 922'337'203'685'477'600, 1, __LINE__);
else
testSuite(n, 922, 16, 922'337'203'685'477'581, 1, __LINE__);
}
{
// int64 min
Number const n{std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::min(), 0};
if (scale == MantissaRange::small)
testSuite(n, -922, 16, -922'337'203'685'477'600, 1, __LINE__);
else
testSuite(n, -922, 16, -922'337'203'685'477'581, 1, __LINE__);
}
{
// int64 min + 1
Number const n{std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::min() + 1, 0};
if (scale == MantissaRange::small)
testSuite(n, -922, 16, -922'337'203'685'477'600, 1, __LINE__);
else
testSuite(n, -922, 16, -9'223'372'036'854'775'807, 0, __LINE__);
}
{
// int64 min - 1
// Need to cast to uint, even though we're dealing with a negative
// number to avoid overflow and UB
Number const n{
true,
static_cast<std::uint64_t>(std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::min()) + 1,
0,
Number::normalized{}};
if (scale == MantissaRange::small)
testSuite(n, -922, 16, -922'337'203'685'477'600, 1, __LINE__);
else
testSuite(n, -922, 16, -922'337'203'685'477'581, 1, __LINE__);
auto const maxMantissa = Number::maxMantissa();
Number const max = Number{false, maxMantissa, 0, Number::normalized{}};
BEAST_EXPECT(max.mantissa() == maxMantissa / 10);
BEAST_EXPECT(max.exponent() == 1);
// 99'999'999'999'999'999'800'000'000'000'000'000'100 - also 38
// digits
BEAST_EXPECT(
(power(max, 2) == Number{false, maxMantissa / 10 - 1, 20, Number::normalized{}}));
}
}
@@ -1875,7 +1552,6 @@ public:
test_truncate();
testRounding();
testInt64();
testNormalizeToRange();
}
}
};

View File

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ public:
{
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> object;
Status const status = backend.fetch(batch[i]->getHash().cbegin(), &object);
Status const status = backend.fetch(batch[i]->getHash(), &object);
BEAST_EXPECT(status == ok);
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ public:
{
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> object;
Status const status = backend.fetch(batch[i]->getHash().cbegin(), &object);
Status const status = backend.fetch(batch[i]->getHash(), &object);
BEAST_EXPECT(status == notFound);
}

View File

@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ public:
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> obj;
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> result;
obj = seq1_.obj(dist_(gen_));
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash().data(), &result);
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash(), &result);
suite_.expect(result && isSame(result, obj));
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
@@ -377,9 +377,9 @@ public:
{
try
{
auto const key = seq2_.key(i);
auto const hash = seq2_.key(i);
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> result;
backend_.fetch(key.data(), &result);
backend_.fetch(hash, &result);
suite_.expect(!result);
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
@@ -449,9 +449,9 @@ public:
{
if (rand_(gen_) < missingNodePercent)
{
auto const key = seq2_.key(dist_(gen_));
auto const hash = seq2_.key(dist_(gen_));
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> result;
backend_.fetch(key.data(), &result);
backend_.fetch(hash, &result);
suite_.expect(!result);
}
else
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ public:
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> obj;
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> result;
obj = seq1_.obj(dist_(gen_));
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash().data(), &result);
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash(), &result);
suite_.expect(result && isSame(result, obj));
}
}
@@ -540,8 +540,7 @@ public:
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> result;
auto const j = older_(gen_);
obj = seq1_.obj(j);
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> result1;
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash().data(), &result);
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash(), &result);
suite_.expect(result != nullptr);
suite_.expect(isSame(result, obj));
}
@@ -559,7 +558,7 @@ public:
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> result;
auto const j = recent_(gen_);
obj = seq1_.obj(j);
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash().data(), &result);
backend_.fetch(obj->getHash(), &result);
suite_.expect(!result || isSame(result, obj));
break;
}

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