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Author SHA1 Message Date
Vito
fc620bf29a test: Fix clang-tidy issues in new Vault+AMM tests
- AMM_test: directly include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
  (misc-include-cleaner).
- Vault_test::testMutateCanTransferAfterDeposit: declare local Vault
  const (misc-const-correctness).
2026-04-29 12:03:50 +02:00
Vito
b01ba1fce2 test: Add Vault+AMM integration coverage
- AMM_test::testVaultSharesAMM: pair vault-share MPT with XRP, do a
  single-asset deposit of additional shares.
- AMM_test::testLockedVaultMPTCashOut: lock the underlying MPT of a
  vault that backs an AMM and confirm the freeze cascades through
  isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen, blocking LP-token Payment (tecPATH_DRY)
  and AMM withdrawal (tecFROZEN).
- Vault_test::testMutateCanTransferAfterDeposit: exercise issuer
  mutating lsfMPTCanTransfer / lsfMPTCanTrade after holders have
  deposited. Confirms CanTrade has no effect on vault I/O, the
  issuer-as-depositor path is exempt from canTransfer, and a holder
  can still exit via VaultWithdraw with Destination = issuer while
  CanTransfer is cleared.
2026-04-29 11:45:43 +02:00
5 changed files with 370 additions and 342 deletions

View File

@@ -1857,18 +1857,8 @@ loanMakePayment(
// -------------------------------------------------------------
// overpayment handling
//
// If the "fixSecurity3_1_3" amendment is enabled, truncate "amount",
// at the loan scale. If the raw value is used, the overpayment
// amount could be meaningless dust. Trying to process such a small
// amount will, at best, waste time when all the result values round
// to zero. At worst, it can cause logical errors with tiny amounts
// of interest that don't add up correctly.
auto const roundedAmount = view.rules().enabled(fixSecurity3_1_3)
? roundToAsset(asset, amount, loanScale, Number::towards_zero)
: amount;
if (paymentType == LoanPaymentType::overpayment && loan->isFlag(lsfLoanOverpayment) &&
paymentRemainingProxy > 0 && totalPaid < roundedAmount &&
paymentRemainingProxy > 0 && totalPaid < amount &&
numPayments < loanMaximumPaymentsPerTransaction)
{
TenthBips32 const overpaymentInterestRate{loan->at(sfOverpaymentInterestRate)};
@@ -1877,7 +1867,7 @@ loanMakePayment(
// It shouldn't be possible for the overpayment to be greater than
// totalValueOutstanding, because that would have been processed as
// another normal payment. But cap it just in case.
Number const overpayment = std::min(roundedAmount - totalPaid, *totalValueOutstandingProxy);
Number const overpayment = std::min(amount - totalPaid, *totalValueOutstandingProxy);
detail::ExtendedPaymentComponents const overpaymentComponents =
detail::computeOverpaymentComponents(

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
#include <bit>
#include <cstdint>
#include <memory>
#include <vector>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -144,7 +143,6 @@ LoanPay::calculateBaseFee(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
Number const numPaymentEstimate = static_cast<std::int64_t>(amount / regularPayment);
// Charge one base fee per paymentsPerFeeIncrement payments, rounding up.
// This set round is safe because there's a mode guard just above
Number::setround(Number::upward);
auto const feeIncrements = std::max(
std::int64_t(1),
@@ -442,10 +440,9 @@ LoanPay::doApply()
// Vault object state changes
view.update(vaultSle);
Number const assetsAvailableBefore = *assetsAvailableProxy;
Number const assetsTotalBefore = *assetsTotalProxy;
#if !NDEBUG
{
Number const assetsAvailableBefore = *assetsAvailableProxy;
Number const pseudoAccountBalanceBefore = accountHolds(
view,
vaultPseudoAccount,
@@ -469,6 +466,16 @@ LoanPay::doApply()
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
"assets available must not be greater than assets outstanding");
if (*assetsAvailableProxy > *assetsTotalProxy)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j_.fatal()) << "Vault assets available must not be greater "
"than assets outstanding. Available: "
<< *assetsAvailableProxy << ", Total: " << *assetsTotalProxy;
return tecINTERNAL;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
JLOG(j_.debug()) << "total paid to vault raw: " << totalPaidToVaultRaw
<< ", total paid to vault rounded: " << totalPaidToVaultRounded
<< ", total paid to broker: " << totalPaidToBroker
@@ -494,68 +501,12 @@ LoanPay::doApply()
associateAsset(*vaultSle, asset);
// Duplicate some checks after rounding
Number const assetsAvailableAfter = *assetsAvailableProxy;
Number const assetsTotalAfter = *assetsTotalProxy;
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
assetsAvailableAfter <= assetsTotalAfter,
*assetsAvailableProxy <= *assetsTotalProxy,
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
"assets available must not be greater than assets outstanding");
if (assetsAvailableAfter == assetsAvailableBefore)
{
// An unchanged assetsAvailable indicates that the amount paid to the
// vault was zero, or rounded to zero. That should be impossible, but I
// can't rule it out for extreme edge cases, so fail gracefully if it
// happens.
