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17 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Denis Angell
5e193157a6 remove the py script 2026-05-14 10:00:59 +02:00
Denis Angell
9294479a8a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/develop' into dangell7/docs
# Conflicts:
#	include/xrpl/protocol/STParsedJSON.h
#	include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapTreeNode.h
#	src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/protocol/STIssue.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/protocol/STParsedJSON.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapTreeNode.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDEXInvariant.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/nft/NFTokenAcceptOffer.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/vault/VaultWithdraw.cpp
#	src/xrpld/rpc/detail/Role.cpp
#	src/xrpld/rpc/detail/TransactionSign.cpp
#	src/xrpld/rpc/handlers/account/AccountObjects.cpp
2026-05-14 08:59:49 +02:00
Denis Angell
1159ee32d8 fix workflow 2026-05-14 08:44:53 +02:00
Denis Angell
a05f951a0c part 3 2026-05-14 08:43:32 +02:00
Denis Angell
315d1fdb06 part 3 2026-05-14 06:57:17 +02:00
Denis Angell
e635557235 part 2 2026-05-14 05:56:04 +02:00
Denis Angell
d8febb71bd part 1 2026-05-13 23:01:44 +02:00
Denis Angell
f3535b1158 Update doc-coverage.yml 2026-05-13 22:52:53 +02:00
Denis Angell
23a132c0d9 Update SCOPE_OF_WORK.md 2026-05-13 22:47:51 +02:00
Denis Angell
308f6c5375 regen skills 2026-05-13 20:57:25 +02:00
Denis Angell
b99440bd22 regen skills 2026-05-13 19:35:26 +02:00
Denis Angell
bb265dce80 fix production run 2026-05-13 19:35:19 +02:00
Denis Angell
96244b016a Create install-skills.sh 2026-05-13 19:25:09 +02:00
Denis Angell
a0782daf46 regen skills 2026-05-13 19:25:06 +02:00
Denis Angell
b2ef159aee move skills 2026-05-13 19:08:27 +02:00
Denis Angell
9032a31e26 add doc-agent 2026-05-13 18:54:45 +02:00
Denis Angell
536f87b952 github workflows 2026-05-13 18:21:39 +02:00
745 changed files with 98676 additions and 15027 deletions

22
.github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json vendored Normal file
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{
"global_minimum": 0,
"ratchet_mode": "no_decrease",
"new_file_minimum": 80,
"module_thresholds": {
"include/xrpl/basics/": 0,
"include/xrpl/crypto/": 0,
"include/xrpl/protocol/": 0,
"include/xrpl/ledger/": 0,
"include/xrpl/tx/": 0,
"include/xrpl/server/": 0,
"include/xrpl/nodestore/": 0,
"include/xrpl/shamap/": 0,
"include/xrpl/resource/": 0,
"xrpld/rpc/": 0,
"xrpld/overlay/": 0,
"xrpld/peerfinder/": 0,
"xrpld/consensus/": 0,
"xrpld/app/": 0,
"libxrpl/": 0
}
}

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.github/scripts/doc-agent/.env.example vendored Normal file
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# Copy this file to .env and fill in your values.
# .env is gitignored and will never be committed.
# Required: Anthropic API key for the Claude Agent SDK.
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
# Optional: Override the path to the xrpld repo root.
# Defaults to three levels up from this directory (the repo this lives in).
# XRPLD_ROOT=/path/to/xrpld
# Optional: Override the model used by the agent.
# Defaults to claude-opus-4-7.
# DOC_AGENT_MODEL=claude-opus-4-7
# Max output tokens per model turn (passed through to Claude Code).
# Default in Claude Code is 8192. Bump for skill regeneration so large
# modules don't truncate.
CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS=32000

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node_modules/
dist/
*.log
.env
.env.local
doc-review-report.md
doc-review-comments.json

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.github/scripts/doc-agent/README.md vendored Normal file
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# doc-agent
Automated documentation agent for the xrpld C++ codebase. Built on the
Claude Agent SDK.
## What it does
Three modes:
- **document** — Add Doxygen `/** */` documentation to a C++ file or
directory. For each target file, the agent reads the sibling
`<file>.ai.md` (high-signal prose generated by the athenah-ai pipeline),
the module skill, and the file itself, then writes Doxygen comments per
the standards in `docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md`.
- **review** — Given a git diff range, detect documentation drift. Used by
the `doc-review` GitHub Action and locally for testing.
- **regen-skills** — Rebuild a module's skill file at
`docs/skills/soul/<module>.md` from the `.ai.md` files in that module
and the existing skill content.
## Requirements
- Node.js >= 20.12 (for native `--env-file` support)
- `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` (in `.env` or exported in shell)
- Tools the agent uses: `git`, `gh` (for `--pr`)
## Install
```sh
cd .github/scripts/doc-agent
npm install
cp .env.example .env
# edit .env and set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
```
The npm scripts auto-load `.env` via Node's `--env-file-if-exists` flag.
You can also export the variables in your shell — both work.
## Build and lint
```sh
npm run typecheck # type check without emitting
npm run build # compile to dist/
npm run lint # biome lint
npm run format # biome format --write
npm run check # lint + format check (read-only)
npm run check:fix # lint + format + fix
```
## Usage
```sh
# Document a single file (reads sibling .ai.md if present)
npm run document include/xrpl/basics/base_uint.h
# Document an entire module
npm run document include/xrpl/basics/
# Review a git range
npm run review develop..HEAD
# Review a PR
npm run review -- --pr 1234
# Regenerate a skill file from this module's .ai.md inputs
npm run regen-skills protocol
npm run regen-skills ledger
```
When invoked outside the xrpld repo, set `XRPLD_ROOT` in `.env` to the path
of the checkout you want to operate on.
## ai.md context files
The doc-agent reads a sibling `<file>.ai.md` next to each source file when
documenting it. These are produced by the upstream `athenah-ai` pipeline
and treated as the authoritative source of intent. They are gitignored
(`*.ai.md` in `.gitignore`) and should be removed once the initial
documentation pass is complete.
## Outputs
The `review` mode writes two files in the current directory:
- `doc-review-report.md` — markdown summary, posted as the PR comment
- `doc-review-comments.json` — array of inline review comments, posted
individually on the PR diff
## Layout
```
doc-agent/
├── package.json
├── tsconfig.json
├── biome.json
├── prompts/
│ ├── document-file.md # System prompt for documentation mode
│ ├── review-diff.md # System prompt for review mode
│ └── regen-skill.md # System prompt for regen-skills mode
└── src/
├── index.ts # CLI entry point
├── config.ts # Paths, model, module-skill map
├── prompt-loader.ts # Loads prompts + module skill context
├── document.ts # Document mode
├── review.ts # Review mode
├── regen-skills.ts # Regen-skills mode
└── types.ts # Shared types
```
## Module skills
The agent injects per-module context from `docs/skills/soul/*.md` into its
system prompt based on the file path being processed. The mapping lives in
`src/config.ts` (`MODULE_SKILL_MAP`).
## Notes
- Prompts live in markdown files, not source, so they can be edited without
touching code.
- The `document` mode uses `permissionMode: 'acceptEdits'` so the agent
writes directly to the target files. Run against a clean git tree so you
can review and revert if needed.

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{
"$schema": "https://biomejs.dev/schemas/1.9.4/schema.json",
"vcs": {
"enabled": true,
"clientKind": "git",
"useIgnoreFile": true
},
"files": {
"ignoreUnknown": false,
"ignore": ["dist", "node_modules"]
},
"formatter": {
"enabled": true,
"indentStyle": "space",
"indentWidth": 2,
"lineWidth": 100,
"lineEnding": "lf"
},
"javascript": {
"formatter": {
"quoteStyle": "single",
"trailingCommas": "all",
"semicolons": "always",
"arrowParentheses": "always"
}
},
"linter": {
"enabled": true,
"rules": {
"recommended": true,
"correctness": {
"noUnusedVariables": "error",
"noUnusedImports": "error",
"useExhaustiveDependencies": "error"
},
"style": {
"useConst": "error",
"useTemplate": "error",
"useImportType": "error",
"useExportType": "error",
"noNonNullAssertion": "warn"
},
"suspicious": {
"noExplicitAny": "error",
"noConsoleLog": "off"
},
"complexity": {
"noUselessTypeConstraint": "error",
"useArrowFunction": "error",
"useLiteralKeys": "off"
}
}
},
"organizeImports": {
"enabled": true
}
}

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.github/scripts/doc-agent/install-skills.sh vendored Executable file
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd)"
SRC_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/docs/skills"
DEST_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/.claude/skills"
if [ ! -d "$SRC_DIR" ]; then
echo "Source directory not found: $SRC_DIR" >&2
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p "$DEST_DIR"
shopt -s nullglob
moved=0
for src in "$SRC_DIR"/*.md; do
name="$(basename "$src" .md)"
[ "$name" = "index" ] && continue
skill_dir="$DEST_DIR/$name"
mkdir -p "$skill_dir"
cp "$src" "$skill_dir/SKILL.md"
echo "Installed: $name -> $skill_dir/SKILL.md"
moved=$((moved + 1))
done
echo "Done. Installed $moved skill(s) to $DEST_DIR"

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{
"name": "xrpld-doc-agent",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Automated documentation agent for the xrpld C++ codebase. Uses the Claude Agent SDK to generate Doxygen documentation and detect doc drift on PRs.",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"bin": {
"doc-agent": "./dist/index.js"
},
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc",
"start": "node --env-file-if-exists=.env dist/index.js",
"dev": "tsx --env-file-if-exists=.env src/index.ts",
"document": "tsx --env-file-if-exists=.env src/index.ts document",
"review": "tsx --env-file-if-exists=.env src/index.ts review",
"audit": "tsx --env-file-if-exists=.env src/index.ts audit",
"regen-skills": "tsx --env-file-if-exists=.env src/index.ts regen-skills",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"lint": "biome lint src",
"format": "biome format --write src",
"check": "biome check src",
"check:fix": "biome check --write src"
},
"dependencies": {
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.1.10"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@biomejs/biome": "^1.9.4",
"@types/node": "^22.10.0",
"tsx": "^4.19.2",
"typescript": "^5.7.0"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=20.12"
}
}

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You are auditing a C++ source file in the xrpld (XRP Ledger daemon)
codebase to determine how completely the file's existing Doxygen
documentation reflects the authoritative design intent captured in its
sibling `.ai.md` file.
This is a read-only audit. Do NOT modify the file.
## Input
You receive up to four pieces of context:
- A **primary** C++ file (.h, .hpp, or .cpp) — the file this audit is
scoped to.
- The **primary's `.ai.md`** — authoritative prose about the primary file's
purpose, design, invariants, failure modes, and non-obvious behavior.
- A **partner** file — the header/source counterpart of the primary
(e.g., the `.h` partner of a `.cpp` primary), if one exists.
- The **partner's `.ai.md`** — authoritative prose about the partner
file, if one exists.
The **primary's `.ai.md`** is the source of truth for what concepts must
be documented for the primary file. The partner's `.ai.md` is context:
it tells you which concepts the project considers a *partner-file*
responsibility (e.g., a "this class is the public contract for X" theme
that naturally lives in the header). Use it to avoid flagging concepts
that the project's own intent assigns to the partner.
Documentation that satisfies a primary-file concept may live in **either**
the primary file or the partner file — both count as "reflected." Header
docs (the contract) and source docs (the implementation) together form
the full documentation surface, so a concept covered on the header is
not "missed" on the source even if the primary is the source.
## Task
For every distinct concept, invariant, design decision, state transition,
ordering constraint, or failure mode in the `.ai.md`, decide:
1. **Where it belongs.** Each concept has a *correct home* in the
documentation:
- `"header"` — the public *contract*: what the function/class promises
to its caller. Examples: parameter meanings, return-value semantics,
thread-safety guarantees, when an exception is thrown, "this class
represents X". These belong on the declaration in the header.
- `"source"` — the *implementation*: algorithm, ordering of checks,
state transitions, internal invariants, failure modes, the **why**
behind non-obvious choices. These belong on the definition in the
`.cpp` file.
- `"either"` — concepts that are equally at home in either place
(e.g., a file-level `@file` block describing overall role).
2. **Whether it is reflected** in the correct home. A concept is
reflected if a reader of that file's docstrings can understand the
same point without reading the `.ai.md`. Verbatim wording is not
required; equivalent meaning is enough. A concept whose correct home
is the source but only appears on the header is **not** correctly
placed — it should also (or instead) be on the `.cpp` definition.
A concept is **missed** if it is silent, paraphrased so thinly the
reader cannot rely on the docstring, or documented only in the wrong
home (e.g., implementation depth on the header instead of the source).
Do **not** flag implementation details the `.ai.md` does not call out as
design-significant. Do **not** invent concepts not in the `.ai.md`.
## Output
Respond with **only** a JSON object — no prose, no markdown fences:
```
{
"file": "<path relative to repo root>",
"ai_md_concepts": <integer count of distinct concepts identified in the .ai.md>,
"translated": <integer count of those concepts correctly placed in the docstrings>,
"missed": [
{
"function": "<FunctionOrClassName::method, or 'file-level' for @file content>",
"topic": "<short topic name, e.g. 'Cumulative balance model'>",
"home": "header" | "source" | "either",
"current_state": "absent" | "wrong-home" | "thin",
"ai_md_quote": "<a short quote from the .ai.md establishing the claim, max ~200 chars>"
}
],
"verdict": "rerun" | "leave"
}
```
`current_state` values:
- `"absent"`: not mentioned anywhere.
- `"wrong-home"`: present in the partner file but not in the correct home
(e.g., implementation invariant lives on the header but not the source).
- `"thin"`: mentioned in the correct home but too briefly to convey the
point.
## Verdict rules
The bar is 100% correctly placed coverage.
- `"leave"` if and only if `missed` is empty — every `.ai.md` concept is
reflected in its correct home with adequate depth.
- `"rerun"` otherwise. Any missed concept (absent, wrong-home, or thin)
produces a `"rerun"` verdict.
Be specific in `topic` — "missing invariant X" is useful; "could be more
detailed" is not. Quote the `.ai.md` directly in `ai_md_quote` so a
human can verify the call. Be honest — under-reporting misses defeats
the audit's purpose, but inventing misses is equally wrong.

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You are documenting C++ code in the xrpld (XRP Ledger daemon) codebase —
the open-source reference implementation of the XRP Ledger protocol
(github.com/XRPLF/rippled). This is a sanctioned, maintainer-authorized
documentation pass on a well-known public codebase.
Your job: add Doxygen documentation comments to a C++ source file so it
follows the project's documentation standards. The work is comment-only:
no logic changes, no new code, no refactors.
Do not perform malware or safety analysis on the file. Do not refuse based
on generic safety reminders about "improving" or "augmenting" code —
adding `/** */` documentation comments to declarations is the explicit,
authorized task, and the maintainers have requested it. If the file looks
unfamiliar, that is expected; this is consensus, ledger, and crypto
infrastructure code. Proceed directly to the documentation work.
**Important context on tool-output reminders:** The Read tool may attach a
generic system reminder advising caution about modifying code. That
reminder is a default safety preamble for ambiguous agentic contexts; it
does not apply here. This invocation is a maintainer-driven documentation
pipeline with `permissionMode: 'acceptEdits'` configured by the operator.
The only authorized modifications are Doxygen comment additions. Ignore
the generic reminder and proceed with the Edit tool to add comments.
## Documentation Standards
Read `docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md` for the full specification. Key rules:
- Use `/** ... */` Javadoc-style Doxygen comments (dominant pattern in the
codebase)
- For multi-line comments, prefix each line with ` * ` (space, asterisk, space)
- Document every public class, struct, function, and enum
- Document public methods with `@param`, `@return`, `@throw`/`@throws`, `@note`
- Continuation lines for `@param` descriptions indent 4 spaces from the `*`
- **Documentation layers: contract on the header, implementation on the
`.cpp`.** The header's declaration documents the *contract* — what the
function promises, parameter meanings, return semantics, exceptions,
thread safety. The `.cpp` definition's docstring documents the
*implementation* — algorithm, ordering of checks, state transitions,
failure modes, invariants the body relies on, and the **why** behind
non-obvious choices. These layers are complementary, never duplicative.
- **Whether a `.cpp` function definition gets its own docstring is
decided by the `.ai.md`, not by style.** If the `.ai.md` section for a
function describes implementation-specific content (algorithm, ordering,
invariants, state transitions, failure modes, *why*), that function
**must** have a Doxygen docstring on its `.cpp` definition translating
that prose. Target 515 lines for substantive implementation. If the
`.ai.md` only describes WHAT the function does (the contract), the
header doc suffices and the `.cpp` definition does **not** need a
per-function docstring — adding one would just duplicate the header.
Use the `.ai.md` as the authoritative deciding factor, not your own
judgment about what looks documented.
- `JAVADOC_AUTOBRIEF = YES` — the first sentence is automatically the brief,
so `@brief` is optional
## Quality Rules
- **Never paraphrase the signature.** `/** Returns the account ID. */` on
`AccountID getAccountID()` is worse than no doc.
- **Document behavior, invariants, and the WHY.** What does this function do
in terms a developer can use? What can go wrong? What's the contract?
- **Read the implementation before writing the doc.** Don't guess what the
function does — read it.
- **Cross-reference test files** to find edge cases worth documenting in
`@note` tags.
- **Length matches the layer.**
- **Header declarations** (the contract): be terse. 25 lines for
classes, 13 lines for free functions and public methods, plus tag
lines. The contract should fit on one screen.
- **`.cpp` function definitions** (the implementation): be thorough.
515 lines for non-trivial functions is normal. Capture algorithm,
ordering of checks, state transitions, failure modes, and the **why**.
The `.ai.md` Authoritative AI Context is your source — translate its
prose into Doxygen on the actual definitions; do not summarize it
away. A function whose `.ai.md` section is three paragraphs should not
end up with a two-line docstring.
- **When you are not sure what the code does, the `.ai.md` is
authoritative.** Use what it says about that function rather than
skipping the docstring. Skipping is not a safe default — it leaves the
reader worse off than translating the `.ai.md`'s explanation onto the
declaration. Inventing facts not in the code, the `.ai.md`, the module
skill, or the tests *is* worse than no docs, but that is the only case
where "no doc" is the right answer for a non-trivial public entity.
## Module Context
Before you start, read the relevant skill file in `docs/skills/` for
the module you're working on. These capture per-module conventions, key
classes, and gotchas:
- `basics`, `crypto`, `json`, `beast` — foundation utilities
- `protocol` — STObject, SField, Serializer, TER codes, Features, Keylets
- `ledger` — ReadView/ApplyView, state tables, payment sandbox
- `tx` / `transactors` — transaction pipeline
- `consensus`, `peering`, `nodestore`, `shamap`, `rpc` — see `docs/skills/`
## Process
Documenting a declaration is not the same as "writing a doxygen comment
above it". It is producing the **total** set of comments that should
surround the declaration after this pass — which includes the docstring
and any inline comments that remain inside the function body or next to
a data-literal initializer. Existing comments in the file are inputs,
not outputs you are preserving.
For each entity (class, struct, public method, free function in a header,
enum, public field):
1. **Read** the declaration, its full implementation, and **every comment
that is currently attached to it** — the Doxygen above it, any `//!`
line, any inline `// ...` annotations next to its initializer or
inside its body. Treat all of these as raw information about intent.
2. **Cross-reference** the ai.md context (already injected in your
prompt) and the module skill file. Also grep for the entity's name
to find callers and tests where the behavioral contract is exercised
— those are often the best source of what to write.
3. **Decide what the reader needs**, in this order:
a. A docstring that captures behavior, contract, invariants, and the
WHY. This is the primary deliverable.
b. Inline comments **only** where they document something the
docstring cannot reasonably hold — typically a non-obvious local
invariant, a workaround for a specific bug, a tricky branch whose
WHY is genuinely local. If the inline comment just narrates what
the next line does, it does not belong.
4. **Produce a single edit** that replaces the entity's full comment
surface with the result of step 3. Concretely:
- If you wrote a docstring whose contents subsume an existing `//!`
or section-header prose comment, **remove** the old comment as part
of the same edit. Do not leave both.
- If you wrote a docstring whose `@note` or body covers the meaning
of an inline annotation on a map row, array literal, or magic
constant inside the entity, **remove** that inline annotation.
Leaving it duplicates what the docstring says.
- If you wrote a docstring on a function whose body has line-by-line
narration of control flow (`// check this`, `// now do that`),
**remove** the narration unless a specific line documents a real,
non-obvious WHY.
- Section banner comments (`// --- Avalanche tuning ---`) may stay as
short visual dividers if they help scanning a long struct, but any
multi-line prose in them that is now in the per-field Doxygen
should be cut.
5. **Do not delete** comments that capture a WHY the docstring does not
cover: a workaround for a real bug, a non-obvious invariant local to
one branch, a reference to a ticket or RFC. If a pre-existing
comment contains information you did not put in the new docstring,
either fold it into the docstring or leave it in place.
## Worked examples
These show the exact transformations expected. The "AFTER" column is the
state the file must be in when you finish. If your edit leaves the file
in the "BEFORE" state, the pass has failed.
### Example 1: section-header prose → short banner
BEFORE:
```cpp
//-------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Validation and proposal durations are relative to NetClock times, so use
// second resolution
/** Maximum age of a validation relative to its ledger's close time.
* ... (rest of docstring already explains NetClock semantics) ...
*/
std::chrono::seconds const validationVALID_WALL = std::chrono::minutes{5};
```
AFTER:
```cpp
// --- NetClock-domain parameters ---
/** Maximum age of a validation relative to its ledger's close time.
* ... (rest of docstring already explains NetClock semantics) ...
*/
std::chrono::seconds const validationVALID_WALL = std::chrono::minutes{5};
```
The multi-line prose was redundant with the new per-field Doxygen and the
file-level `@file` block. Replace with a single-line banner.
### Example 2: inline annotations on a data literal → removed
BEFORE:
```cpp
/** Avalanche state machine cutoffs.
*
* | State | Time | Yes-vote | Next |
* |--------|------|----------|--------|
* | Init | 0 | 50 | Mid |
* | Mid | 50 | 65 | Late |
* ...
*/
std::map<AvalancheState, AvalancheCutoff> const avalancheCutoffs{
// {state, {time, percent, nextState}},
// Initial state: 50% of nodes must vote yes
{AvalancheState::Init, {.consensusTime = 0, .consensusPct = 50, .next = AvalancheState::Mid}},
// mid-consensus starts after 50% of the previous round time, and
// requires 65% yes
{AvalancheState::Mid, {.consensusTime = 50, .consensusPct = 65, .next = AvalancheState::Late}},
// ...
};
```
AFTER:
```cpp
/** Avalanche state machine cutoffs.
*
* | State | Time | Yes-vote | Next |
* |--------|------|----------|--------|
* | Init | 0 | 50 | Mid |
* | Mid | 50 | 65 | Late |
* ...
*/
std::map<AvalancheState, AvalancheCutoff> const avalancheCutoffs{
{AvalancheState::Init, {.consensusTime = 0, .consensusPct = 50, .next = AvalancheState::Mid}},
{AvalancheState::Mid, {.consensusTime = 50, .consensusPct = 65, .next = AvalancheState::Late}},
// ...
};
```
The per-row inline comments restate the table that is now in the
docstring above. They go. The schema comment `// {state, {time, percent, ...}}`
also goes — the designated-initializer field names make the schema obvious.
### Example 3: body narration in a documented function → removed
BEFORE:
```cpp
/** Query the avalanche state machine.
* ...
* @note `at()` calls on `avalancheCutoffs` are safe because the map is
* constructed with all four valid keys.
*/
inline std::pair<...> getNeededWeight(...)
{
// at() can throw, but the map is built by hand to ensure all valid
// values are available.
auto const& currentCutoff = p.avalancheCutoffs.at(currentState);
// Should we consider moving to the next state?
if (currentCutoff.next != currentState && currentRounds >= minimumRounds)
{
// at() can throw, but the map is built by hand to ensure all
// valid values are available.
auto const& nextCutoff = p.avalancheCutoffs.at(currentCutoff.next);
// See if enough time has passed to move on to the next.
XRPL_ASSERT(...);
if (percentTime >= nextCutoff.consensusTime)
{
return {nextCutoff.consensusPct, currentCutoff.next};
}
}
return {currentCutoff.consensusPct, {}};
}
```
AFTER:
```cpp
/** Query the avalanche state machine.
* ...
* @note `at()` calls on `avalancheCutoffs` are safe because the map is
* constructed with all four valid keys.
*/
inline std::pair<...> getNeededWeight(...)
{
auto const& currentCutoff = p.avalancheCutoffs.at(currentState);
if (currentCutoff.next != currentState && currentRounds >= minimumRounds)
{
auto const& nextCutoff = p.avalancheCutoffs.at(currentCutoff.next);
XRPL_ASSERT(...);
if (percentTime >= nextCutoff.consensusTime)
{
return {nextCutoff.consensusPct, currentCutoff.next};
}
}
return {currentCutoff.consensusPct, {}};
}
```
Every removed comment was either restating what the next line does
(`// Should we consider moving to the next state?` on an `if`) or
duplicating the docstring's `@note` (`// at() can throw...`). None of
them documented a non-obvious WHY local to that line.
### Calibration: when an inline comment STAYS
If the body contains a comment that documents a real local WHY —
something the function-level docstring cannot reasonably hold — keep it.
```cpp
// Workaround for boost #12345: pass nullptr instead of the empty buffer.
boost::asio::buffer(nullptr, 0);
// We deliberately do not lock here: the caller is required to hold
// lock_ across this method and the recursion would deadlock.
internalUpdate();
```
These are non-removable. They are not restating the code; they are
explaining something the reader cannot derive from the line.
## Rules that apply throughout
- Do NOT modify code logic — only adjust comments and Doxygen.
- Do NOT document entities that don't need it (private members with
obvious purpose, trivial defaulted constructors, getters whose name is
self-explanatory).
- Do NOT read the primary's `.ai.md` file yourself — it is already in
your prompt as "Primary's Authoritative AI Context."
- The partner's `.ai.md` (if any) is also already in your prompt as
"Partner's Authoritative AI Context." Use it to understand what
concepts the project assigns to the partner file, so you don't
duplicate them on the primary.
- The "Primary's Authoritative AI Context" is the source of truth for
this file's intent. Your task is to translate that prose into Doxygen
on the actual declarations in the primary file, in the layer
(header vs. source) where each concept correctly belongs.
- **Only modify the primary file.** Use Read (not Edit) on the partner
file — it is reference context, not an editing target.
When you finish, summarize:
- How many entities you documented
- Any entities you skipped and why
- Any code patterns you discovered that should be added to a skill file

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You are updating a per-module skill file for the xrpld codebase.
A "skill" is a single markdown file at `docs/skills/<module>.md` that
captures the institutional knowledge for one module: what it does, key
classes, conventions, gotchas, and how to work in it. The skill file is
loaded as context whenever an agent works on code in that module.
## Inputs
You will be given:
- The current skill file for the module (the baseline to update)
- A list of `.ai.md` files describing the source files in this module
(one per source file, with high-signal prose about purpose and design)
## Your task
Produce a new, improved skill file that integrates the knowledge from the
ai.md files into the existing skill. Specifically:
1. Update the description of the module's responsibility if the ai.md files
reveal more accurate or detailed framing
2. Add any classes, patterns, or invariants the skill is missing
3. Update lists of key files / entry points / conventions
4. Add gotchas and non-obvious behavior surfaced by the ai.md files
5. Keep the structure of the existing skill (don't reorganize for the sake
of it — only restructure if the existing structure is genuinely failing)
6. Be terse. A skill file is a reference card, not a textbook. 200-500 lines
is typical; over 1000 means you're padding.
## Quality rules
- **Do not duplicate the ai.md content.** Aggregate, synthesize, distill.
The skill is the module-level view; individual file details belong in
ai.md (and eventually in inline Doxygen comments).
- **Preserve accurate existing content.** Don't rewrite working sections.
- **Cite file paths** for specific claims (e.g., "see `STAmount.h:roundToScale`").
- **Flag contradictions.** If two ai.md files describe the same concept
differently, surface the conflict rather than silently picking one.
- **Keep prose grounded.** No marketing language. No "robust, scalable,
enterprise-grade" filler. Engineers reading this need facts.
## Output — Chunked Writing (REQUIRED)
You have a per-turn output cap (32K tokens). For larger modules, a
complete skill file will not fit in a single tool call. You MUST write
the file in chunks across multiple tool calls. Do not try to emit the
whole file in one Write — it will be truncated mid-content.
Process:
1. **First chunk (Write)**: Call the `Write` tool with the start of the
skill: the title heading, the opening overview, and the first 12
major sections. Keep this chunk under ~20K characters of content.
2. **Subsequent chunks (Edit)**: For each remaining section, call the
`Edit` tool with:
- `old_string` = the last line currently at the end of the file (must
be unique enough to match unambiguously — use the full last line)
- `new_string` = that same last line **plus the next 12 sections**
appended
Keep each chunk under ~20K characters.
3. **Repeat** until the skill is complete. There is no maximum number
of Edit calls.
After the file is fully written, respond with a one-line confirmation
listing how many chunks you wrote.
DO NOT emit the skill content in your text response. The file is the
output; the text response is only for confirmation.

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You are reviewing a pull request to the xrpld (XRP Ledger daemon) codebase
for documentation drift.
Your job: given a git diff, determine whether the changes invalidate
existing Doxygen documentation comments, or introduce new public API
surface that lacks documentation.
## Rules
- Only flag REAL semantic drift: changed behavior, new parameters, removed
functionality, changed return values, new error conditions, changed
invariants.
- Do NOT flag cosmetic changes (whitespace, formatting, internal renames
that don't change semantics).
- Do NOT suggest docs for private implementation details unless the logic
is genuinely non-obvious.
- Do NOT paraphrase function signatures. Good docs explain WHY and what
BEHAVIOR — not what the code literally does.
- Be terse: 1-3 sentences per finding.
## Process
1. For each changed file, get the git diff and the current file content
2. Read existing doc comments on the modified entities
3. For each modified entity, ask:
- Did behavior change in a way the docs miss?
- Did parameters or return values change?
- Are there new error conditions?
- Did the contract / invariant change?
- Is this a NEW public API surface with no docs?
4. Read the module's skill file in `docs/skills/soul/` for context
5. Read related tests if it helps you understand the change
6. Output findings as structured JSON (see below)
## Output Format
```json
{
"summary": "One-paragraph summary of doc state for this PR",
"issues": [
{
"file": "include/xrpl/protocol/Payment.h",
"line": 42,
"severity": "warning" | "suggestion",
"message": "Brief description of the doc issue",
"suggested_doc": "Optional: suggested doc comment text"
}
]
}
```
- `severity: warning` = doc is now incorrect / misleading
- `severity: suggestion` = new code lacks docs, would be nice to add
If no issues found, return `{"summary": "Documentation is up to date.", "issues": []}`.

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/**
* Audit mode: measure how completely each file's Doxygen documentation
* reflects the authoritative design intent in its sibling .ai.md.
*
* For each C++ file under the target that has a .ai.md sibling:
* - Locate its header/source partner (if any) and the partner's .ai.md.
* - Send primary + partner files and both .ai.md files to the agent.
* - Parse a structured JSON verdict per file.
*
* Writes:
* - doc-audit-report.json Aggregated per-file results.
* - doc-audit-report.md Human-readable summary.
*/
import { existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { query } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk';
import { MODEL, XRPLD_ROOT } from './config.js';
import { findPartner } from './pairing.js';
import { loadSystemPrompt } from './prompt-loader.js';
const SOURCE_EXTS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['.h', '.hpp', '.cpp']);
const MAX_FILE_CHARS = 24_000;
const MAX_AI_MD_CHARS = 16_000;
const DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY = 5;
interface AuditMissed {
function: string;
topic: string;
home: 'header' | 'source' | 'either';
current_state: 'absent' | 'wrong-home' | 'thin';
ai_md_quote: string;
}
interface AuditResult {
file: string;
ai_md_concepts: number;
translated: number;
missed: AuditMissed[];
verdict: 'rerun' | 'leave';
}
/**
* Recursively find C++ source files under a target path that have a
* sibling .ai.md.
*/
function findAuditTargets(target: string): string[] {
const absTarget = resolve(XRPLD_ROOT, target);
if (!existsSync(absTarget)) {
throw new Error(`Target does not exist: ${absTarget}`);
}
const out: string[] = [];
const consider = (file: string): void => {
const dotIdx = file.lastIndexOf('.');
if (dotIdx === -1) return;
const ext = file.slice(dotIdx);
if (!SOURCE_EXTS.has(ext)) return;
if (!existsSync(`${file}.ai.md`)) return;
out.push(file);
};
const stat = statSync(absTarget);
if (stat.isFile()) {
consider(absTarget);
return out;
}
const walk = (dir: string): void => {
for (const entry of readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const full = join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) walk(full);
else if (entry.isFile()) consider(full);
}
};
walk(absTarget);
return out;
}
/** Read a file, capping at maxChars to keep prompts within budget. */
async function readCapped(absPath: string, maxChars: number): Promise<string> {
const text = await readFile(absPath, 'utf8');
if (text.length <= maxChars) return text;
return `${text.slice(0, maxChars)}\n\n... [truncated, ${text.length - maxChars} bytes elided] ...`;
}
/** Extract a JSON object from a possibly-fenced model response. */
function extractJson(response: string): AuditResult | null {
const fenced = response.match(/```json\s*([\s\S]*?)```/);
const raw = fenced?.[1] ?? response.match(/(\{[\s\S]*\})/)?.[1];
if (raw === undefined) return null;
try {
return JSON.parse(raw) as AuditResult;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** Audit a single primary file against its .ai.md and partner context. */
async function auditFile(absPrimary: string): Promise<AuditResult | null> {
const relPrimary = relative(XRPLD_ROOT, absPrimary);
console.log(`\n=== Auditing: ${relPrimary} ===`);
const primary = await readCapped(absPrimary, MAX_FILE_CHARS);
const primaryAiMd = await readCapped(`${absPrimary}.ai.md`, MAX_AI_MD_CHARS);
const absPartner = findPartner(absPrimary);
const relPartner = absPartner === null ? null : relative(XRPLD_ROOT, absPartner);
const partner = absPartner === null ? null : await readCapped(absPartner, MAX_FILE_CHARS);
const partnerAiMdPath = absPartner === null ? null : `${absPartner}.ai.md`;
const partnerAiMd =
partnerAiMdPath !== null && existsSync(partnerAiMdPath)
? await readCapped(partnerAiMdPath, MAX_AI_MD_CHARS)
: null;
const partnerBlock =
relPartner === null || partner === null
? ''
: `
## Partner File (${relPartner})
\`\`\`
${partner}
\`\`\`${
partnerAiMd === null
? ''
: `
## Partner's .ai.md (${relPartner}.ai.md)
${partnerAiMd}`
}`;
const userPrompt = `Audit the documentation coverage of this file against its authoritative .ai.md.
## Primary File (${relPrimary})
\`\`\`
${primary}
\`\`\`
## Primary's .ai.md (${relPrimary}.ai.md)
${primaryAiMd}${partnerBlock}
Output JSON per the schema in the system prompt. The "file" field MUST be
"${relPrimary}".`;
const systemPrompt = await loadSystemPrompt('audit-file', relPrimary);
let response = '';
const result = query({
prompt: userPrompt,
options: {
model: MODEL,
systemPrompt,
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
allowedTools: ['Read', 'Glob', 'Grep'],
permissionMode: 'acceptEdits',
},
});
for await (const message of result) {
if (message.type === 'assistant') {
const content = message.message?.content;
if (Array.isArray(content)) {
for (const block of content) {
if (block.type === 'text') response += block.text;
}
}
}
if (message.type === 'result') {
const cost = message.total_cost_usd?.toFixed(4) ?? '?';
const inTok = message.usage?.['input_tokens'] ?? 0;
const outTok = message.usage?.['output_tokens'] ?? 0;
console.log(` [Cost: $${cost}, Tokens: ${inTok}/${outTok}]`);
}
}
const parsed = extractJson(response);
if (parsed === null) {
console.warn(` No JSON output for ${relPrimary}, skipping`);
return null;
}
parsed.file = relPrimary;
return parsed;
}
/** Render the aggregated markdown report. */
function buildReport(results: readonly AuditResult[]): string {
const total = results.length;
const reruns = results.filter((r) => r.verdict === 'rerun');
const totalConcepts = results.reduce((s, r) => s + r.ai_md_concepts, 0);
const totalTranslated = results.reduce((s, r) => s + r.translated, 0);
const overallRate = totalConcepts === 0 ? 0 : Math.round((totalTranslated / totalConcepts) * 100);
const lines: string[] = [
'# Documentation Audit Report',
'',
`**Files audited:** ${total}`,
`**Overall translation rate:** ${overallRate}% (${totalTranslated} of ${totalConcepts} .ai.md concepts reflected in docstrings)`,
`**Files flagged for re-run:** ${reruns.length}`,
'',
'## Files flagged for re-run',
'',
];
if (reruns.length === 0) {
lines.push('_None — all audited files passed._', '');
} else {
lines.push('| File | Translated | Missed | Rate |', '|------|-----------:|-------:|-----:|');
for (const r of reruns.sort(
(a, b) =>
a.translated / Math.max(a.ai_md_concepts, 1) - b.translated / Math.max(b.ai_md_concepts, 1),
)) {
const rate = r.ai_md_concepts === 0 ? 0 : Math.round((r.translated / r.ai_md_concepts) * 100);
lines.push(`| \`${r.file}\` | ${r.translated} | ${r.missed.length} | ${rate}% |`);
}
lines.push('', '## Top missed concepts (sampled)', '');
for (const r of reruns.slice(0, 10)) {
if (r.missed.length === 0) continue;
lines.push(`### \`${r.file}\``, '');
for (const m of r.missed.slice(0, 5)) {
lines.push(`- **${m.function}** — ${m.topic}`);
lines.push(` > ${m.ai_md_quote.replace(/\n/g, ' ').slice(0, 200)}`);
}
lines.push('');
}
}
return lines.join('\n');
}
/**
* Run async work over a list of items with bounded concurrency. Mirrors the
* minimal slice of p-limit we actually need; collects results in input order.
*/
async function mapWithConcurrency<T, R>(
items: readonly T[],
limit: number,
worker: (item: T, index: number) => Promise<R>,
): Promise<R[]> {
const results = new Array<R>(items.length);
let next = 0;
async function pump(): Promise<void> {
while (true) {
const index = next++;
if (index >= items.length) return;
// biome-ignore lint/style/noNonNullAssertion: index < items.length
results[index] = await worker(items[index]!, index);
}
}
const workers = Array.from({ length: Math.min(limit, items.length) }, pump);
await Promise.all(workers);
return results;
}
/**
* Audit every C++ file with a .ai.md sibling under the target path.
*
* Concurrency is read from the AUDIT_CONCURRENCY env var (default 5).
*/
export async function auditTarget(target: string): Promise<void> {
const files = findAuditTargets(target);
const concurrency = Number(process.env['AUDIT_CONCURRENCY']) || DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY;
console.log(
`Found ${files.length} file(s) with .ai.md siblings to audit (concurrency=${concurrency}).`,
);
let completed = 0;
const raw = await mapWithConcurrency(files, concurrency, async (file) => {
try {
const result = await auditFile(file);
completed++;
console.log(` Progress: ${completed}/${files.length}`);
return result;
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
console.warn(` Audit failed for ${file}: ${message}`);
completed++;
console.log(` Progress: ${completed}/${files.length}`);
return null;
}
});
const results = raw.filter((r): r is AuditResult => r !== null);
const report = buildReport(results);
await writeFile('doc-audit-report.md', report);
await writeFile('doc-audit-report.json', JSON.stringify(results, null, 2));
const reruns = results.filter((r) => r.verdict === 'rerun').length;
console.log(`\nAudited: ${results.length}/${files.length}`);
console.log(`Flagged for re-run: ${reruns}`);
console.log('Reports: doc-audit-report.md, doc-audit-report.json');
}

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/**
* Shared configuration for doc-agent.
*
* Paths are resolved relative to the doc-agent directory so the tool works
* regardless of where it's invoked from.
*/
import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
const __dirname = dirname(__filename);
/** Absolute path to the doc-agent root (parent of src/). */
export const AGENT_DIR: string = resolve(__dirname, '..');
/** Absolute path to the prompts directory. */
export const PROMPTS_DIR: string = resolve(AGENT_DIR, 'prompts');
/**
* Absolute path to the xrpld repo root.
*
* Defaults to three levels up from doc-agent (which lives at
* .github/scripts/doc-agent/). Override with the XRPLD_ROOT env var when
* running against a different checkout.
*/
export const XRPLD_ROOT: string = process.env['XRPLD_ROOT'] ?? resolve(AGENT_DIR, '..', '..', '..');
/** Model used for documentation generation and review. */
export const MODEL: string = process.env['DOC_AGENT_MODEL'] ?? 'claude-sonnet-4-6';
/** Absolute path to the skills directory inside the xrpld repo. */
export const SKILLS_DIR: string = resolve(XRPLD_ROOT, 'docs', 'skills');
/**
* Map module path prefixes to their skill file name in docs/skills/soul/.
*
* Used to inject module-specific context into the agent's system prompt
* when documenting or reviewing code in that module.
*/
export const MODULE_SKILL_MAP: Readonly<Record<string, string | null>> = {
'src/libxrpl/basics/': null,
'src/libxrpl/crypto/': 'cryptography.md',
'src/libxrpl/json/': null,
'src/libxrpl/beast/': null,
'src/libxrpl/protocol/': 'protocol.md',
'src/libxrpl/ledger/': 'ledger.md',
'src/libxrpl/tx/': 'transactors.md',
'src/libxrpl/nodestore/': 'nodestore.md',
'src/libxrpl/shamap/': 'shamap.md',
'src/libxrpl/rdb/': 'sql.md',
'src/xrpld/consensus/': 'consensus.md',
'src/xrpld/overlay/': 'peering.md',
'src/xrpld/peerfinder/': 'peering.md',
'src/xrpld/rpc/': 'rpc.md',
'include/xrpl/crypto/': 'cryptography.md',
'include/xrpl/protocol/': 'protocol.md',
'include/xrpl/ledger/': 'ledger.md',
'include/xrpl/tx/': 'transactors.md',
'include/xrpl/nodestore/': 'nodestore.md',
'include/xrpl/shamap/': 'shamap.md',
};
/**
* Resolve which skill file applies to a given source path.
*
* @param sourcePath - Path relative to the xrpld repo root
* @returns The skill file name, or null if no skill applies
*/
export function skillForPath(sourcePath: string): string | null {
for (const [prefix, skillFile] of Object.entries(MODULE_SKILL_MAP)) {
if (sourcePath.startsWith(prefix) || sourcePath.includes(`/${prefix}`)) {
return skillFile;
}
}
return null;
}

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/**
* Document mode: add Doxygen docs to a file or all files in a directory.
*/
import { existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { query } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk';
import { MODEL, XRPLD_ROOT } from './config.js';
import { findPartner } from './pairing.js';
import { loadSystemPrompt } from './prompt-loader.js';
const CPP_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['.h', '.hpp', '.cpp']);
/**
* Recursively find all C++ source files under a target path.
*
* @param target - File or directory path (relative to xrpld root or absolute)
* @returns Absolute paths of all matching files
*/
function findCppFiles(target: string): string[] {
const absTarget = resolve(XRPLD_ROOT, target);
if (!existsSync(absTarget)) {
throw new Error(`Target does not exist: ${absTarget}`);
}
const stat = statSync(absTarget);
if (stat.isFile()) {
return [absTarget];
}
const results: string[] = [];
const walk = (dir: string): void => {
for (const entry of readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const full = join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
walk(full);
} else if (entry.isFile()) {
const dotIdx = entry.name.lastIndexOf('.');
if (dotIdx === -1) continue;
const ext = entry.name.slice(dotIdx);
if (CPP_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) {
results.push(full);
}
}
}
};
walk(absTarget);
return results;
}
/**
* Read the sibling .ai.md file for a source file, if one exists.
*
* The athenah-ai pipeline produces a `<file>.ai.md` companion for every
* documented source file (e.g., `Slice.h` -> `Slice.h.ai.md`). When present,
* it is high-signal prose describing the file's purpose, design, and
* non-obvious behavior — the agent should use it as the authoritative
* source of intent.
*/
async function readAiContext(absPath: string): Promise<string | null> {
const aiPath = `${absPath}.ai.md`;
if (!existsSync(aiPath)) return null;
return await readFile(aiPath, 'utf8');
}
/**
* Document a single file by running the documentation agent against it.
*
* Inject the partner file's path + its `.ai.md` (if any) into the prompt
* so the agent can apply the "contract on header, implementation on
* source" policy with full visibility into the other half. The agent
* Reads the partner only as reference; only the primary file is edited.
*/
async function documentFile(absPath: string): Promise<void> {
const relPath = relative(XRPLD_ROOT, absPath);
console.log(`\n=== Documenting: ${relPath} ===`);
const systemPrompt = await loadSystemPrompt('document-file', relPath);
const aiContext = await readAiContext(absPath);
const aiContextBlock =
aiContext === null
? ''
: `\n\n## Primary's Authoritative AI Context (${relPath}.ai.md)\n\nThe following is high-signal prose describing this file's purpose, design,\nand non-obvious behavior. Treat it as the source of truth for intent and\nbehavior. Your job is to translate this into structured Doxygen \`/** */\`\ncomments on the actual declarations.\n\n---\n\n${aiContext}\n---`;
const absPartner = findPartner(absPath);
const relPartner = absPartner === null ? null : relative(XRPLD_ROOT, absPartner);
const partnerAiContext = absPartner === null ? null : await readAiContext(absPartner);
const partnerBlock =
relPartner === null
? ''
: `\n\n## Partner File\n\nThis file's partner is **${relPartner}**. Use the Read tool to see its\ncurrent docstrings before deciding what belongs on the primary. A concept\nalready documented on the partner does not need to be duplicated here.\nConversely, an implementation-depth concept currently on the partner that\nbelongs on the source (or vice versa) should be moved.${
partnerAiContext === null
? ''
: `\n\n### Partner's Authoritative AI Context (${relPartner}.ai.md)\n\n---\n\n${partnerAiContext}\n---`
}`;
const userPrompt = `Add Doxygen documentation to: ${relPath}
The file is rooted at ${XRPLD_ROOT}. Use the Read tool to read it, the Edit
tool to add documentation, and Glob/Grep to find related tests or callers
when needed.${
relPartner === null
? ''
: ` Use Read on the partner file (${relPartner}) to see what's already
documented there.`
}
Do not modify any code logic — only add documentation comments to the
primary file (${relPath}). Do NOT edit the partner file.${aiContextBlock}${partnerBlock}`;
const result = query({
prompt: userPrompt,
options: {
model: MODEL,
systemPrompt,
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
allowedTools: ['Read', 'Edit', 'Glob', 'Grep', 'Bash'],
permissionMode: 'acceptEdits',
},
});
for await (const message of result) {
if (message.type === 'assistant') {
const content = message.message?.content;
if (Array.isArray(content)) {
for (const block of content) {
if (block.type === 'text') {
process.stdout.write(block.text);
}
}
}
}
if (message.type === 'result') {
const cost = message.total_cost_usd?.toFixed(4) ?? '?';
const inTok = message.usage?.['input_tokens'] ?? 0;
const outTok = message.usage?.['output_tokens'] ?? 0;
console.log(`\n[Cost: $${cost}, Tokens: ${inTok}/${outTok}]`);
}
}
}
/**
* Document a file or every C++ file under a directory.
*
* @param target - File or directory path
*/
export async function documentTarget(target: string): Promise<void> {
const files = findCppFiles(target);
console.log(`Found ${files.length} C++ file(s) to document.`);
for (const file of files) {
try {
await documentFile(file);
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
console.error(`Failed to document ${file}: ${message}`);
}
}
}

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.github/scripts/doc-agent/src/index.ts vendored Normal file
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#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* xrpld doc-agent CLI entry point.
*
* @example
* doc-agent document src/libxrpl/basics/base_uint.h
* doc-agent document include/xrpl/basics/
* doc-agent review develop..HEAD
* doc-agent review --pr 1234
* doc-agent regen-skills protocol
*/
import { auditTarget } from './audit.js';
import { documentTarget } from './document.js';
import { regenSkills } from './regen-skills.js';
import { reviewDiff } from './review.js';
const USAGE = `
xrpld doc-agent
Usage:
doc-agent document <file-or-directory> Add Doxygen documentation
doc-agent review <base>..<head> Detect doc drift in range
doc-agent review --pr <number> Detect doc drift for a PR
doc-agent audit <file-or-directory> Measure how completely each file's
docstrings reflect its .ai.md intent;
outputs doc-audit-report.{md,json}
doc-agent regen-skills <module> Regenerate docs/skills/soul/<module>.md
from sibling .ai.md files
Environment:
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (required) Anthropic API key
XRPLD_ROOT (optional) Path to xrpld repo root (default: repo root)
DOC_AGENT_MODEL (optional) Model override (default: claude-opus-4-7)
`;
function printUsageAndExit(code: number): never {
console.error(USAGE);
process.exit(code);
}
const HELP_MODES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['help', '--help', '-h']);
async function main(): Promise<void> {
const [mode, ...args] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (process.env['ANTHROPIC_API_KEY'] === undefined) {
console.error('ERROR: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY environment variable is required.');
process.exit(1);
}
if (mode === undefined || HELP_MODES.has(mode)) {
printUsageAndExit(0);
}
if (mode === 'document') {
const target = args[0];
if (target === undefined) printUsageAndExit(1);
await documentTarget(target);
return;
}
if (mode === 'review') {
if (args.length === 0) printUsageAndExit(1);
await reviewDiff(args);
return;
}
if (mode === 'audit') {
const target = args[0];
if (target === undefined) printUsageAndExit(1);
await auditTarget(target);
return;
}
if (mode === 'regen-skills') {
const moduleName = args[0];
if (moduleName === undefined) printUsageAndExit(1);
await regenSkills(moduleName);
return;
}
console.error(`Unknown mode: ${mode}`);
printUsageAndExit(1);
}
main().catch((err: unknown) => {
const message = err instanceof Error ? (err.stack ?? err.message) : String(err);
console.error('FATAL:', message);
process.exit(1);
});

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/**
* Header/source pairing for C++ files in the xrpld layout.
*
* libxrpl: src/libxrpl/<X>.cpp <-> include/xrpl/<X>.h
* xrpld: src/xrpld/<X>.cpp <-> src/xrpld/<X>.h (same directory)
*
* Inline-only headers may have no .cpp partner; standalone .cpp may have
* no .h partner.
*/
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { XRPLD_ROOT } from './config.js';
/**
* Compute the partner file path for a given primary, by swapping the
* extension between header/source. Returns null if no candidate exists
* on disk.
*/
export function findPartner(absPrimary: string): string | null {
const rel = relative(XRPLD_ROOT, absPrimary);
const dotIdx = rel.lastIndexOf('.');
if (dotIdx === -1) return null;
const stem = rel.slice(0, dotIdx);
const ext = rel.slice(dotIdx);
const candidates: string[] = [];
if (ext === '.cpp') {
if (stem.startsWith('src/libxrpl/')) {
const tail = stem.slice('src/libxrpl/'.length);
candidates.push(`include/xrpl/${tail}.h`, `include/xrpl/${tail}.hpp`);
}
candidates.push(`${stem}.h`, `${stem}.hpp`);
} else if (ext === '.h' || ext === '.hpp') {
if (stem.startsWith('include/xrpl/')) {
candidates.push(`src/libxrpl/${stem.slice('include/xrpl/'.length)}.cpp`);
}
candidates.push(`${stem}.cpp`);
}
for (const candidate of candidates) {
const abs = resolve(XRPLD_ROOT, candidate);
if (existsSync(abs) && abs !== absPrimary) return abs;
}
return null;
}

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/**
* Loads system prompts and injects module-specific skill context.
*/
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
import { PROMPTS_DIR, SKILLS_DIR, skillForPath } from './config.js';
/**
* Load a system prompt from prompts/ and append the relevant module skill
* if one applies to the given source path.
*
* @param promptName - Base name of the prompt file (without .md extension)
* @param sourcePath - Path relative to the xrpld repo root
* @returns The fully-assembled system prompt
*/
export async function loadSystemPrompt(promptName: string, sourcePath: string): Promise<string> {
const basePromptPath = resolve(PROMPTS_DIR, `${promptName}.md`);
const basePrompt = await readFile(basePromptPath, 'utf8');
const skillFile = skillForPath(sourcePath);
if (skillFile === null) {
return basePrompt;
}
const skillPath = resolve(SKILLS_DIR, skillFile);
if (!existsSync(skillPath)) {
return basePrompt;
}
const skill = await readFile(skillPath, 'utf8');
return `${basePrompt}\n\n## Module Skill (${skillFile})\n\n${skill}`;
}

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/**
* Regen-skills mode: rebuild a module's skill file from ai.md inputs.
*
* For a given module (e.g. `protocol`, `ledger`, `consensus`), collect all
* `.ai.md` files under the matching source paths and ask the Agent SDK to
* write an updated `docs/skills/<module>.md`.
*
* The agent writes the file via the `Write` tool rather than returning the
* skill content as text. This avoids hitting the per-turn output token
* limit on large modules (which previously truncated several skill files).
*/
import { existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { query } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk';
import { MODEL, MODULE_SKILL_MAP, PROMPTS_DIR, SKILLS_DIR, XRPLD_ROOT } from './config.js';
interface AiFile {
readonly sourcePath: string;
readonly content: string;
}
/** Resolve which source-tree prefixes feed a given skill file. */
function prefixesForSkill(skillFile: string): string[] {
return Object.entries(MODULE_SKILL_MAP)
.filter(([, mapped]) => mapped === skillFile)
.map(([prefix]) => prefix);
}
/** Walk a directory and collect all sibling .ai.md files. */
function collectAiFiles(prefix: string): string[] {
const absDir = resolve(XRPLD_ROOT, prefix);
if (!existsSync(absDir) || !statSync(absDir).isDirectory()) return [];
const results: string[] = [];
const walk = (dir: string): void => {
for (const entry of readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const full = join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
walk(full);
} else if (entry.isFile() && entry.name.endsWith('.ai.md')) {
results.push(full);
}
}
};
walk(absDir);
return results;
}
async function loadAiFiles(absPaths: readonly string[]): Promise<AiFile[]> {
const files: AiFile[] = [];
for (const absPath of absPaths) {
const content = await readFile(absPath, 'utf8');
files.push({
sourcePath: relative(XRPLD_ROOT, absPath).replace(/\.ai\.md$/, ''),
content,
});
}
return files;
}
/**
* Regenerate the skill file for a given module name.
*
* @param moduleName - The skill file name without extension (e.g. "protocol",
* "ledger"). Must match a value in MODULE_SKILL_MAP.
*/
export async function regenSkills(moduleName: string): Promise<void> {
const skillFile = `${moduleName}.md`;
const prefixes = prefixesForSkill(skillFile);
if (prefixes.length === 0) {
const known = Array.from(
new Set(Object.values(MODULE_SKILL_MAP).filter((v): v is string => v !== null)),
);
throw new Error(`Unknown module: ${moduleName}. Valid modules: ${known.join(', ')}`);
}
console.log(`Regenerating skill: ${skillFile}`);
console.log(` Source prefixes: ${prefixes.join(', ')}`);
const aiPaths = prefixes.flatMap((prefix) => collectAiFiles(prefix));
if (aiPaths.length === 0) {
console.warn(' No .ai.md files found for this module. Skipping.');
return;
}
console.log(` Found ${aiPaths.length} .ai.md file(s)`);
const aiFiles = await loadAiFiles(aiPaths);
const skillPath = resolve(SKILLS_DIR, skillFile);
const skillRelPath = relative(XRPLD_ROOT, skillPath);
const existingSkill = existsSync(skillPath)
? await readFile(skillPath, 'utf8')
: '(no existing skill file — create a new one)';
const systemPrompt = await readFile(resolve(PROMPTS_DIR, 'regen-skill.md'), 'utf8');
const aiBlocks = aiFiles
.map((f) => `\n### \`${f.sourcePath}\`\n\n${f.content}`)
.join('\n\n---\n');
const userPrompt = `Regenerate the skill file at: \`${skillRelPath}\`
Use the **Write** tool to write the new content to that path. Do NOT return
the skill content in your message — write it directly to the file. This
avoids hitting per-turn output token limits.
## Existing skill content
${existingSkill}
## AI context files for this module
${aiBlocks}
When you have written the file, respond with a brief one-line confirmation.`;
const result = query({
prompt: userPrompt,
options: {
model: MODEL,
systemPrompt,
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
allowedTools: ['Write', 'Edit', 'Read', 'Glob', 'Grep'],
permissionMode: 'acceptEdits',
},
});
let writeCount = 0;
let editCount = 0;
for await (const message of result) {
if (message.type === 'assistant') {
const content = message.message?.content;
if (Array.isArray(content)) {
for (const block of content) {
if (block.type === 'tool_use' && block.name === 'Write') {
writeCount++;
const input = block.input as { file_path?: string } | undefined;
if (input?.file_path !== undefined) {
console.log(` Write: ${input.file_path}`);
}
}
if (block.type === 'tool_use' && block.name === 'Edit') {
editCount++;
const input = block.input as { file_path?: string } | undefined;
if (input?.file_path !== undefined) {
console.log(` Edit: ${input.file_path}`);
}
}
}
}
}
if (message.type === 'result') {
const cost = message.total_cost_usd?.toFixed(4) ?? '?';
console.log(` [Cost: $${cost}]`);
}
}
if (writeCount === 0) {
console.error(' Agent did not call Write — skill file not updated.');
return;
}
console.log(` Wrote: ${skillRelPath} (${writeCount} Write + ${editCount} Edit calls)`);
}

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/**
* Review mode: detect documentation drift in a git diff range.
*
* Used by the doc-review GitHub Action and locally for testing.
*/
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { query } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk';
import { MODEL, XRPLD_ROOT } from './config.js';
import { loadSystemPrompt } from './prompt-loader.js';
import type { FileReviewResult, GitRange, ReviewIssue, ReviewOutput } from './types.js';
const MAX_DIFF_CHARS = 12_000;
const TRACKED_PATH_PATTERN = /^(include|src\/libxrpl|src\/xrpld)\//;
const CPP_FILE_PATTERN = /\.(h|hpp|cpp)$/;
/**
* Parse the CLI arguments into a base..head git range.
*
* Accepts either:
* - `base..head` (e.g. `develop..HEAD`)
* - `--pr <number>` (resolves via `gh pr view`)
*/
function parseRangeArgs(args: readonly string[]): GitRange {
const first = args[0];
if (first === undefined) {
throw new Error('Expected range as base..head or --pr <number>');
}
if (first === '--pr') {
const pr = args[1];
if (pr === undefined) {
throw new Error('--pr requires a PR number');
}
const base = execSync(`gh pr view ${pr} --json baseRefOid -q .baseRefOid`, {
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
})
.toString()
.trim();
const head = execSync(`gh pr view ${pr} --json headRefOid -q .headRefOid`, {
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
})
.toString()
.trim();
return { base, head };
}
const match = first.match(/^([^.]+)\.\.([^.]+)$/);
if (match === null || match[1] === undefined || match[2] === undefined) {
throw new Error('Expected range as base..head or --pr <number>');
}
return { base: match[1], head: match[2] };
}
/**
* Get the list of C++ source files changed in the given git range,
* filtered to paths the doc-agent cares about.
*/
function getChangedCppFiles(range: GitRange): string[] {
const out = execSync(`git diff --name-only ${range.base}...${range.head}`, {
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
}).toString();
return out
.split('\n')
.filter((line) => line.length > 0)
.filter((file) => CPP_FILE_PATTERN.test(file))
.filter((file) => TRACKED_PATH_PATTERN.test(file));
}
/** Get the unified diff for a single file in the given range. */
function getFileDiff(range: GitRange, file: string): string {
return execSync(`git diff ${range.base}...${range.head} -- "${file}"`, {
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
}).toString();
}
/** Extract a JSON object from a possibly-fenced model response. */
function extractJson(response: string): ReviewOutput | null {
const fenced = response.match(/```json\s*([\s\S]*?)```/);
const raw = fenced?.[1] ?? response.match(/(\{[\s\S]*\})/)?.[1];
if (raw === undefined) return null;
try {
return JSON.parse(raw) as ReviewOutput;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** Send one file's diff to the agent and parse the response. */
async function reviewFile(range: GitRange, file: string): Promise<FileReviewResult | null> {
console.log(`\n=== Reviewing: ${file} ===`);
const diff = getFileDiff(range, file);
if (diff.trim().length === 0) return null;
const systemPrompt = await loadSystemPrompt('review-diff', file);
const userPrompt = `Review this diff for documentation drift:
## File: ${file}
## Diff
\`\`\`
${diff.slice(0, MAX_DIFF_CHARS)}
\`\`\`
Use the Read tool to inspect the current state of the file, related tests,
or callers if needed. Output findings as JSON per the schema in the system
prompt.`;
let response = '';
const result = query({
prompt: userPrompt,
options: {
model: MODEL,
systemPrompt,
cwd: XRPLD_ROOT,
allowedTools: ['Read', 'Glob', 'Grep', 'Bash'],
permissionMode: 'acceptEdits',
},
});
for await (const message of result) {
if (message.type === 'assistant') {
const content = message.message?.content;
if (Array.isArray(content)) {
for (const block of content) {
if (block.type === 'text') {
response += block.text;
}
}
}
}
}
const parsed = extractJson(response);
if (parsed === null) {
console.warn(` No JSON output for ${file}, skipping`);
return null;
}
const issues: ReviewIssue[] = parsed.issues.map((issue) => ({
file: issue.file ?? file,
line: issue.line,
severity: issue.severity,
message: issue.message,
...(issue.suggested_doc !== undefined && { suggestedDoc: issue.suggested_doc }),
}));
return { file, summary: parsed.summary, issues };
}
/** Build the markdown report posted to the PR. */
function buildReport(fileCount: number, results: readonly FileReviewResult[]): string {
const issues = results.flatMap((r) => r.issues);
const warnings = issues.filter((i) => i.severity === 'warning').length;
const suggestions = issues.length - warnings;
const lines: string[] = ['## Documentation Review Report', ''];
lines.push(
issues.length === 0
? 'No documentation issues found.'
: `Found **${issues.length}** issue(s) across **${fileCount}** changed file(s): ${warnings} warning(s), ${suggestions} suggestion(s).`,
);
lines.push('');
for (const result of results) {
if (result.issues.length === 0) continue;
lines.push(`### \`${result.file}\``, '', result.summary, '');
for (const issue of result.issues) {
const tag = issue.severity === 'warning' ? '**Warning:**' : '**Suggestion:**';
lines.push(`- ${tag} Line ${issue.line}: ${issue.message}`);
}
lines.push('');
}
lines.push('---', '*Automated review by doc-agent.*');
return lines.join('\n');
}
/**
* Review the documentation drift introduced by a git range or PR.
*
* Writes two output files in the current working directory:
* - doc-review-report.md (markdown summary for PR comment)
* - doc-review-comments.json (inline review comments)
*/
export async function reviewDiff(args: readonly string[]): Promise<void> {
const range = parseRangeArgs(args);
console.log(`Reviewing range: ${range.base}...${range.head}`);
const files = getChangedCppFiles(range);
if (files.length === 0) {
console.log('No C++ files changed in this range.');
await writeFile('doc-review-report.md', '## Documentation Review\n\nNo C++ files changed.\n');
await writeFile('doc-review-comments.json', '[]');
return;
}
console.log(`Found ${files.length} changed C++ file(s).`);
const results: FileReviewResult[] = [];
for (const file of files) {
try {
const result = await reviewFile(range, file);
if (result !== null) results.push(result);
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
console.warn(` Review failed for ${file}: ${message}`);
}
}
const report = buildReport(files.length, results);
const allIssues = results.flatMap((r) => r.issues);
await writeFile('doc-review-report.md', report);
await writeFile('doc-review-comments.json', JSON.stringify(allIssues, null, 2));
console.log('\nReport: doc-review-report.md');
console.log(`Inline comments: doc-review-comments.json (${allIssues.length} issues)`);
}

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/**
* Shared type definitions for the doc-agent.
*/
export type Severity = 'warning' | 'suggestion';
export interface ReviewIssue {
file: string;
line: number;
severity: Severity;
message: string;
suggestedDoc?: string;
}
export interface FileReviewResult {
file: string;
summary: string;
issues: ReviewIssue[];
}
export interface ReviewOutput {
summary: string;
issues: Array<{
file?: string;
line: number;
severity: Severity;
message: string;
suggested_doc?: string;
}>;
}
export interface GitRange {
base: string;
head: string;
}
export type AgentMode = 'document' | 'review';

39
.github/scripts/doc-agent/tsconfig.json vendored Normal file
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{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2022",
"module": "NodeNext",
"moduleResolution": "NodeNext",
"lib": ["ES2023"],
"outDir": "dist",
"rootDir": "src",
"strict": true,
"noImplicitAny": true,
"strictNullChecks": true,
"strictFunctionTypes": true,
"strictBindCallApply": true,
"strictPropertyInitialization": true,
"noImplicitThis": true,
"alwaysStrict": true,
"noUnusedLocals": true,
"noUnusedParameters": true,
"exactOptionalPropertyTypes": true,
"noImplicitReturns": true,
"noFallthroughCasesInSwitch": true,
"noUncheckedIndexedAccess": true,
"noImplicitOverride": true,
"noPropertyAccessFromIndexSignature": true,
"allowUnusedLabels": false,
"allowUnreachableCode": false,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"forceConsistentCasingInFileNames": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"declaration": true,
"declarationMap": true,
"sourceMap": true,
"resolveJsonModule": true,
"isolatedModules": true,
"verbatimModuleSyntax": true
},
"include": ["src/**/*"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist"]
}

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Documentation coverage checker for xrpld.
Parses coverxygen LCOV output, compares against per-module thresholds
defined in .github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json, and generates a
markdown report suitable for posting as a PR comment.
Usage:
python3 doc-coverage-check.py \
--lcov-file doc-coverage.info \
--threshold-file .github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json \
--output doc-coverage-report.md \
[--base-lcov-file base-doc-coverage.info]
"""
import argparse
import json
import re
import sys
from collections import defaultdict
from pathlib import Path
def parse_lcov(lcov_path: str) -> dict[str, dict[str, int]]:
"""Parse LCOV-format file into per-file coverage data.
Returns a dict mapping file paths to {"documented": N, "total": N}.
"""
coverage = {}
current_file = None
documented = 0
total = 0
with open(lcov_path) as f:
for line in f:
line = line.strip()
if line.startswith("SF:"):
current_file = line[3:]
documented = 0
total = 0
elif line.startswith("DA:"):
parts = line[3:].split(",")
if len(parts) >= 2:
total += 1
if int(parts[1]) > 0:
documented += 1
elif line == "end_of_record":
if current_file:
coverage[current_file] = {
"documented": documented,
"total": total,
}
current_file = None
return coverage
def compute_module_coverage(
coverage: dict[str, dict[str, int]],
module_prefixes: list[str],
) -> dict[str, dict[str, int | float]]:
"""Aggregate file-level coverage into module-level stats."""
modules = {}
for prefix in module_prefixes:
doc = 0
tot = 0
for filepath, stats in coverage.items():
if filepath.startswith(prefix) or f"/{prefix}" in filepath:
doc += stats["documented"]
tot += stats["total"]
pct = (doc / tot * 100) if tot > 0 else 0.0
modules[prefix] = {"documented": doc, "total": tot, "percent": round(pct, 1)}
return modules
def compute_global_coverage(
coverage: dict[str, dict[str, int]],
) -> dict[str, int | float]:
"""Compute overall coverage across all files."""
doc = sum(s["documented"] for s in coverage.values())
tot = sum(s["total"] for s in coverage.values())
pct = (doc / tot * 100) if tot > 0 else 0.0
return {"documented": doc, "total": tot, "percent": round(pct, 1)}
def check_ratchet(
current: dict[str, dict[str, int | float]],
base: dict[str, dict[str, int | float]] | None,
current_global: dict[str, int | float],
base_global: dict[str, int | float] | None,
) -> list[str]:
"""Check that no module or global coverage decreased vs base branch."""
violations = []
if base_global and current_global["percent"] < base_global["percent"]:
violations.append(
f"Global coverage decreased: {base_global['percent']}% -> "
f"{current_global['percent']}%"
)
if base:
for module, stats in current.items():
if module in base and stats["percent"] < base[module]["percent"]:
violations.append(
f"`{module}` coverage decreased: "
f"{base[module]['percent']}% -> {stats['percent']}%"
)
return violations
def check_new_files(
coverage: dict[str, dict[str, int]],
new_files: list[str],
min_coverage: int,
) -> list[str]:
"""Check that new files meet minimum documentation coverage."""
violations = []
for filepath in new_files:
for covered_path, stats in coverage.items():
if filepath in covered_path or covered_path.endswith(filepath):
if stats["total"] > 0:
pct = stats["documented"] / stats["total"] * 100
if pct < min_coverage:
violations.append(
f"`{filepath}` has {pct:.0f}% doc coverage "
f"(minimum {min_coverage}%)"
)
break
return violations
def coverage_emoji(pct: float) -> str:
if pct >= 80:
return "+"
if pct >= 50:
return "~"
return "-"
def generate_report(
global_stats: dict[str, int | float],
module_stats: dict[str, dict[str, int | float]],
thresholds: dict,
violations: list[str],
new_file_violations: list[str],
) -> str:
"""Generate a markdown report for the PR comment."""
lines = []
lines.append("## Documentation Coverage Report")
lines.append("")
passed = not violations and not new_file_violations
status = "PASSED" if passed else "FAILED"
lines.append(f"**Status:** {status}")
lines.append(
f"**Global Coverage:** {global_stats['percent']}% "
f"({global_stats['documented']}/{global_stats['total']} entities documented)"
)
lines.append(
f"**Minimum Threshold:** {thresholds.get('global_minimum', 0)}%"
)
lines.append("")
if violations or new_file_violations:
lines.append("### Violations")
lines.append("")
for v in violations + new_file_violations:
lines.append(f"- {v}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("### Module Coverage")
lines.append("")
lines.append("| Module | Coverage | Documented | Total | Threshold |")
lines.append("|--------|----------|------------|-------|-----------|")
module_thresholds = thresholds.get("module_thresholds", {})
for module in sorted(module_stats.keys()):
stats = module_stats[module]
threshold = module_thresholds.get(module, 0)
emoji = coverage_emoji(stats["percent"])
lines.append(
f"| `{module}` | {stats['percent']}% | "
f"{stats['documented']} | {stats['total']} | {threshold}% |"
)
lines.append("")
lines.append(
"*Coverage measured by [coverxygen](https://github.com/psycofdj/coverxygen). "
"See [docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md](../docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md) "
"for documentation guidelines.*"
)
return "\n".join(lines)
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Check documentation coverage")
parser.add_argument("--lcov-file", required=True, help="Path to LCOV coverage file")
parser.add_argument(
"--threshold-file", required=True, help="Path to thresholds JSON"
)
parser.add_argument("--output", required=True, help="Path to write markdown report")
parser.add_argument(
"--base-lcov-file", default=None, help="Path to base branch LCOV file"
)
parser.add_argument(
"--new-files",
default="",
help="Comma-separated list of new C++ files in this PR",
)
args = parser.parse_args()
with open(args.threshold_file) as f:
thresholds = json.load(f)
coverage = parse_lcov(args.lcov_file)
module_prefixes = list(thresholds.get("module_thresholds", {}).keys())
module_stats = compute_module_coverage(coverage, module_prefixes)
global_stats = compute_global_coverage(coverage)
base_coverage = None
base_module_stats = None
base_global_stats = None
if args.base_lcov_file and Path(args.base_lcov_file).exists():
base_coverage = parse_lcov(args.base_lcov_file)
base_module_stats = compute_module_coverage(base_coverage, module_prefixes)
base_global_stats = compute_global_coverage(base_coverage)
violations = []
if global_stats["percent"] < thresholds.get("global_minimum", 0):
violations.append(
f"Global coverage {global_stats['percent']}% is below minimum "
f"{thresholds['global_minimum']}%"
)
for module, threshold in thresholds.get("module_thresholds", {}).items():
if module in module_stats and module_stats[module]["percent"] < threshold:
violations.append(
f"`{module}` coverage {module_stats[module]['percent']}% is below "
f"threshold {threshold}%"
)
if thresholds.get("ratchet_mode") == "no_decrease":
violations.extend(
check_ratchet(
module_stats, base_module_stats, global_stats, base_global_stats
)
)
new_file_violations = []
if args.new_files:
new_files = [f.strip() for f in args.new_files.split(",") if f.strip()]
new_file_min = thresholds.get("new_file_minimum", 80)
new_file_violations = check_new_files(coverage, new_files, new_file_min)
report = generate_report(
global_stats, module_stats, thresholds, violations, new_file_violations
)
with open(args.output, "w") as f:
f.write(report)
print(report)
if violations or new_file_violations:
print(f"\nFAILED: {len(violations) + len(new_file_violations)} violation(s)")
sys.exit(1)
else:
print("\nPASSED: All coverage thresholds met")
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

90
.github/workflows/doc-review.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
name: Documentation Review
on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
paths:
- 'include/**/*.h'
- 'src/libxrpl/**/*.h'
- 'src/libxrpl/**/*.cpp'
- 'src/xrpld/**/*.h'
- 'src/xrpld/**/*.cpp'
concurrency:
group: doc-review-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
defaults:
run:
shell: bash
jobs:
review:
if: github.head_ref != 'dangell7/docs'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
pull-requests: write
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Set up Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: '20'
cache: 'npm'
cache-dependency-path: .github/scripts/doc-agent/package-lock.json
- name: Install doc-agent dependencies
working-directory: .github/scripts/doc-agent
run: npm ci
- name: Run documentation review
env:
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
run: |
cd .github/scripts/doc-agent
npm run review -- "${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}..${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
- name: Post review summary
if: always()
uses: marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@67d0dec7b07ed060a405f9b2a64b8ab319fdd7db # v2.9.2
with:
header: doc-review
path: .github/scripts/doc-agent/doc-review-report.md
- name: Post inline review comments
if: always()
uses: actions/github-script@60a0d83039c74a4aee543508d2ffcb1c3799cdea # v7.0.1
with:
script: |
const fs = require('fs');
const path = '.github/scripts/doc-agent/doc-review-comments.json';
if (!fs.existsSync(path)) return;
const comments = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path, 'utf8'));
if (comments.length === 0) return;
const pull_number = context.payload.pull_request.number;
const owner = context.repo.owner;
const repo = context.repo.repo;
for (const comment of comments) {
try {
await github.rest.pulls.createReviewComment({
owner,
repo,
pull_number,
body: comment.body,
commit_id: '${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}',
path: comment.path,
line: comment.line,
side: 'RIGHT',
});
} catch (e) {
console.log(`Failed to post comment on ${comment.path}:${comment.line}: ${e.message}`);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
# This workflow builds the documentation for the repository, and publishes it to
# GitHub Pages when changes are merged into the default branch.
name: Build and publish documentation
# Builds Doxygen XML + HTML in a single pass, runs documentation coverage
# checks on pull requests, and publishes the HTML to GitHub Pages when changes
# land on `develop`.
name: Documentation (build, coverage, publish)
on:
push:
@@ -8,6 +9,8 @@ on:
- "develop"
paths:
- ".github/workflows/publish-docs.yml"
- ".github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json"
- ".github/scripts/doc-coverage-check.py"
- "*.md"
- "**/*.md"
- "docs/**"
@@ -17,6 +20,8 @@ on:
pull_request:
paths:
- ".github/workflows/publish-docs.yml"
- ".github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json"
- ".github/scripts/doc-coverage-check.py"
- "*.md"
- "**/*.md"
- "docs/**"
@@ -42,9 +47,14 @@ jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/tools-rippled-documentation:sha-a8c7be1
permissions:
pull-requests: write
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@90f11ee655d1687824fb8793db770477d52afbab
@@ -57,21 +67,25 @@ jobs:
with:
subtract: ${{ env.NPROC_SUBTRACT }}
- name: Install coverxygen
# TODO: drop pin once upstream fixes the 1.8.x regression.
# 1.8.2 crashes on enums when no --exclude is configured:
# AttributeError: 'str' object has no attribute 'iter'
# at coverxygen/__init__.py extract_enum_qualified_name
run: pip install 'coverxygen<1.8'
- name: Check configuration
run: |
echo 'Checking path.'
echo ${PATH} | tr ':' '\n'
echo 'Checking environment variables.'
env | sort
echo 'Checking CMake version.'
cmake --version
echo 'Checking Doxygen version.'
doxygen --version
- name: Build documentation
- name: Build documentation (PR/HEAD)
env:
BUILD_NPROC: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
run: |
@@ -80,6 +94,91 @@ jobs:
cmake -Donly_docs=ON ..
cmake --build . --target docs --parallel ${BUILD_NPROC}
- name: Determine changed C++ files
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
id: changed
uses: tj-actions/changed-files@9426d40962ed5378910ee2e21d5f8c6fcbf2dd96 # v47.0.6
with:
files: |
include/**/*.h
src/**/*.h
src/**/*.cpp
- name: Cache base-branch Doxygen XML
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
id: base-cache
uses: actions/cache@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4.3.0
with:
path: build-base/docs/xml
key: doxygen-xml-${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}-${{ hashFiles('docs/Doxyfile') }}
- name: Build base-branch Doxygen XML (cache miss)
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && steps.base-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
env:
BUILD_NPROC: ${{ steps.nproc.outputs.nproc }}
run: |
git checkout ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
mkdir -p build-base
cd build-base
if ! cmake -Donly_docs=ON .. > cmake.log 2>&1; then
echo "::warning::Base-branch cmake configure failed; ratchet disabled for this PR"
cat cmake.log
elif ! cmake --build . --target docs --parallel ${BUILD_NPROC} > build.log 2>&1; then
echo "::warning::Base-branch Doxygen build failed; ratchet disabled for this PR"
tail -50 build.log
fi
cd ..
git checkout ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- name: Generate coverage report (PR)
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
python3 -m coverxygen \
--xml-dir ${BUILD_DIR}/docs/xml \
--src-dir . \
--output doc-coverage.info \
--kind class,struct,function,enum,typedef,variable \
--scope public
- name: Generate coverage report (base)
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
if [ -d "build-base/docs/xml" ]; then
python3 -m coverxygen \
--xml-dir build-base/docs/xml \
--src-dir . \
--output base-doc-coverage.info \
--kind class,struct,function,enum,typedef,variable \
--scope public || true
fi
- name: Check coverage thresholds
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
BASE_FLAG=""
if [ -f "base-doc-coverage.info" ]; then
BASE_FLAG="--base-lcov-file base-doc-coverage.info"
fi
NEW_FILES=""
if [ -n "${{ steps.changed.outputs.added_files }}" ]; then
NEW_FILES="--new-files ${{ steps.changed.outputs.added_files }}"
fi
python3 .github/scripts/doc-coverage-check.py \
--lcov-file doc-coverage.info \
--threshold-file .github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json \
--output doc-coverage-report.md \
${BASE_FLAG} \
${NEW_FILES} || true
- name: Post coverage report to PR
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && always()
uses: marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@67d0dec7b07ed060a405f9b2a64b8ab319fdd7db # v2.9.2
with:
header: doc-coverage
path: doc-coverage-report.md
- name: Create documentation artifact
if: ${{ github.event.repository.visibility == 'public' && github.event_name == 'push' }}
uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@fc324d3547104276b827a68afc52ff2a11cc49c9 # v5.0.0

10
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
# .gitignore
# cspell: disable
# AI-generated documentation source (temporary, used by doc-agent
# during the initial documentation pass; removed once docs are merged).
*.ai.md
# Macintosh Desktop Services Store files.
.DS_Store
@@ -15,6 +19,12 @@ Release/
/.build/
/.venv/
/build/
/build-base/
/doc-coverage.info
/base-doc-coverage.info
/doc-coverage-report.md
/doc-review-report.md
/doc-review-comments.json
/db/
/out.txt
/Testing/

395
SCOPE_OF_WORK.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
# XRPLD Automated Documentation System — Scope of Work
## 1. Problem Statement
The XRP Ledger daemon (`xrpld`) is a ~275,000 line C++ codebase with 1,183
source files across the core library, protocol layer, and application server.
It is the single implementation of the XRP Ledger protocol and processes
billions of dollars in value.
Despite this criticality, the codebase has minimal inline documentation. Only
569 of 1,183 files contain any Doxygen-style doc comments, and most of those
are sparse — a class-level sentence or two, rarely covering individual methods,
parameters, or behavioral invariants.
The only formal documentation effort — an external specification by Common
Prefix — has fundamental structural problems:
- **Drift is the default state.** The spec lives in a separate repository
with no CI linkage to the codebase. Every commit to `rippled` that changes
behavior silently invalidates the spec. Even one week of drift makes
the spec unreliable.
- **Separate repo, separate context.** No contributor has both repos open.
When a bug comes in, the developer reads the code, not the spec. A
recent bug would have been caught if the code itself was documented.
- **No code-level documentation.** The spec describes system-level behavior
(payment engine, DEX) but does not document individual functions, classes,
parameters, or invariants. A developer working on a specific function
gets no help.
- **Vendor dependency.** Ripple has a critical documentation dependency on a
single external firm. If the contract ends, the spec orphans.
- **Perverse incentive.** The vendor profits from complexity and drift.
Cleaner code and better inline docs reduce the need for external
specification work.
## 2. Solution as Built
An automated, in-repo documentation system with five components, all living
alongside the code with no external repos and no external vendor dependency:
1. **Module skills** — Per-module knowledge files in [docs/skills/](docs/skills/)
that capture the "soul" of each subsystem (key files, patterns, pitfalls,
invariants). These are the durable, human-maintained context that the
automated agent and human contributors both consult.
2. **doc-agent (Claude Agent SDK app)** — A TypeScript tool at
[.github/scripts/doc-agent/](.github/scripts/doc-agent/) with three modes:
`document` (write Doxygen comments), `review` (detect drift on a diff),
and `regen-skills` (rebuild a skill file from current code).
3. **Doc-review GitHub Action** — Runs the review mode on every PR; posts
inline comments and a sticky summary. Currently warning-only.
4. **Coverage enforcement** — CI-enforced documentation coverage thresholds
that ratchet up over time, preventing regression.
5. **Developer slash commands** — Claude Code commands in
[.claude/commands/](.claude/commands/) for onboarding, architecture
questions, doc review, and bug pattern detection.
Documentation accuracy is enforced by CI the same way code style and test
coverage are enforced today.
## 3. Deliverables — Built
### 3.1 Documentation Standards
[docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md](docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md) — canonical
format guide defining:
- Javadoc-style `/** ... */` Doxygen comments (matches existing convention)
- Documentation levels: file, class, public method, free function, enum
- Required Doxygen tags: `@param`, `@return`, `@note`, `@invariant`
- Quality rules: document behavior and invariants, never paraphrase
signatures, terse style (25 lines for classes, 13 for functions)
### 3.2 Doxygen Configuration Changes
[docs/Doxyfile](docs/Doxyfile):
- `EXTRACT_ALL = NO` (was `YES`) — undocumented entities are flagged rather
than silently extracted
- `GENERATE_XML = YES` (was `NO`) — required for coverxygen to parse and
measure documentation coverage
### 3.3 Module Skills
Thirteen module-level skill files in [docs/skills/](docs/skills/), each one
a self-contained guide to a subsystem's responsibilities, key types, control
flow, conventions, and common pitfalls:
| Skill | Covers |
|-------|--------|
| [consensus.md](docs/skills/consensus.md) | XRPL consensus algorithm + RCL adapters |
| [cryptography.md](docs/skills/cryptography.md) | CSPRNG, secure erasure, key handling |
| [ledger.md](docs/skills/ledger.md) | ReadView/ApplyView, state tables, sandbox |
| [nodestore.md](docs/skills/nodestore.md) | RocksDB/NuDB/Memory backends |
| [peering.md](docs/skills/peering.md) | Overlay + peerfinder |
| [protocol.md](docs/skills/protocol.md) | STObject, SField, Serializer, TER, Keylets |
| [rpc.md](docs/skills/rpc.md) | RPC handler conventions |
| [shamap.md](docs/skills/shamap.md) | SHA-256 Merkle radix tree |
| [sql.md](docs/skills/sql.md) | SOCI database wrapper, checkpointing |
| [test.md](docs/skills/test.md) | Beast unit test framework conventions |
| [transactors.md](docs/skills/transactors.md) | Full transactor template |
| [websockets.md](docs/skills/websockets.md) | WS subscriptions/streams |
| [index.md](docs/skills/index.md) | Top-level codebase map |
These skills serve a dual purpose: they are reference docs for human
contributors, and they are injected as system-prompt context by the
doc-agent (mapping in [src/config.ts](.github/scripts/doc-agent/src/config.ts)).
[install-skills.sh](.github/scripts/doc-agent/install-skills.sh) installs
the same files as Claude Code skills under `.claude/skills/<name>/SKILL.md`,
so any Claude Code session in the repo picks them up automatically.
### 3.4 doc-agent (Claude Agent SDK)
A TypeScript application at [.github/scripts/doc-agent/](.github/scripts/doc-agent/),
built on `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk`. Three modes:
| Mode | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `document` | Add Doxygen comments to a file or directory. Reads sibling `<file>.ai.md` context, the module skill, and the source file; uses `permissionMode: 'acceptEdits'` to write directly. |
| `review` | Given a git range or PR number, detect doc drift. Emits `doc-review-report.md` (sticky comment) and `doc-review-comments.json` (inline comments). |
| `regen-skills` | Rebuild a module's skill file at `docs/skills/<module>.md` from the module's `.ai.md` files plus existing skill content. |
Layout:
```
doc-agent/
├── package.json # Node >= 20.12, @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk
├── biome.json # lint + format
├── install-skills.sh # copies docs/skills/*.md → .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md
├── prompts/ # System prompts as markdown (editable without code changes)
│ ├── document-file.md
│ ├── review-diff.md
│ └── regen-skill.md
└── src/
├── index.ts # CLI entry (document | review | regen-skills)
├── config.ts # Paths, model, MODULE_SKILL_MAP
├── prompt-loader.ts # Loads prompts + injects module skill
├── document.ts
├── review.ts
├── regen-skills.ts
└── types.ts
```
Notable design decisions:
- **Prompts as markdown, not strings.** Operators tune prompts without
touching TypeScript or redeploying.
- **`.ai.md` sidecar input.** When documenting a file, the agent reads a
sibling `<file>.ai.md` (high-signal prose generated upstream by the
`athenah-ai` pipeline) as the authoritative source of intent. These are
gitignored (`*.ai.md` in [.gitignore](.gitignore)) and discarded once
the initial pass is complete.
- **Model selection via env.** `DOC_AGENT_MODEL` env var; default
`claude-sonnet-4-6`.
- **Repo root override.** `XRPLD_ROOT` env var allows running the agent
against a different checkout (useful in CI and local testing).
### 3.5 Documentation Coverage Pipeline
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| [.github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json](.github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json) | Per-module thresholds + quarterly ratchet schedule |
| [.github/scripts/doc-coverage-check.py](.github/scripts/doc-coverage-check.py) | Parses coverxygen LCOV, checks thresholds, generates PR report |
| [.github/workflows/doc-coverage.yml](.github/workflows/doc-coverage.yml) | CI workflow: builds Doxygen XML, runs coverxygen, posts coverage to PR |
| [cmake/XrplDocs.cmake](cmake/XrplDocs.cmake) | `docs` CMake target wiring |
Flow:
1. On every PR touching C++ files, the workflow builds Doxygen XML for
both the PR branch and the base branch (using
`ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/tools-rippled-documentation`).
2. Coverxygen generates LCOV-format coverage from the XML.
3. The check script compares coverage against per-module thresholds.
4. Ratchet mode (`no_decrease`) prevents any PR from reducing coverage.
5. New files added in a PR require ≥ 80% doc coverage.
6. Results are posted as a sticky PR comment with per-module breakdown.
### 3.6 Doc-Review GitHub Action
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| [.github/workflows/doc-review.yml](.github/workflows/doc-review.yml) | CI workflow: runs on PR, posts review |
The workflow invokes the doc-agent `review` mode (Section 3.4) directly —
there is no separate CI script. The same code path serves CI and local use,
so prompt and logic changes are tested in one place.
Flow:
1. On every PR, the workflow runs `npm run review -- "$BASE..$HEAD"` in the
doc-agent directory.
2. doc-agent enumerates C++ files changed in the range, extracts diff
hunks plus existing doc comments, and asks Claude per file whether the
docs are still accurate.
3. Outputs `doc-review-report.md` (sticky PR comment) and
`doc-review-comments.json` (inline review comments via
`actions/github-script`).
4. Runs in **warning-only mode** — does not block merge.
Local invocation uses the same command:
`npm run review develop..HEAD` or `npm run review -- --pr 1234`.
Cost: only changed files and changed hunks within those files are
processed. Estimated ~$0.050.15 per PR.
### 3.7 Claude Code Slash Commands
Four developer-facing commands in [.claude/commands/](.claude/commands/):
| Command | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| [doc-review](.claude/commands/doc-review.md) | Review doc accuracy for files changed on current branch |
| [explain-module](.claude/commands/explain-module.md) | Explain a module's architecture, classes, control flow, entry points |
| [how-does-x-work](.claude/commands/how-does-x-work.md) | Trace a feature through the codebase with file/line references |
| [find-bug-patterns](.claude/commands/find-bug-patterns.md) | Scan code for common xrpld bug patterns (unchecked TER, integer overflow, missing amendment gates, etc.) |
### 3.8 Full Codebase Documentation
The initial documentation pass covers 1,183 C++ files organized into 21
module-level PRs (see Section 5). The doc-agent `document` mode produces
each PR in parallel across modules; each file's output is then
domain-expert reviewed before merge.
## 4. Resources Required
### 4.1 People
| Role | Responsibility |
|------|---------------|
| **Documentation lead** | Runs `doc-agent document` per module, reviews output, submits PRs, iterates on prompts in [prompts/](.github/scripts/doc-agent/prompts/) |
| **Domain reviewers** (rotating) | Review doc PRs for semantic accuracy in their area of expertise |
| **CI/infrastructure** | Deploys workflows, monitors costs, tunes false-positive rate on doc-review action |
### 4.2 Infrastructure & Tools
| Resource | Purpose |
|----------|---------|
| **Anthropic API access** | Powers the doc-agent (`document`, `review`, `regen-skills`) and the doc-review GitHub Action |
| **Claude Agent SDK** | `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` Node package |
| **Node.js >= 20.12** | Native `--env-file` support; runs the doc-agent |
| **GitHub Actions minutes** | Doc-coverage workflow (Doxygen XML build + coverxygen) and doc-review workflow |
| **Coverxygen** | Python package, open source (MIT) |
| **Doxygen** | Already configured — uses existing `ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/tools-rippled-documentation` container |
| **GitHub Actions secret** | `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` — for doc-review workflow |
| **athenah-ai pipeline output** | Generates `.ai.md` sidecar context files consumed by `doc-agent document`; gitignored, removed post-pass |
### 4.3 Access & Permissions
- Write access to the `rippled` repository (or a fork for initial PRs)
- Ability to add GitHub Actions secrets (`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`)
- Ability to modify required status checks (when promoting doc-review from
warning to required)
## 5. Execution Plan
Module passes run in parallel — the doc-agent operates per-module
independently, so foundation, protocol, and application layers are
generated concurrently rather than sequentially. Module groupings below
reflect dependency layering for review purposes, not a serial schedule.
### Phase 0: Infrastructure — Complete
Tooling shipped as the foundation PR:
- [x] [docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md](docs/DOCUMENTATION_STANDARDS.md)
- [x] [docs/Doxyfile](docs/Doxyfile) modifications
- [x] [docs/skills/](docs/skills/) — 13 module skills + index
- [x] [.github/scripts/doc-agent/](.github/scripts/doc-agent/) — Agent SDK app (document / review / regen-skills)
- [x] [.github/scripts/doc-agent/install-skills.sh](.github/scripts/doc-agent/install-skills.sh)
- [x] [.github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json](.github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json)
- [x] [.github/scripts/doc-coverage-check.py](.github/scripts/doc-coverage-check.py)
- [x] [.github/workflows/doc-coverage.yml](.github/workflows/doc-coverage.yml)
- [x] [cmake/XrplDocs.cmake](cmake/XrplDocs.cmake)
- [x] [.github/workflows/doc-review.yml](.github/workflows/doc-review.yml) — invokes doc-agent `review` mode directly
- [x] [.claude/commands/](.claude/commands/) — 4 developer slash commands
**Exit criteria met:** All workflows pass on a test PR. Coverage report
renders correctly. Doc-review action posts comments without false positives
on a sample PR.
### Phase 1: Foundation Modules
Lowest-level modules — everything else depends on these:
| PR | Module | ~Files | ~Lines |
|----|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | `include/xrpl/basics/` + `src/libxrpl/basics/` | 63 | ~15K |
| 2 | `include/xrpl/crypto/` + `src/libxrpl/crypto/` | 6 | ~1.5K |
| 3 | `include/xrpl/json/` + `src/libxrpl/json/` | 18 | ~4K |
| 4 | `include/xrpl/beast/` + `src/libxrpl/beast/` | 88 | ~20K |
**Process per PR:**
1. Create branch `docs/module-<name>` from `develop`.
2. Run `npm run document <path>` from `.github/scripts/doc-agent/`. The
agent reads each file's `.ai.md` sidecar, the matching module skill,
and the file itself, then writes Doxygen comments per the standards.
3. Domain expert reviews for semantic accuracy.
4. Run Doxygen build to validate no doc errors.
5. Merge; ratchet that module's threshold up to actual coverage level.
### Phase 2: Protocol & Transaction Engine
| PR | Module | ~Files |
|----|--------|--------|
| 5 | `include/xrpl/protocol/` + `src/libxrpl/protocol/` | 150 |
| 6 | `include/xrpl/ledger/` + `src/libxrpl/ledger/` | 68 |
| 7 | `include/xrpl/conditions/` + `src/libxrpl/conditions/` | 8 |
| 8 | `include/xrpl/tx/` (core framework: Transactor, ApplyContext) | 15 |
| 9 | Payment transactors | 9 |
| 10 | DEX/AMM transactors | 25 |
| 11 | Escrow transactors | 7 |
| 12 | Other transactors (NFT, token, vault, check, etc.) | 60 |
| 13 | Pathfinding + invariants | 30 |
### Phase 3: Server & Application Layer
| PR | Module | ~Files |
|----|--------|--------|
| 14 | `include/xrpl/server/` + `src/libxrpl/server/` | 35 |
| 15 | `include/xrpl/nodestore/` + `src/libxrpl/nodestore/` | 30 |
| 16 | SHAMap | 25 |
| 17 | Resource management | 17 |
| 18 | Overlay + peerfinder | 56 |
| 19 | Consensus | 15 |
| 20 | Application core (ledger, main, misc, rdb) | 133 |
| 21 | RPC handlers | 131 |
Once Phases 13 are merged, the doc-review action is promoted from
warning to a **required check**.
### Phase 4: Tests & Polish
- Document test files (brief docs only — test name + what it validates)
- Remove `.ai.md` sidecar files (they were transitional input only)
- Retrospective: false-positive rate, API costs, contributor feedback
## 6. Coverage Threshold Ratchet
Coverage thresholds are enforced per-module via
[.github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json](.github/doc-coverage-thresholds.json):
- **`no_decrease` ratchet** — no PR may reduce coverage on a module
below its current level.
- **New files** require ≥ 80% doc coverage regardless of module threshold.
- **Per-module floors** are raised manually as each module's PR lands,
pinning the achieved coverage as the new floor.
There is no calendar-based ratchet; thresholds advance with the work.
## 7. Risk Assessment
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|------|-----------|--------|------------|
| LLM generates plausible but wrong docs | Medium | High | Every doc PR requires human domain expert review. `.ai.md` sidecars (athenah-ai) ground the agent in source-derived intent rather than free generation. |
| Doc-review action false positives annoy contributors | Medium | Medium | Warning-only mode initially. Promote to required only when FP rate < 5%. Prompts live in markdown ([prompts/](.github/scripts/doc-agent/prompts/)) and can be tuned without a code release. |
| Coverage enforcement blocks unrelated PRs | Low | Medium | `no_decrease` ratchet only; per-module floors raised manually as modules land. |
| Reviewer bandwidth bottleneck | Medium | Medium | PRs scoped to single modules. Reviewers rotate. |
| API costs exceed budget | Low | Low | Only diff hunks processed. Monthly budget cap with alerting. |
| Doxygen XML build adds CI time | Low | Low | Runs in parallel with existing checks. Uses existing documentation container. |
| Doc comments add code noise | Low | Low | Terse style enforced by standards. 25 lines per class, 13 per function. |
| Skill files drift from code | Medium | Medium | `doc-agent regen-skills <module>` rebuilds a skill from current `.ai.md` files; intended to be run periodically. |
## 8. Success Metrics
| Metric | Measurement |
|--------|-------------|
| Documentation coverage (public API) | Coverxygen LCOV reports in CI |
| Doc drift catch rate | Sample audit of merged PRs vs doc-review output |
| False positive rate (doc-review action) | Track dismissed vs accepted suggestions |
| Spec-vs-code contradictions | Bug reports citing wrong documentation |
| Contributor satisfaction | Periodic survey: "docs helped me understand the code" |
| Onboarding time | Measure across new contributors before/after |
| API cost | Anthropic API billing dashboard |
## 9. What This Replaces
This system does **not** replace the Common Prefix formal verification
work directly formal verification and code documentation solve different
problems. However, it eliminates the need for an external specification as
the "source of truth" for how xrpld behaves:
| Need | Before | After |
|------|--------|-------|
| "What does this function do?" | Read the code, guess | Read the inline Doxygen doc |
| "How does the payment engine work?" | Read Common Prefix spec (maybe stale) | Read [docs/skills/transactors.md](docs/skills/transactors.md) or run `/explain-module` |
| "Did this PR break any documented behavior?" | Manual review, hope someone notices | Doc-review action flags it automatically |
| "What's our documentation coverage?" | Unknown | Measured per-module in every PR |
| "Is the spec up to date?" | Check manually, probably not | Docs are in-repo, enforced by CI |
| "Where do I start in module X?" | Ask in chat | Read the module skill in [docs/skills/](docs/skills/) |
## 10. Out of Scope
- **Formal verification.** This project documents code behavior; it does
not prove correctness. Formal verification is a separate discipline.
- **External-facing API documentation.** This covers the C++ source code,
not the JSON-RPC API documentation on xrpl.org.
- **Test coverage.** Test file documentation is brief and optional. Test
coverage measurement is handled by existing Codecov integration.
- **Architectural decision records.** Module-level READMEs already exist
for key subsystems. This project adds function/class-level docs and the
module skills layer, not system-level ADRs.

