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1 Commits
ximinez/fi
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bthomee/ap
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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ce2a02e828 |
@@ -20,10 +20,6 @@ removeTokenOffersWithLimit(
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Keylet const& directory,
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std::size_t maxDeletableOffers);
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/** Returns tesSUCCESS if NFToken has few enough offers that it can be burned */
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TER
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notTooManyOffers(ReadView const& view, uint256 const& nftokenID);
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/** Finds the specified token in the owner's token directory. */
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std::optional<STObject>
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findToken(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& owner, uint256 const& nftokenID);
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@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ XRPL_FIX (Cleanup3_2_0, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo
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XRPL_FEATURE(MPTokensV2, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
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XRPL_FIX (Security3_1_3, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
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XRPL_FIX (PermissionedDomainInvariant, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
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XRPL_FIX (ExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
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XRPL_FIX (BatchInnerSigs, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
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XRPL_FEATURE(LendingProtocol, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
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XRPL_FEATURE(PermissionDelegationV1_1, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
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@@ -81,12 +81,9 @@ setCurrentThreadNameImpl(std::string_view name)
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{
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// truncate and set the thread name.
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char boundedName[maxThreadNameLength + 1];
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std::snprintf(
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boundedName,
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sizeof(boundedName),
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"%.*s",
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static_cast<int>(maxThreadNameLength),
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name.data()); // NOLINT(bugprone-suspicious-stringview-data-usage)
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auto const boundedSize = name.size() < maxThreadNameLength ? name.size() : maxThreadNameLength;
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name.copy(boundedName, boundedSize);
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boundedName[boundedSize] = '\0';
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pthread_setname_np(pthread_self(), boundedName);
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@@ -621,33 +621,6 @@ removeTokenOffersWithLimit(ApplyView& view, Keylet const& directory, std::size_t
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return deletedOffersCount;
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}
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TER
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notTooManyOffers(ReadView const& view, uint256 const& nftokenID)
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{
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std::size_t totalOffers = 0;
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{
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Dir const buys(view, keylet::nft_buys(nftokenID));
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for (auto iter = buys.begin(); iter != buys.end(); iter.next_page())
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{
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totalOffers += iter.page_size();
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if (totalOffers > maxDeletableTokenOfferEntries)
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return tefTOO_BIG;
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}
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}
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{
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Dir const sells(view, keylet::nft_sells(nftokenID));
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for (auto iter = sells.begin(); iter != sells.end(); iter.next_page())
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{
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totalOffers += iter.page_size();
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if (totalOffers > maxDeletableTokenOfferEntries)
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return tefTOO_BIG;
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}
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}
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return tesSUCCESS;
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}
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bool
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deleteTokenOffer(ApplyView& view, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& offer)
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{
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@@ -68,15 +68,12 @@ NFTokenAcceptOffer::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
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if (hasExpired(ctx.view, (*offerSLE)[~sfExpiration]))
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{
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// Before fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval amendment, expired
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// offers caused tecEXPIRED in preclaim, leaving them on ledger
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// forever. After the amendment, we allow expired offers to
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// reach doApply() where they get deleted and tecEXPIRED is
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// returned.
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if (!ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval))
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// Before fixSecurity3_1_3 amendment, expired offers caused tecEXPIRED in preclaim,
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// leaving them on ledger forever. After the amendment, we allow expired offers to
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// reach doApply() where they get deleted and tecEXPIRED is returned.
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if (!ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixSecurity3_1_3))
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return {nullptr, tecEXPIRED};
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// Amendment enabled: return the expired offer to be handled in
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// doApply
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// Amendment enabled: return the expired offer to be handled in doApply.
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}
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if ((*offerSLE)[sfAmount].negative())
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@@ -450,10 +447,9 @@ NFTokenAcceptOffer::doApply()
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auto bo = loadToken(ctx_.tx[~sfNFTokenBuyOffer]);
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auto so = loadToken(ctx_.tx[~sfNFTokenSellOffer]);
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// With fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval amendment, check for expired offers
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// and delete them, returning tecEXPIRED. This ensures expired offers
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// are properly cleaned up from the ledger.
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if (view().rules().enabled(fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval))
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// With fixSecurity3_1_3 amendment, check for expired offers and delete them, returning
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// tecEXPIRED. This ensures expired offers are properly cleaned up from the ledger.
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if (view().rules().enabled(fixSecurity3_1_3))
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{
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bool foundExpired = false;
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@@ -1096,10 +1096,10 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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// The buy offer must not have expired.
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// NOTE: this is only a preclaim check with the
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// fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval amendment disabled.
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// fixSecurity3_1_3 amendment disabled.
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env(token::acceptBuyOffer(alice, buyerExpOfferIndex), ter(tecEXPIRED));
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env.close();
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if (features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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buyerCount--;
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}
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@@ -1117,12 +1117,12 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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// The sell offer must not have expired.
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// NOTE: this is only a preclaim check with the
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// fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval amendment disabled.
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// fixSecurity3_1_3 amendment disabled.
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env(token::acceptSellOffer(buyer, aliceExpOfferIndex), ter(tecEXPIRED));
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env.close();
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// Alice's count is decremented by one when the expired offer is
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// removed.
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if (features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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aliceCount--;
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}
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@@ -3101,10 +3101,10 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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// No one can accept an expired sell offer.
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env(token::acceptSellOffer(buyer, offer1), ter(tecEXPIRED));
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// With fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval amendment, the first accept
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// With fixSecurity3_1_3 amendment, the first accept
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// attempt deletes the expired offer. Without the amendment,
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// the offer remains and we can try to accept it again.