//
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j_.warn()) << "LoanPay: Vault assets available unchanged after rounding: " //
<< "Before: " << assetsAvailableBefore //
<< ", After: " << assetsAvailableAfter;
return tecPRECISION_LOSS;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
if (paymentParts->valueChange != beast::zero && assetsTotalAfter == assetsTotalBefore)
{
// Non-zero valueChange with an unchanged assetsTotal indicates that the
// actual value change rounded to zero. That should be impossible, but I
// can't rule it out for extreme edge cases, so fail gracefully if it
// happens.
//
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j_.warn())
<< "LoanPay: Vault assets expected change, but unchanged after rounding: " //
<< "Before: " << assetsTotalBefore //
<< ", After: " << assetsTotalAfter //
<< ", ValueChange: " << paymentParts->valueChange;
return tecPRECISION_LOSS;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
if (paymentParts->valueChange == beast::zero && assetsTotalAfter != assetsTotalBefore)
{
// A change in assetsTotal when there was no valueChange indicates that
// something really weird happened. That should be flat out impossible.
//
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j_.fatal()) << "LoanPay: Vault assets changed unexpectedly after rounding: " //
<< "Before: " << assetsTotalBefore //
<< ", After: " << assetsTotalAfter //
<< ", ValueChange: " << paymentParts->valueChange;
return tecINTERNAL;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
if (assetsAvailableAfter > assetsTotalAfter)
{
// Assets available are not allowed to be larger than assets total.
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j_.fatal()) << "LoanPay: Vault assets available must not be greater "
"than assets outstanding. Available: "
<< assetsAvailableAfter << ", Total: " << assetsTotalAfter;
return tecINTERNAL;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
// These three values are used to check that funds are conserved after the transfers
#if !NDEBUG
auto const accountBalanceBefore = accountHolds(
view,
account_,
@@ -584,6 +535,7 @@ LoanPay::doApply()
ahIGNORE_AUTH,
j_,
SpendableHandling::shFULL_BALANCE);
#endif
if (totalPaidToVaultRounded != beast::zero)
{
@@ -619,22 +571,19 @@ LoanPay::doApply()
return ter;
#if !NDEBUG
{
Number const pseudoAccountBalanceAfter = accountHolds(
view,
vaultPseudoAccount,
asset,
FreezeHandling::fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
AuthHandling::ahIGNORE_AUTH,
j_);
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
assetsAvailableAfter == pseudoAccountBalanceAfter,
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
"vault pseudo balance agrees after");
}
#endif
Number const assetsAvailableAfter = *assetsAvailableProxy;
Number const pseudoAccountBalanceAfter = accountHolds(
view,
vaultPseudoAccount,
asset,
FreezeHandling::fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
AuthHandling::ahIGNORE_AUTH,
j_);
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
assetsAvailableAfter == pseudoAccountBalanceAfter,
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
"vault pseudo balance agrees after");
// Check that funds are conserved
auto const accountBalanceAfter = accountHolds(
view,
account_,
@@ -663,121 +612,14 @@ LoanPay::doApply()
ahIGNORE_AUTH,
j_,
SpendableHandling::shFULL_BALANCE);
auto const balanceScale = [&]() {
// Find a reasonable scale to use for the balance comparisons.