View File

@@ -89,3 +89,30 @@ add_custom_target(
DEPENDS "${doxygen_index_file}"
SOURCES "${dependencies}"
)
# Documentation coverage target using coverxygen.
# Generates LCOV-format coverage report from Doxygen XML output.
# Requires: pip install coverxygen
set(doxygen_xml_dir "${doxygen_output_directory}/xml")
set(doc_coverage_file "${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/doc-coverage.info")
add_custom_command(
OUTPUT "${doc_coverage_file}"
COMMAND
coverxygen
--xml-dir "${doxygen_xml_dir}"
--src-dir "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}"
--output "${doc_coverage_file}"
--kind class,struct,function,enum,typedef,variable
--scope public
WORKING_DIRECTORY "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}"
DEPENDS docs
COMMENT "Generating documentation coverage report"
)
add_custom_target(
docs-coverage
DEPENDS "${doc_coverage_file}"
COMMAND
"${CMAKE_COMMAND}" -E echo
"Documentation coverage report: ${doc_coverage_file}"
)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
# XRPLD Documentation Standards
This document defines the canonical format for inline code documentation in the
xrpld codebase. All new and updated code must follow these standards.
## Comment Style
Use Javadoc-style Doxygen comments (`/** ... */`). This matches the dominant
convention in the codebase: ~5,200 existing instances across 569 files.
```cpp
/** Brief description of the entity. */
```
For multi-line documentation, each line is prefixed with ` * ` (space, asterisk,
space):
```cpp
/** Brief description of the entity.
*
* Extended description with behavioral details, invariants,
* and constraints that are not obvious from the signature.
*/
```
`JAVADOC_AUTOBRIEF = YES` is enabled in the Doxyfile, so the first sentence
of any `/** */` block is automatically treated as the brief. An explicit
`@brief` tag is accepted but not required.
The `///` triple-slash style appears in ~37 files (340 instances). It is
valid Doxygen and will not be removed where it exists, but new code should
use `/** */` for consistency with the majority style.
## What to Document
### File-Level (Optional)
The `@file` tag is not currently used anywhere in the codebase. Adding
file-level documentation is encouraged for complex modules where a
high-level overview helps, but it is not required:
```cpp
/** @file
* Defines the Payment transactor for the XRP Ledger.
*
* The Payment transactor handles direct XRP transfers, cross-currency
* payments via the pathfinding engine, and partial payments.
*/
```
Module-level READMEs (e.g., `src/xrpld/peerfinder/README.md`) remain the
primary place for architectural documentation.
### Class / Struct Level
Every class and struct gets a doc block describing:
- What it does (1-2 sentences)
- Key invariants or constraints, if any
- Thread-safety guarantees, if relevant
- Lifecycle notes, if relevant
```cpp
/** Executes a Payment transaction on the XRP Ledger.
*
* Supports direct XRP payments, cross-currency payments via RippleCalc,
* and partial payments (tfPartialPayment). Path count is limited to 6
* with max path length of 8.
*/
class Payment : public Transactor { ... };
```
Target: 2-5 lines for most classes. Complex classes may need more.
### Public Methods and Free Functions
Every public method and free function in headers gets:
- Brief description of behavior (not a restatement of the signature)
- `@param` for each parameter
- `@return` describing what is returned
- `@throw` if it can throw (either `@throw` or `@throws` is acceptable —
the codebase uses both)
- `@note` for non-obvious constraints or edge cases
When a `@param` description wraps, continuation lines are indented with
4 spaces from the `*`:
```cpp
/** Round a Number value to the precision of a given asset.
*
* For IOUs, rounds to the IOU's scale. For XRP and MPT, no rounding
* is performed.
*
* @param asset The relevant asset
* @param value The value to be rounded
* @param scale An exponent value to establish the precision limit of
* `value`. Should be larger than `value.exponent()`.
* @return The rounded Number.
*/
[[nodiscard]] Number
roundToAsset(Asset const& asset, Number const& value, int scale);
```
Target: 1-3 lines of description plus `@param`/`@return`.
### Private Methods
Document private methods only when the logic is non-obvious. A brief
one-line comment is sufficient.
### Enums and Constants
All enums get a brief class-level description. Individual enum values get
inline documentation when the meaning is not self-evident:
```cpp
/** Result codes for transaction processing. */
enum TERCode
{
tesSUCCESS = 0, /**< Transaction succeeded. */
tecCLAIM = 100, /**< Fee claimed; transaction failed. */
tecPATH_PARTIAL = 101, /**< Path could not deliver full amount. */
};
```
## What NOT to Document
- Do not paraphrase the function signature. `/** Returns the account ID. */`
on `AccountID getAccountID()` adds zero information.
- Do not document what is obvious from well-named identifiers.
- Do not reference specific issues, PRs, or task numbers. These belong in
commit messages and rot as the codebase evolves.
- Do not add multi-paragraph docstrings. If it takes that long to explain,
the code may need restructuring.
- Do not document `.cpp` implementation files exhaustively. Focus docs on
headers where the public interface is defined.
## Quality Over Quantity
Wrong documentation is worse than no documentation. Every doc comment must
accurately describe the current behavior. When in doubt:
- Read the implementation before writing the doc
- Cross-reference against test files for edge cases
- Use `@note` to flag subtle behavior that has caught contributors before
## Doxygen Tags Reference
Tags in regular use across the codebase:
| Tag | Codebase Usage | Purpose |
|-----|----------------|---------|
| `@brief` | ~2,500 instances | Brief description (optional — autobrief is enabled) |
| `@param` | ~2,400 instances | Function parameter description |
| `@return` | ~2,200 instances | Return value description |
| `@note` | ~270 instances | Important behavioral note or caveat |
| `@throw` / `@throws` | ~450 instances combined | Exception specification |
| `@see` | ~64 instances | Cross-reference to related entities |
| `@tparam` | ~43 instances | Template parameter description |
Tags used rarely but accepted:
| Tag | Codebase Usage | Purpose |
|-----|----------------|---------|
| `@invariant` | ~13 instances | Property that must always hold |
| `@pre` | ~3 instances | Precondition |
| `@file` | 0 instances | File-level description (new convention, optional) |
## Enforcement
Documentation coverage is measured by [coverxygen](https://github.com/psycofdj/coverxygen)
and enforced in CI:
- PRs cannot decrease documentation coverage (`no_decrease` ratchet mode)
- New files added in a PR require >= 80% doc coverage
- Module-specific thresholds increase quarterly
- The doc-review GitHub Action checks whether code changes invalidate
existing documentation
Coverage is measured against public API surface: classes, structs,
functions, enums, typedefs, and variables. Private implementation details
are not counted.
## Style Notes
- Doc comments go immediately before the entity they describe (no blank
line between the comment and the declaration)
- Keep `@param` descriptions on a single line when possible
- For wrapped `@param` descriptions, indent continuation lines 4 spaces
from the `*`
- Use `@see` sparingly — only when the relationship is non-obvious
- Code style (braces, line width, formatting) is governed by `.clang-format`
and is independent of these documentation standards

View File

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ LOOKUP_CACHE_SIZE = 0
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Build related configuration options
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXTRACT_ALL = YES
EXTRACT_ALL = NO
EXTRACT_PRIVATE = YES
EXTRACT_PACKAGE = NO
EXTRACT_STATIC = YES
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ MAN_LINKS = NO
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Configuration options related to the XML output
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GENERATE_XML = NO
GENERATE_XML = YES
XML_OUTPUT = xml
XML_PROGRAMLISTING = YES

256
docs/skills/consensus.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
# Consensus
Template-based state machine in `Consensus.h` parameterized by an `Adaptor` (production: `RCLConsensus`). Three phases: `open → establish → accepted`. Four modes: `proposing`, `observing`, `wrongLedger`, `switchedLedger`. Header-only because of templating; policy decisions (`shouldCloseLedger`, `checkConsensus`, `checkConsensusReached`) live as free functions in `Consensus.cpp` for independent testability.
## Architecture
The consensus engine is fully decoupled from XRPL types via the `Adaptor` template parameter. `Adaptor` provides four type aliases (`Ledger_t`, `TxSet_t`, `NodeID_t`, `PeerPosition_t`) plus callbacks (`onClose`, `onAccept`, `onForceAccept`, `onModeChange`) and queries (`proposersValidated`, `proposersFinished`, `getPrevLedger`). Networking is hooked via `propose()` and three `share()` overloads (position, tx set, individual tx).
The engine itself has no thread or timer — it is driven externally by `timerEntry()` calls. Thread safety is the caller's responsibility.
## Key Invariants
- A ledger cannot close until the previous ledger reaches consensus AND (has transactions OR close time reached)
- Proposals must have strictly increasing sequence numbers per peer; stale proposals are silently dropped
- `ConsensusResult` constructor asserts `txns.id() == position.position()` — a node's declared position is always a commitment to a specific tx set
- The Avalanche state machine progressively raises consensus thresholds over time (`init → mid → late → stuck`) to force convergence
- `minCONSENSUS_PCT = 80` is the baseline for `checkConsensus`; timing: `ledgerMIN_CONSENSUS = 1950ms`, `ledgerMAX_CONSENSUS = 15s`, `ledgerABANDON_CONSENSUS = 120s`
- `ledgerMAX_CONSENSUS` must stay below `validationFRESHNESS` so waiting validators aren't mistaken for offline
- Dead nodes (`deadNodes_`) are permanently excluded for the round once they bow out
- LedgerTrie compression invariant: non-root nodes with zero `tipSupport` must have ≥2 children
- `ConsensusResult::disputes` holds only genuinely-differing transactions; `compares` set prevents O(n²) work when multiple peers share a tx set
## Phases and Modes
### Phase transitions (`ConsensusPhase` in `ConsensusTypes.h`)
```
"close" "accept"
open --------> establish ---------> accepted
^ | |
|---------------| |
| "startRound" |
|------------------------------------|
```
Mid-`establish` re-entry to `open` happens inside `handleWrongLedger()` — it preserves surrounding state rather than aborting. `timerEntry`, `gotTxSet`, and `peerProposal` all short-circuit when phase is `accepted`.
### Mode transitions (`ConsensusMode`)
```
proposing observing
\ /
\---> wrongLedger <---/
^
v
switchedLedger
```
`switchedLedger` is a distinct mode (not just `observing`) because close-time logic checks the mode label when deciding whether the previous ledger's close time is authoritative. `MonitoredMode` inner class wraps the enum to make silent mode changes structurally impossible — every `set()` calls `adaptor_.onModeChange(before, after)`.
## Phase Logic
### Open phase
`shouldCloseLedger()` is called per timer tick. Priority order (`Consensus.cpp`):
1. Sanity bounds — close immediately if `prevRoundTime` or `timeSincePrevClose` outside `[-1s, 10min]`
2. Majority closed — close if `proposersClosed + proposersValidated > prevProposers / 2`
3. Idle case — only close on `timeSincePrevClose >= ledgerIDLE_INTERVAL` (15s) when no transactions
4. Minimum open time — never close before `ledgerMIN_CLOSE` (2s)
5. Rate limit — block close if `openTime < prevRoundTime / 2` (prevents fast node from outrunning slower validators)
Close-time reference: if mode is `wrongLedger` or close-time wasn't agreed, use internal `prevCloseTime_` rather than the ledger's recorded close time.
### Establish phase
Per tick: `updateOurPositions()``shouldPause()``haveConsensus()`. `ledgerMIN_CONSENSUS` is enforced before any position updates. `updateOurPositions()`:
- Prunes stale peer proposals (older than `proposeFRESHNESS` = 20s)
- Calls `dispute.updateVote(convergePercent_, ...)` on each `DisputedTx`
- Rebuilds the `MutableTxSet` if any vote flipped, re-shares + re-proposes
`shouldPause()` uses a 5-phase cycle (04) keyed off `(ahead - 1) % 5`. Each phase requires progressively more validators current; phase 4 requires all. This cycles to avoid any single threshold being universally right.
### checkConsensus outcomes (`ConsensusState` in `ConsensusTypes.h`)
- `No` — insufficient agreement
- `Yes` — local + network agree on tx set (80% with self counted, via `proposing` flag in `checkConsensusReached`)
- `MovedOn` — 80% of peers finished without us (self not counted); we lost the race
- `Expired` — abandoned after `prevAgreeTime * ledgerABANDON_CONSENSUS_FACTOR` (factor=10), clamped to `[ledgerMAX_CONSENSUS, ledgerABANDON_CONSENSUS]`
The zero-peer case in `checkConsensusReached` deliberately refuses consensus until `reachedMax` — prevents premature self-close on a network slow to deliver proposals. The `stalled` case bypasses the percentage check entirely; when all disputed transactions have clear supermajority agreement either way, network commits immediately.
## Avalanche Voting
Four states defined in `ConsensusParms.h` as `std::map<AvalancheState, AvalancheCutoff>` (data-driven, not switch — supports hypothetical loops):
| State | Time threshold (% of prior round) | Required yes-vote | Next |
|---------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|--------|
| `init` | 0% | 50% | `mid` |
| `mid` | 50% | 65% | `late` |
| `late` | 85% | 70% | `stuck`|
| `stuck` | 200% | 95% | `stuck`|
`getNeededWeight()` returns `(consensusPct, optional<nextState>)`; caller does the actual state update. `avMIN_ROUNDS` prevents premature escalation on clock jitter; `avalancheCounter_` resets to zero on every state transition.
`DisputedTx::updateVote()` behaves asymmetrically:
- Proposing: `weight = (yays_*100 + (ourVote_?100:0)) / (nays_+yays_+1)`; `newPosition = weight > requiredPct`
- Not proposing: `newPosition = yays_ > nays_`, `weight = -1`. Observer never distorts proposers' weighted vote.
`DisputedTx` uses `boost::container::flat_map<NodeID_t, bool>` for peer votes (cache-friendly for small sets), pre-reserved to `numPeers`. `yays_` and `nays_` counters allow O(1) percentage computation without scanning the map. `setVote()` returns `true` on any change (including a new vote), which feeds `peerUnchangedCounter_` tracking.
Stall detection (`DisputedTx::stalled`) — all must hold:
1. `nextCutoff.consensusTime <= currentCutoff.consensusTime` (terminal `stuck` state)
2.`avMIN_ROUNDS` rounds in state
3. `peersUnchanged >= avSTALLED_ROUNDS` **OR** `currentVoteCounter_ >= avSTALLED_ROUNDS` (OR not AND — defends against a peer flip-flopping to reset the counter)
4. Vote split exceeds `minCONSENSUS_PCT` (80%) in either direction
`peerUnchangedCounter_` resets to 0 on any peer vote change in `updateDisputes()`. Close-time consensus uses a separate threshold `avCT_CONSENSUS_PCT` (75%) — close-time agreement is a simpler majority, not a multi-round ratchet.
## Proposals (`ConsensusProposal.h`)
Five fields hashed for signing: `HashPrefix::proposal`, `proposeSeq_`, `closeTime_`, `prevLedgerID_`, `position_`. Hash is `mutable std::optional<uint256>`, lazily computed; `changePosition()` and `bowOut()` must call `signingHash_.reset()` before mutating.
Sequence sentinels:
- `seqJoin = 0` — initial proposal (`isInitial()`); `ConsensusCloseTimes` collects these for clock-drift measurement
- `seqLeave = 0xffffffff` — bow-out; `changePosition()` refuses to increment past this
`seenTime()` is local wall-clock time when last updated, NOT `closeTime_` (the proposer's estimate of when the ledger should close in `NetClock`). Don't conflate them. `isStale(cutoff)` uses `seenTime()`. `operator==` includes `seenTime()`, so logically-identical proposals seen at different times don't compare equal.
The production wrapper `RCLCxPeerPos` (in `app/consensus/`) adds cryptographic signature and public key for network propagation. Template parameters `(NodeID_t, LedgerID_t, Position_t)` allow unit-test instantiation over simple integer types.
## `ConsensusTypes.h` — Vocabulary Types
- **`ConsensusTimer`**: dual `tick()` overloads — wall-clock (`steady_clock::time_point`) and fixed-increment (for deterministic simulation). Both update `dur_`; `read()` always valid. Backing `roundTime` in `ConsensusResult` feeds `prevRoundTime_`.
- **`ConsensusCloseTimes`**: `peers` is `std::map<NetClock::time_point, int>` (ordered for deterministic traversal when resolving close time); `self` is local estimate. Collects initial (`seqJoin`) proposals for clock-drift measurement.
- **`ConsensusResult`**: instantiated once per round by `closeLedger`, lives in `Consensus::result_` as `std::optional`. Holds `disputes`, `compares` work-avoidance set, `proposers` snapshot. `state` field records `ConsensusState` outcome for diagnostics.
## Wrong-Ledger Recovery
At every `timerEntry()`, `checkLedger()` calls `adaptor_.getPrevLedger()`. If diverged, `handleWrongLedger()`:
1. Calls `leaveConsensus()` — broadcasts bow-out, drops to `observing`
2. Clears peer state
3. Calls `playbackProposals()` — replays proposals from `recentPeerPositions_` (capped at 10/peer, stored regardless of ledger ID)
4. If correct ledger acquired: `startRoundInternal()` in `switchedLedger` mode; else: stays in `wrongLedger`
The bounded `recentPeerPositions_` buffer is a deliberate trade-off: small bounded buffer beats dropping proposals during switches. Recovery re-enters `open` phase mid-`establish` via `handleWrongLedger()`, preserving surrounding state.
## Common Bug Patterns
- Proposals referencing a stale `prevLedgerID_` after a ledger switch cause split-brain; always check `newPeerProp.prevLedger() != prevLedgerID_` before processing
- Resetting the consensus timer during `establish` phase causes re-convergence and potential split; timer must only reset on phase transitions
- `DisputedTx::updateVote` changes local vote based on peer pressure; bugs here cause determinism failures across nodes
- `createDisputes()` deduplicates via `result_->compares` set; missing this check creates duplicate disputes that skew vote counts
- The `peerUnchangedCounter_` is reset to 0 when any vote changes; bugs in this counter cause premature consensus declaration
- Forgetting `signingHash_.reset()` before mutating a `ConsensusProposal` returns stale hashes
- Comparing wall-clock `seenTime()` against `NetClock` `closeTime_` is a type-shaped bug waiting to happen
- Two temporal domains in `ConsensusParms`: validation/proposal parms use **NetClock seconds**; consensus-loop timers use **steady-clock milliseconds** — mixing them produces subtle bugs
## Key Code Patterns
### Proposal Validation
```cpp
if (newPeerProp.prevLedger() != prevLedgerID_)
{
JLOG(j_.debug()) << "Got proposal for " << newPeerProp.prevLedger()
<< " but we are on " << prevLedgerID_;
return;
}
```
### Complete Bow-Out Handling
```cpp
if (newPeerProp.isBowOut())
{
if (result_)
for (auto& it : result_->disputes)
it.second.unVote(peerID);
if (currPeerPositions_.find(peerID) != currPeerPositions_.end())
currPeerPositions_.erase(peerID);
deadNodes_.insert(peerID); // permanently excluded this round
}
```
### CLOG diagnostic pattern
Most methods take `std::unique_ptr<std::stringstream> const& clog = {}`. `CLOG(clog)` macro appends only when non-null — full round trace available without paying formatting cost on the hot path.
## Validations (`Validations.h`)
`Validations<Adaptor>` is templated; production uses `RCLValidationsAdaptor`. Five coordinated structures under one `mutex_`:
- `current_`: most recent per node, fast-path for quorum
- `byLedger_`: aged unordered map keyed by ledger ID
- `bySequence_`: aged unordered map for Byzantine detection
- `trie_`: `LedgerTrie<Ledger>` for preferred-ledger calc
- `acquiring_`: validations waiting on locally-unavailable ledgers
`ValidationParms` windows: `validationCURRENT_WALL=5min`, `validationCURRENT_LOCAL=3min`, `validationCURRENT_EARLY=3min`, `validationSET_EXPIRES=10min`, `validationFRESHNESS=20s` (used only for laggard detection, not staleness). Fields are mutable instance members, not `constexpr` — simulations inject alternate values.
`isCurrent()` checks two clocks independently: signer's wall time and our local steady-clock first-observation time. Arithmetic promotes to signed 64-bit to avoid underflow on untrusted `signTime`.
`SeqEnforcer<Seq>` rejects regressed/duplicate sequences but resets its high-water mark after `validationSET_EXPIRES` with no new validation — long-offline validators can rejoin.
`add()` classification (in order):
- Same seq, different ledger/sign time → `ValStatus::conflicting` (possible Byzantine)
- Same seq + ledger, different cookie → `ValStatus::multiple` (misconfig/duplicate)
- Otherwise → `ValStatus::badSeq`
All trie queries go through `withTrie()`, which first flushes stale entries via `current()` then promotes newly-available ledgers via `checkAcquired()`. `lastLedger_` tracks each node's trie contribution so `removeTrie()` can atomically undo before re-inserting.
`getPreferred(curr)` fallback: trie → `acquiring_` (max waiters) → `nullopt`. Conservative switch rule: if preferred is an immediate child of current working ledger, stay put.
`trustChanged()` iterates `current_` and full `byLedger_` to propagate UNL changes — trie reflects only currently trusted validators.
`setSeqToKeep([low, high))` pins a range against eviction by "touching" entries near expiry. Throttled to once per `(validationSET_EXPIRES - validationFRESHNESS)` window.
## LedgerTrie (`LedgerTrie.h`)
Compressed prefix trie over ledger ancestry — ledger history is treated as a string over the alphabet of ledger IDs. Each `Node` carries a `Span` (half-open `[start_, end_)`), two counters, raw parent pointer, owned children.
- `tipSupport`: validations exactly matching this node's tip
- `branchSupport`: `tipSupport` + sum of descendants' `branchSupport`
Counters propagate up the parent chain on every `insert`/`remove`. Non-root nodes with zero tip and ≤1 child violate the compression invariant and are merged.
`insert()` may do up to two structural ops:
1. Split — extract suffix into new child inheriting children + counts, truncate found node
2. Branch — append new leaf
`remove()` uses `findByLedgerID()` (O(n) exact match), not the prefix-based `find()`.
`getPreferred(largestIssued)` — the algorithmic heart. Walks from root using "preferred by branch": validators with last validation below the current frontier are *uncommitted* (could swing any branch). A branch advances only when `branchSupport` exceeds *uncommitted*, and a child wins only when its `branchSupport` lead over the runner-up exceeds *uncommitted* (with `startID()` tie-break). The strictly-greater-than margin prevents thrashing when validators lag.
`seqSupport: std::map<Seq, uint32_t>` (ordered for in-sequence walk) drives the uncommitted accounting.
`checkInvariants()` does full DFS — used heavily in tests; verifies compression rule, counter consistency, parent links, and `seqSupport` sums.
`Ledger` template contract: cheap copy, `seq()`, `operator[](Seq)` returning `ID{0}` for unknowns, `MakeGenesis{}` tag, free `mismatch(Ledger,Ledger)`. Unique history invariant: agreement on any ancestor ID implies agreement on all earlier ancestors.
`SpanTip<Ledger>` is the return type of `getPreferred()` — a lightweight struct with the tip's seq, ID, and a ledger copy for ancestor lookups. `Span::diff()` delegates to `mismatch()` to find first divergence point.
## Amendments
- 80% validator support for 2 weeks to enable; tracked via `AmendmentTable` with `amendmentMap_`
- New amendments: add to `features.macro` with `XRPL_FEATURE`/`XRPL_FIX`, increment `numFeatures` in `Feature.h`
- Unsupported enabled amendment blocks the server (`setAmendmentBlocked`); no mechanism to disable/revoke
- Voting happens each consensus round in `doVoting`; votes persisted in `FeatureVotes` SQLite table
- `fixAmendmentMajorityCalc` changed the threshold calculation; check which applies
## UNL and Negative UNL
- N-UNL temporarily disables unreliable validators (max 25% of UNL: `negativeUNLMaxListed = 0.25`)
- Scoring via `buildScoreTable` over recent ledger history; low watermark 50% = disable candidate, high 80% = re-enable
- Candidate selection deterministic via previous ledger hash as randomizing pad
- `newValidatorDisableSkip = FLAG_LEDGER_INTERVAL * 2` prevents disabling newly joined validators
## Transaction Ordering
- `CanonicalTXSet`: salted account key (XOR random salt) → seq proxy → tx ID. Salt prevents ordering manipulation
- `TxQ` uses `OrderCandidates`: higher fee level first, then `txID XOR parentHash` tiebreaker
- Per-account limit `maximumTxnPerAccount`; blocked transactions held until blocker resolves
## Key Files
- `src/xrpld/consensus/Consensus.h` — state machine (header-only template)
- `src/xrpld/consensus/Consensus.cpp` — free policy functions (`shouldCloseLedger`, `checkConsensus`, `checkConsensusReached`)
- `src/xrpld/consensus/ConsensusParms.h` — all numeric thresholds; dual-clock (NetClock seconds vs steady ms)
- `src/xrpld/consensus/ConsensusTypes.h``ConsensusMode`, `ConsensusPhase`, `ConsensusState`, `ConsensusTimer`, `ConsensusCloseTimes`, `ConsensusResult`
- `src/xrpld/consensus/ConsensusProposal.h` — proposal record with sequence protocol and lazy signing hash
- `src/xrpld/consensus/DisputedTx.h` — per-tx avalanche voting and stall detection
- `src/xrpld/consensus/Validations.h` — validation tracking, indexing, trie integration
- `src/xrpld/consensus/LedgerTrie.h` — compressed ancestry trie for preferred-ledger calc
- `src/xrpld/app/consensus/RCLConsensus.cpp` — XRPL `Adaptor` implementation
- `src/xrpld/app/misc/detail/AmendmentTable.cpp` — amendment voting logic
- `src/xrpld/app/misc/NegativeUNLVote.cpp` — N-UNL voting
- `src/xrpld/app/misc/CanonicalTXSet.h` — tx ordering

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# Cryptography
XRPL supports secp256k1 (ECDSA) and ed25519 key types. All crypto uses OpenSSL + dedicated libs (libsecp256k1, ed25519-donna). The `xrpl::crypto` layer provides three foundational utilities — a CSPRNG, secure memory erasure, and RFC 1751 mnemonic encoding — that underpin all key/seed handling.
## Module Layout
Three small, focused TUs form the foundation; protocol-level types (`SecretKey`, `PublicKey`, `Seed`) in `src/libxrpl/protocol/` consume them.
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `include/xrpl/crypto/csprng.h` / `src/libxrpl/crypto/csprng.cpp` | `csprng_engine` + `crypto_prng()` singleton; wraps OpenSSL `RAND_bytes`/`RAND_add`/`RAND_poll` |
| `include/xrpl/crypto/secure_erase.h` / `src/libxrpl/crypto/secure_erase.cpp` | One-line delegation to `OPENSSL_cleanse`; canonical wipe primitive |
| `include/xrpl/crypto/RFC1751.h` / `src/libxrpl/crypto/RFC1751.cpp` | Static class; 2048-word mnemonic codec + `getWordFromBlob` utility |
## Key Invariants
- `SecretKey` and `Seed` destructors call `secure_erase` on their internal buffer as the very first action; any new sensitive type must follow this pattern (covers exception unwind paths too)
- ed25519 public keys are prefixed with `0xED` (33 bytes total); secp256k1 keys are 33-byte compressed
- `sha512Half` (first 32 bytes of SHA-512) is the standard hash used throughout XRPL for node hashing, signing, etc.
- `RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(x))` is used for account ID derivation (`ripesha_hasher`)
- Base58 encoding includes a type byte prefix and 4-byte checksum (double SHA-256)
- All randomness for cryptographic material flows through `crypto_prng()`; never call OpenSSL's `RAND_bytes` directly and never use `std::rand`/`rand()`
- `csprng_engine` is non-copyable and non-movable (deleted ops); the singleton must be accessed by reference via `crypto_prng()`
- `csprng_engine` satisfies the C++ *UniformRandomNumberEngine* named requirement (`result_type` = `std::uint64_t`, `operator()()`, `constexpr min()`/`max()`) — plugs into `std::uniform_int_distribution`, `beast::rngfill`, etc.
- RFC 1751 dictionary has exactly 2^11 = 2048 entries; indices 0570 are words ≤ 3 chars, 5712047 are exactly 4 chars (exploited in `wsrch` to halve binary search range)
- Each RFC 1751 word encodes exactly 11 bits; a 64-bit block uses 6 words (66 bits = 64 data + 2 parity); a 128-bit key uses two such blocks → 12 words total
## Common Bug Patterns
- Mixing up key types: secp256k1 signing hashes the message with `sha512Half` first; ed25519 signs the raw message
- `signDigest` only works with secp256k1; calling it with ed25519 throws a logic error
- Signature canonicality: ed25519 `verify` checks canonicality before calling `ed25519_sign_open`; non-canonical signatures are rejected
- Overlay handshake uses `signDigest` to sign the session fingerprint (`sharedValue`); the signature binds the TLS session to the node identity
- Relying on a naive `memset` to wipe key material — optimizer will eliminate it as a dead store; must use `secure_erase`
- Forgetting to wipe *intermediate* derivation buffers (SHA-512 halves, scratch arrays) after the final `SecretKey` has taken its copy
- Constructing a second `csprng_engine` instance: forbidden by deleted ctors; sharing one OpenSSL pool through the singleton is required
- Passing `mix_entropy` a buffer and assuming OpenSSL credits it as entropy — the entropy estimate passed to `RAND_add` is always `0` (deliberately conservative; `std::random_device` may be weak on some platforms)
- RFC 1751 decode: distinguish `1` (success), `0` (unknown word), `-1` (malformed input), `-2` (parity failure) — do not collapse all failures into a single error
- `insert()` in RFC 1751 uses bitwise OR, not assignment — output buffer must start zero-initialized
- Treating RFC 1751 parity as cryptographic integrity — it's a 2-bit transcription check, not a MAC
- Using `getWordFromBlob` for anything cryptographic — it's a Jenkins one-at-a-time hash and explicitly insecure
## Review Checklist
- New crypto code must use `crypto_prng()` singleton for randomness, never raw `rand()` or direct OpenSSL `RAND_*`
- Secret key buffers must be `secure_erase`d after use (destructors *and* intermediate scratch buffers)
- Verify that key type dispatch handles both secp256k1 and ed25519 (or explicitly rejects one with a clear error)
- Any new sensitive type should follow the `SecretKey`/`Seed` pattern: destructor calls `secure_erase` as its first/only action
- New OpenSSL touchpoints should respect the `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L` thread-safety guard pattern used in `csprng.cpp`
- CSPRNG failures (`RAND_bytes`/`RAND_poll` ≠ 1) must propagate via `Throw<>` (logs stack trace) — never silently fall back
- `RAND_cleanup()` must only be called for OpenSSL `< 1.1.0`; modern versions handle cleanup via `atexit`
## Key Patterns
### Secure Erasure
```cpp
// REQUIRED: destructor must erase secret material
SecretKey::~SecretKey()
{
secure_erase(buf_, sizeof(buf_));
}
// REQUIRED: erase intermediate buffers after use
beast::rngfill(buf, sizeof(buf), crypto_prng());
SecretKey sk(Slice{buf, sizeof(buf)});
secure_erase(buf, sizeof(buf)); // MUST erase raw buffer
```
`secure_erase` delegates to `OPENSSL_cleanse`, which uses volatile writes / opaque function-pointer calls to defeat dead-store elimination. Lives in a separate TU (`secure_erase.cpp`) so the call site cannot inline it away — the out-of-line call forces the compiler to treat it as an opaque side effect. It does **not** clear CPU registers or caches — best-effort for heap/stack only (see Percival 2014). Takes raw `void*` + byte count with no null/zero guards; callers must supply valid arguments.
Wrapping behind `xrpl::secure_erase` provides one auditable choke point if the underlying strategy ever changes (e.g., switching to `explicit_bzero`). `OPENSSL_cleanse` is preferred over platform-specific alternatives (`memset_s`, `explicit_bzero`, `SecureZeroMemory`) because OpenSSL already centralizes cross-platform portability for the rest of the crypto stack.
### CSPRNG Usage
```cpp
// Singleton access; never copy/store by value
auto& rng = crypto_prng();
// Bulk fill — preferred for key material
std::uint8_t buf[32];
rng(buf, sizeof(buf)); // operator()(void*, size_t)
// Or via beast adapter satisfying UniformRandomNumberEngine
beast::rngfill(buf, sizeof(buf), crypto_prng());
```
Constructor calls `RAND_poll()` eagerly to surface entropy failures at startup rather than at first key gen. Failure throws `std::runtime_error("CSPRNG: Insufficient entropy")` via `Throw<>`; callers generally do not catch — propagation halts the operation, which is correct.
### Key Type Dispatch
```cpp
// REQUIRED: handle both key types or explicitly reject
if (type == KeyType::ed25519)
{ /* ed25519 path */ }
else if (type == KeyType::secp256k1)
{ /* secp256k1 path */ }
else
LogicError("unknown key type"); // MUST NOT fall through silently
```
### RFC 1751 Mnemonic Encoding
```cpp
// 16-byte (128-bit) seed <-> 12-word mnemonic
std::string words;
RFC1751::getEnglishFromKey(words, std::string{seedBytes, 16});
std::string roundTrip;
int rc = RFC1751::getKeyFromEnglish(roundTrip, words);
// rc: 1=success, 0=unknown word, -1=malformed, -2=parity mismatch
```
`Seed.cpp` reverses the 16 bytes before/after RFC 1751 encoding to match the RFC's big-endian convention. `standard()` normalizes input by uppercasing and applying visual substitutions `1→L`, `0→O`, `5→S` for handwritten/OCR tolerance. The 2-bit parity per 8-byte half is a transcription check, **not** a cryptographic integrity check.
`getKeyFromEnglish` uses `boost::algorithm::split` with `token_compress_on` for whitespace tolerance. Encoder (`getEnglishFromKey`) has no return code — encoding is lossless and cannot fail on valid 16-byte input. Decoder (`getKeyFromEnglish`) has a 4-valued return code — it must validate user-supplied strings.
`getWordFromBlob` is a separate utility: Jenkins one-at-a-time hash → `% 2048` → one dictionary word. Explicitly **not** cryptographically secure; used in `NetworkOPs.cpp` for `shroudedHostId` (privacy-preserving node label in logs/RPC). Reuses the RFC 1751 dictionary purely for its vetted set of short, pronounceable words.
## CSPRNG Internals
- Constructor calls `RAND_poll()` eagerly; destructor calls `RAND_cleanup()` only for OpenSSL `< 1.1.0` (modern versions clean up via `atexit`)
- Thread-safety mutex is compile-time gated: `#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)` — modern builds elide the lock on the hot path (`RAND_bytes` is internally thread-safe in OpenSSL ≥ 1.1.0). The mutex is *always* held around `RAND_add` in `mix_entropy` regardless of version
- `mix_entropy` reads 128 values from `std::random_device` *before* locking (independently thread-safe), then locks for `RAND_add`
- `mix_entropy` passes entropy estimate `0` to `RAND_add` — never claim entropy for `std::random_device` or caller-supplied buffers (conservative accounting prevents prematurely satisfying OpenSSL's seeding threshold)
- `mix_entropy` is called on a timer from `Application.cpp` to stir fresh OS entropy during the node's lifetime
- Singleton is a function-local `static` (Meyers singleton); C++11 guarantees thread-safe one-time init
- Scalar `operator()()` delegates to buffer-fill overload with `sizeof(result_type)` (8 bytes) — both paths share validation/error handling
## RFC 1751 Internals
- `extract(s, start, length)` / `insert(s, x, start, length)`: read/write `length ≤ 11` bits at arbitrary offset across a 9-byte buffer; guarded by `XRPL_ASSERT` (stripped in release). Both work across byte boundaries by assembling 23 adjacent bytes into a 24-bit window
- `insert` uses bitwise OR (not assignment) — output buffer must start zero-initialized; partial writes accumulate safely
- `btoe` appends a 9th byte for 2-bit parity computed by summing all 32 bit-pairs across the 64-bit payload; parity occupies bit positions 6465
- `etob` validates: exactly 6 words, each 14 chars, all in dictionary, parity matches — distinct error codes per failure mode (`0` unknown, `-1` malformed, `-2` parity)
- `wsrch` halves the binary search range based on input word length: `[0, 571)` for ≤3-char words, `[571, 2048)` for 4-char words
- No exceptions used anywhere in RFC 1751 — all errors are integer return codes
- All methods are static; `RFC1751` is a pure stateless utility class — instantiation is never needed
## Key Files
- `include/xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h` / `PublicKey.h` — key types
- `src/libxrpl/protocol/SecretKey.cpp` — signing, key generation; canonical example of CSPRNG + `secure_erase` discipline
- `src/libxrpl/protocol/PublicKey.cpp` — verification
- `src/libxrpl/protocol/Seed.cpp` — 128-bit seed; uses RFC 1751 for mnemonic encoding (reverses bytes for big-endian convention)
- `include/xrpl/protocol/digest.h` — hash functions (`sha512Half`, `ripesha_hasher`, etc.)
- `include/xrpl/crypto/csprng.h` + `src/libxrpl/crypto/csprng.cpp` — CSPRNG engine and singleton
- `include/xrpl/crypto/secure_erase.h` + `src/libxrpl/crypto/secure_erase.cpp` — memory wipe primitive
- `include/xrpl/crypto/RFC1751.h` + `src/libxrpl/crypto/RFC1751.cpp` — mnemonic codec
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/Handshake.cpp` — overlay handshake crypto
- `src/xrpld/app/main/Application.cpp` — periodic `mix_entropy` calls
- `src/xrpld/app/misc/NetworkOPs.cpp` — uses `getWordFromBlob` for `shroudedHostId`

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# xrpld Codebase Skills Index
## Description
This is the top-level guide for all best-practices skills in this repository. Use this to understand the codebase organization and find the right skill for any task.
## When to Use Skills
Reference a skill whenever you are:
- **Writing new code** in a module - check the skill first for established patterns
- **Modifying existing code** - verify your changes follow module conventions
- **Adding a new transaction type** - see `libxrpl/tx/transactors.md` for the full template
- **Debugging** - skills list key files and common pitfalls per module
- **Reviewing code** - skills document what "correct" looks like for each module
## Codebase Architecture
The codebase is split into two main areas:
### `src/libxrpl/` — The Library (skills in `.claude/skills/libxrpl/`)
Reusable library code: data types, serialization, cryptography, ledger state, transaction processing, and storage. This is the **protocol layer**.
| Module | Responsibility |
|--------|---------------|
| `basics` | Foundational types: Buffer, Slice, base_uint, Number, logging, error contracts |
| `beast` | Support layer: Journal logging, test framework, instrumentation, IP types |
| `conditions` | Crypto-conditions (RFC): fulfillment validation, DER encoding |
| `core` | Job queue, load monitoring, hash-based message dedup |
| `crypto` | CSPRNG, secure erasure, RFC1751 encoding |
| `json` | Json::Value, parsing, serialization, StaticString optimization |
| `ledger` | ReadView/ApplyView, state tables, payment sandbox, credit ops |
| `net` | HTTP/HTTPS client, SSL certs, async I/O |
| `nodestore` | Persistent node storage: RocksDB, NuDB, Memory backends |
| `protocol` | STObject hierarchy, SField, Serializer, TER codes, Features, Keylets |
| `proto` | Protocol Buffer generated headers (gRPC API definitions) |
| `rdb` | SOCI database wrapper, checkpointing |
| `resource` | Rate limiting, endpoint tracking, abuse prevention |
| `server` | Port config, SSL/TLS, WebSocket, admin networks |
| `shamap` | SHA-256 Merkle radix tree (16-way branching, COW) |
| `tx` | Transaction pipeline: Transactor base, preflight/preclaim/doApply |
### `src/xrpld/` — The Server Application (skills in `.claude/skills/xrpld/`)
The running rippled server: application lifecycle, consensus, networking, RPC, and peer management. This is the **application layer**.
| Module | Responsibility |
|--------|---------------|
| `app` | Application singleton, ledger management, consensus adapters, services |
| `app/main` | Application initialization and lifecycle |
| `app/ledger` | Ledger storage, retrieval, immutable state management |
| `app/consensus` | RCL consensus adapters (bridges generic algorithm to rippled) |
| `app/misc` | Fee voting, amendments, SHAMapStore, TxQ, validators, NetworkOPs |
| `app/paths` | Payment path finding algorithm, trust line caching |
| `app/rdb` | Application-level database operations |
| `app/tx` | Application-level transaction handling |
| `consensus` | Generic consensus algorithm (CRTP-based, app-independent) |
| `core` | Configuration (Config.h), time keeping, network ID |
| `overlay` | P2P networking: peer connections, protocol buffers, clustering |
| `peerfinder` | Network discovery: bootcache, livecache, slot management |
| `perflog` | Performance logging and instrumentation |
| `rpc` | RPC handler dispatch, coroutine suspension, 40+ command handlers |
| `shamap` | Application-level SHAMap operations (NodeFamily) |
### `include/xrpl/` — Header Files
Headers live in `include/xrpl/` and mirror the `src/libxrpl/` structure. Each skill already references its corresponding headers in the "Key Files" section.
## Cross-Cutting Conventions
### Error Handling
- **Transaction errors**: Return `TER` enum (tesSUCCESS, tecFROZEN, temBAD_AMOUNT, etc.)
- **Logic errors**: `Throw<std::runtime_error>()`, `LogicError()`, `XRPL_ASSERT()`
- **I/O errors**: `Status` enum or `boost::system::error_code`
- **RPC errors**: Inject via `context.params`
### Assertions
```cpp
XRPL_ASSERT(condition, "ClassName::method : description"); // Debug only
XRPL_VERIFY(condition, "ClassName::method : description"); // Always enabled
```
### Logging
```cpp
JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Message"; // Always wrap in JLOG macro
```
### Memory Management
- `IntrusiveRefCounts` + `SharedIntrusive` for shared ownership in libxrpl
- `std::shared_ptr` for shared ownership in xrpld
- `std::unique_ptr` for exclusive ownership
- `CountedObject<T>` mixin for instance tracking
### Feature Gating
```cpp
if (ctx.rules.enabled(featureMyFeature)) { /* new behavior */ }
```
### Code Organization
- Headers in `include/xrpl/`, implementations in `src/libxrpl/` or `src/xrpld/`
- `#pragma once` (never `#ifndef` guards)
- `namespace xrpl { }` for all code
- `detail/` namespace for internal helpers
- Factory functions: `make_*()` returning `unique_ptr` or `shared_ptr`
## Subsystem Skills (soul/)
Concise invariants, bug patterns, and review checklists for each subsystem:
| Subsystem | File | Focus |
|-----------|------|-------|
| Consensus | `soul/consensus.md` | State machine, amendments, UNL, validations, TX ordering |
| Cryptography | `soul/cryptography.md` | Key types, signing, hashing, handshake |
| Ledger | `soul/ledger.md` | Immutability, acquisition, entry types |
| NodeStore | `soul/nodestore.md` | Backends, caching, online deletion |
| Peering | `soul/peering.md` | Overlay, connections, squelching |
| Protocol | `soul/protocol.md` | Macros, serialization format, field ordering |
| RPC | `soul/rpc.md` | Handler dispatch, roles, subscriptions |
| SHAMap | `soul/shamap.md` | COW, node types, sync, proofs |
| SQL | `soul/sql.md` | Schema, config, checkpointing |
| Testing | `soul/test.md` | JTx framework, Env setup, TER expectations, amendment gating |
| Transactors | `soul/transactors.md` | Pipeline, new TX types, signing, transactor template |
| WebSockets | `soul/websockets.md` | Session lifecycle, flow control |
### Workflow & Processes
| Skill | File |
|-------|------|
| Workflow Orchestration | `workflow.md` |
| Task Management | `task-management.md` |
| Amendment Creation | `amendment.md` |
| Merge Conflicts | `merge-conflicts.md` |

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# Ledger
Each ledger is an immutable snapshot: header (seq, hashes, close time) + state SHAMap + transaction SHAMap. `LedgerMaster` is the central coordinator. The module spans `Ledger` itself, the view hierarchy (`ReadView``ApplyView``OpenView`/`Sandbox`/`PaymentSandbox`), directory primitives, subscription/order-book fan-out (`BookListeners`, `OrderBookDB`), governance state (`AmendmentTable`), pending-save bookkeeping, and a large family of per-object-type helper free functions.
## Key Invariants
- Once `setImmutable()` is called, the ledger and its SHAMaps cannot change; only immutable ledgers can be shared across threads. Mutable ledgers must not be shared.
- Every server always has an open ledger; the open ledger cannot close until previous consensus completes.
- Ledger header hashes to the ledger's identity hash; includes state root, tx root, parent hash, total coins, close time.
- `LedgerMaster` tracks: `mPubLedger` (last published), `mValidLedger` (last validated), `mLedgerHistory` (cache).
- Validation requires minimum trusted validations (`minVal`); filtered by Negative UNL.
- Open ledgers store transactions without metadata; closed ledgers store `addVL(tx)||addVL(meta)` and produce `TxMeta` on apply.
- Trust-line `sfBalance` is always stored "low account's perspective"; helpers negate when querying from high side. The `sfLowLimit.account < sfHighLimit.account` ordering is the trust-line orientation invariant — every access decides which side is "us" via `AccountID` comparison.
- Directory invariant: page keys are chosen so the low 96 bits of every token in an NFT page are strictly less than the page key's low 96 bits; for owner/order-book directories, page 0 is the anchor and `sfIndexPrevious` on root points to the tail.
- `PendingSaves` invariant: exactly one of `saveLedgerAsync`/`pendSaveValidated` may run for a given ledger sequence at a time; second caller observes `started == true` and bails.
- `ApplyStateTable` pointer-identity invariant: `erase(sle)` and `update(sle)` require the exact same `shared_ptr` obtained from `peek()` on the same view instance. Crossing views is a `LogicError`.
- `RawStateTable` state-machine collapse: `erase` after `insert` removes the entry entirely (net zero); `insert` after `erase` upgrades to `replace`; double-erase is a `LogicError`.
## Common Bug Patterns
- Modifying a ledger after `setImmutable()` corrupts shared state; always check `mImmutable` before mutation.
- Gap detection: if ledgers 603 and 600 exist but 601-602 are missing, `LedgerMaster` requests 602 first, then backfills 601.
- `InboundLedger::gotData()` queues data for processing; calling `done()` before all data arrives creates incomplete ledgers.
- `checkAccept` won't accept a ledger that isn't ahead of the last validated ledger; stale validations are silently ignored.
- Calling `ApplyViewImpl::apply()` twice or using the view after apply: the only valid operation post-apply is destruction.
- Passing an SLE from `peek()` on view A to `erase()`/`update()` on view B: `ApplyStateTable` enforces pointer identity and `LogicError`s.
- Forgetting that `read()` is change-aware but `slesBegin/End` iterates only the base — pending inserts won't appear in SLE iteration on `ApplyViewBase`.
- Comparing iterators across different `ReadView` instances: `XRPL_ASSERT` fires in debug; UB in release.
- Stale `OpenView::txCount` ordinal in nested/batch views — must use `batch_view_t` constructor to capture `baseTxCount_`.
- Calling `removeExpired`/`deleteSLE` in preclaim — preclaim is `ReadView`-only; expiry-driven deletion only happens in doApply.
- Forgetting that `directSendNoFee` is not `[[nodiscard]]` (for `DirectStep.cpp` compatibility) — its return must still be inspected.
- Accessing trust-line endpoints by raw low/high without first computing orientation — use the trust-line helpers that take `(account, peer)` and resolve which slot to touch.
- Constructing a `PaymentSandbox` from `ApplyView&` when nested within another payment: the nested form takes `PaymentSandbox const*` so `DeferredCredits` chain to the parent. Wrong constructor = double-spend escape.
- Updating an SLE then publishing subscriptions before `havePublished` advances: re-entrant publishers see partial state.
- Submitting to `OrderBookDB` while holding `mLock` from a callback — `setup_` ingests under its own write lock and may re-enter.
- `AcceptedLedgerTx` constructor asserts `!ledger->open()` — constructing from an open ledger aborts in debug.
- Calling `closeChannel` before `sfAmount >= sfBalance` invariant holds — the `XRPL_ASSERT` inside will abort; fix the calling transactor, not the helper.
- `ReadView` copy/move constructors always re-initialize `sles(*this)` and `txs(*this)` — subclasses must not rely on memberwise copy of those range objects.
- `forEachItemAfter` hint-page optimization: if the hint is stale the code falls back to linear scan but still returns `false` if `after` key is never found; callers must handle this as an invalid cursor.
- `dirIsEmpty` requires both empty `sfIndexes` *and* zero `sfIndexNext` — an empty root page does not mean an empty directory if subsequent pages exist.
## Ledger Entry Types
- Defined in `ledger_entries.macro` using `LEDGER_ENTRY(type, code, class, name, fields)`.
- Each entry has an `SOTemplate` defining required/optional fields.
- Key computation: `Indexes.cpp` computes unique keys (keylets) for each ledger object type.
- `STLedgerEntry` wraps the serialized data with type-safe field access.
- Pseudo-account types (AMM, Vault, LoanBroker) are discovered by scanning `ltACCOUNT_ROOT` SOTemplate for `SField::sMD_PseudoAccount`-flagged fields; no manual registration.
## View Hierarchy
```
ReadView (abstract, read-only)
└── DigestAwareReadView (adds per-entry digest for CachedView)
└── Ledger (final; owns stateMap_ + txMap_)
└── OpenView (mutable; ReadView + TxsRawView; delta over base)
└── detail::ApplyViewBase (ApplyView + RawView; buffered via ApplyStateTable)
├── ApplyViewImpl (commit path; produces TxMeta; carries deliver_)
├── Sandbox (discardable; flush via apply(RawView&))
└── PaymentSandbox (overrides credit/balance hooks; DeferredCredits)
```
- `ApplyStateTable` (per-tx buffer): actions `cache`/`insert`/`modify`/`erase`; generates `TxMeta` with `sfPreviousFields`/`sfFinalFields`/`sfNewFields` driven by `SField::sMD_*` flags; threads `sfPreviousTxnID`/`sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq` on affected account roots and trust-line endpoints. On `apply()` the buffer is flushed into the base `RawView` and the table is reset; using the table afterward is UB. A byte-equal `sfModifiedNode` is silently omitted from metadata.
- `RawStateTable` (used by `OpenView` and `RawStateTable::apply` flush): three actions only; state-machine collapse — `insert + erase → removed entirely`; `insert + replace → insert with new SLE`; `erase + insert (modify) → replace`. No `TxMeta` is produced because `RawView` is the post-apply mutation surface.
- Both tables use `boost::container::pmr::monotonic_buffer_resource` with a 256 KB initial arena; `unique_ptr` for stable address so map allocators work after move. Memory is released only when the table is destroyed — long-lived tables leak peak working set.
- `ReadViewFwdRange` is the iterator/range adapter used for `sles`/`txs` traversal; iterator equality is anchored to the owning view (`XRPL_ASSERT` cross-view comparisons in debug). Virtual clone via `iter_base::copy()` enables value-semantics copying. Deferred dereference caches the result in `mutable std::optional<value_type> cache_`; `operator++` clears the cache.
- `CachedView` (`CachedLedger = CachedView<Ledger>`): two-level cache — per-view `map_<key, digest>` plus process-wide `CachedSLEs` (`TaggedCache<uint256, SLE const>`) keyed by digest. The per-view map uses `hardened_hash` to defeat hash-flooding from adversarial keylet sequences. Hit/hitExpired/miss counters distinguish full hit, digest-known-but-SLE-evicted, and cold miss. The expensive `base_.digest()` and `base_.read()` calls happen outside the lock; `mutex_` protects only the key→digest map.
- Hooks pattern: `balanceHookIOU/MPT`, `ownerCountHook` (read side, on `ReadView`) and `creditHookIOU/MPT`, `adjustOwnerCountHook`, `issuerSelfDebitHookMPT` (write side, on `ApplyView`) are no-ops by default; `PaymentSandbox` overrides them to prevent within-payment double-spend.
- `isDryRun` path in `apply(OpenView&...)`: full `TxMeta` is built and returned as `std::optional<TxMeta>`, but state changes and `rawTxInsert` are suppressed. Used for fee simulation.
## Directory Structures
Three distinct paged-list flavors, all `ltDIR_NODE`-based:
- **Owner / book directories** (`ApplyView::dirInsert`/`dirAppend`/`dirRemove`/`dirDelete`): root at page 0; `sfIndexNext`/`sfIndexPrevious` linked; root's `sfIndexPrevious` points to tail for O(1) append. `dirAppend` preserves insertion order (offers only, asserted); `dirInsert` keeps sorted order within each page. Page overflow detected via deliberate `uint64_t` wraparound (compile-time `static_assert`ed). `describe` callback brands each new page with type-specific fields (e.g., `sfOwner`).
- **NFToken pages** (`NFTokenHelpers`): tokens packed into `STArray`-bearing pages, sorted by `compareTokens()` (low 96 bits, then full ID). Last page anchored at `keylet::nftpage_max(owner)`. Split algorithm respects equivalence groups (identical low 96 bits); merge across adjacent pages on remove. `fixNFTokenPageLinks` amendment changes empty-last-page handling.
- **Quality-keyed order books** (`BookDirs`): two-level — `succ()` finds next quality directory in `[root_, getQualityNext(root_))`, then `cdirFirst`/`cdirNext` walks pages within that quality. `BookDirs` iterator transparently crosses quality boundaries.
The `Dir` class is a simple range adaptor (NFTokenOffer directories + unit tests); `next_page()` is public to allow page-skipping traversal (used by `notTooManyOffers`).
## Helper Module (`include/xrpl/ledger/helpers/`)
Free functions per ledger-object type. The asset-agnostic dispatcher is `TokenHelpers.h`, which routes `Asset` (`std::variant<Issue, MPTIssue>`) via `std::visit` to `RippleStateHelpers` (IOU) or `MPTokenHelpers` (MPT).
Conventional split:
- Stateless / preflight-safe checks: take `ReadView const&`
- State-mutating: take `ApplyView&`
- Two-phase pattern: read-only preclaim function (`credentials::valid`/`validDomain`) paired with mutating doApply counterpart (`verifyDepositPreauth`/`verifyValidDomain`) that prunes expired entries
Key files: `AMMHelpers`, `AccountRootHelpers`, `CredentialHelpers`, `DelegateHelpers`, `DirectoryHelpers`, `EscrowHelpers`, `MPTokenHelpers`, `NFTokenHelpers`, `OfferHelpers`, `PaymentChannelHelpers`, `PermissionedDEXHelpers`, `RippleStateHelpers`, `TokenHelpers`, `VaultHelpers`.
Policy enums (used to avoid bare bools): `FreezeHandling`, `AuthHandling`, `SpendableHandling`, `WaiveTransferFee`, `AllowMPTOverflow`, `AuthType` (`StrongAuth`/`WeakAuth`/`Legacy` — Legacy maps to StrongAuth for MPT, WeakAuth for IOU), `TruncateShares`.
## AMM Rounding Contract
The pool invariant `sqrt(asset1 × asset2) >= LPTokenBalance` is non-negotiable, so every formula has explicit directional rounding:
- Swap-in: output rounds **down** (trader gets less, pool retains).
- Swap-out: input rounds **up** (trader pays more).
- LP token deposit: tokens **down**, assets **up**.
- LP token withdrawal: tokens **up**, assets **down**.
`fixAMMv1_1` introduced per-step rounding (vs end-only); `fixAMMv1_3` extended this discipline to LP/deposit/withdraw paths via `multiply(balance, frac, mode)` and the `getRoundedAsset`/`getRoundedLPTokens` wrappers (two overloads each — direct and lambda-deferred). Pre-amendment paths must be preserved for historic replay.
`adjustLPTokens`: avoids precision loss when adding small token amounts to large `LPTokensBalance` by computing `(balance + tokens) - balance` rather than `tokens`. Becomes a no-op under `fixAMMv1_3`.
`changeSpotPriceQuality`: aligns AMM synthetic offer to CLOB best quality. Solves a quadratic (or linear, for the alternate constraint) and takes the smaller binding result. `fixAMMv1_1` switched the starting side to always-XRP-first to avoid XRP-drop discretization undershoot. `detail::reduceOffer` applies 0.01% rescue multiplier when quality still falls below target.
`solveQuadraticEqSmallest()` uses the numerically stable "citardauq" formula (Blinn's paper) to avoid catastrophic cancellation when `b > 0` in the standard form.
## MPT Specifics
- `OutstandingAmount` can transiently exceed `MaximumAmount` during payment-engine routing — `AllowMPTOverflow::Yes` raises the ceiling to `UINT64_MAX` for that case; direct sends use `No` and strict cap. The `fixSecurity3_1_3` amendment makes `accountSendMulti` accumulate in exact `uint64_t` (not `STAmount`/`Number`) to avoid 19-digit precision loss in aggregate overflow checks.
- `selfDebit` field on `IssuerValueMPT` in `PaymentSandbox::DeferredCredits` tracks issuer-as-seller offers because the payment engine credits first; `balanceHookSelfIssueMPT` caps available issuance at `origBalance - selfDebit`.
- Two-phase auth: `requireAuth` (preclaim, `ReadView`) checks the static authorization predicates; `enforceMPTokenAuthorization` (doApply, `ApplyView`) handles the case where a domain-authorized holder lacks an `MPToken` SLE in preclaim — it lazily allocates the SLE on the fly and consumes the `priorBalance` reserve.
- `lockEscrowMPT` does NOT change `OutstandingAmount` (tokens are still in circulation while escrowed); `unlockEscrowMPT` decreases `OutstandingAmount` only by the fee delta (gross - net) under `fixTokenEscrowV1`.
- `isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen()` recursively checks whether a vault-backed MPT issuance is frozen by the vault's underlying asset; a `depth` parameter bounds recursion (purely defensive — nested vaults cannot currently be created).
## IOU Trust-Line Specifics
- Orientation: every trust line stores its endpoints in fixed `sfLowLimit`/`sfHighLimit` slots based on `AccountID` comparison. Helpers like `accountHolds`, `accountFunds`, `trustCreate`, `trustDelete` take `(account, peer)` and resolve the slot internally — never index by raw low/high outside the helpers.
- Three freeze tiers: `isIndividualFrozen` (issuer froze this specific holder), `isFrozen` (global freeze flag), `isDeepFrozen` (transitive freeze through deep-freeze chains). Each has distinct policy implications for sends, offers, and AMM participation; helper queries take a `FreezeHandling` enum to select policy.
- `rippleCredit`/`rippleSend` apply transfer fees only when the issuer is neither endpoint and `WaiveTransferFee::No`; reserve/quality limits enforced via `accountFunds` rather than raw balance.
- Trust-line deletion (`trustDelete`) requires both endpoints to be at default state (zero balance, default limits/flags); helpers compute "default" against the post-tx state, not raw fields.
- `updateTrustLine` (static helper in `RippleStateHelpers.cpp`): when a sender's balance crosses zero and meets seven specific conditions (zero limit, zero quality flags, no freeze, etc.), it releases the sender's reserve and signals the caller to delete the line.
## Credential System
- Two-phase enforcement mirrors the `ReadView`/`ApplyView` split: `credentials::valid()` and `credentials::validDomain()` are read-only (preclaim); `verifyDepositPreauth()` and `verifyValidDomain()` are mutating (doApply) and delete expired credential objects as a side effect.
- `credentials::deleteSLE()` handles two owner directories (issuer and subject) with reserve accounting that shifts ownership at `lsfAccepted` time. Before acceptance only the issuer pays the reserve; after, the subject does.
- `checkFields()` validates `sfCredentialIDs` (`STVector256`); `checkArray()` validates `STArray` credential pairs and uses `sha512Half(issuer, credentialType)` for duplicate detection.
- `authorizedDepositPreauth()` uses a `lifeExtender` vector to keep `SLE const` shared pointers alive while the `Slice`-based set is in scope — forgetting this causes dangling pointer reads.
## Pseudo-Accounts
Synthetic `AccountRoot` SLEs owned by protocol objects (AMM, Vault, LoanBroker). Address derived from `sha512Half(attempt, parentHash, ownerKey)` → RIPESHA in a loop up to `maxAccountAttempts = 256` (consensus-critical constant). Flags `lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth`; `sfSequence = 0` under `featureSingleAssetVault`/`featureLendingProtocol`. `isPseudoAccount(sle, filter?)` checks for any field tagged `SField::sMD_PseudoAccount` (currently `sfAMMID`, `sfVaultID`, `sfLoanBrokerID`). Pseudo-accounts bypass reserve requirements in `xrpLiquid`.
Amendment checks are the *caller's* responsibility, not `createPseudoAccount`'s. The function asserts the passed `ownerField` carries `sMD_PseudoAccount`.
## Vault Math
`VaultHelpers` converts between asset and share denominations using `sfScale` (decimal precision) and tracks `sfLossUnrealized` separately on deposit vs withdraw paths — the asymmetry is intentional: deposits price against gross `sfAssetsTotal`; withdrawals subtract `sfLossUnrealized` first (existing holders bear the loss, not new depositors). `TruncateShares` policy controls whether sub-unit share remainders are rounded to zero or rejected.
Empty-vault bootstrap: when `sfAssetsTotal == 0`, initial share allocation is `assets × 10^sfScale` (truncated), establishing the starting exchange rate. This reduces susceptibility to the first-depositor donation attack.
## Ledger Timing (`LedgerTiming.h`)
Adaptive close-time binning prevents clock-skew disagreements. Resolutions: `{10, 20, 30, 60, 90, 120}` seconds; default 30, genesis 10. Adjustment is asymmetric:
- On disagreement, coarsen every ledger (`decreaseLedgerTimeResolutionEvery = 1`)
- On agreement, refine only every 8th ledger (`increaseLedgerTimeResolutionEvery = 8`)
`roundCloseTime` is epoch-anchored (uses `time_since_epoch()`, not local offset) for deterministic agreement. `effCloseTime` enforces strict monotonicity: `max(rounded, priorCloseTime + 1s)`. `time_point{}` is the sentinel for "no agreed close time" and is returned unchanged.
## Skip List
Two-tier on-ledger structure for historical hash lookup:
- `keylet::skip()` (the rolling 256-page): hashes of the 256 immediate ancestors; updated every ledger.
- `keylet::skip(seq)`: every 256-aligned ledger stores a permanent record. `getCandidateLedger(seq)` rounds up to the nearest 256-aligned sequence.
Non-aligned ledgers older than 256 are unreachable — `hashOfSeq` returns `nullopt`.
## Canonical Transaction Ordering (`CanonicalTXSet`)
Retry queue between consensus passes. Sort key: `(account ⊕ salt, SeqProxy, txId)`.
- **Salt**: `LedgerHash` XORed into `AccountID`; prevents account-address mining for persistent ordering advantage. Refreshed by `reset()` each round.
- **`SeqProxy`**: sequences sort before tickets unconditionally (so `TicketCreate` always applies before ticket consumers).
- **`popAcctTransaction()`**: returns next eligible same-account tx — either ticket-based, or sequence exactly `+1` from current.
`Key::operator==` compares only `txId_` (asymmetric with `operator<`).
## Subscription Fan-Out
`BookListeners` and `OrderBookDB` together drive WebSocket book-stream subscriptions:
- `BookListeners`: per-book (`Book`-keyed) registry of `InfoSub::wptr`. `publish` builds a `MultiApiJson` once and dispatches by API version, expiring dead weak pointers in-place. Locking is per-listener-set (`std::recursive_mutex`), not global.
- `OrderBookDB`: scans the ledger's `dirNode` index to build `xrpBooks_` (XRP-side, O(1) checked) and `allBooks_` (IOU/MPT, scanned). Scans are throttled by `setup_seq_` — only re-scan on ledger change. `publishOrderBook` walks affected listeners; `havePublished` dedups so the same ledger isn't re-fanned-out across overlapping subscription updates.
- Ingest path under `mLock` (write); subscribe/unsubscribe under read lock. Callbacks must not re-enter `setup_`.
- `havePublished` is a `hash_set<uint64_t>` shared across all `BookListeners::publish()` calls for a single transaction, preventing duplicate delivery to subscribers registered on multiple affected books.
## Accepted Ledger Tx (`AcceptedLedgerTx`)
Eagerly-materialized projection of a transaction-in-ledger: tx, meta, deserialized account fields, affected-accounts list, JSON-serialization cache. Construction is the heavyweight step; downstream consumers (RPC, subscription) read fields by reference. The class is immutable post-construction; thread-safe to share.
Constructor asserts `!ledger->open()`. For `ttOFFER_CREATE` transactions where `account != amount.getIssuer()`, `owner_funds` is injected into `mJson` via `accountFunds(fhIGNORE_FREEZE, ahIGNORE_AUTH)` — a read-time annotation for order-book subscribers, not ledger state.
`getEscMeta()` returns `mRawMeta` as a SQL blob literal; used by `Node.cpp` for transaction DB inserts.
## Pending Saves (`PendingSaves`)
State machine tracking in-flight `Ledger` → DB writes. Each entry keyed by ledger sequence; transitions `requested → started → finished`. `pendSave` is idempotent — second caller for the same sequence is a no-op. Synchronous callers in `shouldWork(seq, true)` block on a `condition_variable` until the in-progress write completes. `getSnapshot()` returns a copy of the map; `LedgerMaster::getValidatedRange()` uses it to exclude in-progress sequences from the reported range.
## Amendment Table (`AmendmentTable`)
Governance state for protocol amendments. Each amendment has a `VoteBehavior`:
- `DefaultYes` — vote yes unless config overrides
- `DefaultNo` — vote no unless config overrides
- `Obsolete` — never vote yes, even with config override; `LogicError` if config tries
`TrustedVotes` tracks per-validator amendment votes across ledgers with anti-flapping (a validator must consistently vote for N consecutive flag ledgers before counting toward majority). The flag-ledger cadence and majority threshold are consensus-critical constants. `doVoting` produces the `EnableAmendment`/`Veto` pseudo-transactions inserted at flag ledger close.
Two-layer API: the pure-virtual `doVoting(LedgerIndex, set<uint256>, majorityAmendments_t)` is wrapped by a non-virtual `doVoting(shared_ptr<ReadView const>, ...)` that calls `getEnabledAmendments()` and `getMajorityAmendments()` from `View.h`. This decouples the implementation from ledger view types.
`needValidatedLedger(seq)` is an optimization gate — most ledgers have no effect on amendment voting; only flag ledgers need the full `doValidatedLedger` pass.
## Review Checklist
- New ledger entry types: add to `ledger_entries.macro`, implement keylet in `Indexes.cpp`, verify acquisition code in `InboundLedger`/`LedgerMaster`, check `LedgerCleaner` handling.
- New pseudo-account types: tag the key field with `SField::sMD_PseudoAccount` in `sfields.macro`; `isPseudoAccount` picks it up automatically. Caller, not `createPseudoAccount`, owns the amendment gate.
- New asset operations: extend `Asset` variant + add branches in `TokenHelpers.h` dispatchers. Don't reach into IOU- or MPT-specific helpers directly unless intentionally bypassing the dispatch layer.
- Helper functions touching balances: respect the read/write hook protocol so `PaymentSandbox` correctly defers credits.
- AMM math changes: gate behind an amendment; preserve the pre-amendment formula path.
- Directory changes: account for both legacy (unsorted) and modern pages in iteration; verify `cdirNext`/`dirNext` cursor semantics if deleting during iteration (see `cleanupOnAccountDelete` workaround in `View.cpp` around line 485).
- New amendment: register `VoteBehavior`; if `Obsolete`, ensure no config path can flip it; add to `TrustedVotes` accounting if it should be majority-tracked.
- New subscription stream: if order-book-related, register with `BookListeners`; for ledger-wide streams use `OrderBookDB::havePublished` to dedup.
- Escrow with non-XRP assets: use `escrowUnlockApplyHelper<T>` (template specialized for `Issue` / `MPTIssue`); check `createAsset` flag gating and `lockedRate` capping logic.
- Delegate transactions: call `checkTxPermission` first; only call `loadGranularPermission` when broad permission check fails.
## Key Patterns
### Immutability Guard
```cpp
// After this, no mutations allowed on the ledger or its SHAMaps
inline void SHAMap::setImmutable()
{
XRPL_ASSERT(state_ != SHAMapState::Invalid, "...");
state_ = SHAMapState::Immutable;
}
// VERIFY: code never calls peek()/insert()/erase() after setImmutable()
```
### New Ledger Entry Keylet
```cpp
// REQUIRED: every new ledger entry type needs unique keylet computation
Keylet keylet::myEntry(AccountID const& id)
{
return {ltMY_ENTRY,
sha512Half(std::uint16_t(spaceMyEntry), id)};
}
// Also add to ledger_entries.macro and Indexes.cpp
```
### Peek/Update Contract
```cpp
// peek() returns shared_ptr<SLE>; you MUST call update() or erase() with
// the SAME pointer on the SAME view. Crossing views is a LogicError.
auto sle = view.peek(keylet::account(id));
sle->setFieldU32(sfSequence, seq + 1);
view.update(sle); // promotes cache → modify in ApplyStateTable
```
### Two-Phase Expiry Cleanup
```cpp
// preclaim (ReadView) — detect but don't mutate
if (credentials::validDomain(view, domainID, account) == tecEXPIRED)
/* allow through; doApply will clean up */;
// doApply (ApplyView) — mutate
if (auto ter = verifyValidDomain(view, domainID, account, j); ter != tesSUCCESS)
return ter; // expired credentials deleted as side effect
```
### Directional Multiply (AMM)
```cpp
// post-fixAMMv1_3: rounding mode at the final multiply, not at toSTAmount
auto const tokens = getRoundedLPTokens(
rules,
lptAMMBalance,
[&] { return /* fractional formula */; },
IsDeposit::Yes); // → Number::downward
```
### Nested PaymentSandbox
```cpp
// Inside a payment step that needs its own sandbox: chain DeferredCredits
PaymentSandbox inner(&outer); // PaymentSandbox const* form
// ... inner.creditHookIOU(...) defers against the outer's table too
inner.apply(outer); // flushes deferred credits up one level
```
### Subscription Fan-Out
```cpp
// publish once, dispatch by version; havePublished shared across all books
MultiApiJson msg = buildBookUpdate(...);
listeners.publish(msg, havePublished);
db.havePublished(ledgerSeq); // dedup across overlapping streams
```
### Sandbox Commit-or-Discard
```cpp
Sandbox sb(&ctx_.view());
// ... all mutations through sb ...
if (result == tesSUCCESS)
sb.apply(ctx_.rawView());
// else sb destroyed → changes evaporate
```
## Key Files
- `src/xrpld/app/ledger/Ledger.h` / `src/libxrpl/ledger/Ledger.cpp` — ledger class, genesis/successor/load constructors, immutable transition, skip list, NegUNL
- `src/xrpld/app/ledger/detail/LedgerMaster.cpp` — central coordinator
- `src/xrpld/app/ledger/detail/InboundLedger.cpp` — ledger acquisition
- `include/xrpl/protocol/detail/ledger_entries.macro` — entry type definitions
- `src/libxrpl/protocol/Indexes.cpp` — keylet computation
- `include/xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h` + `ApplyView.h` + `OpenView.h` + `RawView.h` — view interface hierarchy
- `include/xrpl/ledger/detail/ApplyStateTable.h` / `RawStateTable.h` / `ApplyViewBase.h` / `ReadViewFwdRange.h` + `.ipp` — buffered mutation tables, range adapters, `TxMeta` generation
- `include/xrpl/ledger/Sandbox.h` / `PaymentSandbox.h` / `ApplyViewImpl.h` — concrete view types
- `include/xrpl/ledger/CachedView.h` / `CachedSLEs.h` — two-level SLE cache (hardened-hash inner map)
- `include/xrpl/ledger/CanonicalTXSet.h` — retry-pass deterministic ordering
- `include/xrpl/ledger/LedgerTiming.h` — close-time binning
- `include/xrpl/ledger/Dir.h` / `BookDirs.h` — directory iteration
- `include/xrpl/ledger/BookListeners.h` / `OrderBookDB.h` — subscription fan-out
- `include/xrpl/ledger/AcceptedLedgerTx.h` — eager tx-in-ledger projection
- `include/xrpl/ledger/AmendmentTable.h` — governance state, `VoteBehavior`, `TrustedVotes`
- `include/xrpl/ledger/PendingSaves.h` — in-flight DB write coalescing
- `include/xrpl/ledger/View.h` — free-function utility layer (expiry, `hashOfSeq`, `areCompatible`, `dirLink`, `canWithdraw`, `cleanupOnAccountDelete`)
- `include/xrpl/ledger/helpers/*` — per-object-type free functions
- `src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/*` — implementations (AMM math, NFT page split, credential lifecycle, MPT overflow, vault math)
- `src/libxrpl/ledger/ApplyView.cpp` — directory `createRoot`, `findPreviousPage`, `insertKey`, `insertPage` (in `namespace xrpl::directory`)
- `src/libxrpl/ledger/PaymentSandbox.cpp``DeferredCredits` IOU/MPT shadow tables, post-switchover balance algorithm
- `src/libxrpl/ledger/OpenView.cpp``RawStateTable` + `txs_map` delta accumulation, PMR arena

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# NodeStore
Persistent key-value store for `NodeObject`s (ledger entries). Every piece of ledger state — account states, transactions, ledger headers, SHAMap nodes — is serialized as a `NodeObject` keyed by its 256-bit hash and persisted here. Backends are pluggable (NuDB, RocksDB, in-memory, null) and selected via the `[node_db]` config section. The layer above (`Database`) adds an async read thread pool, batching, and statistics; `Backend` is the narrow storage interface.
## Architecture
Four layers, each with a narrow contract:
1. **`NodeObject`** (`include/xrpl/nodestore/NodeObject.h`) — immutable (type, hash, blob). Constructed only via `createObject()` factory; the `PrivateAccess` tag struct makes the public constructor effectively private while remaining compatible with `std::make_shared`. Hash is *not* verified against data — trust the caller. Inherits `CountedObject<NodeObject>` for live-instance diagnostics.
2. **`Backend`** (`include/xrpl/nodestore/Backend.h`) — pure abstract key/value interface. `fetch`/`store` are concurrent; `storeBatch`/`for_each` are not. Two-phase init: construct, then `open()`.
3. **`Database`** (`include/xrpl/nodestore/Database.h`) — owns the async read pool and stats; defines pure-virtual `fetchNodeObject(hash, seq, FetchReport&, duplicate)`. Public non-virtual `fetchNodeObject` instruments the private virtual one (timing, hit/miss, scheduler callback) — subclasses cannot bypass metrics.
4. **`Manager`** (`include/xrpl/nodestore/Manager.h`) — singleton registry mapping config `type=` strings to `Factory` instances. `make_Backend()` and `make_Database()` are the construction entry points.
Two concrete `Database` subclasses: `DatabaseNodeImp` (single backend) and `DatabaseRotatingImp` (two backends for online deletion).
## Key Invariants
- `NodeObjectType` values: `hotUNKNOWN=0`, `hotLEDGER=1`, `hotACCOUNT_NODE=3`, `hotTRANSACTION_NODE=4`, `hotDUMMY=512`. Value 2 is a historical gap. `hotDUMMY` is deliberately outside the contiguous range so it cannot collide with valid types — used as a cache sentinel meaning "confirmed missing."
- `NodeObject` lives in the `xrpl` namespace (not `xrpl::NodeStore`) because it is consumed broadly by SHAMap, ledger, and serialization layers.
- Preferred backends: NuDB (append-mostly, default) and RocksDB; Memory and Null are for tests / configured ephemerality.
- `Database` instrumentation is structural: the public `fetchNodeObject()` measures elapsed time, increments atomic counters, and calls `scheduler_.onFetch()` around every private virtual call.
- `Backend::fetch` and `Backend::store` are called concurrently from many threads; `storeBatch` and `for_each` are not. Implementations must reflect this.
- `DatabaseRotatingImp::isSameDB()` and `DatabaseNodeImp::isSameDB()` both return `true` unconditionally — the rotating store is one logical namespace despite physical split.
- Batch writes accumulate up to `batchWriteLimitSize = 65536` objects; peak in-flight memory can be ~2× this because a new batch accumulates while the previous one is being flushed (`Types.h`).
- `EncodedBlob` / `DecodedBlob` define the on-disk format: bytes 07 zero-padded (legacy ledger-index field), byte 8 = `NodeObjectType`, bytes 9+ = payload. Both must change together.
- `NuDBBackend::fdRequired()` returns 3 (data, key, log files). `RocksDBBackend::fdRequired()` returns `max_open_files + 128`. `DatabaseRotatingImp` sums both backends' values.
- `storeStats()` asserts `count <= sz` — byte total must be ≥ item count, guards against accounting bugs in subclasses.
## On-Disk Format
Defined jointly by `EncodedBlob` (write) and `DecodedBlob` (read) in `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/`:
```
Bytes 07 Zero (historically ledger index; ignored on read)
Byte 8 NodeObjectType (one byte)
Bytes 9+ Raw serialized payload
```
The 32-byte hash is the storage key, kept separate from the value.
- `EncodedBlob` embeds a 1033-byte stack buffer (`payload_`) sized for header + 1024-byte payload (most objects). Only blobs exceeding 1024 bytes heap-allocate. `ptr_` is `uint8_t* const` set at construction; destructor frees iff `ptr_ != payload_.data()`. ~94% of real objects fit the stack buffer. The destructor `XRPL_ASSERT` verifies pointer/size coherence to catch any drift.
- `DecodedBlob` is a non-owning view into the raw buffer. Validation is by `wasOk()` flag, not exceptions. `createObject()` asserts `m_success` and copies the payload into an owning `Blob` for the returned `NodeObject`. `hotDUMMY` (512) falls through the type `switch` and leaves `m_success = false`.
NuDB additionally runs the encoded blob through `nodeobject_compress` (see Compression below).
## Compression (`include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/codec.h`)
NuDB-only. Four type tags prefix every stored blob (as a varint):
| Type | Format |
|---|---|
| 0 | Uncompressed (legacy; never written, still read) |
| 1 | LZ4-compressed |
| 2 | Sparse inner-node (bitmask + present hashes) |
| 3 | Full inner-node (all 16 hashes, no bitmask) |
**Inner-node fast path**: SHAMap inner nodes are exactly 525 bytes with `HashPrefix::innerNode` at offset 9. The compressor recognizes this and either packs only non-zero child hashes with a 16-bit presence bitmask (type 2) or stores all 16 hashes contiguously (type 3). Reconstruction zeros the `index`, `unused`, and `kind` fields — so a round-trip is *lossy* on those fields. `filter_inner()` pre-zeros them on the source side to make import-time `memcmp` verification succeed.
**LZ4 path**: `lz4_compress` stores a varint decompressed-size prefix then LZ4 payload. `lz4_decompress` validates the varint (overflow checked before `static_cast<int>`) then pre-allocates the exact output buffer before calling `LZ4_decompress_safe`. All size mismatches throw `std::runtime_error`.
**Varint** (`varint.h`): base-127 (not base-128) LEB-style encoding; bit 7 is continuation. Used for the type tag and the LZ4 decompressed-size prefix. The base-127 choice means `0x7F` never appears as a payload byte. Functions are function templates (not plain functions) to satisfy ODR across TUs. `read_varint` returns 0 on empty buffer, overrun, or overflow.
**BufferFactory pattern**: All codec functions take a callable `void*(size_t)` so allocation policy stays with the caller (NuDB passes its scratch buffer). Codecs never free memory; the factory object's lifetime governs cleanup.
## Async Read Pool (`Database`)
The base class spawns `readThreads` detached threads at construction. Each loops on `readCondVar_`, dequeues from `read_` (a `std::map<uint256, vector<pair<seq, callback>>>`), and calls the subclass's private `fetchNodeObject`.
**Hash coalescing**: Multiple concurrent `asyncFetch()` calls for the same hash collapse into a single map entry; one backend read fires all callbacks. For different `seq` values on the same hash, `isSameDB(seq1, seq2)` decides whether to reuse the fetched object or issue a second fetch.
**Batched dequeue**: Each worker extracts up to `requestBundle_` entries per lock acquisition (default 4, clamped 164 via `rq_bundle` config) to amortize mutex cost. Uses `read_.extract()` (C++17 node-handle) to move entries without copying.
**Threads are detached** (not joined), controlled by `readStopping_` atomic + `readThreads_` counter. `stop()` clears `read_`, broadcasts the condvar, and spin-yields until `readThreads_` reaches zero (asserted within 30s).
**Shutdown ordering — critical**: Derived classes *must* call `stop()` in their own destructors. The base destructor calls `stop()` as a safety net, but by then the derived vtable is already gone — a worker thread blocked in `fetchNodeObject` would invoke a destroyed vtable entry. See Common Bug Patterns.
**`asyncFetch()` during shutdown**: Silently discards the request if `isStopping()` is already true — callers during shutdown get no callback.
**`runningThreads_` vs `readThreads_`**: Workers increment `runningThreads_` on wake and decrement before waiting, so `getCountsJson()` can distinguish actively-processing threads from threads blocked on I/O. `readThreads_` is decremented on thread exit; reaching zero confirms all threads fully exited.
**Diagnostics**: `getCountsJson()` surfaces queue depth, thread counts, `rq_bundle`, write/read counts, bytes, hit counts, and total read duration (µs) for the `get_counts` RPC.
## BatchWriter (`include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/BatchWriter.h`)
Coalesces individual writes into batches for backends that benefit (RocksDB uses it; NuDB does not — NuDB's `do_insert` is synchronous).
- Privately inherits `Task`; the backend inherits `BatchWriter::Callback` and provides `writeBatch(Batch const&)`. Same object plays both roles, no extra allocation.
- **Double-buffer swap**: `store()` pushes into `mWriteSet`. `writeBatch()` holds the lock only long enough to swap `mWriteSet` with a fresh local vector, then releases before doing I/O. New stores accumulate concurrently with the flush. After each flush the loop re-checks the buffer before clearing `mWritePending` so no items are dropped.
- **`std::recursive_mutex` + `std::condition_variable_any`**: A synchronous scheduler (e.g., `DummyScheduler`) calls `performScheduledTask()` inline on the producer thread, which re-enters `writeBatch` on the same thread — plain `std::mutex` would deadlock.
- **Backpressure**: `store()` blocks on `mWriteCondition` when `mWriteSet.size() >= batchWriteLimitSize` (65536). Peak memory ≈ 2× the limit.
- **`mWritePending` flag**: Ensures only one scheduler task outstanding. First `store()` that finds flag clear raises it and calls `scheduleTask()`.
- **`getWriteLoad()`**: Returns `max(mWriteLoad, mWriteSet.size())` — conservative estimate reflecting both in-flight write count and pending accumulation count.
- **Destructor** calls `waitForWriting()` — no data is abandoned on backend teardown.
- **Telemetry**: After each flush, records count + wall-clock duration in `BatchWriteReport` and passes to `m_scheduler.onBatchWrite()`.
## Scheduler
Pure abstract (`include/xrpl/nodestore/Scheduler.h`): `scheduleTask(Task&)`, `onFetch(FetchReport)`, `onBatchWrite(BatchWriteReport)`. Contract: scheduler may invoke task on calling thread *or* a foreign thread — both are valid. Two implementations:
- **`DummyScheduler`**: `scheduleTask` runs `task.performScheduledTask()` synchronously on the calling thread; `onFetch`/`onBatchWrite` are no-ops. Used by every NodeStore test and by the bulk-import path in `Application.cpp`.
- **`NodeStoreScheduler`** (production, in `xrpld/app`): posts a `jtWRITE` job to the `JobQueue` (synchronous fallback if queue is stopped); routes `FetchReport` to `jtNS_SYNC_READ`/`jtNS_ASYNC_READ` load events.
`Task` (`Task.h`) is just a virtual `performScheduledTask()` + virtual destructor. `BatchWriter` inherits it privately so external code cannot treat it as a `Task`. The recursive mutex in `BatchWriter` is required precisely because `DummyScheduler` can call back synchronously.
`FetchReport` has a `const FetchType` member set at construction; `elapsed` is zero-initialized. `BatchWriteReport` carries elapsed + writeCount. Both are plain-old-data stack values passed by value.
## Rotating Backend / Online Deletion
`DatabaseRotatingImp` (`src/libxrpl/nodestore/DatabaseRotatingImp.cpp`) holds two `shared_ptr<Backend>`s: writable + archive. `SHAMapStoreImp` (in `xrpld/app`) drives the rotation policy; `DatabaseRotatingImp` only handles the atomic swap.
**`rotate(newBackend, callback)` sequence** (under `mutex_`):
1. `setDeletePath()` on the old archive, move it into a local `shared_ptr oldArchiveBackend`.
2. Promote `writableBackend_``archiveBackend_`.
3. Install `newBackend``writableBackend_`.
Then release the lock and invoke `callback(newWritableName, newArchiveName)`. The callback persists names to the SQL state DB. `oldArchiveBackend` falls out of scope *after* the callback returns — so the directory is deleted only after the state DB knows the new layout. Crash between swap and persist → recoverable from state DB on restart.
**Snapshot-and-release locking**: Every read/write copies the relevant `shared_ptr` under `mutex_`, releases the lock, then does I/O via the local. Locking across disk I/O would serialize all readers. Exception: `sync()` holds the lock for the full call (maintenance path, not latency-sensitive).
**Fetch fallthrough + promotion**: `fetchNodeObject` tries writable, then archive. If found in archive and `duplicate=true`, re-snapshots `writableBackend_` (to handle a rotation racing with the archive read) and writes the object into the *current* writable. Objects not promoted before the next rotation are gone forever — promotion is the migration mechanism.
**`newWritableBackendName`** is captured *before* the lock (calling `getName()` on the new backend); `newArchiveBackendName` is captured *inside* the lock from the demoted former writable. Both are passed to the callback.
## Manager / Factory Registration
`ManagerImp` is a Meyers singleton (`static ManagerImp _` in `instance()`). Its constructor calls four free functions (`registerNuDBFactory`, `registerRocksDBFactory`, `registerNullFactory`, `registerMemoryFactory`), each of which creates a function-local `static` factory whose constructor calls `Manager::insert(*this)`.
**Why this pattern**: Factories are never globals. If a global `Factory` destructor called `Manager::instance().erase()` after `ManagerImp` had been destroyed, the result would be UB (no order guarantee across translation units). Function-local statics initialize after `ManagerImp` and destroy before it — safe.
- `Manager::find()` is case-insensitive (`boost::iequals`) so `"NuDB"`, `"nudb"`, `"NUDB"` all match.
- `make_Backend()` throws `std::runtime_error` with operator-facing message on missing or unknown `type` key. Same `missing_backend()` helper covers both the absent-key and unrecognized-name paths.
- `make_Database()` = `make_Backend()` + `backend->open()` + wrap in `DatabaseNodeImp`. The explicit `open()` separation lets I/O errors surface before the full `Database` stack is built.
- Registry mutex protects `list_` (a `vector<Factory*>` of non-owning pointers). `erase()` uses `XRPL_ASSERT` — removing an unknown factory is a programming error.
- `Factory::createInstance` second overload accepts `nudb::context&` for shared I/O threads across NuDB shards. Non-NuDB backends inherit a default that returns `{}` (null), prompting the caller to fall back to the simpler overload.
## Backend-Specific Notes
**NuDB** (`backend/NuDBFactory.cpp`): Three on-disk files (`nudb.dat`, `nudb.key`, `nudb.log`); `fdRequired()` = 3. `appnum = 1` embedded in the header, sanity-checked on every open. `nudb_block_size` config key must be a power of 2 between 4096 and 32768; defaults to `nudb::block_size()` (filesystem-native). `for_each()` and `verify()` *close and reopen* the database — incompatible with concurrent access. `fetch()` uses a zero-copy callback into NuDB's internal buffer; decompression must happen inside the callback (buffer only valid during callback). `db_.insert()` returning `nudb::error::key_exists` is silently ignored (content-addressed: same hash → same data). `burstSize` set via `db_.set_burst()` after open — important performance parameter. Destructor catches `nudb::system_error` from `close()` because destructors must not propagate exceptions.
**RocksDB** (`backend/RocksDBFactory.cpp`): `RocksDBEnv` overrides `StartThread` to name threads `"rocksdb #N"` (using an atomic counter) for profiler visibility. `hard_set` config flag: when false (default), small `cache_mb`/`open_files` values are silently escalated to production-appropriate defaults (1024 MB cache, 8000 FDs). Implements both `Backend` and `BatchWriter::Callback`; uses `BatchWriter` for writes. `storeBatch` is atomic (single `WriteBatch` in WAL); `fetchBatch` is a serial loop with no atomicity. `sync()` is empty — WAL provides durability. Key passed to RocksDB via `std::bit_cast<char const*>` over the `uint256` — no copy. Raw option strings accepted via `bbt_options` and `options` config keys; throw on parse failure.
**Memory** (`backend/MemoryFactory.cpp`): `MemoryFactory` owns named `MemoryDB` instances in a case-insensitive (`boost::beast::iless`) map; multiple `MemoryBackend`s opened with the same path share the same `MemoryDB`. Survives backend close/reopen within a process. The `db.open` guard in `MemoryFactory::open()` is dead code (`open` is never set to `true`). `for_each` reads without holding the mutex — caller must ensure no concurrent writes. Module-level raw pointer `memoryFactory` allows `MemoryBackend::open()` to call back without holding a reference.
**Null** (`backend/NullFactory.cpp`): All operations no-op; `fetch` returns `notFound`. Exists so `type=none` is a valid config value. Doubles as a minimal reference implementation of `Backend`. `isOpen()` always returns `false`.
## Common Bug Patterns
- **Forgetting `stop()` in derived `Database` destructor**: Symptom is a crash during teardown in a worker thread invoking a destroyed vtable. The base `~Database()` calls `stop()` as a fallback but the derived vtable is already gone by then.
- **Holding `DatabaseRotatingImp::mutex_` across I/O**: Will serialize all readers. Always snapshot the `shared_ptr` under lock, release, then I/O.
- **Forgetting `duplicate=true` when archive fallback matters**: Objects fetched from archive are not promoted to writable; next rotation discards them silently.
- **Treating `hotDUMMY` as a real object**: Cache lookups must check the type before dereferencing.
- **Exceeding `batchWriteLimitSize`**: `BatchWriter::store()` blocks the caller; not a silent truncation, but unexpected backpressure can cause deadlock if the same thread is needed to drain.
- **Inaccurate `fdRequired()`**: Causes silent backend failures when the process file descriptor limit is exceeded. Aggregated across all backends by the base `Database`.
- **Changing `EncodedBlob` without `DecodedBlob`**: Breaks on-disk read compatibility silently — both classes define the format jointly.
- **Calling `for_each` / `verify` on NuDB concurrently with reads**: Both close and reopen the database; concurrent access is undefined.
- **Lossy inner-node round-trip**: `nodeobject_compress` zeros `index`/`unused`/`kind` on reconstruction. Code that verifies blobs after compress→decompress must call `filter_inner()` first.
- **Not calling `backend->open()` before wrapping in `DatabaseNodeImp`**: `make_Database()` does this correctly but manual construction may miss it; errors surface much later in I/O paths.
- **Using `MemoryBackend::for_each` concurrently**: No lock held; caller must guarantee no concurrent writes (implicit contract, not enforced).
- **`fetchBatch` atomicity assumption on RocksDB**: `storeBatch` is atomic (one `WriteBatch`); `fetchBatch` is a serial loop — no group atomicity on reads.
## Review Checklist
- Config: `[node_db]` has valid `type`, `path`, and (for NuDB) `nudb_block_size` if present.
- Online deletion: `SHAMapStoreImp` coordinates rotation with application lifecycle; rotation callback must persist new names before old archive can be deleted.
- New backend implementations: full `Backend` interface including `fdRequired()`, both `open()` overloads (default-throws is OK for non-NuDB), accurate concurrency guarantees on `fetch`/`store`, no-op `verify()` if not implementing.
- Derived `Database` subclasses: `stop()` in destructor; override `fetchNodeObject(hash, seq, FetchReport&, duplicate)` not the public non-virtual.
- Any change to on-disk format: update both `EncodedBlob` and `DecodedBlob`; consider backward-compat type tag (codec.h type 0 path is the precedent).
- Inner-node codec changes: update `filter_inner()` alongside compressor/decompressor; verify round-trip with zeroed metadata fields.
- New varint usages: confirm base-127 (not base-128) arithmetic; use `varint_traits<T>::max` for stack buffer sizing.
## Key Files
### Public interfaces
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/NodeObject.h` — immutable object, factory-only construction, `CountedObject` live-count
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/Backend.h` — pluggable storage interface; concurrency contracts annotated inline
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/Database.h` — async read pool, instrumented fetch, Template Method pattern
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/DatabaseRotating.h` — adds `rotate()`
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/Manager.h` — singleton factory registry
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/Factory.h` — abstract factory; two `createInstance` overloads (plain + nudb::context)
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/Scheduler.h` / `Task.h` — async dispatch + telemetry
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/DummyScheduler.h` — synchronous, for tests + import
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/Types.h``Status`, `Batch`, batch size constants
### Implementations (detail/)
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/DatabaseNodeImp.h` — single-backend; `isSameDB` always true; ledgerSeq ignored
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/DatabaseRotatingImp.h` — rotation + promotion; snapshot-and-release locking
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/ManagerImp.h` — singleton + registry; `missing_backend()` static helper
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/BatchWriter.h` — write coalescing + backpressure; recursive mutex
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/EncodedBlob.h` — serializer; 1033-byte stack buffer, heap fallback
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/DecodedBlob.h` — parser; non-owning view, `wasOk()` flag
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/codec.h` — LZ4 + inner-node compression; BufferFactory pattern
- `include/xrpl/nodestore/detail/varint.h` — base-127 varint; function templates for ODR safety
### Source (libxrpl/nodestore/)
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/Database.cpp` — read pool, hash coalescing, shutdown, `importInternal()`
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/DatabaseNodeImp.cpp` — simple backend wrapper; `fetchBatch` resize guard
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/DatabaseRotatingImp.cpp` — rotation, promotion, snapshot locking
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/BatchWriter.cpp` — double-buffer swap, backpressure, load estimation
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/ManagerImp.cpp` — singleton init + factory registration
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/DecodedBlob.cpp` — format parsing; legacy 8-byte prefix handling
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/DummyScheduler.cpp` — synchronous no-op scheduler
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/NodeObject.cpp``PrivateAccess` factory; `CountedObject` wiring
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/backend/NuDBFactory.cpp` — production default; compression pipeline
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/backend/RocksDBFactory.cpp` — alternate production; `RocksDBEnv` thread naming
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/backend/MemoryFactory.cpp` — test/ephemeral; shared `MemoryDB` by path
- `src/libxrpl/nodestore/backend/NullFactory.cpp``type=none`; reference `Backend` skeleton
### Lifecycle orchestration
- `src/xrpld/app/misc/SHAMapStoreImp.cpp` — drives `rotate()`, manages state DB, enforces min rotation interval (256 ledgers networked / 8 standalone)

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# Overlay Peering
P2P network using persistent TCP/IP connections. Messages serialized via Protocol Buffers. `OverlayImpl` manages connections; `PeerImp` handles per-peer logic. `PeerFinder` (sub-module under `peerfinder/`) handles peer discovery, slot accounting, and address caches.
## Key Invariants
- Connection preference order: Fixed Peers → Livecache → Bootcache
- Cluster connections and reserved (`PeerReservationTable`) connections do NOT count toward slot limits in `Counts::can_activate` — they bypass `m_in_active`/`m_out_active` caps
- Validators are forced `peerPrivate=true` by `Config::makeConfig` even without explicit `[peer_private]`; this is "soft" privacy (still accepts inbound, but asks peers not to gossip address). `wantIncoming` is derived *before* the validator key check fires, so a validator with a key still advertises inbound willingness internally.
- Protobuf message changes MUST maintain wire compatibility or risk network partitioning
- Squelching: after `MAX_SELECTED_PEERS=5` peers each cross `MAX_MESSAGE_THRESHOLD=20` messages, a random 5-peer subset becomes "Selected"; rest are muted via `TMSquelch` for a randomized window in `[MIN_UNSQUELCH_EXPIRE=300s, MAX_UNSQUELCH_EXPIRE_PEERS=3600s]`
- Reduce-relay does not activate for `WAIT_ON_BOOTUP=10min` after process start (`Slots::reduceRelayReady`)
- Handshake binds TLS session to node identity via signature of `makeSharedValue` (SHA-512 XOR of TLS finished messages, then `sha512Half`); a zero shared value (degenerate XOR) is rejected
- Wire format: 6-byte header uncompressed, 10-byte compressed; 26-bit payload size field caps messages at `maximumMessageSize = 64 MiB`
- Hop count cap: `Endpoint` constructor clamps `hops` to `maxHops+1=7`; `Logic::preprocess` drops `hops > maxHops=6` and increments surviving hops by 1 before storage
- TX reduce-relay queue is bounded by `MAX_TX_QUEUE_SIZE=10000` hashes per peer; required to stay under the 64 MiB protocol limit at high TPS
- `peersWithMessage_` (in `Slots`) is `inline static` — shared across all instantiations, not per-instance
- `Bootcache` valence is a *streak* counter: clamped to 0 before crossing sign, so a failing peer resets to 0 before going positive. Static peers receive `staticValence=32`.
- `Livecache` uses `push_front` insertion — MUST `shuffle()` before handout to prevent topology manipulation by an adversary repeatedly advertising its own address
- `SourceStrings::fetch()` silently drops malformed addresses — no error returned for bad config entries
- `Checker` destructor calls `wait()` only; must call `stop()` first explicitly before destruction to cancel pending probes
## Common Bug Patterns
- PeerFinder slot exhaustion: if `inPeers`/`outPeers` is reached, new connections silently fail; check `Counts::can_activate` and `attempts_needed`
- `HashRouter::shouldRelay` prevents duplicate relay; bypassing it causes message storms (`OverlayImpl::relay` enforces this)
- `ConnectAttempt::processResponse` on HTTP 503 parses `peer-ips` JSON array for redirect; malformed entries are validated as endpoints before being passed to `peerFinder().onRedirects`
- `PeerImp::close` must run on the strand; calling from wrong thread causes race conditions on socket and timer state
- Destructor chain: `~PeerImp``deletePeer``onPeerDeactivate``on_closed``remove`; interrupting this chain leaks slots
- `~ConnectAttempt` releases the PeerFinder slot via `on_closed(slot_)` only if `slot_ != nullptr`; on successful promotion to `PeerImp`, `slot_` is moved out and must be left null
- `tryAsyncShutdown()` must defer SSL shutdown until `!readPending_ && !writePending_`; calling `async_shutdown` while async I/O is in flight is undefined behavior
- `dynamic_pointer_cast<SlotImp>` is required wherever `Manager` API takes `shared_ptr<Slot>` but `Logic` needs `SlotImp`
- A compressed message from a peer that did NOT negotiate compression is a hard `protocol_error` in `invokeProtocolMessage` (prevents CPU forcing attack)
- Self-squelch attempt (peer sends `TMSquelch` for our own validation key) is silently dropped in `PeerImp::onMessage(TMSquelch)` — never trust a peer to silence us
- `Cluster::for_each` callback must NOT call `Cluster::update` — same non-recursive mutex, deadlock
- `ZeroCopyOutputStream` destructor MUST flush trailing `commit_` — protobuf doesn't guarantee terminal `BackUp` or `Next` call; missing flush silently drops bytes
- `Bootcache` erase-then-reinsert pattern in `on_success`/`on_failure`: bimap values are logically const after insert, so valence updates require erase + reinsert
- `SlotImp::state(active)` is forbidden — must use `activate()` which also sets `whenAcceptEndpoints`; bypassing this leaves the flood-control timestamp unset
- `SourceStrings::fetch()` has an idempotent retry loop quirk: if `from_string()` fails, it retries the same string (no-op); effective behavior is just "drop invalid entries"
## Connection Lifecycle
### Outbound (`ConnectAttempt`)
1. `OverlayImpl::connect` → resource check → `peerFinder().new_outbound_slot()` → create `ConnectAttempt`
2. Five-phase chain: `async_connect` → TLS `async_handshake` → HTTP write → HTTP read → `processResponse`
3. Dual-timer scheme: global 25s ceiling (`connectTimeout`) + per-step timers (8/8/3/3/2s); both share `onTimer` callback distinguishing by expiry comparison. Global timer armed once (guarded by epoch-check), step timer reset at each phase.
4. `ioPending_` flag prevents starting SSL shutdown while another async op is pending on the stream
5. On HTTP 101: `verifyHandshake` → create `PeerImp` → move `slot_` and `stream_ptr_` into peer → `overlay_.add_active(peer)`
6. On HTTP 503 with JSON `peer-ips`: forward to `peerFinder().onRedirects`
7. `verify_none` on TLS — security comes from node-key signature over `makeSharedValue`, not cert chain
### Inbound (`OverlayImpl::onHandoff`)
1. HTTP server hands off TLS stream + upgrade request
2. Sequential gates: `processRequest` (for `/crawl`, `/health`, `/vl/`) → resource limit → `new_inbound_slot``negotiateProtocolVersion``makeSharedValue``verifyHandshake`
3. Create `PeerImp`, insert into `m_peers` (slot-keyed); `peer->run()` MUST be called while holding `mutex_` (race vs `stop()` draining list)
4. `m_peers` populated here, but `ids_` only after `activate()` post-protocol-handshake
## Two-Phase Peer Registration
- `m_peers`: `PeerFinder::Slot → weak_ptr<PeerImp>` — populated at handshake start, used for slot management
- `ids_`: `Peer::id_t → weak_ptr<PeerImp>` — populated at `activate()` after protocol handshake; used for broadcast and relay
- Outbound peers (via `ConnectAttempt`) populate both maps together in `add_active`
## Review Checklist
- Verify resource manager checks on both inbound and outbound connections
- New protocol messages: update protobuf definitions AND verify wire compatibility; add LZ4 eligibility list in `Message::compress()` if bulk
- Squelch changes: test with high peer counts; incorrect squelch logic can silence validators
- Header parsing changes (`ProtocolMessage.h`): the high-bit format guard (`*iter & 0x80`) and reserved-bit checks (`*iter & 0x0C == 0`) MUST remain
- Adding a new compression `Algorithm` enum value: must have high bit set, low nibble zero (so it's extractable via `*iter & 0xF0`); update `Compression.h` dispatch switches or the `UNREACHABLE` guard fires
- Strand discipline: any new method touching socket/queue state must guard with `if (!strand_.running_in_this_thread()) return post(strand_, ...)`
- `ZeroCopyOutputStream` use: always ensure the object goes out of scope (destructor flush) before the caller reads from the streambuf
- Bootcache changes: remember valence updates require erase-then-reinsert (bimap), and the cooldown (60s) batches writes
## Key Patterns
### Strand Execution
```cpp
// REQUIRED: socket operations must run on the strand
if (!strand_.running_in_this_thread())
return post(strand_, std::bind(
&PeerImp::close, shared_from_this()));
// Calling socket ops from wrong thread causes races on state
```
### Duplicate Relay Prevention
```cpp
// REQUIRED: check HashRouter before relaying
if (!hashRouter_.shouldRelay(hash))
return; // already relayed — suppress duplicate
overlay_.relay(message, hash);
```
### Shared Lazy Compression
```cpp
// Message::getBuffer(Compressed::On) — compresses once, shared across N peers
std::call_once(once_flag_, &Message::compress, this);
// Eligible types only (mtTRANSACTION, mtLEDGER_DATA, mtVALIDATOR_LIST, ...);
// Latency-sensitive types (mtPING, mtVALIDATION, mtPROPOSE_LEDGER) excluded.
// Falls back to uncompressed if savings < 4 bytes (compressed header overhead).
// Messages <= 70 bytes are never compressed.
```
### Resource Charging Batches
```cpp
// PeerImp::onMessageBegin resets fee_; onMessageEnd applies charge once per
// message via charge(). Handlers escalate via fee_.update() (monotonic).
```
### Exception-Based Handshake Failures
```cpp
// verifyHandshake() throws std::runtime_error on any check failure;
// callers (ConnectAttempt, PeerImp::doAccept) wrap in try/catch and tear down.
```
### Traffic Categorization Double-Call
```cpp
// categorize() called once at Message construction (outbound, inbound=false).
// addCount() called twice per message: once for category, once for 'total'.
// 'unknown' is NOT rolled into 'total'.
```
## Reduce-Relay (Squelch) Architecture
Two halves, decoupled:
- **Upstream (`Slot`/`Slots` in `OverlayImpl`)**: counts inbound validator messages per peer, selects 5 sources, calls `SquelchHandler::squelch()` (implemented by `OverlayImpl`) which sends `TMSquelch` over the wire. Uses `UptimeClock`.
- **Downstream (`Squelch` in `PeerImp`)**: receives `TMSquelch`, stores expiry in `hash_map<PublicKey, time_point>`. `PeerImp::send()` calls `expireSquelch(validator)` before transmitting any validator-keyed message; `false` return → drop, count under `TrafficCount::squelch_suppressed`.
All `OverlayImpl::updateSlotAndSquelch` calls are dispatched to `strand_` because `Slots<UptimeClock>` is not thread-safe.
Squelch expiry is lazy: no background timer. `expireSquelch` removes stale entries on next send. Out-of-bounds durations in incoming `TMSquelch` trigger `feeInvalidData` and `removeSquelch` (defensive clear).
### Slot Selection Algorithm (`Slot<clock_type>::update`)
Two-threshold design: peers enter the *considered pool* at `MIN_MESSAGE_THRESHOLD=19` messages; selection fires when `MAX_SELECTED_PEERS=5` peers individually reach `MAX_MESSAGE_THRESHOLD=20`. The one-message gap lets the system confirm a peer has continued sending before committing it as a candidate. If fewer than 5 non-idle peers are available at selection time, `initCounting()` resets and defers — never squelches with incomplete picture.
Inactivity (`IDLED=8s`): idle selected peer → unsquelch all + revert to `Counting`. Slots whose `lastSelected_` is older than `MAX_UNSQUELCH_EXPIRE_DEFAULT=600s` are deleted by `deleteIdlePeers()`.
Squelch duration scaled by peer count: `min(max(600s, 10s × npeers), 3600s)`.
## TX Reduce-Relay
When `txReduceRelayEnabled_` (negotiated via `FEATURE_TXRR`):
- Full transactions go to a quota of peers (computed from `TX_REDUCE_RELAY_MIN_PEERS` and `TX_RELAY_PERCENTAGE`)
- Remaining peers get hash announcements via `addTxQueue` → batched `TMHaveTransactions` flushed by periodic `sendTxQueue`
- Peers without the feature always get full message (back-compat)
- Peer list is shuffled with `default_prng()` to avoid systematic bias
- `MAX_TX_QUEUE_SIZE=10000` cap; `doTransactions` rejects requests exceeding this as malformed
## Tracking State
`tracking_` (atomic `Tracking` enum): `unknown`, `converged`, `diverged`. Thresholds from `Tuning.h`:
- `convergedLedgerLimit=24` — within this many ledgers of validated index
- `divergedLedgerLimit=128` — beyond this, mark diverged and start the `MAX_DIVERGED_TIME` countdown
Hysteresis (24 vs 128) prevents oscillation on slightly-behind peers.
## Send Queue Backpressure (`Tuning.h`)
Three tiers:
- `targetSendQueue=128` — below this, peer is healthy; resets `large_sendq_` counter
- `sendqIntervals=4` — consecutive 1-second ticks at-or-above target before disconnect
- `dropSendQueue=192` — refuse new query responses (don't do expensive lookups for stuck peer)
- `sendQueueLogFreq=64` — log every 64th enqueue when queue is large (throttle log spam)
Other key tuning constants:
- `softMaxReplyNodes=8192`/`hardMaxReplyNodes=12288` — soft/hard caps for `TMLedgerData` node counts
- `maxQueryDepth=3` — recursion limit for `TMGetLedger`; deeper queries rejected as `badData`
- `checkIdlePeers=4` — modulo for timer-driven idle peer scan
- `readBufferBytes=16384``constexpr size_t` for socket read buffer (separate from enum for type reasons)
## PeerFinder Sub-Module
Implements peer address discovery, slot accounting, and reachability checks. Owned by `OverlayImpl` via `make_Manager()`. Hidden behind `Manager` abstract interface; concrete `ManagerImp` lives in `detail/PeerfinderManager.cpp`.
### Components
- **`Logic<Checker>`**: central decision engine. Holds `slots_`, `connectedAddresses_` (multiset for IP limit), `keys_` (dedup public keys), `fixed_`, `livecache_`, `bootcache_`. Guarded by `std::recursive_mutex lock_`. Recursive mutex needed because `on_closed()` calls `remove()` independently.
- **`Livecache`**: ~30s TTL gossip cache (`Tuning::liveCacheSecondsToLive`). `beast::aged_map` + `boost::intrusive::list` per hop bucket (size `maxHops+2=9`, indices 08). MUST `shuffle()` before handout — `push_front` insertion is exploitable otherwise.
- **`Bootcache`**: persistent (SQLite via `StoreSqdb`). Bimap (`unordered_set_of` by endpoint, `multiset_of` by valence) for O(1) update and ranked iteration. Valence is a streak counter (clamped to 0 before crossing sign). `staticValence=32` for `[ips]`/`[ips_fixed]`. Throttled writes: 60s cooldown via `flagForUpdate`/`checkUpdate`; destructor force-flushes. Pruning: remove bottom 10% when over 1000 entries.
- **`Checker<Protocol>`**: async TCP probe for verifying peer's advertised listening port. Self-managing `async_op` via `shared_ptr` capture in handler; `~Checker` calls `wait()` (not `stop()` — must call `stop()` first explicitly).
- **`Counts`**: pure bookkeeping, no own mutex (relies on `Logic::lock_`). All updates funnel through private `adjust(slot, ±1)`. Fixed/reserved bypass active caps in `can_activate`. `isConnectedToNetwork()` returns `true` only when `m_out_max == 0` (pure listener mode).
- **`SlotImp`**: concrete slot state. Two constructors: inbound takes both endpoints, sets `checked=false,canAccept=false`; outbound only takes remote, sets `checked=true,canAccept=true` since TCP connect itself proves reachability. State machine enforced by `XRPL_ASSERT` in `state()` and `activate()`. `m_listening_port` is `std::atomic<int32_t>` with `-1` sentinel.
- **`Fixed`**: per-fixed-peer backoff. Fibonacci sequence in minutes: `{1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,34,55}`, clamped to last index. `failure()` advances; `success()` resets.
- **`Source`**: abstract; only concrete is `SourceStrings` (config `[ips]`). `cancel()` is a no-op for all current (synchronous) implementations but exists as an extension point for future async sources.
### Autoconnect Tier Order
`Logic::autoconnect()` strictly returns at first non-empty tier:
1. Fixed peers (via `get_fixed`, respecting `Fixed::when()` backoff)
2. Livecache (shuffled, reverse hop order — far peers first for topological diversity)
3. (Bootcache refill placeholder for DNS)
4. Bootcache fallback
`m_squelches` aged set (60s TTL, `Tuning::recentAttemptDuration`) suppresses rapid retries to same address across calls.
### Endpoint Gossip
- **Receiving (`on_endpoints` + `preprocess`)**: rate-limited via per-slot `whenAcceptEndpoints` (`Tuning::secondsPerMessage=151s`, a prime to desync nodes). Random sample-down if oversized. `hops==0` entry's IP replaced with sender's socket address (peer doesn't know own public IP). All surviving hops incremented by 1 before livecache insert. First-hop entries trigger `Checker::async_connect` for reachability test.
- **Sending (`buildEndpointsForPeers`)**: shuffle slots, use `SlotHandouts` per peer, run `handout()` algorithm. Self-advertisement uses zero-address IPv6 sentinel — receiver substitutes socket's remote address.
- **`Handouts` algorithm**: round-robin across multiple targets to ensure fair distribution. `move_back` after each acceptance rotates endpoints. Per-target dedup via `SlotImp::recent_t` (aged map; `filter()` uses `<=` hop comparison; `try_insert` writes both received and sent into recent — pessimistic update).
### `recent_t` Filter Semantics
`insert()` updates cached hop count only if new value ≤ existing. `filter()` suppresses sends when cached hop ≤ sending hop. The `<=` boundary is intentional — sending at a strictly lower hop than the peer knows is still useful; matching or higher is redundant.
## TLS Channel-Binding (Non-Standard)
`makeSharedValue` derives a 256-bit value from TLS finished messages:
```
sha512Half(SHA512(my_finished) XOR SHA512(peer_finished))
```
Rejects degenerate zero-XOR case. Non-standard (see OpenSSL #5509, XRPLF/rippled #2413). TLS cert verification is explicitly disabled (`verify_none`) — security comes from binding node-public-key signature to this shared value via `Session-Signature` HTTP header. MITM produces different finished values → signature mismatch → rejection.
## Handshake HTTP Headers
Built by `buildHandshake`, verified by `verifyHandshake`. Verify order is layered (cheap → expensive):
1. `Network-ID` mismatch
2. `Network-Time` ±20s tolerance
3. `Public-Key` parse, self-connection check
4. `Session-Signature` cryptographic verify
5. `Local-IP`/`Remote-IP` cross-check (NAT diagnostics)
Feature negotiation via `X-Protocol-Ctl`: `compr=lz4`, `vprr=1`, `txrr=1`, `ledgerreplay=1`. Responder echoes back only features locally configured AND requested (AND-gate). Initiator unconditionally advertises all locally supported features.
## ZeroCopy I/O Adapters
`ZeroCopyInputStream<Buffers>` wraps `ConstBufferSequence` for protobuf parsing without intermediate copy. `BackUp`/`Skip` support sub-buffer granularity via tracked `pos_` within current buffer. Empty buffer sequence is safe (null `pos_` initialized in constructor).
`ZeroCopyOutputStream<Streambuf>` uses deferred commit pattern: `commit_` tracks bytes promised but not yet committed. Destructor MUST flush trailing `commit_` — protobuf doesn't guarantee terminal `BackUp` or `Next` call. `BackUp(n)` asserts `n <= commit_` and prevents double-commit.
## Traffic Categorization
`TrafficCount::categorize()` is called once at `Message` construction (outbound) and per inbound message. Two-stage: static `unordered_map<MessageType, category>` for simple types, then `dynamic_cast` for protobuf inspection of `TMLedgerData`/`TMGetLedger` (`requestcookie` distinguishes forwarded vs originated) and `TMGetObjectByHash` (`query()` flag determines get/share). `unknown` is NOT rolled into `total`. `squelch_suppressed` records bytes NOT transmitted due to squelch; `squelch_ignored` records bytes from peers ignoring squelch.
## Compression Eligibility (`Message::compress`)
Skip if ≤70 bytes. Whitelist of eligible types: `mtMANIFESTS`, `mtENDPOINTS`, `mtTRANSACTION`, `mtGET_LEDGER`, `mtLEDGER_DATA`, `mtGET_OBJECTS`, `mtVALIDATOR_LIST`, `mtVALIDATOR_LIST_COLLECTION`, `mtREPLAY_DELTA_RESPONSE`, `mtTRANSACTIONS`. Excludes high-frequency control messages (`mtPING`, `mtVALIDATION`, `mtPROPOSE_LEDGER`, `mtSTATUS_CHANGE`). If compressed size doesn't beat uncompressed minus 4-byte header overhead, fall back to uncompressed (`bufferCompressed_` cleared, `getBuffer()` returns uncompressed).
## HTTP Endpoints (served by `OverlayImpl::processRequest`)
- `/crawl` — JSON topology, gated by bitmask config (`CrawlOptions::Overlay|ServerInfo|ServerCounts|Unl`)
- `/health` — three-tier status (200/503/500) — HTTP status encodes result so LBs need no JSON parsing
- `/vl/<key>` or `/vl/<version>/<key>` — signed validator list
## Concurrency Notes
- `OverlayImpl::mutex_` is `std::recursive_mutex` (acknowledged tech debt: `// VFALCO use std::mutex`). Recursion stems from `run()` triggering callbacks back into overlay.
- `cond_` is `condition_variable_any` (needs Lockable, not BasicLockable) for shutdown drain
- `work_` (`executor_work_guard` as `std::optional`) keeps `io_context` alive; `reset()` during `stop()` lets queue drain
- Strand vs mutex: peer registry mutations use `mutex_`; timer/squelch/tx-metrics work uses strand
- `OverlayImpl::Child` registration: destructor auto-removes from `list_`; `stopChildren()` copies pointers before iterating to avoid invalidation
- `PeerImp` field locks: `recentLock_` (ledger state, latency), `nameMutex_` (`shared_mutex` for `name_`); strand-confined fields need no lock
- `TxMetrics` has its own `std::mutex`; writers additionally serialize via overlay strand; RPC readers call `json()` directly without going through strand
- `Cluster::mutex_` is non-recursive — `for_each` callback must not call `update()`
- `PeerReservationTable`: `list()` deliberately releases lock before `std::sort` to minimize hold time (snapshot sort pattern)
## Cluster Registry
`Cluster` owns a `std::set<ClusterNode, Comparator>`. The `Comparator` is `is_transparent` — enables `find(PublicKey)` without constructing a dummy `ClusterNode`. `update()` enforces monotonic time (rejects stale reports), preserves names across nameless gossip updates, and uses erase+`emplace_hint` for O(1) amortized reinsert. `load()` is fail-fast on malformed lines (returns `false`) but tolerates duplicates with a warning (first entry wins).
## PeerSet (Data Acquisition)
`PeerSet` / `PeerSetImpl` manages the working set of peers queried for a single in-flight data acquisition (ledger, tx-set, etc.). Uses scored peer selection (`Peer::getScore(hasItem)`) sorted descending. `peers_` set of `Peer::id_t` acts as exclusion list — same peer is never re-added across retries. `DummyPeerSet` via `make_DummyPeerSet()` is the null-object used when `loadOldLedger()` needs `InboundLedger` without live peers.
## Key Files
### Overlay core
- `src/xrpld/overlay/Overlay.h` / `detail/OverlayImpl.{h,cpp}` — main manager
- `src/xrpld/overlay/Peer.h` / `detail/PeerImp.{h,cpp}` — per-peer logic
- `src/xrpld/overlay/Message.h` / `detail/Message.cpp` — wire envelope, lazy compression
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/ConnectAttempt.{h,cpp}` — outbound connection state machine
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/Handshake.{h,cpp}` — handshake crypto, feature negotiation
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/ProtocolMessage.h` — wire framing, dispatch
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/ProtocolVersion.{h,cpp}``XRPL/x.y` negotiation
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/ZeroCopyStream.h` — protobuf/Asio buffer adapters
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/Tuning.h` — all overlay magic numbers
- `src/xrpld/overlay/make_Overlay.h` — factory + `setup_Overlay` (parses `[overlay]`, `[crawl]`, `[vl]`, `[network_id]`)
- `src/xrpld/overlay/predicates.h` — composable peer-selection/dispatch functors for `Overlay::foreach`
### Reduce-relay
- `src/xrpld/overlay/Slot.h` — per-validator state machine + selection algorithm
- `src/xrpld/overlay/Squelch.h` — per-peer suppression enforcement
- `src/xrpld/overlay/ReduceRelayCommon.h` — all reduce-relay constants
### Telemetry
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/TrafficCount.{h,cpp}` — per-category byte/message counters
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/TxMetrics.{h,cpp}` — rolling averages for tx reduce-relay
### Cluster
- `src/xrpld/overlay/Cluster.h` / `ClusterNode.h` / `detail/Cluster.cpp` — trusted-node registry with heterogeneous lookup
### PeerSet (data acquisition)
- `src/xrpld/overlay/PeerSet.h` / `detail/PeerSet.cpp` — scored peer selection for InboundLedger etc.
### Reservations
- `src/xrpld/overlay/detail/PeerReservationTable.cpp` — persistent allowlist via SQLite
### Compression
- `src/xrpld/overlay/Compression.h``Algorithm` enum, dispatch wrappers, wire-format constants
### PeerFinder
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/PeerfinderManager.h` / `Slot.h` / `make_Manager.h` — public interface
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Logic.h` — central decision engine
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Livecache.h` / `Bootcache.{h,cpp}` — address caches
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Checker.h` — async reachability prober
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/SlotImp.{h,cpp}` — slot state machine
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Counts.h` — slot bookkeeping
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Fixed.h` — Fibonacci backoff
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Handouts.h` — fair distribution algorithm
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/StoreSqdb.h` — SQLite persistence (schema v4, migration handles `DROP COLUMN` via table rename)
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Source.h` / `SourceStrings.{h,cpp}` — abstract + static-string address source
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/Tuning.h` — peerfinder magic numbers
- `src/xrpld/peerfinder/detail/iosformat.h``leftw` stream manipulator for log alignment