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if (features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// After amendment: offer was deleted by first accept attempt
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minterCount--;
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@@ -3123,7 +3123,7 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, minter) == minterCount);
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, buyer) == buyerCount);
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if (!features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (!features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// Before amendment: expired offer still exists and needs to be
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// cancelled
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@@ -3189,10 +3189,10 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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// An expired buy offer cannot be accepted.
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env(token::acceptBuyOffer(minter, offer1), ter(tecEXPIRED));
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// With fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval amendment, the first accept
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// With fixSecurity3_1_3 amendment, the first accept
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// attempt deletes the expired offer. Without the amendment,
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// the offer remains and we can try to accept it again.
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if (features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// After amendment: offer was deleted by first accept attempt
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buyerCount--;
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@@ -3211,7 +3211,7 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, minter) == minterCount);
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, buyer) == buyerCount);
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if (!features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (!features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// Before amendment: expired offer still exists and can be
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// cancelled
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@@ -3288,7 +3288,7 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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env(token::brokerOffers(issuer, buyOffer1, sellOffer1), ter(tecEXPIRED));
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env.close();
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if (features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// With amendment: expired offers are deleted
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minterCount--;
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@@ -3298,7 +3298,7 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, minter) == minterCount);
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, buyer) == buyerCount);
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if (features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// The buy offer was deleted, so no need to cancel it
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// The sell offer still exists, so we can cancel it
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@@ -3377,7 +3377,7 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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env.close();
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, issuer) == 0);
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if (features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// After amendment: expired offers were deleted during broker
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// attempt
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@@ -3463,7 +3463,7 @@ class NFTokenBaseUtil_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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// The expired offers are still in the ledger.
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, issuer) == 0);
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if (!features[fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval])
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if (!features[fixSecurity3_1_3])
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{
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// Before amendment: expired offers still exist in ledger
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BEAST_EXPECT(ownerCount(env, minter) == 2);
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@@ -7190,7 +7190,7 @@ public:
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{
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testWithFeats(
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allFeatures - fixNFTokenReserve - featureNFTokenMintOffer - featureDynamicNFT -
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fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval);
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fixSecurity3_1_3);
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}
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};
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@@ -7227,7 +7227,7 @@ class NFTokenWOExpiredOfferRemoval_test : public NFTokenBaseUtil_test
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void
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run() override
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{
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testWithFeats(allFeatures - fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval);
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testWithFeats(allFeatures - fixSecurity3_1_3);
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}
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};
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@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ class LedgerEntry_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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checkErrorValue(
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jrr[jss::result],
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"malformedAuthorizedCredentials",
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"Invalid field 'authorized_credentials', not array.");
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"Invalid field 'authorized_credentials', not array of objects.");
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}
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{
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@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ class LedgerEntry_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
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checkErrorValue(
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jrr[jss::result],
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"malformedAuthorizedCredentials",
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"Invalid field 'authorized_credentials', not array.");
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"Invalid field 'authorized_credentials', not array of objects.");
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}
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{
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@@ -161,11 +161,7 @@ ValidatorSite::load(
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{
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try
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{
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// This is not super efficient, but it doesn't happen often.
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bool found = std::ranges::any_of(
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sites_, [&uri](auto const& site) { return site.loadedResource->uri == uri; });
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if (!found)
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sites_.emplace_back(uri);
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sites_.emplace_back(uri);
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}
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catch (std::exception const& e)
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{
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@@ -226,17 +222,7 @@ ValidatorSite::setTimer(
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std::lock_guard<std::mutex> const& site_lock,
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std::lock_guard<std::mutex> const& state_lock)
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{
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if (!sites_.empty() && //
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std::ranges::all_of(
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sites_, [](auto const& site) { return site.lastRefreshStatus.has_value(); }))
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{
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// If all of the sites have been handled at least once (including
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// errors and timeouts), call missingSite, which will load the cache
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// files for any lists that are still unavailable.
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missingSite(site_lock);
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}
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auto const next = std::ranges::min_element(
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auto next = std::ranges::min_element(
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sites_, [](Site const& a, Site const& b) { return a.nextRefresh < b.nextRefresh; });
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if (next != sites_.end())
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@@ -347,7 +333,7 @@ ValidatorSite::onRequestTimeout(std::size_t siteIdx, error_code const& ec)
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// processes a network error. Usually, this function runs first,
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// but on extremely rare occasions, the response handler can run
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// first, which will leave activeResource empty.
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auto& site = sites_[siteIdx];
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auto const& site = sites_[siteIdx];
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if (site.activeResource)
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{
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JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Request for " << site.activeResource->uri << " took too long";
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@@ -355,9 +341,6 @@ ValidatorSite::onRequestTimeout(std::size_t siteIdx, error_code const& ec)
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else
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JLOG(j_.error()) << "Request took too long, but a response has "
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"already been processed";
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if (!site.lastRefreshStatus)
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site.lastRefreshStatus.emplace(
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Site::Status{clock_type::now(), ListDisposition::invalid, "timeout"});
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}
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std::lock_guard const lock_state{state_mutex_};
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@@ -2639,7 +2639,7 @@ PeerImp::onMessage(std::shared_ptr<protocol::TMGetObjectByHash> const& m)
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{
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fee_.update(
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Resource::feeModerateBurdenPeer,
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" Reply limit reached. Truncating reply.");
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"Reply limit reached. Truncating reply.");
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break;
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}
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}
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@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ parseAuthorizeCredentials(Json::Value const& jv)
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if (!jo.isObject())
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{
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return LedgerEntryHelpers::invalidFieldError(
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"malformedAuthorizedCredentials", jss::authorized_credentials, "array");
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"malformedAuthorizedCredentials", jss::authorized_credentials, "array of objects");
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}
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if (auto const value = LedgerEntryHelpers::hasRequired(
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