//
// First find the minimum and maximum exponent of all the non-zero balances, before and
// after. If min and max are equal, use that value. If they are not, use "max + 1" to reduce
// rounding discrepancies without making the result meaningless. Cap the scale at
// STAmount::cMaxOffset, just in case the numbers are all very large.
std::vector<int> exponents;
for (auto const& a : {
accountBalanceBefore,
vaultBalanceBefore,
brokerBalanceBefore,
accountBalanceAfter,
vaultBalanceAfter,
brokerBalanceAfter,
})
{
// Exclude zeroes
if (a != beast::zero)
exponents.push_back(a.exponent());
}
if (exponents.empty())
{
UNREACHABLE("xrpl::LoanPay::doApply : all zeroes");
return 0;
}
auto const [minItr, maxItr] = std::ranges::minmax_element(exponents);
auto const min = *minItr;
auto const max = *maxItr;
JLOG(j_.trace()) << "Min scale: " << min << ", max scale: " << max;
// IOU rounding can be interesting. We want all the balance checks to agree, but don't want
// to round to such an extreme that it becomes meaningless. e.g. Everything rounds to one
// digit. So add 1 to the max (reducing the number of digits after the decimal point by 1)
// if the scales are not already all the same.
return std::min(min == max ? max : max + 1, STAmount::cMaxOffset);
}();
// No object changes are made below this point
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
Number::getround() == Number::to_nearest,
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
"Number rounding to_nearest");
NumberRoundModeGuard const mg(Number::to_nearest);
auto const accountBalanceBeforeRounded = roundToScale(accountBalanceBefore, balanceScale);
auto const vaultBalanceBeforeRounded = roundToScale(vaultBalanceBefore, balanceScale);
auto const brokerBalanceBeforeRounded = roundToScale(brokerBalanceBefore, balanceScale);
auto const totalBalanceBefore = accountBalanceBefore + vaultBalanceBefore + brokerBalanceBefore;
auto const totalBalanceBeforeRounded = roundToScale(totalBalanceBefore, balanceScale);
JLOG(j_.trace()) << "Before: " //
<< "account " << Number(accountBalanceBeforeRounded) << " ("
<< Number(accountBalanceBefore) << ")"
<< ", vault " << Number(vaultBalanceBeforeRounded) << " ("
<< Number(vaultBalanceBefore) << ")"
<< ", broker " << Number(brokerBalanceBeforeRounded) << " ("
<< Number(brokerBalanceBefore) << ")"
<< ", total " << Number(totalBalanceBeforeRounded) << " ("
<< Number(totalBalanceBefore) << ")";
auto const accountBalanceAfterRounded = roundToScale(accountBalanceAfter, balanceScale);
auto const vaultBalanceAfterRounded = roundToScale(vaultBalanceAfter, balanceScale);
auto const brokerBalanceAfterRounded = roundToScale(brokerBalanceAfter, balanceScale);
auto const totalBalanceAfter = accountBalanceAfter + vaultBalanceAfter + brokerBalanceAfter;
auto const totalBalanceAfterRounded = roundToScale(totalBalanceAfter, balanceScale);
JLOG(j_.trace()) << "After: " //
<< "account " << Number(accountBalanceAfterRounded) << " ("
<< Number(accountBalanceAfter) << ")"
<< ", vault " << Number(vaultBalanceAfterRounded) << " ("
<< Number(vaultBalanceAfter) << ")"
<< ", broker " << Number(brokerBalanceAfterRounded) << " ("
<< Number(brokerBalanceAfter) << ")"
<< ", total " << Number(totalBalanceAfterRounded) << " ("
<< Number(totalBalanceAfter) << ")";
auto const accountBalanceChange = accountBalanceAfter - accountBalanceBefore;
auto const vaultBalanceChange = vaultBalanceAfter - vaultBalanceBefore;
auto const brokerBalanceChange = brokerBalanceAfter - brokerBalanceBefore;
auto const totalBalanceChange = accountBalanceChange + vaultBalanceChange + brokerBalanceChange;
auto const totalBalanceChangeRounded = roundToScale(totalBalanceChange, balanceScale);
JLOG(j_.trace()) << "Changes: " //
<< "account " << to_string(accountBalanceChange) //
<< ", vault " << to_string(vaultBalanceChange) //
<< ", broker " << to_string(brokerBalanceChange) //
<< ", total " << to_string(totalBalanceChangeRounded) << " ("
<< Number(totalBalanceChange) << ")";
if (totalBalanceBeforeRounded != totalBalanceAfterRounded)
{
JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Total rounded balances don't match"
<< (totalBalanceChangeRounded == beast::zero ? ", but total changes do"
: "");
}
if (totalBalanceChangeRounded != beast::zero)
{
JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Total balance changes don't match"
<< (totalBalanceBeforeRounded == totalBalanceAfterRounded
? ", but total balances do"
: "");
}
// Rounding for IOUs can be weird, so check a few different ways to show
// that funds are conserved.