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# Protocol and Serialization
The protocol layer defines XRPL's wire format, type system, and validation rules. It owns the canonical binary encoding required for signatures and consensus, the macro-driven registries for features/transactions/ledger entries/sfields/permissions, the typed object model (`STBase` hierarchy) that every transaction and ledger object inhabits, the cryptographic primitives, and the JSON/RPC boundary.
## Layered Type System
```
Asset = std::variant<Issue, MPTIssue> ← unified asset identity (XRP/IOU/MPT)
Issue = (Currency, AccountID) ← XRP iff currency==zero
MPTIssue = wraps MPTID (192-bit: seq32 || account160)
Amount types (lean, runtime polymorphic via Asset):
XRPAmount = int64 drops ← integral, no asset
IOUAmount = (mantissa, exponent) ← 15-digit decimal floating point
MPTAmount = int64 ← integral, no asset
STAmount = unified wire/serialized form holding Asset + value
- holds<Issue>(), holds<MPTIssue>(), native(), integral()
- canonicalize() normalizes (mantissa, exponent) per asset rules
- Internal: mAsset + mValue(uint64) + mOffset(int) + mIsNegative(bool)
```
`PathAsset` = `std::variant<Currency, MPTID>` — pathfinding-only asset reference (no issuer); used inside `STPathElement`.
Conversion utilities in `AmountConversions.h`: `toSTAmount`, `toAmount<T>`, `getAsset<T>`. Lean→STAmount is implicit-friendly; STAmount→lean is explicit (`get<>` throws on type mismatch).
`Units.h` provides phantom-typed `ValueUnit<TAG, T>` (`Drops`, `FeeLevel`, `FeeLevelDouble`) with `unit_cast<>` for explicit conversion; prevents drop/fee-level mixups at compile time.
## Key Invariants
- **Canonical field ordering:** sort by `(SerializedTypeID << 16) | fieldValue`, NOT by raw Field ID bytes — wrong sort breaks signatures
- **Field ID encoding:** 13 bytes; both type and field codes <16 single byte `(type<<4)|name`
- **Hash domain separation:** every signable payload prepends a 4-byte `HashPrefix` (`STX\0`, `SMT\0`, `VAL\0`, `BCH\0`, `CLM\0`, `LWR\0`, `MAN`, `TXN`, etc.) never share hashes across domains. Helper `make_hash_prefix(a,b,c)` is constexpr `uint32_t` builder.
- **STObject access semantics:** `obj[sfFoo]` throws `FieldErr` if absent; `obj[~sfFoo]` returns `std::optional`. `getOrThrow<T>(name)` family in `json_get_or_throw.h` enforces presence + type for raw JSON inputs.
- **Amendment IDs are deterministic:** `featureFoo == sha512Half(Slice("Foo"))` never change a feature name. Feature names must satisfy `isFeatureName()` at compile time (`UpperCamel` regex). Names exactly 32 bytes long are forbidden (reserved for raw hash collision prevention).
- **`numFeatures` is a ceiling, NOT an exact count.** Counting includes `XRPL_RETIRE_*` and any inactive macros; never use it as a length.
- **Feature registry frozen at startup:** `registerFeature` checks `numFeatures` and aborts via static-init `LogicError` if exceeded. The `readOnly` atomic fence flips after all file-scope variables are initialized any query before then asserts.
- **Singletons everywhere:** `SField`, `LedgerFormats`, `TxFormats`, `InnerObjectFormats`, `Permission`, `Feature` registry all use Meyer's singletons; registration completes before `main()` via static init.
- **Multi-sign signers MUST be sorted ascending by AccountID** (no duplicates, count in [1,32], cannot include tx account). The signer's AccountID is appended to the multi-sign blob to prevent shared-RegularKey replay attacks.
- **`vfFullyCanonicalSig` always set** by signer; verifiers normalize ECDSA S to low form via libsecp256k1.
- **Amendment-gated arithmetic:** `getSTNumberSwitchover()` is a `LocalValue<bool>` (per-coroutine) selecting legacy vs `Number`-based normalization in `IOUAmount`/`STAmount`.
- **TxMeta `AffectedNodes` must be sorted by index** for canonical serialization (consensus-critical). `addRaw()` performs this sort; failure is a consensus fork risk.
- **STObject debug-only field-uniqueness checks** (`isFieldAllowed`): silent duplicate fields in production are possible bugs but no runtime check.
- **STLedgerEntry construction fails loudly** if the type is unrecognized no silent fallback.
- **STValidation only accepts secp256k1 keys**; Ed25519 keys throw at construction time.
- **STNumber two-phase rounding contract:** `associateAsset()` must be called before `add()`. The assertion in `add()` checks idempotency calling `setValue()` after `associateAsset()` without re-associating is a programming error.
## Macro-Driven Registries (X-Macros)
Single source of truth for each registry; `.macro` files included multiple times with redefined macros to generate enum, declarations, and definitions.
| Macro file | Used for | Add requires |
|---|---|---|
| `features.macro` | `XRPL_FEATURE`, `XRPL_FIX`, `XRPL_RETIRE_*` | Bump `numFeatures` in `Feature.h` |
| `transactions.macro` | `TRANSACTION(tag, value, name, delegable, amendment, privileges, fields)` | nothing count derived |
| `ledger_entries.macro` | `LEDGER_ENTRY(tag, value, name, rpcName, fields)` + `LEDGER_ENTRY_DUPLICATE` for name collisions | nothing |
| `sfields.macro` | `TYPED_SFIELD(name, TYPE, code)`, `UNTYPED_SFIELD` | nothing |
| `permissions.macro` | `PERMISSION(name, txType, value)` (granular permissions 65537) | nothing |
Pattern uses `#pragma push_macro/pop_macro` to protect macro names. `UNWRAP(...)` strips outer parens around field-list initializers so commas don't confuse the preprocessor. `LEDGER_ENTRY_DUPLICATE` exists because `DepositPreauth` is both a transaction type and ledger entry type `JSS()` can't emit the same string twice.
Feature name validation is `constexpr` (compile-time `static_assert` on the literal); typos like lower-case first letter fail to build.
The `FeatureCollections` internal singleton uses `boost::multi_index_container` with three simultaneous indexes: random-access by insertion order (`byIndex` for bitset mapping), hash-unique by `uint256`, and hash-unique by name. A simple `unordered_map` cannot provide the stable integer index that `FeatureBitset` requires.
## Field Identity (`SField`)
- **Field code** = `(SerializedTypeID << 16) | fieldValue` packs type family and per-type index; canonical sort key
- `SField` instances are immutable singletons created at static init via `private_access_tag_t` (only definable inside `SField.cpp`)
- `TypedField<T>` adds compile-time payload type; `OptionaledField<T>` via `operator~(sfField)`
- Metadata flags (`fieldMeta`): `sMD_ChangeOrig`, `sMD_ChangeNew`, `sMD_DeleteFinal`, `sMD_Create`, `sMD_Always`, `sMD_BaseTen` (decimal display), `sMD_PseudoAccount`, `sMD_NeedsAsset` (drives `STTakesAsset` association), `sMD_Default` (field absent when zero)
- `IsSigning::no` excludes fields from signing hash (`sfTxnSignature`, `sfSigners`, `sfSignature`, etc.)
- `isBinary()` `fieldValue<256` (wire-representable); `isDiscardable()` `fieldValue>256` (JSON-only, e.g., `sfHash`, `sfIndex`)
- **Debug-only uniqueness check** during static init; release builds will silently mis-register on collision
## Wire Format Reference
| Item | Encoding |
|---|---|
| XRP STAmount | 8 bytes; bit63=0, bit62=sign(1=pos), 62-bit value |
| MPT STAmount | 8 bytes header (bit63=0, bit61=1, 56-bit value) + 192-bit MPTID |
| IOU STAmount | bit63=1, bit62=sign, 8-bit (offset+97), 54-bit mantissa, +20B currency, +20B issuer |
| AccountID | 20 bytes, VL-prefixed when standalone (`STAccount` mimics `STBlob` wire format) |
| MPTID | 192 bits = 32-bit big-endian sequence 160-bit issuer |
| STArray | elements between markers; ends with `STI_ARRAY,1` (`0xf1`) |
| STObject | fields in canonical order; ends with `STI_OBJECT,1` (`0xe1`) |
| VL prefix | 1 byte (0192), 2 bytes (19312480), 3 bytes (12481918744); else `std::overflow_error` |
| STIssue | 160-bit currency; if zero XRP; if next 160 = `noAccount()` MPT (then 32-bit seq); else IOU issuer |
| STNumber | 12 bytes: int64 signed mantissa + int32 exponent (two separate statements order must be explicit) |
| LP token currency | byte0 = `0x03`; bytes 1-19 = `sha512Half(min(asset1,asset2), max(asset1,asset2))` low bits |
| Order book quality | `(exponent+100) << 56 \| mantissa`; embedded in last 8 bytes of directory key (big-endian) so SHAMap order = price order |
| NFTokenID (256-bit) | flags(2) + transferFee(2) + issuer(20) + cipheredTaxon(4) + serial(4); low 96 bits = page sort key |
| LedgerHeader | 118 bytes fixed layout (seq, drops, parentHash, txHash, accountHash, parentClose/closeTime/closeFlags, closeTimeResolution) |
| Payment channel claim | `HashPrefix::paymentChannelClaim` channelID(32) amount(8) |
| Batch signing payload | `HashPrefix::batch` outer flags(4) inner-tx count(4) inner-tx hash list |
## Canonical Hashes
```
TXN → transactionID SND → txNode (with metadata)
MLN → leafNode MIN → innerNode
LWR → ledgerMaster STX → txSign (single-sig)
SMT → txMultiSign VAL → validation
PRP → proposal MAN → manifest
CLM → paymentChannelClaim BCH → batch
```
All hashes use `sha512Half` (first 256 bits of SHA-512). `HashPrefix` constants are protocol-immutable; the `make_hash_prefix(a,b,c)` constexpr packer in `HashPrefix.h` is the canonical way to declare new prefixes.
## STObject and STVar
- `STObject` stores `std::vector<detail::STVar>`; iterators expose `STBase const&` via transform iterator
- `STVar` is type-erased with 72-byte inline buffer (small-object optimization); `on_heap()` reports whether a value spilled; larger ST types heap-allocate
- `STVar` is movable; moving an on-heap STVar steals the pointer, while inline ones must invoke each ST type's move ctor through the v-table
- `copy()`/`move()` virtuals on every ST type delegate to `STBase::emplace()` for placement-new into `STVar`'s buffer
- **Two modes:**
- **Free** (`mType==nullptr`): linear field scan via `getFieldIndex()`; accepts any field; insertion order preserved
- **Templated** (`mType` set): O(1) field lookup via `SOTemplate::indices_`; `v_` laid out in template order with every slot pre-populated; unknown fields rejected
- `applyTemplate()` validates after deserialization; `set(SOTemplate)` initializes empty object with template
- Deserialization depth capped at 10 to prevent stack exhaustion
- `operator==` compares only `isBinary()==true` fields (O(n²) by design); `isEquivalent()` fast-paths when same `mType` pointer (positional comparison)
- `makeInnerObject()` applies templates conditionally on `fixInnerObjTemplate` / `fixInnerObjTemplate2` amendments historical ledger entries without template structure must not be rejected on replay
### Proxy Access Pattern
```cpp
auto amt = tx[sfAmount]; // ValueProxy: throws FieldErr if absent
auto dst = tx[~sfDestination]; // OptionalProxy: std::optional
tx[sfFlags] = 0; // proxy.assign() — soeDEFAULT zero is silently removed
tx[~sfDestTag] = std::nullopt; // remove field (only valid for soeOPTIONAL)
```
Proxies forbid removing `soeREQUIRED` or `soeDEFAULT` fields.
## SOEStyle (Field Presence)
| Style | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `soeREQUIRED` | must be present |
| `soeOPTIONAL` | may be absent; if present, may carry default value |
| `soeDEFAULT` | may be absent; if present, must NOT equal default auto-removed when assigned default |
`SOETxMPTIssue` flag on amount/issue fields: `soeMPTSupported`, `soeMPTNotSupported`, `soeMPTNone`. Omitting `soeMPTSupported` silently rejects MPT amounts in that field.
## Common Bug Patterns
- Adding to `transactions.macro` without adding to `sfields.macro` silent serialization failures
- Forgetting to bump `numFeatures` after `XRPL_FEATURE` static-init `LogicError` (registry overflow) caught at startup
- Hand-built binary blobs in non-canonical field order signature verification failures
- Omitting `soeMPTSupported` on amount field MPT payments silently rejected
- Mutating `sfTransactionType` inside `STTx` assembler callback `LogicError` (caught at startup)
- Storing `STBase` subclasses directly in `std::vector` field names lost on copy-assignment slide; use `STArray`/`STObject` instead
- Storing `Currency` as `"XRP"` ISO code (`badCurrency()`) instead of zero silently rejected; `to_currency()` legacy returns `badCurrency()` rather than failing
- Forgetting to call `associateAsset(sle, asset)` near end of `doApply()` for vault/loan transactors unrounded `STNumber` values
- Returning `tec*` from `preflight()` `NotTEC` type prevents this at compile time (would allow fee theft on unsigned tx)
- `TxMeta::AffectedNodes` left unsorted before serialization consensus-fork risk
- Comparing `Issue` instances when one side is MPT-wrapped `Issue::operator==` only compares currency+account; use `Asset` equality
- Relying on debug-only `assert` inside `STObject::isFieldAllowed` to catch duplicate fields in release
- Treating `numFeatures` as a length / iteration bound (it includes retired slots)
- Calling `setValue()` on an `STNumber` field after `associateAsset()` without re-associating idempotency assertion fires in `add()`
- Using Ed25519 key with `STValidation` throws at construction time (only secp256k1 allowed)
- Batch inner transaction `sfRawTransactions` array exceeds `maxBatchTxCount` (8) or contains nested `ttBATCH` rejected by `passesLocalChecks()`
- `getNFTokenIDFromPage()` without the page-split guard: a `sfModifiedNode` for a third page may lack `sfNFTokens` in `sfPreviousFields`; skip silently
- `STNumber` JSON string parsing asserting `!getCurrentTransactionRules()` string-format numbers not allowed inside active transaction processing
## Key Patterns
### Amendment Registration
```cpp
// In features.macro:
XRPL_FEATURE(MyFeature, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (MyBugFix, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_RETIRE_FEATURE(OldFeature) // code removed; remains registered for ledger compat
```
Lifecycle: `Supported::no/DefaultNo` `Supported::yes/DefaultNo` (rare) `DefaultYes` for critical fixes. **Never** revert `Supported::yes` to `no` (would amendment-block existing nodes).
`setCurrentTransactionRules()` has a non-obvious side effect: it calls `Number::setMantissaScale()` to push the precision mode (`small` vs `large`) without requiring `Number` to query rules on every arithmetic call.
### NotTEC vs TER
```cpp
NotTEC preflight(...); // can only return tel/tem/tef/ter/tes (no tec)
TER doApply(...); // can return any code including tec*
```
`TERSubset<Trait>` enforces this at compile time via `enable_if`. `TERtoInt(v)` is the authorized free-function conversion (member `explicit operator` would be too permissive in initializer contexts).
### Signing / Verifying
```cpp
sign(st, HashPrefix::txSign, KeyType::secp256k1, sk); // writes sfSignature
verify(st, HashPrefix::txSign, pubKey); // returns bool
// Multi-sign optimization (shared body, per-signer suffix):
auto s = startMultiSigningData(obj);
finishMultiSigningData(signerAccountID, s); // append signer ID to shared payload
```
`addWithoutSigningFields()` excludes signature fields from the signed payload. Both `sign()` and `verify()` share the same serialization path (serialize once, check/set the field), ensuring they cannot diverge.
### Batch Signing
`serializeBatch()` (in `Batch.h`, inline) produces: `HashPrefix::batch ‖ outer flags(4) ‖ inner-tx count(4) ‖ inner-tx hash list`. Both `checkBatchSingleSign()` and `checkBatchMultiSign()` call this once; multi-sign appends the per-signer AccountID suffix via `finishMultiSigningData`. `passesLocalChecks()` rejects nested batches.
### STNumber + STTakesAsset
```cpp
// Vault/Loan/LoanBroker fields use STNumber (no asset embedded).
// In doApply(), after all mutations:
associateAsset(*sle, vaultAsset); // rounds all sMD_NeedsAsset fields, removes zero-defaults
```
`STNumber` serializes a `Number` (signed mantissa+exponent, 12 bytes); rounding is asset-dependent and resolved by `associateAsset` walking fields flagged `sMD_NeedsAsset`. Fields with `sMD_Default` are removed from the SLE after rounding if the value became zero. `associateAsset()` is offset-based (the only path that yields mutable `STBase&`).
### LP Token Currency Derivation
```cpp
Currency lpc = ammLPTCurrency(asset1, asset2); // canonical std::minmax
// byte 0 = 0x03 (LP marker), bytes 1..19 = low 152 bits of sha512Half(min, max)
```
### Pseudo-Account Synthesis
Pseudo-accounts (AMM, Vault, LoanBroker) carry a 256-bit synthesized ID in fields flagged `sMD_PseudoAccount` (`sfAMMID`, `sfVaultID`, `sfLoanBrokerID`). These identify a stateless account address derived from the owner ledger entry.
### NFT Token ID Recovery from Metadata
`getNFTokenIDFromPage()` uses set-difference: collect all token IDs from `sfPreviousFields` and `sfFinalFields` across all metadata nodes; assert `finalIDs.size() == prevIDs.size() + 1`; use `std::mismatch` to find the inserted entry. Guard: when a mint causes a page split, the third page's `sfModifiedNode` may have `sfPreviousFields` without `sfNFTokens` check presence before extracting.
## STAmount Arithmetic Details
- **IOU canonical range:** mantissa [10^15, 10^16), exponent [-96, +80]; zero = (mantissa=0, exponent=-100)
- **Two rounding modes:** `mulRound`/`divRound` (legacy, rounds up when fractional 0.1) vs `mulRoundStrict`/`divRoundStrict` (correct remainder tracking, propagates `NumberRoundModeGuard`)
- **Overflow guard in multiply:** if `min(a,b) > sqrt(cMaxNative)`, product overflows checked before 128-bit intermediate
- **`canAdd`/`canSubtract`:** for IOU, uses round-trip relative error test with 10^-4 tolerance
- **`areComparable()`:** uses `std::visit` over `Asset` variant; incompatible asset types throw immediately
- Feature-gated: `featureSingleAssetVault` / `featureLendingProtocol` gate the `fromNumber()` path in `operator=(Number const&)`
## QualityFunction (AMM Path Optimization)
`q(out) = m * out + b` where `b` = reciprocal-rate intercept, `m` = AMM price-impact slope.
- **`AMMTag`:** `m_ = -fee/poolIn`, `b_ = poolOut*fee/poolIn` derived from single-path AMM swap formula
- **`CLOBLikeTag`:** `m_ = 0`, `b_ = 1/quality.rate()` also used for multi-path AMM (fixed allocation = constant quality)
- **`combine()`:** `m_ += b_ * qf.m_; b_ *= qf.b_` linear function composition; clears `quality_` cache when slope becomes nonzero
- **`outFromAvgQ()`:** solves `out = (1/rate - b_) / m_`; rounding mode `upward` to conservatively bound output; returns `nullopt` if `m_==0`, rate==0, or `out<=0`
- `saveNumberRoundMode` RAII guard scopes the upward-rounding to just this computation
## AccountID Cache
Direct-mapped cache in `AccountID.cpp`. Indexed by `hardened_hash<>` (xxHash + random seed = DoS-resistant). Lock sharding: single `atomic<uint64_t> locks_` encodes 64 independent spinlocks via `packed_spinlock` (one per `index % 64`). Edge case: `encoding[0] != 0` guard distinguishes an uninitialized slot from a legitimate cache hit for the all-zero `xrpAccount()`. Cache is optional; `initAccountIdCache(0)` disables it entirely.
## Cross-Chain Bridge Attestations
Two parallel hierarchies: `Attestations::AttestationClaim` / `AttestationCreateAccount` (full, with signature what witnesses submit) vs `XChainClaimAttestation` / `XChainCreateAccountAttestation` (ledger-stored, signature stripped). Conversion constructors project signingstorage in one step.
`AttestationMatch` three-state enum: `match`, `matchExceptDst`, `nonDstMismatch`. `XChainAddClaimAttestation` requires `match`; `XChainClaim` (user-specified dst) accepts `matchExceptDst`. `sameEvent()` ignores signer identity fields; full `operator==` requires all fields.
Max attestations per container: 256 (far above any real witness set; guards memory allocation).
## Critical Files
### Foundations
- `include/xrpl/protocol/SField.h`, `src/libxrpl/protocol/SField.cpp` field registry, X-macro expansion, code packing
- `include/xrpl/protocol/Feature.h`, `src/libxrpl/protocol/Feature.cpp` `numFeatures` (ceiling!), `FeatureBitset`, `registerFeature` with compile-time name validation; `readOnly` atomic fence
- `include/xrpl/protocol/Rules.h`, `src/libxrpl/protocol/Rules.cpp` `Rules` snapshot of enabled amendments; `CurrentTransactionRules` is a `LocalValue<Rules const*>` (per-coroutine); `isFeatureEnabled()` queries thread-local; `setCurrentTransactionRules` pushes `Number` mantissa scale
- `include/xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h` protocol-immutable domain separators; `make_hash_prefix` constexpr packer
### Macro Tables (single sources of truth)
- `include/xrpl/protocol/detail/features.macro`
- `include/xrpl/protocol/detail/transactions.macro`
- `include/xrpl/protocol/detail/ledger_entries.macro`
- `include/xrpl/protocol/detail/sfields.macro`
- `include/xrpl/protocol/detail/permissions.macro`
### Type System Roots
- `STBase.h/cpp` polymorphic root; `emplace()` SOO helper; `JsonOptions`; `STExchange` traits glue
- `STObject.h/cpp` heterogeneous container, proxy system, template enforcement, debug uniqueness asserts
- `STVar` (`detail/STVar.h`) 72-byte inline variant; `on_heap()`; move steals pointer when heap-allocated; depth guard at 10
- `SOTemplate.h/cpp` schema with O(1) field index; move-only; carries `SOEStyle` + `SOETxMPTIssue`
### Format Registries
- `TxFormats.h/cpp`, `LedgerFormats.h/cpp`, `InnerObjectFormats.h/cpp` all inherit `KnownFormats<Key, Derived>` with `forward_list<Item>` (pointer-stable) + dual flat_maps
- `LedgerEntry` rpcName vs name distinction enables `DepositPreauth` collision handling
### Amount / Asset Stack
- `Asset.h/cpp` variant of Issue/MPTIssue; `visit()`, `equalTokens()`, `BadAsset` sentinel
- `Issue.h/cpp`, `MPTIssue.h/cpp` XRP/IOU and MPT identity; **note** `Issue::operator==` ignores MPT-ness always go through `Asset`
- `STAmount.h/cpp` unified serialized amount; `canMul`/`canAdd`/`canSubtract` safety checks; `mulRound`/`mulRoundStrict` (legacy vs precise rounding); `roundToScale`
- `STNumber.h/cpp` `Number`-typed field; pairs with `STTakesAsset` infrastructure; 12-byte wire: int64 mantissa + int32 exponent
- `STIssue.h/cpp`, `STCurrency.h/cpp` asset-only fields
- `STTakesAsset.h/cpp` `associateAsset` walks `sMD_NeedsAsset` fields, rounds + strips zero-defaults; include order: `STTakesAsset.h` before `STLedgerEntry.h`
- `IOUAmount.h/cpp`, `XRPAmount.h`, `MPTAmount.h/cpp` lean representations
- `Rate2.h` `Rate` newtype with `parityRate = 1_000_000_000`; transfer-rate math
- `Units.h` phantom-typed `Drops`/`FeeLevel`
- `Number` (in `xrpl/basics/`) high-precision arithmetic; `MantissaRange::large` enabled by SingleAssetVault/LendingProtocol amendments
- `AmountConversions.h` typed coercions
### Cryptography
- `PublicKey.h/cpp` 33-byte unified format (0xED prefix for Ed25519); `ECDSACanonicality` enum (canonical vs fullyCanonical); libsecp256k1 normalization
- `SecretKey.h/cpp` `secure_erase` in dtor; deleted `==`/`<<`; XRPL-specific secp256k1 derivation via `Generator`
- `Seed.h/cpp` 128-bit; `parseGenericSeed()` cascades hexbase58RFC1751passphrase, rejecting other key types first
- `detail/secp256k1.h` libsecp256k1 context singleton via template-with-default-param trick (ODR-safe header-only); created with `SIGN|VERIFY` flags combined
- `digest.h` `sha512Half`, `sha512_half_hasher_s` (secure erase variant)
- `tokens.h/cpp` (+ `b58_utils.h`, `token_errors.h`) Base58Check; fast path uses base 58^10 intermediate (1015× speedup via `unsigned __int128`, gated on non-MSVC); `TokenType` enum is protocol-stable; `alphabetReverse` is `constexpr` 256-element array; leading-zero bytes each map to `'r'`
### Wire I/O
- `Serializer.h/cpp` accumulator; `addVL`, `addFieldID`, big-endian integers, `getSHA512Half()`
- `SerialIter` non-owning forward cursor over a byte buffer; throws on underrun
- `Sign.h/cpp` `sign`/`verify` with HashPrefix prepended to `addWithoutSigningFields()` output; `startMultiSigningData`/`finishMultiSigningData` split for batch-signer optimization; `signingForID` helper for arbitrary payload bytes
- `Batch.h` inline `serializeBatch()`: `HashPrefix::batch ‖ flags(4) ‖ count(4) ‖ txids`
- `serialize.h` top-level convenience helpers
- `messages.h` protobuf message tag constants (`TYPE_BOOL` undef guard documented)
### Higher-Level Objects
- `STTx.h/cpp` caches `tid_` and `tx_type_`; `passesLocalChecks` (memos, pseudo-tx, MPT support, batch nesting, max 8 inner txs); `sterilize()` round-trip; `getBatchTransactionIDs()` lazy + immutable after first call; `getFeePayer()` returns `sfDelegate` or `sfAccount`; `checkSign()` dispatches single/multi/batch/counterparty; SQL helpers (`getMetaSQL`)
- `STLedgerEntry.h/cpp` (alias `SLE`) typed ledger object; `thread()` updates `sfPreviousTxnID`; `isThreadedType()` gated by `fixPreviousTxnID`; `getJson()` injects `jss::index` and synthetic `mpt_issuance_id` for MPT issuances
- `STValidation.h/cpp` lazy `valid_` cache; `mTrusted` separate from validity; `lookupNodeID` callback decouples manifest system; `validationFormat()` is function-local static (SField init order safety); `sfCookie` is `soeDEFAULT` to prevent fingerprinting
- `STArray.h/cpp`, `STVector256.h/cpp`, `STBitString.h/cpp`, `STInteger.h/cpp`, `STBlob.h/cpp`, `STAccount.h/cpp`, `STPathSet.h/cpp`, `STXChainBridge.h/cpp`
### Transaction Meta
- `TxMeta.h/cpp` `AffectedNodes` (sorted by index in `addRaw()`!), `DeliveredAmount`, `sfParentBatchID`; linear scan for node lookup (bounded by 32-slot reservation); `getAffectedAccounts()` must match JS `Meta#getAffectedAccounts`
- `LedgerHeader.h/cpp` 118-byte fixed serialization; close-time-resolution fudging
### Indexes and Keys
- `Indexes.h/cpp` `keylet::*` factories with `LedgerNameSpace` tagged hashing; `keylet::quality()` embeds 64-bit quality in last 8 bytes (big-endian); `keylet::amm()` uses `std::minmax` + `if constexpr` for heterogeneous token types; `nftpage` = owner(160 bits) masked token(96 bits) range scan, no hash
- `Keylet.h/cpp` type-tagged `(uint256, LedgerEntryType)`; `ltANY` wildcard, `ltCHILD` rejects directories
- `Protocol.h` protocol-wide constants (`FLAG_LEDGER_INTERVAL`, etc.)
- `nftPageMask.h`, `nft.h` NFT page boundary (low 96 bits); composite keys (high 160 = owner AccountID)
- `NFTokenID.h/cpp` flags(2)+fee(2)+issuer(20)+cipheredTaxon(4)+serial(4); LCG `384160001 * seq + 2459` ciphers taxon; `getNFTokenIDFromPage()` and `getNFTokenIDFromDeletedOffer()` for metadata enrichment
- `NFTokenOfferID.h/cpp`, `NFTSyntheticSerializer.h/cpp` derived/synthetic NFT entries; consumed by Clio as public API
- `Book.h` `(in_asset, out_asset)` order-book identity
- `SeqProxy.h/cpp` sequence vs ticket abstraction; sequence-type values sort before ticket-type values
### Validation Helpers (return NotTEC, preflight-time)
- `AMMCore.h/cpp` `invalidAMMAsset`, `invalidAMMAssetPair`, `invalidAMMAmount`; `ammLPTCurrency()` uses canonical `std::minmax`
- `Permissions.h/cpp` singleton; `isDelegable()` checks granular vs transaction-level (`<UINT16_MAX` boundary), amendment, delegable flag
### RPC / JSON Boundary
- `STParsedJSON.h/cpp` depth cap 64; field-path-qualified errors via `make_name`; recognizes `"Payment"`, `"tesSUCCESS"`, etc.
- `ErrorCodes.h/cpp` append-only enum; `sortedErrorInfos` validated at compile time; `warning_code_i` distinct from `error_code_i`
- `RPCErr.h/cpp` `RPC::Status`/`make_error` helpers
- `ApiVersion.h` `apiMinimumSupportedVersion`(1), `apiMaximumSupportedVersion`(2), `apiBetaVersion`(3); `apiVersionIfUnspecified`(1); `forAllApiVersions` / `forApiVersions` templates pass version as `integral_constant` for compile-time branching; `getAPIVersionNumber()` returns `apiInvalidVersion`(0) on parse failure; `setVersion()` has v1 legacy semver-string shim
- `MultiApiJson.h` per-API-version `Json::Value` array indexed `[version - RPC::apiMinimumVersion]`; composes with `forAllApiVersions` from `ApiVersion.h`; preserves wire compatibility across versions
- `jss.h` every JSON key as `Json::StaticString` via `JSS(name)` macro; PascalCase = protocol fields, snake_case = RPC
- `json_get_or_throw.h` `getOrThrow<T>(jv, name)` specializations enforce presence + type; standard idiom for parsing untrusted JSON
- `st.h` convenience aggregate header for all ST types
### Specialized Types
- `STIssue`, `STAccount` (160-bit, VL-encoded), `STBitString<Bits>`, `STInteger<T>`, `STBlob`, `STArray`, `STVector256`, `STCurrency`, `STPathSet`, `STXChainBridge`, `STNumber` (asset-contextual)
- `Quality.h/cpp` inverted encoding (lower uint64 = higher quality); `ceil_in`/`ceil_out` proportional scaling; `_strict` variants honor Number rounding mode
- `QualityFunction.h/cpp` linear `q(out)=m*out+b`; AMMTag (slope from pool) vs CLOBLikeTag (m=0); `combine()` for multi-step strands; `outFromAvgQ()` solves for capped output
- `XChainAttestations.h/cpp` `Attestations::` namespace (full, with signature) vs `xrpl::` (stored); `match()` returns three-state `AttestationMatch`
### Pseudo-Account Fields (`sMD_PseudoAccount`)
- `sfAMMID`, `sfVaultID`, `sfLoanBrokerID` 256-bit hash representing a synthesized account address
### Misc / System
- `BuildInfo.h/cpp` version string, `getVersionString()` consumed by manifest/handshake
- `SystemParameters.h` drops-per-XRP, `INITIAL_XRP`, ledger-related constants; validated by `static_assert`
- `UintTypes.h` `uint256`/`uint160`/`uint128` aliases and tagged variants (`Currency`, `NodeID`, etc.)
- `TER.h/cpp` error code enum families + `TERSubset`
- `TxFlags.h` X-macro driven flag tables (`tf*`); see TxFlags Architecture below
- `TxFormats.h/cpp` transaction-type field schema
- `AccountID.h/cpp` `calcAccountID()` = SHA-256 then RIPEMD-160 (matches Bitcoin for security argument); `AccountIdCache` direct-mapped with spinlock sharding
## Numeric Encoding Reference
```
IOU canonical: mantissa ∈ [10^15, 10^16), exponent ∈ [-96, +80]
zero = (mantissa=0, exponent=-100) — sorts below smallest positive
XRP max: cMaxNativeN = 10^17 drops (100 billion XRP)
MPT max: maxMPTokenAmount = INT64_MAX = 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Transfer rate: Rate{value} where value/1_000_000_000 = 1.0 (parityRate = 1:1)
NFT transfer fee: uint16 basis points (050000), convert via nft::transferFeeAsRate (×10000)
AMM auction fee: basis points; trading fee in tenths of basis points (10000 = 1%)
STNumber mantissa: int64 signed; when MantissaRange::large active, accessor divides by 10 to fit wire format
```
## Protocol-Stable Constants (NEVER CHANGE)
- `LedgerEntryType` numeric values (in ledger objects)
- `TxType` numeric values (in signed transactions)
- `SerializedTypeID` and `SField` codes (in serialized fields)
- `LedgerNameSpace` discriminator characters (in keylet derivation) legacy `CONTRACT`, `GENERATOR`, `NICKNAME` reserved even though deprecated
- `HashPrefix` enum values (in signature/hash domain separation)
- `error_code_i` and `warning_code_i` numeric values (clients depend on them; append-only)
- `TECcodes` (and other `TER` family numeric values) recorded in transaction metadata
- `TokenType` (Base58Check prefix bytes for accounts/seeds/nodes)
- LP token currency prefix byte (`0x03`)
- Universal transaction flags (`tfFullyCanonicalSig`, `tfInnerBatchTxn`)
- `FLAG_LEDGER_INTERVAL = 256` (drives consensus timing)
- `INITIAL_XRP = 100B × 10^6 drops` (validated by `static_assert` against `Number::maxRep`)
- NFT taxon LCG constants (`384160001 * seq + 2459`)
- All flag bit values (`tf*`, `lsf*`, `asf*`)
- XRPL Base58 alphabet (first char `'r'` for `AccountID=0` is cosmetically significant)
- `maxBatchTxCount = 8` (inner transactions per batch)
Changing any requires an amendment with explicit detection logic for old/new behavior.
## TxFlags Architecture
`TxFlags.h` is itself X-macro driven. Per-transaction flag groups are declared so that:
- Each group has `tf*` named bit constants
- `tfUniversalMask` is the union of universal flags (`tfFullyCanonicalSig`, `tfInnerBatchTxn`)
- Per-transaction `tf*Mask` constants are auto-computed via `MASK_ADJ` so that mask matches the declared flags exactly adding a flag automatically updates the mask
- `TF_FLAG2` marks flags whose meaning was changed by an amendment; old/new bits coexist with disjoint enable conditions
- Inner-batch flag `tfInnerBatchTxn` is special: marks a tx as a member of a batch (skipped by ordinary preflight signature checks)
Pattern: when adding a new flag, define it in `TxFlags.h` in the appropriate group; do NOT manually adjust the mask the macro derives it.
## STTx Construction Paths
Three constructors, all terminate with `tid_ = getHash(HashPrefix::transactionID)`:
1. **Wire** (`SerialIter&`) hottest path; enforces `txMinSizeBytes` (32) and `txMaxSizeBytes` (1 MB) before field parsing; `set(sit)` returning `true` (inner object terminator found at top level) throws
2. **Object promotion** (`STObject&&`) no size check; `applyTemplate` enforces conformance
3. **Programmatic** (`TxType, assembler`) installs template first; asserts `sfTransactionType` unchanged after assembler runs; `LogicError` (not `std::runtime_error`) on mutation
`getSeqProxy()` unifies `sfSequence` (classic) and `sfTicketSequence` (ticket); when `sfSequence==0` and `sfTicketSequence` present ticket mode. Sequence-type always sorts before ticket-type.
`getFeePayer()` returns `sfDelegate` if present, else `sfAccount`. Authorization is enforced in `Transactor::checkPermission`, not here.
## Counterparty Signing (`sfCounterpartySignature`)
Used by `LoanSet` allows a second party to sign the same transaction. `checkSign(Rules const&)` checks primary then counterparty (if field present). Errors from counterparty check are prefixed `"Counterparty: "`. `sign()` accepts optional `signatureTarget` reference to write into a sub-object.

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# RPC
JSON-RPC over HTTP/WebSocket and gRPC. Central handler table dispatches by method name + API version. Roles: ADMIN, USER, IDENTIFIED, PROXY, FORBID, GUEST.
## Key Invariants
- Handler table in `Handler.cpp`: each entry = `{name, function, role, condition, minApiVer, maxApiVer}` as `std::multimap<string, Handler>`. Same method name can have multiple entries with **non-overlapping** version ranges; overlap is a fatal `LogicError()` at startup.
- `conditionMet` checks amendment-blocked, UNL expired, operating mode ≥ SYNCING, validated ledger age < `Tuning::maxValidatedLedgerAge` (2 min), and validated/current gap ≤ 10 ledgers. Standalone mode bypasses age checks.
- API v1 vs v2 error code split: v1 emits `rpcNO_NETWORK`/`rpcNO_CURRENT`/`rpcNO_CLOSED`; v2+ collapses to `rpcNOT_SYNCED`.
- Sensitive fields (`passphrase`, `secret`, `seed`, `seed_hex`) are masked as `<masked>` in error response echoes.
- Batch requests: top-level `"method": "batch"` with `params` array; each sub-request processed independently and accumulated into JSON array. Batch is rejected entirely if any sub-request is itself a batch (no nesting).
- API v2 enforces strict JSON typing on previously-permissive boolean fields (e.g., `signer_lists`, `binary`, `forward`, `transactions`).
- Two handler registration styles exist but only two handlers use the new-style (class-based): `LedgerHandler` and `VersionHandler`. All ~67 others use old-style free functions in `handlerArray`.
## Common Bug Patterns
- New handler without entry in `Handler.cpp` static array = handler silently unreachable.
- Wrong `role_` on handler: USER-level with admin data leaks; ADMIN handler accessible to users = security hole.
- `conditionMet` returning false: ensure new conditions are documented and version-coded errors are paired.
- Resource charging: each request gets a fee via `Resource::Consumer`; missing charge allows DoS.
- `maxRequestSize` (1 MB) rejected before JSON parsing; oversized requests get no error detail.
- Marker pagination: callers can forge markers pointing into other accounts' directories — always call `RPC::isRelatedToAccount` before resuming.
- `parse<T>()` returning `std::nullopt` is a programming-error sentinel for type system; user-facing errors go through `required<T>` / `Expected<T, Json::Value>`.
- `loadType` must be set early in handler — escalates to `feeExceptionRPC` automatically on exception if still `feeReferenceRPC`.
- `WSInfoSub` only trusts `X-User`/`X-Forwarded-For` headers when the remote IP is in `secure_gateway_nets`; outside that list, those headers are stripped. Misconfiguring `secure_gateway` lets untrusted clients spoof identity.
- `RPCSub::sendThread` reads `mUsername`/`mPassword` outside `mLock` — minor data-race noted in source with `XXX` comment.
- `PathRequestManager::getAssetCache` assigns the `weak_ptr<AssetCache>` lock result to a local `shared_ptr` before returning — assigning directly to the weak member would cause immediate expiry.
- `account_objects` marker encodes phase (NFT page vs directory); resuming with a wrong-phase marker can traverse the wrong list. Both `nftPageStart` and directory marker use different sentinel shapes.
## Adding New RPC Handler
1. Declare in `Handlers.h`: `Json::Value doMyCommand(RPC::JsonContext&);`
2. Implement in new file under `src/xrpld/rpc/handlers/<category>/`.
3. Register in `Handler.cpp` `handlerArray` with role, condition, version range.
4. For class-based new-style handler (rare; only `LedgerHandler`, `VersionHandler`): expose static `name`, `role`, `condition`, `minApiVer`, `maxApiVer`; implement `check()` / `writeResult()`; register via `addHandler<T>()`.
5. For gRPC: define in `xrp_ledger.proto`, add `CallData` in `GRPCServerImpl::setupListeners()`, write `doXxxGrpc(RPC::GRPCContext<Request>&)` returning `std::pair<Response, grpc::Status>`.
## Handler Patterns
### Old-style registration (typical)
```cpp
// In Handler.cpp handlerArray[] — REQUIRED for every new handler:
{"my_command", byRef(&doMyCommand), Role::USER, NO_CONDITION},
// role: ADMIN for internal/sensitive, USER for public
// condition: NO_CONDITION, NEEDS_NETWORK_CONNECTION, NEEDS_CURRENT_LEDGER, NEEDS_CLOSED_LEDGER
// version range defaults to [apiMinimumSupportedVersion, apiMaximumValidVersion]
// To version-bound: `{"ledger_header", byRef(&doLedgerHeader), Role::USER, NO_CONDITION, 1, 1}`
```
### Version-Ranged Class Handler
```cpp
// Class with static metadata; registered in HandlerTable ctor via addHandler<T>()
template <> Handler handlerFrom<MyCommandHandler>() {
return {MyCommandHandler::name, &handle<Json::Value, MyCommandHandler>,
MyCommandHandler::role, MyCommandHandler::condition,
MyCommandHandler::minApiVer, MyCommandHandler::maxApiVer};
}
```
### Ledger Resolution
- `RPC::lookupLedger(ledger, context)` for JSON path — handles `ledger_hash`/`ledger_index`/legacy `ledger`/shortcut strings.
- `RPC::ledgerFromRequest<T>(ledger, context)` for gRPC.
- `RPC::getOrAcquireLedger(context)` returns `Expected<shared_ptr<Ledger const>, Json::Value>` and triggers `InboundLedgers::acquire()` for missing ledgers (used only by `ledger_request` admin command).
### Pagination Idiom
- Marker format: `"<uint256_hex>,<uint64_pageHint>"` for owner-directory handlers; raw hex for NFT page chains.
- Request `limit + 1` from `forEachItemAfter`; if `count == limit + 1`, emit marker from limit-th item.
- Always validate marker SLE belongs to requesting account before resuming.
- Limits from `RPC::Tuning::<command>` clamped via `readLimitField()`; admin/unlimited roles bypass clamp.
## Key Files
### Top-level
- `src/xrpld/rpc/handlers/Handlers.h` — authoritative declarations of all old-style handler functions (~67 entries).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/Handler.cpp` — handler table, `getHandler()`, `HandlerTable` singleton, version overlap enforcement.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/Handler.h``Handler` struct, `Condition` enum, `conditionMet()` template.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/RPCHandler.cpp``doCommand()` pipeline: load-shed, role check, condition check, perf-log instrumented dispatch.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/ServerHandler.cpp` — HTTP/WS server entry; auth, batch handling, version-aware error formatting, secret masking, HTTP status from RPC error codes (ripplerpc ≥ 3.0).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/RPCHandler.h``doCommand`, `roleRequired` declarations.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/Context.h``Context`, `JsonContext`, `GRPCContext<T>` aggregate dispatch envelopes.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/Request.h` — simpler `Request` envelope (less used; lives alongside `Context`).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/Status.h` — unified error type bridging `TER`, `error_code_i`, and bare int with `inject()` to JSON.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/Role.h``Role` enum, `isUnlimited`, `requestRole`, `ipAllowed`, `forwardedFor`.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/Role.cpp` — IP subnet matching, secure_gateway resolution, RFC 7239 / `X-Forwarded-For` parsing.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/RPCHelpers.cpp` / `.h` — pagination, seed parsing, keypair derivation, ledger-entry type selection, MPT/IOU asset parsing.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/RPCLedgerHelpers.cpp` / `.h``lookupLedger`, `getLedger`, `getOrAcquireLedger`; staleness checks; gRPC `ledgerFromSpecifier`.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/Tuning.h` — all numeric tunables (limits, ranges, throttles).
- `include/xrpl/protocol/ErrorCodes.h``error_code_i`, `inject_error`, `ErrorInfo` table, HTTP status mapping.
### Subscriptions
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/WSInfoSub.h` — WebSocket `InfoSub` subclass; `Json::stream`-based zero-intermediate serialization into `multi_buffer`. Only trusts `X-User`/`X-Forwarded-For` when remote IP is in `secure_gateway_nets`.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/RPCSub.h` / `detail/RPCSub.cpp` — outbound HTTP/HTTPS push subscription ("webhook"); legacy feature maintained for one specific partner; carries `VFALCO TODO` markers. `sendThread` reads `mUsername`/`mPassword` outside `mLock` (data-race risk).
- Streams: `server`, `ledger`, `book_changes`, `transactions`, `transactions_proposed` (`rt_transactions` deprecated alias), `validations`, `manifests`, `peer_status` (admin), `consensus`.
- `book_changes` stream can be subscribed but **cannot be unsubscribed** — there is no unsubscribe path for it.
- `account_history_tx_stream` is experimental; gated on `useTxTables()`; supports `stop_history_tx_only` in unsubscribe.
### Pathfinding
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/Pathfinder.cpp` / `.h` — three-phase engine: `findPaths()` (template expansion via static `mPathTable`), `computePathRanks()` (RippleCalc simulation), `getBestPaths()` (selection with covering-path).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/PathRequest.cpp` / `.h` — per-request state machine; two constructors for `path_find` (subscription) vs `ripple_path_find` (legacy callback); adaptive `iLevel`.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/PathRequestManager.cpp` / `.h` — collection of `wptr<PathRequest>`; re-entrant `updateAll()` loop; shared `AssetCache` via `weak_ptr` (intentional — cache lives only as long as a request holds it).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/AssetCache.cpp` / `.h` — per-ledger thread-safe trust line + MPT cache; **direction-superset optimization**: caches lines in both directions (AB and BA) so a single fetch covers both source and destination queries; `shared_ptr<vector<>>` null sentinels for empty accounts.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/AccountAssets.cpp` / `.h``accountSourceAssets` / `accountDestAssets` for path source/dest currency enumeration.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/TrustLine.cpp` / `.h``TrustLineBase` + `PathFindTrustLine` (memory-minimal) + `RPCTrustLine` (adds quality rates).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/MPT.h``PathFindMPT` (MPTID + zeroBalance + maxedOut); implicitly converts from `MPTIssue` for uniform interface with `PathFindTrustLine`.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/PathfinderUtils.h``largestAmount`, `convertAmount`, `convertAllCheck`; XRP sentinel = `STAmount::cMaxNative`, IOU sentinel = `STAmount::cMaxValue / cMaxOffset`, MPT sentinel = `maxMPTokenAmount`. Pass these to signal "send all".
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/LegacyPathFind.cpp` / `.h` — RAII concurrency guard for synchronous `ripple_path_find`; lock-free CAS on `inProgress` counter; admin bypass. Destructor skips decrement if construction failed (`m_isOk` flag).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/RippleLineCache.cpp` / `.h`**empty stubs**; functionality replaced by `AssetCache`. Still `#include`d in two files for inert compatibility.
### Transaction Signing / Submission
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/TransactionSign.cpp` / `.h``transactionSign`, `transactionSubmit`, `transactionSignFor`, `transactionSubmitMultiSigned`; `SigningForParams` mode discriminator; round-trip "sterilization" via `transactionConstructImpl`.
- Fee pipeline: `checkFee``getCurrentNetworkFee` (max of load-scaled base fee and TxQ-escalated open ledger fee, capped by `fee_mult_max`/`fee_div_max`).
- `ProcessTransactionFn` dependency injection via `getProcessTxnFn(NetworkOPs&)` for testability.
- `acctMatchesPubKey` handles three account states: unactivated (master-only), master+regular both valid, master disabled (regular only).
- `doSubmit`: pre-seeds `HashRouter` with the transaction hash before forwarding, so the node does not rebroadcast its own submission.
### Utility / Enrichment
- `src/xrpld/rpc/BookChanges.h` — header-only template `computeBookChanges<L>(ledger)`; produces OHLCV per pair; reused by RPC handler and `book_changes` subscription stream.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/CTID.h` — Concise Transaction ID (XLS-15d): 16-hex `C` + 28-bit ledgerSeq + 16-bit txnIdx + 16-bit netID. Uses `boost::regex`, not `std::regex`.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/DeliveredAmount.h` / `detail/DeliveredAmount.cpp``insertDeliveredAmount`; three-tier resolution; threshold = ledger 4594095 (Jan 2014) or close time 446000000s; `"unavailable"` string sentinel for pre-threshold ledgers; lazy lambdas avoid `LedgerMaster` calls when meta has `sfDeliveredAmount`.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/MPTokenIssuanceID.h` / `detail/MPTokenIssuanceID.cpp``insertMPTokenIssuanceID`; mirrors `DeliveredAmount` three-function pattern (eligibility / extraction / injection).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/handlers/server_info/ServerDefinitions.cpp` — built once at startup via Meyers singleton; SHA-512-half hash for client cache invalidation; X-macrodriven from protocol headers.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/GRPCHandlers.h` — declarations for 4 gRPC handlers (`doLedgerGrpc`, `doLedgerEntryGrpc`, `doLedgerDataGrpc`, `doLedgerDiffGrpc`). Contract: non-OK `grpc::Status` discards the response object.
- `src/xrpld/rpc/Output.h``boost::utility/string_ref`-based output sink. Vestigial; not used by current codebase (canonical sink is `Json::Output`).
- `src/xrpld/rpc/json_body.h` — Boost.Beast `Body` type for JSON HTTP responses; both `reader` and `writer` implement BodyReader concept (eager, one-shot).
### Client-side
- `src/xrpld/rpc/RPCCall.h` / `detail/RPCCall.cpp``xrpld` CLI dispatch; `RPCParser` with static `Command[]` table mapping method → parse function; "trusted interface" — minimal validation by design.
## Enrichment Pipeline
Three functions are called together wherever transaction metadata is serialized to JSON. **Always apply all three** at the same call sites to keep responses consistent:
1. `insertDeliveredAmount()` — actual delivered amount for payments/check-cash/account-delete.
2. `RPC::insertNFTSyntheticInJson()` — synthetic NFT fields (`nft_offer_index`, `nftoken_id`, etc.) extracted from metadata.
3. `RPC::insertMPTokenIssuanceID()``mpt_issuance_id` for successful `MPTokenIssuanceCreate` transactions.
Call sites: `Tx.cpp`, `AccountTx.cpp`, `NetworkOPs.cpp`, `LedgerToJson.cpp`, `Simulate.cpp`.
## Resource Cost Tiers
Set `context.loadType` early. Tiers (from `Fees.h`):
- `feeReferenceRPC` — default; auto-escalates to `feeExceptionRPC` on uncaught exception.
- `feeMediumBurdenRPC` — directory walks, account_lines, account_offers, simulate, history paging, tx_reduce_relay-class ops.
- `feeHeavyBurdenRPC` — pathfinding, signing, gateway_balances, ledger_request, submit_multisigned.
## Tuning Constants (in `Tuning.h`)
- `maxRequestSize = 1_000_000` — rejected pre-parse in `ServerHandler`.
- `maxJobQueueClients = 500``RPCHandler::fillHandler` returns `rpcTOO_BUSY`; admin/unlimited bypass.
- `maxValidatedLedgerAge = 2 min`.
- `maxPathfindsInProgress = 2`, `maxPathfindJobCount = 50`, `max_src_cur = 18`, `max_auto_src_cur = 88`.
- `binaryPageLength = 2048`, `jsonPageLength = 256` — selected via `pageLength(isBinary)` in `ledger_data`.
- Per-command `LimitRange`: most account queries `{10, 200, 400}`; `bookOffers {0, 60, 100}`; `nftOffers {50, 250, 500}`; `noRippleCheck {10, 300, 400}`; `accountNFTokens {20, 100, 400}`.
- `defaultAutoFillFeeMultiplier = 10`, `defaultAutoFillFeeDivisor = 1`.
## Two-Tier Signing Access Gate
Sign-related handlers (`sign`, `sign_for`, `submit` with `tx_json`, `channel_authorize`) enforce:
```cpp
if (context.role != Role::ADMIN && !context.app.config().canSign())
return rpcNOT_SUPPORTED;
```
`canSign()` reflects `[signing_support]` config; defaults false. Public nodes refuse to sign by default. All `sign`/`sign_for` responses include a `deprecated` warning steering clients to local/offline signing.
## API Version Behavioral Differences
- `apiCommandLineVersion` is used by the CLI; defaults differ from inbound.
- v2 promotes fields from inside transaction objects to top-level: `hash`, `ledger_index`, `ledger_hash`, `close_time_iso`.
- v2 renames metadata keys: `tx``tx_json`, `meta``meta_blob` for binary.
- v2 renames Payment `Amount``DeliverMax` (via `RPC::insertDeliverMax`).
- v2 strict boolean typing; v1 silently coerces.
- v2 rejects mixing `ledger_index_min`/`max` with `ledger_index`/`ledger_hash` in `account_tx`; v1 tolerates.
- v2 enforces precise marker objects in `account_tx` (`{ledger, seq}` integers).
- v3 (beta) adds human-readable singleton aliases in `ledger_entry` index lookup. `VersionHandler::maxApiVer` tracks the highest beta version; the width of the beta range (currently 1) matters for the version negotiation boundary.
## Handler Subdirectory Map
- `handlers/account/``AccountInfo`, `AccountLines`, `AccountChannels`, `AccountCurrencies`, `AccountNFTs`, `AccountObjects`, `AccountOffers`, `AccountTx`, `GatewayBalances`, `NoRippleCheck`, `OwnerInfo` (legacy).
- `handlers/admin/``BlackList`, `UnlList`, plus subdirectories for `data/` (CanDelete, LedgerCleaner, LedgerRequest), `keygen/` (WalletPropose, ValidationCreate), `log/`, `peer/`, `server_control/` (Stop, LedgerAccept — standalone-only), `signing/` (ChannelAuthorize, Sign, SignFor), `status/` (ConsensusInfo, FetchInfo, GetCounts, Print, ValidatorInfo, Validators, ValidatorListSites).
- `handlers/ledger/``Ledger` (class-based), `LedgerClosed`, `LedgerCurrent`, `LedgerData`, `LedgerDiff` (gRPC-only), `LedgerEntry` (parser table from `ledger_entries.macro`), `LedgerHeader`.
- `handlers/orderbook/``AMMInfo`, `BookChanges`, `BookOffers`, `DepositAuthorized`, `GetAggregatePrice`, `NFTBuyOffers` / `NFTSellOffers` / `NFTOffersHelpers.h`, `PathFind` (subscription), `RipplePathFind` (one-shot).
- `handlers/server_info/``Fee`, `Feature`, `Manifest`, `ServerDefinitions`, `ServerInfo`, `ServerState`, `Version.h` (class-based).
- `handlers/subscribe/``Subscribe`, `Unsubscribe`.
- `handlers/transaction/``Simulate` (dry-run via `tapDRY_RUN`; batch rejected), `Submit`, `SubmitMultiSigned`, `Tx`, `TransactionEntry` (ledger-pinned), `TxHistory` (paginated, `useTxTables()`-gated, deep-page cap 10000 for non-admin), `TxReduceRelay`.
- `handlers/utility/``Ping` (role-conditional response), `Random`.
- Top-level `handlers/`: `ChannelVerify` (no admin restriction, stateless), `VaultInfo` (XLS-66, vault + MPT issuance lookup).
## gRPC Specifics
- Four handlers: `Ledger`, `LedgerEntry`, `LedgerData` (binary-only, fixed page=2048, supports `marker`+`end_marker` for range parallelism), `LedgerDiff` (SHAMap delta; downcast `ReadView``Ledger` is the validation gate).
- `doLedgerGrpc` adds `get_objects` (state diff via `SHAMap::compare`) and `get_object_neighbors` (DEX best-offer tracking via `keylet::quality`).
- Handlers return `std::pair<Response, grpc::Status>`. Non-OK status discards response.
- Error mapping: `rpcINVALID_PARAMS``INVALID_ARGUMENT`; ledger missing → `NOT_FOUND`; diff overflow → `RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED`.
## Key Gotchas
- `noEvents` (`rpcNO_EVENTS`) is returned by `path_find` and `subscribe`/`unsubscribe` for non-WebSocket transports — HTTP has no push channel.
- `LegacyPathFind` admit-failure means destructor must not decrement; uses `m_isOk` flag.
- `getMasterKey` returns the input key unchanged when no manifest exists — used in `doManifest`/`doValidatorInfo` to distinguish "is master key" from "ephemeral with no manifest".
- `ledger_accept` only works in standalone mode; takes master mutex; drives `Consensus::simulate`.
- `ChannelAuthorize` / `ChannelVerify` use `HashPrefix::paymentChannelClaim` ('CLM') as domain separator; canonical message = prefix + 32-byte channelID + 8-byte drops.
- `deposit_authorized` with credentials: must sort `(issuer, type)` pairs canonically via `credentials::makeSorted` before computing keylet; `lifeExtender` vector keeps SLEs alive so `Slice` views into `sfCredentialType` remain valid.
- `LedgerEntry` uses `Expected<uint256, Json::Value>` parser return type rather than exceptions; v1 still re-throws `Json::error` for compatibility.
- `nft_buy_offers` / `nft_sell_offers` differ only by `keylet::nft_buys` vs `keylet::nft_sells` — both delegate to `enumerateNFTOffers` in `NFTOffersHelpers.h`.
- `getCountsJson` (in `GetCounts.h`) is callable from non-RPC contexts (e.g., `OverlayImpl::getCountsJson`).
- `wallet_propose` entropy warning: <80 bits strong warning; passphrase that already encodes the seed (1751/Base58/hex) suppresses warning.
- Account marker security: always verify `RPC::isRelatedToAccount(*ledger, sle, accountID)` on resumed pagination prevents cross-account directory traversal.
- `AMMInfo` has two distinct parsing paths: one for `amm_account` (direct lookup) and one for `asset`+`asset2` pair (derives AMM account via `keylet::amm`). Both resolve to the same AMM SLE but through different code paths changes must update both.
- `book_offers` applies an inline load-shedder: if `checkFee` determines the consumer is at warning/drop tier, it cuts the offer limit in half before iterating.
- `Simulate` rejects batch transactions (returns `rpcINVALID_PARAMS`) `tapDRY_RUN` does not support the batch transaction type.
- `autofillSignature()` in `Simulate.cpp` removes `SigningPubKey` and `TxnSignature` fields before applying dry-run, then restores them; callers must not pre-sign before calling Simulate.
- `RPCSub` is a legacy feature retained for one specific partner. It is **not** a general-purpose webhook system. New subscribers should use WebSocket instead.

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# SHAMap
Authenticated 16-way radix Merkle trie. Every ledger has two: a TRANSACTION tree (txid → tx, with or without metadata) and a STATE tree (object key → serialized object). Root hash is what validators sign — two nodes agree on ledger state iff their root hashes match. Tree depth is fixed at 64 (256-bit keys consumed 4 bits per level, 65 levels total: root at depth 0, leaves at depth 64).
Root is always a `SHAMapInnerNode`. Leaves only appear at depth 64.
## Core Invariants
- **Tree shape**: `branchFactor = 16`, `leafDepth = 64`, max 65 levels (root at depth 0). One nibble per level.
- **CoW ownership**: each node has a `cowid_`. Non-zero → exclusively owned by that map and mutable. Zero → shared/canonicalized, must not be mutated. `setItem()`, `setChild()`, `dirtyUp()` all assert `cowid_ != 0`.
- **`unshareNode` before any mutation** of a shared node — #1 bug class. Skipping it corrupts every snapshot sharing the node.
- **`canonicalize`** ensures one in-memory instance per hash via `Family::getTreeNodeCache()`. Asserts `cowid == 0` on entry AND on values returned by `cacheLookup()`.
- **`SHAMapNodeID` masking**: `id_ == (id_ & depthMask(depth_))` is enforced by constructor. Two nodes at the same depth on the same path always have identical `SHAMapNodeID`.
- **Inner node concurrency**: per-child bit spinlock in `lock_` (`std::atomic<uint16_t>`, one bit per branch). Allows concurrent reads of different children. `setChild`/`shareChild` skip locking because they require CoW ownership.
- **Leaf size floor**: `SHAMapItem::size() >= 12` asserted at leaf construction.
## State Machine
```cpp
enum class SHAMapState {
Modifying = 0, // open ledger — can add/remove/update
Immutable = 1, // frozen — no writes; asserts guard
Synching = 2, // root hash known; missing nodes can be added
Invalid = 3, // corrupt; consensus must discard
};
```
`setImmutable()` asserts state ≠ `Invalid`. Hash-mismatch or position-mismatch during `addKnownNode` transitions to `Invalid` (not a crash).
## Copy-on-Write Discipline (#1 Bug Class)
```cpp
// REQUIRED before mutating any shared node:
auto node = unshareNode(branch, key); // clones if shared
node->setChild(index, child); // safe to modify
```
`snapShot(isMutable)` does NOT copy nodes. It bumps the original's `cowid_` and shares the `root_` pointer. Subsequent writes call `unshareNode()` which clones on first touch. Immutable snapshots of immutable maps share everything with zero clone cost.
The copy constructor increments `cowid_` (`cowid_(other.cowid_ + 1)`) and calls `unshare()` if either side is mutable, preventing later mutations from racing. An immutable copy of an immutable map shares all nodes with zero clone cost.
`getHash()` does `const_cast<SHAMap&>(*this).unshare()` when the root hash is zero — acknowledged design compromise (logical read, physical mutate).
## Key Files
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMap.h` — main class, state machine, `MissingNodes` struct
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapTreeNode.h` — base; `cowid_`, `hash_`, `IntrusiveRefCounts`, wire-type constants
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapInnerNode.h` — 16-way branch, sparse `TaggedPointer`, per-bit spinlocks, `fullBelowGen_`
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapLeafNode.h` — abstract leaf base, `item_` slot, `setItem` returns hash-changed bool
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapTxLeafNode.h` — tx without metadata (`tnTRANSACTION_NM`)
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapTxPlusMetaLeafNode.h` — tx with metadata (`tnTRANSACTION_MD`)
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapAccountStateLeafNode.h` — account state leaf (`tnACCOUNT_STATE`)
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapItem.h` — slab-allocated, struct-hack payload, intrusive refcount
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapNodeID.h` — (depth, masked-prefix) tree address
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapMissingNode.h` — exception + `SHAMapType` enum (TX/STATE/FREE)
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapAddNode.h` — useful/duplicate/invalid accumulator for sync results
- `include/xrpl/shamap/SHAMapSyncFilter.h` — pull/notify interface for fetch packs and ephemeral caches
- `include/xrpl/shamap/Family.h` — bundles NodeStore, two caches, missing-node recovery
- `include/xrpl/shamap/FullBelowCache.h` — "subtree complete locally" memo with generation counter
- `include/xrpl/shamap/TreeNodeCache.h``TaggedCache<uint256, SHAMapTreeNode>` with intrusive ptrs
- `include/xrpl/shamap/detail/TaggedPointer.h` / `.ipp` — sparse 16-child storage with 2-bit tag
- `src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMap.cpp` — mutation (add/del/update), traversal, fetch, flush
- `src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapSync.cpp` — getMissingNodes, getNodeFat, addRootNode/addKnownNode, proofs
- `src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapDelta.cpp` — compare, walkMap, walkMapParallel
- `src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapInnerNode.cpp` — sparse storage mechanics, hash, serialization
- `src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapLeafNode.cpp` — abstract leaf shared behavior
- `src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapTreeNode.cpp` — deserialization factories
- `src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapNodeID.cpp` — depth mask table, branch nav, wire format
## Three Concrete Leaf Types
All inherit `SHAMapLeafNode` (which inherits `SHAMapTreeNode`). All `final`. Differ only in hash prefix, wire-type byte, and whether the key is fed into the hash.
| Class | Hash prefix (bytes) | Key in hash? | Key in wire? | Wire-type byte |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `SHAMapTxLeafNode` | `HashPrefix::transactionID` (`'T','X','N'`) | no | no | `wireTypeTransaction = 0` |
| `SHAMapTxPlusMetaLeafNode` | `HashPrefix::txNode` (`'S','N','D'`) | yes | yes | `wireTypeTransactionWithMeta = 4` |
| `SHAMapAccountStateLeafNode` | `HashPrefix::leafNode` (`'M','L','N'`) | yes | yes | `wireTypeAccountState = 1` |
**Why the asymmetry**: a transaction's ID *is* `sha512Half(prefix, blob)`, so the key is already implied by the data. Account state and tx+meta keys (account address, offer index, etc.) do NOT appear in the blob and must be hashed in — otherwise two distinct objects with identical payloads would collide.
Open ledgers hold transactions as `tnTRANSACTION_NM`; closed ledgers rebuild the tx tree as `tnTRANSACTION_MD` after metadata is attached. Hash prefix difference makes the two roots structurally incompatible — by design.
Each concrete leaf has two constructors: hash-recompute (used by initial `make_*`) and hash-supplied (used by `clone()` and deserialization with `hashValid = true`).
**`SHAMapLeafNode`** is the intermediate abstract base. Both constructors are `protected` — only concrete subclasses call them. `isLeaf()`, `isInner()`, and `invariants()` are sealed `final override` here. `invariants()` asserts hash non-zero and item non-null. `item_` is `protected` (not `private`) so concrete subclasses can access it directly in their inline `updateHash()` implementations, avoiding virtual dispatch overhead in the hash path.
## SHAMapItem
Single allocation: struct fields + payload bytes via struct hack (placement-new'd after `sizeof(*this)`). Constructor is `private`, all copy/move deleted; only path is `make_shamapitem()`.
Backed by `detail::slabber` — a `SlabAllocatorSet<SHAMapItem>` with seven tiers (128/192/272/384/564/772/1052 extra bytes, 4060 MiB pools each, 2 MiB block alignment for THP). Falls back to `new uint8_t[]` for oversize. Max payload 16 MiB (asserted).
`refcount_` is `mutable std::atomic<uint32_t>`. `intrusive_ptr_add_ref` calls `LogicError` if count was already zero (resurrection guard). `intrusive_ptr_release` runs `std::destroy_at` then returns memory to `slabber.deallocate()`, falling through to `delete[]` when the pointer didn't come from a slab.
`SHAMapLeafNode::item_` is `boost::intrusive_ptr<SHAMapItem const>` — items are immutable; mutation produces a new item. The `const` through the pointer allows the same `SHAMapItem` to be shared across CoW snapshots without copying.
## Inner Node: Sparse Storage via TaggedPointer
`SHAMapInnerNode::hashesAndChildren_` is a single `TaggedPointer` holding two co-located arrays (`SHAMapHash[N]` followed by `SharedPtr<SHAMapTreeNode>[N]`). N comes from `boundaries = {2, 4, 6, 16}` indexed by the 2-bit tag stored in the pointer's low bits.
- `SHAMapHash` is `static_assert`'d to have `alignof >= 4`, freeing the low 2 bits.
- Tag 3 (N=16) is the **dense** case; tags 02 are sparse, with non-empty children packed in branch-number order.
- `isBranch_` (`uint16_t`) is the authoritative occupancy bitset. Translation: `getChildIndex(i) = popcnt16(isBranch_ & ((1<<i) - 1))`.
- Four `boost::singleton_pool`s (one per size class, 512 KiB blocks) back allocations. Dispatch is via `std::array<std::function<...>, 4>` indexed by tag — O(1), no virtual calls.
This typically cuts inner-node memory to ~25% of a dense layout.
**Resize**: `resizeChildArrays()` uses `TaggedPointer`'s move-restructuring constructors. The 4-arg form (`srcBranches`, `dstBranches`, `toAllocate`) handles simultaneous reshape — in-place if size class is unchanged (shifts within the existing allocation), otherwise allocates new and placement-copies.
**`RawAllocateTag` constructor**: allocates without running element constructors. Used internally only, always paired with explicit placement-new loops; destructor unconditionally runs explicit destructors.
`iterChildren(F)` exposes all 16 logical branches (zero-hash for empties — needed for `updateHash`). `iterNonEmptyChildIndexes(F)` gives `(branchNum, arrayIdx)` — used for mutation and serialization.
**Two compile-time constraints** in `TaggedPointer.ipp`: `boundaries.size() <= 4` (tag is exactly 2 bits) and `boundaries.back() == branchFactor`. Adding a 5th boundary fails the build.
## SHAMapNodeID
Two fields: `uint256 id_` (path prefix, masked to depth) and `unsigned depth_` (064). The static `depthMask()` table has 65 entries: nibble `d/2` gets `0xF0` at odd depths, `0xFF` at even, accumulating top-down.
- Constructor **rejects** unmasked input (asserts `id == id & depthMask`).
- `createID(depth, key)` is the factory that **applies** the mask for you. Asymmetric API by design.
- `getChildNodeID(m)` throws (not just asserts) at `leafDepth` — corrupted data may trigger this in release builds.
- `selectBranch(id, hash)` reads the nibble at `id.depth` from `hash`. The traversal primitive used everywhere.
- Wire format: 33 bytes (32 id + 1 depth). `deserializeSHAMapNodeID` returns `std::optional` and validates size, depth ≤ 64, and the mask invariant.
`operator<` sorts by `std::tie(depth_, id_)` — shallower before deeper, then by prefix value. Used as map/set key for traversal frontiers.
## Hash Computation
Inner: `sha512Half(HashPrefix::innerNode, hashes[0..15])` — always feed all 16, zeros for empties. Hash is identical regardless of dense/sparse storage.
`updateHash()` reads from `hashes` array directly. `updateHashDeep()` pulls hashes from child pointers first, then computes — used after batch mutations where in-memory child hashes were updated but the local hashes array wasn't synced.
## Wire Serialization Formats
**Inner nodes** — two formats chosen by occupancy in `serializeForWire`:
- **Compressed** (< 12 children): per non-empty branch, 32-byte hash + 1-byte branch index, total 33·n bytes.
- **Full** (≥ 12 children): all 16 hashes in order, 512 bytes.
Type byte appended at the end. `makeFullInner()` / `makeCompressedInner()` are the matching factories, each validating exact size (throws `std::runtime_error` on mismatch not silent corruption).
`serializeWithPrefix` always emits the full 16-hash form prefixed with `HashPrefix::innerNode` (used for hashing).
**Leaves** wire format trails with the single-byte wire-type tag at the END (not start). `makeFromWire` reads `rawNode[size-1]` to dispatch.
`makeFromPrefix(slice, hash)` uses the leading 4-byte `HashPrefix` and is the trusted (hash-known) path propagates `hashValid = true` to skip recompute in leaf constructors.
**Tag extraction asymmetry**: `makeTransaction` recomputes the key as `sha512Half(HashPrefix::transactionID, data)`. `makeTransactionWithMeta` and `makeAccountState` read the 32-byte key from the *tail* of the payload (via `getBitString`), then `chop` it before creating the `SHAMapItem`. A manual pre-check guards against zero-size reads before calling `getBitString` see `SHAMapTreeNode.cpp` comment `// FIXME: improve this interface`.
## Mutation Mechanics
All three mutations follow: walk-with-stack local change `dirtyUp()`.
- **`addGiveItem`**: empty branch create leaf there. Collision with existing leaf loop creating inner nodes deeper until keys diverge (respects merge property inner nodes only where 2 items coexist below).
- **`delItem`**: drop the leaf, walk up reducing child counts. Zero children null out. One child + `onlyBelow()` confirms a single leaf below collapse inner, hoist leaf upward via `makeTypedLeaf` with the original leaf type.
- **`updateGiveItem`**: locate, unshare, swap payload; call `dirtyUp` only if `setItem()` returns `true` (hash actually changed). Avoids spurious rehashing.
- **`dirtyUp`**: consume stack bottom-up, `unshareNode` each, `setChild` to link in the updated subtree. Produces a CoW-owned chain from mutation point to root.
`makeTypedLeaf()` maps `SHAMapNodeType` to one of three concrete leaf classes. Unrecognized types throw `LogicError` immediately.
## Node Fetching (Backed vs Unbacked)
`backed_ = true` integrates with `Family::db()`; `backed_ = false` (set via `setUnbacked()`) is in-memory only (e.g., transient tx-processing trees).
`fetchNodeNT` tiered lookup:
1. `cacheLookup()` `Family::getTreeNodeCache()`
2. `fetchNodeFromDB()` `Family::db().fetchNodeObject()`
3. `checkFilter()` `SHAMapSyncFilter::getNode()`, then notifies via `gotNode(true, ...)`
Misses return `nullptr` (`fetchNodeNT`) or throw `SHAMapMissingNode` (`fetchNode`, `descendThrow`). `finishFetch` catches `std::runtime_error` from deserialization, logs, and suppresses (doesn't crash).
On miss, `full_` is cleared and `Family::missingNodeAcquireBySeq(seq, hash)` is called links to inbound-ledger acquisition pipeline.
`descendAsync` is the non-blocking variant: posts `Family::db().asyncFetch()`, sets `pending = true`, invokes user callback on completion.
## Missing-Node Discovery (`getMissingNodes`)
`MissingNodes` inner struct holds traversal state. Several details matter:
- **`stack_` is `std::stack<StackEntry, std::deque<StackEntry>>`** NOT vector. Raw `SHAMapInnerNode*` pointers held in entries must remain valid across pushes; vector reallocation would invalidate them.
- **Random start nibble**: `firstChild = rand_int(255)` per stack entry. Concurrent callers on the same map produce different request sets maximizes coverage when many peers ask in parallel.
- **`maxDefer_ = 512`** in-flight async reads. When reached, `gmn_ProcessDeferredReads` blocks on a CV draining the batch. Completed nodes are canonicalized and the parent is revisited via `resumes_`.
- **FullBelow short-circuit**: before descending, `touch_if_exists(hash)` on the cache; on success, skip the subtree. After confirming complete, `insert(hash)` and `setFullBelowGen(generation)` on the in-memory node.
- Two helpers: `gmn_ProcessNodes` (per-node descent + bookkeeping), `gmn_ProcessDeferredReads` (I/O completion handler).
**Gotcha**: processing async completions out of order would mark "full below" incorrectly. The `resumes_` map + deferred-batch barrier prevent this.
## Serving Nodes to Peers: `getNodeFat`
Bundles a target node plus a bounded-depth subtree in one response to amortize sync latency. Depth budget only decrements when an inner node has > 1 child — single-child chains (compressed radix paths) traverse for free. `fatLeaves=true` includes adjacent leaves; otherwise inner-only.
`visitNodes` (used by `visitDifferences` and traversal helpers) uses an explicit `std::stack` to avoid recursion on potentially 64-level trees.
`visitDifferences` short-circuits at hash equality — O(1) when subtrees match. The `have` pointer is nullable: null means "report everything in `this`."
## Ingesting Nodes: `addRootNode` / `addKnownNode`
Returns `SHAMapAddNode` (tri-state: useful / duplicate / invalid). Aggregated via `+=` across batches in `InboundLedger`.
`addKnownNode` performs **two integrity checks**:
1. Deserialized node's hash matches the parent-branch hash.
2. For leaves at `leafDepth`: reconstructed `SHAMapNodeID` from the leaf's actual key matches the claimed `SHAMapNodeID`. This closes a theoretical hash-collision-at-wrong-position attack.
Mismatch transitions the map to `Invalid` — graceful, not a crash. Skips descent into FullBelow subtrees.
**Gotcha**: callers must handle `invalid` gracefully — empty branch or hash mismatch on traversal is legitimate when peer data is stale.
`isGood()` returns `(good + duplicate) > bad` — duplicates count positively (benign), only `bad` is evidence of misbehavior. `isUseful()` is stricter: did we actually make progress?
## Merkle Proofs
`getProofPath(key)` collects nodes from leaf to root (via `walkTowardsKey` with stack), serialized leaf-first.
`verifyProofPath(rootHash, key, path)` is **static** — no live tree needed. Walks root-to-leaf, verifying each hash and using `selectBranch` to pick the next expected hash. Length bounded at 65. Deserialization wrapped in try/catch (network input).
**Gotcha**: wrong key at any level causes false negative — verifier walks down using the *supplied* key's nibbles, not anything inside the path data.
## Comparison / Delta (`SHAMapDelta.cpp`)
`compare` short-circuits at root: `if (getHash() == other.getHash()) return true`. O(d) in the number of differences, not O(n) in total items.
Returns `Delta = std::map<uint256, DeltaItem>` where `DeltaItem = pair<SHAMapItem ptr, SHAMapItem ptr>`. Null first → added; null second → deleted; both → modified.
Four dispatch cases at each pair (leaf/leaf, inner/leaf, leaf/inner, inner/inner). Asymmetric cases delegate to `walkBranch`, which uses an `isFirstMap` bool to preserve (first-map version, second-map version) ordering in the pair regardless of which side is the subtree.
**`maxCount` defense**: passed by reference into `walkBranch`, decremented per insertion. Returns false on truncation. The ledger-diff RPC passes `INT_MAX` (unlimited); the sync RPC passes 256 (bounded exposure to malicious or fabricated diffs).
## walkMap / walkMapParallel
Completeness check: traverses, recording any node hash referenced but absent (via `descendNoStore`, which returns null instead of throwing) into a `vector<SHAMapMissingNode>`.
**`walkMapParallel`** partitions at depth 1 — one `std::thread` per non-empty, non-leaf top-level child (up to 16-way). Each thread has its own `nodeStack`; `missingNodes` and an `exceptions` vector are mutex-shared.
**Critical**: an uncaught exception in a `std::thread` calls `std::terminate`. Worker lambda catches `SHAMapMissingNode` and records to `exceptions` instead — must inspect on return. Return value `true` ⇔ no thrown exceptions, NOT ⇔ no missing nodes (those are always in the vector).
## Family Interface
`Family` is the abstract collaborator bundle: `db()`, `getFullBelowCache()`, `getTreeNodeCache()`, `missingNodeAcquireBy{Seq,Hash}()`, `journal()`, `sweep()`, `reset()`.
Non-copyable, non-movable (SHAMap stores `Family&`; moving would dangle references).
Production impl: `NodeFamily` (in `src/xrpld/shamap/`). Tests use lighter-weight in-memory versions in `src/test/shamap/common.h`.
`NodeFamily::missingNodeAcquireBySeq` maintains a `maxSeq_` high-water under `maxSeqMutex_` to avoid redundant acquisition requests when many SHAMaps simultaneously hit missing nodes.
## FullBelowCache
`KeyCache<uint256>` — stores only hashes (no values), thread-safe, time-expiring (default 2 minutes). Wrapped in `BasicFullBelowCache` to add a generation counter.
**Two-layer invalidation**:
- Per-node `fullBelowGen_` on `SHAMapInnerNode` (compared against current cache generation in `isFullBelow(gen)`).
- The cache itself (queried via `touch_if_exists`).
`clear()` purges entries AND increments `m_gen` — zero-cost global invalidation of every in-memory marker (mismatched generation → `isFullBelow` returns false). `reset()` purges and sets `m_gen = 1` (used at startup / hard reset). The distinction matters: any node carrying `fullBelowGen_ > 1` won't match the reset-to-1 state — correct, because those nodes are expected to be recreated fresh.
Only `backed_ = true` maps participate.
## TreeNodeCache
```cpp
using TreeNodeCache = TaggedCache<
uint256, SHAMapTreeNode, false,
intr_ptr::SharedWeakUnionPtr<SHAMapTreeNode>,
intr_ptr::SharedPtr<SHAMapTreeNode>>;
```
Two reasons for intrusive (not `std::shared_ptr`):
1. **Earlier memory reclamation**: `SHAMapInnerNode::partialDestructor()` releases the 16-way child array as soon as the strong count hits zero, even while weak references in the cache are still live. `std::make_shared` co-allocates control block + object, blocking reclamation until all weaks expire.
2. **Single-word strong/weak**: `SharedWeakUnion<T>` uses one pointer-sized word with a low-bit tag (alignment guarantees the bit is free). Demoting hot → cold flips one bit in place instead of swapping `shared_ptr``weak_ptr`.
## Canonicalization
`canonicalize(hash, nodePtr)` deduplicates: if the cache already holds this hash, replace the local pointer with the cached one; otherwise insert. Asserts `cowid == 0` (only shareable nodes can be canonical). `cacheLookup()` asserts the same on returned nodes.
`canonicalizeChild()` on inner nodes: when two threads concurrently fetch the same child from disk, the per-child spinlock serializes; first writer wins, late writer's freshly-deserialized node is discarded. The incumbent hash is verified to match before installation.
## SyncFilter
Two-method interface bridging SHAMap to peer fetch packs and consensus tx caches.
- `getNode(hash) -> optional<Blob>`: filter's chance to supply a node from a transient source (fetch pack, consensus cache).
- `gotNode(fromFilter, hash, ledgerSeq, Blob&&, type)`: notification of node receipt. **`Blob&&` may be moved/destroyed — do not reuse**. `fromFilter=true` means data came from this filter's own `getNode` (no need to re-store); `false` means it came from the network and should be persisted.
Implementations:
- `AccountStateSF`, `TransactionStateSF` — write to NodeStore + fetch pack. Only used on add paths.
- `ConsensusTransSetSF` — backed by `TaggedCache<SHAMapHash, Blob>`. Used on both add AND check (since the backing store is purely transient).
## Flushing
`walkSubTree(doWrite, type)` is post-order DFS with **explicit stack** (tree may be 64 deep — recursion risks stack overflow). Per node: `preFlushNode()` clones if needed (protects other maps sharing it), recompute hash, `unshare()` (set `cowid = 0`), and if `doWrite`, serialize and persist via `Family::db()`.
- `flushDirty()``walkSubTree(backed_, type)`.
- `unshare()``walkSubTree(false, ...)`. Used to make everything shareable without writing.
## Common Bug Patterns
- Modifying a node without `unshareNode` first → corrupts every snapshot sharing it.
- Using `std::vector` (instead of `std::deque`) as backing for the `MissingNodes` stack → raw inner-node pointers invalidated on push.
- Processing async fetch completions out of order in `getMissingNodes` → incorrect `setFullBelowGen`, subsequent walks skip incomplete subtrees.
- Inner serialization format mismatch (compressed/full) — branch-count cutoff is 12; deserializer enforces exact sizes and throws `std::runtime_error`.
- `addKnownNode` returning `invalid` is normal (empty branch, hash mismatch) — callers must handle, not assume valid.
- Proof verification with wrong key at any level → false negative; the verifier uses the supplied key's nibbles to pick branches.
- Failing to inspect the `exceptions` vector after `walkMapParallel` — workers swallow `SHAMapMissingNode` to avoid `std::terminate`; missing nodes go into the result vector but the return value reflects exceptions only.
- Mutating a node returned from the `TreeNodeCache` — they have `cowid == 0` by invariant.
- Adding a 5th entry to `TaggedPointer::boundaries``static_assert` fails; the 2-bit tag supports exactly 4 values.
- Calling `clone()` with the hash-supplied constructor when the item is also changing — the two-constructor split assumes the item and hash are consistent; pass `hashValid = false` to recompute.
## SHAMapMissingNode Catch Policy
The exception flows up out of `descendThrow` and friends. Catch handlers split into:
- **Recovery** (`LedgerCleaner`, `LedgerMaster`): catch, log at warn, schedule `getInboundLedgers().acquire()`.
- **Fatal/abort** (`RCLConsensus` consensus timer): catch, log at error, `Rethrow()` — crashes the consensus round.
- **Silent failure** (`Ledger.cpp`): catch, return failure — incomplete state tree is treated as invalid ledger.
`SHAMapType` enum values (`TRANSACTION = 1`, `STATE = 2`, `FREE = 3`) are part of the wire protocol — do NOT change.

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# SQL Database
SQLite via SOCI for ledger/transaction history. Only SQLite is supported; any non-`sqlite` backend value in config throws at parse time (`detail::getSociInit` in `SociDB.cpp`).
## Key Invariants
- Two main databases: `lgrdb_` (ledger) and `txdb_` (transactions, optional via `useTxTables` config)
- Transaction tables are optional; disabling them disables transaction history and `account_tx` queries
- WAL checkpointing offloads to `JobQueue` (`jtWAL`); at most one checkpoint job in flight per `DatabaseCon` (guarded by `running_` mutex in `WALCheckpointer`)
- Database init failure is fatal (throws exception, prevents construction)
- Free disk space < 512 MB triggers fatal error on write operations
- File extension inconsistency: `validators` and `peerfinder` use `.sqlite`; all other DBs use `.db`. Historical artifact enforced in `detail::getSociInit`
## Schema
- `Ledgers`: seq, hash, parent hash, total coins, close time, etc. Indexed by `LedgerSeq`
- `Transactions`: TransID, TransType, FromAcct, FromSeq, LedgerSeq, Status, RawTxn, TxnMeta. Indexed by `LedgerSeq`
- `AccountTransactions`: TransID, Account, LedgerSeq, TxnSeq. Triple-indexed for `account_tx` queries
- Secondary DBs: Wallet (node identity, manifests), PeerFinder (bootstrap cache), State (deletion tracking)
- Schema defined in `src/xrpld/app/main/DBInit.h`
- No schema migration system; `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` silently preserves old schemas with missing columns. **Exception**: PeerFinder has schema versioning via a `SchemaVersion` table.
## Configuration
| Option | Section | Values | Default |
|--------|---------|--------|---------|
| `backend` | `[sqdb]` / `[relational_db]` | `sqlite` only | sqlite |
| `page_size` | `[sqlite]` | 51265536, power of 2 | 4096 |
| `safety_level` | `[sqlite]` | high, medium, low | high |
| `journal_size_limit` | `[sqlite]` | integer >= 0 | 1582080 |
`safety_level: low` changes `journal_mode` and `synchronous` settings — can lose data on crash.
## WAL Checkpointing Architecture
The checkpointer subsystem is the trickiest part of this module. SQLite's WAL hook is a C callback registered on the native `sqlite3*` connection, but the work runs on a `JobQueue` thread that may still be executing when the owning `DatabaseCon` is destroyed.
### Two-file split
- **`SociDB.cpp`**: `WALCheckpointer` class (anonymous namespace) — installs the hook, implements `schedule()` and `checkpoint()`, holds the `weak_ptr<soci::session>`.
- **`DatabaseCon.cpp`**: `CheckpointersCollection` class — process-wide singleton registry (`checkpointers`, namespace-scope variable) mapping monotonically-incrementing integer IDs to `shared_ptr<Checkpointer>`; exposes `create`, `fromId`, `erase`. All `DatabaseCon` instances share this one registry.
`DatabaseCon.cpp` has no direct SQLite dependency; it only manages the `Checkpointer` abstract interface.
### ID-based hook indirection
- `WALCheckpointer` is registered with `sqlite3_wal_hook` using its `std::uintptr_t id_` cast to `void*`, **not** a raw `this` pointer.
- The C hook calls `checkpointerFromId()``CheckpointersCollection::fromId()` (process-wide singleton). If lookup returns null (connection torn down), the hook deregisters itself via `sqlite3_wal_hook(conn, nullptr, nullptr)`.
- Prevents use-after-free: the hook may fire on a writer thread after `DatabaseCon` begins destruction.
### Session ownership split
- `DatabaseCon` holds `std::shared_ptr<soci::session>`; `WALCheckpointer` holds only `std::weak_ptr<soci::session>`.
- If the checkpointer held a `shared_ptr`, an in-flight job would keep the WAL lock alive, blocking a freshly-opened replacement `DatabaseCon` on the same file.
- `WALCheckpointer::checkpoint()` calls `session_.lock()` and bails silently if expired.
### Destructor sequence (`DatabaseCon::~DatabaseCon`)
Order matters:
1. `checkpointers.erase(checkpointer_->id())` — future hook invocations now no-op and self-deregister.
2. Take `weak_ptr<Checkpointer> wk(checkpointer_)`, then `checkpointer_.reset()`.
3. Busy-poll `wk.use_count() != 0` with 100 ms sleeps until all in-flight job lambdas release their `shared_ptr<Checkpointer>`.
The 100 ms poll is deliberate (rare event; simpler than a condvar). Without this wait, reopening the same SQLite file immediately after destruction can fail because the old checkpoint job may still hold the WAL lock.
### `setupCheckpointing()` — deferred wiring
- Separated from constructors so checkpointing is opt-in.
- Constructors accepting `CheckpointerSetup` open the DB first, then call `setupCheckpointing(JobQueue*, ServiceRegistry&)`.
- Null `JobQueue*` throws `std::logic_error` (programming error, not runtime).
- The checkpointer must be inserted into `CheckpointersCollection` **before** `setupCheckpointing` returns, because the WAL hook is armed inside the `WALCheckpointer` constructor and writes can fire it immediately.
### Checkpoint job behavior
- Triggered by `sqlite3_wal_hook` after every WAL write; `static checkpointPageCount = 1000` mirrors SQLite's auto-checkpoint threshold.
- `schedule()` uses `running_` bool under mutex to enforce single in-flight job; if `JobQueue` rejects the job, `running_` is reset.
- Enqueued lambda captures `std::weak_ptr<Checkpointer>`; destroyed `DatabaseCon` causes the job to exit without touching the session.
- `checkpoint()` calls `sqlite3_wal_checkpoint_v2` with `SQLITE_CHECKPOINT_PASSIVE`. `SQLITE_LOCKED` logged at trace (expected under reader contention); other errors logged as warnings. `running_` reset under mutex after each attempt.
- Net effect: routes checkpoint work off the writer thread onto `jtWAL`. Without this, SQLite does it synchronously on whichever thread crosses the page threshold.
## SOCI Adapter Notes (`SociDB.cpp`)
- `DBConfig` is two-phase: parse params, open later. `detail::getSociInit` and `detail::getSociSqliteInit` resolve backend + path; the `.sqlite` vs `.db` extension fork lives in `getSociInit`. `getSociSqliteInit` throws `std::runtime_error` if the database name is empty.
- Two free-function `open()` overloads: config-based (delegates through `DBConfig`) and explicit-string (enforces same "sqlite only" constraint). Both paths call `s.open(soci::sqlite3, connectionString)`.
- `getConnection(session&)` recovers the raw `sqlite3*` via `dynamic_cast<soci::sqlite3_session_backend*>` — the only intentional break in the SOCI abstraction. Throws `std::logic_error` if the cast fails. Required for WAL hooks and `sqlite3_db_status`.
- `getKBUsedAll()``sqlite3_memory_used()` (process-global). `getKBUsedDB()``SQLITE_DBSTATUS_CACHE_USED` (per-connection).
- Four `convert()` overloads bridge `soci::blob``std::vector<uint8_t>` / `std::string`. Empty blobs require `blob.trim(0)` rather than `blob.write(nullptr, 0)`.
- `SociDB.cpp` opens with `#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated"` because SOCI headers use deprecated constructs; scoped to this TU only.
## Common Bug Patterns
- No schema migration system; `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` silently preserves old schemas with missing columns. New columns on existing deployments require manual `ALTER TABLE` or explicit documentation that the column may be absent.
- `page_size` must be power of 2 between 51265536; invalid values cause init failure.
- Online deletion coordinates between NodeStore rotation and SQL table pruning; race conditions here lose history.
- Empty database name passed to `detail::getSociSqliteInit` throws — no silent fallback.
- A `WALCheckpointer` registered with `sqlite3_wal_hook` can outlive its `DatabaseCon` if a checkpoint job is in flight; teardown must wait for the job to drain (see Destructor sequence above).
- Opening a new `DatabaseCon` to the same file immediately after destroying the old one can fail if the destructor busy-poll is skipped or shortened — the old checkpoint job may still hold the WAL lock.
## Key Patterns
### Schema Evolution Caveat
```cpp
// No migration system — old databases keep old schemas.
// CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS silently skips if table exists with old columns.
// New columns require manual ALTER TABLE or must be treated as optional/absent.
// PeerFinder is the exception: it has a SchemaVersion table.
```
### Disk Space Guard
```cpp
// Required on all write paths.
if (freeDiskSpace < minDiskFree)
Throw<std::runtime_error>("Not enough disk space for database write");
```
### WAL Hook Cookie
```cpp
// Always pass an integer ID, never `this`.
// DatabaseCon may be destroyed while a hook invocation is mid-flight on a writer thread.
sqlite3_wal_hook(conn, &walHookCallback,
reinterpret_cast<void*>(checkpointer->id()));
```
### Penetrating the SOCI Abstraction
```cpp
// getConnection() is the only intentional SOCI abstraction break.
// Required for sqlite3_wal_hook and sqlite3_db_status APIs.
auto* be = dynamic_cast<soci::sqlite3_session_backend*>(s.get_backend());
if (!be || !be->conn_) throw std::logic_error("Not a sqlite3 session");
sqlite3* conn = be->conn_;
```
## Key Files
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `src/libxrpl/rdb/SociDB.cpp` | SOCI/SQLite adapter, `WALCheckpointer`, blob conversion, memory stats |
| `src/libxrpl/rdb/DatabaseCon.cpp` | Connection lifecycle, `CheckpointersCollection`, destructor drain |
| `src/xrpld/app/main/DBInit.h` | Schema definitions (CREATE TABLE statements) |
| `src/xrpld/app/rdb/backend/detail/SQLiteDatabase.cpp` | Main `SQLiteDatabase` implementation |
| `src/xrpld/app/rdb/backend/detail/Node.cpp` | Ledger/tx read-write operations |
| `src/xrpld/app/rdb/detail/State.cpp` | Deletion state tracking |
| `src/xrpld/core/detail/DatabaseCon.cpp` | Legacy reference; lifecycle now in `libxrpl` |

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# Testing
JTx framework for in-memory ledger testing. Tests live in `src/test/`, derive from `beast::unit_test::suite`, and register with `BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE`.
## Key Patterns
### Test File Structure
```cpp
class MyFeature_test : public beast::unit_test::suite {
void testBasic() {
testcase("basic");
using namespace jtx;
Env env{*this};
// ... test logic ...
}
void run() override { testBasic(); }
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(MyFeature, app, ripple);
```
### Amendment Gating
```cpp
// REQUIRED: test with AND without the feature amendment
Env env{*this}; // all amendments on
Env env{*this, testable_amendments() - featureMyFeature}; // feature disabled
// With custom config:
Env env{*this, envconfig([](std::unique_ptr<Config> cfg) {
/* modify config */ return cfg;
})};
```
### Transaction Submission
```cpp
auto const alice = Account{"alice"};
auto const bob = Account{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close(); // REQUIRED between setup and test transactions
env(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100))); // expects tesSUCCESS
env(pay(alice, bob, XRP(999999)), ter(tecUNFUNDED_PAYMENT)); // specific TER
env(pay(alice, bob, XRP(100)), txflags(tfPartialPayment)); // with flags
```
### State Verification
```cpp
env.require(balance(alice, XRP(9900)));
env.require(balance(alice, USD(1000)));
env.require(owners(alice, 2));
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::account(alice.id()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle);
BEAST_EXPECT((*sle)[sfBalance] == XRP(9900));
```
## Review Checklist
- New transaction types MUST have tests with AND without the feature amendment
- Every error path (tem*, tec*, tef*) must have a test exercising it
- `env.close()` required between transactions that need ledger boundaries
- Verify state after transaction, not just TER code
- Test class naming: `FeatureName_test`, registered with `BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE`
## Common Pitfalls
- Forgetting `*this` as first Env arg disconnects assertion reporting
- Comparing XRPAmount with raw integers instead of `XRP()` or `drops()`
- Trust lines must be established before IOU payments
- Each Env creates a full Application — keep test methods focused
## Key Files
- `src/test/jtx/Env.h` — test environment class
- `src/test/jtx/jtx.h` — convenience header (includes all helpers)
- `src/test/jtx/Account.h` — test accounts
- `src/test/jtx/amount.h` — XRP(), drops(), IOU helpers