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
totalBalanceBeforeRounded == totalBalanceAfterRounded ||
totalBalanceChangeRounded == beast::zero,
accountBalanceBefore + vaultBalanceBefore + brokerBalanceBefore ==
accountBalanceAfter + vaultBalanceAfter + brokerBalanceAfter,
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
"funds are conserved (with rounding)");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
accountBalanceAfter >= beast::zero, "xrpl::LoanPay::doApply", "positive account balance");
XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
accountBalanceAfter < accountBalanceBefore || account_ == asset.getIssuer(),
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
@@ -798,6 +640,7 @@ LoanPay::doApply()
vaultBalanceAfter > vaultBalanceBefore || brokerBalanceAfter > brokerBalanceBefore,
"xrpl::LoanPay::doApply",
"vault and/or broker balance increased");
#endif
return tesSUCCESS;
}

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <test/jtx/escrow.h>
#include <test/jtx/fee.h>
#include <test/jtx/flags.h>
#include <test/jtx/mpt.h>
#include <test/jtx/offer.h>
#include <test/jtx/paths.h>
#include <test/jtx/pay.h>
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@
#include <test/jtx/ter.h>
#include <test/jtx/trust.h>
#include <test/jtx/txflags.h>
#include <test/jtx/vault.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
@@ -35,6 +37,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Quality.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
@@ -7060,10 +7063,200 @@ private:
{all});
}
// Create a single-asset vault, deposit assets so the depositor receives
// shares (an MPT issued by the vault pseudo-account), then pair those
// shares with XRP in an AMM. Finally do a single-asset deposit of more
// shares into the AMM.
void
testVaultSharesAMM()
{
testcase("Vault Shares paired with XRP in AMM");
using namespace jtx;
// Vaults rely on featureSingleAssetVault (which the AMM_test class
// strips by default). MPT-AMM pairs require featureMPTokensV2.
FeatureBitset const features{
jtx::testable_amendments() | featureSingleAssetVault | featureMPTokensV2};
Env env{*this, features};
Account const owner{"vaultOwner"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000'000), owner);
env.close();
// Use XRP as the vault asset for simplicity.
PrettyAsset const asset{xrpIssue(), 1'000'000};
Vault const vault{env};
auto [vaultTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = owner, .asset = asset});
env(vaultTx);
env.close();
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(vaultKeylet)))
return;
// Deposit 10,000 XRP into the vault. Owner receives shares (MPT)
// issued by the vault's pseudo-account.
env(vault.deposit(
{.depositor = owner, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(10'000).value()}));
env.close();
auto const vaultSle = env.le(vaultKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(vaultSle))
return;
MPTID const shareMptID = vaultSle->at(sfShareMPTID);
MPTIssue const shareIssue{shareMptID};
// The share MPT is issued by the vault's pseudo-account. Memoize so
// env.balance() can format share amounts.
env.memoize(Account{"vaultPseudo", vaultSle->at(sfAccount)});
// XRP vaults use scale=6, so a 10,000 XRP deposit yields
// 10,000 * 1e6 = 10^10 share units (raw MPT amount).
STAmount const sharesHeld = env.balance(owner, shareIssue);
BEAST_EXPECT(sharesHeld.mantissa() == 10'000'000'000ull);
BEAST_EXPECT(sharesHeld.asset() == shareIssue);
// Seed the AMM with half the shares + 5,000 XRP.
STAmount const halfShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{5'000'000'000});
AMM ammOwner(env, owner, halfShares, XRP(5'000));
BEAST_EXPECT(ammOwner.ammExists());
// Single-asset deposit: add 2,500,000,000 more shares (a quarter of
// the original holding) to the share side of the pool.
STAmount const extraShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{2'500'000'000});
ammOwner.deposit(owner, extraShares);
// The share-side pool should now equal halfShares + extraShares,
// while the XRP-side balance is unchanged at 5,000 XRP.
auto const [shareBalance, xrpBalance, lpt] = ammOwner.balances(shareIssue, xrpIssue());
BEAST_EXPECT(shareBalance == halfShares + extraShares);
BEAST_EXPECT(xrpBalance == XRP(5'000));
// Owner now holds the original 10B shares minus what was put into the
// AMM (5B seed + 2.5B single-asset deposit) = 2.5B.
STAmount const expectedOwnerShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{2'500'000'000});
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(owner, shareIssue) == expectedOwnerShares);
}
// Create a Vault whose underlying asset is a lockable / clawback-able
// MPT. Pair the vault shares with XRP in an AMM. Transfer half of the
// owner's LP tokens to a second account, then issuer-lock the
// underlying MPT, then try to transfer LP tokens / cash out again.
//
// Locking the underlying MPT cascades up via
// `isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen`: the vault-share MPT is treated as
// frozen because its underlying is locked. So:
// - LP-token Payment after lock fails (`tecPATH_DRY`).
// - AMM withdrawal of LP tokens fails (`tecFROZEN`).
// The LP tokens are effectively stuck for as long as the underlying
// MPT remains locked.
void
testLockedVaultMPTCashOut()
{
testcase("Cash out LP Tokens after vault MPT locked");
using namespace jtx;
FeatureBitset const features{
jtx::testable_amendments() | featureSingleAssetVault | featureMPTokensV2};
Env env{*this, features};
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const owner{"vaultOwner"};
Account const trader{"trader"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000'000), issuer, owner, trader);
env.close();
// Underlying MPT supports lock + clawback. MPTDEXFlags adds
// CanTransfer + CanTrade so the vault and AMM can route it.
MPTTester mpt(
{.env = env,
.issuer = issuer,
.holders = {owner},
.pay = 100'000,
.flags = tfMPTCanLock | tfMPTCanClawback | MPTDEXFlags});
PrettyAsset const asset = MPT(mpt);
// Create the vault.
Vault const vault{env};
auto [vaultTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = owner, .asset = asset});
env(vaultTx);
env.close();
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(vaultKeylet)))
return;
// Deposit 50,000 of the underlying MPT.
env(vault.deposit(
{.depositor = owner, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(50'000).value()}));
env.close();
auto const vaultSle = env.le(vaultKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(vaultSle))
return;
MPTID const shareMptID = vaultSle->at(sfShareMPTID);
MPTIssue const shareIssue{shareMptID};
env.memoize(Account{"vaultPseudo", vaultSle->at(sfAccount)});
// MPT vaults use scale=0, so 50,000 deposit -> 50,000 share units.
STAmount const sharesHeld = env.balance(owner, shareIssue);
BEAST_EXPECT(sharesHeld.mantissa() == 50'000);
// Create the AMM: 25,000 vault shares + 1,000 XRP.
STAmount const seedShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{25'000});
AMM ammOwner(env, owner, seedShares, XRP(1'000));
BEAST_EXPECT(ammOwner.ammExists());
// The AMM pseudo-account issues the LP tokens; memoize so
// env.balance() can format LP-token amounts.
env.memoize(Account{"ammPseudo", ammOwner.ammAccount()});
// Owner's LP token balance after AMM creation.
auto const lptIssue = ammOwner.lptIssue();
STAmount const lptOwner0 = env.balance(owner, lptIssue);
STAmount const lptZero(lptIssue, std::uint32_t{0});
BEAST_EXPECT(lptOwner0 != lptZero);
// Trader needs a trust line to receive LP tokens.
STAmount const lptTrustLimit(lptIssue, std::uint64_t{1'000'000'000});
env(trust(trader, lptTrustLimit));
env.close();
// Step 1: transfer half the LP tokens from owner -> trader.