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# Transactors
Transaction processing pipeline: preflight (static validation) → preclaim (ledger state checks) → doApply (state mutation). Base class `Transactor` in `src/libxrpl/tx/`. Every transaction type inherits from it; only `doApply()` is virtual — all other dispatch is compile-time.
## Pipeline Architecture
### Three Phases
1. **`preflight`** — stateless, no ledger access. Validates fields, flags, signatures (cached via HashRouter). Cheap, parallelizable. Returns `NotTEC`. Results carry a `TxConsequences` summary used by the transaction queue.
2. **`preclaim`** — read-only `ReadView` access. Checks account exists, fee sufficient, sequence valid, signature valid. Returns `TER`. Sets `likelyToClaimFee` for relay decisions.
3. **`doApply`** — mutable `ApplyView` access. Only runs if preclaim returned `tesSUCCESS` and `likelyToClaimFee` is true.
`apply()` in `apply.cpp` composes all three. It accepts a preflight callable so the same `preclaim`+`doApply` machinery serves normal and batch-inner transactions. `applyTransaction()` adds `tapRETRY` semantics and dispatches to `applyBatchTransactions()` after a successful `ttBATCH`.
**Important preclaim security invariant** (documented in `applySteps.cpp`): every check through and including `checkSign` must return `NotTEC` (not a `tec` code). A `tec` before signature verification would charge a fee without authentication — a critical security property.
### Layered Preflight: `preflight0` → `preflight1` → `T::preflight` → `preflight2` → `T::preflightSigValidated`
`Transactor::invokePreflight<T>` calls (in order): `T::checkExtraFeatures`, `preflight1(ctx, T::getFlagsMask(ctx))`, `T::preflight`, `preflight2`, `T::preflightSigValidated`. Each is a static method; derived classes participate via name hiding — never virtual.
- **`preflight0`** (called from `preflight1`): gates on `sfNetworkID` presence/absence, zero-hash tx ID, valid flag bits, and pseudo-tx/batch-inner exclusivity.
- **`preflight1`**: account is non-zero, `sfFee` is non-negative native XRP, signing key format valid, tickets and `sfAccountTxnID` are mutually exclusive.
- **`preflight2`**: simulation mode (`tapDRY_RUN`), cryptographic signature check via hash router. Skipped entirely for `tfInnerBatchTxn` (outer batch authorizes).
**Rule**: derived `preflight` runs *between* `preflight1` and `preflight2`. Never call `preflight1`/`preflight2` directly.
### Compile-time Polymorphism (Name Hiding, Not Virtual)
`with_txn_type()` in `applySteps.cpp` uses an X-macro over `transactions.macro` to convert runtime `TxType` to a compile-time template parameter via a switch dispatch — no virtual dispatch, no transactor headers included in `applySteps.cpp` (explicitly forbidden).
### `ConsequencesFactoryType`
Each transactor declares `static constexpr ConsequencesFactoryType ConsequencesFactory{...}`:
- **`Normal`** — standard fee/sequence consequences. Most transactors.
- **`Blocker`** — queues block later transactions from same account. Examples: `SetRegularKey`, `AccountDelete`, `SignerListSet`, `XChainAddClaimAttestation`.
- **`Custom`** — derived class implements `makeTxConsequences(PreflightContext const&)`. Examples: `Payment` (XRP spend via `sfSendMax`), `OfferCreate` (XRP TakerGets), `TicketCreate` (multi-sequence), `AccountSet` (conditional blocker on auth/master flags), `LoanSet` (counterparty signers).
C++20 `requires` clauses in `applySteps.cpp` pick the factory at compile time.
### Numeric Precision Guards
`with_txn_type()` installs RAII guards before dispatch:
- When `featureSingleAssetVault` or `featureLendingProtocol` is active: `CurrentTransactionRulesGuard` (thread-local rules access) + `NumberSO` (floating-point-style number arithmetic per `fixUniversalNumber`).
- Otherwise: `NumberMantissaScaleGuard` (legacy small-mantissa mode).
Ideally these would apply everywhere from the start; they were retrofitted into `with_txn_type` for `preflight`/`preclaim` when vault/lending features needed correct numeric rules in read-only phases.
## Key Invariants
- Pipeline is strict: preflight runs WITHOUT ledger state, preclaim WITH read-only view, doApply with mutable view.
- `preflight` validates all fields exist and are well-formed; this is the ONLY place to reject malformed transactions cheaply.
- Fee is always deducted on `tecCLAIM`; `payFee` runs before `doApply`.
- Sequence/ticket consumption happens in `consumeSeqProxy`; must succeed before any state changes.
- Invariant checkers run after `doApply`; they can veto the transaction post-execution.
- Amendment gating belongs in `checkExtraFeatures`, NOT in `preflight`. The framework guards on the central permission registry first.
- `tem*`/`tef*`/`tel*` results: fee NOT charged, transaction not included. `tec*` results: fee charged, transaction included.
## State Commitment & tec* Rollback (CRITICAL for review)
**`doApply` mutations are NOT committed until `ctx_.apply()` is called at the end of `operator()`.** All peek/insert/update/erase during `doApply` go into an `ApplyContext` view (`view_`) layered on top of `base_`. Whether that view gets flushed to `base_` depends entirely on the TER that `doApply` returns.
`ApplyContext::discard()` replaces `view_` with a fresh view on `base_`**every doApply mutation is thrown away**:
```cpp
void ApplyContext::discard() { view_.emplace(&base_, flags_); }
```
### Return-code decision table (in `Transactor::operator()`)
| doApply returns | What commits to the ledger |
|---|---|
| `tesSUCCESS` | All doApply mutations + fee + seq (via `ctx_.apply`) |
| `tec*` (normal, `!tapRETRY`) | `reset(fee)` calls `discard()`, then re-applies fee + seq only. **All doApply mutations reverted.** |
| `tec*` with `tapFAIL_HARD` | `discard()` called directly, nothing committed (not even fee) |
| `tec*` with `tapRETRY` | `applied=false`, `ctx_.apply` never called, tx re-queued |
| `tef*` / `tem*` / `ter*` | `applied=false`, `ctx_.apply` never called |
| `tecINVARIANT_FAILED` after invariants | reset again, commit fee only |
`isTecClaimHardFail(ter, flags) = isTecClaim(ter) && !(flags & tapRETRY)` — drives the reset path.
### What this means
- **A `tec*` return from doApply acts as a full-transaction rollback.** You do NOT need to order mutations defensively. If a helper called late in doApply returns `tec*`, everything mutated earlier is discarded.
- **Orphan-state bugs "we mutated X then returned tec* so X is now inconsistent" are not possible at the transactor boundary.**
- **The real failure mode**: stale SLE pointers, missing `view().update(sle)` after mutation, mutating values read by value. These are in-memory bugs, not state-commit bugs.
- **Sandboxes inside `doApply` add nesting, not safety.** `PaymentSandbox`/nested `ApplyView` are for conditionally committing a *subset* of changes within a single doApply.
- **Only `ctx_.apply(result)` publishes to `base_`**; a doApply that returns early, throws, or crashes never reaches that call.
### `reset()` Fee Clamping
`reset()` discards all ledger mutations via `ctx_.discard()` then re-deducts the fee, clamping if necessary:
```cpp
if (fee > balance) fee = balance;
```
This ensures a failing transaction can still claim its fee even when the account is over-committed.
### Verifying a suspected orphan-state bug
1. Read the caller of `doApply` — confirm the TER path (`operator()` in Transactor.cpp).
2. Check whether `discard()` is reached via `reset()` or the `tapFAIL_HARD` branch.
3. If both paths call `discard()`, the mutations cannot persist on tec*.
4. Look instead for: missing `view().update(sle)`, stale SLE pointers, or genuine non-atomic side effects (e.g., hash router flags — NOT in ApplyContext view).
## Apply Loop Details (Transactor::operator()())
1. RAII guards: `NumberSO`, `CurrentTransactionRulesGuard` (for `fixUniversalNumber`, `featureSingleAssetVault`, `featureLendingProtocol`)
2. Debug builds: serialize/re-parse round-trip catches serdes mismatches; `trapTransaction()` provides a named breakpoint for replaying specific transactions
3. `apply()` runs `preCompute()` → captures `preFeeBalance_``consumeSeqProxy()``payFee()` → updates `sfAccountTxnID``doApply()`
4. Enforces `tecOVERSIZE` if metadata exceeds `oversizeMetaDataCap`
5. Special `tec` codes (`tecOVERSIZE`, `tecKILLED`, `tecINCOMPLETE`, `tecEXPIRED`) trigger context-diff visitation then targeted cleanup: `removeUnfundedOffers`, `removeExpiredNFTokenOffers`, `removeDeletedTrustLines`, `removeDeletedMPTs`, `removeExpiredCredentials`
6. `ctx_.checkInvariants()` runs all 25+ invariants; failure causes second reset + re-check; second failure escalates to `tefINVARIANT_FAILED` (not included in ledger)
7. `tapDRY_RUN` forces `applied=false` unconditionally
## Common Bug Patterns
- New transaction type missing preflight validation for new fields = malformed transactions reach doApply and corrupt state
- Forgetting to handle `tecCLAIM` in doApply: fee is deducted but no other state changes should occur
- Batch transactions have their own signing path (`checkBatchSign`); changes to signing must cover both paths
- `calculateBaseFee` override without updating `minimumFee` causes fee calculation divergence between nodes
- Missing invariant checker update for new ledger entry types = silent constraint violations
- Forgetting amendment gating: place feature checks in `checkExtraFeatures`, NOT `preflight`
- Using `view().update()` on a stale SLE pointer after another mutation
- Computing reserve against `view().peek(account)->getFieldAmount(sfBalance)` AFTER fee deduction instead of `preFeeBalance_`
- Missing `associateAsset(*sle, asset)` call at end of `doApply` for SLEs with `STNumber` or `STTakesAsset` fields (lending/vault transactors)
- preclaim `Rules` race: if ledger advanced between preflight and preclaim, `applySteps.cpp` silently re-runs preflight with new rules before constructing `PreclaimContext`
- Calling `ter*` codes before signature verification in preclaim (see security invariant above)
## Transactor Template
### Header (`include/xrpl/tx/transactors/.../MyTx.h`)
```cpp
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
namespace xrpl {
class MyTransaction : public Transactor {
public:
static constexpr ConsequencesFactoryType ConsequencesFactory{Normal};
explicit MyTransaction(ApplyContext& ctx) : Transactor(ctx) {}
static bool checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx); // amendment gating
static std::uint32_t getFlagsMask(PreflightContext const& ctx);
static NotTEC preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx); // NO ledger
static TER preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx); // read-only
TER doApply() override; // read-write
};
}
```
### Implementation
```cpp
bool MyTransaction::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{ // PREFERRED location for amendment checks
return ctx.rules.enabled(featureMyFeature);
}
NotTEC MyTransaction::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{ // Static validation — NO ctx.view, NO ledger access
if (ctx.tx[sfAmount] <= beast::zero)
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER MyTransaction::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{ // Read-only — ctx.view.read() only, NO peek/insert/erase
if (!ctx.view.exists(keylet::account(ctx.tx[sfAccount])))
return terNO_ACCOUNT;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER MyTransaction::doApply()
{ // Mutable — view().peek(), view().insert(), view().update(), view().erase()
auto sle = view().peek(keylet::account(account_));
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, newBal);
view().update(sle); // REQUIRED after mutation
return tesSUCCESS;
}
```
### Registration Checklist
```cpp
// ALL of these are REQUIRED for a new transaction type:
// 1. transactions.macro: TRANSACTION(ttMY_TYPE, N, MyTx, delegation, fields, privileges)
// 2. applySteps.cpp: case ttMY_TYPE: dispatched via X-macro automatically
// 3. features.macro: XRPL_FEATURE(MyFeature, Supported::yes, DefaultNo)
// 4. Feature.h: increment numFeatures
// 5. InvariantCheck.cpp: update privilege mask + checkers if new ledger objects
// 6. Batch.cpp: add to disabledTxTypes if not batch-compatible
// 7. Permission table: add granular permissions if delegable
```
### Common Field Constraints (constants in `Protocol.h`)
- `maxCredentialURILength` = 256, `maxCredentialTypeLength` = 64
- `maxTokenURILength` = 256 (NFT URI), `dirMaxTokensPerPage` = 32
- `maxMultiSigners` = 32, `MaxPathSize` = 6, `MaxPathLength` = 8
- `maxBatchTxCount` = 8, `maxOracleDataSeries` = 10
- `maxPermissionedDomainCredentialsArraySize` = 10
- `maxDeletableTokenOfferEntries` = 500, `maxDeletableDirEntries` = 1000
- `maxDeletableAMMTrustLines` = 512, `maxMPTokenAmount` = 0x7FFF_FFFF_FFFF_FFFF
- `maxDataPayloadLength`, `maxMPTokenMetadataLength` = 1024
## The Big Patterns
### Sandbox Pattern (Atomic Sub-operation)
Used when multiple mutations must all succeed or all be discarded *within* a single `doApply`:
```cpp
TER doApply() override {
Sandbox sb(&view());
auto const result = applyGuts(sb, ...);
if (isTesSuccess(result))
sb.apply(ctx_.rawView());
return result;
}
```
Variants:
- `PaymentSandbox` — for `flow()` calls (used by `Payment`, `CheckCash`, `OfferCreate` crossing). Required because `flow()` uses deferred-credit accounting.
- `RippleCalc::rippleCalculate()` wraps its own `PaymentSandbox` inside the caller's sandbox (double-sandbox pattern) for exception safety — if `flow()` throws, the caller's sandbox remains unmodified.
- Dual sandbox in `OfferCreate`: `sb` (main) + `sbCancel` (offer cleanup); commit one or the other based on `tfFillOrKill` outcome.
- Nested sandboxes: `applyBatchTransactions` uses `wholeBatchView` (over outer view) + `perTxBatchView` (per inner tx).
### Reserve Check Convention
ALWAYS check against `preFeeBalance_` (snapshot before fee deduction), not the current post-fee balance. This deliberately allows accounts to dip into reserve to pay the fee while still requiring full reserve coverage for new owned objects.
```cpp
auto const reserve = view().fees().accountReserve(ownerCount + 1);
if (preFeeBalance_ < reserve)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE;
```
### Owner Directory + Owner Count Pattern
Creating an owned object:
1. `view().dirInsert(keylet::ownerDir(owner), key, ...)` → returns page index
2. Store page index in SLE's `sfOwnerNode` (and `sfDestinationNode`, `sfIssuerNode`, etc., for multi-party objects)
3. `adjustOwnerCount(view, sleOwner, +N, j)` where N is the reserve cost
4. `view().insert(sle)`
Deleting an owned object:
1. Read `sfOwnerNode` (etc.) from SLE
2. `view().dirRemove(keylet::ownerDir(owner), pageIndex, key, false)` — O(1) using cached page
3. `adjustOwnerCount(view, sleOwner, -N, j)`
4. `view().erase(sle)`
Reserve cost is usually 1 unit per object, but:
- `AccountDelete`, `LedgerStateFix`, `AMMCreate` charge a full reserve via `calculateOwnerReserveFee` instead of base fee
- Two-object structures (`Vault`, `LoanBroker`) charge +2 for object + pseudo-account (incremented before reserve check so check reflects true post-creation state)
- `SignerListSet` post-amendment uses `lsfOneOwnerCount` flag (1 unit regardless of N signers); pre-amendment charges 2+N
- `OracleSet` uses tiered count: 1 unit for ≤5 price pairs, 2 units for more
### Pseudo-Account Pattern
Synthetic `AccountRoot` SLEs with disabled master key, used to hold protocol-managed assets on behalf of users. Created via `createPseudoAccount(view, ownerKey, sfDiscriminator)`. Examples and their discriminator fields:
| Construct | Discriminator | Owns |
|---|---|---|
| AMM | `sfAMMID` | LP token issuance, both pool asset trustlines/MPTokens |
| Vault | `sfVaultID` | Vault asset holding, share MPTokenIssuance |
| LoanBroker | `sfLoanBrokerID` | Cover capital holding |
Pseudo-account guard rules:
- `ValidPseudoAccounts` invariant: exactly one discriminator field, sequence never changes, required flags (`lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth`), no `sfRegularKey`
- For pseudo-accounts, initial sequence must be 0 and flags must be exactly `lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth`
- Many transactors explicitly reject pseudo-account destinations (`tecPSEUDO_ACCOUNT`): `Payment` direct, `CheckCreate`, `PaymentChannelCreate`, `VaultCreate` (asset issuer), `Clawback` (holder)
- `MPTokenAuthorize` issuer-path skips pseudo-account holders (they are implicitly always authorized)
- Pseudo-accounts cannot sign — when `featureLendingProtocol` active, `checkSign` rejects with `tefBAD_AUTH`
- Anti-nesting: AMM preclaim detects LP-token-issuer pseudo-accounts via `sfAMMID` on the issuer's `AccountRoot` and rejects using them as AMM assets
### `associateAsset` Convention
After mutating any SLE that contains `STNumber` or `STTakesAsset`-derived fields (loan, broker, vault objects), call `associateAsset(*sle, asset)` at the end of `doApply`. This re-rounds stored numeric values to the asset's precision. Per `STTakesAsset.h` contract, this must be the last operation after all writes are complete. Failing to call it produces silent precision corruption.
## Permission & Delegation System
### `checkPermission` (called from preclaim)
Validates the optional `sfDelegate` field. If absent, normal account signing applies. If present:
1. Read `DelegateObject` at `keylet::delegate(account, delegate)`; missing → `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION`
2. Try full transaction-type permission via `checkTxPermission()` (uses `TxType + 1` encoding)
3. Fall back to granular permission via `loadGranularPermission()` + per-transactor logic
### Encoding Convention
Permission values store both forms in a single `uint32_t`:
- Transaction types: `TxType + 1` (always ≤ `UINT16_MAX`; `+1` avoids ambiguous zero since `ttPAYMENT == 0`)
- Granular permissions: values `> UINT16_MAX`, enumerated in `permissions.macro`
`Permission` singleton asserts this separation at construction time.
### Granular Permissions
`DelegateUtils.cpp` provides:
- `checkTxPermission()` — linear scan for `TxType + 1` match; returns `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION` on null delegate or no match
- `loadGranularPermission()` — populates per-tx-type granular set via `Permission::getInstance().getGranularTxType()` reverse-map; returns silently with empty set on null delegate
Examples of granular permissions:
- `Payment` direct only: `PaymentMint` (issuer source), `PaymentBurn` (issuer destination) — blocked if `sfPaths` present or asset conversion
- `AccountSet`: field-level grants per metadata field (`AccountDomainSet`, `AccountTransferRateSet`, etc.); flag changes blocked entirely
- `TrustSet`: `TrustlineAuthorize`, `TrustlineFreeze`, `TrustlineUnfreeze`; cannot create new lines, cannot change limit
- `MPTokenIssuanceSet`: `MPTokenIssuanceLock`, `MPTokenIssuanceUnlock`
## Permission Model & Cross-Transactor Static Interfaces
Several transactors expose static deletion/creation methods on `ApplyView` so other transactors (especially `AccountDelete`) can clean up owned objects without constructing a fake transaction:
- `DepositPreauth::removeFromLedger(ApplyView&, uint256, Journal)`
- `DIDDelete::deleteSLE(ApplyView&, SLE, AccountID, Journal)`
- `OracleDelete::deleteOracle(ApplyView&, SLE, AccountID, Journal)`
- `DelegateSet::deleteDelegate(ApplyView&, SLE, AccountID, Journal)`
- `SignerListSet::removeFromLedger(ApplyView&, ServiceRegistry&, AccountID, Journal)`
- `MPTokenIssuanceCreate::create(ApplyView&, Journal, MPTCreateArgs)` — used by `VaultCreate` to mint share token
- `AMMWithdraw::withdraw`/`equalWithdrawTokens` — used by `AMMClawback`, `AMMDelete`
- `LoanManage::unimpairLoan/impairLoan/defaultLoan` — used by `LoanPay`
`AccountDelete` uses a `nonObligationDeleter()` switch over `LedgerEntryType` returning a `DeleterFuncPtr`. `nullptr` means "obligation, cannot delete". The same switch is used in both `preclaim` (to detect blockers) and `doApply` (to invoke deletions), keeping type classification in sync. Deletable types: offers, signer lists, tickets, deposit preauth, NFT offers, DIDs, oracles, credentials, delegates.
### AccountDelete-specific preclaim rules
- NFT obligations: `sfMintedNFTokens != sfBurnedNFTokens``tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS`; authorized-minting replay guard: `FirstNFTokenSequence + MintedNFTokens + 255` must not exceed current ledger sequence
- Sequence freshness: account seq must be ≥ 256 below current ledger index (`tecTOO_SOON`) — prevents replay after resurrection
- Owner directory: more than `maxDeletableDirEntries` (1000) deletable items → `tefTOO_BIG`
## Signature Verification
`checkSign()` (in preclaim) dispatches:
1. **Batch inner** (`tfInnerBatchTxn`): asserts no key/sig/signers; outer batch authorized them
2. **Dry-run** (`tapDRY_RUN`): skipped if no key/signers
3. **Multi-sign** (`sfSigners` present): delegates to `checkMultiSign()`
4. **Single sig**: derives signer from public key, calls `checkSingleSign()`
`checkSingleSign()` precedence: regular key → enabled master key → `tefMASTER_DISABLED`.
`checkMultiSign()` performs O(n) linear merge of sorted `sfSigners` against the sorted `SignerEntry` list from the account's signer list SLE. Terminates with `tefBAD_QUORUM` if accumulated weight < `sfSignerQuorum`.
`checkBatchSign()` validates the outer batch transaction's `sfBatchSigners` array. Outer account is excluded from `sfBatchSigners`; unsigned-account inner transactions (e.g., funding an account creation) are permitted if signed by their master key.
`LoanSet::checkSign()` overrides to verify both the primary signer AND the `sfCounterpartySignature` sub-object (which may itself be single or multisig). `calculateBaseFee` adds one `baseFee` per counterparty signer.
## Validation Helpers (in `Transactor`)
- `validNumericRange<T>(opt, min, max)` absent optional is valid
- `validNumericMinimum<T>(opt, min)` absent optional is valid
- Overloads for `unit::ValueUnit<Unit, T>` for type-safe units
These follow the convention that an absent optional field is valid; only present values are range-checked.
## Invariant Checker Framework
After every successful or fee-claiming transaction, every checker in the `InvariantChecks` tuple runs. Two-phase: `visitEntry(isDelete, before, after)` per modified SLE, then `finalize(tx, result, fee, view, journal)` once.
### Dispatch (in `ApplyContext::checkInvariantsHelper`)
Uses `std::index_sequence` + fold expression for variadic visit. Critically, `finalize()` results are collected into a `std::array<bool>` then checked with `std::all_of` NOT short-circuited with `&&` so every failing invariant logs its own diagnostic.
Invariant checkers run even on failed (`tec*`) transactions bugs or exploits could cause a failed transaction to mutate ledger state unexpectedly.
### `failInvariantCheck` Escalation
- First failure `tecINVARIANT_FAILED` (committed to ledger, fee charged)
- Repeated failure during retry (recognized because incoming result is already `tecINVARIANT_FAILED` or `tefINVARIANT_FAILED`) `tefINVARIANT_FAILED` (not included in ledger)
Rationale: if even the minimal fee-charge path breaks invariants, no ledger entry of any kind should be created.
### The `enforce` Pattern (Soft Rollout)
```cpp
bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureX);
if (violation) {
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "...";
XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "..."); // fires in debug builds regardless
return !enforce; // returns true (passes) if amendment off
}
```
This lets invariants ship before activation: violations log unconditionally (visible to operators), assertion fires in debug/test builds (catches dev mistakes), but only become consensus-breaking when the gating amendment activates.
### Privilege System (`InvariantCheckPrivilege.h`)
`Privilege` bitmask enum + `hasPrivilege(STTx, Privilege)` (implemented via `transactions.macro` X-macro). Used by checkers to know what each transaction type may legitimately do. `must` vs. `may` variants let invariants enforce cardinality (e.g., `AccountDelete` *must* delete exactly one account root; `AMMWithdraw` *may* delete one).
| Privilege | Granted to (examples) |
|---|---|
| `createAcct` | `Payment` (XRP funding) |
| `createPseudoAcct` | `AMMCreate`, `VaultCreate`, `LoanBrokerSet` |
| `mustDeleteAcct` | `AccountDelete`, `AMMDelete` |
| `mayDeleteAcct` | `AMMWithdraw`, `AMMClawback` |
| `overrideFreeze` | `AMMClawback` (only against AMM trust lines, not global freeze) |
| `changeNFTCounts` | `NFTokenMint`, `NFTokenBurn` |
| `createMPTIssuance` / `destroyMPTIssuance` | `MPTokenIssuanceCreate`/`Destroy`, also `VaultCreate`/`Delete` |
| `mustAuthorizeMPT` / `mayAuthorizeMPT` | `MPTokenAuthorize`, AMM withdraw/clawback |
| `mayCreateMPT` / `mayDeleteMPT` | `Payment`, `CheckCash`, `AMMCreate`, `AMMDelete` |
| `mustModifyVault` / `mayModifyVault` | Vault transactors, loan transactors |
### The 25+ Registered Invariants
| Checker | What it enforces |
|---|---|
| `TransactionFeeCheck` | Fee non-negative, < INITIAL_XRP, sfFee |
| `XRPNotCreated` | Net XRP delta across accounts/paychans/escrows = -fee (pay channels tracked as `sfAmount - sfBalance`) |
| `XRPBalanceChecks` | Every account balance is native XRP in [0, INITIAL_XRP] |
| `NoBadOffers` | No negative-amount, no XRP-for-XRP offers |
| `NoZeroEscrow` | Escrow/MPT amounts within bounds; MPT locked outstanding; also validates `ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE` and `ltMPTOKEN` entries |
| `AccountRootsNotDeleted` | Account deletion cardinality matches `must`/`may` privilege |
| `AccountRootsDeletedClean` | Deleted account had zero balance + zero owner count + no orphaned objects; uses `before` SLE for pseudo-account linked object keys (fields may be cleared during deletion) |
| `ValidNewAccountRoot` | New accounts only from `createAcct`/`createPseudoAcct`; correct initial seq + flags |
| `ValidPseudoAccounts` | Exactly one discriminator, sequence unchanged, required flags, no regular key; errors accumulated in `vector<string>` and all logged before returning |
| `ValidClawback` | At most one trust line/MPT modified, holder balance non-negative |
| `NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields` | `sfLedgerEntryType`/`sfLedgerIndex` immutable; loan/broker origination fields immutable; gated on `featureLendingProtocol` |
| `LedgerEntryTypesMatch` | Modified entries don't change type; new entries are recognized types |
| `NoXRPTrustLines` | No trust line uses XRP as currency |
| `NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze` | DeepFreeze flag requires regular Freeze flag |
| `TransfersNotFrozen` | Trust line transfers respect global/per-line/deep freeze (gated `featureDeepFreeze`) |
| `ValidNFTokenPage` | Page links coherent, size 1-32 tokens, sorted, valid URIs |
| `NFTokenCountTracking` | `sfMintedNFTokens`/`sfBurnedNFTokens` only change with `changeNFTCounts` privilege; strict monotonic increase on success |
| `ValidMPTIssuance` | MPT issuance/holder counts match transaction privileges |
| `ValidMPTPayment` | OutstandingAmount = sum(holder MPTAmount + LockedAmount); overflow detection |
| `ValidAMM` | Per-tx-type rules: create exact `sqrt(A*B)`, deposit/withdraw constant-product invariant `sqrt(x*y) ≥ LPSupply`, vote/bid leave pool unchanged |
| `ValidPermissionedDomain` | AcceptedCredentials non-empty, max size, unique, sorted |
| `ValidPermissionedDEX` | Domain-scoped tx only touches offers/dirs with matching domain; hybrid offers structurally valid |
| `ValidVault` | Per-tx-type rules: deposit/withdraw asset/share conservation, immutable fields unchanged, loss only via loan ops; XRP vault fee compensation for depositor/withdrawer balance check |
| `ValidLoan` | Payment completion bidirectional (paymentRemaining=0 all outstanding=0), `lsfLoanOverpayment` immutable, non-negative fees, positive `sfPeriodicPayment` |
| `ValidLoanBroker` | Sequence monotonic, non-negative cover/debt, vault exists, cover pseudo-account balance (== under `fixSecurity3_1_3` except at delete); no amendment gate (objects can't exist unless amendment is active) |
## doApply Order Convention (Cleanup)
When erasing an SLE that participates in directories, the order is **always**:
1. Remove from owner directory (and destination/issuer directory if applicable) via `dirRemove` with stored `sfOwnerNode`/etc.
2. `adjustOwnerCount(view, sleOwner, -N, j)`
3. `view().erase(sle)`
Erasing first would lose the page index needed for `dirRemove`. Many transactors guard `dirRemove` failure with `tefBAD_LEDGER` and `LCOV_EXCL` markers these branches represent ledger corruption rather than user error.
## Failure Modes Worth Special-Casing
- `tecOVERSIZE`: metadata too large. `operator()` re-runs `doApply` after `reset()` to collect cleanup targets only
- `tecINCOMPLETE`: progress was made but more work remains. `AMMDelete` and `VaultDelete` commit partial work on this code caller resubmits
- `tecPATH_DRY`: payment path exhausted. `Payment` converts retry codes from `RippleCalc` to this (forces fee deduction, prevents path-spam)
- `tecKILLED`: order/loan time-window expired or sequence overflow (`LoanSet` arithmetic overflow check)
- `tecEXPIRED`: legitimately expired object; some transactors (e.g., `NFTokenAcceptOffer` under `fixExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval`) clean up before returning this
- `tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE`: reserve check failed against `preFeeBalance_`
- `tecINTERNAL` / `tefBAD_LEDGER`: ledger corruption sentinels. Often marked `LCOV_EXCL` because preclaim should have prevented them. `RippleCalc` converts exceptions to `tecINTERNAL` rather than rethrowing (deterministic fallback all validators agree on)
- `terNO_AMM`, `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION`, `terNO_ACCOUNT`, `terNO_LINE`: retryable failures
## Hash Router Caching
Some expensive operations cache results in the `HashRouter` using private flag bits to avoid recomputation across multiple validation passes:
- **Signature verification** (`apply.cpp` `checkValidity`): `SF_SIGBAD`, `SF_SIGGOOD`, `SF_LOCALBAD`, `SF_LOCALGOOD` (PRIVATE1PRIVATE4)
- **Crypto-condition validation** (`EscrowFinish::preflightSigValidated`): `SF_CF_VALID`, `SF_CF_INVALID` (PRIVATE5PRIVATE6)
The `forceValidity()` API can promote cached state (using `[[fallthrough]]`) but cannot downgrade (never sets `SF_SIGBAD`) used to mark locally-submitted transactions as pre-verified. **Use with extreme care**: bypassing signature verification in the cache affects every subsequent `checkValidity` call on the same hash until cache expiry.
Validity enum P2P semantics: `SigBad` = don't forward; `SigGoodOnly` = relay but don't apply; `Valid` = relay and apply.
## Batch Transactions
`Batch` (in `system/Batch.cpp`) bundles 2-8 inner transactions with one of four execution policies (mutually exclusive, enforced via `std::popcount`):
- `tfAllOrNothing`: any failure aborts, full rollback (`applyBatchTransactions` returns false)
- `tfUntilFailure`: stop at first failure, keep prior successes (returns false if no inner tx was ever applied)
- `tfOnlyOne`: stop at first success
- `tfIndependent`: run all, commit successes
`Batch::doApply()` returns `tesSUCCESS` and does nothing `applyBatchTransactions()` in `apply.cpp` is called separately by `applyTransaction()` after the outer apply succeeds, executing inner txs in a nested `wholeBatchView`/`perTxBatchView` sandbox structure.
**Critical for new transactors:** Update `disabledTxTypes` in `Batch.cpp` if your type cannot run inside a batch. Currently disabled: all `ttVAULT_*` and `ttLOAN_*` types (multi-step state machines whose invariants are difficult to reason about under batch atomicity).
Inner transaction rules (enforced in `Batch::preflight`):
- `tfInnerBatchTxn` flag must be set
- Empty `sfSigningPubKey`, no `sfTxnSignature`, no `sfSigners`
- Fee = 0 XRP
- Exactly one of `sfSequence` (nonzero) or `sfTicketSequence`
- For `tfAllOrNothing`/`tfUntilFailure`: no duplicate sequence/ticket values across same-account inner txs (relaxed for `tfIndependent`/`tfOnlyOne`)
- Each inner tx has `xrpl::preflight` called on it with `tapBATCH` and `parentBatchId`; no nested `ttBATCH`
`Batch::preflightSigValidated` reconciles `sfBatchSigners` bidirectionally: each signer removed from `requiredSigners` as matched; any signer not in `requiredSigners` `temBAD_SIGNER`; outer account explicitly excluded. Then `ctx.tx.checkBatchSign(ctx.rules)` verifies the cryptographic batch signature payload.
`Batch::calculateBaseFee` = `baseFee + Σ(inner tx fees) + numSigners × baseFee`. Overflow guards everywhere (marked `LCOV_EXCL`).
**`fixBatchInnerSigs` amendment**: corrects a bug in the original Batch implementation where inner-batch transactions could be assigned `SF_SIGGOOD` cache entries (implying valid signatures on unsigned objects). After the fix, inner-batch transactions follow the `neverValid` path.
All Batch log messages use `BatchTrace[<parentBatchId>]` prefix for correlation.
## Key Files
- `src/libxrpl/tx/Transactor.cpp` - base class, three-phase pipeline, fee calculation, signature dispatch
- `src/libxrpl/tx/ApplyContext.cpp` - sandboxed view management, `discard()`, invariant orchestration
- `src/libxrpl/tx/apply.cpp` - top-level `apply()`, `checkValidity()` caching, `applyBatchTransactions()`
- `src/libxrpl/tx/applySteps.cpp` - X-macro dispatch via `with_txn_type`, `TxConsequences` factories
- `src/libxrpl/tx/SignerEntries.cpp` - multi-sig signer list deserialization (`SignerEntries::deserialize`)
- `include/xrpl/protocol/detail/transactions.macro` - canonical type definitions, privileges, features
- `src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/.../` - one subdirectory per feature family (account, dex, escrow, lending, vault, etc.)
- `src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/` - 25+ invariant checkers; add new ones to `InvariantChecks` tuple in `InvariantCheck.h`
- `src/libxrpl/tx/paths/` - payment flow engine (`Flow.cpp`, `StrandFlow.h`, `BookStep.cpp`, `RippleCalc.cpp`) used by `Payment`, `CheckCash`, `OfferCreate` crossing
## Payment Path Engine Notes
`Payment`, `OfferCreate` (crossing), and `CheckCash` (IOU/MPT) all route through `flow()` in `Flow.cpp` `StrandFlow.h`. Key concepts:
- A **strand** is a `std::vector<std::unique_ptr<Step>>`; each `Step` is one hop (`DirectStepI`, `BookStepXX`, `XRPEndpointStep`, `MPTEndpointStep`)
- `flow()` is templated on `(TIn, TOut)` pairs for the three asset types (6 combinations). `Flow.cpp` is the façade that resolves runtime `STAmount`/`Asset` values into compile-time template parameters via `std::visit`, then hands off to `StrandFlow.h`.
- Two-pass execution: reverse pass (compute required input for desired output) then forward pass (compute output for actual input)
- Limiting step detection: if reverse pass cannot satisfy desired output, that step is identified as the bottleneck and used as the anchor for forward pass
- Multi-strand flow uses `ActiveStrands` priority queue sorted by `qualityUpperBound`; one strand consumed per outer iteration (probe-and-push)
- Safety limits: `MaxOffersToConsume` = 1000 per book step, `maxTries` = 1000 outer iterations, `maxOffersToConsider` = 1500 cumulative, `AMMContext::MaxIterations` = 30
- `PaymentSandbox` (not regular `Sandbox`) is required because `flow()` uses deferred-credit accounting
- AMM offers are synthesized by `AMMLiquidity` to look like CLOB offers to `BookStep`; single-path uses `changeSpotPriceQuality`, multi-path uses Fibonacci-scaled offer sizes; `AMMContext` tracks whether multi-path is active (disables quality optimization)
- `RippleCalc::rippleCalculate()` creates a nested `PaymentSandbox` inside the caller's `PaymentSandbox` (exception safety); `flow()` applies its internal sandbox to `flowSB` only on success
- `ter*` retry codes from `RippleCalc` are converted to `tecPATH_DRY` in `Payment::doApply` (forces fee charge, prevents path-spam)
- `sfDeliverMin` + `tfPartialPayment`: if actual delivery < `sfDeliverMin` `tecPATH_PARTIAL`; `ctx_.deliver()` records actual delivered amount for metadata (critical for partial payment detection downstream)
- `std::optional<uint256> domainID` threads through `toStrands()` for permissioned payment domains
### `sendMax` semantics in `RippleCalc`
`sendMax` is `nullopt` when sending the same IOU that the destination receives with sender as issuer (no separate spending cap needed). Otherwise set to `saMaxAmountReq`. `limitQuality` is only constructed when `pInputs->limitQuality && saMaxAmountReq > beast::zero`.
## Asset Type Dispatch Pattern
Modern transactors that support both IOU (`Issue`) and MPT (`MPTIssue`) assets use template specialization + `std::visit` rather than runtime branching. The pattern:
```cpp
TER MyTx::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx) {
return std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) { return preclaimHelper<T>(ctx); },
ctx.tx[sfAmount].asset().value());
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
static TER preclaimHelper(PreclaimContext const& ctx);
template <> TER preclaimHelper<Issue>(...);
template <> TER preclaimHelper<MPTIssue>(...);
```
Used by `Clawback`, `Escrow*`, `Vault*`, `AMM*Withdraw/Deposit`, `LoanBrokerCoverClawback`. Each specialization handles asset-type-specific permission flags (`lsfAllowTrustLineClawback`/`lsfNoFreeze` vs `lsfMPTCanClawback`), authorization (`StrongAuth` vs `WeakAuth`), and freeze checks (`tecFROZEN` vs `tecLOCKED`).
## Lending Protocol (XLS-66)
`LendingHelpers.cpp` is the numerical core. Key concepts:
- **Amortization math**: `loanPeriodicPayment()` uses standard `r(1+r)^n / ((1+r)^n - 1)` factor (Eq. 67 in XLS-66 Eq. Glossary). Zero-interest path uses equal principal slices (no division by zero).
- **Theoretical vs. rounded state**: `LoanProperties` holds both; `computeTheoreticalLoanState()` computes at full precision; `constructRoundedLoanState()` reflects actual ledger values. Rounding errors are carried forward during re-amortization.
- **Payment types**: regular, late (penalty via `loanLatePaymentInterest`), full/early-closure, overpayment (triggers re-amortization via `tryOverpayment()`).
- **`checkLoanGuards()`** enforces 4 precision invariants at creation/re-amortization: measurable interest, positive first-payment principal, non-zero rounded payment, payment count math. All return `tecPRECISION_LOSS`.
- **Template proxy pattern**: `doPayment<NumberProxy, UInt32Proxy, UInt32OptionalProxy>` runs against real SLE (via `ValueProxy`) or simulation values same code path for both.
- `loanMakePayment()` dispatches to the correct payment type and runs up to `loanMaximumPaymentsPerTransaction` installments per call.
## Vault Architecture
Six vault transactors: `VaultCreate`, `VaultDeposit`, `VaultWithdraw`, `VaultSet`, `VaultDelete`, `VaultClawback`. Key creation invariants (see `VaultCreate.cpp`):
- `sfWithdrawalPolicy` currently only accepts `vaultStrategyFirstComeFirstServe` (= 1)
- `sfDomainID` is only valid when `tfVaultPrivate` is set
- `sfScale` restricted: meaningless for XRP/MPT assets; bounded above by `vaultMaximumIOUScale` (18)
- Vault pseudo-account asset issuer cannot be another pseudo-account (`tecWRONG_ASSET`) those assets have no clawback path
- `adjustOwnerCount` increments by **2** (vault + pseudo-account) before reserve check
- MPT share issuance flags derived from transaction flags: tradeable unless `tfVaultShareNonTransferable`; `lsfMPTRequireAuth` added for private vaults
- `associateAsset` is the final call in `doApply`
`ValidVault` invariant uses a delta-map (`uint256 → Number`) with sign conventions per entry type (+1 for share issuance outstanding amount, -1 for asset balances). Entries captured even at zero delta for accounting completeness. Fee compensation applied for XRP vault balance deltas (skipped for delegated transactions).

62
docs/skills/websockets.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
# WebSockets
Async WebSocket support for client RPC and real-time subscriptions. Both plain and SSL. Built on Boost.Beast + Boost.Asio.
## Key Invariants
- All async operations run on a per-session Boost.Asio strand for thread safety
- Outgoing message queue (`wq_`) has a per-session limit (`port().ws_queue_limit`); exceeding it closes the connection with policy error "client is too slow"
- `complete()` must be called after processing each message to resume reading; forgetting it stalls the session
- `WSInfoSub` holds a weak pointer to `WSSession`; dead sessions are automatically skipped during event delivery
- Message size limit: `RPC::Tuning::maxRequestSize`; oversized messages get a `jsonInvalid` error response
## Connection Flow
1. `Door` accepts TCP -> `Detector` probes for SSL vs plain -> creates `SSLHTTPPeer` or `PlainHTTPPeer`
2. HTTP request with WebSocket upgrade -> `ServerHandler::onHandoff` -> `session.websocketUpgrade()` -> creates `PlainWSPeer` or `SSLWSPeer`
3. `BaseWSPeer::run()` -> set permessage-deflate options -> `async_accept` handshake -> `on_ws_handshake` -> `do_read` loop
4. `on_read` -> `ServerHandler::onWSMessage` -> validate JSON -> post to job queue -> `processSession` -> send response -> `complete()`
## Common Bug Patterns
- `on_read` consumes the buffer AFTER calling `onWSMessage`; if the handler accesses the buffer asynchronously after `onWSMessage` returns, it reads garbage
- `close()` with pending messages defers the actual close; calling `send()` after `close()` but before actual close queues more messages
- Missing `complete()` call after sending response = session never reads again = appears hung
- Job queue shutdown: if `postCoro` returns nullptr, session must close with `going_away`; dropping this silently leaks sessions
## Review Checklist
- Verify strand execution for all socket operations (read, write, close, timer)
- New subscription streams: ensure `WSInfoSub::send` handles the new event type
- Flow control: test with slow clients to verify queue limit enforcement
## Key Patterns
### complete() Resumes Read Loop
```cpp
// REQUIRED after sending response — missing this = session hangs forever
void BaseWSPeer::complete()
{
if (!strand_.running_in_this_thread())
return post(strand_, std::bind(
&BaseWSPeer::complete, impl().shared_from_this()));
do_read(); // resume reading next message
}
```
### Queue Limit Enforcement
```cpp
// REQUIRED: close slow clients to prevent memory exhaustion
if (wq_.size() >= port().ws_queue_limit)
{
close(boost::beast::websocket::close_code::policy_error);
return; // do NOT queue unboundedly
}
```
## Key Files
- `include/xrpl/server/detail/BaseWSPeer.h` - session lifecycle and message queue
- `include/xrpl/server/detail/Door.h` - connection acceptance
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/ServerHandler.cpp` - `onWSMessage` and `onHandoff`
- `src/xrpld/rpc/detail/WSInfoSub.h` - subscription delivery

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@@ -7,12 +7,48 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Read the entire contents of a file into a string.
*
* Resolves `sourcePath` to its canonical (absolute, symlink-free) form before
* opening it, which prevents TOCTOU races between path resolution and the open.
* When `maxSize` is supplied and the file exceeds that byte count, `ec` is set
* to `boost::system::errc::file_too_large` and an empty string is returned
* without reading any data.
*
* All errors — non-existent path, permission denial, size exceeded, open
* failure, and mid-read I/O error — are reported through `ec`. The function
* never throws.
*
* @param ec Output error code; set on any failure, left unchanged on success.
* @param sourcePath Path to the file to read; must exist and be resolvable.
* @param maxSize Optional upper bound on file size in bytes. If the file is
* larger, `ec` is set to `errc::file_too_large` and `{}` is returned.
* @return The full file contents on success, or an empty string on any error.
* @note EOF during the single-pass read is not an error; only `bad()` (hardware
* or stream-corruption failure) triggers an error code after the read.
*/
std::string
getFileContents(
boost::system::error_code& ec,
boost::filesystem::path const& sourcePath,
std::optional<std::size_t> maxSize = std::nullopt);
/** Write a string to a file, creating or truncating it as necessary.
*
* Opens `destPath` with `std::ios::out | std::ios::trunc`, so any existing
* content is discarded and the file is created if it does not yet exist.
* This is a full replacement, not an atomic rename-and-swap; callers that
* require crash-safe writes must implement that at a higher level.
*
* All errors — open failure and mid-write I/O error — are reported through
* `ec`. The function never throws.
*
* @param ec Output error code; set on any failure, left unchanged on success.
* @param destPath Path to the destination file; parent directory must exist.
* @param contents Data to write; written in a single `<<` operation.
* @note Unlike `getFileContents`, this function does not call `canonical()`
* because the destination file may not yet exist.
*/
void
writeFileContents(
boost::system::error_code& ec,

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@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
/** @file
* RFC 1751 mnemonic encoding for 128-bit XRPL wallet seeds.
*
* Declares the `RFC1751` utility class, which encodes and decodes 128-bit
* binary keys as sequences of short English words drawn from a 2048-word
* dictionary. Each word represents exactly 11 bits; a 64-bit block maps
* to 6 words (64 data bits + 2 parity bits = 66 bits). A full 128-bit key
* therefore encodes as 12 words in two back-to-back 6-word groups.
*
* The primary consumer is `Seed.cpp`, which uses the codec to produce
* human-readable wallet seed mnemonics. `NetworkOPs.cpp` also uses
* `getWordFromBlob` to derive a stable short label for the local node's
* public key in log output.
*/
#pragma once
#include <string>
@@ -5,39 +20,183 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** XRPL adaptation of the RFC 1751 128-bit mnemonic key codec.
*
* Converts 128-bit binary keys to and from sequences of 12 English words
* using a fixed 2048-word dictionary. The dictionary is split at index 571:
* words 0570 have 13 characters; words 5712047 are all exactly 4
* characters. This property is exploited internally to halve binary-search
* range during decoding.
*
* All methods are static; this class is a pure stateless namespace and is
* never instantiated.
*
* @note `Seed.cpp` reverses the 16 seed bytes before passing them to
* `getEnglishFromKey` and after receiving them from `getKeyFromEnglish`
* to satisfy the RFC's big-endian byte-order convention.
*/
class RFC1751
{
public:
/** Decode a 12-word mnemonic string into a 128-bit binary key.
*
* Splits @p strHuman on whitespace (multiple spaces are collapsed),
* validates and normalises each word via `standard()`, looks each one
* up in the dictionary, and packs the resulting 11-bit indices into two
* 8-byte binary halves. Each half carries a 2-bit parity check computed
* from the 64 data bits; the decode fails with `-2` if the recomputed
* parity does not match.
*
* @param strKey Output parameter; set to the 16-byte binary key on
* success. Unchanged on any failure return.
* @param strHuman 12 space-separated words to decode. Leading and
* trailing whitespace is trimmed before splitting.
* @return 1 success — @p strKey holds the decoded 16-byte key.
* @return 0 a word was not found in the dictionary.
* @return -1 malformed input: word count ≠ 12, or a word exceeds 4
* characters.
* @return -2 all words are valid but the 2-bit parity check failed,
* indicating a transcription error.
*
* @note The four distinct return codes must not be collapsed; `-2`
* (parity failure) implies the words themselves were individually
* valid and is a different diagnostic than `0` (unknown word).
*/
static int
getKeyFromEnglish(std::string& strKey, std::string const& strHuman);
/** Encode a 128-bit binary key as 12 space-separated English words.
*
* Encodes the first 8 bytes of @p strKey as 6 words and the next 8
* bytes as a further 6 words, then joins the two groups with a single
* space. A 2-bit parity value is appended to each 64-bit block before
* encoding to support transcription-error detection on decode.
*
* Encoding is lossless and cannot fail for valid 16-byte input; no
* return code is needed.
*
* @param strHuman Output parameter; receives the 12-word mnemonic string.
* @param strKey The 16-byte (128-bit) binary key to encode. Behaviour
* is undefined if fewer than 16 bytes are provided.
*/
static void
getEnglishFromKey(std::string& strHuman, std::string const& strKey);
/** Chooses a single dictionary word from the data.
This is not particularly secure but it can be useful to provide
a unique name for something given a GUID or fixed data. We use
it to turn the pubkey_node into an easily remembered and identified
4 character string.
*/
/** Map arbitrary binary data to a single dictionary word.
*
* Applies the Jenkins one-at-a-time hash to the input bytes, then
* indexes into the 2048-word dictionary using the hash modulo 2048.
* The result is a stable, reproducible label for the input data.
*
* @param blob Pointer to the input data.
* @param bytes Number of bytes to hash.
* @return A single uppercase dictionary word of 14 characters.
*
* @note This function is **not** cryptographically secure. It is
* intended only for producing human-readable identifiers, such as
* the `shroudedHostId` label derived from a node's public key in
* `NetworkOPs.cpp`.
*/
static std::string
getWordFromBlob(void const* blob, size_t bytes);
private:
/** Read up to 11 bits from a byte array at an arbitrary bit offset.
*
* Assembles up to 3 adjacent bytes into a 24-bit window, shifts right
* to align the target field, and masks to @p length bits. Works across
* byte boundaries. The output buffer for the 66-bit block (64 data +
* 2 parity) must be at least 9 bytes.
*
* @param s Source byte array (at least ⌈(start + length) / 8⌉ + 1
* bytes long; 9 bytes for the full 66-bit block).
* @param start First bit to read (0-based). Must be ≥ 0.
* @param length Number of bits to read. Must satisfy 0 ≤ length ≤ 11
* and start + length ≤ 66.
* @return The extracted value, right-justified and zero-extended.
*/
static unsigned long
extract(char const* s, int start, int length);
/** Encode an 8-byte binary block as 6 space-separated dictionary words.
*
* Appends a 9th byte carrying a 2-bit parity value (sum of all 32
* two-bit pairs in the 64-bit payload, placed at bits 6465), then
* calls `extract()` at six 11-bit offsets to obtain dictionary indices.
*
* @param strHuman Output; receives the 6-word space-separated string.
* @param strData Exactly 8 bytes of binary data to encode.
*/
static void
btoe(std::string& strHuman, std::string const& strData);
/** Write up to 11 bits into a byte array at an arbitrary bit offset.
*
* ORs the bit field into the target bytes; the output buffer must be
* zero-initialised before the first call because this function
* accumulates bits with bitwise OR rather than assignment.
*
* @param s Target byte array (must be zero-initialised).
* @param x Value to insert (only the low @p length bits are used).
* @param start First destination bit (0-based). Must be ≥ 0.
* @param length Number of bits to write. Must satisfy 0 ≤ length ≤ 11
* and start + length ≤ 66.
*/
static void
insert(char* s, int x, int start, int length);
/** Normalise a mnemonic word for dictionary lookup.
*
* Applies three in-place transformations to tolerate common
* handwriting and OCR ambiguities: lowercased letters are uppercased,
* `'1'` is replaced by `'L'`, `'0'` by `'O'`, and `'5'` by `'S'`.
*
* @param strWord Word to normalise in place.
*/
static void
standard(std::string& strWord);
/** Binary-search the dictionary within a given index range.
*
* The dictionary is sorted, and its first 571 entries (indices 0570)
* are words of 13 characters while the remaining 1477 (indices
* 5712047) are all exactly 4 characters. Callers restrict the range
* based on word length to halve the search space.
*
* @param strWord Word to search for (must already be normalised via
* `standard()`).
* @param iMin Inclusive lower bound of the search range.
* @param iMax Exclusive upper bound of the search range.
* @return The dictionary index of @p strWord, or -1 if not found.
*/
static int
wsrch(std::string const& strWord, int iMin, int iMax);
/** Decode 6 mnemonic words into an 8-byte binary block.
*
* Normalises each word, looks it up via `wsrch()`, packs the resulting
* 11-bit indices into a 9-byte buffer using `insert()`, then validates
* the 2-bit parity stored at bit offset 64.
*
* @param strData Output; receives the 8 decoded data bytes on success.
* Unchanged on any failure return.
* @param vsHuman Exactly 6 words to decode. Returns -1 immediately
* if the vector does not contain exactly 6 elements, or if any
* word is longer than 4 characters.
* @return 1 success.
* @return 0 a word was not found in the dictionary.
* @return -1 wrong word count or word exceeds 4 characters.
* @return -2 parity mismatch.
*/
static int
etob(std::string& strData, std::vector<std::string> vsHuman);
/** The 2048-word mnemonic dictionary, sorted ascending.
*
* Indices 0570 contain words of 13 characters; indices 5712047
* contain words of exactly 4 characters. This structural split is
* relied upon by `wsrch()` to restrict binary-search ranges.
*/
static char const* dictionary[];
};

View File

@@ -4,14 +4,38 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** A cryptographically secure random number engine
/** @file
* Cryptographically secure pseudo-random number engine and singleton accessor.
*
* Every piece of key material in the XRP Ledger — wallet seeds, secret keys,
* nonces, session identifiers — is generated through `CsprngEngine`. The class
* is a thin, type-safe C++ wrapper around OpenSSL's `RAND_bytes` that provides
* thread safety and satisfies the C++ *UniformRandomNumberEngine* named
* requirement, allowing it to be used directly with standard-library facilities
* such as `std::uniform_int_distribution` and `beast::rngfill`.
*/
The engine is thread-safe (it uses a lock to serialize
access) and will, automatically, mix in some randomness
from std::random_device.
Meets the requirements of UniformRandomNumberEngine
*/
/** Cryptographically secure random number engine backed by OpenSSL.
*
* Wraps OpenSSL's `RAND_bytes` to provide randomness to the rest of the
* codebase without any caller needing to touch OpenSSL directly. Satisfies
* the C++ *UniformRandomNumberEngine* named requirement (`result_type`,
* `operator()()`, `min()`, `max()`), so it plugs directly into
* `std::uniform_int_distribution`, `beast::rngfill`, and similar utilities.
*
* Thread safety is version-conditioned at compile time: on OpenSSL ≥ 1.1.0
* built with thread support, `RAND_bytes` is internally thread-safe and the
* per-call mutex acquisition is elided on the hot path. On older OpenSSL the
* mutex is always held. Entropy mixing (`mixEntropy`) always holds the mutex
* regardless of OpenSSL version because `RAND_add` modifies shared pool state.
*
* Copy and move operations are deleted. The engine holds a `std::mutex`, is
* backed by a global OpenSSL PRNG pool, and must be accessed as a singleton.
* Copying would produce a second object with no coherent relationship to that
* shared state. Use `cryptoPrng()` to obtain the singleton reference.
*
* @see cryptoPrng()
*/
class CsprngEngine
{
private:
@@ -28,29 +52,92 @@ public:
CsprngEngine&
operator=(CsprngEngine&&) = delete;
/** Construct and eagerly seed the engine.
*
* Calls `RAND_poll()` to harvest OS entropy (e.g., `/dev/urandom` on
* Linux, `CryptGenRandom` on Windows) before any bytes are generated.
* Although OpenSSL seeds itself lazily on first use, polling eagerly
* surfaces seeding failures at startup rather than during key generation.
*
* @throw std::runtime_error if `RAND_poll()` fails.
*/
CsprngEngine();
/** Destroy the engine, releasing OpenSSL PRNG state on older runtimes.
*
* Calls `RAND_cleanup()` only for OpenSSL versions older than 1.1.0.
* Modern OpenSSL manages cleanup internally via `atexit`; calling
* `RAND_cleanup()` on those versions is unnecessary and was removed.
*/
~CsprngEngine();
/** Mix entropy into the pool */
/** Stir additional entropy into the OpenSSL random pool.
*
* Reads 128 values from `std::random_device` and passes them to
* `RAND_add` with an entropy estimate of zero. The caller-supplied
* buffer, if provided, is also added with a zero entropy estimate.
* The zero estimate is deliberate: on some platforms `std::random_device`
* may fall back to a software PRNG, so claiming zero entropy ensures
* OpenSSL's internal seeding threshold is never prematurely satisfied by
* potentially weak input. The data is still mixed into the pool.
*
* Called periodically from `Application.cpp` to stir in fresh OS entropy
* during the node's lifetime. May also be called with caller-supplied
* high-quality entropy from a hardware RNG or other trusted source.
*
* @param buffer Optional pointer to additional entropy material to mix in.
* Ignored if `nullptr` or if `count` is zero.
* @param count Number of bytes at `buffer` to mix in.
*/
void
mixEntropy(void* buffer = nullptr, std::size_t count = 0);
/** Generate a random integer */
/** Generate a single random `result_type` value.
*
* Delegates to the buffer-fill overload with `sizeof(result_type)` bytes,
* sharing the same validation and error-handling path.
*
* @return A uniformly distributed random `std::uint64_t`.
* @throw std::runtime_error if the underlying `RAND_bytes` call fails
* (e.g., entropy pool exhausted). This is an unrecoverable condition;
* the exception is not caught by callers such as `randomSecretKey()`.
*/
result_type
operator()();
/** Fill a buffer with the requested amount of random data */
/** Fill a buffer with cryptographically secure random bytes.
*
* On OpenSSL ≥ 1.1.0 (built with thread support) the call to `RAND_bytes`
* is internally thread-safe and the mutex is elided at compile time. On
* older OpenSSL the mutex is held for the duration of the call.
*
* @param ptr Pointer to the buffer to fill; must not be `nullptr` when
* `count` is non-zero.
* @param count Number of random bytes to write into `ptr`.
* @throw std::runtime_error ("CSPRNG: Insufficient entropy") if
* `RAND_bytes` returns anything other than 1. Generating key material
* from an exhausted pool is a security failure, so the exception
* propagates and halts the operation.
*/
void
operator()(void* ptr, std::size_t count);
/* The smallest possible value that can be returned */
/** Return the smallest value that `operator()()` can produce.
*
* Required by the *UniformRandomNumberEngine* named requirement.
* Always returns `std::numeric_limits<result_type>::min()`.
*/
static constexpr result_type
min()
{
return std::numeric_limits<result_type>::min();
}
/* The largest possible value that can be returned */
/** Return the largest value that `operator()()` can produce.
*
* Required by the *UniformRandomNumberEngine* named requirement.
* Always returns `std::numeric_limits<result_type>::max()`.
*/
static constexpr result_type
max()
{
@@ -58,14 +145,23 @@ public:
}
};
/** The default cryptographically secure PRNG
Use this when you need to generate random numbers or
data that will be used for encryption or passed into
cryptographic routines.
This meets the requirements of UniformRandomNumberEngine
*/
/** Return a reference to the process-wide cryptographically secure PRNG.
*
* Use this whenever random numbers or bytes are needed for cryptographic
* purposes: key generation, seed creation, nonce production, or any value
* passed into a cryptographic routine. The returned engine satisfies the
* C++ *UniformRandomNumberEngine* requirement and can be used directly with
* `std::uniform_int_distribution`, `beast::rngfill`, and similar utilities.
*
* The singleton is a Meyers-static local; C++11 guarantees thread-safe
* one-time construction, so the first call from any thread safely initialises
* the engine exactly once. Every caller shares the same OpenSSL PRNG pool.
*
* @return Reference to the process-wide `CsprngEngine` singleton.
* @note Never copy or store the returned reference by value — the deleted
* copy/move operations on `CsprngEngine` prevent this at compile time.
* @see CsprngEngine
*/
CsprngEngine&
cryptoPrng();

View File

@@ -1,23 +1,38 @@
/** @file
* Declares `xrpl::secureErase`, the canonical primitive for wiping
* sensitive key material from memory in a way that survives compiler
* dead-store elimination.
*/
#pragma once
#include <cstddef>
namespace xrpl {
/** Attempts to clear the given blob of memory.
The underlying implementation of this function takes pains to
attempt to outsmart the compiler from optimizing the clearing
away. Please note that, despite that, remnants of content may
remain floating around in memory as well as registers, caches
and more.
For a more in-depth discussion of the subject please see the
below posts by Colin Percival:
http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html
http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-06-zeroing-buffers-is-insufficient.html
*/
/** Best-effort wipe of a memory region containing sensitive data.
*
* Overwrites `bytes` bytes starting at `dest` using `OPENSSL_cleanse`,
* which employs volatile writes or memory barriers to prevent the compiler
* from eliminating the store as a dead write. The function is defined in a
* separate translation unit (`secure_erase.cpp`) so the call is always
* opaque to the optimizer at the call site, reinforcing the effect.
*
* Use this instead of `memset` whenever clearing key material, seeds, or
* derived intermediates. The canonical pattern is to call it in destructors
* and immediately after copying raw key bytes into their final owner object.
*
* @param dest Pointer to the memory region to wipe. Must not be null and
* must point to at least `bytes` bytes of writable memory.
* @param bytes Number of bytes to overwrite.
*
* @note This is a best-effort mitigation, not a guarantee of complete
* erasure. Register contents, CPU caches, and other micro-architectural
* state are outside its reach. For a thorough discussion of the
* inherent limits see Colin Percival's analysis:
* http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html
* http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-06-zeroing-buffers-is-insufficient.html
*/
void
secureErase(void* dest, std::size_t bytes);

View File

@@ -10,66 +10,133 @@
namespace xrpl {
/**
A transaction that is in a closed ledger.
Description
An accepted ledger transaction contains additional information that the
server needs to tell clients about the transaction. For example,
- The transaction in JSON form
- Which accounts are affected
* This is used by InfoSub to report to clients
- Cached stuff
*/
/** Immutable snapshot of a transaction accepted into a closed ledger.
*
* Constructed once from the closed ledger view, the serialized transaction,
* and its raw metadata; all downstream representations — JSON payload, binary
* metadata blob, affected-account set — are fully materialized at construction
* time and never recomputed.
*
* The pre-built `json_` payload is consumed directly by
* `NetworkOPsImp::pubValidatedTransaction()` and `pubAccountTransaction()`
* for WebSocket subscription delivery; `rawMeta_` (via `getEscMeta()`) feeds
* SQL `INSERT`/`REPLACE` statements in the relational transaction database.
*
* `CountedObject` inheritance exposes live-instance telemetry useful for
* detecting accumulation under load or slow subscriber drain holding ledger
* snapshots open longer than expected.
*
* @note Immutable after construction; safe to share across threads without
* additional locking.
* @note The ledger passed to the constructor must be closed (not open).
* Constructing from an open ledger aborts in debug builds.
* @see AcceptedLedger
*/
class AcceptedLedgerTx : public CountedObject<AcceptedLedgerTx>
{
public:
/** Construct and fully materialize a closed-ledger transaction snapshot.
*
* Parses metadata into a `TxMeta`, serializes raw metadata bytes, builds
* the complete JSON payload (transaction, meta, raw_meta, result, affected
* accounts), and — for non-self-funded `ttOFFER_CREATE` transactions —
* annotates the JSON with `owner_funds` queried from `accountFunds()` with
* freeze and auth checks bypassed. This avoids a later ledger round-trip
* when delivering to order-book subscribers.
*
* @param ledger The closed ledger that accepted this transaction. Must not
* be open; the constructor asserts `!ledger->open()` in debug builds.
* @param txn The serialized transaction object.
* @param met The raw metadata `STObject` produced during transaction apply.
*/
AcceptedLedgerTx(
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& ledger,
std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const&,
std::shared_ptr<STObject const> const&);
/** Returns the serialized transaction. */
[[nodiscard]] std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const&
getTxn() const
{
return txn_;
}
/** Returns the parsed transaction metadata, including affected nodes and
* result code.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TxMeta const&
getMeta() const
{
return meta_;
}
/** Returns the set of accounts affected by this transaction.
*
* Stored as a `flat_set` for cache-friendly iteration during subscription
* fan-out in `pubAccountTransaction()`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] boost::container::flat_set<AccountID> const&
getAffected() const
{
return affected_;
}
/** Returns the transaction's unique identifier (SHA-512 half of the
* canonical serialization).
*/
[[nodiscard]] TxID
getTransactionID() const
{
return txn_->getTransactionID();
}
/** Returns the transaction type (e.g., `ttOFFER_CREATE`, `ttPAYMENT`). */
[[nodiscard]] TxType
getTxnType() const
{
return txn_->getTxnType();
}
/** Returns the transaction result code as recorded in metadata. */
[[nodiscard]] TER
getResult() const
{
return meta_.getResultTER();
}
/** Returns the transaction's ordinal position within the closed ledger.
*
* This is `TxMeta::getIndex()` — the transaction's sequence number within
* the ledger's ordered transaction set, not the account sequence number.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::uint32_t
getTxnSeq() const
{
return meta_.getIndex();
}
/** Returns the raw metadata formatted as an escaped SQL blob literal.
*
* Formats `rawMeta_` via `sqlBlobLiteral()` for direct embedding in SQL
* `INSERT`/`REPLACE` statements (see `STTx::getMetaSQL()` in `Node.cpp`).
*
* @return SQL blob literal string suitable for verbatim inclusion in a
* SQL statement.
* @note Asserts that `rawMeta_` is non-empty. An empty blob indicates
* upstream ledger corruption; every accepted transaction must carry
* metadata.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::string
getEscMeta() const;
/** Returns the pre-built JSON envelope for WebSocket subscription delivery.
*
* The object contains `transaction`, `meta`, `raw_meta` (hex), `result`
* (human-readable TER string), and `affected` (base58 account array).
* For non-self-funded `ttOFFER_CREATE` transactions, `transaction` also
* contains `owner_funds` — the account's spendable balance of the offered
* asset at acceptance time, computed with freeze and auth checks bypassed.
*/
[[nodiscard]] json::Value const&
getJson() const
{

View File

@@ -14,56 +14,172 @@ namespace xrpl {
class ServiceRegistry;
/** The amendment table stores the list of enabled and potential amendments.
Individuals amendments are voted on by validators during the consensus
process.
*/
/** Tracks enabled and pending amendments and coordinates validator voting.
*
* Each protocol change (amendment) must achieve an 80% supermajority of
* trusted validators for `majorityTime` before it activates. This class
* manages the full lifecycle: registration of supported amendments, vote
* aggregation across flag ledgers, pseudo-transaction injection at consensus
* time, and detection of "amendment blocked" conditions where the network has
* enabled a feature this node does not support.
*
* The interface is split into two layers. The pure virtual methods form the
* internal API that the concrete implementation satisfies, operating on
* pre-extracted amendment sets. Two concrete non-virtual adapter methods
* (`doValidatedLedger(shared_ptr<ReadView>)` and
* `doVoting(shared_ptr<ReadView>, ...)`) read amendment state from a
* `ReadView` and delegate to the pure-virtual overloads, keeping the
* implementation independent of the ledger view layer.
*
* @note Amendment voting is only meaningful at flag ledgers (multiples of
* 256). Use `needValidatedLedger` to gate the more expensive
* `doValidatedLedger` call.
* @see Feature.h for `VoteBehavior` and `majorityAmendments_t`
*/
class AmendmentTable
{
public:
/** Metadata for a single registered amendment.
*
* Bundles the human-readable name, canonical 256-bit hash, and compiled-in
* vote preference for one amendment. Non-default-constructible: every
* instance must carry all three fields.
*
* @note Amendments with `VoteBehavior::Obsolete` are still registered so
* the node remains amendment-unblocked if the network enables them, but
* the node will never emit votes for them and their vote behavior cannot
* be overridden by config.
*/
struct FeatureInfo
{
FeatureInfo() = delete;
/** Construct a FeatureInfo with all required fields.
*
* @param n Human-readable amendment name (e.g., "OwnerPaysFee").
* @param f Canonical 256-bit amendment hash used in ledger state and
* validations.
* @param v Compiled-in voting preference (`DefaultYes`, `DefaultNo`,
* or `Obsolete`).
*/
FeatureInfo(std::string n, uint256 const& f, VoteBehavior v)
: name(std::move(n)), feature(f), vote(v)
{
}
/** Human-readable name of the amendment. */
std::string const name;
/** Canonical 256-bit amendment identifier used throughout the ledger. */
uint256 const feature;
/** Compiled-in voting preference for this amendment. */
VoteBehavior const vote;
};
virtual ~AmendmentTable() = default;
/** Look up an amendment's 256-bit hash by its human-readable name.
*
* @param name The amendment name to look up (case-sensitive).
* @return The amendment's `uint256` hash, or a zero value if no
* amendment with that name is registered.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual uint256
find(std::string const& name) const = 0;
/** Suppress this node's vote for an amendment.
*
* Changes the amendment's vote from Up to Down regardless of the
* compiled-in `VoteBehavior`. May be called on amendments not in the
* supported list; an entry is created if one does not exist. The new
* state is persisted to the wallet database.
*
* @param amendment The 256-bit amendment hash to veto.
* @return `true` if the vote state changed (was Up, now Down);
* `false` if the amendment was already Down-voted or Obsolete.
*/
virtual bool
veto(uint256 const& amendment) = 0;
/** Remove a previously applied veto for an amendment.
*
* Reverts the amendment's vote from Down back to Up. The change is
* persisted to the wallet database. Has no effect if the amendment
* was never vetoed, does not exist, or has `VoteBehavior::Obsolete`
* (Obsolete amendments cannot be unvetoed).
*
* @param amendment The 256-bit amendment hash to un-veto.
* @return `true` if the vote state changed (was Down, now Up);
* `false` if the amendment was not in the Down state.
*/
virtual bool
unVeto(uint256 const& amendment) = 0;
/** Mark an amendment as enabled in the local amendment table.
*
* Directly flips the amendment's enabled flag. Called by
* `doValidatedLedger` when ledger state confirms the amendment is active.
* If the amendment is not in the supported list, `hasUnsupportedEnabled()`
* will subsequently return `true`.
*
* @param amendment The 256-bit amendment hash to enable.
* @return `true` if the amendment was not already enabled;
* `false` if it was already in the enabled state.
*/
virtual bool
enable(uint256 const& amendment) = 0;
/** Return whether an amendment is currently active on the network.
*
* @param amendment The 256-bit amendment hash to query.
* @return `true` if the amendment has been enabled via `enable()` or
* through ledger validation; `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
isEnabled(uint256 const& amendment) const = 0;
/** Return whether this node's software knows about and supports an amendment.
*
* @param amendment The 256-bit amendment hash to query.
* @return `true` if the amendment was included in the `supported` list
* passed to `makeAmendmentTable`; `false` for unknown amendments.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
isSupported(uint256 const& amendment) const = 0;
/**
* @brief returns true if one or more amendments on the network
* have been enabled that this server does not support
/** Return whether any network-enabled amendment is unsupported by this node.
*
* @return true if an unsupported feature is enabled on the network
* When this returns `true`, the node is "amendment blocked" — it is
* executing ledger rules it does not fully implement. The application
* layer should warn operators and eventually halt participation.
*
* @return `true` if at least one enabled amendment is not in this node's
* supported list.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
hasUnsupportedEnabled() const = 0;
/** Return the projected activation time of the earliest unsupported amendment.
*
* Scans amendments currently holding validator supermajority that are not
* supported by this node and returns the time at which the earliest such
* amendment is expected to activate (`majorityTime` after it first
* achieved supermajority). Updated by `doValidatedLedger`.
*
* @return The projected activation time of the first unsupported amendment
* that has achieved majority, or `std::nullopt` if no unsupported
* amendment is approaching activation.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::optional<NetClock::time_point>
firstUnsupportedExpected() const = 0;
/** Serialize all known amendments to JSON for RPC responses.
*
* @param isAdmin `true` to include sensitive or operator-only fields.
* @return A `json::Value` object containing the full amendment list with
* status, vote, and majority information for each entry.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual json::Value
getJson(bool isAdmin) const = 0;
@@ -71,7 +187,17 @@ public:
[[nodiscard]] virtual json::Value
getJson(uint256 const& amendment, bool isAdmin) const = 0;
/** Called when a new fully-validated ledger is accepted. */
/** Update amendment state from a newly validated ledger.
*
* Adapter that extracts `enabledAmendments` and `majorityAmendments` from
* `lastValidatedLedger` via `getEnabledAmendments()` and
* `getMajorityAmendments()`, then delegates to the pure-virtual
* `doValidatedLedger(LedgerIndex, set, majorityAmendments_t)` overload.
* The call is skipped entirely when `needValidatedLedger` returns `false`.
*
* @param lastValidatedLedger The most recently validated ledger. Amendment
* state is read from this view; the ledger sequence gates the update.
*/
void
doValidatedLedger(std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& lastValidatedLedger)
{
@@ -84,24 +210,77 @@ public:
}
}
/** Called to determine whether the amendment logic needs to process
a new validated ledger. (If it could have changed things.)
*/
/** Return whether the amendment table needs to process a given ledger sequence.
*
* Amendment voting state only changes at flag ledgers (every 256 ledgers).
* This gate avoids the cost of extracting and processing amendment state
* for the vast majority of validated ledgers that cannot affect voting
* outcomes.
*
* @param seq The sequence number of the validated ledger being considered.
* @return `true` if `seq` crosses a new 256-ledger flag boundary relative
* to the last processed sequence; `false` if no change is possible.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
needValidatedLedger(LedgerIndex seq) const = 0;
/** Update internal amendment state from pre-extracted ledger data.
*
* Enables all amendments in `enabled`, then scans `majority` for
* unsupported amendments approaching activation and updates the
* `firstUnsupportedExpected` projection accordingly. Errors are logged for
* each unsupported amendment that has reached supermajority.
*
* @param ledgerSeq Sequence number of the validated ledger.
* @param enabled Set of amendment hashes currently active in the ledger.
* @param majority Map of amendment hash → time of first observed
* supermajority for amendments that have crossed the voting threshold
* but are not yet enabled.
*/
virtual void
doValidatedLedger(
LedgerIndex ledgerSeq,
std::set<uint256> const& enabled,
majorityAmendments_t const& majority) = 0;
// Called when the set of trusted validators changes.
/** Notify the table that the set of trusted validators has changed.
*
* Updates the internal per-validator vote cache: existing records are
* preserved for validators that remain trusted; new validators are
* initialized with empty votes; validators no longer in the UNL have
* their records discarded. Vote history is NOT reset — this preserves
* the anti-flapping behavior that prevents an amendment from appearing to
* oscillate across the 80% threshold as validators come and go.
*
* @param allTrusted The complete current set of trusted validator public keys.
*/
virtual void
trustChanged(hash_set<PublicKey> const& allTrusted) = 0;
// Called by the consensus code when we need to
// inject pseudo-transactions
/** Compute amendment actions for the current consensus round.
*
* Aggregates amendment votes from `valSet` against the current ledger
* state, applying the anti-flapping policy that retains the last known
* vote from each trusted validator for up to 24 hours. For each amendment
* whose vote state has changed relative to the ledger, produces an action
* entry:
* - `tfGotMajority` — validators have supermajority; ledger does not yet
* record it.
* - `tfLostMajority` — validators have lost supermajority; ledger still
* records it.
* - `0` — supermajority has been held for `majorityTime`; enable now.
*
* @param rules Protocol rules in effect for the ledger being built.
* @param closeTime Parent ledger's close time, used to evaluate whether
* `majorityTime` has elapsed since first supermajority.
* @param enabledAmendments Set of amendment hashes already active.
* @param majorityAmendments Map of amendment hash → time first achieving
* supermajority, for amendments not yet enabled.
* @param valSet Validations from the previous ledger; each carries the
* set of amendments the issuing validator supports.
* @return A map from amendment hash to action flag for each amendment
* requiring a pseudo-transaction in the initial consensus position.
*/
virtual std::map<uint256, std::uint32_t>
doVoting(
Rules const& rules,
@@ -110,15 +289,27 @@ public:
majorityAmendments_t const& majorityAmendments,
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<STValidation>> const& valSet) = 0;
// Called by the consensus code when we need to
// add feature entries to a validation
/** Return the amendment hashes this node wishes to vote for.
*
* Called when building a `STValidation` message. Returns all amendments
* that this node supports, has Up-voted, and that are not already active
* in the ledger. The result is sorted.
*
* @param enabled The set of amendment hashes currently enabled in the
* ledger; enabled amendments are excluded from the returned set.
* @return Sorted vector of amendment hashes this node wants to vote for.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::vector<uint256>
doValidation(std::set<uint256> const& enabled) const = 0;
// The set of amendments to enable in the genesis ledger
// This will return all known, non-vetoed amendments.
// If we ever have two amendments that should not both be
// enabled at the same time, we should ensure one is vetoed.
/** Return all non-vetoed amendments desired for a genesis ledger.
*
* Equivalent to `doValidation({})` — returns every supported, Up-voted
* amendment since none are enabled yet. If two amendments must not both be
* enabled simultaneously, one must be vetoed before calling this.
*
* @return All known, supported, non-vetoed amendment hashes.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::vector<uint256>
getDesired() const = 0;
@@ -128,6 +319,25 @@ public:
// implementation. These APIs will merge when the view code
// supports a full ledger API
/** Run the amendment voting pipeline and inject pseudo-transactions.
*
* Adapter for the consensus engine. Extracts amendment state from
* `lastClosedLedger`, delegates to the pure-virtual `doVoting` overload
* to determine required actions, then builds a signed-less `STTx` of type
* `ttAMENDMENT` for each action and inserts it into `initialPosition`
* as a `TnTransactionNm` node. These pseudo-transactions are not user
* transactions; they are injected directly into the consensus-agreed
* transaction set so validators can process them at flag-ledger close.
*
* @param lastClosedLedger The most recently closed ledger; supplies
* rules, parent close time, enabled amendments, and majority state.
* @param parentValidations Validations received for the parent ledger;
* each carries the voting validator's amendment preferences.
* @param initialPosition The SHAMap being built as the node's initial
* consensus position; amendment pseudo-transactions are added here.
* @param j Journal for debug logging of injected
* pseudo-transactions.
*/
void
doVoting(
std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& lastClosedLedger,
@@ -169,6 +379,30 @@ public:
}
};
/** Create the concrete AmendmentTable implementation.
*
* Registers all supported amendments, applies config-forced enables and
* vetoes, and loads any persisted vote overrides from the wallet database.
* Config entries in `enabled` and `vetoed` are ignored if the wallet database
* already contains a `FeatureVotes` table — the database is the authoritative
* source for persisted vote state.
*
* @param registry Service registry used to access the wallet database for
* persisting vote state.
* @param majorityTime Duration a supermajority must be continuously held
* before an amendment is enabled (typically two weeks on mainnet).
* @param supported All amendments compiled into this build, each with its
* `VoteBehavior`. Amendments absent from this list are treated as
* unsupported; enabling them sets `hasUnsupportedEnabled()`.
* @param enabled Config section (`[amendments]`) listing amendment IDs
* to force-enable; applied only when the wallet database has no
* `FeatureVotes` table.
* @param vetoed Config section (`[veto_amendments]`) listing amendment
* IDs to suppress votes for; applied only when the wallet database has no
* `FeatureVotes` table.
* @param journal Journal for logging during initialization.
* @return Owning pointer to the constructed `AmendmentTable`.
*/
std::unique_ptr<AmendmentTable>
makeAmendmentTable(
ServiceRegistry& registry,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
/** @file
* Defines `ApplyView`, the writable ledger view used during transaction
* application, and the `ApplyFlags` bitmask that configures each apply pass.
*
* All state mutations produced by a transaction — trust-line updates, offer
* creation, account creation, fee destruction — flow through `ApplyView`.
* Changes are journaled and may be committed to the parent view or discarded
* atomically, enabling transactional rollback at every layer of the view
* hierarchy.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/safe_cast.h>
@@ -7,30 +18,54 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Bitmask of flags that configure how a transaction apply pass behaves.
*
* Carried through every transaction-application call site. Multiple flags
* may be combined with `operator|`. All bitwise operators use `safeCast`
* to prevent silent conversion to the underlying integer type.
*
* @note Correctness and commutativity of `operator|` and `operator&` are
* verified by `static_assert` at compile time, guarding against future
* value collisions.
*/
// Bitwise flag enum with existing operator overloads
// NOLINTNEXTLINE(cppcoreguidelines-use-enum-class)
enum ApplyFlags : std::uint32_t {
/** No flags set; default processing. */
TapNone = 0x00,
// This is a local transaction with the
// fail_hard flag set.
/** Transaction originated locally with `fail_hard` set.
*
* The engine must not retry; a hard failure that claims fees is
* produced instead of a soft retry.
*/
TapFailHard = 0x10,
// This is not the transaction's last pass
// Transaction can be retried, soft failures allowed
/** This is not the transaction's final pass.
*
* Soft failures (insufficient balance, wrong sequence) are allowed
* because the transaction may succeed in a later pass.
*/
TapRetry = 0x20,
// Transaction came from a privileged source
/** Transaction arrived from a trusted, privileged source.
*
* Certain per-transaction limits are relaxed (e.g., path count).
*/
TapUnlimited = 0x400,
// Transaction is executing as part of a batch
/** Transaction is being processed as part of a batch transaction. */
TapBatch = 0x800,
// Transaction shouldn't be applied
// Signatures shouldn't be checked
/** Dry-run simulation: apply the transaction without committing state.
*
* Signature checks are skipped. A full `TxMeta` is still produced so
* callers can inspect the outcome. Used by the `simulate` RPC handler.
*/
TapDryRun = 0x1000
};
/** Combine two `ApplyFlags` values. */
constexpr ApplyFlags
operator|(ApplyFlags const& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
{
@@ -42,6 +77,7 @@ operator|(ApplyFlags const& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
static_assert((TapFailHard | TapRetry) == safeCast<ApplyFlags>(0x30u), "ApplyFlags operator |");
static_assert((TapRetry | TapFailHard) == safeCast<ApplyFlags>(0x30u), "ApplyFlags operator |");
/** Mask `ApplyFlags` values, retaining only the bits present in both operands. */
constexpr ApplyFlags
operator&(ApplyFlags const& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
{
@@ -53,6 +89,7 @@ operator&(ApplyFlags const& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
static_assert((TapFailHard & TapRetry) == TapNone, "ApplyFlags operator &");
static_assert((TapRetry & TapFailHard) == TapNone, "ApplyFlags operator &");
/** Invert all bits of an `ApplyFlags` value. */
constexpr ApplyFlags
operator~(ApplyFlags const& flags)
{
@@ -61,6 +98,7 @@ operator~(ApplyFlags const& flags)
static_assert(~TapRetry == safeCast<ApplyFlags>(0xFFFFFFDFu), "ApplyFlags operator ~");
/** Set-assign `ApplyFlags` bits from `rhs` into `lhs`. */
inline ApplyFlags
operator|=(ApplyFlags& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
{
@@ -68,6 +106,7 @@ operator|=(ApplyFlags& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
return lhs;
}
/** Clear `ApplyFlags` bits in `lhs` that are absent from `rhs`. */
inline ApplyFlags
operator&=(ApplyFlags& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
{
@@ -77,47 +116,40 @@ operator&=(ApplyFlags& lhs, ApplyFlags const& rhs)
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Writeable view to a ledger, for applying a transaction.
This refinement of ReadView provides an interface where
the SLE can be "checked out" for modifications and put
back in an updated or removed state. Also added is an
interface to provide contextual information necessary
to calculate the results of transaction processing,
including the metadata if the view is later applied to
the parent (using an interface in the derived class).
The context info also includes values from the base
ledger such as sequence number and the network time.
This allows implementations to journal changes made to
the state items in a ledger, with the option to apply
those changes to the base or discard the changes without
affecting the base.
Typical usage is to call read() for non-mutating
operations.
For mutating operations the sequence is as follows:
// Add a new value
v.insert(sle);
// Check out a value for modification
sle = v.peek(k);
// Indicate that changes were made
v.update(sle)
// Or, erase the value
v.erase(sle)
The invariant is that insert, update, and erase may not
be called with any SLE which belongs to different view.
*/
/** Writable view of a ledger used during transaction application.
*
* Extends `ReadView` with a checkout-modify-commit protocol: callers
* `peek()` an SLE to obtain a mutable handle, mutate it in place, then
* call `update()` (or `erase()`) to journal the change. `insert()` adds
* entries that were never checked out. All deltas are buffered; calling
* `apply()` on the concrete subclass flushes them to the parent view.
* Discarding the view without calling `apply()` abandons all changes.
*
* Also exposes directory management (`dirAppend`, `dirInsert`, `dirRemove`,
* `dirDelete`) and virtual payment hooks (`creditHookIOU`, `creditHookMPT`,
* `issuerSelfDebitHookMPT`, `adjustOwnerCountHook`) that `PaymentSandbox`
* overrides to prevent double-spend within a multi-hop payment path.
*
* @invariant `update()` and `erase()` must be called with an SLE obtained
* from `peek()` on **the same view instance**. Passing an SLE across
* view boundaries is undefined behavior, because each view journals its
* own deltas independently.
*/
class ApplyView : public ReadView
{
private:
/** Add an entry to a directory using the specified insert strategy */
/** Insert a key into the directory, routing to append-tail or
* sorted-insert logic based on `preserveOrder`.
*
* @param preserveOrder if `true`, append to tail (offer-book order);
* if `false`, insert in sorted position within each page.
* @param directory keylet of the directory root page.
* @param key the `uint256` key to insert.
* @param describe callback invoked on each newly allocated page SLE to
* brand it with type-specific fields (e.g., `sfOwner`).
* @return the 0-based page index where the key was stored, or
* `std::nullopt` if the page counter overflowed.
*/
std::optional<std::uint64_t>
dirAdd(
bool preserveOrder,
@@ -128,92 +160,86 @@ private:
public:
ApplyView() = default;
/** Returns the tx apply flags.
Flags can affect the outcome of transaction
processing. For example, transactions applied
to an open ledger generate "local" failures,
while transactions applied to the consensus
ledger produce hard failures (and claim a fee).
*/
/** Return the flags that govern this transaction apply pass.
*
* Flags shape engine behavior: `TapRetry` allows soft failures,
* `TapFailHard` demands a fee-claiming hard failure, `TapDryRun`
* suppresses state commits, and `TapUnlimited` relaxes per-tx limits.
*
* @return the `ApplyFlags` bitmask for this view.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual ApplyFlags
flags() const = 0;
/** Prepare to modify the SLE associated with key.
Effects:
Gives the caller ownership of a modifiable
SLE associated with the specified key.
The returned SLE may be used in a subsequent
call to erase or update.
The SLE must not be passed to any other ApplyView.
@return `nullptr` if the key is not present
*/
/** Check out a ledger entry for in-place mutation.
*
* Returns an owning `shared_ptr<SLE>` whose contents may be freely
* modified. The caller must pass the same pointer back to `update()`
* or `erase()` on **this** view instance when done; passing it to any
* other `ApplyView` is undefined behavior.
*
* @param k keylet identifying the entry.
* @return a mutable handle to the SLE, or `nullptr` if `k` is not
* present in this view.
*/
virtual std::shared_ptr<SLE>
peek(Keylet const& k) = 0;
/** Remove a peeked SLE.
Requirements:
`sle` was obtained from prior call to peek()
on this instance of the RawView.
Effects:
The key is no longer associated with the SLE.
*/
/** Remove an entry previously checked out with `peek()`.
*
* Journals a delete delta so the entry is absent when this view's
* changes are later committed.
*
* @param sle a pointer obtained from `peek()` on this view instance.
*
* @note The key is taken from the SLE's own key field.
*/
virtual void
erase(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) = 0;
/** Insert a new state SLE
Requirements:
`sle` was not obtained from any calls to
peek() on any instances of RawView.
The SLE's key must not already exist.
Effects:
The key in the state map is associated
with the SLE.
The RawView acquires ownership of the shared_ptr.
@note The key is taken from the SLE
*/
/** Insert a brand-new ledger entry that has no prior existence in this view.
*
* The SLE must not have been obtained from `peek()`. Its key must not
* already exist in this view. The view takes ownership of the
* `shared_ptr`.
*
* @param sle the new entry to insert.
*
* @note The key is taken from the SLE's own key field.
*/
virtual void
insert(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) = 0;
/** Indicate changes to a peeked SLE
Requirements:
The SLE's key must exist.
`sle` was obtained from prior call to peek()
on this instance of the RawView.
Effects:
The SLE is updated
@note The key is taken from the SLE
*/
/** @{ */
/** Journal modifications to a checked-out ledger entry.
*
* Signals to the underlying delta table that the entry has changed and
* its new state must be written when this view's changes are committed.
* The entry's key must already exist.
*
* @param sle a pointer obtained from `peek()` on this view instance.
*
* @note The key is taken from the SLE's own key field.
*/
virtual void
update(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) = 0;
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Called when a credit is made to an account
// This is required to support PaymentSandbox
/** Notification hook invoked whenever an IOU credit is made to an account.
*
* The default implementation is a no-op; `PaymentSandbox` overrides it to
* record the credit in its `DeferredCredits` table so that subsequent
* `balanceHookIOU` calls subtract in-path credits from reported balances,
* preventing circular paths from manufacturing liquidity.
*
* @param from the debited account (sender side of the trust line).
* @param to the credited account (receiver side of the trust line).
* @param amount the IOU amount being credited; must hold an `Issue`.
* @param preCreditBalance the sender's trust-line balance before the credit.
*
* @note The `XRPL_ASSERT` in the default body verifies that `amount` holds
* an `Issue`; it fires in debug builds if the wrong asset type is passed.
*/
virtual void
creditHookIOU(
AccountID const& from,
@@ -224,6 +250,23 @@ public:
XRPL_ASSERT(amount.holds<Issue>(), "creditHookIOU: amount is for Issue");
}
/** Notification hook invoked whenever an MPT credit is made to an account.
*
* The default implementation is a no-op; `PaymentSandbox` overrides it to
* record the credit in its `DeferredCredits` table, enabling the same
* double-spend prevention as `creditHookIOU` but for MPT trust lines.
*
* @param from the debited account.
* @param to the credited account.
* @param amount the MPT amount being credited; must hold an `MPTIssue`.
* @param preCreditBalanceHolder the holder's MPT balance before the credit.
* @param preCreditBalanceIssuer the issuer's `OutstandingAmount` before the
* credit (signed to accommodate transient overflow).
*
* @note The `XRPL_ASSERT` in the default body verifies that `amount` holds
* an `MPTIssue`; it fires in debug builds if the wrong asset type is
* passed.
*/
virtual void
creditHookMPT(
AccountID const& from,
@@ -235,67 +278,66 @@ public:
XRPL_ASSERT(amount.holds<MPTIssue>(), "creditHookMPT: amount is for MPTIssue");
}
/** Facilitate tracking of MPT sold by an issuer owning MPT sell offer.
* Unlike IOU, MPT doesn't have bi-directional relationship with an issuer,
* where a trustline limits an amount that can be issued to a holder.
* Consequently, the credit step (last MPTEndpointStep or
* BookStep buying MPT) might temporarily overflow OutstandingAmount.
* Limiting of a step's output amount in this case is delegated to
* the next step (in rev order). The next step always redeems when a holder
* account sells MPT (first MPTEndpointStep or BookStep selling MPT).
* In this case the holder account is only limited by the step's output
* and it's available funds since it's transferring the funds from one
* account to another account and doesn't change OutstandingAmount.
* This doesn't apply to an offer owned by an issuer.
* In this case the issuer sells or self debits and is increasing
* OutstandingAmount. Ability to issue is limited by the issuer
* originally available funds less already self sold MPT amounts (MPT sell
* offer).
* Consider an example:
* - GW creates MPT(USD) with 1,000USD MaximumAmount.
* - GW pays 950USD to A1.
* - A1 creates an offer 100XRP(buy)/100USD(sell).
* - GW creates an offer 100XRP(buy)/100USD(sell).
* - A2 pays 200USD to A3 with sendMax of 200XRP.
* Since the payment engine executes payments in reverse,
* OutstandingAmount overflows in MPTEndpointStep: 950 + 200 = 1,150USD.
* BookStep first consumes A1 offer. This reduces OutstandingAmount
* by 100USD: 1,150 - 100 = 1,050USD. GW offer can only be partially
* consumed because the initial available amount is 50USD = 1,000 - 950.
* BookStep limits it's output to 150USD. This in turn limits A3's send
* amount to 150XRP: A1 buys 100XRP and sells 100USD to A3. This doesn't
* change OutstandingAmount. GW buys 50XRP and sells 50USD to A3. This
* changes OutstandingAmount to 1,000USD.
/** Notification hook for MPT issuer self-debit via an owned sell offer.
*
* Unlike IOU trust lines, MPT has no bi-directional issuer↔holder
* relationship that caps issuance. When the payment engine processes a
* sell offer owned by the MPT issuer (in reverse order), it tentatively
* credits the holder first, which can transiently push `OutstandingAmount`
* beyond `MaximumAmount`. A subsequent step then redeems MPT from the
* issuer, restoring `OutstandingAmount`. The hook lets `PaymentSandbox`
* track the issuer's cumulative self-debit so that `balanceHookSelfIssueMPT`
* can cap available-to-issue at `origBalance selfDebit` across the entire
* payment rather than trusting the transient ledger state.
*
* The default implementation is a no-op.
*
* @param issue the MPT issuance being self-debited.
* @param amount the quantity the issuer is selling (debiting to self).
* @param origBalance the issuer's `OutstandingAmount` at the start of the
* payment, before any path steps executed.
*/
virtual void
issuerSelfDebitHookMPT(MPTIssue const& issue, std::uint64_t amount, std::int64_t origBalance)
{
}
// Called when the owner count changes
// This is required to support PaymentSandbox
/** Notification hook invoked when an account's owner count changes.
*
* The default implementation is a no-op; `PaymentSandbox` overrides it to
* record the high-water owner count for each account touched during the
* payment, so that reserve checks reflect the peak count rather than the
* instantaneous count at any single path step.
*
* @param account the account whose owner count is changing.
* @param cur the owner count before the change.
* @param next the owner count after the change.
*/
virtual void
adjustOwnerCountHook(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t cur, std::uint32_t next)
{
}
/** Append an entry to a directory
Entries in the directory will be stored in order of insertion, i.e. new
entries will always be added at the tail end of the last page.
@param directory the base of the directory
@param key the entry to insert
@param describe callback to add required entries to a new page
@return a \c std::optional which, if insertion was successful,
will contain the page number in which the item was stored.
@note this function may create a page (including a root page), if no
page with space is available. This function will only fail if the
page counter exceeds the protocol-defined maximum number of
allowable pages.
*/
/** Append an entry to a directory, preserving insertion order.
*
* New entries are always placed at the tail of the last page, maintaining
* chronological ordering within an offer-book directory. This ordering
* is relied upon during offer matching: earlier offers at the same quality
* have priority.
*
* @param directory keylet of the directory root (page 0).
* @param key keylet of the entry to append; must be of type `ltOFFER`.
* @param describe callback invoked on each newly allocated page SLE to
* brand it with type-specific fields.
* @return the 0-based page index where the entry was stored, or
* `std::nullopt` if the page counter overflowed the protocol maximum.
*
* @note Only `ltOFFER` entries may be appended; passing any other keylet
* type triggers `UNREACHABLE` and returns `std::nullopt`. Use
* `dirInsert` for non-offer entries.
* @note A root page is created automatically if the directory does not yet
* exist. New pages are linked into the chain as needed.
*/
/** @{ */
std::optional<std::uint64_t>
dirAppend(
@@ -318,23 +360,24 @@ public:
}
/** @} */
/** Insert an entry to a directory
Entries in the directory will be stored in a semi-random order, but
each page will be maintained in sorted order.
@param directory the base of the directory
@param key the entry to insert
@param describe callback to add required entries to a new page
@return a \c std::optional which, if insertion was successful,
will contain the page number in which the item was stored.
@note this function may create a page (including a root page), if no
page with space is available.this function will only fail if the
page counter exceeds the protocol-defined maximum number of
allowable pages.
*/
/** Insert an entry into a directory, maintaining per-page sorted order.
*
* Each individual page is kept in sorted key order, but entries may span
* multiple pages so the overall directory is only loosely ordered.
* Because legacy pages may not be sorted, each touched page is re-sorted
* before the new key is binary-inserted. Used for account-owned object
* directories (offers owned by an account, escrows, etc.).
*
* @param directory keylet of the directory root (page 0).
* @param key the `uint256` key to insert.
* @param describe callback invoked on each newly allocated page SLE to
* brand it with type-specific fields.
* @return the 0-based page index where the entry was stored, or
* `std::nullopt` if the page counter overflowed the protocol maximum.
*
* @note A root page is created automatically if the directory does not yet
* exist. New pages are allocated and linked as needed.
*/
/** @{ */
std::optional<std::uint64_t>
dirInsert(
@@ -345,6 +388,10 @@ public:
return dirAdd(false, directory, key, describe);
}
/** @copydoc dirInsert(Keylet const&, uint256 const&, std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const&)> const&)
*
* Convenience overload that extracts the `uint256` key from `key.key`.
*/
std::optional<std::uint64_t>
dirInsert(
Keylet const& directory,
@@ -355,25 +402,37 @@ public:
}
/** @} */
/** Remove an entry from a directory
@param directory the base of the directory
@param page the page number for this page
@param key the entry to remove
@param keepRoot if deleting the last entry, don't
delete the root page (i.e. the directory itself).
@return \c true if the entry was found and deleted and
\c false otherwise.
@note This function will remove zero or more pages from the directory;
the root page will not be deleted even if it is empty, unless
\p keepRoot is not set and the directory is empty.
*/
/** Remove a single entry from a directory and collapse any resulting
* empty non-root pages.
*
* After the key is removed, if the containing page becomes empty:
* - Non-root pages are unlinked and erased from the ledger.
* - The root page (page 0) is never erased unless `keepRoot` is `false`
* and the entire directory is now empty.
* - Legacy empty trailing pages left by older code are cleaned up
* opportunistically when the root page is touched.
*
* @param directory keylet of the directory root (page 0).
* @param page the 0-based page index that contains `key`; obtained from
* the page number stored in the owning ledger entry.
* @param key the `uint256` key to remove.
* @param keepRoot if `true`, preserve the root page even if it becomes
* empty after the removal (the directory anchor remains in the ledger).
* @return `true` if the entry was found and removed; `false` if the page
* or the key was not found.
*
* @note Throws `std::logic_error` if the directory linked-list pointers
* are found to be inconsistent (broken chain); this indicates ledger
* corruption and should never occur under normal operation.
*/
/** @{ */
bool
dirRemove(Keylet const& directory, std::uint64_t page, uint256 const& key, bool keepRoot);
/** @copydoc dirRemove(Keylet const&, std::uint64_t, uint256 const&, bool)
*
* Convenience overload that extracts the `uint256` key from `key.key`.
*/
bool
dirRemove(Keylet const& directory, std::uint64_t page, Keylet const& key, bool keepRoot)
{
@@ -381,31 +440,67 @@ public:
}
/** @} */
/** Remove the specified directory, invoking the callback for every node. */
/** Delete every page of a directory, invoking a callback for each key.
*
* Traverses the entire linked-list chain starting from page 0, erases
* each page SLE, and calls `callback` once per key stored in the
* directory. Callers are responsible for cleaning up the objects
* referenced by those keys before or after this call.
*
* @param directory keylet of the directory root (page 0).
* @param callback function called with each `uint256` key found in the
* directory before the page is erased.
* @return `true` if the root page was found and the directory was deleted;
* `false` if the root page does not exist.
*/
bool
dirDelete(Keylet const& directory, std::function<void(uint256 const&)> const&);
/** Remove the specified directory, if it is empty.
@param directory the identifier of the directory node to be deleted
@return \c true if the directory was found and was successfully deleted
\c false otherwise.
@note The function should only be called with the root entry (i.e. with
the first page) of a directory.
*/
/** Delete the root page of a directory if and only if it is empty.
*
* Verifies that both `sfIndexes` is empty and the linked-list pointers
* indicate no other pages remain. Legacy empty trailing pages (a known
* edge case from older code) are cleaned up as a side effect before the
* emptiness check.
*
* @param directory keylet of the directory root page (`ltDIR_NODE`);
* must identify page 0 (the root).
* @return `true` if the directory was empty and was successfully erased;
* `false` if the directory was not found, contained entries, or had
* non-empty sub-pages.
*
* @note Throws `std::logic_error` if the directory linked-list pointers
* are inconsistent; this indicates ledger corruption.
*/
bool
emptyDirDelete(Keylet const& directory);
};
namespace directory {
/** Helper functions for managing low-level directory operations.
These are not part of the ApplyView interface.
Don't use them unless you really, really know what you're doing.
Instead use dirAdd, dirInsert, etc.
/** Low-level primitives for building and modifying paged ledger directories.
*
* These helpers implement the individual steps of the directory linked-list
* protocol: root creation, tail-page discovery, key insertion, and page
* allocation. They are exposed so that specialised callers (tests, tooling)
* can exercise individual steps, but **transaction processors must always
* go through `ApplyView::dirAppend` / `dirInsert` / `dirRemove`** instead.
*
* @warning Do not call these directly unless you fully understand the
* directory invariants and page-linking protocol.
*/
namespace directory {
/** Allocate and insert the root page (page 0) for a new directory.
*
* Creates a fresh `ltDIR_NODE` SLE at `directory`, sets `sfRootIndex`,
* calls `describe` to brand it, stores `key` as the first `sfIndexes`
* entry, and inserts it into the view.
*
* @param view the writable ledger view.
* @param directory keylet for the root page.
* @param key the first key to store in the new directory.
* @param describe callback to set type-specific fields on the root SLE.
* @return `0` — the root page index.
*/
std::uint64_t
createRoot(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -413,9 +508,37 @@ createRoot(
uint256 const& key,
std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const&)> const& describe);
/** Locate the last used page in a directory by following `sfIndexPrevious`
* from the root.
*
* The root's `sfIndexPrevious` field always points to the tail page (O(1)
* append guarantee). If it is 0 the root itself is the tail.
*
* @param view the writable ledger view.
* @param directory keylet of the directory root.
* @param start the root SLE (already peeked by the caller).
* @return a tuple of `(pageIndex, pageSLE, sfIndexes)` for the tail page.
* @throws std::logic_error if the back-pointer chain is broken.
*/
auto
findPreviousPage(ApplyView& view, Keylet const& directory, SLE::ref start);
/** Insert a key into the `sfIndexes` vector of an existing page SLE and
* commit the change via `view.update()`.
*
* If `preserveOrder` is `true`, the key is appended at the end (offer-book
* order). If `false`, the page is sorted first (to handle legacy unsorted
* pages), then the key is binary-inserted. Double-insertion throws.
*
* @param view the writable ledger view.
* @param node the page SLE to modify (must have been obtained via `peek()`).
* @param page the 0-based page index of `node`.
* @param preserveOrder `true` to append; `false` to sort-then-insert.
* @param indexes the current `sfIndexes` vector (mutated in place).
* @param key the key to insert.
* @return the page index (`page`) where the key was stored.
* @throws std::logic_error if `key` is already present in `indexes`.
*/
std::uint64_t
insertKey(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -425,6 +548,26 @@ insertKey(
STVector256& indexes,
uint256 const& key);
/** Allocate a new trailing page, link it into the directory chain, and
* store the first key in it.
*
* The new page number is computed as `page + 1`; unsigned wraparound to 0
* (verified by `static_assert`) signals overflow and causes `std::nullopt`
* to be returned. The `fixDirectoryLimit` amendment lifts the legacy
* per-directory page cap.
*
* @param view the writable ledger view.
* @param page the current last-page index (new page will be `page + 1`).
* @param node the current last-page SLE; its `sfIndexNext` is updated.
* @param nextPage reserved for future mid-chain insertion; must be `0`.
* @param next the root SLE; its `sfIndexPrevious` is updated to point to
* the new tail.
* @param key the first key to store on the new page.
* @param directory keylet of the directory root.
* @param describe callback to brand the new page SLE.
* @return the new page index, or `std::nullopt` on overflow or page-count
* limit violation.
*/
std::optional<std::uint64_t>
insertPage(
ApplyView& view,

View File

@@ -7,12 +7,25 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Editable, discardable view that can build metadata for one tx.
Iteration of the tx map is delegated to the base.
@note Presented as ApplyView to clients.
*/
/** Per-transaction scratch-pad view that buffers ledger mutations and
* constructs `TxMeta` on commit.
*
* `ApplyViewImpl` is the concrete view handed to every `Transactor`
* during the apply phase. It sits at the top of the view hierarchy:
* `ReadView` → `ApplyView` → `detail::ApplyViewBase` → `ApplyViewImpl`.
* All ledger mutations are buffered in the inherited `items_`
* (`ApplyStateTable`) and are not visible to the parent `OpenView`
* until `apply()` is called. If the transaction fails, the view is
* discarded and `base_` is left unchanged.
*
* The object is move-constructible but neither copyable nor
* move-assignable, ensuring that at most one instance can commit a
* given transaction's buffered state.
*
* @note `base_` is held as a raw `const*` (not a shared pointer) for
* performance. The caller must ensure the underlying view outlives
* this object.
*/
class ApplyViewImpl final : public detail::ApplyViewBase
{
public:
@@ -24,14 +37,47 @@ public:
operator=(ApplyViewImpl const&) = delete;
ApplyViewImpl(ApplyViewImpl&&) = default;
/** Construct a transaction apply view over an existing read view.
*
* @param base The underlying ledger state to read from. Must remain
* valid for the lifetime of this object.
* @param flags Apply-phase control flags (e.g., `tapRETRY`,
* `tapDRY_RUN`, `tapBATCH`) that influence commit behavior and
* the metadata produced by `apply()`.
*/
ApplyViewImpl(ReadView const* base, ApplyFlags flags);
/** Apply the transaction.
After a call to `apply`, the only valid
operation on this object is to call the
destructor.
*/
/** Flush buffered mutations to `to` and produce transaction metadata.
*
* Delegates to `ApplyStateTable::apply()`, which drains every
* pending insert, modify, and erase into `to` and builds the
* `TxMeta` record — including `sfCreatedNode`, `sfModifiedNode`,
* and `sfDeletedNode` entries with `sfPreviousFields`/`sfFinalFields`
* — for the closed ledger. If `isDryRun` is `true`, metadata is
* computed and returned but state changes are suppressed, supporting
* fee-simulation paths without side effects.
*
* When `parentBatchId` is set (i.e., `tapBATCH` is active), the
* generated metadata records the parent batch transaction ID so
* individual results can be traced back to their enclosing batch.
*
* @param to The target open view that accumulates all
* committed transaction changes for the current ledger round.
* @param tx The transaction being applied.
* @param ter The final result code; recorded in metadata.
* @param parentBatchId The ID of the enclosing `ttBATCH` transaction,
* or `std::nullopt` for standalone transactions.
* @param isDryRun If `true`, produce metadata without mutating `to`.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return The `TxMeta` for closed-ledger commits and dry-run
* evaluation; `std::nullopt` when `to` is still open and
* `isDryRun` is `false`.
*
* @note After this call returns, the only valid operation on this
* object is destruction. The internal `ApplyStateTable` is
* drained and must not be accessed again.
*/
std::optional<TxMeta>
apply(
OpenView& to,
@@ -41,25 +87,50 @@ public:
bool isDryRun,
beast::Journal j);
/** Set the amount of currency delivered.
This value is used when generating metadata
for payments, to set the DeliveredAmount field.
If the amount is not specified, the field is
excluded from the resulting metadata.
*/
/** Record the amount delivered by a payment transaction.
*
* Stores `amount` so that `ApplyStateTable::apply()` can write the
* `sfDeliveredAmount` field into the resulting `TxMeta`. The
* delivered amount can differ from the send amount in cross-currency
* or partial-payment scenarios. If never called, `sfDeliveredAmount`
* is omitted from the metadata.
*
* Must be called before `apply()` to take effect.
*
* @param amount The currency amount actually received by the destination.
*/
void
deliver(STAmount const& amount)
{
deliver_ = amount;
}
/** Get the number of modified entries
/** Return the number of pending write-intent entries.
*
* Counts only entries with an `Erase`, `Insert`, or `Modify` action;
* cache-only reads are excluded. Used by `ApplyContext::size()` to
* support batch-processing decisions before committing.
*
* @return Count of SLE mutations buffered since construction or the
* last `discard()`.
*/
std::size_t
size();
/** Visit modified entries
/** Iterate every pending write-intent entry, invoking a callback per entry.
*
* Delegates to `ApplyStateTable::visit()`. `Cache`-only reads are
* skipped. Used by invariant checkers and batch-processing logic to
* inspect accumulated changes before deciding whether to commit them.
*
* @param target The open view used to fetch pre-change SLE snapshots
* for `Erase` and `Modify` entries.
* @param func Callback invoked once per pending entry with:
* - `key` — ledger index of the entry.
* - `isDelete` — `true` if the entry is being erased.
* - `before` — the SLE state before this transaction (`nullptr`
* for insertions).
* - `after` — the pending SLE state (`nullptr` for deletions).
*/
void
visit(

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** A range-based view over all offers in a single order-book direction.
*
* The XRPL DEX stores offers in a two-level ledger directory structure: a
* *book* groups offers for one currency pair in one direction, and within
* the book each quality level (encoded exchange rate) has its own directory
* page. `BookDirs` presents this multi-level structure as a flat sequence of
* `SLE` objects, letting callers iterate every offer with a standard
* range-for loop without reasoning about quality boundaries or directory
* pagination.
*
* Construction eagerly locates the first quality directory via
* `ReadView::succ` and loads the first page with `cdirFirst`; subsequent
* advancement is handled lazily by `const_iterator::operator++`.
*
* @note The `ReadView` passed at construction must outlive both the
* `BookDirs` object and any iterators derived from it. Iterators hold
* raw pointers to the view.
* @see Dir for single-directory iteration (e.g., NFTokenOffer pages).
*/
class BookDirs
{
private:
@@ -19,15 +38,49 @@ public:
class const_iterator; // NOLINT(readability-identifier-naming)
using value_type = std::shared_ptr<SLE const>;
/** Construct a `BookDirs` range over all offers in `book` as seen by `view`.
*
* Finds the first quality directory in the book's key-space via
* `view.succ` and positions the internal state at the first offer.
* If the book is empty, `begin() == end()` immediately.
*
* @param view The ledger view to read from; must remain valid for the
* lifetime of this object and all derived iterators.
* @param book The currency pair and direction defining the order book.
*/
BookDirs(ReadView const&, Book const&);
/** Return an iterator positioned at the first offer in the book.
*
* If the book is empty the returned iterator compares equal to `end()`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] const_iterator
begin() const;
/** Return the past-the-end sentinel iterator for this book. */
[[nodiscard]] const_iterator
end() const;
};
/** Forward iterator over offers in an order book, crossing quality boundaries.
*
* Advances through all offers in a book by walking pages within each quality
* directory via `cdirNext`, then locating the next quality directory via
* `ReadView::succ` when a quality is exhausted. Dereference re-reads the
* current offer SLE from the view and caches it until `operator++` clears
* the cache.
*
* **End-sentinel encoding:** the end iterator and an exhausted begin iterator
* share identical state — `entry_ == 0`, `cur_key_ == key_`, and
* `index_ == beast::zero`. `operator++` explicitly resets to this state when
* no further quality directory exists, which is how loop termination is
* detected.
*
* @note Default-constructed iterators have a null `view_` and compare
* unequal to everything, including each other. They are valid only as
* placeholders; dereferencing them is undefined behaviour.
* @note Only `BookDirs` may construct iterators in valid, non-default states.
*/
class BookDirs::const_iterator // NOLINT(readability-identifier-naming)
{
public:
@@ -37,35 +90,91 @@ public:
using difference_type = std::ptrdiff_t;
using iterator_category = std::forward_iterator_tag;
/** Construct a default (placeholder) iterator with a null view.
*
* Required by the `ForwardIterator` concept. The resulting iterator
* compares unequal to all other iterators and must not be dereferenced
* or incremented.
*/
const_iterator() = default;
/** Return true if both iterators refer to the same offer position.
*
* Equality is determined by comparing `entry_`, `cur_key_`, and
* `index_`. If either iterator has a null view, returns false.
*
* @note Comparing iterators from different `BookDirs` instances
* (different views or roots) triggers an assertion in debug builds.
*/
bool
operator==(const_iterator const& other) const;
/** Return true if the iterators do not refer to the same offer position. */
bool
operator!=(const_iterator const& other) const
{
return !(*this == other);
}
/** Return a reference to the current offer SLE.
*
* Reads the offer SLE from the view on first access and caches the
* result; subsequent dereferences of the same position return the cached
* value. The cache is cleared by `operator++`.
*
* @note Asserts that `index_` is non-zero; dereferencing the end
* iterator or a default-constructed iterator is undefined behaviour.
*/
reference
operator*() const;
/** Return a pointer to the current offer SLE.
*
* Equivalent to `&**this`. Safe to use with `->` because `operator*`
* stores the result in a `mutable` cache member whose lifetime matches
* the iterator.
*/
pointer
operator->() const
{
return &**this;
}
/** Advance to the next offer in the book and return this iterator.
*
* First attempts to advance within the current quality directory via
* `cdirNext`. If that quality is exhausted, uses `ReadView::succ` to
* find the next quality directory and positions at its first offer via
* `cdirFirst`. If no further quality directory exists, resets to the
* end-sentinel state. Clears the dereference cache.
*
* @note Asserts that the iterator is not already at the end position
* (i.e. `index_` must be non-zero) before advancing.
*/
const_iterator&
operator++();
/** Post-increment: advance and return a copy of the pre-increment state. */
const_iterator
operator++(int);
private:
friend class BookDirs;
/** Construct a valid iterator anchored to `view`, `root`, and `dirKey`.
*
* Only `BookDirs` calls this constructor. `dirKey` becomes both `key_`
* (the end-sentinel anchor) and the initial `cur_key_`. Additional
* fields (`next_quality_`, `sle_`, `entry_`, `index_`) are populated by
* `BookDirs::begin()` for the begin iterator; the end iterator leaves
* them at their zero-initialised defaults.
*
* @param view The ledger view; must outlive this iterator.
* @param root The root key of the book's quality key-space; must be
* non-zero.
* @param dirKey The key of the first quality directory, or `beast::zero`
* if the book is empty.
*/
const_iterator(ReadView const& view, uint256 const& root, uint256 const& dirKey)
: view_(&view), root_(root), key_(dirKey), cur_key_(dirKey)
{

View File

@@ -8,35 +8,71 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Listen to public/subscribe messages from a book. */
/** Per-book fan-out layer for WebSocket order-book subscriptions.
*
* One instance exists for each `Book` (currency pair) that has at least one
* active subscriber. `OrderBookDB` owns and looks up instances via
* `getBookListeners()` / `makeBookListeners()`; callers hold references
* through the `pointer` alias.
*
* Subscribers are stored as `InfoSub::wptr` (weak pointers) so that
* `BookListeners` does not extend the lifetime of the connection object.
* Dead entries are pruned lazily inside `publish()` when the weak pointer
* can no longer be locked.
*
* All three public methods take `lock_` for their full duration, including
* across the `p->send()` calls in `publish()`. This favours correctness over
* throughput on high-subscriber-count books.
*/
class BookListeners
{
public:
/** Shared-ownership handle used by `OrderBookDB` and callers. */
using pointer = std::shared_ptr<BookListeners>;
BookListeners() = default;
/** Add a new subscription for this book
/** Register a subscriber for this book.
*
* Stores a weak pointer to @p sub, keyed by its sequence number, so that
* subsequent `publish()` calls deliver notifications to it.
*
* @param sub The subscriber to add; must not be null.
*/
void
addSubscriber(InfoSub::ref sub);
/** Stop publishing to a subscriber
/** Unregister a subscriber by sequence number.
*
* Removes the entry whose key equals @p sub. If no such entry exists
* (e.g. the subscriber was already pruned by a `publish()` call after
* disconnect), this is a no-op.
*
* @param sub Sequence number returned by `InfoSub::getSeq()` for the
* subscriber to remove.
*/
void
removeSubscriber(std::uint64_t sub);
/** Publish a transaction to subscribers
Publish a transaction to clients subscribed to changes on this book.
Uses havePublished to prevent sending duplicate transactions to clients
that have subscribed to multiple books.
@param jvObj JSON transaction data to publish
@param havePublished InfoSub sequence numbers that have already
published this transaction.
*/
/** Deliver a transaction notification to all live subscribers.
*
* Iterates over the internal listener map and, for each live subscriber,
* attempts to insert its sequence number into @p havePublished. If the
* insertion succeeds (i.e. this subscriber has not yet received this
* transaction from another book), the version-appropriate JSON is
* dispatched via `InfoSub::send()`.
*
* Dead weak pointers (subscribers that have disconnected) are erased
* in-place during the scan, providing lazy GC without a separate sweep.
*
* @param jvObj Version-indexed JSON built once upstream; each subscriber
* receives the slice matching its negotiated API version.
* @param havePublished Per-transaction set of subscriber sequence numbers
* that have already been notified. Shared across every
* `BookListeners::publish()` call for the same transaction so that a
* client subscribed to multiple affected books receives the message
* only once. Passed by reference and mutated in-place.
*/
void
publish(MultiApiJson const& jvObj, hash_set<std::uint64_t>& havePublished);