STAmount const halfLpt(lptIssue, lptOwner0.mantissa() / 2, lptOwner0.exponent());
env(pay(owner, trader, halfLpt));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, lptIssue) == halfLpt);
// Step 2: issuer locks the underlying MPT.
mpt.set({.flags = tfMPTLock});
env.close();
// Step 3: transfer LP tokens again. The lock on the underlying MPT
// cascades through the vault-share issuance via
// isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen, so the AMM-routed Payment fails.
STAmount const quarterLpt(lptIssue, lptOwner0.mantissa() / 4, lptOwner0.exponent());
env(pay(owner, trader, quarterLpt), ter(tecPATH_DRY));
env.close();
// Trader's balance is still just the half from before the lock.
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, lptIssue) == halfLpt);
// Step 4: try to cash out the LP tokens. The AMM withdrawal must
// touch the vault-share side, which is now treated as frozen
// because its underlying is locked, so the withdrawal fails.
ammOwner.withdrawAll(trader, std::nullopt, ter(tecFROZEN));
env.close();
// Trader still holds the LP tokens; nothing was redeemed.
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, lptIssue) == halfLpt);
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, shareIssue) == STAmount(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{0}));
}
void
run() override
{
FeatureBitset const all{testable_amendments()};
testVaultSharesAMM();
testLockedVaultMPTCashOut();
testInvalidInstance();
testInstanceCreate();
testInvalidDeposit(all);

View File

@@ -370,11 +370,16 @@ protected:
env.balance(vaultPseudo, broker.asset).number());
if (ownerCount == 0)
{
// The Vault must be perfectly balanced if there
// are no loans outstanding
// Allow some slop for rounding IOUs
// TODO: This needs to be an exact match once all the
// other rounding issues are worked out.
auto const total = vaultSle->at(sfAssetsTotal);
auto const available = vaultSle->at(sfAssetsAvailable);
env.test.BEAST_EXPECT(total == available);
env.test.BEAST_EXPECT(
total == available ||
(!broker.asset.integral() && available != 0 &&
((total - available) / available < Number(1, -6))));
env.test.BEAST_EXPECT(vaultSle->at(sfLossUnrealized) == 0);
}
}
@@ -7063,140 +7068,6 @@ protected:
BEAST_EXPECT(afterSecondCoverAvailable == 0);
}
void
testYieldTheftRounding(std::uint32_t flags)
{
testcase("Rounding manipulation does not permit yield theft");
using namespace jtx;
using namespace loan;
// 1. Setup Environment
Env env(*this, all);
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const lender{"lender"};
Account const borrower{"borrower"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), issuer, lender, borrower);
env.close();
// 2. Asset Selection
PrettyAsset const iou = issuer["USD"];
env(trust(lender, iou(100'000'000)));
env(trust(borrower, iou(100'000'000)));
env(pay(issuer, lender, iou(100'000'000)));
env(pay(issuer, borrower, iou(100'000'000)));
env.close();
// 3. Create Vault and Broker with High Debt Limit (100M)
auto const brokerInfo = createVaultAndBroker(
env,
iou,
lender,
{
.vaultDeposit = 5'000'000,
.debtMax = Number{100'000'000},
.coverDeposit = 500'000,
});
auto const [currentSeq, vaultKeylet] = [&]() {
auto const brokerSle = env.le(keylet::loanbroker(brokerInfo.brokerID));
auto const currentSeq = brokerSle->at(sfLoanSequence);
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(brokerSle->at(sfVaultID));
return std::make_tuple(currentSeq, vaultKeylet);
}();
// 4. Loan Parameters (Attack Vector)
Number const principal = 1'000'000;
TenthBips32 const interestRate = TenthBips32{1}; // 0.001%
std::uint32_t const paymentInterval = 86400;
std::uint32_t const paymentTotal = 3650;
auto const loanSetFee = fee(env.current()->fees().base * 2);
env(set(borrower, brokerInfo.brokerID, iou(principal).value(), flags),
sig(sfCounterpartySignature, lender),