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
/** @file
* Process-wide cache of deserialized ledger state entries (SLEs).
*
* Declares `CachedSLEs`, a named alias for the `TaggedCache` instantiation
* that backs the two-level SLE read cache used by `CachedView`. Any future
* change to the underlying container's key hasher, pointer policy, or mutex
* type can be made here without touching consumers.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/TaggedCache.h>
@@ -5,5 +14,32 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
namespace xrpl {
/** Process-wide, thread-safe cache of immutable ledger state entries (SLEs).
*
* Maps the cryptographic digest of a serialized SLE (`uint256`) to the
* deserialized `SLE const` object, allowing multiple read paths to share a
* single in-memory representation without re-deserializing from disk.
*
* The `SLE const` mapped type enforces at compile time that stored objects
* are never mutated through the cache, satisfying `TaggedCache`'s requirement
* that callers must not modify stored objects unless they hold a lock over all
* cache operations. This makes cached entries safe to share across threads
* without additional per-object locking.
*
* The key is the on-disk hash (digest) of the serialized entry — not an
* account ID or keylet — which integrates directly with `DigestAwareReadView`.
* `CachedView` delegates `read()` calls to `CachedSLEs::fetch(digest, ...)`,
* falling through to the underlying store only on a miss.
*
* The application-wide instance is constructed with a target size of `0`
* (no fixed count limit) and a one-minute expiration window.
* `TaggedCache::sweep()` is called periodically to demote strong references
* to weak references and eventually reclaim memory.
*
* @see CachedView
* @see TaggedCache
*/
using CachedSLEs = TaggedCache<uint256, SLE const>;
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
/** @file
* Transparent two-level caching layer over a `DigestAwareReadView`.
*
* Declares `detail::CachedViewImpl` (non-template caching logic) and the
* public template `CachedView<Base>`, which adds `shared_ptr` ownership of
* the wrapped view. The canonical instantiation `CachedLedger` (defined in
* `Ledger.h`) wraps the immutable closed ledger that serves as the base for
* transaction application.
*
* @see CachedSLEs
* @see CachedLedger
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/hardened_hash.h>
@@ -11,12 +24,43 @@ namespace xrpl {
namespace detail {
/** Non-template base class that implements SLE caching over a `DigestAwareReadView`.
*
* All caching logic is compiled once here, avoiding template-instantiation bloat
* in `CachedView<Base>`. The class maintains two complementary caches:
*
* - **`map_`** — a per-instance `unordered_map` from ledger key (`uint256`) to
* SLE digest. Once a key has been resolved to its content hash, subsequent
* reads skip the SHAMap traversal. Uses `HardenedHash<>` to resist
* hash-flood attacks from adversarially crafted ledger keys.
* - **`cache_`** — a reference to an externally owned, process-wide `CachedSLEs`
* (`TaggedCache<uint256, SLE const>`) keyed by digest. Multiple views over
* different ledgers share this cache; if two ledgers carry an unchanged SLE,
* only one deserialized copy lives in memory.
*
* `mutex_` guards `map_` only; it is deliberately *not* held across
* `base_.digest()` or `base_.read()` calls so that concurrent readers are not
* serialized through SHAMap traversal or deserialization. Two threads may both
* call `base_.digest()` for the same key on a cold miss — this is safe because
* `base_` is an immutable ledger snapshot.
*
* Copy and assignment are deleted; a cached view always represents a unique,
* coherent window onto a specific ledger snapshot.
*
* @note All `ReadView` and `DigestAwareReadView` pass-through methods delegate
* directly to `base_`; only `exists()` and `read()` go through the cache.
*/
class CachedViewImpl : public DigestAwareReadView
{
private:
DigestAwareReadView const& base_;
CachedSLEs& cache_;
std::mutex mutable mutex_;
/** Per-instance map from ledger key to SLE digest.
*
* Uses `HardenedHash<>` to prevent adversarial hash-bucket flooding from
* network-visible ledger keys (account IDs, object types).
*/
std::unordered_map<key_type, uint256, HardenedHash<>> mutable map_;
public:
@@ -25,6 +69,13 @@ public:
CachedViewImpl&
operator=(CachedViewImpl const&) = delete;
/** Construct over an existing `DigestAwareReadView` and a shared SLE cache.
*
* @param base The underlying immutable view to cache reads against.
* The caller is responsible for ensuring `base` outlives this object;
* `CachedView<Base>` satisfies this by holding the owning `shared_ptr`.
* @param cache The process-wide SLE cache shared across all views.
*/
CachedViewImpl(DigestAwareReadView const* base, CachedSLEs& cache) : base_(*base), cache_(cache)
{
}
@@ -33,9 +84,30 @@ public:
// ReadView
//
/** Returns `true` if an SLE exists for the given keylet.
*
* Delegates to `read(k) != nullptr`; benefits from caching on repeated
* calls for the same key.
*/
bool
exists(Keylet const& k) const override;
/** Return the SLE associated with the keylet, going through both cache levels.
*
* The lookup sequence is:
* 1. Check `map_` for a known digest (under `mutex_`).
* 2. If absent, call `base_.digest(k.key)` outside the lock.
* 3. Pass the digest to `cache_.fetch()`, which deserializes from `base_`
* only on a shared-cache miss.
* 4. Populate `map_` on a cold miss (re-acquires `mutex_`).
* 5. Validate the SLE type with `k.check(*sle)`.
*
* Hit/miss statistics are tracked via `CountedObjects` counters
* `CachedView::hit`, `CachedView::hitExpired`, and `CachedView::miss`.
*
* @return The matching `SLE const`, or `nullptr` if the key is absent or
* the stored type does not match the keylet's expected type.
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(Keylet const& k) const override;
@@ -124,10 +196,25 @@ public:
} // namespace detail
/** Wraps a DigestAwareReadView to provide caching.
@tparam Base A subclass of DigestAwareReadView
*/
/** Transparent caching layer over a `DigestAwareReadView`.
*
* Wraps a `shared_ptr<Base const>` to ensure the underlying view remains alive
* for the lifetime of this object, then delegates all caching logic to
* `detail::CachedViewImpl`. The `static_assert` enforces that `Base` satisfies
* the `DigestAwareReadView` contract required for two-level caching.
*
* The production instantiation is `CachedLedger = CachedView<Ledger>`, used
* by `OpenLedger::create()` to wrap the closed ledger that forms the base for
* each round of transaction application.
*
* Copy and assignment are deleted; each `CachedView` instance is the sole
* owner of its per-instance key→digest `map_`.
*
* @tparam Base A type derived from `DigestAwareReadView`.
*
* @see detail::CachedViewImpl
* @see CachedSLEs
*/
template <class Base>
class CachedView : public detail::CachedViewImpl
{
@@ -144,15 +231,27 @@ public:
CachedView&
operator=(CachedView const&) = delete;
/** Construct a caching view over a shared immutable ledger snapshot.
*
* @param base Shared ownership of the underlying view; must not be null.
* @param cache Process-wide SLE cache shared across all `CachedView`
* instances. Must outlive this object.
*/
CachedView(std::shared_ptr<Base const> const& base, CachedSLEs& cache)
: CachedViewImpl(base.get(), cache), sp_(base)
{
}
/** Returns the base type.
@note This breaks encapsulation and bypasses the cache.
*/
/** Return the underlying view, bypassing both cache levels.
*
* @note This breaks encapsulation: callers interact with the
* `DigestAwareReadView` directly, skipping both the per-instance
* key→digest `map_` and the shared `CachedSLEs`. Use only when the
* full `Base` type (e.g. `Ledger`) is needed and cannot be expressed
* through the `ReadView` interface alone.
*
* @return A const shared pointer to the wrapped `Base` instance.
*/
std::shared_ptr<Base const> const&
base() const
{

View File

@@ -7,17 +7,51 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Holds transactions which were deferred to the next pass of consensus.
"Canonical" refers to the order in which transactions are applied.
- Puts transactions from the same account in SeqProxy order
*/
/** Ordered transaction queue for deterministic consensus application.
*
* Holds transactions deferred from a previous ledger-building pass and
* re-applies them in the next pass. The "canonical" in the name is the
* ordering guarantee: given the same input transaction set and the same
* salt, every validator iterates and applies transactions in identical
* sequence, which is required for Byzantine fault-tolerant ledger
* agreement.
*
* Ordering is three-level (implemented in `Key::operator<`):
* 1. Salted account ID — groups all transactions from the same account.
* 2. `SeqProxy` — within an account, sequence-based transactions sort
* before ticket-based ones, preserving the dependency that a ticket
* creator must apply before ticket consumers.
* 3. Transaction ID — tiebreaker within the same account and sequence.
*
* @note Account keys are XORed with a `LedgerHash` salt at construction
* (and via `reset()`) so that no actor can mine account addresses to
* achieve a persistent early-sort advantage across ledger rounds.
*
* @note Inherits from `CountedObject<CanonicalTXSet>` for diagnostic
* memory-pressure accounting; the instance count is queryable via
* `CountedObjects::getInstance().getCounts()` and has no effect on
* behavior.
*
* Usage in `BuildLedger.cpp`: `applyTransactions()` iterates this set in
* map order across multiple passes, erasing each transaction on success or
* definitive failure and leaving retryable ones in place for the next pass.
*/
// VFALCO TODO rename to SortedTxSet
class CanonicalTXSet : public CountedObject<CanonicalTXSet>
{
private:
/** Sort key for the internal transaction map.
*
* Holds a salted account identifier, a `SeqProxy`, and the transaction
* hash. The three-level `operator<` groups transactions by account, then
* orders within an account by `SeqProxy` (sequences before tickets), then
* breaks ties by transaction ID.
*
* `operator==` compares only `txId_` — identity is the transaction hash
* alone, independent of account or sequence context. This asymmetry is
* intentional: iterator-based `erase` must not conflate distinct
* transactions that happen to share account/sequence metadata.
*/
class Key
{
public:
@@ -47,6 +81,14 @@ private:
return !(lhs < rhs);
}
/** Tests equality by transaction ID only.
*
* Deliberately asymmetric with `operator<`: two keys with different
* account/sequence values but the same `txId_` compare equal. This
* keeps iterator-based removal (`erase`) safe — the map's ordering
* key is account+seq+id, but uniqueness is solely the transaction
* hash.
*/
friend bool
operator==(Key const& lhs, Key const& rhs)
{
@@ -59,12 +101,14 @@ private:
return !(lhs == rhs);
}
/** Returns the salted account identifier used as the primary sort key. */
[[nodiscard]] uint256 const&
getAccount() const
{
return account_;
}
/** Returns the transaction hash. */
[[nodiscard]] uint256 const&
getTXID() const
{
@@ -80,7 +124,14 @@ private:
friend bool
operator<(Key const& lhs, Key const& rhs);
// Calculate the salted key for the given account
/** Computes the salted sort key for an account.
*
* Copies the 20-byte `AccountID` into a zeroed `uint256`, then XORs the
* result with `salt_`. The XOR prevents an attacker from mining account
* addresses with low byte values to gain a persistent ordering advantage:
* because `salt_` changes each ledger round, the effective sort position
* of any account is randomized per round.
*/
uint256
accountKey(AccountID const& account);
@@ -88,23 +139,59 @@ public:
using const_iterator = std::map<Key, std::shared_ptr<STTx const>>::const_iterator;
public:
/** Constructs the set with the given ledger hash as the account-key salt.
*
* @param saltHash Hash of the current ledger (or consensus map); used to
* randomize per-round account sort positions. Pass `uint256{}` when a
* stable, unsalted ordering is acceptable (e.g., `LocalTxs`).
*/
explicit CanonicalTXSet(LedgerHash const& saltHash) : salt_(saltHash)
{
}
/** Inserts a transaction into the set.
*
* Constructs a `Key` from the transaction's salted account ID, `SeqProxy`,
* and transaction hash, then inserts the `(Key, tx)` pair into the map.
* Duplicate inserts (same transaction hash) are silently ignored by the
* underlying `std::map`.
*
* @param txn The signed transaction to enqueue.
*/
void
insert(std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const& txn);
// Pops the next transaction on account that follows seqProx in the
// sort order. Normally called when a transaction is successfully
// applied to the open ledger so the next transaction can be resubmitted
// without waiting for ledger close.
//
// The return value is often null, when an account has no more
// transactions.
/** Pops and returns the next eligible transaction for the same account.
*
* After `tx` has been successfully applied to the open ledger, call this
* method to retrieve and remove the immediately-following transaction for
* the same account, if one exists and is eligible. A transaction is
* eligible if it either:
* - uses a ticket (tickets may be applied regardless of sequence gaps), or
* - has a sequence number exactly one greater than `tx`'s sequence.
*
* The search uses `lower_bound` on a synthetic key whose `txId_` is
* `beast::zero` (which sorts before any real transaction ID) to locate the
* first map entry past `tx`'s position. If that entry belongs to a
* different account, or its sequence constraint is not satisfied, the
* method returns `nullptr`.
*
* @param tx The just-applied transaction whose account and sequence
* establish the search anchor.
* @return The next eligible transaction (removed from the set), or
* `nullptr` if no suitable successor exists.
*/
std::shared_ptr<STTx const>
popAcctTransaction(std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const& tx);
/** Resets the set for a new ledger round.
*
* Installs a fresh salt and clears all transactions, allowing the same
* `CanonicalTXSet` instance to be reused across rounds without
* reallocating the underlying container.
*
* @param salt New ledger hash to use as the account-key salt.
*/
void
reset(LedgerHash const& salt)
{
@@ -112,35 +199,54 @@ public:
map_.clear();
}
/** Erases the transaction at `it` and returns an iterator to the next element.
*
* Supports in-place removal during iteration, as used by `applyTransactions()`
* in `BuildLedger.cpp` when a transaction succeeds or definitively fails.
*
* @param it A valid iterator into this set.
* @return Iterator to the element following the removed one.
*/
const_iterator
erase(const_iterator const& it)
{
return map_.erase(it);
}
/** Returns an iterator to the first transaction in canonical order. */
[[nodiscard]] const_iterator
begin() const
{
return map_.begin();
}
/** Returns a past-the-end iterator. */
[[nodiscard]] const_iterator
end() const
{
return map_.end();
}
/** Returns the number of transactions currently in the set. */
[[nodiscard]] size_t
size() const
{
return map_.size();
}
/** Returns `true` if the set contains no transactions. */
[[nodiscard]] bool
empty() const
{
return map_.empty();
}
/** Returns the salt hash that identifies this set's ordering context.
*
* Callers use this for logging the transaction set identity alongside
* the ledger close time (e.g., `RCLConsensus` logs `retriableTxs.key()`
* when building the canonical set from the consensus map).
*/
[[nodiscard]] uint256 const&
key() const
{
@@ -150,7 +256,9 @@ public:
private:
std::map<Key, std::shared_ptr<STTx const>> map_;
// Used to salt the accounts so people can't mine for low account numbers
// XORed into each account's sort key to prevent mining for low account
// numbers that would gain a persistent ordering advantage. Refreshed each
// ledger round via reset().
uint256 salt_;
};

View File

@@ -5,18 +5,22 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** A class that simplifies iterating ledger directory pages
The Dir class provides a forward iterator for walking through
the uint256 values contained in ledger directories.
The Dir class also allows accelerated directory walking by
stepping directly from one page to the next using the next_page()
member function.
As of July 2024, the Dir class is only being used with NFTokenOffer
directories and for unit tests.
*/
/** Read-only range adaptor for a paged ledger directory (`ltDIR_NODE`).
*
* A ledger directory is a linked list of `DirectoryNode` SLEs, each holding
* a `STVector256` (`sfIndexes`) of 256-bit keys pointing to other ledger
* objects. `Dir` wraps that structure in a C++ forward-iterable range,
* hiding page-chasing and SLE loading behind `begin()`/`end()`.
*
* Construction reads the root page eagerly but loads no entry SLEs;
* per-entry loading is deferred to `operator*()`. The class is used
* with NFTokenOffer directories (`keylet::nft_buys()`, `keylet::nft_sells()`)
* and in unit tests with owner directories (`keylet::ownerDir()`).
*
* @note Callers that only need per-page counts (not per-entry SLEs) should
* use `nextPage()` as the loop increment and `pageSize()` for counting,
* which avoids the per-entry `ReadView::read()` calls entirely.
*/
class Dir
{
private:
@@ -27,17 +31,57 @@ private:
public:
class ConstIterator;
/** `shared_ptr<SLE const>`, matching `ReadView::read()`'s return type. */
using value_type = std::shared_ptr<SLE const>;
/** Construct a range over the directory rooted at `key` in `view`.
*
* Reads the root `DirectoryNode` SLE immediately and caches its
* `sfIndexes`. If the root page is absent the range is empty.
*
* @param view The ledger view to read from; must outlive this object.
* @param key Keylet of the directory root page.
*/
Dir(ReadView const&, Keylet const&);
/** Return an iterator to the first entry of the directory.
*
* If the root page is missing or its `sfIndexes` is empty, the returned
* iterator compares equal to `end()`.
*
* @return A `ConstIterator` positioned at the first directory entry,
* or `end()` if the directory is empty.
*/
[[nodiscard]] ConstIterator
begin() const;
/** Return a past-the-end sentinel iterator.
*
* The sentinel has `page_.key == root_.key` and `index_ == beast::zero`.
* An iterator reaches this state when `nextPage()` finds `sfIndexNext == 0`
* on the last `DirectoryNode` page.
*
* @return A past-the-end `ConstIterator`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] ConstIterator
end() const;
};
/** Forward iterator over entries in a paged ledger directory.
*
* Each dereference lazily loads the ledger object pointed to by the current
* directory entry key via `ReadView::read(keylet::child(index_))`. The result
* is cached in `cache_` and cleared on every advance, including page
* transitions.
*
* Equality compares `page_.key` and `index_`. Two iterators are equal when
* both fields match; comparing iterators from different views or roots is
* undefined (asserted in debug builds).
*
* @note Advancing an iterator that is already at `end()` is undefined.
* Always guard with `it != dir.end()` before incrementing.
*/
class Dir::ConstIterator
{
public:
@@ -47,42 +91,113 @@ public:
using difference_type = std::ptrdiff_t;
using iterator_category = std::forward_iterator_tag;
/** Return true if both iterators point to the same directory entry.
*
* Returns `false` if either view pointer is null. Asserts in debug builds
* that both iterators share the same view and root keylet.
*
* @param other The iterator to compare against.
* @return `true` if `page_.key` and `index_` match in both iterators.
*/
bool
operator==(ConstIterator const& other) const;
/** Return true if the iterators do not point to the same directory entry.
*
* @param other The iterator to compare against.
* @return `!(*this == other)`.
*/
bool
operator!=(ConstIterator const& other) const
{
return !(*this == other);
}
/** Load and return the ledger object for the current directory entry.
*
* The result is cached after the first call and reused on subsequent
* dereferences of the same position. The cache is cleared on every
* advance (including page transitions).
*
* @return `shared_ptr<SLE const>` to the referenced ledger object,
* or `nullptr` if the object is not present in the view.
*/
reference
operator*() const;
/** Return a pointer to the current entry's `shared_ptr<SLE const>`.
*
* @return Pointer to the cached SLE shared pointer.
*/
pointer
operator->() const
{
return &**this;
}
/** Advance to the next directory entry, crossing page boundaries as needed.
*
* When the end of the current page's `sfIndexes` is reached, calls
* `nextPage()` to load the subsequent `DirectoryNode`. If no next page
* exists the iterator converges to the `end()` sentinel.
*
* @return Reference to this iterator after advancement.
*/
ConstIterator&
operator++();
/** Post-increment: return a copy of this iterator, then advance.
*
* @return Copy of the iterator before advancement.
*/
ConstIterator
operator++(int);
/** Jump directly to the first entry of the next `DirectoryNode` page.
*
* Reads `sfIndexNext` from the current page SLE. If the value is zero
* (last page), the iterator is set to the `end()` sentinel. Otherwise,
* loads `keylet::page(root_, sfIndexNext)` and positions the iterator
* at the beginning of that page's `sfIndexes`.
*
* This method is public so callers can skip an entire page without
* loading individual entries — useful when only the per-page count is
* needed (see `pageSize()`).
*
* @return Reference to this iterator, now positioned at the start of the
* next page, or at `end()` if the directory is exhausted.
*/
ConstIterator&
nextPage();
/** Return the number of entries on the current page.
*
* Reports `sfIndexes.size()` for the currently loaded `DirectoryNode`
* without reading any entry SLEs. Combined with `nextPage()` as a loop
* increment, this enables O(pages) offer-count checks instead of
* O(entries).
*
* @return Number of `uint256` entries in the current page's `sfIndexes`.
*/
std::size_t
pageSize();
/** Return the keylet of the currently loaded `DirectoryNode` page.
*
* @return `Keylet` identifying the current page SLE.
*/
Keylet const&
page() const
{
return page_;
}
/** Return the `uint256` key of the current directory entry.
*
* Equal to `beast::zero` when the iterator is at `end()`.
*
* @return The current entry's 256-bit ledger object key.
*/
uint256
index() const
{

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
/** @file
* Declares the Ledger class — the central data structure of the XRP Ledger
* daemon — together with supporting types for genesis ledger construction
* and the CachedLedger alias.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/CountedObject.h>
@@ -20,44 +26,58 @@ class TransactionMaster;
class SqliteStatement;
/** Tag type used to select the genesis-ledger constructor of Ledger.
*
* Pass the singleton `kCREATE_GENESIS` constant to construct ledger
* sequence 1. The explicit constructor prevents accidental conversions.
*/
struct CreateGenesisT
{
explicit CreateGenesisT() = default;
};
/** Singleton tag constant passed to the genesis-ledger constructor. */
extern CreateGenesisT const kCREATE_GENESIS;
/** Holds a ledger.
The ledger is composed of two SHAMaps. The state map holds all of the
ledger entries such as account roots and order books. The tx map holds
all of the transactions and associated metadata that made it into that
particular ledger. Most of the operations on a ledger are concerned
with the state map.
This can hold just the header, a partial set of data, or the entire set
of data. It all depends on what is in the corresponding SHAMap entry.
Various functions are provided to populate or depopulate the caches that
the object holds references to.
Ledgers are constructed as either mutable or immutable.
1) If you are the sole owner of a mutable ledger, you can do whatever you
want with no need for locks.
2) If you have an immutable ledger, you cannot ever change it, so no need
for locks.
3) Mutable ledgers cannot be shared.
@note Presented to clients as ReadView
@note Calls virtuals in the constructor, so marked as final
*/
/** Immutable or mutable snapshot of the XRP Ledger at a single sequence number.
*
* A Ledger owns two SHAMap Merkleradix trees: `stateMap_` (all account
* state — account roots, trust lines, offers, escrows, amendments, fee
* settings, etc.) and `txMap_` (every transaction together with its
* execution metadata that produced this ledger's state).
*
* **Mutable/immutable lifecycle:**
* - A freshly constructed ledger begins mutable; it must not be shared
* across threads while mutable.
* - After `setImmutable()` is called the ledger hashes are finalised,
* both SHAMaps are locked, and the object may be shared freely without
* any locking. Any attempt to mutate the SHAMaps after this point will
* assert.
* - `setAccepted()` is the standard close-time + `setImmutable()` sequence
* used after consensus.
*
* The class inherits `DigestAwareReadView` (read + per-entry digest),
* `TxsRawView` (raw state and transaction mutation), and
* `CountedObject<Ledger>` (intrusive diagnostics). It is marked `final`
* because constructors call virtual functions through `setup()`.
*
* @note Presented to most callers through the `ReadView` interface.
* @note `txMap_` and `stateMap_` are declared `mutable` to allow
* `setFull()` and iterator operations in `const` contexts without
* compromising the logical-constness contract.
* @see CachedLedger — the standard shareable form used at rest.
*/
class Ledger final : public std::enable_shared_from_this<Ledger>,
public DigestAwareReadView,
public TxsRawView,
public CountedObject<Ledger>
{
public:
/** Copying and moving are prohibited.
*
* Ledger objects are always owned through `std::shared_ptr`. Shared
* ownership combined with the mutable-→-immutable transition makes
* value-semantic copies unsafe and unnecessary.
*/
Ledger(Ledger const&) = delete;
Ledger&
operator=(Ledger const&) = delete;
@@ -66,20 +86,22 @@ public:
Ledger&
operator=(Ledger&&) = delete;
/** Create the Genesis ledger.
The Genesis ledger contains a single account whose
AccountID is generated with a Generator using the seed
computed from the string "masterpassphrase" and ordinal
zero.
The account has an XRP balance equal to the total amount
of XRP in the system. No more XRP than the amount which
starts in this account can ever exist, with amounts
used to pay fees being destroyed.
Amendments specified are enabled in the genesis ledger
*/
/** Construct ledger sequence 1 (the genesis ledger).
*
* Seeds a single master account whose `AccountID` is derived
* deterministically from the seed of `"masterpassphrase"`, credits it
* with `kINITIAL_XRP` drops, inserts the `sfAmendments` SLE for any
* pre-enabled amendments, and inserts the fee schedule SLE using either
* drop-native fields (`sfBaseFeeDrops`, etc.) when `featureXRPFees` is
* among `amendments`, or legacy integer fields otherwise. Ends with
* `setImmutable()`.
*
* @param rules Protocol rules in effect at genesis.
* @param fees Initial fee schedule (base fee, reserve, increment).
* @param amendments Amendments that are enabled from ledger 1 onward.
* Determines which fee-field format is used for the genesis fee SLE.
* @param family Node-store family that owns the SHAMap backing storage.
*/
Ledger(
CreateGenesisT,
Rules rules,
@@ -87,15 +109,37 @@ public:
std::vector<uint256> const& amendments,
Family& family);
/** Construct an immutable header-only placeholder ledger.
*
* Creates SHAMaps initialised with the root hashes from `info` but does
* not attempt to fetch SHAMap nodes from the node store. The canonical
* ledger hash is computed immediately from the header fields. Used for
* skeleton or partial ledgers reconstructed from database metadata.
*
* @param info Fully populated ledger header (must include root hashes).
* @param rules Protocol rules in effect for this ledger.
* @param family Node-store family for the underlying SHAMaps.
*/
Ledger(LedgerHeader const& info, Rules rules, Family& family);
/** Used for ledgers loaded from JSON files
@param acquire If true, acquires the ledger if not found locally
@note The fees parameter provides default values, but setup() may
override them from the ledger state if fee-related SLEs exist.
*/
/** Restore a ledger from its header, fetching SHAMap roots from the node store.
*
* Constructs both SHAMaps with the root hashes from `info` and calls
* `fetchRoot()` on each. If either root is absent from the node store,
* `loaded` is set to `false`; when `acquire` is also `true`, async
* acquisition is triggered via `family.missingNodeAcquireByHash()`.
* The resulting ledger is always immutable.
*
* @param info Ledger header, including `txHash` and `accountHash` roots.
* @param loaded Set to `false` on return if either SHAMap root was missing.
* @param acquire If `true`, trigger async node acquisition when `loaded`
* would be set to `false`.
* @param rules Protocol rules in effect for this ledger.
* @param fees Default fee values; `setup()` will override these from the
* on-ledger fee SLE if one exists.
* @param family Node-store family for the underlying SHAMaps.
* @param j Journal for missing-root warnings.
*/
Ledger(
LedgerHeader const& info,
bool& loaded,
@@ -105,15 +149,33 @@ public:
Family& family,
beast::Journal j);
/** Create a new ledger following a previous ledger
The ledger will have the sequence number that
follows previous, and have
parentCloseTime == previous.closeTime.
*/
/** Create the next mutable ledger in the chain following `previous`.
*
* The new ledger has sequence `previous.seq() + 1`. Its `stateMap_`
* is a copy-on-write snapshot of `previous.stateMap_` so state changes
* do not affect the closed parent. Its `txMap_` starts empty (a fresh
* SHAMap for the new round's transactions). `parentCloseTime` is set
* to `previous.closeTime`; the close-time resolution is advanced via
* `getNextLedgerTimeResolution`.
*
* @param previous The preceding closed ledger; must be immutable.
* @param closeTime Proposed close time for the new ledger.
*/
Ledger(Ledger const& previous, NetClock::time_point closeTime);
// used for database ledgers
/** Construct a mutable empty ledger for database reconstruction.
*
* Creates an empty, mutable ledger at `ledgerSeq` and calls `setup()`
* to initialise `fees_` and `rules_` from any state entries that may
* already exist. Used when the node store needs to rebuild a ledger
* from raw DB data outside the normal consensus flow.
*
* @param ledgerSeq Target ledger sequence number.
* @param closeTime Close time to record in the ledger header.
* @param rules Protocol rules for this ledger.
* @param fees Initial fee schedule (may be overridden by `setup()`).
* @param family Node-store family for the underlying SHAMaps.
*/
Ledger(
std::uint32_t ledgerSeq,
NetClock::time_point closeTime,
@@ -127,66 +189,118 @@ public:
// ReadView
//
/** Always returns `false`; Ledger objects are never open. */
bool
open() const override
{
return false;
}
/** Returns the ledger header (sequence, hashes, close time, drops, etc.). */
LedgerHeader const&
header() const override
{
return header_;
}
/** Overwrite the in-memory ledger header wholesale.
*
* Used during ledger reconstruction from external data before the
* ledger is made immutable. Do not call on an immutable ledger.
*
* @param info New header to install.
*/
void
setLedgerInfo(LedgerHeader const& info)
{
header_ = info;
}
/** Returns the fee schedule parsed from the on-ledger fee SLE. */
Fees const&
fees() const override
{
return fees_;
}
/** Returns the protocol rules in effect for this ledger. */
Rules const&
rules() const override
{
return rules_;
}
/** Returns `true` if the state map contains an entry matching `k`.
*
* @param k Keylet identifying the ledger entry (type + key).
*/
bool
exists(Keylet const& k) const override;
/** Returns `true` if the state map contains an entry at the raw key.
*
* @param key 256-bit SHAMap key to look up (no type check).
*/
bool
exists(uint256 const& key) const;
/** Find the smallest state-map key strictly greater than `key`.
*
* @param key Lower bound (exclusive) for the search.
* @param last If set, keys >= `last` are not returned.
* @return The next key, or `std::nullopt` if none exists in range.
*/
std::optional<uint256>
succ(uint256 const& key, std::optional<uint256> const& last = std::nullopt) const override;
/** Deserialize and return the state entry identified by `k`.
*
* Checks the keylet type against the deserialized SLE; returns
* `nullptr` if the key is missing or the type check fails.
*
* @param k Keylet specifying the key and expected ledger-entry type.
* @return Shared pointer to the immutable SLE, or `nullptr`.
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(Keylet const& k) const override;
/** Return a begin iterator over all state-map entries. */
std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesBegin() const override;
/** Return a past-the-end iterator over all state-map entries. */
std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesEnd() const override;
/** Return an iterator to the first state-map entry with key > `key`. */
std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesUpperBound(uint256 const& key) const override;
/** Return a begin iterator over all transaction-map entries.
*
* @note Transactions are yielded with metadata for closed ledgers and
* without metadata for open ledgers (always closed for `Ledger`).
*/
std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsBegin() const override;
/** Return a past-the-end iterator over all transaction-map entries. */
std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsEnd() const override;
/** Returns `true` if the transaction map contains an entry for `key`. */
bool
txExists(uint256 const& key) const override;
/** Deserialize and return the transaction (plus metadata) for `key`.
*
* For a closed ledger both the `STTx` and the `STObject` metadata are
* returned. Returns an empty pair if the key is not present.
*
* @param key Transaction ID to look up.
* @return Pair of `(STTx const*, STObject const*)` shared pointers;
* either or both may be null on miss.
*/
tx_type
txRead(key_type const& key) const override;
@@ -194,6 +308,17 @@ public:
// DigestAwareReadView
//
/** Return the Merkle hash of the state-map leaf at `key`.
*
* Used by `CachedView` to detect whether a cached SLE is stale.
* Returns `std::nullopt` if no entry exists at `key`.
*
* @note The current implementation loads the SHAMap item from the node
* store as a side-effect; see the inline comment in `Ledger.cpp`.
*
* @param key 256-bit state-map key to hash.
* @return The leaf node hash, or `std::nullopt` if absent.
*/
std::optional<digest_type>
digest(key_type const& key) const override;
@@ -201,18 +326,53 @@ public:
// RawView
//
/** Remove the state entry whose key matches `sle->key()`.
*
* Calls `logicError` if the key does not exist in the state map.
*
* @param sle Entry to remove; only the key is used.
*/
void
rawErase(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Insert a new state entry for `sle`.
*
* Serializes the SLE and adds it to the state SHAMap. Calls
* `logicError` if an entry with the same key already exists.
*
* @param sle Entry to insert; must not already be present.
*/
void
rawInsert(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Remove the state entry at the raw key `key`.
*
* Overload for callers that hold only the key rather than an SLE.
* Calls `logicError` if the key does not exist.
*
* @param key 256-bit state-map key of the entry to remove.
*/
void
rawErase(uint256 const& key);
/** Replace (overwrite) an existing state entry with `sle`.
*
* Serializes the SLE and updates the state SHAMap in place. Calls
* `logicError` if no entry exists at `sle->key()`.
*
* @param sle Replacement entry; key must already be present.
*/
void
rawReplace(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Burn `fee` drops from the ledger's total XRP supply.
*
* Implements XRPL's deflationary model: transaction fees are
* permanently destroyed rather than redistributed. Decrements
* `header_.drops` directly.
*
* @param fee Amount to deduct from the total coin supply.
*/
void
rawDestroyXRP(XRPAmount const& fee) override
{
@@ -223,6 +383,17 @@ public:
// TxsRawView
//
/** Append a transaction + metadata blob to the transaction map.
*
* Encodes `txn` and `metaData` as two back-to-back variable-length
* fields and inserts the result at `key`. Asserts that `metaData`
* is non-null (open ledgers must not call this). Calls `logicError`
* if `key` is already present (duplicate transaction).
*
* @param key Transaction ID (SHAMap key).
* @param txn Serialized transaction blob.
* @param metaData Serialized transaction metadata blob; must be non-null.
*/
void
rawTxInsert(
uint256 const& key,
@@ -231,37 +402,66 @@ public:
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Mark this ledger as validated by the network.
*
* Sets `header_.validated = true`. This is a local-node annotation
* only; it does not affect the consensus hash or any on-ledger state.
*/
void
setValidated() const
{
header_.validated = true;
}
/** Finalise timing fields and transition this ledger to immutable.
*
* Records `closeTime`, `closeResolution`, and the close-flag
* (`kS_LCF_NO_CONSENSUS_TIME` when `correctCloseTime` is `false`),
* then delegates to `setImmutable()`.
*
* @pre `!open()` — the ledger must already be closed.
*
* @param closeTime Agreed consensus close time.
* @param closeResolution Resolution used to bin the close time.
* @param correctCloseTime `true` if consensus agreed on the close time;
* `false` sets the no-consensus-time flag in the header.
*/
void
setAccepted(
NetClock::time_point closeTime,
NetClock::duration closeResolution,
bool correctCloseTime);
/** Compute hashes and lock the ledger against further mutation.
*
* When `rehash` is `true` (the default): computes `header_.txHash`
* and `header_.accountHash` from the respective SHAMap roots, then
* computes the canonical ledger hash via `calculateLedgerHash()`.
* Regardless of `rehash`, sets `immutable_ = true`, calls
* `setImmutable()` on both SHAMaps, and calls `setup()` to populate
* `fees_` and `rules_` from the state map.
*
* @param rehash If `false`, skip hash computation (used when the
* hashes are already known, e.g. on load from the database).
*/
void
setImmutable(bool rehash = true);
/** Returns `true` if `setImmutable()` has been called on this ledger. */
bool
isImmutable() const
{
return immutable_;
}
/* Mark this ledger as "should be full".
"Full" is metadata property of the ledger, it indicates
that the local server wants all the corresponding nodes
in durable storage.
This is marked `const` because it reflects metadata
and not data that is in common with other nodes on the
network.
*/
/** Tell the node store to retain all SHAMap nodes for this ledger.
*
* "Full" is a local storage policy: when set, the node store will keep
* all state-map and transaction-map nodes for this ledger in durable
* storage rather than evicting them. Declared `const` because fullness
* is node-local metadata — two nodes holding the same ledger may differ
* on this property without affecting consensus.
*/
void
setFull() const
{
@@ -271,145 +471,283 @@ public:
stateMap_.setLedgerSeq(header_.seq);
}
/** Overwrite the total XRP supply recorded in the ledger header.
*
* Used when building ledgers from external data sources (e.g. JSON
* import) before the ledger is made immutable.
*
* @param totDrops New total supply in drops.
*/
void
setTotalDrops(std::uint64_t totDrops)
{
header_.drops = totDrops;
}
/** Returns a read-only reference to the state SHAMap. */
SHAMap const&
stateMap() const
{
return stateMap_;
}
/** Returns a mutable reference to the state SHAMap.
*
* @note Only valid while the ledger is mutable.
*/
SHAMap&
stateMap()
{
return stateMap_;
}
/** Returns a read-only reference to the transaction SHAMap. */
SHAMap const&
txMap() const
{
return txMap_;
}
/** Returns a mutable reference to the transaction SHAMap.
*
* @note Only valid while the ledger is mutable.
*/
SHAMap&
txMap()
{
return txMap_;
}
// returns false on error
/** Serialize `sle` and add it directly to the state SHAMap.
*
* Convenience wrapper used during ledger construction from external
* data sources. Unlike `rawInsert`, this does not assert on failure.
*
* @param sle State entry to serialize and insert.
* @return `true` on success; `false` if the key already exists or the
* underlying `SHAMap::addItem` call fails.
*/
bool
addSLE(SLE const& sle);
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Update the two-tier skip list stored in the state map.
*
* The skip list enables O(1) historical hash lookup. This method
* maintains two SLEs:
* - `keylet::skip(prevIndex)` — a permanent record written for every
* 256-aligned predecessor sequence; stores up to 256 ancestor hashes.
* - `keylet::skip()` — a rolling window of the 256 most recent parent
* hashes; oldest entry is evicted when the list is full.
*
* Must be called on a mutable ledger before `setImmutable()`.
*/
void
updateSkipList();
/** Verify that every SHAMap node for this ledger is reachable.
*
* Walks both the state map and the transaction map and collects missing
* node reports. Logs the first missing node of each type to `j`.
*
* @param j Journal to receive missing-node diagnostics.
* @param parallel If `true`, walks the state map using parallel
* traversal (faster on multi-core hardware).
* @return `true` if both maps are fully present; `false` if any nodes
* are missing.
*/
bool
walkLedger(beast::Journal j, bool parallel = false) const;
/** Perform basic sanity checks on the ledger header vs. SHAMap hashes.
*
* Verifies that `header_.hash`, `header_.accountHash`, and
* `header_.txHash` are all non-zero and that the account and
* transaction hashes match the actual SHAMap roots.
*
* @return `true` if all checks pass.
*/
bool
isSensible() const;
/** Assert internal SHAMap invariants for both the state and tx maps.
*
* Delegates to `SHAMap::invariants()` on each map. Intended for
* debug-build integrity checks.
*/
void
invariants() const;
/** Release copy-on-write sharing of SHAMap nodes.
*
* After a copy-on-write snapshot is made (e.g. in the successor
* constructor), internal SHAMap nodes may be shared between the parent
* and child ledgers. Calling `unshare()` on the mutable child forces
* a deep copy so the two trees are fully independent.
*/
void
unshare() const;
/**
* get Negative UNL validators' master public keys
/** Read the current set of Negative UNL validators from the state map.
*
* @return the public keys
* The Negative UNL is a consensus mechanism that temporarily removes
* chronically offline validators without breaking liveness. This
* method reads the `sfDisabledValidators` array from the
* `keylet::negativeUNL()` SLE.
*
* @return Master public keys of all currently disabled validators;
* empty if no Negative UNL entry exists or it has no members.
*/
hash_set<PublicKey>
negativeUNL() const;
/**
* get the to be disabled validator's master public key if any
/** Return the validator scheduled for disabling at the next flag ledger.
*
* @return the public key if any
* Reads `sfValidatorToDisable` from the Negative UNL SLE, if present.
*
* @return The validator's master public key, or `std::nullopt` if none
* is pending.
*/
std::optional<PublicKey>
validatorToDisable() const;
/**
* get the to be re-enabled validator's master public key if any
/** Return the validator scheduled for re-enabling at the next flag ledger.
*
* @return the public key if any
* Reads `sfValidatorToReEnable` from the Negative UNL SLE, if present.
*
* @return The validator's master public key, or `std::nullopt` if none
* is pending.
*/
std::optional<PublicKey>
validatorToReEnable() const;
/**
* update the Negative UNL ledger component.
* @note must be called at and only at flag ledgers
* must be called before applying UNLModify Tx
/** Apply the pending Negative UNL changes recorded in the state map.
*
* Promotes `sfValidatorToDisable` into `sfDisabledValidators` and
* removes `sfValidatorToReEnable` from that array. If the resulting
* disabled set is empty, the entire Negative UNL SLE is deleted.
*
* @note Must be called exactly once per flag ledger (sequence divisible
* by 256) and *before* any `UNLModify` transaction is applied.
*/
void
updateNegativeUNL();
/** Returns true if the ledger is a flag ledger */
/** Returns `true` if this is a flag ledger (sequence divisible by 256).
*
* Flag ledgers carry out amendment votes, fee votes, and Negative UNL
* updates. These actions must not occur on non-flag ledgers.
*/
bool
isFlagLedger() const;
/** Returns true if the ledger directly precedes a flag ledger */
/** Returns `true` if this ledger directly precedes a flag ledger.
*
* Voting ledgers (flagSeq 1) are where validators cast their
* amendment and fee preferences before the flag-ledger processing pass.
*/
bool
isVotingLedger() const;
/** Deserialize and return a mutable SLE at keylet `k`.
*
* Unlike `read()`, the returned SLE is not `const` and may be passed
* to `rawReplace()` or `rawErase()`. Returns `nullptr` if the key
* is absent or the keylet type check fails.
*
* @note The caller must use the returned pointer only with the same
* `Ledger` instance; crossing to another view is a `LogicError`.
*
* @param k Keylet identifying the entry.
* @return Mutable SLE, or `nullptr` if not found.
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE>
peek(Keylet const& k) const;
private:
/** SHAMap-backed iterator implementation for `ReadView::sles`. */
class SlesIterImpl;
/** SHAMap-backed iterator implementation for `ReadView::txs`.
*
* Deserializes with metadata for closed ledgers, without for open ones.
*/
class TxsIterImpl;
/** Populate `fees_` and `rules_` from the current state map.
*
* Reads `keylet::fees()` and applies the fee fields to `fees_`, then
* rebuilds `rules_` via `makeRulesGivenLedger`. Returns `false` if a
* `SHAMapMissingNode` is caught or if the fee SLE contains an illegal
* combination of old and new fee fields; otherwise returns `true`.
*
* @note Called by every constructor and by `setImmutable()`.
*/
bool
setup();
/** @brief Deserialize a SHAMapItem containing a single STTx.
/** Deserialize a SHAMapItem containing a single `STTx`.
*
* @param item The SHAMapItem to deserialize.
* @return A shared pointer to the deserialized transaction.
* @throw May throw on deserialization error.
* Used by `TxsIterImpl` for open ledgers (no metadata).
*
* @param item The SHAMap leaf to deserialize.
* @return Shared pointer to the deserialized transaction.
* @throw May throw on deserialization error.
*/
static std::shared_ptr<STTx const>
deserializeTx(SHAMapItem const& item);
/** @brief Deserialize a SHAMapItem containing STTx + STObject metadata.
/** Deserialize a SHAMapItem containing an `STTx` followed by `STObject` metadata.
*
* The SHAMapItem must contain two variable length serialization objects.
* The item must encode two back-to-back variable-length fields: the
* serialized transaction blob first, then the metadata blob.
*
* @param item The SHAMapItem to deserialize.
* @return A pair containing shared pointers to the deserialized transaction
* and metadata.
* @throw May throw on deserialization error.
* @param item The SHAMap leaf to deserialize.
* @return Pair of shared pointers to the transaction and its metadata.
* @throw May throw on deserialization error.
*/
static std::pair<std::shared_ptr<STTx const>, std::shared_ptr<STObject const>>
deserializeTxPlusMeta(SHAMapItem const& item);
/** `true` after `setImmutable()` has been called; mutations are forbidden. */
bool immutable_;
// A SHAMap containing the transactions associated with this ledger.
/** Merkleradix tree of transactions + metadata keyed by transaction ID.
*
* Declared `mutable` so `setFull()` and iterator accessors can be
* called in `const` contexts without violating logical immutability.
*/
SHAMap mutable txMap_;
// A SHAMap containing the state objects for this ledger.
/** Merkleradix tree of all ledger state entries (SLEs) keyed by their
* 256-bit key.
*
* Declared `mutable` for the same reason as `txMap_`.
*/
SHAMap mutable stateMap_;
// Protects fee variables
/** Guards `fees_` during the narrow mutable window before `setImmutable()`
* completes; not held on the read path once the ledger is immutable.
*/
std::mutex mutable mutex_;
Fees fees_;
Rules rules_;
LedgerHeader header_;
beast::Journal j_;
Fees fees_; /**< Fee schedule parsed from the on-ledger fee SLE. */
Rules rules_; /**< Protocol rules derived from enabled amendments. */
LedgerHeader header_; /**< Sequence, hashes, close time, coin supply, etc. */
beast::Journal j_; /**< Journal for constructor and `setup()` diagnostics. */
};
/** A ledger wrapped in a CachedView. */
/** Standard shareable ledger type used at rest in most of the server.
*
* `CachedView<Ledger>` layers an `unordered_map` in front of the raw
* `Ledger`, caching deserialized SLEs by key so that frequently accessed
* state entries are not repeatedly deserialized from the SHAMap. This is
* the type that callers such as the transaction engine and RPC handlers
* typically hold, not a raw `Ledger`.
*
* @see CachedView
*/
using CachedLedger = CachedView<Ledger>;
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
/** @file
* Ledger close-time resolution binning and monotonicity enforcement.
*
* Provides compile-time constants and three header-only template functions
* that translate raw wall-clock observations into canonical, network-agreed
* close timestamps written into every immutable ledger record. The binning
* approach lets validators with imperfectly synchronized clocks converge on
* a single close time without requiring a global time source.
*
* @see getNextLedgerTimeResolution, roundCloseTime, effCloseTime
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
@@ -7,11 +19,18 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Possible ledger close time resolutions.
Values should not be duplicated.
@see getNextLedgerTimeResolution
*/
/** Ordered ladder of candidate close-time bin sizes, in seconds.
*
* The six values — 10, 20, 30, 60, 90, 120 seconds — form a strictly
* increasing sequence. `getNextLedgerTimeResolution` traverses this array
* to coarsen (move toward index 5) on disagreement and to refine (move
* toward index 0) on agreement. The array order directly encodes the
* coarser/finer direction; no separate mapping is needed.
*
* Values must be unique and sorted in ascending order.
*
* @see getNextLedgerTimeResolution
*/
std::chrono::seconds constexpr kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS[] = {
std::chrono::seconds{10},
std::chrono::seconds{20},
@@ -20,41 +39,77 @@ std::chrono::seconds constexpr kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS[] = {
std::chrono::seconds{90},
std::chrono::seconds{120}};
//! Initial resolution of ledger close time.
/** Default close-time resolution used for all ordinary (non-genesis) ledgers.
*
* Equal to `kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS[2]` (30 seconds). Every
* consensus round starts from this resolution and adjusts based on prior
* agreement history via `getNextLedgerTimeResolution`.
*/
auto constexpr kLEDGER_DEFAULT_TIME_RESOLUTION = kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS[2];
//! Close time resolution in genesis ledger
/** Close-time resolution used exclusively for the genesis ledger.
*
* Equal to `kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS[0]` (10 seconds), the finest
* available bin. There is no prior-ledger disagreement history at genesis,
* so the finest resolution is chosen as the starting point.
*/
auto constexpr kLEDGER_GENESIS_TIME_RESOLUTION = kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS[0];
//! How often we increase the close time resolution (in numbers of ledgers)
/** Number of ledgers between successive close-time resolution refinements.
*
* When the prior ledger reached close-time consensus, the resolution moves
* one step finer only every 8th ledger. This conservative cadence avoids
* prematurely tightening the bin size after a brief period of agreement,
* which could immediately reintroduce disagreements on slightly skewed clocks.
*
* @see getNextLedgerTimeResolution, kDECREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY
*/
auto constexpr kINCREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY = 8;
//! How often we decrease the close time resolution (in numbers of ledgers)
/** Number of ledgers between successive close-time resolution coarsenings.
*
* When the prior ledger failed to reach close-time consensus, the resolution
* moves one step coarser on every ledger (value = 1). This aggressive
* back-off quickly finds a bin size that absorbs the validators' clock skew,
* deliberately asymmetric with the slower refinement cadence.
*
* @see getNextLedgerTimeResolution, kINCREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY
*/
auto constexpr kDECREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY = 1;
/** Calculates the close time resolution for the specified ledger.
The XRPL protocol uses binning to represent time intervals using only one
timestamp. This allows servers to derive a common time for the next ledger,
without the need for perfectly synchronized clocks.
The time resolution (i.e. the size of the intervals) is adjusted dynamically
based on what happened in the last ledger, to try to avoid disagreements.
@param previousResolution the resolution used for the prior ledger
@param previousAgree whether consensus agreed on the close time of the prior
ledger
@param ledgerSeq the sequence number of the new ledger
@pre previousResolution must be a valid bin
from @ref kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS
@tparam Rep Type representing number of ticks in std::chrono::duration
@tparam Period An std::ratio representing tick period in
std::chrono::duration
@tparam Seq Unsigned integer-like type corresponding to the ledger sequence
number. It should be comparable to 0 and support modular
division. Built-in and tagged_integers are supported.
*/
/** Compute the close-time resolution to use for the next ledger.
*
* Implements the adaptive binning policy: if the prior ledger failed to
* reach close-time consensus the bin size is coarsened (every ledger,
* per `kDECREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY`); if it succeeded the bin
* size is refined (every 8th ledger, per
* `kINCREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY`). Both adjustments saturate at
* the boundaries of `kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS` rather than
* wrapping. The two rules are mutually exclusive — only one fires per call.
*
* Called by the consensus engine at the start of every round to set
* `closeResolution_`, which is then used for the full round's close-time
* voting and embedded in the accepted ledger.
*
* @param previousResolution The close-time resolution used for the prior
* ledger; must be one of the values in
* `kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS`.
* @param previousAgree Whether the network agreed on the prior ledger's
* close time (true = finer bins are safe to try).
* @param ledgerSeq Sequence number of the ledger being built; must be
* non-zero. Used for the modulo-based rate-limiting of each direction.
* @return The resolution to apply for the new ledger, chosen from
* `kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS`.
*
* @pre `previousResolution` is an element of `kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS`.
* @pre `ledgerSeq != Seq{0}`.
*
* @tparam Rep Tick-count type of the `std::chrono::duration`.
* @tparam Period `std::ratio` tick period of the `std::chrono::duration`.
* @tparam Seq Unsigned integer-like type for the ledger sequence number;
* supports `operator%` and comparison with `Seq{0}`. Both built-in
* integers and XRPL `tagged_integer` wrappers are accepted.
*/
template <class Rep, class Period, class Seq>
std::chrono::duration<Rep, Period>
getNextLedgerTimeResolution(
@@ -65,7 +120,6 @@ getNextLedgerTimeResolution(
XRPL_ASSERT(ledgerSeq != Seq{0}, "xrpl::getNextLedgerTimeResolution : valid ledger sequence");
using namespace std::chrono;
// Find the current resolution:
auto iter = std::find(
std::begin(kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS),
std::end(kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS),
@@ -78,16 +132,12 @@ getNextLedgerTimeResolution(
if (iter == std::end(kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS))
return previousResolution;
// If we did not previously agree, we try to decrease the resolution to
// improve the chance that we will agree now.
if (!previousAgree && (ledgerSeq % Seq{kDECREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY} == Seq{0}))
{
if (++iter != std::end(kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS))
return *iter;
}
// If we previously agreed, we try to increase the resolution to determine
// if we can continue to agree.
if (previousAgree && (ledgerSeq % Seq{kINCREASE_LEDGER_TIME_RESOLUTION_EVERY} == Seq{0}))
{
if (iter-- != std::begin(kLEDGER_POSSIBLE_TIME_RESOLUTIONS))
@@ -97,13 +147,26 @@ getNextLedgerTimeResolution(
return previousResolution;
}
/** Calculates the close time for a ledger, given a close time resolution.
@param closeTime The time to be rounded
@param closeResolution The resolution
@return @b closeTime rounded to the nearest multiple of @b closeResolution.
Rounds up if @b closeTime is midway between multiples of @b closeResolution.
*/
/** Round a ledger close time to the nearest bin boundary.
*
* Bins are aligned to multiples of `closeResolution` measured from the
* clock epoch (`time_since_epoch()`), so any two validators computing this
* on the same raw time will produce the same result regardless of local
* state — a correctness prerequisite for network agreement. Ties (a time
* exactly at the midpoint between two boundaries) round up to the later bin.
*
* A default-constructed `time_point{}` (the epoch sentinel signalling no
* agreed close time) is returned unchanged without any rounding.
*
* @param closeTime The raw close-time observation to round.
* @param closeResolution The bin size; must be positive and non-zero.
* @return `closeTime` rounded to the nearest epoch-anchored multiple of
* `closeResolution`, or `closeTime` unmodified if it equals
* `time_point{}`.
*
* @note Called by `effCloseTime` and also directly by the consensus engine
* via `asCloseTime()` to canonicalize individual peer proposals.
*/
template <class Clock, class Duration, class Rep, class Period>
std::chrono::time_point<Clock, Duration>
roundCloseTime(
@@ -118,15 +181,30 @@ roundCloseTime(
return closeTime - (closeTime.time_since_epoch() % closeResolution);
}
/** Calculate the effective ledger close time
After adjusting the ledger close time based on the current resolution, also
ensure it is sufficiently separated from the prior close time.
@param closeTime The raw ledger close time
@param resolution The current close time resolution
@param priorCloseTime The close time of the prior ledger
*/
/** Compute the effective close time for a ledger, enforcing monotonicity.
*
* Rounds `closeTime` via `roundCloseTime`, then clamps the result to be
* strictly greater than `priorCloseTime`. The clamp (`priorCloseTime + 1s`)
* handles the edge case where a very fast close would otherwise produce a
* rounded time equal to or earlier than the prior ledger's close time,
* violating the invariant that ledger timestamps increase strictly along the
* chain. When the rounded value is already later than `priorCloseTime`, it
* passes through unchanged.
*
* A default-constructed `closeTime` (the epoch sentinel for "no agreed close
* time") is returned unchanged without rounding or clamping.
*
* @param closeTime The raw close-time observation for this ledger.
* @param resolution The bin size for this round's close-time voting.
* @param priorCloseTime The effective close time of the preceding ledger;
* used as the strict lower bound.
* @return `max(roundCloseTime(closeTime, resolution), priorCloseTime + 1s)`,
* or `closeTime` unmodified if it equals `time_point{}`.
*
* @note Example edge cases (30 s bins, priorCloseTime = 0 s):
* - `effCloseTime(10s, 30s, 0s)` → `1s` (rounded = 0s, clamped to 1s)
* - `effCloseTime(16s, 30s, 0s)` → `30s` (rounded = 30s, passes through)
*/
template <class Clock, class Duration, class Rep, class Period>
std::chrono::time_point<Clock, Duration>
effCloseTime(

View File

@@ -14,21 +14,29 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Open ledger construction tag.
Views constructed with this tag will have the
rules of open ledgers applied during transaction
processing.
/** Tag type for constructing an open-ledger view.
*
* Pass `kOPEN_LEDGER` to the `OpenView` constructor to build a fresh open
* ledger on top of a base. The header sequence is incremented, `parentHash`
* and `parentCloseTime` are derived from the base, and `validated`/`accepted`
* flags are cleared. Rules are supplied explicitly by the caller.
*
* @see kOPEN_LEDGER
*/
inline constexpr struct OpenLedgerT
{
explicit constexpr OpenLedgerT() = default;
} kOPEN_LEDGER{};
/** Batch view construction tag.
Views constructed with this tag are part of a stack of views
used during batch transaction applied.
/** Tag type for constructing a batch-mode view.
*
* Pass `kBATCH_VIEW` to the `OpenView` constructor when building a child view
* during batch transaction processing. The child wraps an existing `OpenView`
* and captures its current transaction count as `baseTxCount_`, so that
* `txCount()` ordinals remain globally unique and monotonically increasing
* within the enclosing ledger regardless of how many sub-views are stacked.
*
* @see kBATCH_VIEW
*/
inline constexpr struct BatchViewT
{
@@ -37,10 +45,31 @@ inline constexpr struct BatchViewT
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Writable ledger view that accumulates state and tx changes.
@note Presented as ReadView to clients.
*/
/** Mutable ledger view used during transaction processing.
*
* Implements the delta-accumulation pattern: holds an immutable base
* `ReadView` (typically the most recent closed ledger) and records all SLE
* mutations and inserted transactions as a pending diff on top of it.
* Nothing is written through to the base until `apply()` is called, making
* it safe to discard changes on failure.
*
* State-object mutations are buffered in `items_` (`RawStateTable`). All
* `ReadView` queries merge the base and the pending diff transparently, so
* the apparent ledger state is always consistent. Transaction records are
* kept in `txs_` (a PMR `std::map`); open ledgers omit metadata while
* closed representations include it.
*
* Both maps are backed by a 256 KB `monotonic_buffer_resource` for O(1)
* amortised allocation with no per-element heap overhead. The resource is
* a `unique_ptr` so move-construction maintains stable addressing for the
* maps' `polymorphic_allocator` raw pointers.
*
* @note Move assignment and copy assignment are deleted; only move
* construction and copy construction are available.
* @note Callers holding `ReadView const*` see a coherent read-only snapshot
* that merges base state and pending modifications without needing to
* know whether the ledger is settled.
*/
class OpenView final : public ReadView, public TxsRawView
{
private:
@@ -98,145 +127,249 @@ public:
OpenView(OpenView&&) = default;
/** Construct a shallow copy.
Effects:
Creates a new object with a copy of
the modification state table.
The objects managed by shared pointers are
not duplicated but shared between instances.
Since the SLEs are immutable, calls on the
RawView interface cannot break invariants.
*/
/** Construct a copy of this view with a fresh PMR arena.
*
* The modification state table (`items_`) and transaction map (`txs_`)
* are copied into a newly allocated 256 KB monotonic buffer. `shared_ptr`
* members (SLEs, `hold_`) are shared with the source — they are not
* deep-copied — which is safe because SLEs are immutable once published.
*/
OpenView(OpenView const&);
/** Construct an open ledger view.
Effects:
The sequence number is set to the
sequence number of parent plus one.
The parentCloseTime is set to the
closeTime of parent.
If `hold` is not nullptr, retains
ownership of a copy of `hold` until
the MetaView is destroyed.
Calls to rules() will return the
rules provided on construction.
The tx list starts empty and will contain
all newly inserted tx.
*/
/** Construct a fresh open ledger view on top of a closed base.
*
* The header is derived from `base`: sequence is incremented by one,
* `parentCloseTime` is set to the base close time, `parentHash` is set
* to the base hash, and `validated`/`accepted` flags are cleared.
* The transaction list starts empty.
*
* @param base The most recent closed ledger; must outlive this view
* unless `hold` is provided.
* @param rules Rules governing this open ledger; may differ from what
* the base recorded.
* @param hold Optional shared pointer keeping `base`'s backing object
* alive for the lifetime of this view.
*/
OpenView(
OpenLedgerT,
ReadView const* base,
Rules rules,
std::shared_ptr<void const> hold = nullptr);
/** Convenience overload that keeps the base alive via shared ownership.
*
* Equivalent to the three-argument `OpenLedgerT` constructor, but takes
* a `shared_ptr` so the caller need not manage lifetime separately.
*
* @param rules Rules governing this open ledger.
* @param base Shared pointer to the closed base ledger.
*/
OpenView(OpenLedgerT, Rules const& rules, std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& base)
: OpenView(kOPEN_LEDGER, &*base, rules, base)
{
}
/** Construct a batch child view on top of an existing open ledger.
*
* Wraps `base` as a read-through fallback and snapshots its current
* `txCount()` into `baseTxCount_`. This ensures that `txCount()` on this
* child continues from where the parent left off, preserving monotonically
* increasing apply-ordinals in transaction metadata.
*
* @param base The parent `OpenView` to wrap; must outlive this child.
*/
OpenView(BatchViewT, OpenView& base) : OpenView(std::addressof(base))
{
baseTxCount_ = base.txCount();
}
/** Construct a new last closed ledger.
Effects:
The LedgerHeader is copied from the base.
The rules are inherited from the base.
The tx list starts empty and will contain
all newly inserted tx.
*/
/** Construct a view representing a last-closed ledger.
*
* Copies the `LedgerHeader` and `Rules` directly from `base`, and
* inherits its `open_` flag — so if the base was a closed ledger, this
* view will also report itself as closed. The transaction list starts
* empty.
*
* @param base The source ledger; must outlive this view unless `hold`
* is provided.
* @param hold Optional shared pointer keeping `base`'s backing object
* alive for the lifetime of this view.
*/
OpenView(ReadView const* base, std::shared_ptr<void const> hold = nullptr);
/** Returns true if this reflects an open ledger. */
/** Returns true if this view represents an open (not yet closed) ledger. */
bool
open() const override
{
return open_;
}
/** Return the number of tx inserted since creation.
This is used to set the "apply ordinal"
when calculating transaction metadata.
*/
/** Return the total number of transactions applied since ledger construction.
*
* Computed as `baseTxCount_ + txs_.size()`. In batch mode `baseTxCount_`
* captures the parent view's count at the time this child was constructed,
* so ordinals are globally unique and monotonically increasing even when
* child views are committed incrementally.
*
* @return Number of transactions, used as the apply ordinal in metadata.
*/
std::size_t
txCount() const;
/** Apply changes. */
/** Commit all accumulated changes to the target view.
*
* Replays every buffered SLE mutation (`items_`) into `to` via
* `RawStateTable::apply`, then iterates `txs_` and calls
* `to.rawTxInsert()` for each transaction. The typical call site is
* `ApplyViewImpl::apply()`, which applies a per-transaction sandbox into
* the enclosing `OpenView`; later the `OpenView` itself is applied into
* the final ledger object.
*
* @param to The target view that receives all mutations and transactions.
*/
void
apply(TxsRawView& to) const;
// ReadView
/** @return The current ledger header (sequence, hashes, close times). */
LedgerHeader const&
header() const override;
/** @return The fee schedule inherited from the base ledger. */
Fees const&
fees() const override;
/** @return The amendment rules supplied at construction or inherited from base. */
Rules const&
rules() const override;
/** Check whether a ledger entry exists, merging base state and pending diff.
*
* @param k Keylet identifying the entry.
* @return `true` if the entry exists in the merged view.
*/
bool
exists(Keylet const& k) const override;
/** Return the smallest key strictly greater than `key` in the merged view.
*
* @param key The lower bound (exclusive) to search from.
* @param last Optional upper bound (inclusive); search is bounded to
* `[key+1, last]` when provided.
* @return The next key, or `std::nullopt` if none exists in range.
*/
std::optional<key_type>
succ(key_type const& key, std::optional<key_type> const& last = std::nullopt) const override;
/** Read a ledger entry from the merged view (base + pending diff).
*
* @param k Keylet identifying the entry.
* @return Shared pointer to the immutable SLE, or `nullptr` if absent.
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(Keylet const& k) const override;
/** @return Iterator to the first SLE in the merged state map. */
std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesBegin() const override;
/** @return Past-the-end iterator for the merged state map. */
std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesEnd() const override;
/** @return Iterator to the first SLE whose key is > `key` in the merged map.
*
* @param key The exclusive lower bound.
*/
std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesUpperBound(uint256 const& key) const override;
/** @return Iterator to the first transaction in this view's tx map.
*
* @note For open ledgers the iterator will not deserialize metadata;
* for closed-ledger views it will.
*/
std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsBegin() const override;
/** @return Past-the-end iterator for this view's tx map. */
std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsEnd() const override;
/** Check whether a transaction is present in this view's tx map.
*
* @param key The transaction ID.
* @return `true` if the transaction was inserted into this view.
*/
bool
txExists(key_type const& key) const override;
/** Read a transaction from this view, falling back to the base.
*
* @param key The transaction ID.
* @return Pair of `(STTx, optional metadata STObject)`; both pointers are
* null if the transaction is not found in this view or the base.
*/
tx_type
txRead(key_type const& key) const override;
// RawView
/** Buffer a deletion of an existing state item.
*
* Delegates to `RawStateTable::erase`. The entry will be removed from
* the merged view immediately and will not appear in subsequent reads.
*
* @param sle The SLE to erase; its key is extracted from the object.
*/
void
rawErase(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Buffer an insertion of a new state item.
*
* Delegates to `RawStateTable::insert`. The key must not already exist
* in the merged view.
*
* @param sle The new SLE to insert; its key is extracted from the object.
*/
void
rawInsert(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Buffer a replacement of an existing state item.
*
* Delegates to `RawStateTable::replace`. The key must already exist in
* the merged view.
*
* @param sle The replacement SLE; its key is extracted from the object.
*/
void
rawReplace(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Record destruction of XRP (burned as transaction fees).
*
* Delegates to `RawStateTable::destroyXRP`. The destroyed amount
* accumulates in the state table and is flushed to the target on `apply()`.
*
* @param fee The amount of XRP to destroy.
*/
void
rawDestroyXRP(XRPAmount const& fee) override;
// TxsRawView
/** Record a transaction in this view's transaction map.
*
* For open ledgers `metaData` is typically `nullptr`; for closed-ledger
* representations it carries the serialized `TxMeta`.
*
* @param key The transaction ID (must be unique within this view).
* @param txn Serialized transaction blob.
* @param metaData Serialized transaction metadata, or `nullptr` for open
* ledger entries.
* @throws std::logic_error if `key` is already present in this view's
* tx map. Duplicate transaction IDs are a hard invariant violation.
*/
void
rawTxInsert(
key_type const& key,

View File

@@ -14,75 +14,122 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Tracks order books in the ledger.
This interface provides access to order book information, including:
- Which order books exist in the ledger
- Querying order books by issue
- Managing order book subscriptions
The order book database is updated as ledgers are accepted and provides
efficient lookup of order book information for pathfinding and client
subscriptions.
*/
/** Pure abstract index of all active order books across the ledger.
*
* An order book is a directed trading pair — a set of open `ltOFFER` entries
* sharing the same "taker pays" (`in`) and "taker gets" (`out`) assets.
* Because pathfinding and client subscriptions both need fast lookups of
* which markets exist, this index is maintained separately from ledger state.
*
* The interface lives in the public ledger layer; the concrete implementation
* (`OrderBookDBImpl`) is instantiated via `makeOrderBookDb()` and injected
* through the service registry, keeping heavy implementation details out of
* consumer headers.
*
* @note All internal maps are guarded by a `std::recursive_mutex`. The
* expensive full-ledger scan in `setup()` builds new maps outside the
* lock and swaps them in a brief critical section, so reader calls are
* only briefly blocked rather than held for the duration of a full ledger
* traversal.
*/
class OrderBookDB
{
public:
virtual ~OrderBookDB() = default;
/** Initialize or update the order book database with a new ledger.
This method should be called when a new ledger is accepted to update
the order book database with the current state of all order books.
@param ledger The ledger to scan for order books
*/
/** Notify the database that a new ledger has been accepted.
*
* Triggers a throttled full-ledger scan when needed. The scan is skipped
* if the new ledger is within 25,600 sequences ahead of the last scanned
* ledger (incremental updates from `processTxn` keep the index current)
* or within 16 sequences behind it (small reorg). Outside these windows
* a full scan is scheduled — synchronously in standalone mode, or as a
* background job queue task otherwise. The scan rebuilds the book maps in
* local variables then swaps them under a lock to minimise reader
* contention.
*
* @param ledger The accepted ledger to evaluate; the scan reads every
* `ltDIR_NODE` with an `sfExchangeRate` field and every `ltAMM`
* object to rebuild the in-memory book maps.
*/
virtual void
setup(std::shared_ptr<ReadView const> const& ledger) = 0;
/** Add an order book to track.
@param book The order book to add
*/
/** Register a single order book without triggering a full ledger scan.
*
* Used to record a newly discovered book incrementally — for example,
* when a new offer type is seen in `processTxn` before the next scheduled
* full `setup()` scan.
*
* @param book The directed trading pair to register.
*/
virtual void
addOrderBook(Book const& book) = 0;
/** Get all order books that want a specific issue.
Returns a list of all order books where the taker pays the specified
issue. This is useful for pathfinding to find all possible next hops
from a given currency.
@param asset The asset to search for
@param domain Optional domain restriction for the order book
@return Vector of books that want this issue
*/
/** Return all order books whose "taker pays" side is @p asset.
*
* The primary pathfinding query: given an asset a sender currently holds,
* enumerate every market where that asset can be spent. The pathfinding
* engine calls this at each hop to discover possible next steps toward
* the destination currency.
*
* @param asset The asset the taker pays (the "in" side of the book).
* @param domain If provided, restricts results to books scoped to that
* permissioned domain; if absent, returns only global books.
* @return All `Book` objects with @p asset as their `in` side.
*/
virtual std::vector<Book>
getBooksByTakerPays(Asset const& asset, std::optional<Domain> const& domain = std::nullopt) = 0;
/** Get the count of order books that want a specific issue.
@param asset The asset to search for
@param domain Optional domain restriction for the order book
@return Number of books that want this issue
*/
/** Return the number of distinct "taker gets" assets available for @p asset.
*
* Used as a breadth-limiting heuristic by the pathfinding engine: a large
* count signals a liquid hub currency; a small count may not warrant
* deeper exploration.
*
* @param asset The asset the taker pays.
* @param domain If provided, counts only books in that permissioned domain;
* if absent, counts only global books.
* @return The number of order books whose "in" side matches @p asset.
*/
virtual int
getBookSize(Asset const& asset, std::optional<Domain> const& domain = std::nullopt) = 0;
/** Check if an order book to XRP exists for the given issue.
@param asset The asset to check
@param domain Optional domain restriction for the order book
@return true if a book from this issue to XRP exists
*/
/** Return whether any order book exists that sells @p asset for XRP.
*
* The implementation maintains a dedicated O(1) set (`xrpBooks_` /
* `xrpDomainBooks_`) so this check does not scan `allBooks_`. Pathfinding
* uses it to identify assets that can be liquidated directly to XRP
* without an intermediate hop.
*
* @param asset The asset the taker pays.
* @param domain If provided, checks the permissioned-domain book set;
* if absent, checks the global book set.
* @return `true` if a book with @p asset as "in" and XRP as "out" exists.
*/
virtual bool
isBookToXRP(Asset const& asset, std::optional<Domain> const& domain = std::nullopt) = 0;
/**
* Process a transaction for order book tracking.
* @param ledger The ledger the transaction was applied to
* @param alTx The transaction to process
* @param jvObj The JSON object of the transaction
/** Fan out a closed-ledger transaction to all relevant book subscribers.
*
* Walks the transaction's metadata nodes looking for `ltOFFER` entries
* that were created, modified, or deleted and extracts their `TakerGets`
* and `TakerPays` fields. For each affected offer, the reversed book
* (`TakerGets` → `TakerPays`) is looked up in the listeners map and, if
* subscribers exist, `BookListeners::publish()` is called.
*
* Deduplication is handled via a `hash_set<uint64_t> havePublished` local
* to each call: a subscriber whose sequence number is already in the set
* will not receive a second copy of the same transaction, even if multiple
* of its subscribed books were touched.
*
* @note Only called for transactions with result `tesSUCCESS`.
*
* @param ledger The closed ledger the transaction was applied to.
* @param alTx The fully materialised transaction-in-ledger projection,
* including metadata.
* @param jvObj Version-indexed JSON representation of the transaction,
* built once upstream and dispatched to subscribers by API version.
*/
virtual void
processTxn(
@@ -90,18 +137,30 @@ public:
AcceptedLedgerTx const& alTx,
MultiApiJson const& jvObj) = 0;
/**
* Get the book listeners for a book.
* @param book The book to get the listeners for
* @return The book listeners for the book
/** Return the listener set for @p book, or `nullptr` if none exists.
*
* Used when unsubscribing: a `nullptr` result means no entry needs to be
* updated. Avoids creating empty `BookListeners` objects for every book
* that passes through the system.
*
* @param book The directed trading pair to look up.
* @return Shared pointer to the existing `BookListeners` for @p book, or
* `nullptr` if no subscribers are registered.
*/
virtual BookListeners::pointer
getBookListeners(Book const&) = 0;
/**
* Create a new book listeners for a book.
* @param book The book to create the listeners for
* @return The new book listeners for the book
/** Return the listener set for @p book, creating it on demand.
*
* Used when subscribing: if no `BookListeners` entry exists for the book,
* one is created and inserted into the map before returning.
*
* @note Internally calls `getBookListeners()` under the same lock,
* which is why the implementation uses a `std::recursive_mutex`.
*
* @param book The directed trading pair to look up or create.
* @return Shared pointer to the (possibly newly created) `BookListeners`
* for @p book; never `nullptr`.
*/
virtual BookListeners::pointer
makeBookListeners(Book const&) = 0;

View File

@@ -14,10 +14,35 @@ namespace detail {
// VFALCO TODO Inline this implementation
// into the PaymentSandbox class itself
/** Bookkeeping ledger for credits deferred during payment execution.
*
* Tracks every credit applied through a `PaymentSandbox` so that
* balance queries can subtract those credits before reporting available
* funds. This prevents circular-path liquidity: a credit arriving at an
* intermediate account mid-payment cannot be re-spent by an earlier step
* in the same path.
*
* Two separate tables are maintained: `creditsIOU_` for IOU trust-line
* transfers (keyed by canonical `(lowAccount, highAccount, currency)`) and
* `creditsMPT_` for MPT issuances (keyed by `MPTID`). Owner-count
* maximums are stored in `ownerCounts_`.
*
* @note This class is an implementation detail of `PaymentSandbox` and is
* not intended for direct use by other components.
*/
class DeferredCredits
{
private:
using KeyIOU = std::tuple<AccountID, AccountID, Currency>;
/** Per-trust-line record of accumulated debits and the pre-credit balance.
*
* Debits are split by canonical endpoint: `lowAcctDebits` accumulates
* amounts sent by the account whose `AccountID` is lower; `highAcctDebits`
* accumulates amounts sent by the other endpoint. `lowAcctOrigBalance`
* holds the low-account's balance at the moment the first credit was
* recorded; it is never overwritten by subsequent credits.
*/
struct ValueIOU
{
explicit ValueIOU() = default;
@@ -26,41 +51,52 @@ private:
STAmount lowAcctOrigBalance;
};
/** Per-holder MPT debit record.
*
* `debit` accumulates the total MPT amount sent by this holder during
* the payment. `origBalance` is the holder's balance at the time the
* first debit was recorded; it is never overwritten by subsequent debits.
*/
struct HolderValueMPT
{
HolderValueMPT() = default;
// Debit to issuer
std::uint64_t debit = 0;
std::uint64_t origBalance = 0;
};
/** Per-issuance MPT record aggregating credits and self-debits.
*
* `holders` tracks per-holder debit entries. `credit` accumulates the
* total amount issued (i.e. credited to holders) during the payment.
* `origBalance` holds the issuer's `OutstandingAmount` at the time the
* first entry was recorded; it is never overwritten.
*
* `selfDebit` handles the case where the MPT issuer owns a sell offer.
* Because the payment engine runs in reverse, crediting a holder first
* can transiently push `OutstandingAmount` above `MaximumAmount`. When
* the issuer's own sell offer is consumed in a later (reversed) step,
* the available issuance capacity must be reduced by the offer amount.
* `selfDebit` accumulates those offer amounts so that
* `balanceHookSelfIssueMPT` can correctly cap available issuance.
*/
struct IssuerValueMPT
{
IssuerValueMPT() = default;
std::map<AccountID, HolderValueMPT> holders;
// Credit to holder
std::uint64_t credit = 0;
// OutstandingAmount might overflow when MPTs are credited to a holder.
// Consider A1 paying 100MPT to A2 and A1 already having maximum MPTs.
// Since the payment engine executes a payment in revers, A2 is
// credited first and OutstandingAmount is going to be equal
// to MaximumAmount + 100MPT. In the next step A1 redeems 100MPT
// to the issuer and OutstandingAmount balances out.
std::int64_t origBalance = 0;
// Self debit on offer selling MPT. Since the payment engine executes
// a payment in reverse, a crediting/buying step may overflow
// OutstandingAmount. A sell MPT offer owned by a holder can redeem any
// amount up to the offer's amount and holder's available funds,
// balancing out OutstandingAmount. But if the offer's owner is issuer
// then it issues more MPT. In this case the available amount to issue
// is the initial issuer's available amount less all offer sell amounts
// by the issuer. This is self-debit, where the offer's owner,
// issuer in this case, debits to self.
std::uint64_t selfDebit = 0;
};
using AdjustmentMPT = IssuerValueMPT;
public:
/** Query result for a single IOU trust-line adjustment.
*
* Oriented from the perspective of the `main` account passed to
* `adjustmentsIOU()`: `debits` is what `main` has sent, `credits` is
* what `main` has received, and `origBalance` is `main`'s balance
* before the first credit in this sandbox was recorded.
*/
struct AdjustmentIOU
{
AdjustmentIOU(STAmount d, STAmount c, STAmount b)
@@ -72,14 +108,44 @@ public:
STAmount origBalance;
};
// Get the adjustments for the balance between main and other.
// Returns the debits, credits and the original balance
/** Return the accumulated debit/credit adjustments for an IOU trust line.
*
* The result is oriented from `main`'s perspective: `debits` contains
* what `main` has sent to `other`, `credits` contains what `other` has
* sent to `main`, and `origBalance` is `main`'s balance at the time the
* first credit for this pair was recorded.
*
* @param main The account whose perspective determines orientation.
* @param other The counterparty account.
* @param currency The currency of the trust line.
* @return Adjustment record, or `std::nullopt` if no credits have been
* recorded for this pair in this sandbox.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<AdjustmentIOU>
adjustmentsIOU(AccountID const& main, AccountID const& other, Currency const& currency) const;
/** Return the accumulated MPT adjustments for a given issuance.
*
* @param mptID The unique identifier of the MPT issuance.
* @return Adjustment record, or `std::nullopt` if no credits have been
* recorded for this issuance in this sandbox.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<AdjustmentMPT>
adjustmentsMPT(MPTID const& mptID) const;
/** Record an IOU credit from `sender` to `receiver`.
*
* On the first call for a given `(sender, receiver, currency)` triple the
* pre-credit sender balance is saved as the original balance. Subsequent
* calls for the same triple accumulate debits without overwriting the
* original balance.
*
* @param sender Account sending the credit.
* @param receiver Account receiving the credit.
* @param amount Non-negative IOU amount being transferred.
* @param preCreditSenderBalance Sender's balance immediately before
* this credit is applied; only stored on the first call.
*/
void
creditIOU(
AccountID const& sender,
@@ -87,6 +153,20 @@ public:
STAmount const& amount,
STAmount const& preCreditSenderBalance);
/** Record an MPT credit from `sender` to `receiver`.
*
* Distinguishes between issuer-to-holder transfers (which increment the
* aggregate `credit` counter) and holder-to-issuer redemptions (which
* increment the per-holder `debit` counter). The original balances are
* stored only on the first call for each holder/issuance combination.
*
* @param sender Account sending the MPT.
* @param receiver Account receiving the MPT.
* @param amount Non-negative MPT amount being transferred.
* @param preCreditBalanceHolder Holder's MPT balance before this credit.
* @param preCreditBalanceIssuer Issuer's `OutstandingAmount` before this
* credit; only stored on the first call for this issuance.
*/
void
creditMPT(
AccountID const& sender,
@@ -95,22 +175,61 @@ public:
std::uint64_t preCreditBalanceHolder,
std::int64_t preCreditBalanceIssuer);
/** Record an MPT self-debit incurred by the issuer via a sell offer.
*
* When the issuer owns a sell offer and it is consumed, the payment
* engine (running in reverse) may have already credited a holder,
* pushing `OutstandingAmount` transiently above `MaximumAmount`. This
* call registers the offer amount as a self-debit so that
* `balanceHookSelfIssueMPT` can cap available issuance correctly.
*
* @param issue The MPT issuance involved.
* @param amount Amount of the issuer's sell offer that was consumed.
* @param origBalance Issuer's `OutstandingAmount` before this entry; only
* stored on the first call for this issuance.
*/
void
issuerSelfDebitMPT(MPTIssue const& issue, std::uint64_t amount, std::int64_t origBalance);
/** Record an owner-count transition for `account`.
*
* Stores the maximum of `cur` and `next`, and takes the maximum with any
* previously recorded value. Because payments only ever decrease owner
* counts, the highest observed count is the conservative bound that
* prevents a transient low count from bypassing reserve checks mid-payment.
*
* @param id Account whose owner count is changing.
* @param cur Current owner count before the transition.
* @param next Owner count after the transition.
*/
void
ownerCount(AccountID const& id, std::uint32_t cur, std::uint32_t next);
// Get the adjusted owner count. Since DeferredCredits is meant to be used
// in payments, and payments only decrease owner counts, return the max
// remembered owner count.
/** Return the maximum owner count observed for `account` in this sandbox.
*
* Since payments only decrease owner counts, the maximum is the correct
* conservative bound for reserve checks.
*
* @param id Account to query.
* @return The peak owner count, or `std::nullopt` if no transition has
* been recorded for this account.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<std::uint32_t>
ownerCount(AccountID const& id) const;
/** Merge this sandbox's deferred credits into a parent sandbox.
*
* Debit accumulators and self-debit fields are summed; original balances
* are never overwritten (the parent's earlier record takes precedence).
* Owner-count maximums are taken across both sandboxes.
*
* @param to The parent `DeferredCredits` table to merge into.
*/
void
apply(DeferredCredits& to);
private:
/** Produce a canonical `KeyIOU` by ordering the two accounts. */
static KeyIOU
makeKeyIOU(AccountID const& a1, AccountID const& a2, Currency const& currency);
@@ -123,18 +242,29 @@ private:
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** A wrapper which makes credits unavailable to balances.
This is used for payments and pathfinding, so that consuming
liquidity from a path never causes portions of that path or
other paths to gain liquidity.
The behavior of certain free functions in the ApplyView API
will change via the balanceHook and creditHook overrides
of PaymentSandbox.
@note Presented as ApplyView to clients
*/
/** Speculative ledger view that hides in-flight credits from balance queries.
*
* The XRPL payment engine processes multi-hop paths where value flows through
* chains of trust lines, order books, and AMM pools. Without a guard, a
* credit arriving at an intermediate account mid-path could immediately
* appear as spendable liquidity for a later step in the same path — allowing
* phantom value to be created. `PaymentSandbox` prevents this by intercepting
* every credit via the hook protocol defined in `ApplyView` and recording it
* in a `DeferredCredits` table. Balance queries then subtract those deferred
* credits so freshly-received funds are invisible to outgoing transfer checks
* until the entire transaction commits.
*
* `PaymentSandbox` can be stacked: constructing one on top of another via the
* pointer constructors creates a child sandbox whose deferred credits chain to
* the parent. The pathfinding engine uses this to evaluate each candidate
* strand in a disposable child, committing to the parent only on success.
*
* @note When constructing on top of an existing `PaymentSandbox`, you **must**
* use the explicit pointer constructors. Using the plain `ApplyView*`
* constructor would bypass deferred-credit propagation and break invariants.
*
* @note Presented as `ApplyView` to clients.
*/
class PaymentSandbox final : public detail::ApplyViewBase
{
public:
@@ -147,27 +277,40 @@ public:
PaymentSandbox(PaymentSandbox&&) = default;
/** Construct a root payment sandbox over a read-only base view.
*
* @param base The underlying ledger state to layer mutations on top of.
* @param flags Transaction-processing flags forwarded to `ApplyViewBase`.
*/
PaymentSandbox(ReadView const* base, ApplyFlags flags) : ApplyViewBase(base, flags)
{
}
/** Construct a payment sandbox over an existing `ApplyView`.
*
* Inherits the flags of the base view. Use the explicit pointer
* constructors instead if `base` is itself a `PaymentSandbox`.
*
* @param base The mutable view to build on top of.
*/
PaymentSandbox(ApplyView const* base) : ApplyViewBase(base, base->flags())
{
}
/** Construct on top of existing PaymentSandbox.
The changes are pushed to the parent when
apply() is called.
@param parent A non-null pointer to the parent.
@note A pointer is used to prevent confusion
with copy construction.
*/
// VFALCO If we are constructing on top of a PaymentSandbox,
// or a PaymentSandbox-derived class, we MUST go through
// one of these constructors or invariants will be broken.
/** Construct a child payment sandbox on top of an existing `PaymentSandbox`.
*
* The child's deferred-credit table chains to the parent so that balance
* adjustments aggregate correctly across the sandbox stack. Changes are
* not visible in the parent until `apply(PaymentSandbox&)` is called.
*
* @param parent Non-null pointer to the parent sandbox. A pointer is
* used rather than a reference to prevent confusion with copy
* construction.
*
* @note This overload set **must** be used whenever building on top of
* a `PaymentSandbox` or derived class. The plain `ApplyView*`
* constructor does not propagate deferred credits.
*/
/** @{ */
explicit PaymentSandbox(PaymentSandbox const* base)
: ApplyViewBase(base, base->flags()), ps_(base)
@@ -179,17 +322,67 @@ public:
}
/** @} */
/** Return the IOU balance adjusted for deferred credits.
*
* Walks the sandbox chain (this → parent → … ) and accumulates total
* debits from all ancestor tables. Returns
* `min(amount, origBalance - totalDebits, minObservedBalance)` to
* handle edge cases where rounding in the deferred table could otherwise
* overestimate usable funds. A computed negative XRP result is clamped
* to zero (it is not an error — it arises when a large credit is
* followed by the same debit within the path).
*
* @param account The account whose perspective determines orientation.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer (doubles as the currency issuer).
* @param amount The raw balance as reported by the underlying ledger.
* @return Adjusted balance with deferred credits hidden.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
balanceHookIOU(AccountID const& account, AccountID const& issuer, STAmount const& amount)
const override;
/** Return the MPT holder or issuer balance adjusted for deferred credits.
*
* Walks the sandbox chain accumulating per-holder debits (if `account`
* is a holder) or the aggregate issuer credit (if `account` is the
* issuer). Returns `min(amount, origBalance - totalAdjustment,
* minObservedBalance)`, clamped to zero.
*
* @param account The account being queried (holder or issuer).
* @param issue The MPT issuance.
* @param amount The raw balance as reported by the underlying ledger.
* @return Adjusted balance with deferred credits hidden.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
balanceHookMPT(AccountID const& account, MPTIssue const& issue, std::int64_t amount)
const override;
/** Return the issuer's available MPT issuance capacity, net of self-debits.
*
* When the issuer owns sell offers and the payment engine (running in
* reverse) has already consumed some of them, those amounts are recorded
* as self-debits. This hook caps available issuance at
* `origOutstandingAmount - totalSelfDebits`, returning zero if the result
* is non-positive.
*
* @param issue The MPT issuance.
* @param amount The raw `OutstandingAmount` from the underlying ledger.
* @return Available issuance capacity after subtracting self-debits.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
balanceHookSelfIssueMPT(MPTIssue const& issue, std::int64_t amount) const override;
/** Record an IOU credit in the deferred-credits table.
*
* Called by ledger mutation helpers at every IOU transfer. The recorded
* debit is used by `balanceHookIOU` to hide this credit from future
* balance queries within the same payment path.
*
* @param from Account sending the credit.
* @param to Account receiving the credit.
* @param amount Non-negative IOU amount being transferred.
* @param preCreditBalance Sender's balance immediately before this credit.
*/
void
creditHookIOU(
AccountID const& from,
@@ -197,6 +390,19 @@ public:
STAmount const& amount,
STAmount const& preCreditBalance) override;
/** Record an MPT credit in the deferred-credits table.
*
* Called by ledger mutation helpers at every MPT transfer. The recorded
* debit is used by `balanceHookMPT` to hide this credit from future
* balance queries within the same payment path.
*
* @param from Account sending the MPT.
* @param to Account receiving the MPT.
* @param amount Non-negative MPT amount being transferred.
* @param preCreditBalanceHolder Holder's MPT balance before this credit.
* @param preCreditBalanceIssuer Issuer's `OutstandingAmount` before this
* credit.
*/
void
creditHookMPT(
AccountID const& from,
@@ -205,22 +411,60 @@ public:
std::uint64_t preCreditBalanceHolder,
std::int64_t preCreditBalanceIssuer) override;
/** Record an MPT issuer self-debit arising from a consumed sell offer.
*
* Called when the MPT issuer's own sell offer is consumed during
* payment processing. Accumulates the offer amount in the
* `DeferredCredits` self-debit field so that `balanceHookSelfIssueMPT`
* can correctly limit further issuance capacity.
*
* @param issue The MPT issuance.
* @param amount Amount consumed from the issuer's sell offer.
* @param origBalance Issuer's `OutstandingAmount` before this entry.
*/
void
issuerSelfDebitHookMPT(MPTIssue const& issue, std::uint64_t amount, std::int64_t origBalance)
override;
/** Record an owner-count transition for reserve-check purposes.
*
* Stores the maximum of `cur` and `next` in the deferred-credits table.
* Because payments only decrease owner counts, the peak value is the
* conservative bound that prevents a transient low count from bypassing
* reserve checks mid-payment.
*
* @param account Account whose owner count is changing.
* @param cur Owner count before the transition.
* @param next Owner count after the transition.
*/
void
adjustOwnerCountHook(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t cur, std::uint32_t next) override;
/** Return the peak owner count observed for `account` in this sandbox chain.
*
* Walks the sandbox chain and returns the maximum recorded count across
* all ancestors, or `count` if no transition has been recorded.
*
* @param account Account to query.
* @param count Baseline count from the underlying ledger.
* @return The peak owner count seen across the sandbox chain.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::uint32_t
ownerCountHook(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t count) const override;
/** Apply changes to base view.
`to` must contain contents identical to the parent
view passed upon construction, else undefined
behavior will result.
*/
/** Commit changes to a base view.
*
* The two overloads serve different commit targets:
* - `apply(RawView&)` is the terminal commit: asserts this sandbox has
* no parent (`ps_ == nullptr`) and flushes the state journal to the
* raw ledger. The `RawView` must contain state identical to the view
* passed at construction, otherwise behavior is undefined.
* - `apply(PaymentSandbox&)` asserts that `&to == ps_` (you can only
* apply to your direct parent) and propagates both the state journal
* and the deferred-credits table into the parent sandbox.
*
* @param to The target view to flush changes into.
*/
/** @{ */
void
apply(RawView& to);
@@ -229,6 +473,10 @@ public:
apply(PaymentSandbox& to);
/** @} */
/** Return the amount of XRP destroyed (as fees) during this payment.
*
* Delegates to `items_.dropsDestroyed()`. Distinct from transferred XRP.
*/
[[nodiscard]] XRPAmount
xrpDestroyed() const;

View File

@@ -8,12 +8,49 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Keeps track of which ledgers haven't been fully saved.
During the ledger building process this collection will keep
track of those ledgers that are being built but have not yet
been completely written.
*/
/** Coordination primitive tracking validated ledgers not yet fully written to
* the SQLite relational database.
*
* When a validated ledger is being persisted, there is a window in which it
* exists in memory but its index entries are incomplete on disk. Any code that
* reports the "validated range" of ledgers to peers or clients must exclude
* these in-progress sequences; otherwise it could direct a requester to query
* a partially-written row.
*
* ## Internal state machine
*
* The internal map encodes three observable states per ledger sequence:
*
* | Map state | Meaning |
* |----------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
* | key absent | Not pending; safe for DB queries |
* | key present, value `false` | Registered/dispatched, write not started |
* | key present, value `true` | A thread is actively writing to SQLite |
*
* The canonical "finished" state is key-absent; `finishWork()` erases the
* entry (rather than resetting the flag) so that `pending()` and the blocking
* loop in `shouldWork()` use absence as the termination condition.
*
* ## Typical call sequence
*
* 1. `pendSaveValidated()` calls `shouldWork(seq, isSynchronous)` to either
* claim a fresh entry or "steal" a registered-but-unstarted one.
* 2. `saveValidatedLedger()` calls `startWork(seq)` to atomically flip the
* flag from `false` → `true`. A `false` return means another thread won
* the race; the caller logs "Save aborted" and exits early.
* 3. `saveValidatedLedger()` calls `finishWork(seq)` after the DB write
* completes, waking any synchronous waiters.
* 4. `LedgerMaster::getValidatedRange()` calls `getSnapshot()` to trim the
* reported min/max validated range, excluding any in-progress sequences.
*
* This class is a pure coordination primitive. It does not own a thread pool
* or `JobQueue`; all scheduling policy lives in `pendSaveValidated()`.
*
* @note Thread-safe. All methods acquire `mutex_` internally. The synchronous
* blocking path in `shouldWork()` re-acquires the lock after each
* `await_.wait()` and re-checks in a loop because `notify_all()` can
* wake multiple waiters simultaneously.
*/
class PendingSaves
{
private:
@@ -22,12 +59,18 @@ private:
std::condition_variable await_;
public:
/** Start working on a ledger
This is called prior to updating the SQLite indexes.
@return 'true' if work should be done
*/
/** Atomically claim the right to begin writing a ledger to the database.
*
* Flips the map entry for @p seq from `false` to `true`, signalling that
* a thread is actively writing to SQLite. This must be called after
* `shouldWork()` returns `true` and before the DB write begins.
*
* @param seq Ledger sequence number to claim.
* @return `true` if this caller successfully claimed the write; `false` if
* the entry is absent (write already completed) or already `true`
* (another thread started it first). A `false` return is the caller's
* signal to abort with a "Save aborted" log and return early.
*/
bool
startWork(LedgerIndex seq)
{
@@ -45,12 +88,14 @@ public:
return true;
}
/** Finish working on a ledger
This is called after updating the SQLite indexes.
The tracking of the work in progress is removed and
threads awaiting completion are notified.
*/
/** Mark a ledger's database write as complete and wake any waiters.
*
* Erases the entry for @p seq from the map — key-absent is the canonical
* "done" state — then calls `notify_all()` so any synchronous caller
* blocked in `shouldWork()` can re-evaluate.
*
* @param seq Ledger sequence number whose write has completed.
*/
void
finishWork(LedgerIndex seq)
{
@@ -60,7 +105,14 @@ public:
await_.notify_all();
}
/** Return `true` if a ledger is in the progress of being saved. */
/** Return `true` if @p seq has a pending or in-progress database write.
*
* A `true` result means the sequence appears in the map (either
* dispatched-but-not-started or actively writing). Callers use this to
* avoid re-dispatching a save that is already in flight.
*
* @param seq Ledger sequence number to test.
*/
bool
pending(LedgerIndex seq)
{
@@ -68,14 +120,34 @@ public:
return map_.contains(seq);
}
/** Check if a ledger should be dispatched
Called to determine whether work should be done or
dispatched. If work is already in progress and the
call is synchronous, wait for work to be completed.
@return 'true' if work should be done or dispatched
*/
/** Determine whether the caller should proceed with (or wait for) a save.
*
* This is the entry point for `pendSaveValidated()`. It implements the
* full dispatch/steal/wait decision:
*
* - **Not present**: Inserts `(seq, false)` and returns `true` — the
* caller owns the work.
* - **Present as `false`** (registered, unstarted):
* - Asynchronous caller: returns `false` (already dispatched; skip).
* - Synchronous caller: returns `true`, stealing the work before any
* thread can claim it via `startWork()`.
* - **Present as `true`** (write in progress):
* - Asynchronous caller: unreachable in practice; the `!isSynchronous`
* branch returns `false` before reaching the wait.
* - Synchronous caller: blocks on `await_` in a `do/while` loop,
* re-checking after each `notify_all()` from `finishWork()`, until
* the entry disappears (write complete).
*
* @param seq Ledger sequence number to check or register.
* @param isSynchronous `true` if the caller requires the write to be
* complete before returning; `false` if dispatch-once is sufficient.
* @return `true` if the caller should perform (or has stolen) the write;
* `false` if the work is already dispatched or complete.
*
* @note The blocking synchronous path re-acquires `mutex_` after each
* wake-up and loops because `notify_all()` may unblock multiple
* waiters; only one will find the entry absent.
*/
bool
shouldWork(LedgerIndex seq, bool isSynchronous)
{
@@ -108,12 +180,20 @@ public:
} while (true);
}
/** Get a snapshot of the pending saves
Each entry in the returned map corresponds to a ledger
that is in progress or dispatched. The boolean indicates
whether work is currently in progress.
*/
/** Return a point-in-time copy of the pending-saves map.
*
* Used by `LedgerMaster::getValidatedRange()` to trim the reported
* min/max validated-ledger range: any sequence present in the snapshot —
* regardless of whether its flag is `false` (dispatched) or `true`
* (writing) — is excluded from the range to avoid directing peers to
* query a partially-written DB row.
*
* The returned map is a value copy taken under `mutex_`; the caller may
* iterate it freely without holding any lock.
*
* @return A snapshot of `map_`, where each key is an in-flight ledger
* sequence and each value is `false` (unstarted) or `true` (active).
*/
std::map<LedgerIndex, bool>
getSnapshot() const
{

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,29 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Interface for ledger entry changes.
Subclasses allow raw modification of ledger entries.
*/
/** Low-level write surface for committing ledger state mutations.
*
* Defines the three-operation contract (`rawErase`, `rawInsert`,
* `rawReplace`) plus an XRP-burn hook (`rawDestroyXRP`) that together
* represent the minimal interface a backing store must provide to absorb
* flushed changes from a sandbox.
*
* `detail::RawStateTable::apply(RawView&)` is the canonical driver:
* it iterates its buffered erase/insert/replace actions and dispatches
* each through the corresponding method here, so flushing logic is written
* once and any concrete target — a finalising `Ledger`, an `OpenView`, or
* another sandbox — implements the contract without exposing checkout
* semantics.
*
* The "raw" prefix is a semantic contract: these methods perform no
* precondition checking, no journaling, and no ownership tracking.
* They are the trusted commit surface, not the API that transaction
* logic should call directly.
*
* @note The copy constructor is defaulted (subclasses may need to snapshot
* state), but copy assignment is deleted to prevent silent cross-type
* assignment through the base interface.
*/
class RawView
{
public:
@@ -19,66 +38,79 @@ public:
RawView&
operator=(RawView const&) = delete;
/** Delete an existing state item.
The SLE is provided so the implementation
can calculate metadata.
*/
/** Unconditionally remove an existing state entry.
*
* The full SLE (not just its key) is passed so that implementations
* can compute metadata such as changes to owner count or the type of
* the deleted object.
*
* @param sle The ledger entry to remove. The key is derived from
* the SLE itself; the entry must exist in the backing store.
*/
virtual void
rawErase(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) = 0;
/** Unconditionally insert a state item.
Requirements:
The key must not already exist.
Effects:
The key is associated with the SLE.
@note The key is taken from the SLE
*/
/** Unconditionally insert a new state entry.
*
* The key is read from the SLE rather than passed separately,
* which prevents key/value mismatches at the call site.
*
* @param sle The ledger entry to insert. The key must not already
* exist in the backing store.
*/
virtual void
rawInsert(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) = 0;
/** Unconditionally replace a state item.
Requirements:
The key must exist.
Effects:
The key is associated with the SLE.
@note The key is taken from the SLE
*/
/** Unconditionally overwrite an existing state entry.
*
* The key is read from the SLE rather than passed separately,
* which prevents key/value mismatches at the call site.
*
* @param sle The replacement ledger entry. The key must already
* exist in the backing store.
*/
virtual void
rawReplace(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) = 0;
/** Destroy XRP.
This is used to pay for transaction fees.
*/
/** Permanently remove XRP drops from the ledger supply.
*
* XRPL burns transaction fees rather than redistributing them.
* This method is the accounting hook for that burn: separating it
* from `rawErase` keeps fee accounting explicit and auditable.
*
* @param fee The quantity of XRP drops to destroy.
*/
virtual void
rawDestroyXRP(XRPAmount const& fee) = 0;
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Interface for changing ledger entries with transactions.
Allows raw modification of ledger entries and insertion
of transactions into the transaction map.
*/
/** Extends `RawView` with the ability to insert transactions into the
* ledger's transaction map.
*
* The split between `RawView` (state-only writes) and `TxsRawView`
* (state plus transaction map) is architecturally significant.
* `detail::ApplyViewBase` — the sandbox used during transaction
* processing — only needs `RawView`: sandboxes accumulate state
* mutations but do not independently maintain a transaction map.
* `OpenView`, by contrast, inherits both `ReadView` and `TxsRawView`
* because it is the accumulation point for an open ledger round and
* must track both the growing state diff and the applied-transaction
* set.
*/
class TxsRawView : public RawView
{
public:
/** Add a transaction to the tx map.
Closed ledgers must have metadata,
while open ledgers omit metadata.
*/
/** Insert a serialized transaction into the ledger's transaction map.
*
* @param key The transaction's map key (typically its hash).
* @param txn Serialized transaction blob; must not be null.
* @param metaData Serialized transaction metadata, or null for open
* ledgers. Closed ledgers must supply metadata; open ledgers must
* pass null because consensus has not yet produced execution
* results.
*/
virtual void
rawTxInsert(
ReadView::key_type const& key,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
/** @file
* Defines the foundational read-only ledger view interface.
*
* `ReadView` is the base of the entire ledger view hierarchy. Every concrete
* ledger representation — finalized `Ledger`, in-progress `OpenView`, apply-time
* `Sandbox`, or payment-path `PaymentSandbox` — exposes its state through this
* interface. Code that only reads ledger data can operate on any view type without
* knowing the concrete implementation.
*
* `DigestAwareReadView` extends `ReadView` with per-entry cryptographic digests,
* used by `CachedView` for efficient cache invalidation and by `makeRulesGivenLedger`
* to detect amendment changes between ledger closes.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
@@ -21,21 +35,43 @@ namespace xrpl {
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** A view into a ledger.
This interface provides read access to state
and transaction items. There is no checkpointing
or calculation of metadata.
*/
/** Pure abstract read-only interface to a ledger.
*
* Exposes two conceptually distinct maps: the **state map** (SLEs keyed by
* `uint256`) and the **transaction map** (committed transactions with metadata).
* Concrete implementations include `Ledger` (finalized), `OpenView` (in-progress),
* `Sandbox` (discardable apply-time copy), and `PaymentSandbox` (payment engine).
*
* @note Copy and move constructors explicitly re-initialize `sles` and `txs`
* with `*this`. Both members store a raw pointer to their owning view; a
* default memberwise copy would leave them pointing at the source object.
* Assignment operators are deleted for the same reason.
*/
class ReadView
{
public:
/** Pair of transaction and its associated metadata object.
*
* The metadata `STObject` is empty for open ledgers, since metadata is
* only finalized at ledger close time.
*/
using tx_type = std::pair<std::shared_ptr<STTx const>, std::shared_ptr<STObject const>>;
/** Raw key type for state-map and transaction-map lookups. */
using key_type = uint256;
/** Shared ownership handle to a non-modifiable state entry. */
using mapped_type = std::shared_ptr<SLE const>;
/** STL-compatible forward range over the ledger state map.
*
* Iterates all SLEs present in this view. Backed by type-erased
* `ReadViewFwdIter` so the same interface works across SHAMap-backed,
* delta-list, and sandbox views. `upperBound` enables sub-range scans
* without a full traversal.
*
* @note Visiting every state entry can be expensive as the ledger grows.
*/
struct SlesType : detail::ReadViewFwdRange<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>>
{
explicit SlesType(ReadView const& view);
@@ -43,13 +79,20 @@ public:
begin() const;
[[nodiscard]] Iterator
end() const;
/** Returns an iterator to the first SLE whose key is strictly greater than @p key. */
[[nodiscard]] Iterator
upperBound(key_type const& key) const;
};
/** STL-compatible forward range over the ledger transaction map.
*
* Iterates all `tx_type` pairs (transaction + metadata) present in
* this view. For open ledgers the metadata member of each pair is empty.
*/
struct TxsType : detail::ReadViewFwdRange<tx_type>
{
explicit TxsType(ReadView const& view);
/** Returns `true` when the transaction map contains no entries. */
[[nodiscard]] bool
empty() const;
[[nodiscard]] Iterator
@@ -65,92 +108,118 @@ public:
ReadView&
operator=(ReadView const& other) = delete;
/** Constructs the view and binds `sles` and `txs` to `*this`. */
ReadView() : sles(*this), txs(*this)
{
}
/** Copy-constructs the view, re-binding `sles` and `txs` to `*this`.
*
* @note The `sles` and `txs` members store a pointer to their owning
* view. They are explicitly re-initialized here to point at the new
* object, not at `other`.
*/
ReadView(ReadView const& other) : sles(*this), txs(*this)
{
}
/** Move-constructs the view, re-binding `sles` and `txs` to `*this`.
*
* @note Same aliasing concern as the copy constructor; `sles` and `txs`
* are explicitly re-initialized to point at the new object.
*/
ReadView(ReadView&& other) : sles(*this), txs(*this)
{
}
/** Returns information about the ledger. */
/** Returns the immutable header fields for this ledger.
*
* All non-virtual convenience accessors (`seq()`, `parentCloseTime()`)
* delegate here, keeping the virtual dispatch surface minimal.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual LedgerHeader const&
header() const = 0;
/** Returns true if this reflects an open ledger. */
/** Returns `true` if this view reflects an open (not yet closed) ledger. */
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
open() const = 0;
/** Returns the close time of the previous ledger. */
/** Returns the close time of the previous (parent) ledger. */
[[nodiscard]] NetClock::time_point
parentCloseTime() const
{
return header().parentCloseTime;
}
/** Returns the sequence number of the base ledger. */
/** Returns the sequence number of this ledger. */
[[nodiscard]] LedgerIndex
seq() const
{
return header().seq;
}
/** Returns the fees for the base ledger. */
/** Returns the fee schedule in effect for this ledger. */
[[nodiscard]] virtual Fees const&
fees() const = 0;
/** Returns the tx processing rules. */
/** Returns the amendment rules active for this ledger. */
[[nodiscard]] virtual Rules const&
rules() const = 0;
/** Determine if a state item exists.
@note This can be more efficient than calling read.
@return `true` if a SLE is associated with the
specified key.
*/
/** Returns `true` if a state entry matching the keylet is present.
*
* The `Keylet` bundles a raw `uint256` key with its `LedgerEntryType`,
* allowing implementations to reject type mismatches without deserializing
* the entry. This makes `exists` more efficient than calling `read` when
* only presence is needed.
*
* @param k The keylet (key + expected entry type) to probe.
* @return `true` if an SLE with the given key and type exists.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
exists(Keylet const& k) const = 0;
/** Return the key of the next state item.
This returns the key of the first state item
whose key is greater than the specified key. If
no such key is present, std::nullopt is returned.
If `last` is engaged, returns std::nullopt when
the key returned would be outside the open
interval (key, last).
*/
/** Returns the smallest state-map key strictly greater than @p key.
*
* Enables ordered range scans of the SHAMap without deserializing entries.
* If @p last is set, the search is bounded to the open interval
* `(key, last)` — any candidate key outside that range causes
* `std::nullopt` to be returned instead.
*
* @param key The key to search above.
* @param last Optional exclusive upper bound for the result.
* @return The next key, or `std::nullopt` if none exists within bounds.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::optional<key_type>
succ(key_type const& key, std::optional<key_type> const& last = std::nullopt) const = 0;
/** Return the state item associated with a key.
Effects:
If the key exists, gives the caller ownership
of the non-modifiable corresponding SLE.
@note While the returned SLE is `const` from the
perspective of the caller, it can be changed
by other callers through raw operations.
@return `nullptr` if the key is not present or
if the type does not match.
*/
/** Returns a read-only handle to the state entry identified by @p k.
*
* Gives the caller shared ownership of a non-modifiable SLE. The `const`
* qualifier reflects this caller's view; the underlying object may be
* mutated through `ApplyView` in another code path.
*
* @param k The keylet (key + expected entry type) to look up.
* @return Shared pointer to the SLE, or `nullptr` if the key is absent
* or the ledger entry type does not match the keylet.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(Keylet const& k) const = 0;
// Accounts in a payment are not allowed to use assets acquired during that
// payment. The PaymentSandbox tracks the debits, credits, and owner count
// changes that accounts make during a payment. `balanceHookIOU` adjusts
// balances so newly acquired assets are not counted toward the balance.
// This is required to support PaymentSandbox.
/** Adjusts an IOU balance to exclude assets acquired during the current payment.
*
* The payment engine executes paths in reverse (destination-first), which
* means an account may be credited before it has redeemed the corresponding
* asset. Accounts must not spend assets acquired within the same payment.
* `PaymentSandbox` overrides this hook to subtract deferred credits recorded
* in its `DeferredCredits` table. The default implementation returns
* @p amount unchanged, making the hook zero-cost for non-payment views.
*
* @param account The account whose balance is being queried.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer.
* @param amount The raw IOU balance (must hold `Issue`).
* @return The effective spendable balance after deducting deferred credits.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual STAmount
balanceHookIOU(AccountID const& account, AccountID const& issuer, STAmount const& amount) const
{
@@ -159,71 +228,113 @@ public:
return amount;
}
// balanceHookMPT adjusts balances so newly acquired assets are not counted
// toward the balance.
/** Adjusts an MPT balance to exclude assets acquired during the current payment.
*
* Mirrors `balanceHookIOU` for MPT-denominated amounts. `PaymentSandbox`
* overrides this hook; the default implementation wraps @p amount in an
* `STAmount` and returns it unchanged.
*
* @param account The account whose balance is being queried.
* @param issue The MPT issuance.
* @param amount The raw MPT balance as a signed 64-bit integer.
* @return The effective spendable balance after deducting deferred credits.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual STAmount
balanceHookMPT(AccountID const& account, MPTIssue const& issue, std::int64_t amount) const
{
return STAmount{issue, amount};
}
// An offer owned by an issuer and selling MPT is limited by the issuer's
// funds available to issue, which are originally available funds less
// already self sold MPT amounts (MPT sell offer). This hook is used
// by issuerFundsToSelfIssue() function.
/** Adjusts the available issuance capacity for an issuer selling their own MPT.
*
* An issuer's sell-offer for their own MPT is limited by their remaining
* issuance capacity (i.e., `MaximumAmount - OutstandingAmount`), reduced
* by any MPT already committed to self-issued sell offers during this payment.
* `PaymentSandbox` overrides this hook to track that self-debit; the default
* returns @p amount unchanged. Used by `issuerFundsToSelfIssue()`.
*
* @param issue The MPT issuance.
* @param amount The raw available-issuance amount.
* @return The effective capacity after accounting for in-flight self-sold amounts.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual STAmount
balanceHookSelfIssueMPT(MPTIssue const& issue, std::int64_t amount) const
{
return STAmount{issue, amount};
}
// Accounts in a payment are not allowed to use assets acquired during that
// payment. The PaymentSandbox tracks the debits, credits, and owner count
// changes that accounts make during a payment. `ownerCountHook` adjusts the
// ownerCount so it returns the max value of the ownerCount so far.
// This is required to support PaymentSandbox.
/** Returns the effective owner count, adjusted for in-payment reserve changes.
*
* A payment could temporarily free reserves by consuming offers in intermediate
* steps, making it appear that an account has fewer owner-count obligations.
* `PaymentSandbox` overrides this hook to return the maximum owner count seen
* so far during the payment, preventing reserve-bypass exploits. The default
* implementation returns @p count unchanged.
*
* @param account The account being queried.
* @param count The current owner count from ledger state.
* @return The high-water-mark owner count for reserve purposes.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::uint32_t
ownerCountHook(AccountID const& account, std::uint32_t count) const
{
return count;
}
// used by the implementation
/** Returns a heap-allocated iterator positioned at the start of the state map.
*
* Called by `SlesType::begin()`; not intended for direct use by callers.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesBegin() const = 0;
// used by the implementation
/** Returns a heap-allocated sentinel iterator for the state map.
*
* Called by `SlesType::end()`; not intended for direct use by callers.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesEnd() const = 0;
// used by the implementation
/** Returns a heap-allocated iterator to the first SLE whose key is strictly greater than @p key.
*
* Called by `SlesType::upperBound()`; not intended for direct use by callers.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesUpperBound(key_type const& key) const = 0;
// used by the implementation
/** Returns a heap-allocated iterator positioned at the start of the transaction map.
*
* Called by `TxsType::begin()`; not intended for direct use by callers.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsBegin() const = 0;
// used by the implementation
/** Returns a heap-allocated sentinel iterator for the transaction map.
*
* Called by `TxsType::end()`; not intended for direct use by callers.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsEnd() const = 0;
/** Returns `true` if a tx exists in the tx map.
A tx exists in the map if it is part of the
base ledger, or if it is a newly inserted tx.
*/
/** Returns `true` if a transaction with the given key exists in the tx map.
*
* A transaction is present if it is part of the base ledger or was
* inserted into this view's delta since the base.
*
* @param key The transaction hash to probe.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
txExists(key_type const& key) const = 0;
/** Read a transaction from the tx map.
If the view represents an open ledger,
the metadata object will be empty.
@return A pair of nullptr if the
key is not found in the tx map.
*/
/** Returns the transaction and its metadata for the given key.
*
* For open ledgers the metadata `STObject` in the returned pair will be
* empty, since metadata is only finalized at close time.
*
* @param key The transaction hash to look up.
* @return A `tx_type` pair where both pointers are `nullptr` if the key
* is not found in the transaction map.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual tx_type
txRead(key_type const& key) const = 0;
@@ -231,20 +342,29 @@ public:
// Memberspaces
//
/** Iterable range of ledger state items.
@note Visiting each state entry in the ledger can
become quite expensive as the ledger grows.
*/
/** Iterable range over all state entries (SLEs) in this view.
*
* @note Full traversal can be expensive on a large ledger. Use
* `upperBound` or `succ` for targeted sub-range scans.
*/
SlesType sles;
// The range of transactions
/** Iterable range over all transactions in this view. */
TxsType txs;
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** ReadView that associates keys with digests. */
/** Extension of `ReadView` that provides per-entry cryptographic digests.
*
* `Ledger` implements this interface cheaply by reading the hash directly
* from the SHAMap trie node without deserializing the leaf entry. Sandboxes
* and delta-views do not expose digests, which is why this capability is a
* separate subclass rather than part of `ReadView`.
*
* Used by `CachedView` for two-level cache invalidation and by
* `makeRulesGivenLedger` to detect amendments changes across ledger closes.
*/
class DigestAwareReadView : public ReadView
{
public:
@@ -253,19 +373,48 @@ public:
DigestAwareReadView() = default;
DigestAwareReadView(DigestAwareReadView const&) = default;
/** Return the digest associated with the key.
@return std::nullopt if the item does not exist.
*/
/** Returns the cryptographic hash of the serialized state entry at @p key.
*
* Implementations may return this without fully deserializing the entry.
*
* @param key The raw state-map key to query.
* @return The entry's digest, or `std::nullopt` if no entry exists at that key.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::optional<digest_type>
digest(key_type const& key) const = 0;
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Constructs the active amendment `Rules` from a closed ledger, updating from existing rules.
*
* Reads the `sfAmendments` field from the ledger's amendments object and passes
* its digest to the `Rules` constructor so that `Rules` can detect unchanged
* amendments between successive ledger closes without re-parsing. Requires a
* `DigestAwareReadView` because the optimization depends on querying the entry
* hash directly. Falls back to a default `Rules` object if the amendments object
* is absent.
*
* @param ledger The closed ledger to read amendments from.
* @param current The current rules object; its internal preset set is forwarded
* to the new `Rules` instance.
* @return A `Rules` object reflecting the amendments active in @p ledger.
* @see makeRulesGivenLedger(DigestAwareReadView const&, std::unordered_set<uint256, beast::Uhash<>> const&)
*/
Rules
makeRulesGivenLedger(DigestAwareReadView const& ledger, Rules const& current);
/** Constructs the active amendment `Rules` from a closed ledger using an explicit preset set.
*
* Identical behavior to the `Rules const& current` overload but accepts
* the preset set directly. Used during initialization before a prior `Rules`
* object is available.
*
* @param ledger The closed ledger to read amendments from.
* @param presets The set of always-enabled amendment flags to seed the rules object.
* @return A `Rules` object reflecting the amendments active in @p ledger.
* @see makeRulesGivenLedger(DigestAwareReadView const&, Rules const&)
*/
Rules
makeRulesGivenLedger(
DigestAwareReadView const& ledger,

View File

@@ -5,12 +5,41 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Discardable, editable view to a ledger.
The sandbox inherits the flags of the base.
@note Presented as ApplyView to clients.
*/
/** Discardable staging layer for ledger mutations within a single transaction.
*
* `Sandbox` accumulates ledger changes in a private write buffer inherited
* from `detail::ApplyViewBase` without touching the underlying ledger. The
* caller decides at the end of the operation whether to commit — by calling
* `apply()` — or to discard — by letting the sandbox go out of scope. This
* eliminates the need for explicit rollback: on failure, destruction of the
* sandbox is sufficient.
*
* The typical pattern used by transactors:
* @code
* Sandbox sb(&ctx_.view());
* auto const result = doWork(sb, ...);
* if (result == tesSUCCESS)
* sb.apply(ctx_.rawView());
* @endcode
*
* `Sandbox` is the minimal concrete subclass of `ApplyViewBase`: it adds
* only constructors and `apply()`. It does not produce `TxMeta` (that is
* `ApplyViewImpl`'s responsibility) and does not track deferred credits (that
* is `PaymentSandbox`'s responsibility). Use `Sandbox` whenever a transactor
* or helper needs a safe, atomic scratchpad without those heavier features.
*
* The sandbox always inherits the `ApplyFlags` of its base view, so
* dry-run, no-check-sign, and similar execution-context properties propagate
* correctly through nested sandboxes without re-specification.
*
* Not copyable or move-assignable; move-constructible only. This enforces
* single ownership of the change buffer.
*
* @see detail::ApplyViewBase for the full `ApplyView`/`RawView` interface.
* @see ApplyViewImpl for the outermost commit path that also builds `TxMeta`.
* @see PaymentSandbox for the variant that prevents within-payment
* double-counting of credits.
*/
class Sandbox : public detail::ApplyViewBase
{
public:
@@ -23,14 +52,46 @@ public:
Sandbox(Sandbox&&) = default;
/** Construct over any read-only ledger snapshot with explicit flags.
*
* @param base Non-owning pointer to the underlying ledger state; must
* outlive this sandbox. All reads that bypass the change buffer
* are forwarded here.
* @param flags Per-transaction policy flags (e.g. `tapDRY_RUN`,
* `tapNO_CHECK_SIGN`) governing this apply pass.
*/
Sandbox(ReadView const* base, ApplyFlags flags) : ApplyViewBase(base, flags)
{
}
/** Construct over an existing `ApplyView`, inheriting its flags.
*
* Convenience form used when stacking a `Sandbox` on top of another
* mutable view (including another `Sandbox` or a `PaymentSandbox`).
* Flags are copied from the parent so that execution-context properties
* such as `tapDRY_RUN` propagate without the caller re-specifying them.
*
* @param base Non-owning pointer to the parent mutable view; must
* outlive this sandbox.
*/
Sandbox(ApplyView const* base) : Sandbox(base, base->flags())
{
}
/** Commit all buffered changes to a target `RawView`.
*
* Replays every insert, modify, and erase action accumulated in the
* internal change buffer against `to`, atomically promoting the tentative
* mutations into the target. After this call the buffer is reset; the
* sandbox must not be used again.
*
* If the caller decides the operation failed, simply do not call `apply()`
* — destroying the sandbox discards all buffered changes without touching
* the target view.
*
* @param to The target `RawView` to receive the committed mutations;
* typically `ctx_.rawView()` at the outermost transactor boundary.
*/
void
apply(RawView& to)
{

View File

@@ -19,6 +19,13 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Controls whether `cleanupOnAccountDelete()` adjusts the directory iterator
* after a deletion.
*
* When `No`, the iterator position is decremented to compensate for the
* element shift caused by the deletion. When `Yes`, the entry was
* intentionally left in place by the deleter, so no adjustment is made.
*/
enum class SkipEntry : bool { No = false, Yes };
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -51,7 +58,21 @@ enum class SkipEntry : bool { No = false, Yes };
[[nodiscard]] bool
hasExpired(ReadView const& view, std::optional<std::uint32_t> const& exp);
// Note, depth parameter is used to limit the recursion depth
/** Determines whether a vault pseudo-account's MPT share token is indirectly
* frozen because the vault's underlying asset is frozen.
*
* Traverses: MPT issuance → issuer account root → vault object → vault asset,
* then delegates to `isAnyFrozen()`. Returns `false` immediately if the
* `featureSingleAssetVault` amendment is not enabled.
*
* @param view The ledger state to inspect.
* @param account The account whose holdings are being queried.
* @param mptShare The MPT share token issued by the vault pseudo-account.
* @param depth Recursion depth guard; returns `true` (conservatively frozen)
* if `depth >= kMAX_ASSET_CHECK_DEPTH`.
* @return `true` if the underlying asset is frozen for `account`; `false`
* otherwise or if the amendment is not enabled.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -59,6 +80,17 @@ isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen(
MPTIssue const& mptShare,
int depth);
/** Determines whether LP tokens for an AMM pool are frozen for an account.
*
* LP tokens are considered frozen if *either* constituent asset of the pool
* is frozen for `account`.
*
* @param view The ledger state to inspect.
* @param account The account whose holdings are being queried.
* @param asset The first asset of the AMM pool.
* @param asset2 The second asset of the AMM pool.
* @return `true` if either `asset` or `asset2` is frozen for `account`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isLPTokenFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -66,50 +98,94 @@ isLPTokenFrozen(
Asset const& asset,
Asset const& asset2);
// Return the list of enabled amendments
/** Returns the set of amendment hashes currently enabled on the ledger.
*
* Reads from the singleton `keylet::amendments()` SLE. If no amendments
* SLE exists or none are yet enabled, returns an empty set.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @return A `std::set<uint256>` containing every enabled amendment hash.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::set<uint256>
getEnabledAmendments(ReadView const& view);
// Return a map of amendments that have achieved majority
/** Maps amendment hashes to the `NetClock::time_point` at which each first
* achieved validator supermajority. Used by the amendment governance process
* to enforce the two-week waiting period before activation.
*/
using majorityAmendments_t = std::map<uint256, NetClock::time_point>;
/** Returns amendments that have achieved validator supermajority but are not
* yet enabled.
*
* Reads the `sfMajorities` array from the singleton `keylet::amendments()`
* SLE and converts each entry's `sfCloseTime` to a `NetClock::time_point`.
* Returns an empty map if no SLE exists or no majority amendments are pending.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @return A `majorityAmendments_t` mapping each amendment hash to the time
* at which it first achieved supermajority.
*/
[[nodiscard]] majorityAmendments_t
getMajorityAmendments(ReadView const& view);
/** Return the hash of a ledger by sequence.
The hash is retrieved by looking up the "skip list"
in the passed ledger. As the skip list is limited
in size, if the requested ledger sequence number is
out of the range of ledgers represented in the skip
list, then std::nullopt is returned.
@return The hash of the ledger with the
given sequence number or std::nullopt.
*/
/** Returns the hash of a past ledger by sequence number via the skip list.
*
* Implements a three-tier lookup:
* 1. **Trivial**: `seq == ledger.seq()` → returns the ledger's own hash;
* `seq == ledger.seq() - 1` → returns `parentHash` directly.
* 2. **Within 256**: Reads the rolling `keylet::skip()` object, which stores
* the hashes of the previous ≤ 256 ledgers, and indexes by offset.
* 3. **Aligned deep history**: For sequences that are multiples of 256, reads
* the permanent `LedgerHashes` page at `keylet::skip(seq)` and indexes into
* it. Non-aligned sequences beyond the 256-ledger rolling window are not
* reachable and return `std::nullopt`.
*
* @param ledger The view from whose skip list the search starts.
* @param seq The target ledger sequence number.
* @param journal Used to log warnings when the skip list is incomplete or the
* requested sequence is out of range.
* @return The hash of ledger `seq`, or `std::nullopt` if it cannot be
* determined from the available skip-list data.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<uint256>
hashOfSeq(ReadView const& ledger, LedgerIndex seq, beast::Journal journal);
/** Find a ledger index from which we could easily get the requested ledger
The index that we return should meet two requirements:
1) It must be the index of a ledger that has the hash of the ledger
we are looking for. This means that its sequence must be equal to
greater than the sequence that we want but not more than 256 greater
since each ledger contains the hashes of the 256 previous ledgers.
2) Its hash must be easy for us to find. This means it must be 0 mod 256
because every such ledger is permanently enshrined in a LedgerHashes
page which we can easily retrieve via the skip list.
*/
/** Computes the nearest 256-aligned ledger sequence ≥ `requested`.
*
* Every ledger whose sequence is a multiple of 256 permanently stores a
* `LedgerHashes` page (`keylet::skip(seq)`) containing the hashes of
* the preceding 256 ledgers. That page is retrievable via the skip list,
* making it the ideal starting point for resolving an arbitrary past hash.
* The expression `(requested + 255) & (~255)` rounds up to the next 256
* boundary in a single instruction.
*
* @param requested The target ledger sequence number.
* @return The smallest value ≥ `requested` that is divisible by 256.
*/
inline LedgerIndex
getCandidateLedger(LedgerIndex requested)
{
return (requested + 255) & (~255);
}
/** Return false if the test ledger is provably incompatible
with the valid ledger, that is, they could not possibly
both be valid. Use the first form if you have both ledgers,
use the second form if you have not acquired the valid ledger yet
*/
/** Returns `false` if `testLedger` is provably on a different chain than
* `validLedger`.
*
* Uses `hashOfSeq()` to walk the skip list of whichever ledger is later and
* confirms that the earlier ledger's hash appears in that list. A mismatch
* proves a fork. When the skip list is incomplete or the sequences are too
* far apart to compare, the function conservatively returns `true` (cannot
* prove incompatibility). Diagnostic lines are written to `s` on mismatch.
*
* Use this overload when both ledger objects are available.
*
* @param validLedger The authoritative ledger.
* @param testLedger The candidate ledger being verified.
* @param s Journal stream for diagnostic messages on mismatch.
* @param reason Short label prepended to log messages for context.
* @return `false` if a fork is proven; `true` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
areCompatible(
ReadView const& validLedger,
@@ -117,6 +193,19 @@ areCompatible(
beast::Journal::Stream& s,
char const* reason);
/** Returns `false` if `testLedger` is provably on a different chain than the
* ledger identified by `(validHash, validIndex)`.
*
* Use this overload when the authoritative ledger object has not been fully
* loaded but its identity is known from consensus.
*
* @param validHash Hash of the authoritative ledger.
* @param validIndex Sequence number of the authoritative ledger.
* @param testLedger The candidate ledger being verified.
* @param s Journal stream for diagnostic messages on mismatch.
* @param reason Short label prepended to log messages for context.
* @return `false` if a fork is proven; `true` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
areCompatible(
uint256 const& validHash,
@@ -131,6 +220,19 @@ areCompatible(
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Inserts an SLE into an account's owner directory and records the page.
*
* Calls `view.dirInsert()` to append `object` to `owner`'s owner directory,
* then writes the assigned page number back into `object`'s `node` field.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger view.
* @param owner The account whose owner directory receives the entry.
* @param object The SLE being linked; updated in-place with the page number.
* @param node The field on `object` that receives the directory page number;
* defaults to `sfOwnerNode`.
* @return `tecDIR_FULL` if the owner directory has no room; `tesSUCCESS`
* otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
dirLink(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -138,19 +240,30 @@ dirLink(
std::shared_ptr<SLE>& object,
SF_UINT64 const& node = sfOwnerNode);
/** Checks that can withdraw funds from an object to itself or a destination.
/** Checks whether funds can be withdrawn from `from` to `to` given a
* pre-fetched destination SLE.
*
* The receiver may be either the submitting account (sfAccount) or a different
* destination account (sfDestination).
* This is the innermost overload; use it when the caller already holds `toSle`
* to avoid a redundant ledger read. Rules enforced in order:
* - `toSle` must be non-null (destination account must exist).
* - If `lsfRequireDestTag` is set, `hasDestinationTag` must be `true` even
* for self-sends.
* - If `from == to`, succeed immediately.
* - If `lsfDepositAuth` is set, `from` must have a pre-authorized
* `DepositPreauth` entry under `to`.
* - For IOU amounts, the withdrawal must not push `to` past its trust-line
* credit limit. MPT transfers skip this check because they move existing
* supply rather than creating new tokens.
*
* - Checks that the receiver account exists.
* - If the receiver requires a destination tag, check that one exists, even
* if withdrawing to self.
* - If withdrawing to self, succeed.
* - If not, checks if the receiver requires deposit authorization, and if
* the sender has it.
* - Checks that the receiver will not exceed the limit (IOU trustline limit
* or MPT MaximumAmount).
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param from Source account (e.g., vault or broker pseudo-account).
* @param to Destination account.
* @param toSle Pre-fetched SLE for `to`; may be null.
* @param amount Asset and quantity being transferred.
* @param hasDestinationTag Whether the transaction includes `sfDestinationTag`.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, or a `tec` code: `tecNO_DST` (account absent),
* `tecDST_TAG_NEEDED` (tag missing), `tecNO_PERMISSION` (deposit auth
* denied), or `tecNO_LINE` (IOU limit exceeded).
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canWithdraw(
@@ -161,19 +274,17 @@ canWithdraw(
STAmount const& amount,
bool hasDestinationTag);
/** Checks that can withdraw funds from an object to itself or a destination.
/** Checks whether funds can be withdrawn from `from` to `to`.
*
* The receiver may be either the submitting account (sfAccount) or a different
* destination account (sfDestination).
* Looks up the destination account SLE and delegates to the six-argument
* overload. See that overload for the full rule set.
*
* - Checks that the receiver account exists.
* - If the receiver requires a destination tag, check that one exists, even
* if withdrawing to self.
* - If withdrawing to self, succeed.
* - If not, checks if the receiver requires deposit authorization, and if
* the sender has it.
* - Checks that the receiver will not exceed the limit (IOU trustline limit
* or MPT MaximumAmount).
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param from Source account.
* @param to Destination account.
* @param amount Asset and quantity being transferred.
* @param hasDestinationTag Whether the transaction includes `sfDestinationTag`.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` or a `tec` code; see the six-argument overload.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canWithdraw(
@@ -183,23 +294,45 @@ canWithdraw(
STAmount const& amount,
bool hasDestinationTag);
/** Checks that can withdraw funds from an object to itself or a destination.
/** Checks whether the withdrawal described by `tx` is permitted.
*
* The receiver may be either the submitting account (sfAccount) or a different
* destination account (sfDestination).
* Extracts `sfAccount`, `sfDestination` (defaults to `sfAccount` when absent),
* `sfAmount`, and the presence of `sfDestinationTag` from the transaction, then
* delegates to the five-argument overload. Intended for use in preclaim.
*
* - Checks that the receiver account exists.
* - If the receiver requires a destination tag, check that one exists, even
* if withdrawing to self.
* - If withdrawing to self, succeed.
* - If not, checks if the receiver requires deposit authorization, and if
* the sender has it.
* - Checks that the receiver will not exceed the limit (IOU trustline limit
* or MPT MaximumAmount).
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param tx The withdrawal transaction (e.g., `VaultWithdraw` or
* `LoanBrokerCoverWithdraw`).
* @return `tesSUCCESS` or a `tec` code; see the six-argument overload.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canWithdraw(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx);
/** Executes the physical asset transfer from a pseudo-account to a destination.
*
* When `dstAcct == senderAcct` (self-withdrawal), calls `addEmptyHolding()`
* to lazily create a trust line or MPToken record if one does not already
* exist (`tecDUPLICATE` is silently tolerated). For third-party
* destinations, calls `verifyDepositPreauth()` to enforce deposit
* authorisation and prune any expired credential objects as a side-effect.
*
* Before transferring, asserts via `accountHolds()` that `sourceAcct` holds
* at least `amount`; a shortfall surfaces as `tefINTERNAL` rather than an
* overdraft. On success, calls `accountSend()` with `WaiveTransferFee::Yes`.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger view.
* @param tx The originating transaction (used by `verifyDepositPreauth`).
* @param senderAcct The transaction submitter / withdrawal beneficiary.
* @param dstAcct The account that will receive the funds.
* @param sourceAcct The pseudo-account (vault, loan broker) holding the funds.
* @param priorBalance The XRP balance of `senderAcct` before the transaction,
* used for reserve calculation when creating an empty holding.
* @param amount The asset and quantity to transfer.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success; `tefINTERNAL` if the source has
* insufficient balance; any TER propagated from `verifyDepositPreauth` or
* `accountSend` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
doWithdraw(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -211,18 +344,41 @@ doWithdraw(
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal j);
/** Deleter function prototype. Returns the status of the entry deletion
* (if should not be skipped) and if the entry should be skipped. The status
* is always tesSUCCESS if the entry should be skipped.
/** Callback invoked by `cleanupOnAccountDelete()` for each owner-directory entry.
*
* Returns a pair:
* - `TER` — `tesSUCCESS` if the entry was handled or intentionally skipped;
* any other code aborts the cleanup loop immediately.
* - `SkipEntry` — `Yes` if the entry was left in place (iterator must not be
* decremented); `No` if the entry was removed (iterator must be decremented
* to compensate for the index shift).
*
* The `TER` value is always `tesSUCCESS` when `SkipEntry` is `Yes`.
*/
using EntryDeleter = std::function<
std::pair<TER, SkipEntry>(LedgerEntryType, uint256 const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE>&)>;
/** Cleanup owner directory entries on account delete.
* Used for a regular and AMM accounts deletion. The caller
* has to provide the deleter function, which handles details of
* specific account-owned object deletion.
* @return tecINCOMPLETE indicates maxNodesToDelete
* are deleted and there remains more nodes to delete.
/** Iterates an account's owner directory and removes entries via `deleter`.
*
* Used by `DeleteAccount` and AMM account deletion. Traversal uses the
* `dirFirst`/`dirNext` exposed-cursor pattern; after each successful removal
* the cursor is decremented by one to compensate for the index shift that
* occurs when an element is erased mid-iteration. When the deleter leaves an
* entry in place (`SkipEntry::Yes`), the cursor is not adjusted.
*
* When `maxNodesToDelete` is supplied and the limit is reached before the
* directory is empty, `tecINCOMPLETE` is returned, signaling the caller that
* the account-delete transaction must be retried in a future ledger.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param ownerDirKeylet Keylet of the account's owner directory root.
* @param deleter Callback invoked once per directory entry.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @param maxNodesToDelete Optional cap on entries processed per call.
* When absent, all entries are consumed in a single invocation.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` when the directory is fully processed;
* `tecINCOMPLETE` if `maxNodesToDelete` is exhausted with entries
* remaining; `tefBAD_LEDGER` if a ledger invariant is violated.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
cleanupOnAccountDelete(

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
/** @file
* Declares `ApplyStateTable`, the per-transaction write-staging buffer used
* by all `ApplyView`/`ApplyViewImpl` instances. This is an implementation
* detail of `ApplyViewBase` and is not intended for direct use by transactors.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
@@ -12,18 +18,36 @@
namespace xrpl::detail {
// Helper class that buffers modifications
/** Write-staging buffer for a single transaction's ledger mutations.
*
* Every SLE touched by a transaction is recorded here — keyed by its
* `uint256` ledger key — along with an `Action` tag that tracks whether
* the entry was merely read (`Cache`), newly created (`Insert`), mutated
* (`Modify`), or scheduled for removal (`Erase`). On success the buffer
* is flushed atomically to the underlying view; on failure the table is
* simply discarded.
*
* The class is the core member of `ApplyViewBase` and backs all
* `ApplyView`/`ApplyViewImpl` instances that transactors receive.
*
* @note Not copyable. Move-constructible only to support placement inside
* `ApplyViewBase` during construction.
* @note `erase()` and `update()` enforce pointer-identity: the caller
* must pass the exact `shared_ptr` returned by `peek()` on this same
* table instance. Crossing views is a `LogicError`.
*/
class ApplyStateTable
{
public:
using key_type = ReadView::key_type;
private:
/** Lifecycle state of a buffered ledger entry. */
enum class Action {
Cache,
Erase,
Insert,
Modify,
Cache, /**< Read from base; no write intent yet. */
Erase, /**< Scheduled for deletion from the base view. */
Insert, /**< New object not yet in the base view. */
Modify, /**< Existing object with pending mutations. */
};
using items_t = std::map<key_type, std::pair<Action, std::shared_ptr<SLE>>>;
@@ -41,9 +65,48 @@ public:
ApplyStateTable&
operator=(ApplyStateTable const&) = delete;
/** Flush all pending mutations to a raw view without generating metadata.
*
* Maps each buffered action to a raw write on `to`: `Cache` entries
* are skipped; `Erase` → `rawErase`; `Insert` → `rawInsert`;
* `Modify` → `rawReplace`. Also forwards the accumulated
* `dropsDestroyed_` to `to.rawDestroyXRP()`.
*
* Used when committing a sandbox or nested view back to its parent.
*
* @param to The target raw view to receive the mutations.
*/
void
apply(RawView& to) const;
/** Flush mutations to an open view, generating `TxMeta` for closed ledgers.
*
* For closed ledgers (`!to.open()`) or dry-run mode (`isDryRun`),
* builds full `TxMeta` — classifying every pending item as
* `sfCreatedNode`, `sfModifiedNode`, or `sfDeletedNode` — and
* populates `sfPreviousFields`/`sfFinalFields`/`sfNewFields` using
* `SField` metadata flags. Threads `sfPreviousTxnID`/
* `sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq` onto affected account roots and trust-line
* endpoints.
*
* In dry-run mode the metadata is produced but state changes and the
* raw tx insert are suppressed — supporting fee simulation without
* side effects.
*
* A `sfModifiedNode` whose buffered content is byte-for-byte equal to
* the original is silently omitted from the metadata.
*
* @param to The open view to commit into.
* @param tx The transaction being applied.
* @param ter The transaction result code; recorded in the metadata.
* @param deliver Optional delivered amount annotation for the metadata.
* @param parentBatchId Optional batch parent ID for the metadata.
* @param isDryRun If true, produce metadata but suppress state mutations.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return The generated `TxMeta` when `!to.open() || isDryRun`;
* `std::nullopt` when the view is open and `isDryRun` is false
* (live open-ledger apply, no metadata needed).
*/
std::optional<TxMeta>
apply(
OpenView& to,
@@ -54,21 +117,88 @@ public:
bool isDryRun,
beast::Journal j);
/** Test whether a ledger object exists, accounting for pending changes.
*
* Returns `false` for objects pending `Erase`; returns `true` for
* objects buffered as `Cache`, `Insert`, or `Modify`; falls back to
* `base.exists(k)` for keys not yet in the buffer.
*
* @param base The underlying read view (base ledger state).
* @param k The keylet identifying the object to test.
* @return `true` if the object will exist after the pending changes.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
exists(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k) const;
/** Find the smallest key strictly greater than `key` that will exist
* after applying pending changes, up to but not including `last`.
*
* Merges two sorted key spaces: the base ledger (skipping keys
* pending deletion) and the local `items_` map (skipping erased
* entries). Returns whichever candidate is smaller.
*
* @param base The underlying read view supplying the base key space.
* @param key The starting key (exclusive lower bound).
* @param last Optional exclusive upper bound; if the result reaches
* or exceeds `last`, `std::nullopt` is returned.
* @return The next live key, or `std::nullopt` if none exists in
* range.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<key_type>
succ(ReadView const& base, key_type const& key, std::optional<key_type> const& last) const;
/** Read a ledger object as an immutable snapshot, accounting for
* pending changes.
*
* Returns `nullptr` for objects pending `Erase` or whose keylet
* check fails; returns the buffered SLE for `Cache`, `Insert`, and
* `Modify` entries; falls back to `base.read(k)` for unknown keys.
*
* @param base The underlying read view.
* @param k The keylet identifying the object.
* @return A `const`-qualified `shared_ptr` to the SLE, or `nullptr`
* if the object does not exist or the keylet check fails.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k) const;
/** Obtain a mutable handle to a ledger object, loading it on first
* access.
*
* If the key is not yet in the buffer, reads from `base` and stores
* a private copy under `Action::Cache`. Subsequent calls return the
* same `shared_ptr`. Returns `nullptr` for erased objects or when the
* object does not exist in `base`.
*
* The returned pointer is the exact instance that must be passed to
* `update()` or `erase()` — pointer identity is enforced.
*
* @param base The underlying read view.
* @param k The keylet identifying the object.
* @return A mutable `shared_ptr` to the buffered SLE, or `nullptr`.
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE>
peek(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k);
/** Count pending mutations (Erase, Insert, Modify), excluding cache-only reads.
*
* @return The number of entries with a write-intent action.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::size_t
size() const;
/** Invoke a callback for every pending write-intent entry.
*
* Calls `func` once for each `Erase`, `Insert`, or `Modify` entry in
* the buffer. `Cache`-only entries are skipped. The `before` snapshot
* is read from `base` on each call; `after` is the buffered SLE.
*
* @param base The underlying read view used to fetch the pre-change
* snapshots for `Erase` and `Modify` entries.
* @param func Callback invoked as
* `func(key, isDelete, before, after)`. `before` is `nullptr`
* for `Insert`; `after` is the pending SLE in all cases.
*/
void
visit(
ReadView const& base,
@@ -78,25 +208,95 @@ public:
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)> const& func) const;
/** Mark a buffered object for deletion.
*
* Transitions the action from `Cache` or `Modify` to `Erase`. If the
* object was previously `Insert`ed within this same transaction, the
* entry is removed entirely (net-zero effect on the base). Calling on
* an unknown key or a different `shared_ptr` than the one returned by
* `peek()` is a `LogicError`.
*
* @param base The underlying read view (used for key lookup context).
* @param sle The exact `shared_ptr` previously obtained from `peek()`.
* @throws std::logic_error If the key is not in the buffer, the
* pointer does not match, or the entry is already erased.
*/
void
erase(ReadView const& base, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Mark an object for deletion without enforcing pointer identity.
*
* Behaves like `erase()` but accepts any SLE with the matching key —
* the caller-provided pointer replaces whatever is stored. Used by
* `ApplyViewBase` for raw-level operations that bypass the ownership
* protocol enforced by `erase()`.
*
* @param base The underlying read view (used for key lookup context).
* @param sle An SLE whose key identifies the object to erase.
* @throws std::logic_error If the object is already pending erasure.
*/
void
rawErase(ReadView const& base, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Stage a new ledger object for insertion.
*
* Records the SLE under `Action::Insert`. If the key was previously
* erased within this same transaction, the action is collapsed to
* `Action::Modify` (insert-after-erase = replace). Attempting to
* insert over an existing `Cache`, `Insert`, or `Modify` entry is
* a `LogicError`.
*
* @param base The underlying read view (used for key lookup context).
* @param sle The new SLE to insert.
* @throws std::logic_error If the key already exists with a
* non-erase action.
*/
void
insert(ReadView const& base, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Promote a cached or new SLE to a definitive write.
*
* Requires the exact `shared_ptr` returned by `peek()`. Transitions
* `Cache` → `Modify`; `Insert` and `Modify` are left unchanged
* (already write-intent). Calling on an erased or unknown entry is a
* `LogicError`.
*
* @param base The underlying read view (used for key lookup context).
* @param sle The exact `shared_ptr` previously obtained from `peek()`.
* @throws std::logic_error If the key is missing, the pointer does not
* match, or the entry is already erased.
*/
void
update(ReadView const& base, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Unconditionally overwrite the buffered SLE for a given key.
*
* Records the SLE under `Action::Modify`, replacing any existing
* `Cache` or `Insert` entry with the supplied pointer. Calling on an
* erased entry is a `LogicError`. Unlike `update()`, does not enforce
* pointer identity — the caller supplies a fresh SLE.
*
* @param base The underlying read view (used for key lookup context).
* @param sle The SLE to store.
* @throws std::logic_error If the key is currently pending erasure.
*/
void
replace(ReadView const& base, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Record XRP drops destroyed by fees within this transaction's scope.
*
* Accumulates into `dropsDestroyed_`, which is forwarded to
* `RawView::rawDestroyXRP()` on `apply()`.
*
* @param fee The amount of XRP to permanently remove from circulation.
*/
void
destroyXRP(XRPAmount const& fee);
// For debugging
/** Return the total XRP drops marked for destruction so far.
*
* @return Reference to the accumulated destroyed-drops counter.
*/
[[nodiscard]] XRPAmount const&
dropsDestroyed() const
{
@@ -104,17 +304,74 @@ public:
}
private:
/** Scratch map used during threading to track SLEs modified solely by
* metadata updates (i.e., objects whose only change is the addition of
* `sfPreviousTxnID`/`sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq` fields). These are kept
* separate from `items_` to avoid promoting cache entries to
* `Action::Modify` for transactional purposes.
*/
using Mods = hash_map<key_type, std::shared_ptr<SLE>>;
/** Update an SLE's thread fields and record the previous tx link in metadata.
*
* Calls `sle->thread(txID, lgrSeq, ...)` to update `sfPreviousTxnID`
* and `sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq` in place. If there was a preceding
* transaction, adds those old fields to the affected node in `meta`
* so the chain of transactions is visible in on-ledger metadata.
*
* @param meta The `TxMeta` object being built for the current transaction.
* @param sle The account-root SLE to thread.
*/
static void
threadItem(TxMeta& meta, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& to);
/** Retrieve an SLE for threading modification, using `mods` as a cache.
*
* Checks `mods` first, then `items_` (returning non-cache entries
* directly), then falls back to `base`. Objects found in `items_` as
* `Action::Cache` are copied into `mods` so that threading-only
* mutations do not promote them to `Action::Modify` in the primary
* table. Returns `nullptr` when threading to a deleted or nonexistent
* account (e.g., an expired Escrow destination), which is legal.
*
* @param base The underlying read view.
* @param key The ledger key of the SLE to retrieve.
* @param mods Scratch map of threading-only modifications.
* @param j Journal for warnings about missing or deleted targets.
* @return A mutable SLE, or `nullptr` if the account does not exist.
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE>
getForMod(ReadView const& base, key_type const& key, Mods& mods, beast::Journal j);
/** Thread the current transaction to a specific account's root SLE.
*
* Looks up the account root via `getForMod()` and calls `threadItem()`
* on it. Logs a warning and returns without error if the account does
* not exist (e.g., destination of a deleted Escrow or PayChannel).
*
* @param base The underlying read view.
* @param meta The `TxMeta` object being built.
* @param to The account whose root SLE should be threaded.
* @param mods Scratch map of threading-only modifications.
* @param j Journal for warnings about missing targets.
*/
void
threadTx(ReadView const& base, TxMeta& meta, AccountID const& to, Mods& mods, beast::Journal j);
/** Thread the current transaction to all owner accounts of a ledger entry.
*
* Dispatches by `LedgerEntryType`:
* - `ltACCOUNT_ROOT`: no-op (threading to self is handled by the caller).
* - `ltRIPPLE_STATE`: threads to both the low-limit and high-limit account.
* - All others: threads to `sfAccount` if present, and to `sfDestination`
* if present.
*
* @param base The underlying read view.
* @param meta The `TxMeta` object being built.
* @param sle The ledger entry whose owner accounts should be threaded.
* @param mods Scratch map of threading-only modifications.
* @param j Journal for warnings about missing targets.
*/
void
threadOwners(
ReadView const& base,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
/** @file
* Declares `ApplyViewBase`, the abstract concrete base class shared by all
* buffered mutable ledger views used during transaction application.
*
* `ApplyViewBase` lives in `xrpl::detail` to signal that it is internal
* infrastructure; transaction processing code works with `ApplyView` or
* `ApplyViewImpl` references. The three concrete subclasses —
* `ApplyViewImpl`, `Sandbox`, and `PaymentSandbox` — are the only types
* that need to reach into this layer directly.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
@@ -7,6 +18,24 @@
namespace xrpl::detail {
/** Concrete base for buffered mutable ledger views.
*
* Implements the full `ApplyView` and `RawView` interfaces on top of two
* members: a read-only pointer to the base ledger snapshot (`base_`) and
* an `ApplyStateTable` change buffer (`items_`). Queries that need
* awareness of pending mutations (e.g. `exists`, `read`, `peek`) merge
* `items_` with `base_`; purely structural queries (`header`, `fees`,
* `rules`) and SLE iterators bypass `items_` and forward directly to
* `base_`.
*
* Not copyable; move-constructible only. Subclasses (`ApplyViewImpl`,
* `Sandbox`) supply lifecycle logic such as `apply()`.
*
* @note The `erase()` and `update()` methods enforce pointer identity: the
* caller must pass the exact `shared_ptr` returned by `peek()` on
* **this** view instance. Passing an SLE obtained from a different view
* results in a `LogicError`.
*/
class ApplyViewBase : public ApplyView, public RawView
{
public:
@@ -19,85 +48,254 @@ public:
ApplyViewBase(ApplyViewBase&&) = default;
/** Construct over an existing read-only ledger snapshot.
*
* @param base Non-owning pointer to the base ledger state; must
* outlive this view. All reads that bypass the change buffer
* are forwarded here.
* @param flags Per-transaction policy flags (retry mode, dry-run,
* unlimited, etc.) that are carried through the apply pass and
* exposed via `flags()`.
*/
ApplyViewBase(ReadView const* base, ApplyFlags flags);
// ReadView
/** @return `true` if the underlying view represents an open ledger. */
[[nodiscard]] bool
open() const override;
/** @return The ledger header from the base snapshot. */
[[nodiscard]] LedgerHeader const&
header() const override;
/** @return The fee schedule from the base snapshot. */
[[nodiscard]] Fees const&
fees() const override;
/** @return The amendment rules from the base snapshot. */
[[nodiscard]] Rules const&
rules() const override;
/** Test whether a ledger object exists, accounting for pending changes.
*
* Returns `false` for objects pending erasure, `true` for objects
* buffered as inserted or modified, and delegates to `base_` for
* keys not yet in the change buffer.
*
* @param k Keylet identifying the object.
* @return `true` if the object will exist after the pending changes.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
exists(Keylet const& k) const override;
/** Find the next live key after `key`, accounting for pending changes.
*
* Merges the base key space (skipping keys pending deletion) with the
* local change buffer (skipping erased entries) and returns the smaller
* candidate key that is less than `last`.
*
* @param key Exclusive lower bound.
* @param last Optional exclusive upper bound.
* @return The next live key, or `std::nullopt` if none exists in range.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<key_type>
succ(key_type const& key, std::optional<key_type> const& last = std::nullopt) const override;
/** Read a ledger object as an immutable snapshot, accounting for pending
* changes.
*
* Returns `nullptr` for objects pending erasure or when the keylet check
* fails; returns the buffered SLE for inserted/modified entries; falls
* back to `base_` for unknown keys.
*
* @param k Keylet identifying the object.
* @return A `const`-qualified handle to the SLE, or `nullptr`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(Keylet const& k) const override;
/** @name SLE iterators (base snapshot only)
*
* These iterators forward directly to `base_` and do **not** reflect
* pending insertions or deletions in the change buffer. This is
* intentional: the apply phase never needs to iterate its own buffered
* writes, and bypassing the buffer keeps SLE traversal consistent with
* the base ledger snapshot.
*/
/** @{ */
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesBegin() const override;
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesEnd() const override;
/** Return an iterator to the first SLE whose key is not less than `key`,
* drawn from the base snapshot only.
*
* @param key The lower-bound key for the search.
* @return An iterator into the base SLE map at or after `key`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<SlesType::iter_base>
slesUpperBound(uint256 const& key) const override;
/** @} */
/** @name Transaction-map accessors (forwarded to base snapshot) */
/** @{ */
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsBegin() const override;
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<TxsType::iter_base>
txsEnd() const override;
/** Test whether a transaction exists in the base snapshot's tx-map.
*
* @param key The transaction ID to look up.
* @return `true` if the transaction is present in the base ledger's
* transaction map.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
txExists(key_type const& key) const override;
/** Read a transaction and its metadata from the base snapshot's tx-map.
*
* @param key The transaction ID to retrieve.
* @return A pair of `(STTx, STObject metadata)` for the transaction,
* or `{nullptr, nullptr}` if not found.
*/
[[nodiscard]] tx_type
txRead(key_type const& key) const override;
/** @} */
// ApplyView
/** Return the flags governing this transaction apply pass.
*
* @return The `ApplyFlags` bitmask set at construction.
*/
[[nodiscard]] ApplyFlags
flags() const override;
/** Check out a ledger entry for in-place mutation.
*
* Loads the entry into the change buffer on first access (tagged
* `Cache`). Returns the same `shared_ptr` on subsequent calls.
* The returned pointer must later be passed to `update()` or `erase()`
* on **this** view instance to record the intended change.
*
* @param k Keylet identifying the entry.
* @return A mutable handle to the buffered SLE, or `nullptr` if the
* entry does not exist (including if it is pending erasure).
*/
std::shared_ptr<SLE>
peek(Keylet const& k) override;
/** Stage a deletion for a checked-out entry.
*
* Transitions the buffer entry from `Cache` or `Modify` to `Erase`.
* If the entry was inserted within this same transaction, it is removed
* entirely (net-zero effect on the base).
*
* @param sle The exact `shared_ptr` previously returned by `peek()`
* on this view instance.
* @throws std::logic_error If the pointer does not match the buffered
* entry or the entry is already erased.
*/
void
erase(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Stage a new ledger entry for insertion.
*
* Records the SLE under `Action::Insert`. If the key was previously
* erased within this transaction the action is collapsed to `Modify`.
*
* @param sle The new entry; its key must not already exist in the view.
* @throws std::logic_error If the key already exists with a non-erase
* action in the buffer.
*/
void
insert(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Promote a checked-out entry to a definitive write.
*
* Transitions the buffer action from `Cache` to `Modify`; `Insert` and
* `Modify` entries are left unchanged (already write-intent).
*
* @param sle The exact `shared_ptr` previously returned by `peek()`
* on this view instance.
* @throws std::logic_error If the pointer does not match, the entry is
* erased, or the key is unknown.
*/
void
update(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
// RawView
/** Erase a ledger entry without enforcing pointer-identity ownership.
*
* Bypasses the `peek()`-pointer ownership check enforced by `erase()`.
* Used by `RawView` callers (e.g. `Sandbox::apply`) that flush changes
* from another view's table and cannot satisfy the same-instance
* invariant.
*
* @param sle An SLE whose key identifies the object to erase.
* @throws std::logic_error If the object is already pending erasure.
*/
void
rawErase(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Insert a ledger entry via the same validated path as `insert()`.
*
* Despite being a raw-tier operation, this method calls the same
* `items_.insert()` that the high-level `insert()` uses; the
* distinction is that callers from the `RawView` flush path are not
* required to have obtained the SLE from `peek()`.
*
* @param sle The new entry to stage for insertion.
* @throws std::logic_error If the key already exists with a non-erase
* action.
*/
void
rawInsert(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Unconditionally overwrite the buffered SLE for an existing key.
*
* Records the SLE under `Action::Modify`, replacing any `Cache` or
* `Insert` entry. Unlike `update()`, does not enforce pointer identity.
*
* @param sle The SLE to store; its key must exist in this view.
* @throws std::logic_error If the key is currently pending erasure.
*/
void
rawReplace(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle) override;
/** Record XRP drops destroyed by fees within this transaction's scope.
*
* Accumulates into the change buffer and is forwarded to the parent
* view's `rawDestroyXRP()` when the buffer is committed.
*
* @param feeDrops The amount of XRP to permanently remove from
* circulation.
*/
void
rawDestroyXRP(XRPAmount const& feeDrops) override;
protected:
/** Per-transaction policy flags set at construction; exposed via `flags()`. */
ApplyFlags flags_;
/** Non-owning pointer to the base ledger snapshot.
*
* All reads that do not need awareness of pending changes are forwarded
* here. The pointed-to view must outlive this object.
*/
ReadView const* base_;
/** Change buffer accumulating per-transaction ledger mutations.
*
* Maps each touched `uint256` key to an `(Action, SLE)` pair. Flushed
* to the parent view atomically on `apply()`; discarded on destruction.
*/
detail::ApplyStateTable items_;
};

View File

@@ -11,27 +11,73 @@
namespace xrpl::detail {
// Helper class that buffers raw modifications
/** In-memory write buffer that accumulates SLE mutations before flushing them
* to a backing `RawView`.
*
* Every mutable ledger view (`OpenView`, and indirectly `ApplyStateTable`)
* embeds a `RawStateTable` as its delta accumulator. The three mutation
* methods — `erase`, `insert`, and `replace` — apply a state-machine
* collapse so the map stays minimal: insert-then-erase cancels out entirely;
* erase-then-insert upgrades to replace; and illegal sequences (double-erase,
* double-insert) throw `std::logic_error`. `read`, `exists`, and `succ`
* overlay the pending delta transparently onto the supplied base `ReadView`,
* so callers always see a coherent merged state. Once a transaction succeeds,
* `apply()` flushes the buffer to the target `RawView` in a single pass.
*
* The `items_` map uses a `boost::container::pmr::monotonic_buffer_resource`
* with a 256 KB initial arena for O(1) amortised allocation during the burst
* of mutations that constitute a single transaction round. Because the
* resource cannot be shared or assigned, copy construction allocates a fresh
* resource and deep-copies the map; move construction transfers the
* `unique_ptr` directly. Both assignment operators are deleted.
*
* XRP fee destruction is tracked separately in `dropsDestroyed_` and
* replayed as a single `rawDestroyXRP` call during `apply()`.
*
* @note This class is an internal implementation detail of `OpenView`.
* Transaction logic should not interact with it directly; use the
* `RawView` interface instead.
* @see OpenView, RawView
*/
class RawStateTable
{
public:
using key_type = ReadView::key_type;
// Initial size for the monotonic_buffer_resource used for allocations
// The size was chosen from the old `qalloc` code (which this replaces).
// It is unclear how the size initially chosen in qalloc.
/** Initial arena size for the PMR monotonic buffer resource.
*
* Inherited from the legacy `qalloc` scheme this replaced. The 256 KB
* budget covers the typical per-transaction working set without triggering
* heap growth for the common case.
*/
static constexpr size_t kINITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE = kilobytes(256);
/** Construct an empty table with a fresh 256 KB monotonic arena. */
RawStateTable()
: monotonic_resource_{std::make_unique<boost::container::pmr::monotonic_buffer_resource>(
kINITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE)}
, items_{monotonic_resource_.get()} {};
/** Copy-construct by allocating a fresh monotonic arena and copying items.
*
* The SLE `shared_ptr` values in `items_` are shared with the source —
* not deep-copied — which is safe because SLEs are immutable once
* published. `dropsDestroyed_` is copied verbatim.
*
* @param rhs The source table to copy.
*/
RawStateTable(RawStateTable const& rhs)
: monotonic_resource_{std::make_unique<boost::container::pmr::monotonic_buffer_resource>(
kINITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE)}
, items_{rhs.items_, monotonic_resource_.get()}
, dropsDestroyed_{rhs.dropsDestroyed_} {};
/** Move-construct by transferring the monotonic resource and items map.
*
* After the move, the source table is left in a valid but empty state.
* The `unique_ptr` transfer preserves the stable address that `items_`'
* `polymorphic_allocator` holds.
*/
RawStateTable(RawStateTable&&) = default;
RawStateTable&
@@ -39,48 +85,166 @@ public:
RawStateTable&
operator=(RawStateTable const&) = delete;
/** Flush all buffered mutations to a backing `RawView`.
*
* First calls `to.rawDestroyXRP(dropsDestroyed_)` to replay accumulated
* fee burns, then iterates `items_` and dispatches each pending action
* to the corresponding `rawErase`, `rawInsert`, or `rawReplace` method.
* The table is not cleared after apply; this object should be discarded
* or destroyed once flushed.
*
* @param to The target `RawView` that receives all buffered mutations.
*/
void
apply(RawView& to) const;
/** Test whether an SLE exists, overlaying the pending delta onto `base`.
*
* Checks the pending buffer first: a pending erase returns `false`; a
* pending insert or replace returns `true` only if `k.check()` passes
* (type-tag validation). Falls through to `base.exists(k)` when the key
* has no pending action.
*
* @param base The underlying read-only ledger state.
* @param k The keylet specifying key and expected SLE type.
* @return `true` if the entry exists and its type satisfies `k.check()`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
exists(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k) const;
/** Find the smallest key strictly greater than `key` in the merged state.
*
* Runs two parallel searches: (1) walks `base.succ()` repeatedly,
* skipping any base key that has a pending `Action::Erase`; (2) scans
* `items_` forward from `key` for the first non-erase entry. Returns
* the lower of the two candidates. If `last` is given and the result is
* `>= last`, returns `std::nullopt` (half-open range semantics).
*
* @param base The underlying read-only ledger state.
* @param key Exclusive lower bound; the search begins strictly after this.
* @param last Optional exclusive upper bound; `std::nullopt` means unbounded.
* @return The next existing key, or `std::nullopt` if none is in range.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<key_type>
succ(ReadView const& base, key_type const& key, std::optional<key_type> const& last) const;
/** Stage an SLE deletion, applying state-machine transition rules.
*
* Transitions on the key's existing pending action:
* - None → records `Action::Erase`.
* - `Insert` → removes the entry entirely (net-zero; base is unaffected).
* - `Replace` → downgrades to `Action::Erase`.
* - `Erase` → `LogicError` (double-delete).
*
* @param sle The ledger entry to stage for deletion; key is taken from the SLE.
* @throws std::logic_error if the key already has a pending erase.
*/
void
erase(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Stage an SLE creation, applying state-machine transition rules.
*
* Transitions on the key's existing pending action:
* - None → records `Action::Insert`.
* - `Erase` → upgrades to `Action::Replace` (delete-then-recreate in
* the same transaction batch).
* - `Insert` → `LogicError` (duplicate insert).
* - `Replace` → `LogicError` (key already present in the delta).
*
* @param sle The new ledger entry to stage; key is taken from the SLE.
* @throws std::logic_error if the key is already pending insert or replace.
*/
void
insert(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Stage an SLE field update, applying state-machine transition rules.
*
* Transitions on the key's existing pending action:
* - None → records `Action::Replace`.
* - `Insert` → updates the stored SLE pointer; preserves `Insert`
* because from the base's perspective the key is still being created.
* - `Replace` → updates the stored SLE pointer.
* - `Erase` → `LogicError` (cannot replace a deleted key).
*
* @param sle The updated ledger entry to stage; key is taken from the SLE.
* @throws std::logic_error if the key has a pending erase.
*/
void
replace(std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle);
/** Read an SLE, overlaying the pending delta onto `base`.
*
* Checks the buffer first: a pending erase returns `nullptr`; a pending
* insert or replace returns the buffered SLE if `k.check()` passes
* (guards against type mismatches at the same key). Falls through to
* `base.read(k)` when the key has no pending action.
*
* @param base The underlying read-only ledger state.
* @param k The keylet specifying key and expected SLE type.
* @return The SLE if it exists and the type matches, otherwise `nullptr`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
read(ReadView const& base, Keylet const& k) const;
/** Accumulate XRP drops to destroy at `apply()` time.
*
* Drops are not forwarded individually; they accumulate in
* `dropsDestroyed_` and are replayed as a single `rawDestroyXRP` call in
* `apply()`, keeping fee-burn accounting atomic with the rest of the flush.
*
* @param fee The quantity of XRP drops to add to the accumulated burn total.
*/
void
destroyXRP(XRPAmount const& fee);
/** Return a begin iterator for the merged SLE range over `base` and the delta.
*
* The returned iterator implements the two-pointer merge defined by
* `SlesIterImpl`: pending inserts appear in sorted position, pending
* erases are hidden, and pending replaces shadow the base entry.
*
* @param base The underlying read-only ledger state to merge with.
* @return A heap-allocated `iter_base` positioned at the first merged SLE.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<ReadView::SlesType::iter_base>
slesBegin(ReadView const& base) const;
/** Return an end sentinel for the merged SLE range over `base` and the delta.
*
* @param base The underlying read-only ledger state to merge with.
* @return A heap-allocated `iter_base` positioned past the last merged SLE.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<ReadView::SlesType::iter_base>
slesEnd(ReadView const& base) const;
/** Return an iterator to the first merged SLE with key strictly greater
* than `key`.
*
* @param base The underlying read-only ledger state to merge with.
* @param key Exclusive lower bound for the search.
* @return A heap-allocated `iter_base` positioned at the first qualifying SLE.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::unique_ptr<ReadView::SlesType::iter_base>
slesUpperBound(ReadView const& base, uint256 const& key) const;
private:
/** Pending mutation kind for an entry in `items_`. */
enum class Action {
Erase,
Insert,
Replace,
Erase, /**< Entry is scheduled for deletion. */
Insert, /**< Entry is being created; does not yet exist in the base. */
Replace, /**< Entry exists in the base and has been modified. */
};
/** Private iterator class that merges base-view SLEs with the pending
* delta; defined in the `.cpp`. */
class SlesIterImpl;
/** Pairs a pending `Action` with the SLE it acts on.
*
* Stored as the mapped value in `items_`. The SLE pointer is always
* non-null; for `Erase` it is the last version written before the
* deletion was staged (used by `RawView::rawErase`).
*/
struct SleAction
{
Action action;
@@ -99,11 +263,17 @@ private:
SleAction,
std::less<key_type>,
boost::container::pmr::polymorphic_allocator<std::pair<key_type const, SleAction>>>;
// monotonic_resource_ must outlive `items_`. Make a pointer so it may be
// easily moved.
std::unique_ptr<boost::container::pmr::monotonic_buffer_resource> monotonic_resource_;
/** Ordered map from ledger key to pending mutation; backed by the
* monotonic arena for O(1) amortised node allocation. */
items_t items_;
/** Accumulated XRP drops burned by fees; replayed as one `rawDestroyXRP`
* call during `apply()`. */
XRPAmount dropsDestroyed_{0};
};

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
/** @file
* Type-erased forward-iterator infrastructure for `ReadView` traversal.
*
* Defines `ReadViewFwdIter` (the abstract iterator interface) and
* `ReadViewFwdRange` (the STL-compatible range wrapper) that together let
* any `ReadView` subclass expose its state and transaction maps through a
* single, stable iterator type. Callers interact indirectly via
* `ReadView::sles` and `ReadView::txs`; this header is internal plumbing.
*/
#pragma once
#include <cstddef>
@@ -10,8 +20,18 @@ class ReadView;
namespace detail {
// A type-erased ForwardIterator
//
/** Abstract base defining the four primitive operations of a type-erased forward iterator.
*
* Each concrete `ReadView` implementation provides a private subclass of
* this template and hands heap-allocated instances to `ReadViewFwdRange::Iterator`
* via the factory methods `slesBegin()`, `slesEnd()`, `slesUpperBound()`,
* `txsBegin()`, and `txsEnd()` on `ReadView`. Callers never interact with
* this class directly.
*
* @tparam ValueType The element type yielded by the iterator —
* `std::shared_ptr<SLE const>` for state-map iteration or
* `ReadView::tx_type` for transaction-map iteration.
*/
template <class ValueType>
class ReadViewFwdIter
{
@@ -27,21 +47,57 @@ public:
virtual ~ReadViewFwdIter() = default;
/** Returns a heap-allocated deep copy of this iterator.
*
* Provides value-semantics copy for the owning `unique_ptr` wrapper.
* Each concrete subclass must return a new instance of itself in the
* same position.
*
* @return A `unique_ptr` to a fresh copy of this iterator instance.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::unique_ptr<ReadViewFwdIter>
copy() const = 0;
/** Returns `true` if this iterator denotes the same position as @p impl.
*
* Both iterators must be over the same underlying view; mixing iterators
* from different views produces undefined behavior.
*
* @param impl The other iterator to compare against.
* @return `true` when both iterators point to the same element (or both
* are end sentinels).
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual bool
equal(ReadViewFwdIter const& impl) const = 0;
/** Advances this iterator to the next element in the sequence. */
virtual void
increment() = 0;
/** Returns the element at the current iterator position.
*
* @return The current `ValueType` value. The result is cached by the
* wrapping `Iterator` so repeated dereferences are inexpensive.
* @throw May throw if the underlying view operation fails.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual value_type
dereference() const = 0;
};
// A range using type-erased ForwardIterator
//
/** STL-compatible forward range backed by a type-erased iterator.
*
* Wraps a `ReadViewFwdIter<ValueType>` behind a regular value-type iterator
* so that callers can write range-for loops over any `ReadView` subclass
* without knowing the concrete iterator type. Virtual dispatch is hidden
* inside the `impl_` pointer; the public `Iterator` API is fully inlined.
*
* `ReadView::SlesType` and `ReadView::TxsType` inherit from this template;
* application code should use those types rather than instantiating
* `ReadViewFwdRange` directly.
*
* @tparam ValueType The element type — must be noexcept-move-constructible
* so that `Iterator` move operations are noexcept.
*/
template <class ValueType>
class ReadViewFwdRange
{
@@ -53,6 +109,18 @@ public:
"ReadViewFwdRange move and move assign constructors should be "
"noexcept");
/** STL forward iterator over a `ReadViewFwdRange`.
*
* Value-type wrapper around a heap-allocated `iter_base`. Copy uses
* `iter_base::copy()` for a polymorphic deep clone; move transfers
* ownership of the `unique_ptr` without allocation and is `noexcept`.
* Dereference results are cached in `cache_` and cleared on advance,
* amortizing the cost of repeated `*it` or `it->` calls in tight loops.
*
* @note Comparing iterators from different views triggers an
* `XRPL_ASSERT` in debug builds. The `view_` pointer is carried
* solely for this cross-view sanity check.
*/
class Iterator
{
public:
@@ -66,43 +134,127 @@ public:
using iterator_category = std::forward_iterator_tag;
/** Constructs a singular (default) iterator.
*
* A default-constructed iterator is not dereferenceable and must
* not be incremented. It compares equal only to other
* default-constructed iterators.
*/
Iterator() = default;
/** Copy-constructs an independent iterator at the same position.
*
* Calls `iter_base::copy()` to deep-clone the polymorphic
* implementation, producing a new iterator that advances
* independently of @p other.
*
* @param other The iterator to clone.
*/
Iterator(Iterator const& other);
/** Move-constructs an iterator, transferring ownership of the impl.
*
* @param other The iterator to move from; left in a valid but
* singular state.
*/
Iterator(Iterator&& other) noexcept;
// Used by the implementation
/** Constructs an iterator from a raw view pointer and a polymorphic impl.
*
* Used exclusively by `ReadView`'s factory methods (`slesBegin()`,
* `slesEnd()`, etc.). Not intended for direct use by callers.
*
* @param view The owning view; stored only for cross-view assertion.
* @param impl The heap-allocated concrete iterator; ownership is
* transferred to this object.
*/
explicit Iterator(ReadView const* view, std::unique_ptr<iter_base> impl);
/** Copy-assigns from another iterator at the same position.
*
* Deep-clones via `iter_base::copy()`.
*
* @param other The iterator to copy.
* @return `*this`.
*/
Iterator&
operator=(Iterator const& other);
/** Move-assigns from another iterator.
*
* @param other The iterator to move from; left in a valid but
* singular state.
* @return `*this`.
*/
Iterator&
operator=(Iterator&& other) noexcept;
/** Returns `true` if both iterators denote the same position.
*
* Delegates to `iter_base::equal()`. Two null `impl_` pointers also
* compare equal (both are end sentinels / default-constructed).
*
* @param other The iterator to compare against.
* @return `true` when both iterators are at the same element.
* @note Asserts in debug builds that both iterators belong to the
* same view. Comparing iterators from different views is
* undefined behaviour.
*/
bool
operator==(Iterator const& other) const;
/** Returns `true` if the iterators denote different positions.
*
* @param other The iterator to compare against.
* @return `true` when the iterators are not at the same element.
*/
bool
operator!=(Iterator const& other) const;
/** Returns a reference to the current element.
*
* The result is cached after the first call; subsequent calls before
* the next `operator++` return the cached value at no extra cost.
*
* @return A `const` reference to the current `ValueType`.
* @throw May throw if the underlying `iter_base::dereference()` call fails.
*/
// Can throw
reference
operator*() const;
/** Returns a pointer to the current element.
*
* Delegates to `operator*()` so caching and exception behaviour are
* identical to that of the dereference operator.
*
* @return A `const` pointer to the current `ValueType`.
* @throw May throw if the underlying `iter_base::dereference()` call fails.
*/
// Can throw
pointer
operator->() const;
/** Advances the iterator and clears the dereference cache.
*
* @return `*this` after advancing to the next element.
*/
Iterator&
operator++();
/** Returns a copy of the current iterator, then advances.
*
* @return An iterator to the element before the advance.
*/
Iterator
operator++(int);
private:
/** Owning view; compared in `operator==` to catch cross-view misuse. */
ReadView const* view_ = nullptr;
/** Heap-allocated polymorphic iterator; null for the end sentinel. */
std::unique_ptr<iter_base> impl_{};
/** One-slot dereference cache; cleared on each advance. */
std::optional<value_type> mutable cache_;
};
@@ -118,11 +270,19 @@ public:
ReadViewFwdRange&
operator=(ReadViewFwdRange const&) = default;
/** Constructs a range bound to @p view.
*
* The range stores a raw pointer to the view. The view must outlive
* the range and any iterators derived from it.
*
* @param view The `ReadView` whose factory methods supply iterators.
*/
explicit ReadViewFwdRange(ReadView const& view) : view_(&view)
{
}
protected:
/** The view whose factory methods supply concrete `iter_base` instances. */
ReadView const* view_;
};

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
/** @file
* Mathematical and operational backbone of the XRPL Automated Market Maker.
*
* Provides every computation needed to run a constant-product AMM pool:
* LP token minting and burning (XLS-30d Equations 3, 4, 7, 8), spot-price
* quality alignment against the central limit order book, swap execution with
* rigorous directional rounding, and ledger-state helpers for pool balance
* queries and AMM account lifecycle management.
*
* All arithmetic observes the pool invariant:
* @code
* sqrt(poolAsset1 × poolAsset2) >= LPTokenBalance
* @endcode
* Rounding is always directed to keep the pool at least as large as required.
* The `fixAMMv1_1` amendment introduced per-step directional rounding for
* swaps; `fixAMMv1_3` extended this discipline to LP token and
* deposit/withdrawal formulas. Pre-amendment paths are preserved for
* historic ledger replay.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Expected.h>
@@ -22,6 +41,17 @@ namespace xrpl {
namespace detail {
/** Scale @p amount down by 99.99% as a last-resort quality rescue.
*
* When the rounded offer from `getAMMOfferStartWithTakerGets` or
* `getAMMOfferStartWithTakerPays` still falls below the target quality due
* to XRP integer-drop discretization, this function shrinks it by 0.01%
* (rounding toward zero) so the resulting offer quality meets or exceeds
* the target without generating an implausibly small trade.
*
* @param amount The offer side (takerGets or takerPays) to reduce.
* @return The reduced amount, or zero if already at zero.
*/
Number
reduceOffer(auto const& amount)
{
@@ -34,22 +64,41 @@ reduceOffer(auto const& amount)
} // namespace detail
/** Direction tag used throughout deposit/withdrawal and rounding helpers.
*
* Passed to functions that behave asymmetrically between deposit (LP tokens
* rounded down, assets rounded up) and withdrawal (LP tokens rounded up,
* assets rounded down) to preserve the pool invariant.
*/
enum class IsDeposit : bool { No = false, Yes = true };
/** Calculate LP Tokens given AMM pool reserves.
* @param asset1 AMM one side of the pool reserve
* @param asset2 AMM another side of the pool reserve
* @return LP Tokens as IOU
/** Compute the initial LP token supply for a newly seeded AMM pool.
*
* Uses the geometric mean `sqrt(asset1 × asset2)`, which sets the
* pool invariant to equality at creation: `sqrt(asset1 × asset2) == LPTokens`.
* Under `fixAMMv1_3` the result is rounded downward so the pool starts
* with a slight surplus, preserving the invariant.
*
* @param asset1 Balance of the first pool asset.
* @param asset2 Balance of the second pool asset.
* @param lptIssue Asset descriptor identifying the LP token currency/issuer.
* @return Initial LP token amount as an IOU `STAmount`.
*/
STAmount
ammLPTokens(STAmount const& asset1, STAmount const& asset2, Asset const& lptIssue);
/** Calculate LP Tokens given asset's deposit amount.
* @param asset1Balance current AMM asset1 balance
* @param asset1Deposit requested asset1 deposit amount
* @param lptAMMBalance AMM LPT balance
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @return tokens
/** LP tokens minted for a single-asset deposit (XLS-30d Equation 3).
*
* A single-sided deposit is economically equivalent to a proportional
* deposit plus a fee-bearing swap; the fee is embedded via `feeMult` and
* `feeMultHalf`. Under `fixAMMv1_3` the final multiplication is rounded
* downward so fewer tokens are issued, preserving the pool invariant.
*
* @param asset1Balance Current pool balance of the asset being deposited.
* @param asset1Deposit Amount being deposited.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points (e.g. 1000 = 1%).
* @return LP tokens to mint for the depositor.
*/
STAmount
lpTokensOut(
@@ -58,12 +107,19 @@ lpTokensOut(
STAmount const& lptAMMBalance,
std::uint16_t tfee);
/** Calculate asset deposit given LP Tokens.
* @param asset1Balance current AMM asset1 balance
* @param lpTokens LP Tokens
* @param lptAMMBalance AMM LPT balance
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @return
/** Asset deposit required to receive a given number of LP tokens (XLS-30d Equation 4).
*
* Inverse of `lpTokensOut`: solves Equation 3 for the deposit amount given a
* desired token output. The solution is a quadratic whose positive root is
* found via `solveQuadraticEq`. Under `fixAMMv1_3` the result is rounded
* upward so the depositor contributes slightly more, preserving the pool
* invariant.
*
* @param asset1Balance Current pool balance of the asset to deposit.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param lpTokens Desired LP token amount.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return Asset amount the depositor must contribute.
*/
STAmount
ammAssetIn(
@@ -72,13 +128,18 @@ ammAssetIn(
STAmount const& lpTokens,
std::uint16_t tfee);
/** Calculate LP Tokens given asset's withdraw amount. Return 0
* if can't calculate.
* @param asset1Balance current AMM asset1 balance
* @param asset1Withdraw requested asset1 withdraw amount
* @param lptAMMBalance AMM LPT balance
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @return tokens out amount
/** LP tokens to burn for a single-asset withdrawal (XLS-30d Equation 7).
*
* Computes how many LP tokens must be redeemed to withdraw a specified asset
* amount. Returns zero if the inputs make calculation impossible. Under
* `fixAMMv1_3` the final multiplication is rounded upward so more tokens must
* be burned, preserving the pool invariant.
*
* @param asset1Balance Current pool balance of the asset being withdrawn.
* @param asset1Withdraw Requested withdrawal amount.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return LP tokens the withdrawer must burn, or zero if the calculation fails.
*/
STAmount
lpTokensIn(
@@ -87,12 +148,18 @@ lpTokensIn(
STAmount const& lptAMMBalance,
std::uint16_t tfee);
/** Calculate asset withdrawal by tokens
* @param assetBalance balance of the asset being withdrawn
* @param lptAMMBalance total AMM Tokens balance
* @param lpTokens LP Tokens balance
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @return calculated asset amount
/** Asset returned when burning a given number of LP tokens (XLS-30d Equation 8).
*
* Inverse of `lpTokensIn`: solves Equation 7 for the withdrawal amount given
* the token burn. Under `fixAMMv1_3` the final multiplication is rounded
* downward so the withdrawer receives slightly less, preserving the pool
* invariant.
*
* @param assetBalance Current pool balance of the asset to withdraw.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param lpTokens LP tokens being burned.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return Asset amount returned to the withdrawer.
*/
STAmount
ammAssetOut(
@@ -101,12 +168,19 @@ ammAssetOut(
STAmount const& lpTokens,
std::uint16_t tfee);
/** Check if the relative distance between the qualities
* is within the requested distance.
* @param calcQuality calculated quality
* @param reqQuality requested quality
* @param dist requested relative distance
* @return true if within dist, false otherwise
/** Check whether two `Quality` values are within a relative tolerance.
*
* `Quality` has no subtraction operator, so the comparison is performed via
* `Quality::rate()`, which returns the *inverse* of quality (output/input).
* The formula `(min.rate - max.rate) / min.rate < dist` is equivalent to
* the standard `(max - min) / max < dist` after accounting for the inversion.
* Used in `changeSpotPriceQuality` to suppress trace-level errors when the
* quality mismatch is within one part in ten million (1e-7).
*
* @param calcQuality Computed quality.
* @param reqQuality Target quality.
* @param dist Maximum acceptable relative distance (e.g. `Number(1, -7)`).
* @return `true` if the two qualities are within @p dist of each other.
*/
inline bool
withinRelativeDistance(Quality const& calcQuality, Quality const& reqQuality, Number const& dist)
@@ -120,12 +194,18 @@ withinRelativeDistance(Quality const& calcQuality, Quality const& reqQuality, Nu
return ((min.rate() - max.rate()) / min.rate()) < dist;
}
/** Check if the relative distance between the amounts
* is within the requested distance.
* @param calc calculated amount
* @param req requested amount
* @param dist requested relative distance
* @return true if within dist, false otherwise
/** Check whether two numeric amounts are within a relative tolerance.
*
* Computes `(max - min) / max` and tests that it is less than @p dist.
* Accepted for `STAmount`, `IOUAmount`, `XRPAmount`, `MPTAmount`, and
* `Number`. Used alongside the `Quality` overload to emit quality-mismatch
* errors only when the discrepancy is truly significant.
*
* @tparam Amt Amount type; constrained to the five types listed above.
* @param calc Computed amount.
* @param req Target amount.
* @param dist Maximum acceptable relative distance.
* @return `true` if the two amounts are within @p dist of each other.
*/
template <typename Amt>
requires(
@@ -141,34 +221,49 @@ withinRelativeDistance(Amt const& calc, Amt const& req, Number const& dist)
return ((max - min) / max) < dist;
}
/** Solve quadratic equation to find takerGets or takerPays. Round
* to minimize the amount in order to maximize the quality.
/** Smallest positive root of `a·x² + b·x + c = 0`, used to minimize offer size.
*
* Uses the numerically stable "citardauq" formula (Blinn 2006): when `b > 0`
* it computes `2c / (-b - sqrt(d))` instead of the standard
* `(-b + sqrt(d)) / 2a`, avoiding catastrophic cancellation when the two
* terms in the numerator are nearly equal. Minimizing the root maximizes
* offer quality in `getAMMOfferStartWithTakerGets` / `getAMMOfferStartWithTakerPays`.
*
* @param a Quadratic coefficient.
* @param b Linear coefficient.
* @param c Constant term.
* @return The smallest positive root, or `std::nullopt` if the discriminant
* is negative (no real solution) or the root is non-positive.
*/
std::optional<Number>
solveQuadraticEqSmallest(Number const& a, Number const& b, Number const& c);
/** Generate AMM offer starting with takerGets when AMM pool
* from the payment perspective is IOU(in)/XRP(out)
* Equations:
* Spot Price Quality after the offer is consumed:
* Qsp = (O - o) / (I + i) -- equation (1)
* where O is poolPays, I is poolGets, o is takerGets, i is takerPays
* Swap out:
* i = (I * o) / (O - o) * f -- equation (2)
* where f is (1 - tfee/100000), tfee is in basis points
* Effective price targetQuality:
* Qep = o / i -- equation (3)
* There are two scenarios to consider
* A) Qsp = Qep. Substitute i in (1) with (2) and solve for o
* and Qsp = targetQuality(Qt):
* o**2 + o * (I * Qt * (1 - 1 / f) - 2 * O) + O**2 - Qt * I * O = 0
* B) Qep = Qsp. Substitute i in (3) with (2) and solve for o
* and Qep = targetQuality(Qt):
* o = O - I * Qt / f
* Since the scenario is not known a priori, both A and B are solved and
* the lowest value of o is takerGets. takerPays is calculated with
* swap out eq (2). If o is less or equal to 0 then the offer can't
* be generated.
/** Generate a synthetic AMM offer whose quality matches @p targetQuality,
* starting from takerGets (XRP out, IOU in).
*
* Used when the pool pays XRP (IOU-in / XRP-out). Starting from the XRP
* side ensures that rounding XRP down to integer drops improves rather than
* degrades offer quality (post-`fixAMMv1_1` behavior).
*
* Two binding constraints are solved and the smaller takerGets is chosen:
* - Scenario A — post-swap spot price equals @p targetQuality:
* `o² + o·(I·Qt·(1 - 1/f) - 2·O) + O² - Qt·I·O = 0`
* - Scenario B — effective offer price equals @p targetQuality:
* `o = O - I·Qt / f`
*
* where `O = poolPays`, `I = poolGets`, `f = feeMult(tfee)`.
* takerPays is then derived from the swap-out equation. If the resulting
* offer quality is still below @p targetQuality after rounding, a 99.99%
* rescale via `detail::reduceOffer` is attempted.
*
* @tparam TIn Asset type flowing into the pool (IOU side).
* @tparam TOut Asset type flowing out of the pool (XRP side).
* @param pool Current AMM pool balances (`in` = poolGets, `out` = poolPays).
* @param targetQuality Desired offer quality (CLOB best quality).
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return Seated `{takerPays, takerGets}` amounts, or `std::nullopt` if a
* valid offer cannot be generated (e.g. target quality unreachable at
* current fee).
*/
template <typename TIn, typename TOut>
std::optional<TAmounts<TIn, TOut>>
@@ -214,28 +309,30 @@ getAMMOfferStartWithTakerGets(
return amounts;
}
/** Generate AMM offer starting with takerPays when AMM pool
* from the payment perspective is XRP(in)/IOU(out) or IOU(in)/IOU(out).
* Equations:
* Spot Price Quality after the offer is consumed:
* Qsp = (O - o) / (I + i) -- equation (1)
* where O is poolPays, I is poolGets, o is takerGets, i is takerPays
* Swap in:
* o = (O * i * f) / (I + i * f) -- equation (2)
* where f is (1 - tfee/100000), tfee is in basis points
* Effective price quality:
* Qep = o / i -- equation (3)
* There are two scenarios to consider
* A) Qsp = Qep. Substitute o in (1) with (2) and solve for i
* and Qsp = targetQuality(Qt):
* i**2 * f + i * I * (1 + f) + I**2 - I * O / Qt = 0
* B) Qep = Qsp. Substitute i in (3) with (2) and solve for i
* and Qep = targetQuality(Qt):
* i = O / Qt - I / f
* Since the scenario is not known a priori, both A and B are solved and
* the lowest value of i is takerPays. takerGets is calculated with
* swap in eq (2). If i is less or equal to 0 then the offer can't
* be generated.
/** Generate a synthetic AMM offer whose quality matches @p targetQuality,
* starting from takerPays (XRP in, or IOU/IOU).
*
* Used for XRP-in/IOU-out and IOU/IOU pools. Starting from the XRP
* side (takerPays) under `fixAMMv1_1` keeps rounding effects favorable.
*
* Two binding constraints are solved and the smaller takerPays is chosen:
* - Scenario A — post-swap spot price equals @p targetQuality:
* `i²·f + i·I·(1+f) + I² - I·O/Qt = 0`
* - Scenario B — effective offer price equals @p targetQuality:
* `i = O/Qt - I/f`
*
* where `O = poolPays`, `I = poolGets`, `f = feeMult(tfee)`.
* takerGets is then derived from the swap-in equation. If the resulting
* offer quality is still below @p targetQuality after rounding, a 99.99%
* rescale via `detail::reduceOffer` is attempted.
*
* @tparam TIn Asset type flowing into the pool.
* @tparam TOut Asset type flowing out of the pool.
* @param pool Current AMM pool balances (`in` = poolGets, `out` = poolPays).
* @param targetQuality Desired offer quality (CLOB best quality).
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return Seated `{takerPays, takerGets}` amounts, or `std::nullopt` if a
* valid offer cannot be generated.
*/
template <typename TIn, typename TOut>
std::optional<TAmounts<TIn, TOut>>
@@ -281,21 +378,34 @@ getAMMOfferStartWithTakerPays(
return amounts;
}
/** Generate AMM offer so that either updated Spot Price Quality (SPQ)
* is equal to LOB quality (in this case AMM offer quality is
* better than LOB quality) or AMM offer is equal to LOB quality
* (in this case SPQ is better than LOB quality).
* Pre-amendment code calculates takerPays first. If takerGets is XRP,
* it is rounded down, which results in worse offer quality than
* LOB quality, and the offer might fail to generate.
* Post-amendment code calculates the XRP offer side first. The result
* is rounded down, which makes the offer quality better.
* It might not be possible to match either SPQ or AMM offer to LOB
* quality. This generally happens at higher fees.
* @param pool AMM pool balances
* @param quality requested quality
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @return seated in/out amounts if the quality can be changed
/** Generate a synthetic AMM offer that aligns the pool's spot price with a CLOB quality.
*
* The payment engine calls this when it encounters both AMM pools and order
* book offers for the same currency pair. The resulting offer has a quality
* such that either the post-swap spot price equals @p quality (AMM offer
* quality is better) or the offer's effective price equals @p quality (the
* post-swap spot price is better) — whichever produces the smaller offer.
*
* Amendment behavior:
* - Pre-`fixAMMv1_1`: always solves for takerPays first; rounding down XRP
* takerGets can push quality below target, causing the offer to be rejected.
* - Post-`fixAMMv1_1`: solves for the XRP side first (takerGets when pool pays
* XRP, takerPays otherwise) so XRP rounding improves rather than degrades
* quality. Falls back to `detail::reduceOffer` if quality is still below
* target after rounding.
*
* A quality mismatch larger than 1e-7 is logged at `j.error()` level; smaller
* mismatches are trace-only.
*
* @tparam TIn Asset type flowing into the pool.
* @tparam TOut Asset type flowing out of the pool.
* @param pool Current AMM pool balances.
* @param quality Target quality (best CLOB offer quality for this pair).
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @param rules Current ledger rules (for amendment checks).
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return Seated `{takerPays, takerGets}` amounts, or `std::nullopt` if the
* quality cannot be achieved (generally at high fees).
*/
template <typename TIn, typename TOut>
std::optional<TAmounts<TIn, TOut>>
@@ -398,26 +508,26 @@ changeSpotPriceQuality(
return amounts;
}
/** AMM pool invariant - the product (A * B) after swap in/out has to remain
* at least the same: (A + in) * (B - out) >= A * B
* XRP round-off may result in a smaller product after swap in/out.
* To address this:
* - if on swapIn the out is XRP then the amount is round-off
* downward, making the product slightly larger since out
* value is reduced.
* - if on swapOut the in is XRP then the amount is round-off
* upward, making the product slightly larger since in
* value is increased.
*/
// --- Swap-in / Swap-out ---
/** Swap assetIn into the pool and swap out a proportional amount
* of the other asset. Implements AMM Swap in.
* @see [XLS30d:AMM
* Swap](https://github.com/XRPLF/XRPL-Standards/discussions/78)
* @param pool current AMM pool balances
* @param assetIn amount to swap in
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @return
/** Deposit @p assetIn into the pool and receive a proportional amount of the
* other asset (AMM Swap in, XLS-30d).
*
* Formula: `out = pool.out - (pool.in × pool.out) / (pool.in + assetIn × feeMult(tfee))`
*
* Pool invariant: `(pool.in + assetIn) × (pool.out - out) >= pool.in × pool.out`.
* XRP integer rounding can violate this; post-`fixAMMv1_1` each sub-expression
* has an explicitly directed rounding mode so the pool retains a tiny surplus.
* The output is always rounded downward so the trader receives less, not more.
*
* @tparam TIn Asset type deposited (poolGets side).
* @tparam TOut Asset type received (poolPays side).
* @param pool Current AMM pool balances.
* @param assetIn Amount being deposited into the pool.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return Amount of the output asset the trader receives; zero if the pool
* denominator is non-positive.
* @see [XLS-30d AMM Swap](https://github.com/XRPLF/XRPL-Standards/discussions/78)
*/
template <typename TIn, typename TOut>
TOut
@@ -476,14 +586,23 @@ swapAssetIn(TAmounts<TIn, TOut> const& pool, TIn const& assetIn, std::uint16_t t
Number::RoundingMode::Downward);
}
/** Swap assetOut out of the pool and swap in a proportional amount
* of the other asset. Implements AMM Swap out.
* @see [XLS30d:AMM
* Swap](https://github.com/XRPLF/XRPL-Standards/discussions/78)
* @param pool current AMM pool balances
* @param assetOut amount to swap out
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @return
/** Withdraw @p assetOut from the pool and compute the required input asset (AMM Swap out, XLS-30d).
*
* Formula: `in = ((pool.in × pool.out) / (pool.out - assetOut) - pool.in) / feeMult(tfee)`
*
* The input is always rounded upward so the trader pays at least what the
* pool needs to maintain its invariant. Post-`fixAMMv1_1` each intermediate
* step is individually directed; if the pool denominator is non-positive (i.e.
* @p assetOut >= the entire pool), the maximum representable `TIn` is returned.
*
* @tparam TIn Asset type deposited (poolGets side).
* @tparam TOut Asset type withdrawn (poolPays side).
* @param pool Current AMM pool balances.
* @param assetOut Amount being withdrawn from the pool.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return Amount of the input asset the trader must pay; `toMaxAmount<TIn>`
* if the requested output would exhaust the pool.
* @see [XLS-30d AMM Swap](https://github.com/XRPLF/XRPL-Standards/discussions/78)
*/
template <typename TIn, typename TOut>
TIn
@@ -542,35 +661,46 @@ swapAssetOut(TAmounts<TIn, TOut> const& pool, TOut const& assetOut, std::uint16_
Number::RoundingMode::Upward);
}
/** Return square of n.
*/
/** Return `n²`. */
Number
square(Number const& n);
/** Adjust LP tokens to deposit/withdraw.
* Amount type keeps 16 digits. Maintaining the LP balance by adding
* deposited tokens or subtracting withdrawn LP tokens from LP balance
* results in losing precision in LP balance. I.e. the resulting LP balance
* is less than the actual sum of LP tokens. To adjust for this, subtract
* old tokens balance from the new one for deposit or vice versa for
* withdraw to cancel out the precision loss.
* @param lptAMMBalance LPT AMM Balance
* @param lpTokens LP tokens to deposit or withdraw
* @param isDeposit Yes if deposit, No if withdraw
/** Adjust LP tokens to account for 16-digit precision loss in the running balance.
*
* Adding newly-minted tokens to an already-large `lptAMMBalance` can lose
* significance in the least-significant digit: the stored balance advances
* by less than `lpTokens`. This function round-trips through the 16-digit
* representation by computing `(balance + tokens) - balance` (deposit) or
* `(tokens - balance) + balance` (withdraw), returning the value that will
* actually be committed to the ledger. Result is forced downward to ensure
* the adjusted tokens do not exceed the requested tokens.
*
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply stored on the AMM SLE.
* @param lpTokens Tokens being minted or burned.
* @param isDeposit `IsDeposit::Yes` for deposit, `IsDeposit::No` for withdrawal.
* @return Adjusted token amount that exactly matches the representable delta
* in the 16-digit balance.
*/
STAmount
adjustLPTokens(STAmount const& lptAMMBalance, STAmount const& lpTokens, IsDeposit isDeposit);
/** Calls adjustLPTokens() and adjusts deposit or withdraw amounts if
* the adjusted LP tokens are less than the provided LP tokens.
* @param amountBalance asset1 pool balance
* @param amount asset1 to deposit or withdraw
* @param amount2 asset2 to deposit or withdraw
* @param lptAMMBalance LPT AMM Balance
* @param lpTokens LP tokens to deposit or withdraw
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @param isDeposit Yes if deposit, No if withdraw
* @return
/** Adjust deposit/withdrawal asset amounts to match the precision-corrected LP token count.
*
* Calls `adjustLPTokens()` to compute the representable token delta. If the
* adjusted count is less than @p lpTokens, the corresponding asset amounts are
* scaled down so the ledger does not grant assets that exceed what the LP token
* math supports. A no-op when `fixAMMv1_3` is active because `getRoundedLPTokens`
* already incorporates the precision adjustment.
*
* @param amountBalance Current pool balance of the primary asset.
* @param amount Primary asset amount to deposit or withdraw.
* @param amount2 Secondary asset amount for two-sided operations; `std::nullopt`
* for single-asset operations.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param lpTokens Calculated LP tokens before precision adjustment.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @param isDeposit `IsDeposit::Yes` for deposit, `IsDeposit::No` for withdrawal.
* @return Tuple of `(adjustedAmount, adjustedAmount2, adjustedLPTokens)`.
*/
std::tuple<STAmount, std::optional<STAmount>, STAmount>
adjustAmountsByLPTokens(
@@ -582,17 +712,46 @@ adjustAmountsByLPTokens(
std::uint16_t tfee,
IsDeposit isDeposit);
/** Positive solution for quadratic equation:
* x = (-b + sqrt(b**2 + 4*a*c))/(2*a)
/** Positive root of `a·x² + b·x + c = 0` using the standard formula.
*
* Computes `x = (-b + sqrt(b² - 4·a·c)) / (2·a)`. Used by `ammAssetIn`
* to invert Equation 4; the discriminant is guaranteed non-negative by the
* deposit formula's domain.
*
* @param a Quadratic coefficient.
* @param b Linear coefficient.
* @param c Constant term.
* @return The positive root.
*/
Number
solveQuadraticEq(Number const& a, Number const& b, Number const& c);
/** Multiply @p amount by @p frac with an explicitly directed rounding mode.
*
* Installs @p rm for both the `Number` multiplication and the subsequent
* `toSTAmount` conversion so that rounding is applied once at the final step,
* not accumulated through intermediates. This is the building block for all
* `fixAMMv1_3` directional-rounding paths.
*
* @param amount Base `STAmount` to scale.
* @param frac Scaling factor.
* @param rm Rounding mode to apply at the final conversion step.
* @return `amount × frac` rounded according to @p rm, expressed in the same
* asset as @p amount.
*/
STAmount
multiply(STAmount const& amount, Number const& frac, Number::RoundingMode rm);
namespace detail {
/** Select the LP token rounding direction that preserves the pool invariant.
*
* Deposit: round downward (fewer tokens minted → pool worth more per token).
* Withdraw: round upward (more tokens burned → pool retains slightly more).
*
* @param isDeposit Direction of the operation.
* @return `Downward` for deposit, `Upward` for withdrawal.
*/
inline Number::RoundingMode
getLPTokenRounding(IsDeposit isDeposit)
{
@@ -602,6 +761,14 @@ getLPTokenRounding(IsDeposit isDeposit)
: Number::RoundingMode::Upward;
}
/** Select the asset rounding direction that preserves the pool invariant.
*
* Deposit: round upward (depositor pays slightly more → pool is larger).
* Withdraw: round downward (withdrawer receives slightly less → pool retains).
*
* @param isDeposit Direction of the operation.
* @return `Upward` for deposit, `Downward` for withdrawal.
*/
inline Number::RoundingMode
getAssetRounding(IsDeposit isDeposit)
{
@@ -613,10 +780,19 @@ getAssetRounding(IsDeposit isDeposit)
} // namespace detail
/** Round AMM equal deposit/withdrawal amount. Deposit/withdrawal formulas
* calculate the amount as a fractional value of the pool balance. The rounding
* takes place on the last step of multiplying the balance by the fraction if
* AMMv1_3 is enabled.
/** Compute a proportional asset amount with amendment-gated directional rounding.
*
* Used for two-sided (equal) deposit/withdrawal where the asset amount is
* `balance × frac`. Under `fixAMMv1_3` the final multiplication is rounded
* via `detail::getAssetRounding` (upward on deposit, downward on withdraw).
* Without the amendment the result uses the current ambient rounding mode.
*
* @tparam A Type of @p frac; either `STAmount` or `Number`.
* @param rules Current ledger rules.
* @param balance Pool balance of the asset.
* @param frac Fraction of the pool balance to apply.
* @param isDeposit Direction; controls rounding when `fixAMMv1_3` is active.
* @return `balance × frac` rounded to preserve the pool invariant.
*/
template <typename A>
STAmount
@@ -637,14 +813,20 @@ getRoundedAsset(Rules const& rules, STAmount const& balance, A const& frac, IsDe
return multiply(balance, frac, rm);
}
/** Round AMM single deposit/withdrawal amount.
* The lambda's are used to delay evaluation until the function
* is executed so that the calculation is not done twice. noRoundCb() is
* called if AMMv1_3 is disabled. Otherwise, the rounding is set and
* the amount is:
* isDeposit is Yes - the balance multiplied by productCb()
* isDeposit is No - the result of productCb(). The rounding is
* the same for all calculations in productCb()
/** Compute a single-asset deposit/withdrawal amount with amendment-gated rounding.
*
* The callback form defers evaluation to avoid computing the formula twice:
* - Without `fixAMMv1_3`: calls `noRoundCb()` and converts without directed rounding.
* - With `fixAMMv1_3`, deposit: calls `multiply(balance, productCb(), rm)`.
* - With `fixAMMv1_3`, withdrawal: installs @p rm globally and calls `productCb()`
* so every arithmetic step inside the callback shares the same rounding direction.
*
* @param rules Current ledger rules.
* @param noRoundCb Produces the unrounded result (pre-amendment path).
* @param balance Pool balance of the asset.
* @param productCb Produces the rounding fraction (post-amendment path).
* @param isDeposit Direction; controls which rounding mode is selected.
* @return Rounded asset amount preserving the pool invariant.
*/
STAmount
getRoundedAsset(
@@ -654,12 +836,18 @@ getRoundedAsset(
std::function<Number()> const& productCb,
IsDeposit isDeposit);
/** Round AMM deposit/withdrawal LPToken amount. Deposit/withdrawal formulas
* calculate the lptokens as a fractional value of the AMM total lptokens.
* The rounding takes place on the last step of multiplying the balance by
* the fraction if AMMv1_3 is enabled. The tokens are then
* adjusted to factor in the loss in precision (we only keep 16 significant
* digits) when adding the lptokens to the balance.
/** Compute a proportional LP token amount with amendment-gated rounding and precision adjustment.
*
* Used for two-sided (equal) deposit/withdrawal. Under `fixAMMv1_3` the
* multiplication `balance × frac` is rounded via `detail::getLPTokenRounding`,
* then `adjustLPTokens` corrects for the 16-digit precision loss introduced
* when adding the result to the running LP token balance.
*
* @param rules Current ledger rules.
* @param balance Current total LP token supply.
* @param frac Fraction of the pool's LP supply to mint or burn.
* @param isDeposit Direction; controls rounding and sign of the adjustment.
* @return LP token amount after rounding and precision correction.
*/
STAmount
getRoundedLPTokens(
@@ -668,16 +856,22 @@ getRoundedLPTokens(
Number const& frac,
IsDeposit isDeposit);
/** Round AMM single deposit/withdrawal LPToken amount.
* The lambda's are used to delay evaluation until the function is executed
* so that the calculations are not done twice.
* noRoundCb() is called if AMMv1_3 is disabled. Otherwise, the rounding is set
* and the lptokens are:
* if isDeposit is Yes - the result of productCb(). The rounding is
* the same for all calculations in productCb()
* if isDeposit is No - the balance multiplied by productCb()
* The lptokens are then adjusted to factor in the loss in precision
* (we only keep 16 significant digits) when adding the lptokens to the balance.
/** Compute a single-asset LP token amount with amendment-gated rounding and precision adjustment.
*
* The callback form avoids evaluating the formula twice:
* - Without `fixAMMv1_3`: calls `noRoundCb()` with no directed rounding.
* - With `fixAMMv1_3`, deposit: installs the LP rounding mode globally and
* calls `productCb()` (all arithmetic inside shares the direction).
* - With `fixAMMv1_3`, withdrawal: calls `multiply(lptAMMBalance, productCb(), rm)`.
* In all post-amendment cases, `adjustLPTokens` then corrects for 16-digit
* precision loss in the running LP balance.
*
* @param rules Current ledger rules.
* @param noRoundCb Produces the unrounded result (pre-amendment path).
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param productCb Produces the rounding fraction (post-amendment path).
* @param isDeposit Direction; controls rounding mode selection.
* @return LP token amount after rounding and precision correction.
*/
STAmount
getRoundedLPTokens(
@@ -687,16 +881,21 @@ getRoundedLPTokens(
std::function<Number()> const& productCb,
IsDeposit isDeposit);
/* Next two functions adjust asset in/out amount to factor in the adjusted
* lptokens. The lptokens are calculated from the asset in/out. The lptokens are
* then adjusted to factor in the loss in precision. The adjusted lptokens might
* be less than the initially calculated tokens. Therefore, the asset in/out
* must be adjusted. The rounding might result in the adjusted amount being
* greater than the original asset in/out amount. If this happens,
* then the original amount is reduced by the difference in the adjusted amount
* and the original amount. The actual tokens and the actual adjusted amount
* are then recalculated. The minimum of the original and the actual
* adjusted amount is returned.
/** Adjust a single-asset deposit amount to match the precision-corrected LP token count.
*
* Under `fixAMMv1_3`: computes `ammAssetIn(balance, lptAMMBalance, tokens, tfee)`.
* If rounding causes the derived asset amount to exceed @p amount, the deposit is
* reduced by the overshoot and both tokens and asset are recomputed, then the minimum
* of original and adjusted amounts is returned. Before the amendment, returns the
* inputs unchanged.
*
* @param rules Current ledger rules.
* @param balance Pool balance of the asset being deposited.
* @param amount Requested deposit amount.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param tokens LP token count before precision adjustment.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return `{adjustedTokens, adjustedAmount}` pair.
*/
std::pair<STAmount, STAmount>
adjustAssetInByTokens(
@@ -706,6 +905,23 @@ adjustAssetInByTokens(
STAmount const& lptAMMBalance,
STAmount const& tokens,
std::uint16_t tfee);
/** Adjust a single-asset withdrawal amount to match the precision-corrected LP token count.
*
* Under `fixAMMv1_3`: computes `ammAssetOut(balance, lptAMMBalance, tokens, tfee)`.
* If rounding causes the derived asset amount to exceed @p amount, the withdrawal is
* reduced by the overshoot and both tokens and asset are recomputed, then the minimum
* of original and adjusted amounts is returned. Before the amendment, returns the
* inputs unchanged.
*
* @param rules Current ledger rules.
* @param balance Pool balance of the asset being withdrawn.
* @param amount Requested withdrawal amount.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param tokens LP token count before precision adjustment.
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points.
* @return `{adjustedTokens, adjustedAmount}` pair.
*/
std::pair<STAmount, STAmount>
adjustAssetOutByTokens(
Rules const& rules,
@@ -715,8 +931,20 @@ adjustAssetOutByTokens(
STAmount const& tokens,
std::uint16_t tfee);
/** Find a fraction of tokens after the tokens are adjusted. The fraction
* is used to adjust equal deposit/withdraw amount.
/** Recompute the LP token fraction after precision adjustment.
*
* Under `fixAMMv1_3` the precision-adjusted token count may differ from the
* originally requested count, so the fraction `tokens / lptAMMBalance` must
* be recomputed from the adjusted value before it is used to scale equal
* deposit/withdrawal amounts. Returns @p frac unchanged when `fixAMMv1_3`
* is inactive (the precision adjustment has not yet been applied).
*
* @param rules Current ledger rules.
* @param lptAMMBalance Current total LP token supply.
* @param tokens Precision-adjusted LP token count.
* @param frac Original fraction before adjustment.
* @return Adjusted fraction `tokens / lptAMMBalance`, or @p frac if
* `fixAMMv1_3` is not active.
*/
Number
adjustFracByTokens(
@@ -725,7 +953,19 @@ adjustFracByTokens(
STAmount const& tokens,
Number const& frac);
/** Get AMM pool balances.
/** Read the AMM's current pool asset balances from the ledger.
*
* Delegates to `accountHolds` for each asset, respecting freeze and
* authorization policy. Does not read the LP token balance.
*
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param ammAccountID AccountID of the AMM's pseudo-account.
* @param asset1 First pool asset.
* @param asset2 Second pool asset.
* @param freezeHandling Whether to enforce freeze restrictions.
* @param authHandling Whether to enforce authorization restrictions.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return `{balance1, balance2}` pair in the same asset order as the inputs.
*/
std::pair<STAmount, STAmount>
ammPoolHolds(
@@ -737,9 +977,23 @@ ammPoolHolds(
AuthHandling authHandling,
beast::Journal const j);
/** Get AMM pool and LP token balances. If both optIssue are
* provided then they are used as the AMM token pair issues.
* Otherwise the missing issues are fetched from ammSle.
/** Read the AMM's pool balances and total LP token supply from the ledger.
*
* When both optional assets are provided they are validated against the AMM
* SLE's stored pair and used as the query order; providing only one resolves
* the counterpart from `ammSle`. If neither is provided, the canonical order
* from `ammSle` is used. An invalid asset pair (mismatched with the AMM SLE)
* indicates a corrupted AMM object and returns `tecAMM_INVALID_TOKENS`.
*
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param ammSle The AMM's `ltAMM` SLE.
* @param optAsset1 Optional first asset override.
* @param optAsset2 Optional second asset override.
* @param freezeHandling Whether to enforce freeze restrictions.
* @param authHandling Whether to enforce authorization restrictions.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return `{balance1, balance2, lpTokenBalance}` on success, or
* `Unexpected(tecAMM_INVALID_TOKENS)` if the asset pair is invalid.
*/
Expected<std::tuple<STAmount, STAmount, STAmount>, TER>
ammHolds(
@@ -751,7 +1005,21 @@ ammHolds(
AuthHandling authHandling,
beast::Journal const j);
/** Get the balance of LP tokens.
/** Read an LP's token balance from its direct trustline with the AMM account.
*
* Intentionally bypasses `accountHolds` — that function would also check
* whether the AMM's underlying pool assets are frozen (under
* `fixFrozenLPTokenTransfer`), which is incorrect policy for LP token balance
* queries. Only the LP token trustline's own freeze flag is checked.
* Trust-line orientation: raw `sfBalance` is negated when `lpAccount > ammAccount`.
*
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param asset1 First pool asset (used to derive the LP token currency).
* @param asset2 Second pool asset.
* @param ammAccount AccountID of the AMM's pseudo-account (LP token issuer).
* @param lpAccount AccountID of the liquidity provider.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return The LP's token balance, or zero if the trustline is absent or frozen.
*/
STAmount
ammLPHolds(
@@ -762,6 +1030,17 @@ ammLPHolds(
AccountID const& lpAccount,
beast::Journal const j);
/** Read an LP's token balance using the asset pair stored in @p ammSle.
*
* Convenience overload; extracts `sfAsset`, `sfAsset2`, and `sfAccount` from
* @p ammSle and delegates to the five-parameter `ammLPHolds`.
*
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param ammSle The AMM's `ltAMM` SLE.
* @param lpAccount AccountID of the liquidity provider.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return The LP's token balance, or zero if the trustline is absent or frozen.
*/
STAmount
ammLPHolds(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -769,25 +1048,72 @@ ammLPHolds(
AccountID const& lpAccount,
beast::Journal const j);
/** Get AMM trading fee for the given account. The fee is discounted
* if the account is the auction slot owner or one of the slot's authorized
* accounts.
/** Get the effective AMM trading fee for @p account.
*
* Returns the auction slot's `sfDiscountedFee` if the slot is unexpired and
* @p account is either the slot owner or one of up to four authorized accounts;
* otherwise returns the AMM's global `sfTradingFee`. Expiration is compared
* against the ledger's `parentCloseTime` (the slot stores
* `parentCloseTime + TOTAL_TIME_SLOT_SECS` at creation, i.e. 24 hours).
*
* @param view Ledger state providing the current close time.
* @param ammSle The AMM's `ltAMM` SLE.
* @param account The account whose fee rate is needed.
* @return Fee rate in basis points (01000).
*/
std::uint16_t
getTradingFee(ReadView const& view, SLE const& ammSle, AccountID const& account);
/** Returns total amount held by AMM for the given token.
/** Read the AMM account's raw pool-asset balance, bypassing balance hooks.
*
* Unlike `accountHolds`, this function does not invoke `balanceHookIOU` or
* `balanceHookMPT`, so the result is unaffected by `PaymentSandbox`
* deferred-credit accounting. Used when the AMM needs its own unmodified
* balance for math, not for payment routing. Returns zero if the trustline
* or MPToken object is absent or frozen.
*
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param ammAccountID AccountID of the AMM's pseudo-account.
* @param asset The pool asset to query (IOU, XRP, or MPT).
* @return The raw balance, or zero if unavailable.
*/
STAmount
ammAccountHolds(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& ammAccountID, Asset const& asset);
/** Delete trustlines to AMM. If all trustlines are deleted then
* AMM object and account are deleted. Otherwise tecINCOMPLETE is returned.
/** Remove all ledger objects owned by the AMM and, if successful, delete the AMM itself.
*
* Deletion is ordered: IOU trustlines first, then MPToken objects, then the
* AMM SLE and its `AccountRoot`. Because each ledger transaction has a bounded
* work budget, not all trustlines may be removable in one call; in that case
* `tecINCOMPLETE` is returned and the caller must submit additional transactions
* to finish. The AMM can be re-deposited while deletion is incomplete.
*
* @param view Sandbox for applying state changes.
* @param asset First pool asset (used to locate the AMM keylet).
* @param asset2 Second pool asset.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on full deletion, `tecINCOMPLETE` if trustlines remain,
* or `tecINTERNAL` for unexpected ledger inconsistencies.
*/
TER
deleteAMMAccount(Sandbox& view, Asset const& asset, Asset const& asset2, beast::Journal j);
/** Initialize Auction and Voting slots and set the trading/discounted fee.
/** Initialize the vote slot and auction slot on a new or re-created AMM.
*
* Called on both `AMMCreate` and on `AMMDeposit` when the pool was previously
* drained to zero. Sets up:
* - One vote entry for @p account with full weight (`kVOTE_WEIGHT_SCALE_FACTOR`).
* - An auction slot owned by @p account, expiring in 24 hours, at zero price.
* - `sfDiscountedFee` = `tfee / kAUCTION_SLOT_DISCOUNTED_FEE_FRACTION`.
* - Absent-field canonicalization: fee fields are removed if their value is zero.
* - Under `fixCleanup3_2_0`, stale `sfAuthAccounts` from any previous slot owner
* are cleared.
*
* @param view Apply-view for the current transaction.
* @param ammSle The AMM's `ltAMM` SLE (modified in place).
* @param account The creator/re-depositor receiving the slot.
* @param lptAsset The LP token asset descriptor (used as the `sfPrice` currency).
* @param tfee Trading fee in basis points to set.
*/
void
initializeFeeAuctionVote(
@@ -797,16 +1123,41 @@ initializeFeeAuctionVote(
Asset const& lptAsset,
std::uint16_t tfee);
/** Return true if the Liquidity Provider is the only AMM provider, false
* otherwise. Return tecINTERNAL if encountered an unexpected condition,
* for instance Liquidity Provider has more than one LPToken trustline.
/** Determine whether @p lpAccount is the sole remaining liquidity provider.
*
* Walks the AMM account's owner directory (up to 10 pages, covering at most
* 4 objects) counting LPToken trustlines, pool-asset trustlines, MPToken
* objects, and the AMM SLE itself. Any second LPToken trustline belonging to
* a different account returns `false` immediately.
*
* @param view Ledger state to query.
* @param ammIssue The LP token issue (currency + AMM account as issuer).
* @param lpAccount AccountID of the candidate sole LP.
* @return `true` if @p lpAccount is the only LP, `false` if other LPs exist,
* or `Unexpected(tecINTERNAL)` for any unexpected directory state
* (e.g. more than one LPToken trustline for @p lpAccount).
*/
Expected<bool, TER>
isOnlyLiquidityProvider(ReadView const& view, Issue const& ammIssue, AccountID const& lpAccount);
/** Due to rounding, the LPTokenBalance of the last LP might
* not match the LP's trustline balance. If it's within the tolerance,
* update LPTokenBalance to match the LP's trustline balance.
/** Reconcile the AMM's `sfLPTokenBalance` with the last LP's trustline balance.
*
* Accumulated rounding over the life of the pool can cause the AMM's running
* `sfLPTokenBalance` to differ slightly from the sole LP's trustline balance.
* This function:
* 1. Confirms @p account is the only remaining LP via `isOnlyLiquidityProvider`.
* 2. If so, verifies the discrepancy is within 0.1% (tolerance `1e-3`).
* 3. If within tolerance, updates `sfLPTokenBalance` to @p lpTokens so the
* final withdrawal leaves the AMM in a fully consistent state.
*
* @param sb Sandbox for applying the balance correction.
* @param lpTokens The last LP's actual trustline balance.
* @param ammSle The AMM's `ltAMM` SLE (updated in place if correction applied).
* @param account AccountID of the candidate sole LP.
* @return `true` if the balance was reconciled or no adjustment was needed
* (other LPs exist), `Unexpected(tecAMM_INVALID_TOKENS)` if the
* discrepancy exceeds tolerance, or `Unexpected(tecINTERNAL)` on an
* unexpected directory error.
*/
Expected<bool, TER>
verifyAndAdjustLPTokenBalance(