loan::interestRate(interestRate),
loan::paymentInterval(paymentInterval),
loan::paymentTotal(paymentTotal),
fee(loanSetFee));
env.close();
// --- RETRIEVE OBJECTS & SETUP ATTACK ---
auto borrowerBalance = [&]() { return env.balance(borrower, iou); };
auto const borrowerScale = static_cast<STAmount const&>(borrowerBalance()).exponent();
auto const loanKeylet = keylet::loan(brokerInfo.brokerID, currentSeq);
auto const maybePeriodicPayment = [&]() -> std::optional<STAmount> {
auto const loanSle = env.le(loanKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(loanSle))
return std::nullopt;
// Construct Payment
return STAmount{iou, loanSle->at(sfPeriodicPayment)};
}();
if (!maybePeriodicPayment)
return;
auto const periodicPayment = *maybePeriodicPayment;
auto const roundedPayment = roundToScale(periodicPayment, borrowerScale, Number::upward);
// ATTACK: Add dust buffer (1e-9) to force 'excess' logic execution
STAmount const paymentBuffer{iou, Number(1, -9)};
STAmount const attackPayment = periodicPayment + paymentBuffer;
auto const maybeInitialVaultAssets = [&]() -> std::optional<Number> {
auto const vault = env.le(vaultKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(vault))
return std::nullopt;
return vault->at(sfAssetsTotal);
}();
if (!maybeInitialVaultAssets)
return;
auto const initialVaultAssets = *maybeInitialVaultAssets;
// 5. Execution Loop
int yieldTheftCount = 0;
auto previousAssetsTotal = initialVaultAssets;
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
auto const balanceBefore = borrowerBalance();
env(pay(borrower, loanKeylet.key, attackPayment, flags));
env.close();
auto const borrowerDelta = balanceBefore - borrowerBalance();
BEAST_EXPECT(borrowerDelta.signum() == roundedPayment.signum());
auto const loanSle = env.le(loanKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(loanSle))
break;
auto const updatedPayment = STAmount{iou, loanSle->at(sfPeriodicPayment)};
BEAST_EXPECT(
(roundToScale(updatedPayment, borrowerScale, Number::upward) == roundedPayment));
BEAST_EXPECT(
(updatedPayment == periodicPayment) ||
(flags == tfLoanOverpayment && i >= 2 && updatedPayment < periodicPayment));
auto const currentVaultSle = env.le(vaultKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(currentVaultSle))
break;
auto const currentAssetsTotal = currentVaultSle->at(sfAssetsTotal);
auto const delta = currentAssetsTotal - previousAssetsTotal;
BEAST_EXPECT(
(delta == beast::zero && borrowerDelta <= roundedPayment) ||
(delta > beast::zero && borrowerDelta > roundedPayment));
// If tx succeeded but Assets Total didn't change, interest was
// stolen.
if (delta == beast::zero && borrowerDelta > roundedPayment)
{
yieldTheftCount++;
}
previousAssetsTotal = currentAssetsTotal;
}
BEAST_EXPECTS(yieldTheftCount == 0, std::to_string(yieldTheftCount));
}
// Tests that vault withdrawals work correctly when the vault has unrealized
// loss from an impaired loan, ensuring the invariant check properly
// accounts for the loss.
@@ -7335,11 +7206,6 @@ public:
testLoanPayLateFullPaymentBypassesPenalties();
testLoanCoverMinimumRoundingExploit();
#endif
for (auto const flags : {0u, tfLoanOverpayment})
{
testYieldTheftRounding(flags);
}
testWithdrawReflectsUnrealizedLoss();
testInvalidLoanSet();

View File

@@ -6139,6 +6139,141 @@ class Vault_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
runTest(amendments);
}
// Issuer mutates the underlying MPT's lsfMPTCanTransfer / lsfMPTCanTrade
// flags after holders have already deposited into a vault. Demonstrates:
//
// - VaultDeposit and VaultWithdraw both go through `canTransfer`,
// so clearing lsfMPTCanTransfer freezes every holder's funds in
// the vault until the issuer re-enables the flag (`tecNO_AUTH`).
//
// - The issuer is exempt: `canTransfer` short-circuits when either
// side of the transfer is the issuer, so the issuer can still
// deposit and withdraw.
//
// - lsfMPTCanTrade is *not* checked by VaultDeposit/VaultWithdraw at
// all — clearing it has no effect on vault I/O. (It only gates
// DEX/AMM operations via `canTrade`.)
void
testMutateCanTransferAfterDeposit()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase("MPT vault: clearing CanTransfer/CanTrade after deposit");
Env env{*this, testable_amendments() | featureSingleAssetVault};
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const alice{"alice"};
Account const bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, alice, bob);
env.close();
// MPT is transferable, tradable, lockable, and clawback-capable. Both
// CanTransfer and CanTrade are mutable so the issuer can flip them
// later via MPTokenIssuanceSet.
MPTTester mptt{env, issuer, mptInitNoFund};
mptt.create(
{.flags = tfMPTCanTransfer | tfMPTCanTrade | tfMPTCanLock | tfMPTCanClawback,
.mutableFlags = tmfMPTCanMutateCanTransfer | tmfMPTCanMutateCanTrade});
PrettyAsset const asset = mptt.issuanceID();
mptt.authorize({.account = alice});
mptt.authorize({.account = bob});
env(pay(issuer, alice, asset(100'000)));
env(pay(issuer, bob, asset(100'000)));
env.close();
Vault const vault{env};
auto [createTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = alice, .asset = asset});
env(createTx);
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(vaultKeylet));
// Both holders deposit. Issuer also deposits (issuer can be a
// depositor too) so we can later confirm the issuer-exempt path.
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(50'000)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = bob, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(30'000)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(20'000)}));
env.close();
// -- 1. Issuer clears lsfMPTCanTransfer ---------------------------
mptt.set({.mutableFlags = tmfMPTClearCanTransfer});
env.close();
{
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::mptIssuance(asset.raw().get<MPTIssue>().getMptID()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTransfer));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTrade));
}
// 2. Holder deposits and withdrawals are blocked: vault pseudo-
// account is neither sender nor receiver = issuer, so
// canTransfer returns tecNO_AUTH.
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = bob, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
// 3. Issuer-as-depositor is exempt — `canTransfer` short-circuits
// on the issuer side. Both deposit and withdraw succeed.
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(5'000)}));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(5'000)}));
env.close();
// 3b. A holder can also escape by withdrawing *to the issuer* via
// sfDestination. `canTransfer`'s issuer short-circuit fires on
// `to == issuer`, so the withdrawal succeeds even though
// CanTransfer is cleared. The holder's shares are burned and
// the underlying MPT lands at the issuer (presumably part of
// an off-ledger redemption arrangement).
auto const aliceMptBefore = env.balance(alice, asset);
auto withdrawToIssuer =
vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(2'000)});
withdrawToIssuer[sfDestination] = issuer.human();
env(withdrawToIssuer);
env.close();
// Alice's MPT balance is unchanged — the asset went to the issuer,
// not back to her — but her share holding was burned.
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(alice, asset) == aliceMptBefore);
// -- 4. Also clear lsfMPTCanTrade. Vault paths don't consult
// CanTrade, so this changes nothing for vault I/O. ----------
mptt.set({.mutableFlags = tmfMPTClearCanTrade});
env.close();
{
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::mptIssuance(asset.raw().get<MPTIssue>().getMptID()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTrade));
}
// Holder ops still fail the same way (CanTransfer-driven), and the
// issuer is still exempt.
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}));
env.close();
// -- 5. Re-enable CanTransfer; leave CanTrade cleared. ------------
mptt.set({.mutableFlags = tmfMPTSetCanTransfer});
env.close();
// Holders can now withdraw all their stake — confirms CanTrade is
// not consulted by the vault transactors. Alice already redeemed
// 2,000 to the issuer, so only 48,000 remains for her.
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(48'000)}));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = bob, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(30'000)}));
env.close();
{
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::mptIssuance(asset.raw().get<MPTIssue>().getMptID()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTransfer));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTrade));
}
}
public:
void
run() override
@@ -6162,6 +6297,7 @@ public:
testAssetsMaximum();
testBug6_LimitBypassWithShares();
testRemoveEmptyHoldingLockedAmount();
testMutateCanTransferAfterDeposit();
}
};