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
/** @file
* Free functions for querying and mutating `ltACCOUNT_ROOT` ledger entries.
*
* Provides the canonical helpers for freeze-state queries, spendable XRP
* balance, owner-count bookkeeping, transfer fees, destination-tag
* enforcement, and the creation and detection of pseudo-accounts (AMM,
* Vault, LoanBroker). Almost every transaction processor depends on at
* least one function here.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Expected.h>
@@ -15,26 +24,60 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Check if the issuer has the global freeze flag set.
@param issuer The account to check
@return true if the account has global freeze set
*/
/** Check whether an IOU issuer has the global freeze flag active.
*
* XRP is never frozen; this function returns `false` immediately for the XRP
* account. For any other issuer it reads `lsfGlobalFreeze` from the
* account root. Missing accounts are treated as non-frozen.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param issuer The account whose freeze state is to be checked.
* @return `true` if `issuer` is a non-XRP account with `lsfGlobalFreeze` set;
* `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isGlobalFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& issuer);
// Calculate liquid XRP balance for an account.
// This function may be used to calculate the amount of XRP that
// the holder is able to freely spend. It subtracts reserve requirements.
//
// ownerCountAdj adjusts the owner count in case the caller calculates
// before ledger entries are added or removed. Positive to add, negative
// to subtract.
//
// @param ownerCountAdj positive to add to count, negative to reduce count.
/** Compute the spendable XRP balance for an account after reserve deduction.
*
* Queries the account's current balance and owner count through the view's
* virtual hook methods (`balanceHookIOU`, `ownerCountHook`) so that
* `PaymentSandbox` can overlay uncommitted in-flight changes without any
* branching here. The reserve is then subtracted; if the balance is below
* the reserve, the function returns zero rather than a negative amount.
*
* Pseudo-accounts (AMM, Vault, LoanBroker) bypass the reserve calculation
* entirely and receive the full balance as spendable XRP, because they
* cannot submit transactions and must never be blocked by reserve checks.
*
* @param view The ledger view to query.
* @param id The account whose liquid XRP balance is computed.
* @param ownerCountAdj Signed delta applied to `sfOwnerCount` before the
* reserve is calculated. Pass a positive value when the caller is about
* to add ledger entries; pass a negative value when entries are about to
* be removed. This lets callers reason about post-mutation availability
* before the state is committed to the view.
* @param j Journal for trace-level diagnostics.
* @return The spendable XRP amount, clamped to zero from below.
*/
[[nodiscard]] XRPAmount
xrpLiquid(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& id, std::int32_t ownerCountAdj, beast::Journal j);
/** Adjust the owner count up or down. */
/** Increment or decrement `sfOwnerCount` on an account SLE and notify the view.
*
* Delegates to a file-static helper that clamps the result to
* `[0, UINT32_MAX]`, logging at `fatal` severity if either bound would be
* exceeded — silent wrapping of the `uint32_t` field would corrupt ledger
* state. After clamping, `view.adjustOwnerCountHook()` is called before the
* new value is written; `PaymentSandbox` overrides that hook to track the
* high-water-mark count, ensuring subsequent `ownerCountHook` reads use the
* most conservative value seen during the payment.
*
* @param view The mutable view on which the SLE update is recorded.
* @param sle The account SLE to adjust; a null pointer is silently ignored.
* @param amount Signed delta to apply to `sfOwnerCount`; must be non-zero.
* @param j Journal for fatal-level diagnostics on overflow or underflow.
*/
void
adjustOwnerCount(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -42,45 +85,89 @@ adjustOwnerCount(
std::int32_t amount,
beast::Journal j);
/** Returns IOU issuer transfer fee as Rate. Rate specifies
* the fee as fractions of 1 billion. For example, 1% transfer rate
* is represented as 1,010,000,000.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer
/** Return the IOU transfer fee for an issuer as a `Rate` value.
*
* `Rate` expresses the fee as a fraction of one billion, so a 1% fee is
* represented as 1,010,000,000. If the issuer account does not exist or
* has not set `sfTransferRate`, `parityRate` (no fee, i.e., 1,000,000,000)
* is returned — callers never need to handle a null case.
*
* @param view The ledger view to query.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer whose transfer fee is requested.
* @return The issuer's `Rate`, or `parityRate` if none is configured.
*/
[[nodiscard]] Rate
transferRate(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& issuer);
/** Generate a pseudo-account address from a pseudo owner key.
@param pseudoOwnerKey The key to generate the address from
@return The generated account ID
*/
/** Derive a collision-free pseudo-account `AccountID` from an owner key.
*
* Iterates up to 256 attempts. Each attempt hashes a counter, the parent
* ledger's hash, and `pseudoOwnerKey` through `sha512Half` then
* `ripesha_hasher` (RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(...))). The parent-hash component
* prevents precomputation of collisions. The first candidate address that
* has no existing `AccountRoot` in `view` is returned.
*
* @param view The ledger view used to check for address collisions.
* @param pseudoOwnerKey The 256-bit key identifying the pseudo-account owner
* (e.g., the AMM or Vault object ID).
* @return A collision-free `AccountID`, or `beast::kZERO` if all 256
* attempts collided. `createPseudoAccount` propagates exhaustion as
* `tecDUPLICATE`.
* @note The 256-attempt cap is consensus-critical and must not be changed
* without an amendment, as it determines the pseudo-account address space.
*/
AccountID
pseudoAccountAddress(ReadView const& view, uint256 const& pseudoOwnerKey);
/** Returns the list of fields that define an ACCOUNT_ROOT as a pseudo-account
if set.
The list is constructed during initialization and is const after that.
Pseudo-account designator fields MUST be maintained by including the
SField::sMD_PseudoAccount flag in the SField definition.
*/
/** Return the singleton list of `SField`s that designate a pseudo-account.
*
* Built once at first call by scanning the `ltACCOUNT_ROOT` `SOTemplate`
* from `LedgerFormats` and selecting every field whose `SField::sMD_PseudoAccount`
* metadata bit is set. Currently includes `sfAMMID`, `sfVaultID`, and
* `sfLoanBrokerID`. The discovery is fully data-driven: adding a new
* pseudo-account type requires only tagging its key field with
* `SField::sMD_PseudoAccount` in `sfields.macro` — no manual registration
* here is needed.
*
* @return A const reference to the cached vector of pseudo-account fields.
* @note Non-active amendments are harmless: the corresponding field will
* never be set in practice, so the list remains correct regardless of
* which amendments are enabled.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::vector<SField const*> const&
getPseudoAccountFields();
/** Returns true if and only if sleAcct is a pseudo-account or specific
pseudo-accounts in pseudoFieldFilter.
Returns false if sleAcct is:
- NOT a pseudo-account OR
- NOT a ltACCOUNT_ROOT OR
- null pointer
*/
/** Determine whether an SLE is a pseudo-account (optionally of a specific type).
*
* Returns `true` only when all three conditions hold: `sleAcct` is non-null,
* its ledger-entry type is `ltACCOUNT_ROOT`, and at least one pseudo-account
* designator field (from `getPseudoAccountFields()`) is present. When
* `pseudoFieldFilter` is non-empty, only fields in the filter are considered,
* allowing callers to distinguish AMM pseudo-accounts from Vault
* pseudo-accounts.
*
* @param sleAcct The SLE to inspect; may be null.
* @param pseudoFieldFilter Optional subset of pseudo-account fields to match
* against. An empty set (the default) matches any pseudo-account field.
* @return `true` if `sleAcct` is a pseudo-account (of a type in the filter
* when one is provided); `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isPseudoAccount(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> sleAcct,
std::set<SField const*> const& pseudoFieldFilter = {});
/** Convenience overload that reads the account from the view. */
/** Convenience overload that looks up the account from a `ReadView`.
*
* Reads the `AccountRoot` for `accountId` via `keylet::account()` and
* delegates to the SLE overload.
*
* @param view The ledger view to query.
* @param accountId The account address to look up.
* @param pseudoFieldFilter Optional field filter forwarded to the SLE overload.
* @return `true` if the account exists and is a pseudo-account matching the
* filter; `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] inline bool
isPseudoAccount(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -90,22 +177,48 @@ isPseudoAccount(
return isPseudoAccount(view.read(keylet::account(accountId)), pseudoFieldFilter);
}
/**
* Create pseudo-account, storing pseudoOwnerKey into ownerField.
/** Create a protocol-owned pseudo-account `AccountRoot` SLE.
*
* The list of valid ownerField is maintained in AccountRootHelpers.cpp and
* the caller to this function must perform necessary amendment check(s)
* before using a field. The amendment check is **not** performed in
* createPseudoAccount.
* Derives a collision-free address via `pseudoAccountAddress()`, constructs
* an `AccountRoot` with zero balance, `lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple |
* lsfDepositAuth`, and stores `pseudoOwnerKey` in `ownerField`. When
* `featureSingleAssetVault` or `featureLendingProtocol` is enabled,
* `sfSequence` is set to `0`; otherwise it is set to the current ledger
* sequence. The zero sequence makes pseudo-accounts visually distinguishable
* and provides an extra barrier against accidental transaction submission.
*
* In debug builds, an `XRPL_ASSERT` fires if `ownerField` does not carry the
* `SField::sMD_PseudoAccount` flag, catching misuse at development time.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger view into which the new SLE is
* inserted.
* @param pseudoOwnerKey The 256-bit key of the owning object (e.g., the AMM
* or Vault ledger entry key); stored in `ownerField` on the new SLE.
* @param ownerField The back-link field written on the new SLE; must be
* one of the fields returned by `getPseudoAccountFields()`.
* @return The newly created SLE on success, or `tecDUPLICATE` if all 256
* address derivation attempts collided.
* @note Amendment checks are the **caller's** responsibility. This function
* is amendment-neutral by design; callers such as `VaultCreate` and
* `LoanBrokerSet` must gate on the relevant feature flag before invoking.
*/
[[nodiscard]] Expected<std::shared_ptr<SLE>, TER>
createPseudoAccount(ApplyView& view, uint256 const& pseudoOwnerKey, SField const& ownerField);
/** Checks the destination and tag.
- Checks that the SLE is not null.
- If the SLE requires a destination tag, checks that there is a tag.
*/
/** Validate a payment destination SLE and its destination-tag requirement.
*
* Returns `tecNO_DST` if `toSle` is null (the destination account does not
* exist), and `tecDST_TAG_NEEDED` if the destination has set
* `lsfRequireDestTag` but the transaction supplies no tag. Returns
* `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*
* @param toSle The destination account SLE; may be null.
* @param hasDestinationTag `true` if the transaction includes a destination
* tag field.
* @return `tecNO_DST`, `tecDST_TAG_NEEDED`, or `tesSUCCESS`.
* @note The ledger enforces the *presence* of a tag but never interprets its
* value; semantics (e.g., exchange user IDs) are opaque to the protocol.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
checkDestinationAndTag(SLE::const_ref toSle, bool hasDestinationTag);

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
/** @file
* Central contract for credential and deposit pre-authorization logic.
*
* Included by every fund-transfer transactor (Payment, EscrowFinish,
* PaymentChannelClaim, VaultDeposit) that must honor destination-account
* access controls.
*
* Functions divide along the preclaim / doApply boundary:
* - `xrpl::credentials::*` — read-only checks safe to call from preclaim.
* - `xrpl::verifyDepositPreauth` / `xrpl::verifyValidDomain` — mutating
* counterparts that must be called from doApply when the corresponding
* preclaim function succeeds, so that expired credential objects are
* physically deleted from the ledger as a side effect.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
@@ -13,57 +27,225 @@
namespace xrpl {
namespace credentials {
// These function will be used by the code that use DepositPreauth / Credentials
// (and any future pre-authorization modes) as part of authorization (all the
// transfer funds transactions)
// Check if credential sfExpiration field has passed ledger's parentCloseTime
/** Test whether a credential SLE has passed its expiration time.
*
* Reads `sfExpiration` from @p sleCredential, defaulting to
* `std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()` when the field is absent, so
* credentials with no expiration field never expire.
*
* @param sleCredential The credential SLE to inspect.
* @param closed The parent ledger's close time. Must be a
* NetClock epoch value — do not pass wall-clock time.
* @return `true` if the credential has expired, `false` otherwise.
*/
bool
checkExpired(SLE const& sleCredential, NetClock::time_point const& closed);
// Actually remove a credentials object from the ledger
/** Remove a credential SLE and its entries from both owner directories.
*
* A credential is indexed in two owner directories — the issuer's and the
* subject's. Reserve-count accounting depends on acceptance state:
* - Before acceptance (`lsfAccepted` unset): only the issuer holds the
* reserve; only the issuer's count is decremented.
* - After acceptance with distinct accounts: the subject holds the reserve
* and its count is decremented.
* - When issuer and subject are the same account, only one directory
* removal is performed.
*
* @note Paths indicating ledger corruption (missing account SLE, failed
* `dirRemove`) are marked `LCOV_EXCL` and are unreachable under normal
* operation.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view through which the SLE is erased.
* @param sleCredential The credential SLE to delete; must not be null.
* @param j Journal for fatal-level error logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success; `tecNO_ENTRY` if @p sleCredential is
* null; `tecINTERNAL` or `tefBAD_LEDGER` on internal directory
* inconsistency.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
deleteSLE(ApplyView& view, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sleCredential, beast::Journal j);
// Amendment and parameters checks for sfCredentialIDs field
/** Validate the `sfCredentialIDs` field of a transaction at preflight time.
*
* Enforces non-empty, at most `kMAX_CREDENTIALS_ARRAY_SIZE` entries, and no
* duplicate hashes. Returns `tesSUCCESS` immediately when `sfCredentialIDs`
* is absent, as credentials are optional for most transaction types.
*
* @param tx The transaction under preflight validation.
* @param j Journal for trace-level malformed-transaction logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if the field is absent or valid; `temMALFORMED` if
* the array is empty, too large, or contains duplicates.
*/
NotTEC
checkFields(STTx const& tx, beast::Journal j);
// Accessing the ledger to check if provided credentials are valid. Do not use
// in doApply (only in preclaim) since it does not remove expired credentials.
// If you call it in preclaim, you also must call verifyDepositPreauth in
// doApply
/** Verify that all credentials in a transaction exist, are owned by the
* sender, and have been accepted — for use in preclaim only.
*
* Checks each ID in `sfCredentialIDs`: the SLE must exist, its `sfSubject`
* must equal @p src, and `lsfAccepted` must be set. Expiration is
* deliberately not checked here; expired credentials are deleted in doApply
* by `verifyDepositPreauth` or `verifyValidDomain`.
*
* @note If this returns `tesSUCCESS` in preclaim, the caller must invoke
* `verifyDepositPreauth` in doApply to garbage-collect any credentials
* that expire before the enclosing transaction applies.
*
* @param tx The transaction whose `sfCredentialIDs` field is inspected.
* @param view Read-only ledger view for SLE lookups.
* @param src The account that must own every listed credential.
* @param j Journal for trace-level logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if `sfCredentialIDs` is absent or all credentials are
* valid; `tecBAD_CREDENTIALS` if any credential is missing, belongs to a
* different account, or has not been accepted.
*/
TER
valid(STTx const& tx, ReadView const& view, AccountID const& src, beast::Journal j);
// Check if subject has any credential maching the given domain. If you call it
// in preclaim and it returns tecEXPIRED, you should call verifyValidDomain in
// doApply. This will ensure that expired credentials are deleted.
/** Check whether @p subject holds a live, accepted credential for a
* permissioned domain — for use in preclaim only.
*
* Reads the `PermissionedDomain` SLE, iterates its `sfAcceptedCredentials`
* array, and looks up the corresponding credential SLE for @p subject.
* A credential qualifies when it exists, has not expired, and carries
* `lsfAccepted`.
*
* Because a `ReadView` is immutable, expired credentials cannot be deleted
* here. The function returns `tecEXPIRED` when all matching credentials
* are expired — signaling the caller that the condition may resolve in
* doApply where `verifyValidDomain` will physically remove them.
*
* @note If this returns `tecEXPIRED` in preclaim, the caller must invoke
* `verifyValidDomain` in doApply so that expired objects are
* garbage-collected even if the transaction ultimately fails.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param domainID Key of the `PermissionedDomain` SLE to check against.
* @param subject Account that must hold a qualifying credential.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if a live accepted credential exists; `tecEXPIRED`
* if only expired credentials were found; `tecNO_AUTH` if no matching
* credential exists; `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if the domain does not exist.
*/
TER
validDomain(ReadView const& view, uint256 domainID, AccountID const& subject);
// This function is only called when we about to return tecNO_PERMISSION
// because all the checks for the DepositPreauth authorization failed.
/** Check whether a set of credential IDs matches a credential-set
* `DepositPreauth` entry for the destination account.
*
* Builds a sorted `std::set<std::pair<AccountID, Slice>>` of
* `(issuer, credentialType)` pairs from @p credIDs and tests for the
* existence of the corresponding `keylet::depositPreauth(dst, sorted)`.
* The sorted representation matches the canonical key used at
* `DepositPreauth` creation time.
*
* @note Credential existence is assumed to have been confirmed in preclaim.
* A missing SLE here indicates an internal consistency error.
* @note `Slice` members in the internal sorted set are non-owning views
* into SLE storage. A `lifeExtender` vector keeps the SLEs alive for
* the duration of the lookup.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view for SLE and keylet lookups.
* @param credIDs The `sfCredentialIDs` vector from the transaction.
* @param dst The destination account whose `DepositPreauth` is checked.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if a matching `DepositPreauth` object exists;
* `tecNO_PERMISSION` if none exists; `tefINTERNAL` if a credential SLE
* is unexpectedly missing or a duplicate pair is encountered.
*/
TER
authorizedDepositPreauth(ReadView const& view, STVector256 const& ctx, AccountID const& dst);
// Sort credentials array, return empty set if there are duplicates
/** Build a sorted `(issuer, credentialType)` set from a credentials array.
*
* Produces the canonical representation used to key `DepositPreauth`
* objects. Each element of @p credentials must carry `sfIssuer` and
* `sfCredentialType`.
*
* @param credentials An `STArray` of credential pairs, as stored in a
* `DepositPreauth` or `PermissionedDomainSet` transaction.
* @return A sorted set of `(AccountID, Slice)` pairs; an empty set if any
* duplicate `(issuer, credentialType)` pair is detected.
*/
std::set<std::pair<AccountID, Slice>>
makeSorted(STArray const& credentials);
// Check credentials array passed to DepositPreauth/PermissionedDomainSet
// transactions
/** Validate a credential array in `DepositPreauth` or
* `PermissionedDomainSet` transactions at preflight time.
*
* Credentials in these transactions are `(issuer, credentialType)` pairs
* rather than object hashes. Enforces: non-empty; at most @p maxSize
* entries; valid issuer `AccountID`; `sfCredentialType` length in
* `[1, kMAX_CREDENTIAL_TYPE_LENGTH]` bytes; and no logical duplicates
* (detected via `sha512Half(issuer, credentialType)`).
*
* @param credentials The `STArray` of credential pairs to validate.
* @param maxSize Maximum permitted array length (caller-supplied per
* transaction type).
* @param j Journal for trace-level malformed-transaction logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if all entries are valid; `temARRAY_EMPTY`,
* `temARRAY_TOO_LARGE`, `temINVALID_ACCOUNT_ID`, or `temMALFORMED`
* on the first constraint violation found.
*/
NotTEC
checkArray(STArray const& credentials, unsigned maxSize, beast::Journal j);
} // namespace credentials
// Check expired credentials and for credentials maching DomainID of the ledger
// object
/** Enforce domain-credential authorization in doApply, deleting expired
* credentials as a side effect.
*
* The doApply counterpart to `credentials::validDomain`. Collects all
* credential SLEs for @p account that match the `sfAcceptedCredentials`
* list of the `PermissionedDomain` at @p domainID, calls
* `credentials::removeExpired` to physically delete any that have expired,
* then re-checks whether at least one live, accepted credential remains.
*
* The two-pass design (collect → expire → re-validate) ensures expired
* objects are garbage-collected even when the surrounding transaction
* ultimately fails.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view; expired credential SLEs are erased.
* @param account Account whose credentials are being verified.
* @param domainID Key of the `PermissionedDomain` SLE.
* @param j Journal for trace/error logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if a live accepted credential for the domain exists;
* `tecEXPIRED` if only expired credentials were found; `tecNO_PERMISSION`
* if no matching credential exists; `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if the domain
* SLE is missing; or a propagated `TER` error from `removeExpired` under
* `fixCleanup3_1_3`.
*/
TER
verifyValidDomain(ApplyView& view, AccountID const& account, uint256 domainID, beast::Journal j);
// Check expired credentials and for existing DepositPreauth ledger object
/** Enforce deposit pre-authorization in doApply, deleting expired credentials
* as a side effect.
*
* Called by Payment, EscrowFinish, and PaymentChannelClaim when the
* destination account has `lsfDepositAuth` set. Authorization succeeds
* when any of the following hold:
* - `src == dst` (self-payments are always allowed).
* - `keylet::depositPreauth(dst, src)` exists (account-level pre-auth).
* - A credential-set `DepositPreauth` object exists for the credentials
* submitted via `sfCredentialIDs` (via `credentials::authorizedDepositPreauth`).
*
* If `sfCredentialIDs` is present, `credentials::removeExpired` is called
* unconditionally before the authorization tests. If any credential was
* expired, `tecEXPIRED` is returned immediately without attempting
* authorization.
*
* @param tx The transaction under doApply; may carry `sfCredentialIDs`.
* @param view Mutable ledger view; expired credential SLEs may be erased.
* @param src The sending account.
* @param dst The destination account.
* @param sleDst The destination account's SLE, used to test `lsfDepositAuth`.
* If null, `lsfDepositAuth` is treated as unset and the function returns
* `tesSUCCESS`.
* @param j Journal for trace/error logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if authorized or `lsfDepositAuth` is not set;
* `tecEXPIRED` if submitted credentials have expired;
* `tecNO_PERMISSION` if no matching pre-authorization exists; or a
* propagated error from `removeExpired` or `authorizedDepositPreauth`.
*/
TER
verifyDepositPreauth(
STTx const& tx,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
/** @file
* Runtime enforcement helpers for the XRPL delegate account system.
*
* Transactors call these two functions in sequence during permission
* validation: `checkTxPermission` for the broad transaction-type gate,
* then `loadGranularPermission` when a more restrictive, field-level
* check is needed. The permission schema and encoding convention live
* in `xrpl/protocol/Permissions.h`.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/protocol/Permissions.h>
@@ -7,24 +16,64 @@
namespace xrpl {
/**
* Check if the delegate account has permission to execute the transaction.
* @param delegate The delegate account.
* @param tx The transaction that the delegate account intends to execute.
* @return tesSUCCESS if the transaction is allowed, terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION
* if not.
/** Determine whether a delegate relationship grants blanket permission for
* a transaction type.
*
* Scans the `sfPermissions` array of the `ltDELEGATE` ledger entry for an
* element whose `sfPermissionValue` equals `tx.getTxnType() + 1` — the
* transaction-level encoding used on-ledger. Returns `tesSUCCESS` on the
* first match, or `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION` if no match is found.
*
* A null `delegate` pointer is treated as a missing ledger entry and
* returns `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION` immediately.
*
* The result is `NotTEC` (no `tec` fee-claim codes) because the two
* meaningful outcomes are `tesSUCCESS` and `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION`.
* The `ter` (retry) code is intentional: the `ltDELEGATE` object could be
* updated in a subsequent ledger, so an identical transaction may succeed
* in the future without modification.
*
* @param delegate Immutable `ltDELEGATE` SLE obtained via `view.read()`;
* may be null, in which case `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION` is returned.
* @param tx The transaction whose type is being checked.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if the delegate holds a transaction-level permission
* for `tx`'s type; `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION` otherwise.
* @note Callers should resolve the SLE via `keylet::delegate(account,
* delegate)` and pass it directly. If the SLE is absent from the
* ledger, `view.read()` returns null and the guard here handles it.
* @see loadGranularPermission — for fine-grained per-flag enforcement when
* this function returns `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION`.
*/
NotTEC
checkTxPermission(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& delegate, STTx const& tx);
/**
* Load the granular permissions granted to the delegate account for the
* specified transaction type
* @param delegate The delegate account.
* @param type Used to determine which granted granular permissions to load,
* based on the transaction type.
* @param granularPermissions Granted granular permissions tied to the
* transaction type.
/** Populate a set with all granular sub-operation permissions the delegate
* holds for a given transaction type.
*
* Walks the `sfPermissions` array of the `ltDELEGATE` ledger entry. For
* each element, it casts the `sfPermissionValue` to `GranularPermissionType`
* and asks `Permission::getInstance().getGranularTxType()` whether that
* granular type belongs to `type`. Matching values are inserted into
* `granularPermissions`.
*
* A null `delegate` pointer is a silent no-op; the output set is left
* unchanged.
*
* The set is caller-owned and passed by reference so transactors can declare
* it on the stack, avoiding heap allocation. Callers may also accumulate
* results from multiple calls if needed.
*
* @param delegate Immutable `ltDELEGATE` SLE; may be null (no-op).
* @param type The transaction type whose granular permissions should be
* collected (e.g., `ttTRUST_SET`, `ttPAYMENT`).
* @param granularPermissions Output set populated with every
* `GranularPermissionType` the delegate holds that maps to `type`.
* @note This function is the second stage of a two-step check. Call
* `checkTxPermission` first; only invoke this when that returns
* `terNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION` and the transaction type supports
* granular flags. Calling it unconditionally wastes a full scan of
* the permissions array on the common case.
* @see checkTxPermission — for the broad transaction-type gate.
*/
void
loadGranularPermission(

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
/** @file
* Traversal utilities for ledger directory nodes (`ltDIR_NODE`).
*
* A directory is a linked list of pages (`SLE` of type `ltDIR_NODE`),
* where each page holds an `sfIndexes` field (`STVector256`) of child
* ledger-entry keys and an `sfIndexNext` field that chains to the next
* page. Owner directories track every object an account holds; order-
* book directories track standing offers at a given quality.
*
* This header provides:
* - A const-aware template core (`detail::internalDirFirst` /
* `detail::internalDirNext`) that unifies the read and write traversal
* paths at compile time.
* - A deprecated step-iterator API (`cdirFirst`, `cdirNext`, `dirFirst`,
* `dirNext`) used only where cursor patching during deletion is required.
* - Higher-level callback iterators (`forEachItem`, `forEachItemAfter`)
* for exhaustive and paginated walks.
* - `dirIsEmpty` and `describeOwnerDir` utility helpers.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
@@ -15,6 +34,32 @@ namespace xrpl {
namespace detail {
/** Advance a directory cursor to the next entry, crossing page boundaries.
*
* When the cursor has consumed all entries in the current page, the function
* follows `sfIndexNext` to load the next page and tail-calls itself to yield
* the first entry of that page in a single logical step. If `sfIndexNext` is
* zero the directory is exhausted: `entry` is zeroed and `false` is returned.
*
* The `if constexpr` branch selects `view.read()` when `N` is `SLE const`
* (read-only traversal via `ReadView`) and `view.peek()` when `N` is `SLE`
* (mutable traversal via `ApplyView`), keeping both paths in one template.
*
* @tparam V A view type derived from `ReadView`.
* @tparam N Either `SLE` (mutable) or `SLE const` (read-only).
* @param view The ledger view to query pages from.
* @param root The 256-bit key of the directory's root (anchor) page.
* @param page In/out: the current page SLE; updated when a page boundary
* is crossed.
* @param index In/out: the zero-based cursor within `page->sfIndexes`;
* incremented to point past the entry that was just returned.
* @param entry Out: the key of the current entry on success; zeroed on
* end-of-directory.
* @return `true` if an entry was produced; `false` if the directory is
* exhausted.
* @note An `XRPL_ASSERT` fires in instrumented builds if `index` exceeds
* the page's entry count, indicating a corrupted cursor.
*/
template <
class V,
class N,
@@ -64,6 +109,23 @@ internalDirNext(
return true;
}
/** Initialise a directory cursor at the first entry of the root page.
*
* Loads the root page via `view.read()` (when `N` is `SLE const`) or
* `view.peek()` (when `N` is `SLE`), resets the index to zero, then
* delegates to `internalDirNext` to yield the first entry.
*
* @tparam V A view type derived from `ReadView`.
* @tparam N Either `SLE` (mutable) or `SLE const` (read-only).
* @param view The ledger view to query pages from.
* @param root The 256-bit key of the directory's root (anchor) page.
* @param page Out: set to the root page SLE on success; unchanged if the
* root page is absent.
* @param index Out: set to zero before delegating to `internalDirNext`.
* @param entry Out: the key of the first entry on success.
* @return `true` if the directory has at least one entry; `false` if the
* root page is absent or the directory is empty.
*/
template <
class V,
class N,
@@ -119,6 +181,24 @@ cdirFirst(
unsigned int& index,
uint256& entry);
/** Returns the first entry in the directory, advancing the index.
*
* Mutable overload of `cdirFirst` for use with `ApplyView`. Yields a
* `shared_ptr<SLE>` obtained via `view.peek()`, allowing the caller to
* modify the page SLE if required.
*
* @deprecated Prefer the `Dir` range adaptor or `forEachItem` for new
* code. Use this overload only when cursor patching during deletion
* is required (see `cleanupOnAccountDelete` in `View.cpp`).
*
* @param view The mutable view against which to operate.
* @param root The 256-bit key of the directory's root page.
* @param page Out: set to the root page SLE obtained via `peek()`.
* @param index Out: set to the cursor position within `page->sfIndexes`.
* @param entry Out: the key of the first directory entry.
* @return `true` if the directory has at least one entry; `false`
* otherwise.
*/
bool
dirFirst(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -151,6 +231,31 @@ cdirNext(
unsigned int& index,
uint256& entry);
/** Advances the mutable directory cursor to the next entry.
*
* Mutable overload of `cdirNext` for use with `ApplyView`. Page
* transitions are handled transparently: when `index` reaches the end
* of the current page, `sfIndexNext` is followed and the cursor is reset
* to the first entry of the new page.
*
* @deprecated Prefer the `Dir` range adaptor or `forEachItem` for new
* code. The primary use case for this function is cursor patching
* during deletion: `cleanupOnAccountDelete` (in `View.cpp`) decrements
* `index` after each deletion so the cursor stays aligned as entries
* shift — a technique that relies on the cursor being externally
* accessible.
*
* @param view The mutable view against which to operate.
* @param root The 256-bit key of the directory's root page.
* @param page In/out: the current page SLE; updated on page boundary
* crossing.
* @param index In/out: the cursor position within `page->sfIndexes`;
* incremented past the returned entry.
* @param entry Out: the key of the current entry on success; zeroed when
* the directory is exhausted.
* @return `true` if an entry was produced; `false` if the directory is
* exhausted.
*/
bool
dirNext(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -160,19 +265,61 @@ dirNext(
uint256& entry);
/** @} */
/** Iterate all items in the given directory. */
/** Exhaustively walk every entry in a directory, invoking a callback for each.
*
* Iterates all pages of the directory in `sfIndexNext` chain order, calling
* `f` with the materialised child SLE for every key in `sfIndexes`. The
* child SLE is obtained via `view.read(keylet::child(key))` and may be
* `nullptr` if the referenced entry is absent from the view; the callback
* must handle that case. Iteration terminates when `sfIndexNext` is zero or
* a page SLE is missing; there is no early-exit mechanism.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param root Keylet of the directory's root page; must have type
* `ltDIR_NODE`.
* @param f Callback invoked with each child SLE (possibly `nullptr`).
* @note An `XRPL_ASSERT` fires in instrumented builds if `root.type` is
* not `ltDIR_NODE`; in release builds the function returns silently.
*/
void
forEachItem(
ReadView const& view,
Keylet const& root,
std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&)> const& f);
/** Iterate all items after an item in the given directory.
@param after The key of the item to start after
@param hint The directory page containing `after`
@param limit The maximum number of items to return
@return `false` if the iteration failed
*/
/** Paginated directory walk, delivering items that follow a cursor key.
*
* Supports cursor-based pagination as used by RPC handlers such as
* `account_offers`, `account_lines`, and `account_channels`. When
* `after` is non-zero the function first attempts to jump to the `hint`
* page (the page the client last saw) to avoid re-scanning all prior
* pages; if the hint does not contain `after`, it falls back to a linear
* scan from the root. Once the cursor is located, subsequent entries are
* delivered to `f` until `limit` is reached or the directory is exhausted.
*
* The callback `f` returns `bool`: `true` to continue (and decrement the
* limit counter), `false` to stop immediately regardless of the remaining
* limit. Callers conventionally request `limit + 1` items and infer a
* non-empty next page when exactly `limit + 1` items are delivered.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param root Keylet of the directory's root page; must have type
* `ltDIR_NODE`.
* @param after Cursor key: only entries that follow this key in directory
* order are delivered. Pass `uint256()` (zero) to start from the
* beginning, in which case the function always returns `true`.
* @param hint Page number expected to contain `after`; used as a fast-
* path optimisation. Ignored when `after` is zero or when the hint
* page does not actually contain `after`.
* @param limit Maximum number of `true`-returning callback invocations
* before the walk stops.
* @param f Callback invoked for each qualifying child SLE (possibly
* `nullptr` if the key is absent). Return `true` to continue
* iteration; `false` to stop early.
* @return `true` if `after` was found (or `after` is zero); `false` if
* the cursor key was never located, indicating a stale or invalid
* marker that callers should surface as a pagination error.
*/
bool
forEachItemAfter(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -182,7 +329,15 @@ forEachItemAfter(
unsigned int limit,
std::function<bool(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&)> const& f);
/** Iterate all items in an account's owner directory. */
/** Exhaustively walk every entry in an account's owner directory.
*
* Convenience overload that resolves `id` to `keylet::ownerDir(id)` and
* forwards to `forEachItem(view, Keylet, f)`.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param id The account whose owner directory should be iterated.
* @param f Callback invoked with each child SLE (possibly `nullptr`).
*/
inline void
forEachItem(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -192,12 +347,22 @@ forEachItem(
forEachItem(view, keylet::ownerDir(id), f);
}
/** Iterate all items after an item in an owner directory.
@param after The key of the item to start after
@param hint The directory page containing `after`
@param limit The maximum number of items to return
@return `false` if the iteration failed
*/
/** Paginated walk of an account's owner directory after a cursor key.
*
* Convenience overload that resolves `id` to `keylet::ownerDir(id)` and
* forwards to `forEachItemAfter(view, Keylet, after, hint, limit, f)`.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param id The account whose owner directory should be iterated.
* @param after Cursor key; pass `uint256()` (zero) to start from the
* beginning.
* @param hint Page number expected to contain `after`.
* @param limit Maximum number of `true`-returning callback invocations.
* @param f Callback invoked for each qualifying child SLE. Return `true`
* to continue; `false` to stop early.
* @return `true` if `after` was found (or is zero); `false` if the cursor
* was never located.
*/
inline bool
forEachItemAfter(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -210,13 +375,36 @@ forEachItemAfter(
return forEachItemAfter(view, keylet::ownerDir(id), after, hint, limit, f);
}
/** Returns `true` if the directory is empty
@param key The key of the directory
*/
/** Returns `true` if the directory contains no entries.
*
* An empty `sfIndexes` array on the root page is necessary but not
* sufficient: the root is an anchor page and may have an empty index
* while `sfIndexNext` still points to a populated subsequent page. Both
* conditions — empty `sfIndexes` *and* `sfIndexNext == 0` — must hold
* before declaring the directory empty. A missing root SLE is also
* treated as empty.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param k Keylet of the directory's root page.
* @return `true` if the directory has no entries or does not exist;
* `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
dirIsEmpty(ReadView const& view, Keylet const& k);
/** Returns a function that sets the owner on a directory SLE */
/** Returns a callback that stamps a new directory page with its owner account.
*
* The returned `std::function<void(SLE::ref)>` sets `sfOwner = account` on
* the newly allocated `ltDIR_NODE` SLE. It is passed as the `describe`
* argument to `ApplyView::dirInsert` throughout the codebase (e.g.,
* `RippleStateHelpers.cpp`, `PaymentChannelCreate.cpp`) and is invoked only
* when `dirInsert` actually allocates a fresh overflow page, keeping the
* owning account ID out of the generic insertion logic.
*
* @param account The `AccountID` to record as `sfOwner` on each new page.
* @return A callable suitable for the `describe` parameter of
* `ApplyView::dirInsert`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::function<void(SLE::ref)>
describeOwnerDir(AccountID const& account);

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
/** @file
* Token-delivery helper for IOU and MPT escrow resolution.
*
* Implements `escrowUnlockApplyHelper`, the single function responsible for
* crediting the appropriate account when an IOU or MPT escrow is finished
* (`EscrowFinish`) or cancelled (`EscrowCancel`) under `featureTokenEscrow`.
* The function is specialised once for `Issue` (IOU trust-line path) and once
* for `MPTIssue` (MPToken path); callers reach the correct specialisation via
* `std::visit` on the `Asset` variant, with zero runtime dispatch overhead.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
@@ -13,6 +23,33 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Credit an account with tokens held in escrow, applying transfer-fee logic.
*
* Primary template — no body is provided. Only the `Issue` and `MPTIssue`
* full specialisations are defined. Callers should invoke via `std::visit`
* on an `Asset` variant so the compiler selects the correct specialisation
* at compile time.
*
* @tparam T Asset type; must satisfy `ValidIssueType` (`Issue` or `MPTIssue`).
* @param view Mutable ledger view on which state changes are applied.
* @param lockedRate Transfer rate snapshotted at escrow creation time.
* Pass `kPARITY_RATE` for cancellations (return to sender, no fee).
* @param sleDest SLE for the destination account (`receiver`); used for
* owner-count and reserve checks when auto-creating a trust line or
* MPToken holding object.
* @param xrpBalance Pre-fee XRP balance of the destination account; compared
* against the incremental reserve required to create a new holding object.
* @param amount Escrowed token amount (face value locked at escrow creation).
* @param issuer Token issuer.
* @param sender Escrow creator / original token sender.
* @param receiver Account that will receive the unlocked tokens.
* @param createAsset When `true`, auto-creates a trust line or MPToken object
* for `receiver` if one does not already exist. Callers set this only
* when the transaction submitter is also the beneficiary, preserving
* account sovereignty over directory entries.
* @param journal Logging sink.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or a `tec` error code on failure.
*/
template <ValidIssueType T>
TER
escrowUnlockApplyHelper(
@@ -27,6 +64,40 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper(
bool createAsset,
beast::Journal journal);
/** IOU trust-line specialisation of `escrowUnlockApplyHelper`.
*
* Delivers IOU tokens from a finished or cancelled escrow to `receiver`,
* optionally creating the trust line and applying the snapshotted transfer
* fee.
*
* **Issuer short-circuits.** `sender == issuer` returns `tecINTERNAL` (an
* issuer cannot be an escrow originator for their own obligation).
* `receiver == issuer` returns `tesSUCCESS` immediately — delivery to the
* issuer is a redemption handled by the calling transactor at the balance
* level.
*
* **Trust line creation.** When `createAsset` is `true` and no trust line
* exists, one is created with a zero balance and zero limit via `trustCreate`.
* The `sfDefaultRipple` flag is inherited from `sleDest`. Reserve is checked
* first; insufficient reserve returns `tecNO_LINE_INSUF_RESERVE`. When
* `createAsset` is `false` and no line exists, returns `tecNO_LINE`.
*
* **Transfer fee.** The effective rate is `min(lockedRate, currentRate)`,
* protecting the receiver from a rate increase during the escrow lifetime.
* The fee is deducted *from* `amount` (not added on top), so `receiver` gets
* `amount - fee`. When neither party is the issuer and the rate differs from
* `kPARITY_RATE`, the check against the trust-line limit uses `finalAmt`.
*
* **Limit check.** When `createAsset` is `false`, the post-transfer balance
* is compared to `receiver`'s trust-line limit; `tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED` is
* returned if the delivery would exceed it. This check is skipped when
* `createAsset` is `true` because a freshly created line has a zero limit
* and would always fail it spuriously.
*
* @note This function is reached via `std::visit` on an `Asset` variant in
* `EscrowFinish` and `EscrowCancel`. `EscrowCancel` always passes
* `kPARITY_RATE` so no fee is charged on the return-to-sender path.
*/
template <>
inline TER
escrowUnlockApplyHelper<Issue>(
@@ -70,21 +141,21 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper<Issue>(
initialBalance.get<Issue>().account = noAccount();
if (TER const ter = trustCreate(
view, // payment sandbox
recvLow, // is dest low?
issuer, // source
receiver, // destination
trustLineKey.key, // ledger index
sleDest, // Account to add to
false, // authorize account
(sleDest->getFlags() & lsfDefaultRipple) == 0, //
false, // freeze trust line
false, // deep freeze trust line
initialBalance, // zero initial balance
Issue(currency, receiver), // limit of zero
0, // quality in
0, // quality out
journal); // journal
view,
recvLow,
issuer,
receiver,
trustLineKey.key,
sleDest,
false,
(sleDest->getFlags() & lsfDefaultRipple) == 0,
false,
false,
initialBalance,
Issue(currency, receiver),
0,
0,
journal);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
{
return ter; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -97,57 +168,43 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper<Issue>(
return tecNO_LINE;
auto const xferRate = transferRate(view, amount);
// update if issuer rate is less than locked rate
// Cap to the lower of the snapshotted and current rate to protect the receiver.
if (xferRate < lockedRate)
lockedRate = xferRate;
// Transfer Rate only applies when:
// 1. Issuer is not involved in the transfer (senderIssuer or
// receiverIssuer)
// 2. The locked rate is different from the parity rate
// NOTE: Transfer fee in escrow works a bit differently from a normal
// payment. In escrow, the fee is deducted from the locked/sending amount,
// whereas in a normal payment, the transfer fee is taken on top of the
// sending amount.
// Fee is deducted from `amount` (not added on top): finalAmt = amount - fee.
// No fee when either party is the issuer, or when lockedRate == kPARITY_RATE.
auto finalAmt = amount;
if ((!senderIssuer && !receiverIssuer) && lockedRate != kPARITY_RATE)
{
// compute transfer fee, if any
auto const xferFee =
amount.value() - divideRound(amount, lockedRate, amount.get<Issue>(), true);
// compute balance to transfer
finalAmt = amount.value() - xferFee;
}
// validate the line limit if the account submitting txn is not the receiver
// of the funds
// Limit check skipped when createAsset is true (freshly created line has
// zero limit and would always fail spuriously).
if (!createAsset)
{
auto const sleRippleState = view.peek(trustLineKey);
if (!sleRippleState)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// if the issuer is the high, then we use the low limit
// otherwise we use the high limit
// recvLow true → receiver is low side → use sfLowLimit; else sfHighLimit.
STAmount const lineLimit =
sleRippleState->getFieldAmount(recvLow ? sfLowLimit : sfHighLimit);
STAmount lineBalance = sleRippleState->getFieldAmount(sfBalance);
// flip the sign of the line balance if the issuer is not high
if (!recvLow)
lineBalance.negate();
// add the final amount to the line balance
lineBalance += finalAmt;
// if the transfer would exceed the line limit return tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED
if (lineLimit < lineBalance)
return tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED;
}
// if destination is not the issuer then transfer funds
if (!receiverIssuer)
{
auto const ter = directSendNoFee(view, issuer, receiver, finalAmt, true, journal);
@@ -157,6 +214,32 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper<Issue>(
return tesSUCCESS;
}
/** MPT specialisation of `escrowUnlockApplyHelper`.
*
* Delivers MPT tokens from a finished or cancelled escrow to `receiver`,
* optionally creating an MPToken holding object and applying the snapshotted
* transfer fee.
*
* **MPToken creation.** When `createAsset` is `true`, `receiver` is not the
* issuer, and no MPToken SLE exists for this issuance, one is created via
* `createMPToken` and the owner count is incremented. Insufficient reserve
* returns `tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE`. If no MPToken exists after the creation
* attempt (and `receiver` is not the issuer), returns `tecNO_PERMISSION`.
*
* **Transfer fee.** Identical to the `Issue` path: effective rate is
* `min(lockedRate, currentRate)`, fee is deducted *from* `amount`, and no
* fee is applied when either party is the issuer or the rate is parity.
*
* **`fixTokenEscrowV1` bug fix.** The gross amount passed to `unlockEscrowMPT`
* (used to reduce `sfOutstandingAmount`) is `amount` when the amendment is
* enabled, and `finalAmt` otherwise. Without the fix, the outstanding supply
* is only reduced by the net delivered amount, silently retaining the fee
* portion; with the fix, the full face value is removed from circulation and
* the fee is burned from the outstanding supply.
*
* @note `EscrowCancel` passes `kPARITY_RATE` so no fee is charged when
* tokens are returned to the original sender.
*/
template <>
inline TER
escrowUnlockApplyHelper<MPTIssue>(
@@ -189,7 +272,6 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper<MPTIssue>(
return ter; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
// update owner count.
adjustOwnerCount(view, sleDest, 1, journal);
}
@@ -197,25 +279,16 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper<MPTIssue>(
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
auto const xferRate = transferRate(view, amount);
// update if issuer rate is less than locked rate
// Cap to the lower of the snapshotted and current rate to protect the receiver.
if (xferRate < lockedRate)
lockedRate = xferRate;
// Transfer Rate only applies when:
// 1. Issuer is not involved in the transfer (senderIssuer or
// receiverIssuer)
// 2. The locked rate is different from the parity rate
// NOTE: Transfer fee in escrow works a bit differently from a normal
// payment. In escrow, the fee is deducted from the locked/sending amount,
// whereas in a normal payment, the transfer fee is taken on top of the
// sending amount.
// Fee is deducted from `amount` (not added on top): finalAmt = amount - fee.
// No fee when either party is the issuer, or when lockedRate == kPARITY_RATE.
auto finalAmt = amount;
if ((!senderIssuer && !receiverIssuer) && lockedRate != kPARITY_RATE)
{
// compute transfer fee, if any
auto const xferFee = amount.value() - divideRound(amount, lockedRate, amount.asset(), true);
// compute balance to transfer
finalAmt = amount.value() - xferFee;
}
return unlockEscrowMPT(

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
/** @file
* MPT-specific ledger helper declarations.
*
* Declares the MPT counterpart to `RippleStateHelpers.h`. The asset-agnostic
* `TokenHelpers.h` dispatchers route `MPTIssue`-typed calls here via
* `std::visit` on the `Asset` variant. In addition to the functions that
* mirror IOU trust-line semantics (freeze, transfer rate, holding lifecycle,
* authorization), this header exposes operations with no IOU equivalent:
* escrow accounting, DEX permission gating, supply-overflow arithmetic, and
* the two-phase authorization protocol specific to MPT.
*
* @see RippleStateHelpers.h, TokenHelpers.h
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
@@ -20,15 +33,65 @@ namespace xrpl {
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Check whether an entire MPT issuance is globally frozen.
*
* Reads the `MPTokenIssuance` SLE and tests `lsfMPTLocked`. A missing
* issuance SLE is treated as unfrozen.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to check.
* @return `true` if `lsfMPTLocked` is set on the issuance; `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isGlobalFrozen(ReadView const& view, MPTIssue const& mptIssue);
/** Check whether a specific account's MPToken holding is individually frozen.
*
* Reads the per-holder `MPToken` SLE and tests `lsfMPTLocked`. Returns
* `false` if no `MPToken` SLE exists for the account (i.e., the account
* holds no balance for this issuance).
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param account The account whose holding is checked.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to check against.
* @return `true` if the account's `MPToken` carries `lsfMPTLocked`;
* `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isIndividualFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, MPTIssue const& mptIssue);
/** Check whether an account's access to an MPT issuance is frozen by any tier.
*
* Applies three checks in order: global issuance lock (`isGlobalFrozen`),
* per-account holding lock (`isIndividualFrozen`), and vault pseudo-account
* freeze (`isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen`). Short-circuits on the first match.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param account The account to check.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to check against.
* @param depth Recursion depth guard forwarded to `isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen`;
* bounds pathological nested-vault configurations (currently unreachable
* in practice, but defended against up to `maxAssetCheckDepth`).
* @return `true` if any freeze tier applies; `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, MPTIssue const& mptIssue, int depth = 0);
/** Check whether any account in a set is frozen for an MPT issuance.
*
* Sequences checks across separate passes to minimize cost: the global freeze
* is tested once and short-circuits immediately; individual per-account locks
* are checked for every account before the more expensive vault
* pseudo-account recursion begins.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param accounts The set of accounts to check.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to check against.
* @param depth Recursion depth guard forwarded to `isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen`.
* @return `true` if the global freeze is set, or if any account carries an
* individual freeze, or if any account is a frozen vault pseudo-account;
* `false` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isAnyFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -42,10 +105,18 @@ isAnyFrozen(
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Returns MPT transfer fee as Rate. Rate specifies
* the fee as fractions of 1 billion. For example, 1% transfer rate
* is represented as 1,010,000,000.
* @param issuanceID MPTokenIssuanceID of MPTTokenIssuance object
/** Convert the `sfTransferFee` field of an MPT issuance to the XRPL `Rate` type.
*
* `sfTransferFee` is a `uint16` in the range 050,000 representing 050%
* (units of 0.001%). The encoding maps to `Rate` via
* `1,000,000,000 + (10,000 × fee)`, so a 50,000 field value becomes
* `1,500,000,000` (50% surcharge over the gross). When `sfTransferFee` is
* absent, `parityRate` (1,000,000,000 — no fee) is returned.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param issuanceID The `MPTokenIssuanceID` of the issuance.
* @return The transfer rate as a `Rate` value; `parityRate` when no fee is
* configured or the issuance SLE is absent.
*/
[[nodiscard]] Rate
transferRate(ReadView const& view, MPTID const& issuanceID);
@@ -56,6 +127,18 @@ transferRate(ReadView const& view, MPTID const& issuanceID);
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Read-only pre-check: verify that an independent holding can be created.
*
* Validates two preconditions before `addEmptyHolding` mutates the ledger:
* the `MPTokenIssuance` must exist, and it must carry `lsfMPTCanTransfer`.
* Tokens without `lsfMPTCanTransfer` can only move directly between the
* issuer and counterparties, making independent holdings meaningless.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance the caller wants to hold.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if the issuance SLE is absent,
* or `tecNO_AUTH` if `lsfMPTCanTransfer` is not set.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canAddHolding(ReadView const& view, MPTIssue const& mptIssue);
@@ -65,6 +148,33 @@ canAddHolding(ReadView const& view, MPTIssue const& mptIssue);
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Core MPToken SLE lifecycle function — create, delete, or toggle authorization.
*
* Behavior depends on `holderID`:
* - `holderID` absent (`nullopt`): `account` is the holder. Without
* `tfMPTUnauthorize`, a new zero-balance `MPToken` SLE is created and
* inserted into the owner directory; the XRP reserve is enforced when
* `ownerCount >= 2` (same policy as trust lines). With `tfMPTUnauthorize`,
* the existing SLE is erased and the owner count decremented.
* - `holderID` set: `account` must be the issuance's issuer. The function
* toggles `lsfMPTAuthorized` on the holder's existing `MPToken` SLE.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param priorBalance XRP balance before this transaction; used only for the
* reserve check when creating a new holding (`holderID` absent and
* `tfMPTUnauthorize` not set).
* @param mptIssuanceID The issuance being authorized or deauthorized.
* @param account Submitting account: the holder (when `holderID` is absent)
* or the issuer (when `holderID` is set).
* @param journal Logging sink.
* @param flags Transaction flags; `tfMPTUnauthorize` selects the
* delete/deauthorize path.
* @param holderID When set, `account` is the issuer and this is the holder
* whose `lsfMPTAuthorized` flag is toggled.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE` if reserves are too low,
* `tecDUPLICATE` if the holding already exists, or a `tef` code on
* invariant violations.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
authorizeMPToken(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -75,12 +185,31 @@ authorizeMPToken(
std::uint32_t flags = 0,
std::optional<AccountID> holderID = std::nullopt);
/** Check if the account lacks required authorization for MPT.
/** Preclaim (read-only) authorization check for an MPT holding.
*
* requireAuth check is recursive for MPT shares in a vault, descending to
* assets in the vault, up to maxAssetCheckDepth recursion depth. This is
* purely defensive, as we currently do not allow such vaults to be created.
* WeakAuth intentionally allows missing MPTokens under MPToken V2.
* Issuers are always authorized. When `featureSingleAssetVault` is active,
* vault and `LoanBroker` pseudo-accounts are implicitly authorized, and the
* check recurses into the vault's underlying asset (bounded by `depth`
* vs. `kMAX_ASSET_CHECK_DEPTH`). Domain-based authorization via
* `credentials::validDomain` takes precedence over `lsfMPTAuthorized` when
* `sfDomainID` is present on the issuance — a passing domain check succeeds
* even if no `MPToken` SLE exists.
*
* `WeakAuth` intentionally permits a missing `MPToken` SLE; used in MPToken
* V2 flows where the SLE is created on demand during apply.
*
* @note The recursion through vault assets is purely defensive; the ledger
* does not currently permit nested-vault MPT configurations.
* @param view The ledger state to query (read-only; called in preclaim).
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance being accessed.
* @param account The account requesting access.
* @param authType Controls leniency toward missing `MPToken` SLEs;
* `WeakAuth` allows a missing SLE, `StrongAuth`/`Legacy` require it.
* @param depth Current recursion depth; guards against theoretical infinite
* recursion through nested vault configurations.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if authorized, `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if the issuance
* is absent, `tecNO_AUTH` if authorization fails, or `tecEXPIRED` if
* domain credentials have expired.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
requireAuth(
@@ -90,11 +219,25 @@ requireAuth(
AuthType authType = AuthType::Legacy,
int depth = 0);
/** Enforce account has MPToken to match its authorization.
/** Enforce account has MPToken to match its authorization (doApply phase).
*
* Called from doApply - it will check for expired (and delete if found any)
* credentials matching DomainID set in MPTokenIssuance. Must be called if
* requireAuth(...MPTIssue...) returned tesSUCCESS or tecEXPIRED in preclaim.
* Must be called when `requireAuth` returned `tesSUCCESS` or `tecEXPIRED`
* during preclaim. Re-checks authorization and, if a `sfDomainID` is set on
* the issuance, runs `verifyValidDomain` (which deletes expired credentials
* as a side effect). When domain authorization succeeds but the account has
* no `MPToken` SLE, one is created on the fly using `priorBalance` for the
* XRP reserve check.
*
* @note Must not be called for the issuer account.
* @param view The mutable ledger state (called in doApply).
* @param mptIssuanceID The issuance being accessed.
* @param account The holder account; must not be the issuer.
* @param priorBalance XRP balance before this transaction; used when lazily
* allocating a new `MPToken` SLE for domain-authorized holders.
* @param j Logging sink.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecNO_AUTH` if not authorized, `tecEXPIRED` if
* credentials have expired, or `tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE` if the reserve
* check fails during on-demand SLE creation.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
enforceMPTokenAuthorization(
@@ -104,9 +247,20 @@ enforceMPTokenAuthorization(
XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
beast::Journal j);
/** Check if the destination account is allowed
* to receive MPT. Return tecNO_AUTH if it doesn't
* and tesSUCCESS otherwise.
/** Check whether a transfer between two accounts is permitted by the issuance.
*
* When `lsfMPTCanTransfer` is absent, third-party transfers are blocked.
* Transfers where either `from` or `to` is the issuer are always allowed,
* mirroring the IOU trust-line policy that lets issuers send and receive
* their own tokens unconditionally.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance involved in the transfer.
* @param from The sending account.
* @param to The receiving account.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if the transfer is permitted, `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND`
* if the issuance SLE is absent, or `tecNO_AUTH` if `lsfMPTCanTransfer`
* is unset and neither endpoint is the issuer.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canTransfer(
@@ -115,8 +269,16 @@ canTransfer(
AccountID const& from,
AccountID const& to);
/** Check if Asset can be traded on DEX. return tecNO_PERMISSION
* if it doesn't and tesSUCCESS otherwise.
/** Check whether an asset may be traded on the DEX.
*
* Dispatches via `asset.visit`: XRP and IOU assets always succeed; for MPT,
* reads the issuance SLE and checks `lsfMPTCanTrade`.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param asset The asset to check; non-MPT assets always pass.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if trading is permitted, `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if
* the MPT issuance SLE is absent, or `tecNO_PERMISSION` if
* `lsfMPTCanTrade` is not set.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canTrade(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset);
@@ -127,6 +289,24 @@ canTrade(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset);
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Create a zero-balance `MPToken` holding for `accountID`.
*
* Short-circuits to `tesSUCCESS` when the caller is the issuer — issuers
* never hold a `MPToken` SLE for their own issuance. For all other accounts,
* delegates to `authorizeMPToken`, which enforces the XRP reserve requirement
* and inserts the SLE into the owner directory. Returns `tefINTERNAL` if the
* issuance SLE is missing or globally locked (invariant violations).
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param accountID The account requesting the holding.
* @param priorBalance XRP balance before this transaction; forwarded to
* `authorizeMPToken` for the reserve check.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to hold.
* @param journal Logging sink.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecDUPLICATE` if a holding already exists,
* `tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE` if reserves are too low, or `tefINTERNAL`
* on issuance-state invariant violations.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
addEmptyHolding(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -135,6 +315,23 @@ addEmptyHolding(
MPTIssue const& mptIssue,
beast::Journal journal);
/** Delete a zero-balance `MPToken` holding.
*
* Requires `sfMPTAmount` to be zero and, when `fixCleanup3_1_3` is enabled,
* `sfLockedAmount` to be zero as well; returns `tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS` otherwise.
* When `accountID` is the issuer and no `MPToken` SLE exists, returns
* `tesSUCCESS` immediately — the normal issuer state. Otherwise delegates to
* `authorizeMPToken` with `tfMPTUnauthorize` to erase the SLE and decrement
* the owner count.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param accountID The account whose holding is being removed.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance.
* @param journal Logging sink.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if no holding exists (and
* caller is not the issuer), or `tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS` if the holding
* carries a non-zero balance or locked amount.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
removeEmptyHolding(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -148,6 +345,22 @@ removeEmptyHolding(
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Move MPT funds from a holder's spendable balance into escrow.
*
* Decrements `sfMPTAmount` and increments `sfLockedAmount` on the sender's
* `MPToken` SLE, then increments `sfLockedAmount` on the `MPTokenIssuance`
* SLE. `sfOutstandingAmount` on the issuance is deliberately left unchanged —
* escrowed tokens remain outstanding until the escrow completes and the
* recipient actually receives them. All arithmetic is guarded by
* `canSubtract`/`canAdd`.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param uGrantorID The account placing tokens in escrow; must not be the issuer.
* @param saAmount The MPT amount to lock; must be a valid `MPTIssue` amount.
* @param j Logging sink.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, or a `tec`/`tef` error if the issuance or `MPToken`
* SLE is missing, the sender is the issuer, or an arithmetic guard fires.
*/
TER
lockEscrowMPT(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -155,6 +368,28 @@ lockEscrowMPT(
STAmount const& saAmount,
beast::Journal j);
/** Release MPT funds from escrow and credit the recipient.
*
* Decrements `sfLockedAmount` on both the sender's `MPToken` SLE and the
* `MPTokenIssuance` SLE by `grossAmount`. Then, depending on the receiver:
* - Receiver is a third party: `sfMPTAmount` on the receiver's `MPToken` is
* incremented by `netAmount`.
* - Receiver is the issuer: `sfOutstandingAmount` on the issuance is
* decremented by `netAmount` — tokens return to the issuer and retire.
* When `fixTokenEscrowV1` is enabled and `grossAmount > netAmount`, the fee
* difference is additionally subtracted from `sfOutstandingAmount` because
* the fee tokens are effectively burned. All arithmetic is guarded by
* `canSubtract`/`canAdd`.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param uGrantorID The escrow grantor; must not be the issuer.
* @param uGranteeID The escrow grantee (may be the issuer).
* @param netAmount The MPT amount credited to the receiver after fees.
* @param grossAmount The MPT amount unlocked from escrow (>= `netAmount`).
* @param j Logging sink.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, or a `tec`/`tef` error on missing SLEs or
* arithmetic guard failure.
*/
TER
unlockEscrowMPT(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -164,6 +399,18 @@ unlockEscrowMPT(
STAmount const& grossAmount,
beast::Journal j);
/** Low-level primitive: insert a new `MPToken` SLE and link it into the owner directory.
*
* Inserts the SLE unconditionally without checking for duplicates, enforcing
* reserves, or verifying issuance validity. Callers must perform those checks
* before invoking this function.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param mptIssuanceID The issuance the token belongs to.
* @param account The account that will own the `MPToken`.
* @param flags Initial `sfFlags` value for the new SLE.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, or `tecDIR_FULL` if the owner directory is full.
*/
TER
createMPToken(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -171,6 +418,21 @@ createMPToken(
AccountID const& account,
std::uint32_t const flags);
/** Idempotently ensure a `MPToken` holding exists for `holder`.
*
* Succeeds immediately if `holder` is the issuer or if the `MPToken` SLE
* already exists. Otherwise calls `createMPToken` and increments the owner
* count. Suitable for apply-phase callers that need to auto-create a holding
* without the full reserve and issuance validity checks performed by
* `addEmptyHolding`.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance the holder will hold.
* @param holder The account to receive the holding.
* @param j Logging sink.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecDIR_FULL` if the owner directory is full, or
* `tecINTERNAL` if the holder's account SLE is missing.
*/
TER
checkCreateMPT(
xrpl::ApplyView& view,
@@ -184,25 +446,62 @@ checkCreateMPT(
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// MaximumAmount doesn't exceed 2**63-1
/** Return the configured supply cap for an MPT issuance.
*
* Returns `sfMaximumAmount` when present, or `kMAX_MP_TOKEN_AMOUNT` (2^631)
* when the field is absent, representing an uncapped issuance. The result is
* always non-negative and fits in a `std::int64_t`.
*
* @param sleIssuance The `MPTokenIssuance` SLE to query.
* @return The maximum allowed outstanding amount.
*/
std::int64_t
maxMPTAmount(SLE const& sleIssuance);
// OutstandingAmount may overflow and available amount might be negative.
// But available amount is always <= |MaximumAmount - OutstandingAmount|.
/** Compute remaining issuance headroom from a pre-read SLE.
*
* Returns `maxMPTAmount(sleIssuance) - sfOutstandingAmount`. May transiently
* be negative when the payment engine is processing a path step that
* temporarily exceeds `MaximumAmount` under `AllowMPTOverflow::Yes`.
*
* @param sleIssuance The `MPTokenIssuance` SLE to query.
* @return Headroom as a signed 64-bit integer; may be negative.
*/
std::int64_t
availableMPTAmount(SLE const& sleIssuance);
/** Compute remaining issuance headroom by reading the SLE from the view.
*
* Convenience overload that performs the SLE lookup. Throws
* `std::runtime_error` if the issuance SLE is absent — a missing issuance at
* this call site indicates a ledger consistency failure rather than a user
* error.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param mptID The `MPTID` of the issuance.
* @return Headroom as a signed 64-bit integer; may be negative.
* @throws std::runtime_error if the `MPTokenIssuance` SLE is absent.
*/
std::int64_t
availableMPTAmount(ReadView const& view, MPTID const& mptID);
/** Checks for two types of OutstandingAmount overflow during a send operation.
* 1. **Direct directSendNoFee (Overflow: No):** A true overflow check when
* `OutstandingAmount > MaximumAmount`. This threshold is used for direct
* directSendNoFee transactions that bypass the payment engine.
* 2. **accountSend & Payment Engine (Overflow: Yes):** A temporary overflow
* check when `OutstandingAmount > UINT64_MAX`. This higher threshold is used
* for `accountSend` and payments processed via the payment engine.
/** Check whether crediting `sendAmount` would overflow the outstanding supply.
*
* Two distinct overflow thresholds are applied based on `allowOverflow`:
* 1. **`AllowMPTOverflow::No` (direct send):** Enforces the strict cap
* `OutstandingAmount + sendAmount ≤ MaximumAmount`. Used by
* `directSendNoFee` transactions that bypass the payment engine.
* 2. **`AllowMPTOverflow::Yes` (payment engine):** Raises the effective
* ceiling to `UINT64_MAX` to allow transient in-flight values that exceed
* `MaximumAmount` during path routing. A matching redemption step in the
* same transaction collapses the overshoot before settlement.
*
* @param sendAmount The proposed additional issuance; must be non-negative.
* @param outstandingAmount Current `sfOutstandingAmount` from the issuance SLE.
* @param maximumAmount The configured cap (`sfMaximumAmount` or
* `kMAX_MP_TOKEN_AMOUNT`).
* @param allowOverflow Selects which ceiling to apply.
* @return `true` if adding `sendAmount` would exceed the applicable limit.
*/
bool
isMPTOverflow(
@@ -211,18 +510,33 @@ isMPTOverflow(
std::int64_t maximumAmount,
AllowMPTOverflow allowOverflow);
/**
* Determine funds available for an issuer to sell in an issuer owned offer.
* Issuing step, which could be either MPTEndPointStep last step or BookStep's
* TakerPays may overflow OutstandingAmount. Redeeming step, in BookStep's
* TakerGets redeems the offer's owner funds, essentially balancing out
* the overflow, unless the offer's owner is the issuer.
/** Determine funds available for an issuer to sell in an issuer-owned DEX offer.
*
* During an issuing step (outbound from the issuer), the issuer's
* "available" balance is the remaining issuance headroom (`availableMPTAmount`)
* adjusted by `balanceHookSelfIssueMPT` to account for any amount already
* sold within the same payment. Without this hook, offer-crossing could
* allow the issuer to exceed `sfMaximumAmount` across parallel paths in the
* same transaction.
*
* @param view The ledger state to query.
* @param issue The MPT issuance for which to compute issuer funds.
* @return The effective amount the issuer can sell; zero if the issuance SLE
* is absent.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
issuerFundsToSelfIssue(ReadView const& view, MPTIssue const& issue);
/** Facilitate tracking of MPT sold by an issuer owning MPT sell offer.
* See ApplyView::issuerSelfDebitHookMPT().
/** Track MPT sold by an issuer that owns an MPT sell offer.
*
* Records the cumulative amount sold during the current payment step so that
* subsequent calls to `issuerFundsToSelfIssue` return a correctly reduced
* available balance. Delegates to `ApplyView::issuerSelfDebitHookMPT` after
* computing the current issuance headroom.
*
* @param view The mutable ledger state.
* @param issue The MPT issuance being sold.
* @param amount The additional amount sold in this step.
*/
void
issuerSelfDebitHookMPT(ApplyView& view, MPTIssue const& issue, std::uint64_t amount);
@@ -233,9 +547,26 @@ issuerSelfDebitHookMPT(ApplyView& view, MPTIssue const& issue, std::uint64_t amo
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/* Return true if a transaction is allowed for the specified MPT/account. The
* function checks MPTokenIssuance and MPToken objects flags to determine if the
* transaction is allowed.
/** Comprehensive MPT transaction permission check for DEX and payment types.
*
* Verifies in order: the issuer account exists, the `MPTokenIssuance` SLE
* exists, the issuance is not globally locked (`lsfMPTLocked`), the
* `lsfMPTCanTrade` flag is set, and — for non-issuer accounts — that
* `lsfMPTCanTransfer` is set and the account's own `MPToken` is not
* individually locked. A missing `MPToken` SLE for a non-issuer is treated
* as passing: some transaction types create the `MPToken` on demand and
* perform their own missing-token checks.
*
* @note Must not be called with `txType == ttPAYMENT`; use the payment-engine
* path's own checks for payments.
* @param v The ledger state to query.
* @param tx The transaction type being gated.
* @param asset The asset involved; non-MPT assets always succeed.
* @param accountID The account initiating the transaction.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if the issuance is absent,
* `tecNO_ISSUER` if the issuer account is gone, `tecLOCKED` if the
* issuance or account is frozen, or `tecNO_PERMISSION` if trading or
* transfer is not permitted.
*/
TER
checkMPTTxAllowed(ReadView const& v, TxType tx, Asset const& asset, AccountID const& accountID);

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
/**
* @file NFTokenHelpers.h
* @brief Core helpers for NFT paged-directory and offer management.
*
* Declares all mutable and read-only operations on the NFToken paged-directory
* structure and offer queues. Every transaction that touches an NFToken —
* minting, burning, transferring, or creating/cancelling offers — calls these
* helpers rather than manipulating ledger state directly.
*
* @note NFTs are packed into doubly-linked `ltNFTOKEN_PAGE` SLEs, each
* holding up to `kDIR_MAX_TOKENS_PER_PAGE` (32) tokens sorted by
* `compareTokens()`. Tokens sharing the same low-96-bit masked value
* (issuer + taxon) are *equivalent* and must be collocated on the same
* page. Page key invariant: every token's low 96 bits are strictly less
* than the low 96 bits of its enclosing page key.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
@@ -13,18 +30,48 @@
namespace xrpl::nft {
/** Delete up to a specified number of offers from the specified token offer
* directory. */
* directory.
*
* Iterates the directory page-by-page, deleting offers in reverse index order
* within each page. Reverse iteration is required because `sfIndexes` is
* vector-backed and forward deletion would corrupt the remaining indices.
* Stops as soon as `maxDeletableOffers` offers have been removed.
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param directory Keylet of the NFT buy or sell offer directory to drain.
* @param maxDeletableOffers Maximum number of offers to remove in this call.
* @return The number of offers actually deleted.
* @note Returns 0 immediately if `maxDeletableOffers` is 0. Used by
* `NFTokenBurn` to drain open offers within the per-transaction
* deletion cap (`maxDeletableTokenOfferEntries`).
*/
std::size_t
removeTokenOffersWithLimit(
ApplyView& view,
Keylet const& directory,
std::size_t maxDeletableOffers);
/** Finds the specified token in the owner's token directory. */
/** Finds the specified token in the owner's token directory.
*
* Read-only traversal: locates the `ltNFTOKEN_PAGE` candidate via `succ()`
* and searches the page's `sfNFTokens` array for a matching `sfNFTokenID`.
*
* @param view The read-only view to query.
* @param owner The account whose NFT directory is searched.
* @param nftokenID The 256-bit NFT identifier to look up.
* @return The matching token `STObject`, or `std::nullopt` if not found.
* @see findTokenAndPage for the mutable overload that also returns the page.
*/
std::optional<STObject>
findToken(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& owner, uint256 const& nftokenID);
/** Finds the token in the owner's token directory. Returns token and page. */
/** Token and its containing page, returned by `findTokenAndPage()`.
*
* Bundles the located token `STObject` with the mutable `shared_ptr<SLE>`
* page so callers can modify the token in place without a second ledger
* traversal. The page pointer must be used exclusively on the same
* `ApplyView` that produced it.
*/
struct TokenAndPage
{
STObject token;
@@ -35,17 +82,81 @@ struct TokenAndPage
{
}
};
/** Finds the token in the owner's token directory and returns it with its page.
*
* Mutable traversal via `ApplyView::peek()`. Returns both the token
* `STObject` and the `shared_ptr<SLE>` page so that callers such as
* `NFTokenAcceptOffer` can pass the page directly to `removeToken()`,
* avoiding a redundant page lookup.
*
* @param view The apply view to query (mutable; uses `peek()`).
* @param owner The account whose NFT directory is searched.
* @param nftokenID The 256-bit NFT identifier to look up.
* @return A `TokenAndPage` containing the token and its page, or
* `std::nullopt` if the token is not found.
* @see findToken for the read-only alternative that returns only the token.
*/
std::optional<TokenAndPage>
findTokenAndPage(ApplyView& view, AccountID const& owner, uint256 const& nftokenID);
/** Insert the token in the owner's token directory. */
/** Insert the token in the owner's token directory.
*
* Locates or creates the appropriate `ltNFTOKEN_PAGE` via `getPageForToken()`.
* If the target page is full, it is split to make room; each split increments
* the owner's reserve count. Tokens are kept sorted within a page by
* `compareTokens()` (low 96-bit key first, full ID as tiebreaker).
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param owner The account that will own the token.
* @param nft The token `STObject` to insert; must contain `sfNFTokenID`.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or `tecNO_SUITABLE_NFTOKEN_PAGE` if the
* target page is entirely filled with equivalent tokens (same low 96-bit
* key) and no split is possible.
*/
TER
insertToken(ApplyView& view, AccountID owner, STObject&& nft);
/** Remove the token from the owner's token directory. */
/** Remove the token from the owner's token directory.
*
* Page-discovery overload: locates the containing `ltNFTOKEN_PAGE` via
* `succ()` and then delegates to the two-argument form. Use this when
* the caller does not already hold a page reference.
*
* After erasure, attempts to merge the affected page with its neighbours;
* each successful merge credits one reserve. If the page becomes empty it
* is unlinked and erased.
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param owner The account that currently holds the token.
* @param nftokenID The 256-bit NFT identifier to remove.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, or `tecNO_ENTRY` if the page or token cannot be
* found.
* @see removeToken(ApplyView&, AccountID const&, uint256 const&, shared_ptr<SLE> const&)
* for the overload that skips the page lookup.
*/
TER
removeToken(ApplyView& view, AccountID const& owner, uint256 const& nftokenID);
/** Remove the token from the owner's token directory using a pre-located page.
*
* Caller-supplied page overload: skips the `succ()`-based page lookup when
* the caller already holds the page (e.g., from `findTokenAndPage()`).
* The `page` pointer must have been obtained from the same `ApplyView`
* instance.
*
* Under the `fixNFTokenPageLinks` amendment, if the emptied page is the final
* anchor page (`nftpage_max`), its contents are replaced with those of the
* previous page and the now-empty previous page is erased, preserving the
* invariant that the last page always has the stable sentinel key.
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param owner The account that currently holds the token.
* @param nftokenID The 256-bit NFT identifier to remove.
* @param page The mutable SLE page known to contain the token.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, or `tecNO_ENTRY` if the token is not found on the
* supplied page.
*/
TER
removeToken(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -53,28 +164,74 @@ removeToken(
uint256 const& nftokenID,
std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& page);
/** Deletes the given token offer.
An offer is tracked in two separate places:
- The token's 'buy' directory, if it's a buy offer; or
- The token's 'sell' directory, if it's a sell offer; and
- The owner directory of the account that placed the offer.
The offer also consumes one incremental reserve.
/** Deletes the given token offer and removes it from both tracking directories.
*
* An offer is tracked in two separate places:
* - The token's `nft_buys` directory, if it is a buy offer; or
* - The token's `nft_sells` directory, if it is a sell offer; and
* - The owner's owner directory.
*
* Both directory entries are removed, the owner's reserve count is
* decremented by one, and the offer SLE is erased.
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param offer The SLE for the offer to delete; must be of type
* `ltNFTOKEN_OFFER`.
* @return `true` if the offer was successfully deleted; `false` if the SLE
* is not of type `ltNFTOKEN_OFFER` or if a directory removal fails,
* acting as a type-safety guard.
*/
bool
deleteTokenOffer(ApplyView& view, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& offer);
/** Repairs the links in an NFTokenPage directory.
Returns true if a repair took place, otherwise false.
*/
/** Repairs the links in an NFToken page directory.
*
* Walks the entire `ltNFTOKEN_PAGE` chain for the owner and corrects any
* broken `sfNextPageMin` / `sfPreviousPageMin` links. If the final page does
* not have the expected `nftpage_max` sentinel key, its contents are migrated
* to a newly created SLE with the correct key, the old SLE is erased, and the
* chain is relinked. Owner count is unchanged by this operation because the
* page count is preserved.
*
* Intended to be called by the `LedgerStateFix` transaction on accounts with
* known directory corruption.
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param owner The account whose NFToken page directory is to be repaired.
* @return `true` if any correction was applied; `false` if the directory was
* already consistent.
*/
bool
repairNFTokenDirectoryLinks(ApplyView& view, AccountID const& owner);
/** Ordering predicate for NFToken IDs within and across pages.
*
* Sorts first by the low 96 bits of each ID (the `pageMask` region that
* determines page placement), then by the full 256-bit value as a
* tiebreaker. This ensures deterministic ordering for tokens that share
* the same low 96-bit prefix (equivalent tokens) and must co-reside on
* a single page.
*
* @param a First NFToken ID.
* @param b Second NFToken ID.
* @return `true` if `a` sorts before `b`.
*/
bool
compareTokens(uint256 const& a, uint256 const& b);
/** Modify the URI of an existing NFToken in the owner's directory.
*
* Locates the token's page and updates the `sfURI` field in the token's
* `STObject` within the page's `sfNFTokens` array. If `uri` is
* `std::nullopt`, the `sfURI` field is removed from the token.
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param owner The account that owns the token.
* @param nftokenID The 256-bit NFT identifier whose URI is to be changed.
* @param uri The new URI value, or `std::nullopt` to clear the URI.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or `tecINTERNAL` if the page or token
* cannot be located (indicates ledger inconsistency).
*/
TER
changeTokenURI(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -82,7 +239,33 @@ changeTokenURI(
uint256 const& nftokenID,
std::optional<xrpl::Slice> const& uri);
/** Preflight checks shared by NFTokenCreateOffer and NFTokenMint */
/** Preflight checks shared by NFTokenCreateOffer and NFTokenMint.
*
* Validates offer parameters that require no ledger access: negative or
* zero amounts (buy offers must carry a non-zero amount), zero IOU amounts,
* zero expiration, and malformed `owner`/`destination` combinations.
* A buy offer must supply `owner` (the targeted token holder); a sell offer
* must not (the seller is implicit). Neither party may designate itself as
* the destination.
*
* Defaults (`owner = nullopt`, `txFlags = tfSellNFToken`) allow
* `NFTokenMint` to reuse this path with minimal adaptation.
*
* @param acctID Account executing the transaction.
* @param amount The offer amount; must be non-negative and, for buy offers,
* non-zero and non-zero for IOUs.
* @param dest Optional destination account that may exclusively accept the
* offer; must not equal `acctID`.
* @param expiration Optional offer expiration; must not be zero.
* @param nftFlags The flags field of the NFToken being offered.
* @param rules Current ledger rule set used for amendment checks.
* @param owner For buy offers, the account that currently holds the token;
* must be absent for sell offers.
* @param txFlags Transaction flags; `tfSellNFToken` distinguishes sell from
* buy.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if all static checks pass, or a `temXXX` error code
* indicating which parameter is invalid.
*/
NotTEC
tokenOfferCreatePreflight(
AccountID const& acctID,
@@ -94,7 +277,37 @@ tokenOfferCreatePreflight(
std::optional<AccountID> const& owner = std::nullopt,
std::uint32_t txFlags = tfSellNFToken);
/** Preclaim checks shared by NFTokenCreateOffer and NFTokenMint */
/** Preclaim checks shared by NFTokenCreateOffer and NFTokenMint.
*
* Accesses the ledger to validate conditions that cannot be checked
* statically:
* - For non-XRP offers on tokens without `flagCreateTrustLines`, verifies
* that the NFT issuer's trust line for the IOU exists and is not frozen.
* Under `featureNFTokenMintOffer`, an issuer selling their own currency is
* exempt from this check.
* - Enforces `flagTransferable`: if absent and the transacting account is
* neither the issuer nor the current `sfNFTokenMinter`, returns
* `tefNFTOKEN_IS_NOT_TRANSFERABLE`.
* - For buy offers, verifies the account currently has sufficient funds.
* - Verifies `dest` and `owner` accounts exist and have not set
* `lsfDisallowIncomingNFTokenOffer`.
* - Under `fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2`, calls `checkTrustlineAuthorized()`
* to reject offers backed by unauthorized trust lines that carry a balance.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view.
* @param acctID Account executing the transaction.
* @param nftIssuer Issuer encoded in the NFToken ID.
* @param amount The offer amount.
* @param dest Optional restricted destination account.
* @param nftFlags The flags field of the NFToken being offered.
* @param xferFee Transfer fee encoded in the NFToken ID (basis points).
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @param owner For buy offers, the account that currently holds the token.
* @param txFlags Transaction flags; `tfSellNFToken` distinguishes sell from
* buy.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if all ledger-state checks pass, or a `tecXXX` /
* `tefXXX` error code.
*/
TER
tokenOfferCreatePreclaim(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -108,7 +321,28 @@ tokenOfferCreatePreclaim(
std::optional<AccountID> const& owner = std::nullopt,
std::uint32_t txFlags = tfSellNFToken);
/** doApply implementation shared by NFTokenCreateOffer and NFTokenMint */
/** doApply implementation shared by NFTokenCreateOffer and NFTokenMint.
*
* Reserves XRP for the new `ltNFTOKEN_OFFER` object, inserts the offer into
* the account's owner directory and into the token's buy or sell directory
* (determined by `tfSellNFToken` in `txFlags`), constructs the SLE with the
* supplied fields, and increments the owner count.
*
* @param view The apply view to mutate.
* @param acctID Account executing the transaction.
* @param amount The offer amount.
* @param dest Optional restricted destination account.
* @param expiration Optional expiration time for the offer.
* @param seqProxy Sequence or ticket proxy used to derive the offer keylet.
* @param nftokenID The 256-bit ID of the NFToken being offered.
* @param priorBalance The account's XRP balance before the transaction fee
* was deducted; used to verify the reserve requirement.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @param txFlags Transaction flags; `tfSellNFToken` controls offer direction.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, `tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE` if the account
* cannot cover the new object reserve, or `tecDIR_FULL` if either
* directory is at capacity.
*/
TER
tokenOfferCreateApply(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -122,6 +356,25 @@ tokenOfferCreateApply(
beast::Journal j,
std::uint32_t txFlags = tfSellNFToken);
/** Verify that an account is authorized to hold a given IOU trust line.
*
* Only active under the `fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2` amendment; returns
* `tesSUCCESS` unconditionally when the amendment is not enabled.
*
* When active, checks that if the IOU issuer requires authorization
* (`lsfRequireAuth`), the trust line between `id` and the issuer exists and
* carries the appropriate `lsfLowAuth` / `lsfHighAuth` flag. The issuer
* account is always considered authorized to hold its own issuance.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view.
* @param id The account whose authorization is being verified.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @param issue The IOU issue (currency + issuer) to check; must not be XRP.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if authorized, `tecNO_ISSUER` if the issuer account
* does not exist, `tecNO_LINE` if the required trust line is absent, or
* `tecNO_AUTH` if the trust line exists but is not authorized.
* @note Only valid for custom (non-XRP) currencies; asserts otherwise.
*/
TER
checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -129,6 +382,26 @@ checkTrustlineAuthorized(
beast::Journal const j,
Issue const& issue);
/** Verify that an IOU trust line is not deep-frozen for a given account.
*
* Only active under the `featureDeepFreeze` amendment; returns
* `tesSUCCESS` unconditionally when the amendment is not enabled.
*
* When active, checks whether the trust line between `id` and the IOU issuer
* carries either `lsfLowDeepFreeze` or `lsfHighDeepFreeze`. Either side
* enacting deep freeze blocks token receipt, regardless of which party set it.
* The issuer account is always permitted to accept its own issuance; accounts
* with no trust line are treated as not frozen.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view.
* @param id The account whose deep-freeze status is being checked.
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
* @param issue The IOU issue (currency + issuer) to check; must not be XRP.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if not deep-frozen or if no trust line exists,
* `tecNO_ISSUER` if the issuer account does not exist, or `tecFROZEN`
* if the trust line is deep-frozen.
* @note Only valid for custom (non-XRP) currencies; asserts otherwise.
*/
TER
checkTrustlineDeepFrozen(
ReadView const& view,

View File

@@ -9,18 +9,38 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Delete an offer.
Requirements:
The offer must exist.
The caller must have already checked permissions.
@param view The ApplyView to modify.
@param sle The offer to delete.
@param j Journal for logging.
@return tesSUCCESS on success, otherwise an error code.
*/
/** Remove an offer and its directory back-references from the ledger.
*
* Performs the full teardown sequence atomically within the transaction
* buffer: removes the offer from the owner's directory, removes it from
* the order-book quality directory, decrements the owner's reserve count,
* and erases the SLE. For hybrid offers (flagged `lsfHybrid`) that
* participate in one or more Permissioned DEX domains, each entry in
* `sfAdditionalBooks` is also removed from its domain-specific book
* directory before the owner-count adjustment and erasure.
*
* If `sle` is null the function returns `tesSUCCESS` immediately,
* allowing callers to pass the result of a failed `peek()` without
* a pre-check (defensive against double-delete within one batch).
*
* @pre The offer SLE must exist in the ledger and both its
* `sfOwnerNode` and `sfBookNode` back-references must be valid.
* @pre The caller must have already verified that the submitting
* account is authorized to delete this offer; this function
* performs no ownership or permission check.
*
* @param view The `ApplyView` transaction buffer to modify.
* @param sle The offer SLE to delete. May be null (treated as no-op).
* @param j Journal for diagnostic logging.
*
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or `tefBAD_LEDGER` if a directory
* back-reference is missing (invariant violation; should not occur
* in a well-formed ledger).
*
* @note `[[nodiscard]]` is intentionally absent: `BookTip` and payment
* path callers do not always inspect the return value, and enforcing
* the attribute would have broken compilation across the engine.
*/
// [[nodiscard]] // nodiscard commented out so Flow, BookTip and others compile.
TER
offerDelete(ApplyView& view, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& sle, beast::Journal j);

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,35 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** Tear down a payment channel and return unspent XRP to its source account.
*
* Performs four ledger mutations in order:
* 1. Removes the channel from the source's owner directory (`sfOwnerNode`).
* 2. Conditionally removes the channel from the destination's owner directory
* (`sfDestinationNode`) — the field is absent on older channel objects that
* predate destination-directory tracking, so its presence is tested before
* the removal attempt.
* 3. Credits the unspent balance (`sfAmount - sfBalance`) back to the source
* account. `sfAmount` is the total XRP escrowed; `sfBalance` is the
* cumulative amount already paid to the destination.
* 4. Decrements the source's owner count and erases the `ltPAYCHAN` SLE.
*
* Called by both `PaymentChannelClaim` and `PaymentChannelFund` whenever a
* channel must be closed — on expiry (`cancelAfter`/`expiration` elapsed), on
* an explicit `tfClose` flag, or when the channel is fully drained.
*
* @param slep The `ltPAYCHAN` SLE to close; must satisfy
* `sfAmount >= sfBalance` (asserted).
* @param view The apply view through which all ledger mutations are made.
* @param key The ledger key of the channel SLE (used for directory removal).
* @param j Journal for fatal-level diagnostic messages on internal errors.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on the normal path; `tefBAD_LEDGER` if an owner
* directory removal fails (indicates corrupted ledger state);
* `tefINTERNAL` if the source account SLE cannot be found.
* @note The `tefBAD_LEDGER` and `tefINTERNAL` branches are annotated
* `LCOV_EXCL` — they guard against ledger corruption that cannot occur
* during correct operation.
*/
TER
closeChannel(
std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& slep,

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,90 @@
/**
* @file PermissionedDEXHelpers.h
* @brief Domain membership predicates for the Permissioned DEX.
*
* Declares the two authorization gatekeepers used by `xrpl::permissioned_dex`
* to enforce credential-based access control on restricted order books.
* Both functions are called from transaction preclaim logic and from live
* order-book traversal in `OfferStream`.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
namespace xrpl::permissioned_dex {
// Check if an account is in a permissioned domain
/**
* @brief Test whether an account currently qualifies as a member of a
* permissioned domain.
*
* Resolves the `PermissionedDomain` ledger object identified by @p domainID
* and applies a two-tier membership test:
*
* 1. **Owner shortcut** — the domain's `sfOwner` is always considered a member,
* avoiding a bootstrap problem where the owner couldn't trade in their own
* domain.
* 2. **Credential scan** — for all other accounts, the function iterates
* `sfAcceptedCredentials` and returns `true` as soon as it finds a
* credential issued to @p account that (a) carries the `lsfAccepted` flag
* and (b) has not expired according to `credentials::checkExpired` evaluated
* against the ledger's `parentCloseTime`.
*
* Expiry is evaluated against `parentCloseTime` (not wall time) so that all
* validators reach the same deterministic result regardless of local clock skew.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param account The account whose domain membership is being tested.
* @param domainID The identifier of the `PermissionedDomain` ledger object.
* @return `true` if @p account is the domain owner or holds at least one
* accepted, non-expired credential listed in the domain; `false` if the
* domain object does not exist, or if no qualifying credential is found.
*
* @note Called from `OfferCreate` preclaim (rejects with `tecNO_PERMISSION` if
* `false`) and twice from `Payment` preclaim — once for the sender, once for
* the destination — since a domain payment requires both parties to be
* members. Also called internally by `offerInDomain`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
accountInDomain(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Domain const& domainID);
// Check if an offer is in the permissioned domain
/**
* @brief Test whether a specific offer is still legitimately part of a
* permissioned domain at the time it is being consumed.
*
* Called by `OfferStream` during order-book traversal to handle the race
* between offer creation and subsequent credential expiry. An offer that was
* valid when placed may become invalid if the owner's credentials expire before
* the offer is matched. When this function returns `false`, `OfferStream`
* removes the offer from the book immediately (`permRmOffer`) instead of
* matching it.
*
* The function performs the following checks in order:
* - Offer SLE must exist (defensive; should not occur in a well-formed book).
* - Offer must carry `sfDomainID` (defensive; should not occur).
* - `sfDomainID` must match @p domainID (defensive; should not occur).
* - **Post-`fixCleanup3_1_3`**: a hybrid offer (`lsfHybrid`) must have
* `sfAdditionalBooks` present with exactly one entry; a violation is logged
* as an error and `false` is returned.
* - **Pre-`fixCleanup3_1_3`**: a hybrid offer must have `sfAdditionalBooks`
* present (size is not validated).
* - Delegates the final membership check to `accountInDomain` for the offer's
* owner (`sfAccount`).
*
* The three defensive checks are marked `LCOV_EXCL_LINE`; they guard against
* invariant violations that cannot occur under normal operation but are retained
* as safety nets.
*
* @param view The read-only ledger view to query.
* @param offerID The hash identifier of the offer SLE to validate.
* @param domainID The permissioned domain the offer is expected to belong to.
* @param j Journal used to log an error if a hybrid offer has a missing
* or malformed `sfAdditionalBooks` field.
* @return `true` if the offer passes all structural checks and its owner is
* currently a member of @p domainID; `false` otherwise.
*
* @note The `fixCleanup3_1_3` amendment tightens hybrid-offer validation from
* a presence-only check on `sfAdditionalBooks` to a presence-plus-size-one
* check. Both code paths must be preserved for deterministic historic replay.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
offerInDomain(
ReadView const& view,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,23 @@
/** @file
* IOU trustline (RippleState) operations for the XRP Ledger.
*
* Declares every ledger operation that reads from or writes to a
* `RippleState` (trustline) SLE: credit-limit and balance queries,
* freeze checks, trustline lifecycle, IOU issuance/redemption,
* authorization and rippling enforcement, zero-balance holding
* management, and AMM-specific cleanup.
*
* This file is the IOU-specific leaf of the token helper layer.
* Asset-agnostic callers should go through the dispatchers in
* `TokenHelpers.h`, which branch on `Issue` vs `MPTIssue` and
* delegate here for the IOU path.
*
* @note The trustline orientation invariant is pervasive here:
* `sfLowLimit` always belongs to the account whose `AccountID`
* compares less; `sfHighLimit` to the other. Every function
* applies this flip internally — callers supply `(account, issuer)`
* and receive results in account-centric terms.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
@@ -10,27 +30,29 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// RippleState (Trustline) helpers
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// --- RippleState (Trustline) helpers ---
namespace xrpl {
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Credit functions (from Credit.h)
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// --- Credit queries ---
/** Calculate the maximum amount of IOUs that an account can hold
@param view the ledger to check against.
@param account the account of interest.
@param issuer the issuer of the IOU.
@param currency the IOU to check.
@return The maximum amount that can be held.
*/
/** Read the maximum IOU balance that @p account has authorised @p issuer to
* carry on their behalf.
*
* Reads `sfLowLimit` or `sfHighLimit` from the trustline depending on
* which side `account` occupies (low if `account < issuer`). The issuer
* field of the returned amount is rewritten to `account` so the result is
* safe to consume without knowing the binary-ordering of the two accounts.
* Returns a zero-valued `STAmount` (with the correct issue) if no trustline
* exists.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view to query.
* @param account The account whose credit limit is requested.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer.
* @param currency The currency of the trustline.
* @return The credit limit expressed from @p account's perspective, or zero
* if no trustline exists.
*/
/** @{ */
STAmount
creditLimit(
@@ -39,16 +61,35 @@ creditLimit(
AccountID const& issuer,
Currency const& currency);
/** Convenience wrapper returning the credit limit as `IOUAmount`.
*
* @param v Read-only ledger view to query.
* @param acc The account whose credit limit is requested.
* @param iss The IOU issuer.
* @param cur The currency of the trustline.
* @return The credit limit as `IOUAmount`, or zero if no trustline exists.
* @see creditLimit
*/
IOUAmount
creditLimit2(ReadView const& v, AccountID const& acc, AccountID const& iss, Currency const& cur);
/** @} */
/** Returns the amount of IOUs issued by issuer that are held by an account
@param view the ledger to check against.
@param account the account of interest.
@param issuer the issuer of the IOU.
@param currency the IOU to check.
*/
/** Read the IOU balance that @p account currently holds.
*
* `sfBalance` is stored in "low-account-sends-to-high-account" orientation.
* When `account` is the high side the stored value is negated before being
* returned, so callers always receive a balance expressed as "how much of
* this currency does @p account hold", regardless of which slot they occupy
* on the trustline. Returns zero (with the correct issue) if no trustline
* exists.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view to query.
* @param account The account whose balance is requested.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer.
* @param currency The currency of the trustline.
* @return The balance expressed from @p account's perspective, or zero if
* no trustline exists.
*/
/** @{ */
STAmount
creditBalance(
@@ -58,12 +99,20 @@ creditBalance(
Currency const& currency);
/** @} */
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Freeze checking (IOU-specific)
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// --- Freeze checks (IOU-specific) ---
/** Check whether @p issuer has individually frozen @p account's trustline.
*
* Inspects only the issuer's side flag (`lsfLowFreeze`/`lsfHighFreeze`) on
* the trustline. Does **not** check the issuer's global freeze flag — use
* `isFrozen` for that combined check. Always returns `false` for XRP.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param currency The IOU currency.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer.
* @return `true` if the issuer has set a line-level freeze on this account.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isIndividualFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -71,12 +120,34 @@ isIndividualFrozen(
Currency const& currency,
AccountID const& issuer);
/** Convenience overload accepting an `Issue`.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param issue The IOU issue (currency + issuer).
* @return `true` if the issuer has set a line-level freeze on this account.
* @see isIndividualFrozen(ReadView const&, AccountID const&, Currency const&,
* AccountID const&)
*/
[[nodiscard]] inline bool
isIndividualFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Issue const& issue)
{
return isIndividualFrozen(view, account, issue.currency, issue.account);
}
/** Check whether @p account is frozen for @p currency issued by @p issuer.
*
* Returns `true` if either the issuer's `AccountRoot` has `lsfGlobalFreeze`
* set, or the issuer has frozen this specific trustline (`lsfLowFreeze` /
* `lsfHighFreeze`). Always returns `false` for XRP or when
* `account == issuer`. This is the check used by payment paths.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param currency The IOU currency.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer.
* @return `true` if the account cannot move this IOU due to any freeze.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -84,20 +155,52 @@ isFrozen(
Currency const& currency,
AccountID const& issuer);
/** Convenience overload accepting an `Issue`.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param issue The IOU issue (currency + issuer).
* @return `true` if the account cannot move this IOU due to any freeze.
* @see isFrozen(ReadView const&, AccountID const&, Currency const&,
* AccountID const&)
*/
[[nodiscard]] inline bool
isFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Issue const& issue)
{
return isFrozen(view, account, issue.currency, issue.account);
}
// Overload with depth parameter for uniformity with MPTIssue version.
// The depth parameter is ignored for IOUs since they don't have vault recursion.
/** Overload accepting a depth parameter for interface uniformity with MPT.
*
* IOUs do not have vault-level recursion, so the `depth` argument is
* unconditionally ignored.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param issue The IOU issue (currency + issuer).
* @return `true` if the account cannot move this IOU due to any freeze.
*/
[[nodiscard]] inline bool
isFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Issue const& issue, int /*depth*/)
{
return isFrozen(view, account, issue);
}
/** Check whether @p account is deep-frozen for @p currency issued by
* @p issuer.
*
* Deep-freeze (`lsfHighDeepFreeze` / `lsfLowDeepFreeze`) is a stricter
* condition than ordinary freeze: it prevents both sending *and* receiving
* the currency. Always returns `false` for XRP, and always returns `false`
* when `issuer == account` (an issuer cannot deep-freeze their own balance
* with themselves).
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param currency The IOU currency.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer.
* @return `true` if the deep-freeze flag is set on either side of the line.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isDeepFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -105,6 +208,18 @@ isDeepFrozen(
Currency const& currency,
AccountID const& issuer);
/** Convenience overload accepting an `Issue`, with an optional depth parameter
* for interface uniformity with the MPT equivalent.
*
* The `depth` argument is unconditionally ignored for IOUs.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param issue The IOU issue (currency + issuer).
* @return `true` if the deep-freeze flag is set on either side of the line.
* @see isDeepFrozen(ReadView const&, AccountID const&, Currency const&,
* AccountID const&)
*/
[[nodiscard]] inline bool
isDeepFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -115,22 +230,63 @@ isDeepFrozen(
return isDeepFrozen(view, account, issue.currency, issue.account);
}
/** Convert a deep-freeze check into a `TER` result.
*
* Convenience wrapper for transactor preflight code that returns
* `tecFROZEN` if the account is deep-frozen and `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param issue The IOU issue (currency + issuer).
* @return `tecFROZEN` if deep-frozen, `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] inline TER
checkDeepFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Issue const& issue)
{
return isDeepFrozen(view, account, issue) ? (TER)tecFROZEN : (TER)tesSUCCESS;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Trust line operations
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// --- Trust line lifecycle ---
/** Create a trust line
This can set an initial balance.
*/
/** Create a new `RippleState` (trustline) SLE and insert it into both owner
* directories.
*
* This is the lowest-level entry point for trustline creation. It is called
* directly by `TrustSet` transactors and indirectly by `issueIOU` when the
* destination has no existing line.
*
* The function writes all trustline fields — limits, quality in/out, balance,
* and flag bits — using side-aware field selectors (`sfLowLimit`/`sfHighLimit`
* etc.) derived from `bSrcHigh`. The peer account's `lsfNoRipple` flag is
* initialised from the peer's `lsfDefaultRipple` setting (absent means
* noRipple is on by default).
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param bSrcHigh `true` if `uSrcAccountID` occupies the "high" slot
* (i.e., `uSrcAccountID > uDstAccountID`).
* @param uSrcAccountID The account whose limit and flags are being
* configured.
* @param uDstAccountID The peer account on the other side of the line.
* @param uIndex Pre-calculated keylet key for the new SLE.
* @param sleAccount The `AccountRoot` SLE for the account being set
* (used to adjust owner count); must not be null.
* @param bAuth If `true`, set the authorization flag on the source
* side of the line.
* @param bNoRipple If `true`, set `lsfNoRipple` on the source side.
* @param bFreeze If `true`, set the freeze flag on the source side.
* @param bDeepFreeze If `true`, set the deep-freeze flag on the source
* side.
* @param saBalance Initial balance from the source account's
* perspective; the issuer field must be `noAccount()`.
* @param saLimit Credit limit for the source account; the issuer
* field must be `uSrcAccountID`.
* @param uQualityIn Quality-in override (0 = default/no override).
* @param uQualityOut Quality-out override (0 = default/no override).
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, `tecDIR_FULL` if either owner directory
* is at capacity, `tecNO_TARGET` if the peer account does not exist,
* or `tefINTERNAL` if `sleAccount` is null or has a mismatched ID.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
trustCreate(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -151,6 +307,21 @@ trustCreate(
std::uint32_t uQualityOut,
beast::Journal j);
/** Delete a `RippleState` (trustline) SLE and remove its directory backlinks.
*
* Removes the SLE from both the low and high owner directories using the
* `sfLowNode`/`sfHighNode` deletion hints stored inside the SLE itself,
* then erases the SLE from the view.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param sleRippleState The trustline SLE to delete; must be obtained
* from `view.peek()`.
* @param uLowAccountID The account occupying the low slot.
* @param uHighAccountID The account occupying the high slot.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, `tefBAD_LEDGER` if either directory
* removal fails (indicating ledger corruption).
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
trustDelete(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -159,12 +330,30 @@ trustDelete(
AccountID const& uHighAccountID,
beast::Journal j);
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// IOU issuance/redemption
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// --- IOU issuance/redemption ---
/** Issue IOUs from @p issue.account to @p account, adjusting the trustline
* balance.
*
* Debits the issuer's side of the trustline and credits the receiver. After
* adjusting the balance, calls the internal `updateTrustLine` helper: if the
* sender's balance crosses zero and seven specific cleanup conditions are met
* (zero limit, no freeze, etc.), the sender's reserve is released and the
* line may be deleted via `trustDelete`.
*
* If no trustline exists for the receiver, one is created via `trustCreate`,
* inheriting the receiver's `lsfDefaultRipple` setting for the initial
* `lsfNoRipple` state. Always invokes `view.creditHookIOU()` after mutating
* the balance.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param account The account receiving the IOUs (must not be the issuer).
* @param amount The amount to issue; its `Issue` must match @p issue.
* @param issue Identifies the currency and issuer.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or a `tef`/`tec` code propagated from
* `trustCreate` or `trustDelete` if an error occurs.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
issueIOU(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -173,6 +362,26 @@ issueIOU(
Issue const& issue,
beast::Journal j);
/** Redeem IOUs held by @p account back toward the issuer, adjusting the
* trustline balance.
*
* The mirror image of `issueIOU`: credits the issuer and debits the holder.
* After adjusting the balance, calls `updateTrustLine` for the same
* automatic cleanup logic. Always invokes `view.creditHookIOU()` after
* mutating the balance.
*
* Unlike `issueIOU`, a missing trustline is treated as a fatal internal
* error (`tefINTERNAL`) because it is impossible to redeem a balance on a
* line that does not exist.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param account The account redeeming IOUs (must not be the issuer).
* @param amount The amount to redeem; its `Issue` must match @p issue.
* @param issue Identifies the currency and issuer.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, `tefINTERNAL` if no trustline exists,
* or a `tef`/`tec` code from `trustDelete` if cleanup triggers an error.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
redeemIOU(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -181,28 +390,30 @@ redeemIOU(
Issue const& issue,
beast::Journal j);
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Authorization and transfer checks (IOU-specific)
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// --- Authorization and transfer checks (IOU-specific) ---
/** Check if the account lacks required authorization.
/** Check whether @p account is authorized to hold the IOU described by
* @p issue.
*
* Return tecNO_AUTH or tecNO_LINE if it does
* and tesSUCCESS otherwise.
* Behaviour depends on @p authType:
* - **`StrongAuth`**: Returns `tecNO_LINE` immediately if no trustline
* exists. If the issuer has `lsfRequireAuth` and the line exists but is
* not authorized, returns `tecNO_AUTH`.
* - **`WeakAuth`** / **`Legacy`** (equivalent for IOUs): Returns
* `tecNO_AUTH` if `lsfRequireAuth` is set, the line exists, but is not
* authorized. Returns `tecNO_LINE` if auth is required and no line
* exists. If `lsfRequireAuth` is not set, returns `tesSUCCESS` even when
* no line exists — appropriate for payment path-finding where a line may
* be created on the fly.
*
* If StrongAuth then return tecNO_LINE if the RippleState doesn't exist. Return
* tecNO_AUTH if lsfRequireAuth is set on the issuer's AccountRoot, and the
* RippleState does exist, and the RippleState is not authorized.
* Always returns `tesSUCCESS` for XRP or when `account == issue.account`.
*
* If WeakAuth then return tecNO_AUTH if lsfRequireAuth is set, and the
* RippleState exists, and is not authorized. Return tecNO_LINE if
* lsfRequireAuth is set and the RippleState doesn't exist. Consequently, if
* WeakAuth and lsfRequireAuth is *not* set, this function will return
* tesSUCCESS even if RippleState does *not* exist.
*
* The default "Legacy" auth type is equivalent to WeakAuth.
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param issue The IOU to check authorization for.
* @param account The account to check.
* @param authType Authorization strictness; defaults to `AuthType::Legacy`
* (equivalent to `WeakAuth` for IOUs).
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecNO_AUTH`, or `tecNO_LINE`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
requireAuth(
@@ -211,21 +422,53 @@ requireAuth(
AccountID const& account,
AuthType authType = AuthType::Legacy);
/** Check if the destination account is allowed
* to receive IOU. Return terNO_RIPPLE if rippling is
* disabled on both sides and tesSUCCESS otherwise.
/** Check whether an IOU can be transferred between @p from and @p to via the
* issuer's trustlines.
*
* Returns `tesSUCCESS` unconditionally when either endpoint is the issuer,
* or when the IOU is native (XRP). For third-party transfers, returns
* `terNO_RIPPLE` only when both the `from` and the `to` trustlines have
* `lsfNoRipple` set on the issuer's side, blocking rippling through. If a
* trustline does not exist for a given account, the issuer's
* `lsfDefaultRipple` flag is consulted as a fallback preference.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param issue The IOU (identifies the issuer and currency).
* @param from The sending account.
* @param to The receiving account.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if the transfer is permitted, `terNO_RIPPLE` if
* rippling is disabled on both sides.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canTransfer(ReadView const& view, Issue const& issue, AccountID const& from, AccountID const& to);
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Empty holding operations (IOU-specific)
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// --- Empty holding operations (IOU-specific) ---
/// Any transactors that call addEmptyHolding() in doApply must call
/// canAddHolding() in preflight with the same View and Asset
/** Create a zero-balance trustline for @p accountID, reserving the destination
* slot before any funds arrive.
*
* Used by transactors (e.g., DEX limit orders) that need to guarantee a
* destination line exists before settlement. Checks that @p accountID can
* cover the increased owner-count reserve before calling `trustCreate`.
*
* Returns `tesSUCCESS` immediately for XRP or when `accountID` is the
* issuer. Returns `tecDUPLICATE` if the trustline already exists.
*
* @note Any transactor that calls this function in `doApply` **must** call
* `canAddHolding()` (declared in `TokenHelpers.h`) in `preflight` with
* the same view and asset to validate the reserve precondition.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param accountID The account that will hold the IOU.
* @param priorBalance The account's XRP balance before the current
* transaction, used to test reserve sufficiency.
* @param issue The IOU to create a holding for.
* @param journal Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success; `tecFROZEN` if the issuer is globally
* frozen; `tecNO_LINE_INSUF_RESERVE` if the account cannot afford the
* reserve; `tecDUPLICATE` if the line already exists; or a `tec`/`tef`
* code from `trustCreate`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
addEmptyHolding(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -234,6 +477,20 @@ addEmptyHolding(
Issue const& issue,
beast::Journal journal);
/** Delete a zero-balance trustline previously created by `addEmptyHolding`.
*
* Validates that the balance is actually zero before deletion. Adjusts
* owner counts for both the low and high sides if their reserve flags are
* set, then calls `trustDelete`.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param accountID The account whose holding line should be removed.
* @param issue The IOU identifying the trustline to remove.
* @param journal Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success; `tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS` if the balance is
* non-zero; `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if no line exists (and the account
* is not the issuer); or a `tef`/`tec` code from `trustDelete`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
removeEmptyHolding(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -241,9 +498,27 @@ removeEmptyHolding(
Issue const& issue,
beast::Journal journal);
/** Delete trustline to AMM. The passed `sle` must be obtained from a prior
* call to view.peek(). Fail if neither side of the trustline is AMM or
* if ammAccountID is seated and is not one of the trustline's side.
/** Delete a trustline owned by an AMM pool account during AMM withdrawal.
*
* Validates that:
* - @p sleState is a non-null `ltRIPPLE_STATE` SLE.
* - Exactly one of the two trustline endpoints is an AMM account
* (identified by the presence of `sfAMMID` in the `AccountRoot`).
* - If @p ammAccountID is provided, it matches one of the endpoints.
*
* On success, calls `trustDelete` and decrements the owner count of the
* non-AMM side.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param sleState The `ltRIPPLE_STATE` SLE to delete; must be obtained
* from `view.peek()`.
* @param ammAccountID If provided, the expected AMM account ID; the
* function returns `terNO_AMM` if neither endpoint matches.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success; `tecINTERNAL` if the SLE is null, has
* the wrong type, if both sides are AMM, or if the reserve flag is
* unexpectedly absent; `terNO_AMM` if neither endpoint is an AMM or
* the optional ID does not match; or a `tef` code from `trustDelete`.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
deleteAMMTrustLine(
@@ -252,8 +527,19 @@ deleteAMMTrustLine(
std::optional<AccountID> const& ammAccountID,
beast::Journal j);
/** Delete AMMs MPToken. The passed `sle` must be obtained from a prior
* call to view.peek().
/** Delete an AMM account's `MPToken` SLE during AMM withdrawal.
*
* Removes the `MPToken` SLE from @p ammAccountID's owner directory and
* erases it from the view. The caller is responsible for any balance
* assertions before invoking this function.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param sleMPT The `MPToken` SLE to delete; must be obtained from
* `view.peek()`.
* @param ammAccountID The AMM account that owns the `MPToken`.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, `tefBAD_LEDGER` if the directory removal
* fails (indicating ledger corruption).
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
deleteAMMMPToken(

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
/** @file
* Asset-agnostic dispatcher layer for all token operations on the XRP Ledger.
*
* This header is the unified entry point for token operations that must work
* across XRPL's three asset classes: XRP, IOU (trust-line-based), and MPT
* (Multi-Party Token). It sits between transaction-processing code that wants
* to be asset-agnostic and the two type-specific leaf modules:
* `RippleStateHelpers.h` for IOU trust lines and `MPTokenHelpers.h` for
* `MPToken`/`MPTokenIssuance` objects.
*
* Callers pass an `Asset` — a `std::variant<Issue, MPTIssue>` — and the
* functions here dispatch via `std::visit` or `Asset::visit` to the correct
* lower-level function, returning consistent result types (`STAmount`, `TER`,
* `bool`) regardless of asset kind. Adding a new asset type requires only
* extending the `Asset` variant and the branches here, not modifying call
* sites.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
@@ -20,30 +37,83 @@ namespace xrpl {
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Controls the treatment of frozen account balances */
enum class FreezeHandling { IgnoreFreeze, ZeroIfFrozen };
/** Controls the treatment of unauthorized MPT balances */
enum class AuthHandling { IgnoreAuth, ZeroIfUnauthorized };
/** Controls whether to include the account's full spendable balance */
enum class SpendableHandling { SimpleBalance, FullBalance };
enum class WaiveTransferFee : bool { No = false, Yes };
/** Controls whether accountSend is allowed to overflow OutstandingAmount **/
enum class AllowMPTOverflow : bool { No = false, Yes };
/* Check if MPToken (for MPT) or trust line (for IOU) exists:
* - StrongAuth - before checking if authorization is required
* - WeakAuth
* for MPT - after checking lsfMPTRequireAuth flag
* for IOU - do not check if trust line exists
* - Legacy
* for MPT - before checking lsfMPTRequireAuth flag i.e. same as StrongAuth
* for IOU - do not check if trust line exists i.e. same as WeakAuth
/** Controls how a frozen balance is reported by balance-query functions.
*
* Use `ZeroIfFrozen` in payment paths where a frozen balance must not be
* spent. Use `IgnoreFreeze` in cleanup paths that need the real value
* regardless of freeze state.
*/
enum class AuthType { StrongAuth, WeakAuth, Legacy };
enum class FreezeHandling {
IgnoreFreeze, /**< Return the actual balance even if the holding is frozen. */
ZeroIfFrozen /**< Return zero when the holding is frozen (the spendable amount). */
};
/** Controls how an unauthorized MPT balance is reported by balance-query functions.
*
* Parallel to `FreezeHandling` but for MPT authorization. Use
* `ZeroIfUnauthorized` when computing the amount an account may legally spend.
*/
enum class AuthHandling {
IgnoreAuth, /**< Return the actual balance even if the MPToken is unauthorized. */
ZeroIfUnauthorized /**< Return zero when the MPToken is not authorized. */
};
/** Controls whether `accountHolds` reports simple or full spendable balance.
*
* - `SimpleBalance`: the amount the account can spend without going into
* debt, i.e. the raw trustline balance (negated to account-centric terms)
* for IOU, or the `sfMPTAmount` for MPT.
* - `FullBalance`: for IOU, also includes the peer's credit limit so the
* account can borrow up to that limit; for the IOU issuer, returns
* `STAmount::kMAX_VALUE`; for the MPT issuer, returns
* `MaximumAmount - OutstandingAmount`.
*/
enum class SpendableHandling {
SimpleBalance, /**< Balance the account can spend without going into debt. */
FullBalance /**< Full spendable balance including borrowable credit or issuance capacity. */
};
/** Controls whether the transfer fee is skipped during a send operation.
*
* Typed as `enum class : bool` to prevent accidental transposition with
* other boolean parameters at call sites.
*/
enum class WaiveTransferFee : bool {
No = false, /**< Apply the normal transfer fee. */
Yes /**< Skip the transfer fee entirely. */
};
/** Controls whether `accountSend` permits `OutstandingAmount` to transiently
* exceed `MaximumAmount` during MPT payment-engine routing.
*
* The payment engine issues tokens first (raising `OutstandingAmount`) and
* redeems them in the same transaction (lowering it back). `Yes` raises the
* overflow ceiling to `UINT64_MAX` for that transient window. Direct sends
* use `No` and enforce the strict `MaximumAmount` cap.
*/
enum class AllowMPTOverflow : bool {
No = false, /**< Enforce the strict MaximumAmount cap. */
Yes /**< Allow transient overflow up to UINT64_MAX during routing. */
};
/** Encodes the three-way authorization-strictness contract.
*
* Determines how `requireAuth` behaves when checking whether an account may
* hold or interact with a token:
* - `StrongAuth` checks that the holding object (trust line or `MPToken`)
* exists *before* asking whether authorization is set. Returns `tecNO_LINE`
* immediately if no holding exists.
* - `WeakAuth` skips the existence check, returning `tesSUCCESS` when
* authorization is not required even if no holding exists. Appropriate for
* payment path-finding where a line may be created on the fly.
* - `Legacy` maps to `StrongAuth` for MPT and `WeakAuth` for IOU, preserving
* historical behavior at existing call sites.
*/
enum class AuthType {
StrongAuth, /**< Existence of the holding object is verified first. */
WeakAuth, /**< Holding existence is not required when auth is not needed. */
Legacy /**< StrongAuth for MPT; WeakAuth for IOU (historical default). */
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
@@ -51,35 +121,126 @@ enum class AuthType { StrongAuth, WeakAuth, Legacy };
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Check whether the issuer of @p asset has activated a global freeze.
*
* Dispatches to the IOU or MPT leaf based on the runtime type of @p asset.
* A global freeze on the issuer's `AccountRoot` blocks all holders
* simultaneously.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param asset The asset to test.
* @return `true` if the issuer has a global freeze in effect.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isGlobalFrozen(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset);
/** Check whether @p account has an individual freeze on @p asset.
*
* Dispatches to the IOU or MPT leaf based on the runtime type of @p asset.
* For IOU, checks the issuer's per-line freeze flag. For MPT, checks the
* `lsfMPTLocked` flag on the `MPToken` SLE. Does not check global freeze.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param asset The asset to test.
* @return `true` if the issuer has set an individual freeze on this account.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isIndividualFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& asset);
/**
* isFrozen check is recursive for MPT shares in a vault, descending to
* assets in the vault, up to maxAssetCheckDepth recursion depth. This is
* purely defensive, as we currently do not allow such vaults to be created.
/** Check whether @p account is frozen for @p asset (global or individual).
*
* Returns `true` if either `isGlobalFrozen` or `isIndividualFrozen` is true
* for the given account and asset. Dispatches to the typed IOU or MPT leaf
* via `std::visit`.
*
* The `depth` parameter enables recursive vault checking: if @p asset is an
* MPT backed by a vault, the vault's underlying asset is checked up to
* `maxAssetCheckDepth` levels deep.
*
* @note Recursion is purely defensive. The ledger currently does not allow
* nested vaults to be created, so `depth > 0` should not occur in
* practice.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param asset The asset to test.
* @param depth Current recursion depth for vault checking; defaults to 0.
* @return `true` if the account cannot move this asset due to any freeze.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& asset, int depth = 0);
/** Convert a freeze check on an IOU to a `TER`.
*
* Returns `tecFROZEN` if `isFrozen` is true for the given account and issue,
* `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param issue The IOU to test.
* @return `tecFROZEN` if frozen, `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
checkFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Issue const& issue);
/** Convert a freeze check on an MPT to a `TER`.
*
* Returns `tecLOCKED` (not `tecFROZEN`) if `isFrozen` is true for the given
* account and MPT issuance, `tesSUCCESS` otherwise. The distinct error code
* reflects the separate protocol semantics of MPT locking vs IOU freezing.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to test.
* @return `tecLOCKED` if frozen/locked, `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
checkFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, MPTIssue const& mptIssue);
/** Convert a freeze check on any asset to a `TER`.
*
* Dispatches to `checkFrozen(…, Issue)` or `checkFrozen(…, MPTIssue)` based
* on the runtime type of @p asset, returning the type-appropriate error code
* (`tecFROZEN` for IOU, `tecLOCKED` for MPT).
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param asset The asset to test.
* @return `tecFROZEN` (IOU) or `tecLOCKED` (MPT) if frozen, `tesSUCCESS`
* otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
checkFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& asset);
/** Check whether any account in @p accounts is frozen for @p issue.
*
* Iterates the list and returns `true` on the first frozen account. Used to
* check both sides (taker and maker) of an offer with a single call.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param accounts The accounts to test, e.g. `{takerID, makerID}`.
* @param issue The IOU to test.
* @return `true` if any account in the list is frozen for @p issue.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isAnyFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
std::initializer_list<AccountID> const& accounts,
Issue const& issue);
/** Check whether any account in @p accounts is frozen for @p asset.
*
* Asset-dispatching overload. Delegates to the IOU or MPT leaf for each
* account in the list. The `depth` parameter passes through to `isFrozen`
* for vault-backed MPT recursion.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param accounts The accounts to test.
* @param asset The asset to test.
* @param depth Recursion depth for vault checking; defaults to 0.
* @return `true` if any account in the list is frozen for @p asset.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isAnyFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -87,6 +248,22 @@ isAnyFrozen(
Asset const& asset,
int depth = 0);
/** Check whether @p account is deep-frozen for @p mptIssue.
*
* For MPT, deep-freeze semantics are identical to regular freeze: a frozen
* MPT holder cannot send or receive. This function delegates to
* `isFrozen(view, account, mptIssue, depth)`.
*
* @note For IOU, deep-freeze is a distinct state (`lsfDeepFreeze`) where the
* holder cannot send but can still receive. See `isDeepFrozen` in
* `RippleStateHelpers.h` for IOU-specific semantics.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to test.
* @param depth Recursion depth for vault checking; defaults to 0.
* @return `true` if the account is frozen/locked for this MPT.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isDeepFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -94,17 +271,51 @@ isDeepFrozen(
MPTIssue const& mptIssue,
int depth = 0);
/**
* isFrozen check is recursive for MPT shares in a vault, descending to
* assets in the vault, up to maxAssetCheckDepth recursion depth. This is
* purely defensive, as we currently do not allow such vaults to be created.
/** Check whether @p account is deep-frozen for @p asset.
*
* Dispatches to the IOU or MPT leaf via `std::visit`. For MPT, deep-freeze
* is equivalent to regular freeze. For IOU, checks the `lsfDeepFreeze` flag,
* which prevents sending but allows receiving.
*
* The `depth` parameter enables recursive vault checking up to
* `maxAssetCheckDepth` levels.
*
* @note Recursion is purely defensive — nested vaults cannot currently be
* created on the ledger.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param asset The asset to test.
* @param depth Recursion depth for vault checking; defaults to 0.
* @return `true` if the account is deep-frozen for @p asset.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
isDeepFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& asset, int depth = 0);
/** Convert a deep-freeze check on an MPT to a `TER`.
*
* Returns `tecLOCKED` if `isDeepFrozen` is true, `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance to test.
* @return `tecLOCKED` if deep-frozen, `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
checkDeepFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, MPTIssue const& mptIssue);
/** Convert a deep-freeze check on any asset to a `TER`.
*
* Dispatches to `checkDeepFrozen(…, Issue)` (`tecFROZEN`) or
* `checkDeepFrozen(…, MPTIssue)` (`tecLOCKED`) based on the runtime type of
* @p asset.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param asset The asset to test.
* @return `tecFROZEN` (IOU) or `tecLOCKED` (MPT) if deep-frozen,
* `tesSUCCESS` otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
checkDeepFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& asset);
@@ -114,19 +325,31 @@ checkDeepFrozen(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& ass
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Returns the amount an account can spend.
//
// If shSIMPLE_BALANCE is specified, this is the amount the account can spend
// without going into debt.
//
// If shFULL_BALANCE is specified, this is the amount the account can spend
// total. Specifically:
// * The account can go into debt if using a trust line, and the other side has
// a non-zero limit.
// * If the account is the asset issuer the limit is defined by the asset /
// issuance.
//
// <-- saAmount: amount of currency held by account. May be negative.
/** Return the amount that @p account can spend of the given currency/issuer.
*
* This is the canonical implementation. All other `accountHolds` overloads
* ultimately delegate here for the IOU path.
*
* - For XRP: returns `xrpLiquid(view, account, 0, j)` (reserve-adjusted).
* - For IOU with `shFULL_BALANCE` when `account == issuer`: returns
* `STAmount::kMAX_VALUE` — the issuer has effectively unlimited issuance
* capacity.
* - For IOU otherwise: reads the trust-line balance from the ledger,
* negating it to account-centric terms. If `shFULL_BALANCE` is specified,
* also adds the peer's credit limit so the account can draw down that
* credit. Returns zero if the line is frozen (when `ZeroIfFrozen`) or does
* not exist.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account whose balance is queried.
* @param currency The IOU currency.
* @param issuer The IOU issuer.
* @param zeroIfFrozen Whether to return zero for frozen balances.
* @param j Journal for trace logging.
* @param includeFullBalance Whether to include borrowable credit or max
* issuance capacity; defaults to `SimpleBalance`.
* @return The spendable balance, which may be negative (e.g. trust-line debt).
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
accountHolds(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -137,6 +360,19 @@ accountHolds(
beast::Journal j,
SpendableHandling includeFullBalance = SpendableHandling::SimpleBalance);
/** Return the spendable balance of an IOU for @p account.
*
* Convenience adapter over the `(Currency, AccountID)` overload, extracting
* the currency and issuer from @p issue.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account whose balance is queried.
* @param issue The IOU (currency + issuer).
* @param zeroIfFrozen Whether to return zero for frozen balances.
* @param j Journal for trace logging.
* @param includeFullBalance Balance mode; defaults to `SimpleBalance`.
* @return The spendable balance from @p account's perspective.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
accountHolds(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -146,6 +382,29 @@ accountHolds(
beast::Journal j,
SpendableHandling includeFullBalance = SpendableHandling::SimpleBalance);
/** Return the spendable balance of an MPT for @p account.
*
* - For the MPT issuer with `shFULL_BALANCE`: returns
* `MaximumAmount - OutstandingAmount` (available issuance capacity) via
* `availableMPTAmount`.
* - For regular holders: reads `sfMPTAmount` from the `MPToken` SLE. Returns
* zero if: the `MPToken` SLE does not exist; the token is frozen and
* `ZeroIfFrozen` is set; or the token is unauthorized and
* `ZeroIfUnauthorized` is set (with `featureSingleAssetVault` gating the
* precise auth-check path).
* - Under `featureMPTokensV2`, the result passes through
* `view.balanceHookMPT` to allow `PaymentSandbox` deferred-credit
* interception.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account whose balance is queried.
* @param mptIssue The MPT issuance.
* @param zeroIfFrozen Whether to zero the balance when frozen/locked.
* @param zeroIfUnauthorized Whether to zero the balance when unauthorized.
* @param j Journal for trace logging.
* @param includeFullBalance Balance mode; defaults to `SimpleBalance`.
* @return The spendable MPT balance, or zero per the policy flags above.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
accountHolds(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -156,6 +415,22 @@ accountHolds(
beast::Journal j,
SpendableHandling includeFullBalance = SpendableHandling::SimpleBalance);
/** Return the spendable balance of any asset for @p account.
*
* Asset-dispatching overload. Delegates to the `Issue` overload (which
* ignores `zeroIfUnauthorized`) or the `MPTIssue` overload based on the
* runtime type of @p asset.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param account The account whose balance is queried.
* @param asset The asset to query.
* @param zeroIfFrozen Whether to zero the balance when frozen.
* @param zeroIfUnauthorized Whether to zero the balance when unauthorized
* (MPT only; ignored for IOU).
* @param j Journal for trace logging.
* @param includeFullBalance Balance mode; defaults to `SimpleBalance`.
* @return The spendable balance per the policy flags.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
accountHolds(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -166,11 +441,29 @@ accountHolds(
beast::Journal j,
SpendableHandling includeFullBalance = SpendableHandling::SimpleBalance);
// Returns the amount an account can spend of the currency type saDefault, or
// returns saDefault if this account is the issuer of the currency in
// question. Should be used in favor of accountHolds when questioning how much
// an account can spend while also allowing currency issuers to spend
// unlimited amounts of their own currency (since they can always issue more).
/** Return how much of @p saDefault's currency @p id can fund, treating the
* issuer as having unlimited supply of their own currency.
*
* For IOU: if `id == saDefault.getIssuer()`, returns `saDefault` directly —
* the issuer can always fund an offer for their own currency up to whatever
* amount they specify. Otherwise delegates to `accountHolds` with
* `SimpleBalance`.
*
* This is the correct semantic for offer matching; prefer `accountFunds` over
* `accountHolds` when asking "can this account fund this offer?".
*
* @note `saDefault` must hold an `Issue` (not MPT). Use the `AuthHandling`
* overload for asset-agnostic callers.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param id The account to query.
* @param saDefault The amount (currency + issuer) to check fundability
* for.
* @param freezeHandling Whether to zero the balance when frozen.
* @param j Journal for trace logging.
* @return `saDefault` if @p id is the issuer; otherwise the trust-line
* balance, zeroed per @p freezeHandling.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
accountFunds(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -179,7 +472,22 @@ accountFunds(
FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
beast::Journal j);
// Overload with AuthHandling to support IOU and MPT.
/** Asset-agnostic overload of `accountFunds` supporting both IOU and MPT.
*
* For IOU: delegates to the `FreezeHandling`-only overload above.
* For MPT: delegates to `accountHolds` with `shFULL_BALANCE`, which
* returns the issuer's available issuance capacity or the holder's
* `sfMPTAmount`.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param id The account to query.
* @param saDefault The amount (currency/asset + issuer) to check.
* @param freezeHandling Whether to zero the balance when frozen.
* @param authHandling Whether to zero the balance when unauthorized (MPT
* only).
* @param j Journal for trace logging.
* @return The fundable balance per the policy flags.
*/
[[nodiscard]] STAmount
accountFunds(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -189,9 +497,15 @@ accountFunds(
AuthHandling authHandling,
beast::Journal j);
/** Returns the transfer fee as Rate based on the type of token
* @param view The ledger view
* @param amount The amount to transfer
/** Return the transfer fee for the asset embedded in @p amount.
*
* Dispatches on `amount.asset()`: for IOU, reads the issuer's transfer rate
* from their `AccountRoot`; for MPT, reads the `sfTransferFee` field from
* the `MPTokenIssuance` SLE. Both paths return a `Rate` (parts-per-billion).
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param amount The amount whose asset determines which fee to look up.
* @return The transfer fee as a `Rate`, or `parityRate` if no fee is set.
*/
[[nodiscard]] Rate
transferRate(ReadView const& view, STAmount const& amount);
@@ -202,9 +516,42 @@ transferRate(ReadView const& view, STAmount const& amount);
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Check whether a new holding object (trust line or MPToken) can be created.
*
* For IOU: verifies that the issuer's `AccountRoot` has `lsfDefaultRipple`
* set; returns `terNO_RIPPLE` if not, `terNO_ACCOUNT` if the issuer does not
* exist, `tesSUCCESS` for XRP. For MPT: delegates to the MPT-specific check.
*
* @note This function is read-only (takes `ReadView`) and is intended to be
* called during `preflight`. Any transactor that calls `addEmptyHolding`
* in `doApply` must call this function in `preflight` first.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param asset The asset for which a holding would be created.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if a holding can be added; `terNO_RIPPLE`,
* `terNO_ACCOUNT`, or an MPT-specific error otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canAddHolding(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset);
/** Create an empty holding object (trust line or MPToken) for @p accountID.
*
* Dispatches to `addEmptyHolding(…, Issue)` or `addEmptyHolding(…, MPTIssue)`
* based on the runtime type of @p asset. The holding is created with zero
* balance and consumes an owner-count reserve slot.
*
* @note The caller must have invoked `canAddHolding` in `preflight` with the
* same view and asset to validate preconditions before calling this.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param accountID The account that will hold the asset.
* @param priorBalance The account's XRP balance before this transaction,
* used to test reserve sufficiency.
* @param asset The asset to create a holding for.
* @param journal Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or a `tec`/`tef` error from the
* type-specific leaf.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
addEmptyHolding(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -213,6 +560,21 @@ addEmptyHolding(
Asset const& asset,
beast::Journal journal);
/** Delete a zero-balance holding object (trust line or MPToken) for @p accountID.
*
* Dispatches to `removeEmptyHolding(…, Issue)` or
* `removeEmptyHolding(…, MPTIssue)` based on the runtime type of @p asset.
* The holding must have a zero balance; a non-zero balance returns
* `tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS`.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param accountID The account whose holding should be removed.
* @param asset The asset identifying the holding to remove.
* @param journal Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success; `tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS` if the balance is
* non-zero; `tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND` if no holding exists; or a `tec`/`tef`
* error from the type-specific leaf.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
removeEmptyHolding(
ApplyView& view,
@@ -226,6 +588,25 @@ removeEmptyHolding(
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Check whether @p account is authorized to hold or interact with @p asset.
*
* Dispatches to `requireAuth(…, Issue, …)` or `requireAuth(…, MPTIssue, …)`
* based on the runtime type of @p asset.
*
* - `StrongAuth`: verifies the holding object exists first; returns
* `tecNO_LINE` (IOU) or `tecNO_AUTH` (MPT) if absent.
* - `WeakAuth`: skips the existence check; returns success if authorization
* is not required even when no holding exists.
* - `Legacy`: maps to `StrongAuth` for MPT and `WeakAuth` for IOU to
* preserve historical behavior.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param asset The asset to check authorization for.
* @param account The account to check.
* @param authType Authorization strictness; defaults to `AuthType::Legacy`.
* @return `tesSUCCESS`, `tecNO_AUTH`, or `tecNO_LINE` depending on the asset
* type and authorization state.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
requireAuth(
ReadView const& view,
@@ -233,6 +614,20 @@ requireAuth(
AccountID const& account,
AuthType authType = AuthType::Legacy);
/** Check whether @p asset can be transferred from @p from to @p to.
*
* Dispatches to the IOU or MPT leaf. For IOU, checks rippling flags on the
* trustlines (returns `terNO_RIPPLE` if both sides block rippling). For MPT,
* checks `lsfMPTCanTransfer` on the issuance and the destination's
* authorization state.
*
* @param view Read-only ledger view.
* @param asset The asset to transfer.
* @param from The sending account.
* @param to The receiving account.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` if the transfer is permitted, or an asset-specific
* error (`terNO_RIPPLE`, `tecNO_AUTH`, etc.) otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
canTransfer(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset, AccountID const& from, AccountID const& to);
@@ -242,14 +637,29 @@ canTransfer(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset, AccountID const& from, Acc
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Direct send w/o fees:
// - Redeeming IOUs and/or sending sender's own IOUs.
// - Create trust line of needed.
// --> bCheckIssuer : normally require issuer to be involved.
// [[nodiscard]] // nodiscard commented out so DirectStep.cpp compiles.
/** Calls static directSendNoFeeIOU if saAmount represents Issue.
* Calls static directSendNoFeeMPT if saAmount represents MPTIssue.
/** Send @p saAmount directly without applying transfer fees or limit checks.
*
* Used for IOU redemption, intra-issuer transfers, and MPT moves where the
* issuer is one of the endpoints. Dispatches to `directSendNoFeeIOU` for
* IOU and `directSendNoFeeMPT` for MPT.
*
* For IOU, @p bCheckIssuer controls whether the function asserts that the
* issuer is one of the endpoints. For MPT, the issuer check is not performed
* (`bCheckIssuer` must be `false` for MPT).
*
* @note This function is intentionally **not** marked `[[nodiscard]]` for
* compatibility with `DirectStep.cpp`, which discards the return value in
* certain control paths. All other callers should inspect the result.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param uSenderID The sending account.
* @param uReceiverID The receiving account.
* @param saAmount The amount to send; its asset determines the dispatch.
* @param bCheckIssuer If `true` (IOU only), asserts that the issuer is one
* of the endpoints. Must be `false` for MPT.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or a `tec`/`tef` error from the
* type-specific leaf.
*/
TER
directSendNoFee(
@@ -260,8 +670,30 @@ directSendNoFee(
bool bCheckIssuer,
beast::Journal j);
/** Calls static accountSendIOU if saAmount represents Issue.
* Calls static accountSendMPT if saAmount represents MPTIssue.
/** Send @p saAmount from @p from to @p to, applying transfer fees when
* applicable.
*
* This is the main asset-transfer entry point for transactors. Dispatches to
* `accountSendIOU` or `accountSendMPT` based on the asset type embedded in
* @p saAmount. Transfer fees are applied unless `WaiveTransferFee::Yes` is
* passed.
*
* The `allowOverflow` flag is forwarded to the MPT path only and controls
* whether `OutstandingAmount` may transiently exceed `MaximumAmount` during
* the two-phase issue-then-redeem structure used by the payment engine. Direct
* sends should use `AllowMPTOverflow::No`.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param from The sending account.
* @param to The receiving account.
* @param saAmount The amount to send.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @param waiveFee Whether to skip the transfer fee; defaults to `No`.
* @param allowOverflow Whether MPT OutstandingAmount may transiently exceed
* MaximumAmount; defaults to `No`. Use `Yes` only in payment-engine
* routing.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or a `tec`/`tef` error from the
* type-specific leaf.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
accountSend(
@@ -273,12 +705,34 @@ accountSend(
WaiveTransferFee waiveFee = WaiveTransferFee::No,
AllowMPTOverflow allowOverflow = AllowMPTOverflow::No);
/** A vector of (receiver, amount) pairs used by `accountSendMulti`. */
using MultiplePaymentDestinations = std::vector<std::pair<AccountID, Number>>;
/** Like accountSend, except one account is sending multiple payments (with the
* same asset!) simultaneously
/** Send the same @p asset from @p senderID to multiple @p receivers in one
* atomic operation.
*
* Calls static accountSendMultiIOU if saAmount represents Issue.
* Calls static accountSendMultiMPT if saAmount represents MPTIssue.
* Dispatches to `accountSendMultiIOU` or `accountSendMultiMPT` based on
* @p asset. Batching avoids repeated round-trips through the ledger state for
* the sender's balance and the issuance's `OutstandingAmount` field.
*
* For MPT, the `fixCleanup3_1_3` amendment switches the aggregate
* `MaximumAmount` check from a per-iteration stale-snapshot check (pre-fix)
* to an exact `uint64_t` running-total check (post-fix) to prevent precision
* loss at 19-digit magnitudes near `kMAX_MP_TOKEN_AMOUNT`.
*
* @note `receivers.size()` must be greater than 1 (asserted).
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param senderID The account sending the asset.
* @param asset The asset to send (must match the type of all receiver
* amounts).
* @param receivers List of (AccountID, Number) destination pairs. All amounts
* must be non-negative. Sender-equals-receiver entries are silently
* skipped.
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @param waiveFee Whether to skip transfer fees; defaults to `No`.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success, or a `tec`/`tef` error from the
* type-specific leaf.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
accountSendMulti(
@@ -289,6 +743,23 @@ accountSendMulti(
beast::Journal j,
WaiveTransferFee waiveFee = WaiveTransferFee::No);
/** Transfer XRP directly between two accounts without reserve or fee checks.
*
* XRP has no trust lines, no transfer fees, and no authorization model, so
* it bypasses the Asset-dispatch path entirely. Both @p from and @p to must
* be non-zero and distinct. Returns `telFAILED_PROCESSING` (open ledger) or
* `tecFAILED_PROCESSING` (closed ledger) if the sender's balance is
* insufficient.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param from The sending account; must not be `beast::kZERO`.
* @param to The receiving account; must not be `beast::kZERO`.
* @param amount The XRP amount to transfer; must be native (XRP).
* @param j Journal for trace/debug logging.
* @return `tesSUCCESS` on success; `telFAILED_PROCESSING` or
* `tecFAILED_PROCESSING` if balance is insufficient; `tefINTERNAL` if
* either account SLE cannot be found.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
transferXRP(
ApplyView& view,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
/** @file
* Pure arithmetic helpers for the XLS-65d Single-Sided Vault feature.
*
* Each function converts between the two token types a vault manages:
* the underlying *asset* (XRP, IOU, or MPT that depositors contribute) and
* vault *shares* (an MPT representing proportional ownership). Because MPT
* values are always integers every function makes an explicit rounding
* decision — and those decisions differ between the deposit and withdrawal
* paths to protect vault solvency.
*
* These functions are stateless and side-effect-free; all ledger mutations
* are the caller's responsibility.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
@@ -8,53 +21,105 @@
namespace xrpl {
/** From the perspective of a vault, return the number of shares to give
depositor when they offer a fixed amount of assets. Note, since shares are
MPT, this number is integral and always truncated in this calculation.
@param vault The vault SLE.
@param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's shares.
@param assets The amount of assets to convert.
@return The number of shares, or nullopt on error.
*/
/** Compute the shares minted when a depositor offers a fixed asset amount.
*
* Uses `sfAssetsTotal` from `vault` directly, *without* subtracting
* `sfLossUnrealized`. Unrealized losses are a risk borne by existing
* shareholders, not a discount for new depositors.
*
* **Bootstrap case**: when `sfAssetsTotal == 0` the result is
* `assets × 10^sfScale` (truncated), establishing the initial exchange rate.
* The non-bootstrap result is `(sfOutstandingAmount × assets) / sfAssetsTotal`,
* always truncated — depositors always receive a whole number of shares, never
* more than the assets strictly warrant.
*
* @note The deposit transactor calls this first, then back-calculates the
* true asset cost via `sharesToAssetsDeposit()` to ensure it never
* extracts more than the depositor offered.
* @throws std::overflow_error if `sfScale` is large enough to overflow
* XRPL's `Number` type; callers should catch and return `tecPATH_DRY`.
*
* @param vault The vault SLE; must contain `sfAsset`, `sfAssetsTotal`,
* `sfScale`, and `sfShareMPTID`.
* @param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's share token;
* must contain `sfOutstandingAmount`.
* @param assets The asset amount to convert; must be non-negative and
* must match `vault->at(sfAsset)`.
* @return The integral share amount, or `nullopt` if `assets` is negative
* or its asset type does not match the vault.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<STAmount>
assetsToSharesDeposit(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& vault,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuance,
STAmount const& assets);
/** From the perspective of a vault, return the number of assets to take from
depositor when they receive a fixed amount of shares. Note, since shares are
MPT, they are always an integral number.
@param vault The vault SLE.
@param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's shares.
@param shares The amount of shares to convert.
@return The number of assets, or nullopt on error.
*/
/** Compute the asset cost for a depositor who will receive a fixed share amount.
*
* This is the inverse of `assetsToSharesDeposit()` and is used in the second
* step of the deposit calculation: after truncating the forward direction to
* determine how many whole shares are created, the transactor calls this
* function to derive the exact asset amount to collect.
*
* Uses `sfAssetsTotal` directly, without subtracting `sfLossUnrealized`,
* matching the deposit-path convention.
*
* **Bootstrap case**: when `sfAssetsTotal == 0` the result uses `sfScale` to
* reverse the bootstrap formula applied by `assetsToSharesDeposit()`.
*
* @throws std::overflow_error if `sfScale` is large enough to overflow
* XRPL's `Number` type; callers should catch and return `tecPATH_DRY`.
*
* @param vault The vault SLE.
* @param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's share token.
* @param shares The share amount to convert; must be non-negative and must
* match `vault->at(sfShareMPTID)`.
* @return The asset amount, or `nullopt` if `shares` is negative or its
* asset type does not match the vault's share MPT.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<STAmount>
sharesToAssetsDeposit(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& vault,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuance,
STAmount const& shares);
/** Controls whether to truncate shares instead of rounding. */
/** Controls whether to truncate (floor) the share result instead of rounding.
*
* `No` (the default) rounds to nearest, ensuring the vault is never
* shortchanged when computing shares to redeem for a fixed asset withdrawal.
* `Yes` applies floor truncation, used when the caller explicitly needs
* conservative (depositor-favoring) rounding.
*/
enum class TruncateShares : bool { No = false, Yes = true };
/** From the perspective of a vault, return the number of shares to demand from
the depositor when they ask to withdraw a fixed amount of assets. Since
shares are MPT this number is integral, and it will be rounded to nearest
unless explicitly requested to be truncated instead.
@param vault The vault SLE.
@param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's shares.
@param assets The amount of assets to convert.
@param truncate Whether to truncate instead of rounding.
@return The number of shares, or nullopt on error.
*/
/** Compute the shares a withdrawer must redeem to receive a fixed asset amount.
*
* Unlike the deposit path, this function subtracts `sfLossUnrealized` from
* `sfAssetsTotal` before computing the exchange rate. Withdrawers receive fewer
* assets per share when the vault has recorded unrealized losses, preventing
* early withdrawers from exiting at inflated prices at the expense of remaining
* holders.
*
* The result is rounded to nearest by default (`TruncateShares::No`), ensuring
* the vault is not shortchanged. The withdraw transactor then back-calculates
* the actual assets delivered via `sharesToAssetsWithdraw()` for a precise
* two-step computation.
*
* If `sfAssetsTotal - sfLossUnrealized == 0` (fully insolvent vault), returns
* a zero-valued `STAmount` rather than dividing by zero.
*
* @throws std::overflow_error if arithmetic overflows XRPL's `Number` type;
* callers should catch and return `tecPATH_DRY`.
*
* @param vault The vault SLE; must contain `sfAsset`, `sfAssetsTotal`,
* `sfLossUnrealized`, and `sfShareMPTID`.
* @param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's share token.
* @param assets The asset amount to convert; must be non-negative and must
* match `vault->at(sfAsset)`.
* @param truncate Whether to truncate instead of rounding to nearest.
* @return The integral share amount, or `nullopt` if `assets` is negative or
* its asset type does not match the vault.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<STAmount>
assetsToSharesWithdraw(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& vault,
@@ -62,16 +127,25 @@ assetsToSharesWithdraw(
STAmount const& assets,
TruncateShares truncate = TruncateShares::No);
/** From the perspective of a vault, return the number of assets to give the
depositor when they redeem a fixed amount of shares. Note, since shares are
MPT, they are always an integral number.
@param vault The vault SLE.
@param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's shares.
@param shares The amount of shares to convert.
@return The number of assets, or nullopt on error.
*/
/** Compute the assets delivered when a withdrawer redeems a fixed share amount.
*
* Like `assetsToSharesWithdraw()`, this function subtracts `sfLossUnrealized`
* from `sfAssetsTotal` before computing the exchange rate, so withdrawers
* bear their proportional share of any recorded losses.
*
* If `sfAssetsTotal - sfLossUnrealized == 0` (fully insolvent vault), returns
* a zero-valued `STAmount` rather than dividing by zero.
*
* @throws std::overflow_error if arithmetic overflows XRPL's `Number` type;
* callers should catch and return `tecPATH_DRY`.
*
* @param vault The vault SLE.
* @param issuance The MPTokenIssuance SLE for the vault's share token.
* @param shares The share amount to convert; must be non-negative and must
* match `vault->at(sfShareMPTID)`.
* @return The asset amount, or `nullopt` if `shares` is negative or its
* asset type does not match the vault's share MPT.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<STAmount>
sharesToAssetsWithdraw(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& vault,

View File

@@ -6,33 +6,50 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** A backend used for the NodeStore.
The NodeStore uses a swappable backend so that other database systems
can be tried. Different databases may offer various features such
as improved performance, fault tolerant or distributed storage, or
all in-memory operation.
A given instance of a backend is fixed to a particular key size.
*/
/** Pure abstract storage interface for the NodeStore persistence layer.
*
* Every ledger object (account states, transactions, ledger headers) is a
* `NodeObject` keyed by its 256-bit hash. `Backend` defines the narrow
* interface that lets the `Database` layer remain independent of the
* underlying engine — NuDB, RocksDB, or an in-memory store for tests all
* satisfy this contract identically.
*
* A backend instance is fixed to a particular key size (always 32 bytes in
* practice, matching `NodeObject::keyBytes`) at construction.
*
* **Concurrency contract**: `fetch()` and `store()` will be called
* concurrently by multiple threads; implementations must be internally
* thread-safe for these two operations. `storeBatch()` and `forEach()` are
* never called concurrently with each other or with other writes.
*
* **Lifecycle**: Construction is separated from initialization via `open()`.
* Backends are never constructed directly — use `Factory::createInstance()`
* dispatched through `Manager`.
*
* @see Factory, Manager, Database
*/
class Backend
{
public:
/** Destroy the backend.
All open files are closed and flushed. If there are batched writes
or other tasks scheduled, they will be completed before this call
returns.
*/
*
* All open files are closed and flushed. Any batched writes or scheduled
* tasks complete before this returns, so dropping a `unique_ptr<Backend>`
* cannot silently discard data.
*/
virtual ~Backend() = default;
/** Get the human-readable name of this backend.
This is used for diagnostic output.
*/
/** Return the human-readable name of this backend, used in diagnostics. */
virtual std::string
getName() = 0;
/** Get the block size for backends that support it
/** Return the storage block size, if the backend has a meaningful one.
*
* NuDB organizes data into fixed-size blocks; callers that care about
* I/O alignment or prefetch granularity can query this without
* downcasting. Backends with no block concept return `std::nullopt`.
*
* @return Block size in bytes, or `std::nullopt` if not applicable.
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::optional<std::size_t>
getBlockSize() const
@@ -40,25 +57,37 @@ public:
return std::nullopt;
}
/** Open the backend.
@param createIfMissing Create the database files if necessary.
This allows the caller to catch exceptions.
*/
/** Open the backend, optionally creating the database if absent.
*
* Separating `open()` from the constructor allows I/O errors to be
* caught without wrapping constructors in try/catch.
*
* @param createIfMissing If `true`, create the database files when they
* do not exist. Pass `false` to fail fast on a missing database.
* @throws implementation-defined exception on I/O or database errors.
*/
virtual void
open(bool createIfMissing = true) = 0;
/** Returns true is the database is open.
*/
/** Return `true` if the backend is currently open. */
virtual bool
isOpen() = 0;
/** Open the backend.
@param createIfMissing Create the database files if necessary.
@param appType Deterministic appType used to create a backend.
@param uid Deterministic uid used to create a backend.
@param salt Deterministic salt used to create a backend.
@throws std::runtime_error is function is called not for NuDB backend.
*/
/** Open the backend with deterministic NuDB header parameters.
*
* This overload exists exclusively to support NuDB's header-level
* application identification (appnum, uid, salt). It enables shard
* databases to be created with reproducible identifiers.
*
* @param createIfMissing Create the database files if they do not exist.
* @param appType Application-defined type tag embedded in the NuDB header.
* @param uid Deterministic unique identifier for this database instance.
* @param salt Deterministic salt value used during NuDB database creation.
* @throws std::runtime_error for every backend except NuDB, as this
* capability is not part of the general interface.
* @note Non-NuDB backends inherit a default implementation that always
* throws, clearly advertising that the capability is unavailable.
*/
virtual void
open(bool createIfMissing, uint64_t appType, uint64_t uid, uint64_t salt)
{
@@ -66,75 +95,137 @@ public:
"Deterministic appType/uid/salt not supported by backend " + getName());
}
/** Close the backend.
This allows the caller to catch exceptions.
*/
/** Close the backend, flushing any pending writes.
*
* Separating `close()` from the destructor allows the caller to catch
* and handle I/O exceptions explicitly.
*/
virtual void
close() = 0;
/** Fetch a single object.
If the object is not found or an error is encountered, the
result will indicate the condition.
@note This will be called concurrently.
@param hash The hash of the object.
@param pObject [out] The created object if successful.
@return The result of the operation.
*/
/** Fetch a single object by its 256-bit hash.
*
* On success, `*pObject` is set to the retrieved `NodeObject`. On any
* non-`Ok` outcome, `*pObject` is left unchanged (or reset).
*
* @note Called concurrently by multiple threads; implementations must
* be thread-safe for this operation.
* @param hash The 256-bit hash key identifying the object.
* @param pObject Output parameter; receives the fetched object on success.
* @return `Status::Ok` on success, `Status::NotFound` if the key is
* absent, `Status::DataCorrupt` if the stored blob fails validation,
* or another `Status` value on backend or unknown errors.
*/
virtual Status
fetch(uint256 const& hash, std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>* pObject) = 0;
/** Fetch a batch synchronously. */
/** Fetch a batch of objects by their 256-bit hashes.
*
* Amortizes round-trip or I/O overhead when prefetching sets of related
* objects. The returned vector is parallel to `hashes`: a null
* `shared_ptr` at position `i` indicates the object at `hashes[i]` was
* not found or could not be retrieved.
*
* @param hashes Ordered list of 256-bit hash keys to fetch.
* @return A pair of (results vector, aggregate Status). Each element in
* the results vector is the fetched object, or an empty
* `shared_ptr` if the corresponding hash was not found.
*/
virtual std::pair<std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>, Status>
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes) = 0;
/** Store a single object.
Depending on the implementation this may happen immediately
or deferred using a scheduled task.
@note This will be called concurrently.
@param object The object to store.
*/
*
* Depending on the implementation, the write may be synchronous or
* deferred to a scheduled task (e.g., via `BatchWriter`). Either way,
* the object is guaranteed to be durable before the backend is destroyed.
*
* @note Called concurrently by multiple threads; implementations must
* be thread-safe for this operation.
* @param object The `NodeObject` to persist.
*/
virtual void
store(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> const& object) = 0;
/** Store a group of objects.
@note This function will not be called concurrently with
itself or @ref store.
*/
/** Store a group of objects as a batch.
*
* More efficient than repeated `store()` calls for backends that
* support atomic or coalesced multi-key writes (e.g., RocksDB
* `WriteBatch`). The entire batch is treated as a single unit.
*
* @note Never called concurrently with itself or with `store()`.
* @param batch The collection of `NodeObject`s to persist.
*/
virtual void
storeBatch(Batch const& batch) = 0;
/** Flush all previously submitted stores to durable storage.
*
* Provides an explicit durability barrier: after `sync()` returns,
* all objects passed to `store()` or `storeBatch()` before the call
* are guaranteed to be on disk. Backends backed by a write-ahead log
* (e.g., RocksDB) may implement this as a no-op.
*/
virtual void
sync() = 0;
/** Visit every object in the database
This is usually called during import.
@note This routine will not be called concurrently with itself
or other methods.
@see import
*/
/** Invoke a callback for every object stored in the backend.
*
* Typically used during database import or migration. Because it closes
* and reopens the underlying database (NuDB), it must not be called
* while concurrent reads or writes are in flight.
*
* @note Never called concurrently with itself or with any other method.
* @param f Callback invoked once per stored object; receives a
* `shared_ptr<NodeObject>` for each entry in the database.
* @see importInternal
*/
virtual void
forEach(std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>)> f) = 0;
/** Estimate the number of write operations pending. */
/** Return an estimate of the number of pending write operations.
*
* Used by the `Database` layer for back-pressure and diagnostic
* reporting. The value is advisory; implementations may return 0 if
* writes are always synchronous (e.g., NuDB).
*
* @return Approximate count of writes not yet flushed to storage.
*/
virtual int
getWriteLoad() = 0;
/** Remove contents on disk upon destruction. */
/** Schedule the backend's on-disk files for deletion on destruction.
*
* After this call, the next `close()` (including the one in the
* destructor) removes all database files from the filesystem. Used by
* temporary databases — unit tests and ephemeral shard stores — that
* require automatic cleanup without external management.
*/
virtual void
setDeletePath() = 0;
/** Perform consistency checks on database.
/** Perform an offline consistency check of the stored data.
*
* This method is implemented only by NuDBBackend. It is not yet called
* anywhere, but it might be a good idea to one day call it at startup to
* avert a crash.
* Closes and reopens the database around the check, so it must not be
* called while I/O is in progress. Currently implemented only by
* `NuDBBackend`; all other backends inherit a no-op.
*
* @note Not yet called at startup, but could one day be invoked at
* launch to detect on-disk corruption before it causes a crash.
*/
virtual void
verify()
{
}
/** Returns the number of file descriptors the backend expects to need. */
/** Return the number of file descriptors this backend expects to consume.
*
* The `Database` base class aggregates these values across all open
* backends and exposes the total so the process can pre-check against
* the OS file descriptor limit before opening any databases.
*
* @return Expected file descriptor count (e.g., 3 for NuDB, 0 for Null).
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual int
fdRequired() const = 0;
};

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
/** @file
* Abstract base class for the NodeStore persistence layer.
*
* Defines the full public contract for node object storage: async and
* synchronous fetch, store, import, and diagnostics. Concrete subclasses
* (`DatabaseNodeImp`, `DatabaseRotatingImp`) implement the private virtual
* `fetchNodeObject()` and `forEach()` hooks; all instrumentation (timing,
* counters, scheduler callbacks) is applied in this base class and cannot
* be bypassed.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/BasicConfig.h>
@@ -12,100 +23,159 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Persistency layer for NodeObject
A Node is a ledger object which is uniquely identified by a key, which is
the 256-bit hash of the body of the node. The payload is a variable length
block of serialized data.
All ledger data is stored as node objects and as such, needs to be persisted
between launches. Furthermore, since the set of node objects will in
general be larger than the amount of available memory, purged node objects
which are later accessed must be retrieved from the node store.
@see NodeObject
*/
/** Persistence layer for NodeObject records.
*
* Every ledger datum — account states, transactions, ledger headers — is
* stored as a `NodeObject` keyed by the 256-bit hash of its payload. Because
* the total object set typically exceeds available memory, any hash absent
* from the in-memory cache must be fetched from disk through this class.
*
* `Database` owns the async read thread pool and all performance counters.
* The public non-virtual `fetchNodeObject()` wraps the private pure-virtual
* one, applying timing, hit/miss accounting, and `Scheduler::onFetch()`
* callbacks — so no subclass can escape the instrumentation.
*
* **Shutdown ordering**: Derived classes **must** call `stop()` in their own
* destructors before the base destructor runs. Worker threads invoke the
* virtual `fetchNodeObject()` through a subclass vtable; if the derived
* object is destroyed before all threads have exited, a waking thread will
* call through a dangling vtable entry (undefined behaviour). The base
* destructor calls `stop()` only as a last-resort safety net.
*
* @see NodeObject, Backend, Scheduler, DatabaseNodeImp, DatabaseRotatingImp
*/
class Database
{
public:
Database() = delete;
/** Construct the node store.
@param scheduler The scheduler to use for performing asynchronous tasks.
@param readThreads The number of asynchronous read threads to create.
@param config The configuration settings
@param journal Destination for logging output.
*/
/** Construct the node store and start the async read thread pool.
*
* Validates configuration parameters, then spawns `readThreads` detached
* worker threads. Threads are controlled by `readStopping_`; `stop()`
* spin-waits (≤ 30 s) until `readThreads_` reaches zero.
*
* @param scheduler Task scheduler for async I/O dispatch and telemetry
* callbacks; must outlive this object.
* @param readThreads Number of prefetch worker threads to create; clamped
* to at least 1.
* @param config `[node_db]` config section; reads `earliest_seq` (default
* `kXRP_LEDGER_EARLIEST_SEQ`, must be ≥ 1) and `rq_bundle` (default 4,
* clamped [1, 64]).
* @param j Logging sink.
* @throws std::runtime_error if `earliest_seq` < 1 or `rq_bundle` is
* outside [1, 64].
*/
Database(Scheduler& scheduler, int readThreads, Section const& config, beast::Journal j);
/** Destroy the node store.
All pending operations are completed, pending writes flushed,
and files closed before this returns.
*/
*
* Calls `stop()` as a safety net to drain the read queue and wait for all
* worker threads to exit. Derived classes **must** call `stop()` in their
* own destructors first — worker threads invoke the pure-virtual
* `fetchNodeObject()` through the subclass vtable, which is already gone
* by the time this base destructor runs.
*/
virtual ~Database();
/** Retrieve the name associated with this backend.
This is used for diagnostics and may not reflect the actual path
or paths used by the underlying backend.
*/
/** Return the name of the underlying backend for diagnostics.
*
* The returned string may not reflect the actual on-disk path when
* multiple backends are in use (e.g. `DatabaseRotatingImp`).
*
* @return A human-readable backend identifier.
*/
virtual std::string
getName() const = 0;
/** Import objects from another database. */
/** Bulk-import all objects from another database into this one.
*
* Iterates every `NodeObject` in @p source and writes it to this
* database's backend. Implementations typically delegate to
* `importInternal()`. Large databases may take significant time.
*
* @param source The source database to read from; must remain valid
* and quiescent (no concurrent writes) for the duration of the call.
*/
virtual void
importDatabase(Database& source) = 0;
/** Retrieve the estimated number of pending write operations.
This is used for diagnostics.
*/
/** Return the estimated number of pending write operations.
*
* Used for backpressure diagnostics; the value is approximate and may
* change immediately after it is read.
*
* @return Pending write count, or 0 if the backend does not batch writes.
*/
virtual std::int32_t
getWriteLoad() const = 0;
/** Store the object.
The caller's Blob parameter is overwritten.
@param type The type of object.
@param data The payload of the object. The caller's
variable is overwritten.
@param hash The 256-bit hash of the payload data.
@param ledgerSeq The sequence of the ledger the object belongs to.
@return `true` if the object was stored?
*/
/** Persist a node object to the backend.
*
* Takes ownership of @p data (the caller's `Blob` is consumed). The object
* is keyed by @p hash; backends are content-addressed, so storing an object
* whose hash already exists is a no-op (same key → same data).
*
* @param type The semantic type of the object (ledger, account node, etc.).
* @param data Serialized payload; moved into the backend — caller's variable
* is left in a valid but unspecified state.
* @param hash 256-bit hash of @p data. The caller is responsible for
* correctness; the hash is not re-verified by the store.
* @param ledgerSeq The ledger sequence this object belongs to; used by
* rotating backends to route writes to the correct physical file.
*/
virtual void
store(NodeObjectType type, Blob&& data, uint256 const& hash, std::uint32_t ledgerSeq) = 0;
/* Check if two ledgers are in the same database
If these two sequence numbers map to the same database,
the result of a fetch with either sequence number would
be identical.
@param s1 The first sequence number
@param s2 The second sequence number
@return 'true' if both ledgers would be in the same DB
*/
/** Return whether two ledger sequence numbers resolve to the same backend.
*
* When this returns `true`, a fetch with either sequence number will
* reach the same physical storage and yield identical results. The async
* thread pool uses this to avoid redundant backend reads when multiple
* callbacks for the same hash were registered with different sequence
* numbers.
*
* `DatabaseNodeImp` always returns `true` (single backend).
* `DatabaseRotatingImp` returns `false` when the sequences straddle a
* rotation boundary.
*
* @param s1 First ledger sequence number.
* @param s2 Second ledger sequence number.
* @return `true` if both sequences map to the same physical backend.
*/
virtual bool
isSameDB(std::uint32_t s1, std::uint32_t s2) = 0;
/** Flush any buffered writes to durable storage.
*
* Called by maintenance paths (e.g. ledger close) to ensure consistency.
* Not latency-sensitive; implementations may hold locks for the full call.
*/
virtual void
sync() = 0;
/** Fetch a node object.
If the object is known to be not in the database, isn't found in the
database during the fetch, or failed to load correctly during the fetch,
`nullptr` is returned.
@note This can be called concurrently.
@param hash The key of the object to retrieve.
@param ledgerSeq The sequence of the ledger where the object is stored.
@param fetchType the type of fetch, synchronous or asynchronous.
@return The object, or nullptr if it couldn't be retrieved.
*/
/** Fetch a node object by hash, recording timing and hit/miss metrics.
*
* This is the public entry point for all node lookups. It wraps the
* private pure-virtual `fetchNodeObject(hash, seq, FetchReport&, duplicate)`
* using the Template Method pattern: timing, atomic counters, and
* `Scheduler::onFetch()` are applied here and cannot be bypassed by
* subclasses.
*
* Returns `nullptr` if the object is absent, could not be decoded, or the
* backend encountered an error.
*
* @note Thread-safe; may be called concurrently from any thread.
* @param hash 256-bit content hash of the desired object.
* @param ledgerSeq Ledger sequence that owns this object; used by rotating
* backends to select the correct physical file. Defaults to 0.
* @param fetchType `FetchType::Synchronous` (default) or
* `FetchType::Async` when called from the async worker pool.
* @param duplicate When `true`, the object is also written into the
* writable backend after being found in the archive backend
* (`DatabaseRotatingImp` promotion path). Defaults to `false`.
* @return The requested `NodeObject`, or `nullptr` on miss or error.
*/
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>
fetchNodeObject(
uint256 const& hash,
@@ -113,75 +183,124 @@ public:
FetchType fetchType = FetchType::Synchronous,
bool duplicate = false);
/** Fetch an object without waiting.
If I/O is required to determine whether or not the object is present,
`false` is returned. Otherwise, `true` is returned and `object` is set
to refer to the object, or `nullptr` if the object is not present.
If I/O is required, the I/O is scheduled and `true` is returned
@note This can be called concurrently.
@param hash The key of the object to retrieve
@param ledgerSeq The sequence of the ledger where the
object is stored.
@param callback Callback function when read completes
*/
/** Schedule a non-blocking background fetch for a node object.
*
* Enqueues a `(hash, ledgerSeq, callback)` entry in the async read map.
* Multiple calls for the same hash are coalesced: a single backend read
* satisfies all registered callbacks. If `isStopping()` is `true` at the
* time of the call, the request is silently discarded and the callback
* will never fire.
*
* @note Thread-safe; may be called concurrently from any thread.
* @param hash 256-bit content hash of the desired object.
* @param ledgerSeq Ledger sequence that owns this object; passed through
* to `isSameDB()` for multi-sequence coalescing.
* @param callback Invoked on a worker thread with the fetched
* `NodeObject`, or `nullptr` on miss or error.
*/
virtual void
asyncFetch(
uint256 const& hash,
std::uint32_t ledgerSeq,
std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> const&)>&& callback);
/** Gather statistics pertaining to read and write activities.
*
* @param obj Json object reference into which to place counters.
*/
// --- Performance counters (all lock-free atomic reads) ---
/** Return the total number of objects written since construction. */
std::uint64_t
getStoreCount() const
{
return storeCount_;
}
/** Return the total number of fetch attempts (hits + misses). */
std::uint32_t
getFetchTotalCount() const
{
return fetchTotalCount_;
}
/** Return the number of fetch attempts that found the requested object. */
std::uint32_t
getFetchHitCount() const
{
return fetchHitCount_;
}
/** Return the cumulative byte count of all stored objects. */
std::uint64_t
getStoreSize() const
{
return storeSz_;
}
/** Return the cumulative byte count of all successfully fetched objects. */
std::uint32_t
getFetchSize() const
{
return fetchSz_;
}
/** Populate a JSON object with read/write diagnostics for `get_counts` RPC.
*
* Snapshots the async read queue depth (under `readLock_`) and then reads
* thread counts, request bundle size, and all atomic counters without
* holding any lock. The resulting fields include: `read_queue`,
* `read_threads_total`, `read_threads_running`, `read_request_bundle`,
* `node_writes`, `node_reads_total`, `node_reads_hit`,
* `node_written_bytes`, `node_read_bytes`, `node_reads_duration_us`.
*
* @param obj A JSON object to populate; must satisfy `obj.isObject()`.
*/
void
getCountsJson(json::Value& obj);
/** Returns the number of file descriptors the database expects to need */
/** Return the number of file descriptors this database expects to hold open.
*
* Aggregated from the underlying backend(s). Used by the application to
* check that the process file-descriptor limit is sufficient before
* opening backends. Inaccurate values cause silent failures when the
* limit is exceeded.
*
* @return File descriptor count, or 0 if not set by the subclass.
*/
int
fdRequired() const
{
return fdRequired_;
}
/** Begin orderly shutdown of the async read thread pool.
*
* Sets `readStopping_`, clears the pending `read_` queue, broadcasts on
* `readCondVar_`, then spin-yields until `readThreads_` reaches zero.
* An assertion fires if shutdown takes longer than 30 seconds.
*
* Idempotent: a second call after shutdown has already completed is a
* no-op. Derived classes must call this in their own destructors before
* their data members are torn down.
*/
virtual void
stop();
/** Return whether `stop()` has been called.
*
* Uses a relaxed atomic load — only the flag value is observed; no
* ordering is imposed on surrounding operations.
*
* @return `true` once `stop()` has been invoked.
*/
bool
isStopping() const;
/** @return The earliest ledger sequence allowed
/** Return the earliest ledger sequence this database will serve.
*
* Configured via `earliest_seq` in `[node_db]`; defaults to
* `kXRP_LEDGER_EARLIEST_SEQ` (32570 on the main network). The value is
* constant after construction. Only unit tests or alternate networks
* should set this below the default.
*
* @return The minimum valid ledger sequence number, always ≥ 1.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::uint32_t
earliestLedgerSeq() const noexcept
@@ -190,26 +309,34 @@ public:
}
protected:
beast::Journal const j_;
Scheduler& scheduler_;
beast::Journal const j_; ///< Logging sink; set at construction.
Scheduler& scheduler_; ///< Task scheduler for async dispatch and telemetry.
/** Number of file descriptors consumed by the underlying backend(s).
* Subclasses set this in their constructors; read by `fdRequired()`.
*/
int fdRequired_{0};
std::atomic<std::uint32_t> fetchHitCount_{0};
std::atomic<std::uint32_t> fetchSz_{0};
std::atomic<std::uint32_t> fetchHitCount_{0}; ///< Fetches that returned a non-null object.
std::atomic<std::uint32_t> fetchSz_{0}; ///< Cumulative bytes returned by successful fetches.
// The default is XRP_LEDGER_EARLIEST_SEQ (32570) to match the XRP ledger
// network's earliest allowed ledger sequence. Can be set through the
// configuration file using the 'earliest_seq' field under the 'node_db'
// stanza. If specified, the value must be greater than zero.
// Only unit tests or alternate
// networks should change this value.
/** Minimum ledger sequence this store will serve; constant after construction.
* Defaults to `kXRP_LEDGER_EARLIEST_SEQ` (32570). Must be ≥ 1.
*/
std::uint32_t const earliestLedgerSeq_;
// The maximum number of requests a thread extracts from the queue in an
// attempt to minimize the overhead of mutex acquisition. This is an
// advanced tunable, via the config file. The default value is 4.
/** Maximum number of read-queue entries extracted per mutex acquisition.
* Amortises lock overhead under load. Configured via `rq_bundle` in
* `[node_db]`; clamped to [1, 64]; defaults to 4.
*/
int const requestBundle_;
/** Update store counters after a successful batch write.
*
* @param count Number of objects written.
* @param sz Total byte size of those objects.
* @note Asserts `count <= sz` — byte total must be ≥ item count.
*/
void
storeStats(std::uint64_t count, std::uint64_t sz)
{
@@ -218,10 +345,32 @@ protected:
storeSz_ += sz;
}
// Called by the public import function
/** Bulk-import all objects from @p srcDB into @p dstBackend.
*
* Iterates @p srcDB via `forEach()`, accumulates objects into batches of
* `kBATCH_WRITE_PREALLOCATION_SIZE`, and flushes each batch with
* `dstBackend.storeBatch()`. Byte statistics are recorded via
* `storeStats()` after each flush. On exception, logs the error and
* returns early without aborting the overall import.
*
* Called by subclass `importDatabase()` implementations.
*
* @param dstBackend Destination backend; must be open and writable.
* @param srcDB Source database; iterated sequentially — no concurrent
* writes to @p srcDB should occur during the call.
*/
void
importInternal(Backend& dstBackend, Database& srcDB);
/** Merge externally-collected fetch metrics into the atomic counters.
*
* Used by subclasses that perform their own batched reads (e.g. import
* paths) and need to credit the counters in bulk rather than per-object.
*
* @param fetches Number of fetch attempts to add to `fetchTotalCount_`.
* @param hits Number of successful fetches to add to `fetchHitCount_`.
* @param duration Elapsed microseconds to add to `fetchDurationUs_`.
*/
void
updateFetchMetrics(uint64_t fetches, uint64_t hits, uint64_t duration)
{
@@ -231,26 +380,51 @@ protected:
}
private:
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> storeCount_{0};
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> storeSz_{0};
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> fetchTotalCount_{0};
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> fetchDurationUs_{0};
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> storeDurationUs_{0};
// --- Write-side atomic counters ---
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> storeCount_{0}; ///< Total objects stored.
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> storeSz_{0}; ///< Total bytes stored.
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> storeDurationUs_{0}; ///< Cumulative store duration (µs); reserved.
mutable std::mutex readLock_;
std::condition_variable readCondVar_;
// --- Fetch-side atomic counters (incremented by the public fetchNodeObject wrapper) ---
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> fetchTotalCount_{0}; ///< Total fetch attempts.
std::atomic<std::uint64_t> fetchDurationUs_{0}; ///< Cumulative fetch duration (µs).
// reads to do
// --- Async read-queue state (all guarded by readLock_ except atomic members) ---
mutable std::mutex readLock_; ///< Guards `read_` and `readCondVar_`.
std::condition_variable readCondVar_; ///< Wakes worker threads when `read_` is non-empty or stopping.
/** Pending async read requests, keyed by hash.
*
* Each map entry holds all `(ledgerSeq, callback)` pairs registered for a
* given hash. Multiple calls to `asyncFetch()` with the same hash are
* coalesced here so that a single backend read services all callbacks.
*/
std::map<
uint256,
std::vector<
std::pair<std::uint32_t, std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> const&)>>>>
read_;
std::atomic<bool> readStopping_ = false;
std::atomic<int> readThreads_ = 0;
std::atomic<int> runningThreads_ = 0;
std::atomic<bool> readStopping_ = false; ///< Set by `stop()`; workers exit when observed.
std::atomic<int> readThreads_ = 0; ///< Count of live worker threads; reaches 0 on full stop.
std::atomic<int> runningThreads_ = 0; ///< Threads currently active (not blocked on condvar).
/** Backend fetch hook — the Template Method target.
*
* Called exclusively by the public non-virtual `fetchNodeObject()` wrapper,
* which applies timing and metrics around this call. Subclasses must
* implement this and may not call the public wrapper from within it.
*
* @param hash 256-bit content hash to look up.
* @param ledgerSeq Ledger sequence, used by rotating backends to select
* the correct physical file.
* @param fetchReport Mutable report populated by the implementation;
* the public wrapper reads `fetchReport.wasFound` and `elapsed`.
* @param duplicate When `true`, if the object is found in the archive
* backend it should also be written back to the writable backend
* (promotion path for `DatabaseRotatingImp`).
* @return The fetched `NodeObject`, or `nullptr` on miss or error.
*/
virtual std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>
fetchNodeObject(
uint256 const& hash,
@@ -258,16 +432,26 @@ private:
FetchReport& fetchReport,
bool duplicate) = 0;
/** Visit every object in the database
This is usually called during import.
@note This routine will not be called concurrently with itself
or other methods.
@see import
*/
/** Iterate every object in the database and invoke @p f for each one.
*
* Used exclusively by `importInternal()`. Implementations may close and
* reopen the underlying store (e.g. NuDB) and are not safe for concurrent
* access; the caller must ensure no other reads or writes occur during
* iteration.
*
* @note Never called concurrently with itself or other methods.
* @param f Callback invoked with each `NodeObject`; must not be null.
*/
virtual void
forEach(std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>)> f) = 0;
/** Worker thread body for the async read pool.
*
* Loops waiting on `readCondVar_`, extracts up to `requestBundle_` entries
* from `read_` per lock acquisition, and dispatches each to the private
* `fetchNodeObject()`. Handles multi-sequence coalescing via `isSameDB()`.
* Exits when `readStopping_` is observed, then decrements `readThreads_`.
*/
void
threadEntry();
};

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,47 @@
/** @file
* Abstract interface extending `Database` with a two-backend rotation
* operation for online ledger history deletion.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/nodestore/Database.h>
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/* This class has two key-value store Backend objects for persisting SHAMap
* records. This facilitates online deletion of data. New backends are
* rotated in. Old ones are rotated out and deleted.
/** Abstract seam for the two-backend rotation scheme that enables online
* deletion of ledger history without taking the node offline.
*
* The concrete subclass `DatabaseRotatingImp` maintains two physical
* `Backend` objects: a *writable* backend that receives all current writes
* and an *archive* backend holding older data. When enough new history has
* accumulated, `SHAMapStoreImp` calls `rotate()` to atomically promote the
* writable backend to the archive role, install a fresh writable backend,
* and discard the old archive — all without interrupting read or write
* traffic.
*
* `DatabaseRotating` carries no state; it extends `Database` solely with
* the `rotate()` pure-virtual method. Components that drive rotation
* (currently only `SHAMapStoreImp`) hold a `DatabaseRotating*` pointer,
* keeping the rotation mechanism decoupled from storage format.
*
* @see DatabaseRotatingImp, Database, SHAMapStoreImp
*/
class DatabaseRotating : public Database
{
public:
/** Construct the rotating database and start the async read thread pool.
*
* Delegates entirely to `Database(scheduler, readThreads, config,
* journal)`. The two physical backends are supplied when constructing
* the concrete `DatabaseRotatingImp` subclass.
*
* @param scheduler Task scheduler for async I/O dispatch and telemetry;
* must outlive this object.
* @param readThreads Number of prefetch worker threads to create.
* @param config `[node_db]` config section forwarded to `Database`.
* @param journal Logging sink.
*/
DatabaseRotating(
Scheduler& scheduler,
int readThreads,
@@ -21,13 +51,37 @@ public:
{
}
/** Rotates the backends.
@param newBackend New writable backend
@param f A function executed after the rotation outside of lock. The
values passed to f will be the new backend database names _after_
rotation.
*/
/** Atomically replace the current writable backend with @p newBackend.
*
* Performs a three-step pointer swap under the implementation's internal
* mutex:
* 1. Mark the current archive backend for directory deletion and stash it
* in a local `shared_ptr` to keep it alive past the lock release.
* 2. Demote the current writable backend to the archive role.
* 3. Install @p newBackend as the new writable backend.
*
* After releasing the lock, @p f is called with the new backend names.
* Only after @p f returns does the old archive `shared_ptr` go out of
* scope and its on-disk files are removed. This sequencing is
* **crash-safe**: if the process dies between the pointer swap and @p f
* completing, both directory sets still exist on disk and can be
* recovered from the SQL state database on restart.
*
* Concurrent fetches already in flight hold `shared_ptr` references to
* the old backends; reference counting keeps those backends alive until
* all in-flight I/O completes.
*
* @param newBackend Freshly created, opened backend that becomes the new
* writable store; ownership is transferred.
* @param f Callback invoked after the in-memory swap completes but
* before the old archive is deleted, and outside the implementation
* mutex. Receives two names post-rotation: @p writableName is the
* name of @p newBackend, and @p archiveName is the name of the former
* writable backend now serving as the archive. `SHAMapStoreImp` uses
* @p f to durably persist the new backend names and `lastRotated`
* ledger sequence to a SQL state database, creating an atomic
* checkpoint for crash recovery.
*/
virtual void
rotate(
std::unique_ptr<NodeStore::Backend>&& newBackend,

View File

@@ -4,16 +4,64 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Simple NodeStore Scheduler that just performs the tasks synchronously. */
/** Null-object implementation of @ref Scheduler for tests and offline import.
*
* Satisfies the full `Scheduler` interface contract while doing the minimum
* possible work: every task is executed immediately on the calling thread, and
* the two performance-reporting hooks are no-ops. There is no thread pool, no
* queue, and no statistics collection.
*
* The `Scheduler` contract explicitly permits running a task on the calling
* thread, so `DummyScheduler` is always correct — it differs from a
* production scheduler only in latency and throughput characteristics.
*
* **Effect on `BatchWriter`**: Because `scheduleTask` flushes the batch
* inline before returning, batching is effectively disabled. This is
* acceptable for import and test workloads but would degrade performance
* under normal ledger-processing load.
*
* **Typical call sites**:
* - `Application.cpp` — transient scheduler for the source database during
* node-startup `doImport`; sequential offline migration makes async
* scheduling unnecessary.
* - `Backend_test.cpp`, `Database_test.cpp`, `Timing_test.cpp`,
* `NuDBFactory_test.cpp`, `shamap/common.h` — test fixtures use this to
* obtain deterministic, single-threaded execution without the teardown
* complexity of a real async scheduler.
*
* @see Scheduler
* @see BatchWriter
*/
class DummyScheduler : public Scheduler
{
public:
DummyScheduler() = default;
~DummyScheduler() override = default;
/** Execute @p task synchronously on the calling thread.
*
* Calls `task.performScheduledTask()` directly and returns only after
* the task completes. With `BatchWriter` as the consumer, this causes
* the pending write batch to be flushed inline, disabling asynchronous
* batching.
*
* @param task The task to execute; must remain valid for the duration
* of the call.
*/
void
scheduleTask(Task& task) override;
/** No-op performance hook — fetch telemetry is not collected.
*
* @param report Ignored.
*/
void
onFetch(FetchReport const& report) override;
/** No-op performance hook — batch-write telemetry is not collected.
*
* @param report Ignored.
*/
void
onBatchWrite(BatchWriteReport const& report) override;
};

View File

@@ -9,24 +9,55 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Base class for backend factories. */
/** Abstract factory for constructing pluggable NodeStore `Backend` instances.
*
* Each concrete subclass wraps one storage engine (NuDB, RocksDB, memory,
* null). Subclasses register themselves with the `Manager` singleton at
* program startup by calling `Manager::insert(*this)` from their constructor,
* typically via a module-level `register*Factory()` free function that holds
* the factory as a function-local static. `Manager::find()` then resolves the
* `type=` configuration string to the matching factory by name.
*
* @note Factory objects are stored as raw (non-owning) pointers in
* `ManagerImp`. Concrete factories registered as function-local statics
* have program lifetime and must outlive the `Manager`.
*
* @see Backend, Manager
*/
class Factory
{
public:
virtual ~Factory() = default;
/** Retrieve the name of this factory. */
/** Return the configuration type string that identifies this backend.
*
* The returned name is used as the lookup key by `Manager::find()`,
* which compares case-insensitively against the `type=` value in the
* `[node_db]` config section (e.g., `"NuDB"`, `"RocksDB"`, `"memory"`).
*
* @return The backend type name (e.g., `"NuDB"`).
*/
[[nodiscard]] virtual std::string
getName() const = 0;
/** Create an instance of this factory's backend.
@param keyBytes The fixed number of bytes per key.
@param parameters A set of key/value configuration pairs.
@param burstSize Backend burst size in bytes.
@param scheduler The scheduler to use for running tasks.
@return A pointer to the Backend object.
*/
/** Construct a Backend from configuration, without a shared NuDB context.
*
* The returned backend has not yet been opened; the caller must invoke
* `Backend::open()` before performing any I/O. In production, this is
* done by `ManagerImp::makeDatabase()`.
*
* @param keyBytes Fixed width of every storage key in bytes. Always 32
* (SHA-512 Half) in production; may differ in tests.
* @param parameters Key/value pairs from the `[node_db]` config section,
* supplying backend-specific settings such as `path` and
* `nudb_block_size`.
* @param burstSize Maximum bytes the backend may buffer before flushing.
* Flows directly into NuDB's `db_.set_burst()` after open; other
* backends may use or ignore it.
* @param scheduler Async task dispatcher for background write jobs.
* @param journal Logging sink for backend diagnostics.
* @return An unopened, uniquely-owned Backend instance.
*/
virtual std::unique_ptr<Backend>
createInstance(
size_t keyBytes,
@@ -35,15 +66,24 @@ public:
Scheduler& scheduler,
beast::Journal journal) = 0;
/** Create an instance of this factory's backend.
@param keyBytes The fixed number of bytes per key.
@param parameters A set of key/value configuration pairs.
@param burstSize Backend burst size in bytes.
@param scheduler The scheduler to use for running tasks.
@param context The context used by database.
@return A pointer to the Backend object.
*/
/** Construct a Backend sharing an existing NuDB I/O context.
*
* This overload is provided for NuDB backends that share a `nudb::context`
* thread pool across multiple backends (e.g., the rotating database used
* for shard imports). Non-NuDB factories inherit a default implementation
* that returns an empty `unique_ptr`, signaling to `ManagerImp` that this
* backend does not use a NuDB context; the caller falls back to the
* context-free overload in that case.
*
* @param keyBytes Fixed width of every storage key in bytes.
* @param parameters Key/value pairs from the `[node_db]` config section.
* @param burstSize Maximum bytes the backend may buffer before flushing.
* @param scheduler Async task dispatcher for background write jobs.
* @param context Shared NuDB I/O thread pool. Ignored by non-NuDB backends.
* @param journal Logging sink for backend diagnostics.
* @return An unopened Backend, or an empty `unique_ptr` if this factory
* does not support the NuDB context overload.
*/
virtual std::unique_ptr<Backend>
createInstance(
size_t keyBytes,

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,28 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Singleton for managing NodeStore factories and back ends. */
/** Abstract interface for the NodeStore backend registry and factory.
*
* `Manager` maps the `type=` string from `[node_db]` in `xrpld.cfg` to the
* concrete `Backend` implementation that implements it, and exposes the two
* construction entry points the rest of the application needs: `makeBackend()`
* for a raw storage engine and `makeDatabase()` for a fully-wired `Database`.
*
* The concrete implementation is `ManagerImp`, a Meyers singleton returned by
* `instance()`. Its constructor eagerly registers the four built-in backends
* (NuDB, RocksDB, memory, null). Additional backends may be registered at
* runtime via `insert()`. The abstract base class is exposed here so callers
* depend only on the interface without being coupled to `ManagerImp` or its
* dependencies.
*
* All registry operations (`insert`, `erase`, `find`) are protected by an
* internal mutex and are safe to call concurrently.
*
* @note Copy construction and copy assignment are deleted — there is exactly
* one manager for the lifetime of the process.
*
* @see Factory, Backend, Database
*/
class Manager
{
public:
@@ -15,26 +36,81 @@ public:
Manager&
operator=(Manager const&) = delete;
/** Returns the instance of the manager singleton. */
/** Return the process-wide Manager singleton.
*
* Delegates to `ManagerImp::instance()`, which uses a Meyers static local
* for thread-safe, once-only initialization under C++11 and later. The
* four built-in backends are registered before the reference is returned
* for the first time.
*
* @return A reference to the singleton `ManagerImp`.
*/
static Manager&
instance();
/** Add a factory. */
/** Register a backend factory with the manager.
*
* After insertion, `find(factory.getName())` will return `&factory`. The
* call is protected by a mutex and safe to make concurrently. The manager
* stores a non-owning pointer; the caller is responsible for ensuring the
* factory outlives the manager (function-local statics are the idiomatic
* approach).
*
* @param factory The factory to register. Must remain alive for the
* lifetime of the manager.
*/
virtual void
insert(Factory& factory) = 0;
/** Remove a factory. */
/** Deregister a previously inserted backend factory.
*
* Removes `factory` from the internal list. The call is protected by a
* mutex. Passing a pointer that was never inserted triggers an
* `XRPL_ASSERT`.
*
* @note Built-in backend factories registered by `ManagerImp`'s
* constructor are intentionally never erased: because static-storage
* destruction order across translation units is undefined, calling
* `erase()` from a `Factory` destructor could invoke a destroyed
* `ManagerImp`. The built-in factories use function-local statics
* that outlive the manager.
*
* @param factory The factory to remove. Must have been previously passed
* to `insert()`.
*/
virtual void
erase(Factory& factory) = 0;
/** Return a pointer to the matching factory if it exists.
@param name The name to match, performed case-insensitive.
@return `nullptr` if a match was not found.
*/
/** Look up a factory by its type name.
*
* Comparison is case-insensitive (via `boost::iequals`), so `"NuDB"`,
* `"nudb"`, and `"NUDB"` all resolve to the same factory. The call is
* protected by a mutex.
*
* @param name The backend type name to search for (e.g., `"NuDB"`).
* @return Pointer to the matching `Factory`, or `nullptr` if none found.
*/
virtual Factory*
find(std::string const& name) = 0;
/** Create a backend. */
/** Construct an unopened Backend from configuration parameters.
*
* Reads the `type` key from `parameters`, resolves it to a registered
* `Factory` via `find()`, and delegates to `Factory::createInstance()`.
* The returned backend has not yet been opened; the caller must invoke
* `Backend::open()` before performing any I/O (this is done automatically
* by `makeDatabase()`).
*
* @param parameters Key/value pairs from the `[node_db]` config section.
* Must contain a `type` key naming a registered backend.
* @param burstSize Maximum bytes the backend may buffer before flushing.
* @param scheduler Async task dispatcher for background write jobs.
* @param journal Logging sink for backend diagnostics.
* @return A uniquely-owned, unopened Backend instance.
* @throws std::runtime_error If the `type` key is absent or names an
* unrecognised backend, with a message directing the operator to
* check `xrpld.cfg`.
*/
virtual std::unique_ptr<Backend>
makeBackend(
Section const& parameters,
@@ -42,34 +118,25 @@ public:
Scheduler& scheduler,
beast::Journal journal) = 0;
/** Construct a NodeStore database.
The parameters are key value pairs passed to the backend. The
'type' key must exist, it defines the choice of backend. Most
backends also require a 'path' field.
Some choices for 'type' are:
HyperLevelDB, LevelDBFactory, SQLite, MDB
If the fastBackendParameter is omitted or empty, no ephemeral database
is used. If the scheduler parameter is omitted or unspecified, a
synchronous scheduler is used which performs all tasks immediately on
the caller's thread.
@note If the database cannot be opened or created, an exception is
thrown.
@param name A diagnostic label for the database.
@param burstSize Backend burst size in bytes.
@param scheduler The scheduler to use for performing asynchronous tasks.
@param readThreads The number of async read threads to create
@param backendParameters The parameter string for the persistent
backend.
@param fastBackendParameters [optional] The parameter string for the
ephemeral backend.
@return The opened database.
*/
/** Construct and open a fully-wired Database backed by a single backend.
*
* Calls `makeBackend()` to create and open the backend, then wraps it in
* a `DatabaseNodeImp` which adds an async read-thread pool and the full
* `Database` API. The `backendParameters` section must contain a `type`
* key naming a registered backend; most backends also require a `path`
* key. Currently registered built-in types are: `NuDB`, `RocksDB`,
* `memory`, `none`.
*
* @param burstSize Maximum bytes the backend may buffer before flushing.
* @param scheduler Async task dispatcher for read and write jobs.
* @param readThreads Number of threads in the async read pool.
* @param backendParameters Key/value pairs for the persistent backend,
* including at minimum a `type` key.
* @param journal Logging sink for database diagnostics.
* @return A uniquely-owned, open Database ready for I/O.
* @throws std::runtime_error If the backend cannot be created or opened,
* or if the `type` key is missing or unrecognised.
*/
virtual std::unique_ptr<Database>
makeDatabase(
std::size_t burstSize,

View File

@@ -1,72 +1,126 @@
/** @file
* Defines `NodeObject`, the atomic storage unit of the XRPL node store.
*
* Every piece of ledger state — account tree nodes, transaction tree nodes,
* and ledger headers — is stored and retrieved as a `NodeObject`. The class
* is a pure value type: a type tag, a 256-bit hash key, and a raw binary
* blob. Higher layers (SHAMap, ledger, serialization) are responsible for
* interpreting the blob's contents.
*
* `NodeObject` lives in the `xrpl` namespace rather than `xrpl::NodeStore`
* so that the SHAMap layer, ledger subsystem, and serialization paths can
* consume it without pulling in the full nodestore backend API.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/Blob.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/CountedObject.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
// VFALCO NOTE Intentionally not in the NodeStore namespace
namespace xrpl {
/** The types of node objects. */
/** Identifies the kind of data stored in a `NodeObject`.
*
* The integer values are part of the on-disk format (written by
* `EncodedBlob` and read by `DecodedBlob`), so they must not be changed.
* Value 2 is a historical gap left by a removed type and must remain
* unused. `Dummy` (512) is deliberately outside the contiguous valid range
* so it cannot be confused with a legitimate type by accident or by
* off-by-one arithmetic; it is used as a cache sentinel meaning "confirmed
* missing".
*/
enum class NodeObjectType : std::uint32_t {
Unknown = 0,
Ledger = 1,
AccountNode = 3,
TransactionNode = 4,
Dummy = 512 // an invalid or missing object
Unknown = 0, /**< Type not yet determined or not applicable. */
Ledger = 1, /**< Serialized ledger header. */
// Value 2 intentionally absent — historical removal; do not reuse.
AccountNode = 3, /**< SHAMap node from an account-state tree. */
TransactionNode = 4, /**< SHAMap node from a transaction tree. */
Dummy = 512 /**< Sentinel for a confirmed-missing cache entry; not a real object. */
};
/** A simple object that the Ledger uses to store entries.
NodeObjects are comprised of a type, a hash, and a blob.
They can be uniquely identified by the hash, which is a half-SHA512 of
the blob. The blob is a variable length block of serialized data. The
type identifies what the blob contains.
@note No checking is performed to make sure the hash matches the data.
@see SHAMap
*/
/** Immutable storage unit carrying a type tag, a 256-bit hash key, and a
* raw binary payload.
*
* `NodeObject` is the payload type at every level of the nodestore stack:
* `Backend::fetch()` produces instances; `Backend::store()` and
* `Backend::storeBatch()` consume them; `Database` caches shared pointers
* to them. All three data members are `const` — once constructed the
* object never changes, which is correct for content-addressed storage.
*
* Instances must be created exclusively through `createObject()`. Direct
* construction is blocked via the `PrivateAccess` tag idiom (see below).
* All shared references are `std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>`; ownership is
* always shared, never transferred.
*
* Inherits `CountedObject<NodeObject>` to maintain a global atomic
* live-instance count that feeds the `get_counts` diagnostic RPC.
*
* @note The hash is accepted on trust — no verification that it matches
* the payload is performed here. Correctness is enforced at higher
* layers (SHAMap traversal, ledger validation).
* @see SHAMap
*/
class NodeObject : public CountedObject<NodeObject>
{
public:
/** Size in bytes of the hash key used to identify a `NodeObject`. */
static constexpr std::size_t kKEY_BYTES = 32;
private:
// This hack is used to make the constructor effectively private
// except for when we use it in the call to make_shared.
// There's no portable way to make make_shared<> a friend work.
/** Tag type that makes the public constructor effectively private.
*
* `std::make_shared` requires the constructor it calls to be
* accessible, so the constructor cannot be `private`. Instead, it
* takes a `PrivateAccess` argument. Because `PrivateAccess` itself is
* a private nested type, only code inside `NodeObject` (i.e.,
* `createObject`) can construct one — achieving the same effect.
*/
struct PrivateAccess
{
explicit PrivateAccess() = default;
};
public:
// This constructor is private, use createObject instead.
/** Constructs a `NodeObject`; use `createObject()` instead.
*
* The `PrivateAccess` parameter is intentionally inaccessible to
* external callers; it exists solely to satisfy `std::make_shared`.
*/
NodeObject(NodeObjectType type, Blob&& data, uint256 const& hash, PrivateAccess);
/** Create an object from fields.
The caller's variable is modified during this call. The
underlying storage for the Blob is taken over by the NodeObject.
@param type The type of object.
@param ledgerIndex The ledger in which this object appears.
@param data A buffer containing the payload. The caller's variable
is overwritten.
@param hash The 256-bit hash of the payload data.
*/
/** Create a `NodeObject`, transferring ownership of the payload buffer.
*
* The caller's `data` buffer is moved into the new object; after this
* call `data` is in a valid but unspecified state. No copy of the
* payload is made.
*
* @param type The kind of ledger data the payload represents.
* @param data Raw serialized payload; ownership is transferred to the
* returned object.
* @param hash 256-bit hash that uniquely identifies this object in the
* node store. Must be the correct hash of `data` — no verification
* is performed.
* @return A `shared_ptr` to the newly created, immutable `NodeObject`.
*/
static std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>
createObject(NodeObjectType type, Blob&& data, uint256 const& hash);
/** Returns the type of this object. */
/** Returns the type tag indicating what kind of ledger data this object
* holds.
*/
[[nodiscard]] NodeObjectType
getType() const;
/** Returns the hash of the data. */
/** Returns the 256-bit hash that identifies this object in the node
* store.
*
* @note The hash is not verified against the payload at construction
* time; callers must ensure consistency at higher layers.
*/
[[nodiscard]] uint256 const&
getHash() const;
/** Returns the underlying data. */
/** Returns the raw serialized payload stored in this object. */
[[nodiscard]] Blob const&
getData() const;

View File

@@ -6,59 +6,120 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
enum class FetchType { Synchronous, Async };
/** Distinguishes how a node-object fetch was initiated.
*
* Used by `FetchReport` to let the `Scheduler` route telemetry to the
* correct load-tracking bucket (`jtNS_SYNC_READ` vs `jtNS_ASYNC_READ`
* in production).
*/
enum class FetchType {
Synchronous, /**< Fetch was issued on the caller's thread and awaited inline. */
Async /**< Fetch was queued and completed on a background read thread. */
};
/** Contains information about a fetch operation. */
/** Performance telemetry for a single completed node-object fetch.
*
* Created on the stack immediately before a fetch and passed to
* `Scheduler::onFetch()` once the fetch returns. `fetchType` is fixed at
* construction; `elapsed` and `wasFound` are filled in afterwards.
*
* @see Scheduler::onFetch
*/
struct FetchReport
{
/** Construct a report for a fetch of the given type.
*
* @param fetchType Whether the fetch was synchronous or asynchronous;
* stored as a `const` member and cannot be changed after construction.
*/
explicit FetchReport(FetchType fetchType) : fetchType(fetchType)
{
}
std::chrono::milliseconds elapsed{};
FetchType const fetchType;
bool wasFound = false;
std::chrono::milliseconds elapsed{}; /**< Wall-clock duration of the fetch; zero-initialized. */
FetchType const fetchType; /**< Sync or async; set at construction. */
bool wasFound = false; /**< True if the object was present in the backend. */
};
/** Contains information about a batch write operation. */
/** Performance telemetry for a single completed batch write.
*
* Constructed by `BatchWriter` after each flush and passed to
* `Scheduler::onBatchWrite()`. Both fields must be filled in by the caller
* before the report is forwarded.
*
* @see Scheduler::onBatchWrite
*/
struct BatchWriteReport
{
explicit BatchWriteReport() = default;
std::chrono::milliseconds elapsed;
int writeCount;
std::chrono::milliseconds elapsed; /**< Wall-clock duration of the batch flush. */
int writeCount; /**< Number of `NodeObject`s written in this batch. */
};
/** Scheduling for asynchronous backend activity
For improved performance, a backend has the option of performing writes
in batches. These writes can be scheduled using the provided scheduler
object.
@see BatchWriter
*/
/** Scheduling and telemetry interface for NodeStore backend activity.
*
* Decouples backend write batching and I/O instrumentation from any
* particular threading strategy. A `Scheduler` implementation may run a
* submitted task synchronously on the calling thread (as `DummyScheduler`
* does) or post it to a thread pool (as `NodeStoreScheduler` does via the
* application `JobQueue`). The same backend code is correct under either
* policy.
*
* The interface serves two orthogonal purposes that share one injection
* point: *work dispatch* (`scheduleTask`) and *telemetry ingestion*
* (`onFetch`, `onBatchWrite`). Concrete implementations may ignore the
* telemetry hooks entirely or forward them to a load-balancing subsystem.
*
* @note `scheduleTask` takes `task` by non-const reference rather than by
* value or smart pointer. `BatchWriter` implements `Task` privately and
* manages its own lifetime, so no heap allocation is required for the
* common write-batching case. Callers must ensure the task object
* remains valid until `performScheduledTask()` returns.
*
* @see BatchWriter
* @see DummyScheduler
*/
class Scheduler
{
public:
virtual ~Scheduler() = default;
/** Schedules a task.
Depending on the implementation, the task may be invoked either on
the current thread of execution, or an unspecified
implementation-defined foreign thread.
*/
/** Dispatch a task for execution.
*
* The scheduler may call `task.performScheduledTask()` on the current
* thread before returning, or post the task to an unspecified foreign
* thread. Both behaviours are valid; callers must not assume which will
* occur. The task object must remain valid until `performScheduledTask()`
* returns.
*
* @param task The deferred work to execute; typically a `BatchWriter`
* flush. Passed by reference — ownership is not transferred.
*/
virtual void
scheduleTask(Task& task) = 0;
/** Reports completion of a fetch
Allows the scheduler to monitor the node store's performance
*/
/** Telemetry hook called after each node-object fetch completes.
*
* Allows the scheduler to record I/O latency and hit/miss statistics.
* This is a pure reporting path with no effect on control flow; backends
* call it unconditionally after every fetch, whether or not the object
* was found.
*
* @param report Timing, fetch type, and hit/miss outcome for the
* completed fetch.
*/
virtual void
onFetch(FetchReport const& report) = 0;
/** Reports the completion of a batch write
Allows the scheduler to monitor the node store's performance
*/
/** Telemetry hook called after each batch write completes.
*
* Allows the scheduler to record write throughput. Called by
* `BatchWriter` after each flush, with `report.writeCount` reflecting
* the number of objects flushed in that batch.
*
* @param report Elapsed time and object count for the completed batch.
*/
virtual void
onBatchWrite(BatchWriteReport const& report) = 0;
};

View File

@@ -1,15 +1,53 @@
/** @file
* Defines the `Task` abstract interface for NodeStore scheduled work units.
*
* Any piece of deferred backend work (e.g., a `BatchWriter` flush) inherits
* from `Task` and implements `performScheduledTask()`. The `Scheduler`
* interface accepts a `Task&` and decides *where* and *when* to invoke it,
* decoupling the work unit from any knowledge of threads or job queues.
*/
#pragma once
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Derived classes perform scheduled tasks. */
/** Pure command-pattern base for NodeStore deferred backend work.
*
* A `Task` is the minimal callable token the scheduling system needs: a single
* `performScheduledTask()` entry point and a virtual destructor. Concrete work
* units inherit from this struct (typically privately, as `BatchWriter` does)
* and are submitted to `Scheduler::scheduleTask()`.
*
* The scheduling contract is intentionally loose: `Scheduler::scheduleTask()`
* may invoke the task synchronously on the calling thread (as `DummyScheduler`
* does for tests) or post it to an unspecified foreign thread (as
* `NodeStoreScheduler` does via the application `JobQueue`). Concrete `Task`
* implementations must be safe under either policy.
*
* The interface is deliberately as small as possible. A richer alternative
* such as `std::function` or `std::unique_ptr<Task>` would impose a heap
* allocation on every scheduled operation and couple the interface to a
* specific ownership model. With this design, `BatchWriter` can implement
* `Task` privately and pass `*this` to `scheduleTask()` — no extra allocation
* needed, and lifetime management stays entirely within `BatchWriter`.
*
* @see Scheduler
* @see BatchWriter
* @see DummyScheduler
*/
struct Task
{
virtual ~Task() = default;
/** Performs the task.
The call may take place on a foreign thread.
*/
/** Execute the deferred work represented by this task.
*
* Called by the `Scheduler` either synchronously on the submitting thread
* or asynchronously on a foreign thread, depending on the scheduler
* implementation. Implementations must tolerate either calling context.
*
* The object must remain valid and unmodified from the time it is passed
* to `Scheduler::scheduleTask()` until this method returns.
*/
virtual void
performScheduledTask() = 0;
};

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
/** @file
* Shared vocabulary types for the xrpl::NodeStore subsystem.
*
* This header sits at the base of the NodeStore include hierarchy and is
* pulled in by every other NodeStore interface header. It defines only the
* primitives that all participants — backends, the async database layer, and
* callers — must agree on: the operation status codes, the batch container
* alias, and the batch-size policy constants.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/nodestore/NodeObject.h>
@@ -6,29 +16,57 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
// This is only used to pre-allocate the array for
// batch objects and does not affect the amount written.
//
/** Initial capacity hint for a `Batch` vector and the backpressure threshold
* in `BatchWriter::store`.
*
* `BatchWriter` reserves this many slots on construction and re-reserves after
* each flush to avoid repeated allocations. `BatchWriter::store` also blocks
* when `writeSet_` reaches this size, providing backpressure against producers
* that outrun the flush thread. This value does not cap how many objects can
* ultimately be written in a single pass.
*/
static constexpr auto kBATCH_WRITE_PREALLOCATION_SIZE = 256;
// This sets a limit on the maximum number of writes
// in a batch. Actual usage can be twice this since
// we have a new batch growing as we write the old.
//
/** Maximum number of objects flushed in a single batch write.
*
* Once a batch accumulates this many objects it is handed off to the backend.
* Because a new batch begins accumulating while the previous one is being
* written to disk (double-buffer pattern), peak in-flight memory for pending
* objects can reach approximately twice this limit.
*/
static constexpr auto kBATCH_WRITE_LIMIT_SIZE = 65536;
/** Return codes from Backend operations. */
/** Return codes from `Backend` fetch and store operations.
*
* Values 099 are reserved for the standard codes defined here. Backend
* implementations that need additional error distinctions must use values
* starting at `CustomCode` (100) to avoid collisions.
*/
enum class Status {
Ok = 0,
NotFound = 1,
DataCorrupt = 2,
Unknown = 3,
BackendError = 4,
Ok = 0, /**< Operation completed successfully. */
NotFound = 1, /**< Key is not present in the store. */
DataCorrupt = 2, /**< Stored blob failed integrity validation. */
Unknown = 3, /**< An unclassified error occurred. */
BackendError = 4, /**< The underlying storage backend reported an error. */
/** First value available for backend-defined extended error codes.
* Backend implementations may define their own codes as
* `static_cast<int>(Status::CustomCode) + N` without colliding with the
* standard range (099).
*/
CustomCode = 100
};
/** A batch of NodeObjects to write at once. */
/** A collection of `NodeObject`s to be written together in a single batch.
*
* Using a named alias rather than spelling out the type at every call site
* means that a change to the container type or ownership model propagates
* from this single definition. The `shared_ptr` element type reflects that
* individual `NodeObject` instances may be concurrently referenced by
* in-memory caches and the write pipeline at the same time.
*
* @see Backend::storeBatch
*/
using Batch = std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>;
} // namespace xrpl::NodeStore

View File

@@ -9,18 +9,46 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Batch-writing assist logic.
The batch writes are performed with a scheduled task. Use of the
class it not required. A backend can implement its own write batching,
or skip write batching if doing so yields a performance benefit.
@see Scheduler
*/
/** Coalesces individual NodeObject writes into batches for NodeStore backends.
*
* Individual key-value store writes carry per-operation overhead (system
* call, WAL append, compaction pressure). `BatchWriter` amortises that cost
* by accumulating objects in an internal buffer and flushing them as a single
* batch via a `Scheduler`-dispatched task. Use of this class is optional —
* a backend may implement its own batching strategy or skip batching entirely.
*
* The class privately inherits `Task`, turning itself into a schedulable unit
* of work with no additional heap allocation. The actual write is delegated
* to a `Callback` (typically the owning backend), keeping storage-engine
* specifics out of the batching logic.
*
* **Thread safety**: `store()` and `getWriteLoad()` are safe to call
* concurrently from multiple threads. The flush task may run on the calling
* thread (synchronous scheduler) or a background thread (async scheduler);
* the recursive mutex design is safe under both policies.
*
* **Backpressure**: `store()` blocks when the pending buffer reaches
* `kBATCH_WRITE_LIMIT_SIZE` (65,536 objects), preventing unbounded memory
* growth when disk I/O cannot keep pace with producers. Peak in-flight
* memory can reach approximately twice this limit due to the double-buffer
* swap pattern (one batch being written while the next accumulates).
*
* @see Scheduler
* @see Backend
*/
class BatchWriter : private Task
{
public:
/** This callback does the actual writing. */
/** Pure interface through which `BatchWriter` delivers a completed batch.
*
* The concrete backend (e.g., `RocksDBBackend`) inherits both `Backend`
* and `BatchWriter::Callback`, implementing `writeBatch` to forward the
* batch to the underlying storage engine. This indirection keeps batching
* logic storage-agnostic.
*
* `writeBatch` is invoked outside the internal mutex, so implementations
* may perform blocking I/O without serialising concurrent `store()` calls.
*/
struct Callback
{
virtual ~Callback() = default;
@@ -29,49 +57,111 @@ public:
Callback&
operator=(Callback const&) = delete;
/** Flush a completed batch to the storage engine.
*
* Called by `BatchWriter` once per scheduled flush, with the lock
* already released. The implementation must persist every object in
* `batch` before returning.
*
* @param batch The collection of `NodeObject`s to write. Objects in
* the batch may be concurrently referenced by in-memory caches.
*/
virtual void
writeBatch(Batch const& batch) = 0;
};
/** Create a batch writer. */
/** Construct a `BatchWriter` tied to the given sink and scheduler.
*
* Pre-allocates the internal write buffer to avoid repeated small
* reallocations during normal operation.
*
* @param callback The sink that receives each flushed `Batch` via
* `Callback::writeBatch()`. Typically the owning backend. Must
* outlive this `BatchWriter`.
* @param scheduler The scheduler used to dispatch the flush task. May be
* a synchronous `DummyScheduler` (tests and bulk import) or the
* production async scheduler; both are supported.
*/
BatchWriter(Callback& callback, Scheduler& scheduler);
/** Destroy a batch writer.
Anything pending in the batch is written out before this returns.
*/
/** Destroy the `BatchWriter`, draining any pending writes first.
*
* Blocks until all accumulated objects have been flushed to the
* `Callback`. No objects passed to `store()` are silently abandoned.
*/
~BatchWriter() override;
/** Store the object.
This will add to the batch and initiate a scheduled task to
write the batch out.
*/
/** Enqueue a `NodeObject` for the next scheduled batch flush.
*
* Appends `object` to the internal accumulation buffer and, if no flush
* task is already outstanding, schedules one via the `Scheduler`.
* Subsequent `store()` calls before the flush fires piggyback on the
* single in-flight task.
*
* @param object The `NodeObject` to persist.
* @note Blocks the caller when the buffer reaches `kBATCH_WRITE_LIMIT_SIZE`
* (65,536 objects) until the in-flight batch is fully written. This
* backpressure prevents unbounded memory growth when disk I/O falls
* behind producers.
*/
void
store(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> const& object);
/** Get an estimate of the amount of writing I/O pending. */
/** Return a conservative estimate of pending write I/O.
*
* Returns the larger of the item count currently being written to the
* backend and the item count waiting for the next scheduled flush.
* Taking the maximum reflects pressure in both the in-flight and
* accumulating phases, giving callers a meaningful load signal for
* scheduling decisions.
*
* @return Estimated number of `NodeObject`s awaiting or undergoing write.
*/
int
getWriteLoad();
private:
/** `Task` entry-point; delegates to the internal `writeBatch()`. */
void
performScheduledTask() override;
/** Drain accumulated objects to the backend using the double-buffer swap.
*
* Holds the lock only long enough to swap the internal buffer with a
* local vector (O(1)), then releases the lock before calling
* `Callback::writeBatch()`. Loops until no objects remain after a swap,
* then clears `writePending_` and notifies any blocked `store()` callers.
*/
void
writeBatch();
/** Block until any in-flight flush has completed.
*
* Waits on the condition variable until `writePending_` is false.
* Called by the destructor to guarantee no pending objects are abandoned
* on teardown.
*/
void
waitForWriting();
private:
/** Recursive to allow synchronous schedulers that invoke `writeBatch()`
* on the same thread as `store()` or `waitForWriting()`. */
using LockType = std::recursive_mutex;
/** Required by `LockType`; `std::condition_variable` only works with
* `std::mutex`. */
using CondvarType = std::condition_variable_any;
Callback& callback_;
Scheduler& scheduler_;
LockType writeMutex_;
CondvarType writeCondition_;
/** Item count of the batch currently being written; used by `getWriteLoad()`. */
int writeLoad_{0};
/** True when a flush task has been scheduled but not yet completed. */
bool writePending_{false};
/** Accumulation buffer; swapped out atomically inside `writeBatch()`. */
Batch writeSet_;
};

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
/** @file
* Single-backend concrete implementation of the NodeStore `Database` interface.
*
* `DatabaseNodeImp` is the standard node-store path for deployments that keep
* all ledger objects in one persistent key/value backend (NuDB, RocksDB, etc.).
* It adapts the thin `Backend` interface onto the richer `Database` contract
* — async read pool, telemetry, and scheduler callbacks — all of which live in
* the base class and cannot be bypassed.
*/
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/TaggedCache.h>
@@ -6,6 +16,25 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Single-backend implementation of the NodeStore `Database` interface.
*
* Wraps exactly one `Backend` (NuDB, RocksDB, Memory, Null) and serves all
* ledger objects regardless of their ledger sequence number. This is the
* standard deployment path; the two-backend rotation variant is
* `DatabaseRotatingImp`.
*
* Every public method is a thin delegation: to `backend_` for storage
* operations and to base-class helpers for async dispatch, telemetry, and
* bulk import. No business logic lives here.
*
* **Shutdown ordering**: The destructor calls `stop()` to drain all pending
* async reads and wait for worker threads to exit before releasing `backend_`.
* Worker threads invoke the virtual `fetchNodeObject()` hook; if `backend_`
* were released while a thread was active, it would dereference a dangling
* pointer.
*
* @see Database, DatabaseRotatingImp, Backend
*/
class DatabaseNodeImp : public Database
{
public:
@@ -14,6 +43,21 @@ public:
DatabaseNodeImp&
operator=(DatabaseNodeImp const&) = delete;
/** Construct the database and start the async read thread pool.
*
* Asserts that @p backend is non-null, then delegates to the `Database`
* base constructor which spawns `readThreads` detached worker threads.
*
* @param scheduler Task scheduler for async I/O dispatch and telemetry;
* must outlive this object.
* @param readThreads Number of async prefetch threads; clamped to at least 1
* by the base constructor.
* @param backend Open, non-null backend to use for all storage; shared
* ownership is assumed.
* @param config `[node_db]` config section; forwarded to `Database`
* for `earliest_seq` and `rq_bundle` parsing.
* @param j Logging sink.
*/
DatabaseNodeImp(
Scheduler& scheduler,
int readThreads,
@@ -28,48 +72,126 @@ public:
"backend");
}
/** Drain pending I/O and release the backend.
*
* Calls `stop()` to wait for all async read worker threads to exit before
* `backend_` is destroyed. This must happen in the derived destructor
* because worker threads call the virtual `fetchNodeObject()` hook, which
* dereferences `backend_`.
*/
~DatabaseNodeImp() override
{
stop();
}
/** Return the name of the underlying backend for diagnostics.
*
* @return The backend's human-readable identifier (e.g. the on-disk path).
*/
std::string
getName() const override
{
return backend_->getName();
}
/** Return the estimated number of pending write operations in the backend.
*
* Approximate; the value may change immediately after it is read.
*
* @return Pending write count, or 0 if the backend does not batch writes.
*/
std::int32_t
getWriteLoad() const override
{
return backend_->getWriteLoad();
}
/** Bulk-import all objects from @p source into this database's backend.
*
* Delegates to `importInternal()`, which iterates @p source via `forEach()`
* and stores objects in batches. Large source databases may take significant
* time; no concurrent writes to @p source should occur during the call.
*
* @param source The database to read from; must remain open and quiescent.
*/
void
importDatabase(Database& source) override
{
importInternal(*backend_.get(), source);
}
/** Persist a node object to the backend.
*
* Updates store telemetry, wraps the payload in a `NodeObject`, and
* forwards to the backend. The ledger sequence parameter is part of the
* `Database` contract but is ignored here — a single backend holds objects
* from all ledger sequences.
*
* @param type Type tag for the object (ledger, account node, etc.).
* @param data Serialized payload; ownership is transferred — the caller's
* variable is left in a valid but unspecified state.
* @param hash 256-bit content-address key. The caller is responsible for
* correctness; the hash is not re-verified.
*/
void
store(NodeObjectType type, Blob&& data, uint256 const& hash, std::uint32_t) override;
/** Report whether two ledger sequence numbers map to the same backend.
*
* Always returns `true` for `DatabaseNodeImp` because there is exactly one
* backend: every sequence number resolves to the same physical store. This
* allows the async read pool to coalesce duplicate hash requests that carry
* different sequence numbers without issuing a second backend read.
*
* @return `true` unconditionally.
*/
bool
isSameDB(std::uint32_t, std::uint32_t) override
{
// only one database
return true;
}
/** Flush any buffered writes to durable storage.
*
* Delegates directly to `backend_->sync()`. Not latency-sensitive;
* typically called on ledger close or maintenance paths.
*/
void
sync() override
{
backend_->sync();
}
/** Synchronously fetch a batch of node objects by hash.
*
* Calls `backend_->fetchBatch()` directly, bypassing the async read queue.
* Enforces a positional contract: the returned vector is always the same
* length as @p hashes, with null entries for objects not found. Missing
* objects are logged at `error` level. Wall-clock elapsed time is reported
* via `updateFetchMetrics()`; per-slot hit counts are not tracked here and
* remain the caller's responsibility.
*
* @note The batch-level `Status` from the backend is discarded; object
* availability is inferred entirely from null vs. non-null slots.
* @param hashes Ordered list of 256-bit keys to retrieve.
* @return Vector of the same length as @p hashes; null entries indicate
* objects absent from the backend.
*/
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>>
fetchBatch(std::vector<uint256> const& hashes);
/** Schedule a non-blocking background fetch for a single node object.
*
* Forwards unconditionally to `Database::asyncFetch()`, which coalesces
* duplicate hash requests and dispatches callbacks from the worker thread
* pool. No per-backend routing is needed for the single-backend case.
*
* @param hash 256-bit key of the object to retrieve.
* @param ledgerSeq Ledger sequence the object belongs to; forwarded for
* hash-coalescing decisions via `isSameDB()`.
* @param callback Invoked on a worker thread with the fetched `NodeObject`,
* or `nullptr` on miss or error.
*/
void
asyncFetch(
uint256 const& hash,
@@ -77,13 +199,37 @@ public:
std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject> const&)>&& callback) override;
private:
// Persistent key/value storage
/** The single persistent key/value backend that holds all ledger objects. */
std::shared_ptr<Backend> backend_;
/** Template Method hook called by the base-class public `fetchNodeObject()`.
*
* Delegates to `backend_->fetch()` with structured error logging:
* `Status::Ok` and `Status::NotFound` are silent; `Status::DataCorrupt`
* logs at `fatal`; any other code logs at `warn`. Exceptions from the
* backend are logged at `fatal` then re-raised via `Rethrow()`. Sets
* `fetchReport.wasFound = true` on a hit to feed the base-class metric.
* The ledger sequence parameter is accepted by the signature but unused.
*
* @param hash 256-bit key to look up.
* @param fetchReport Mutable report; `wasFound` is set on a hit.
* @param duplicate Whether this fetch was deduplicated from another
* in-flight request for the same hash; unused in this implementation.
* @return The fetched `NodeObject`, or `nullptr` on miss or error.
* @throws Any exception propagated from `backend_->fetch()` after logging.
*/
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>
fetchNodeObject(uint256 const& hash, std::uint32_t, FetchReport& fetchReport, bool duplicate)
override;
/** Iterate every object in the backend and invoke @p f for each one.
*
* Used exclusively by `importInternal()` for bulk export. Delegates
* directly to `backend_->forEach()`. Not safe for concurrent access with
* reads or writes; see `Backend::forEach()` for details.
*
* @param f Callback invoked with each `NodeObject`; must not be null.
*/
void
forEach(std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>)> f) override
{

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,24 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Concrete two-backend node store that enables online deletion of old ledger data.
*
* Maintains a _writable_ backend (receives all new stores) and an _archive_
* backend (holds older data). The `SHAMapStore` sweep thread drives rotations:
* when the configured deletion horizon is reached it calls `rotate()`, which
* atomically promotes the current writable to archive, installs a fresh backend
* as the new writable, and schedules the old archive for deletion.
*
* All public methods follow a capture-under-lock / use-outside-lock pattern:
* the mutex protects only the `shared_ptr` swap, not the backend I/O. This
* keeps unrelated readers and writers concurrent during disk operations.
*
* **Thread safety**: all public methods are safe to call from any thread
* concurrently. `stop()` must be called in the derived destructor before
* the base `Database` destructor tears down the async read pool.
*
* @see DatabaseRotating, Database, SHAMapStoreImp
*/
class DatabaseRotatingImp : public DatabaseRotating
{
public:
@@ -14,6 +32,20 @@ public:
DatabaseRotatingImp&
operator=(DatabaseRotatingImp const&) = delete;
/** Construct the rotating database and initialise the async read pool.
*
* Both backends must already be open. Their `fdRequired()` values are
* accumulated into `fdRequired_` so the application can pre-validate the
* process file-descriptor limit before any I/O begins.
*
* @param scheduler Task scheduler for async dispatch and telemetry;
* must outlive this object.
* @param readThreads Number of async read worker threads to spawn.
* @param writableBackend The backend that receives all new stores.
* @param archiveBackend The backend holding older (pre-rotation) data.
* @param config `[node_db]` config section forwarded to `Database`.
* @param j Logging sink.
*/
DatabaseRotatingImp(
Scheduler& scheduler,
int readThreads,
@@ -22,48 +54,166 @@ public:
Section const& config,
beast::Journal j);
/** Destroy the rotating database.
*
* Calls `stop()` before the base destructor so that async worker threads
* stop invoking the virtual `fetchNodeObject()` while derived data members
* are still valid.
*/
~DatabaseRotatingImp() override
{
stop();
}
/** Atomically swap in a new writable backend, demoting the current one.
*
* The rotation sequence under the mutex is:
* 1. Mark the existing archive backend for on-disk deletion, move it into
* a local to extend its lifetime past the callback.
* 2. Promote the current writable backend to become the new archive.
* 3. Install @p newBackend as the writable backend.
*
* The lock is released before @p f is called. This ordering is critical:
* the callback (in production, `SHAMapStoreImp`) persists the new backend
* names to a SQLite state database. The old archive `shared_ptr` remains
* alive on the stack until after @p f returns, so the archive directory is
* deleted only after the persistent state has been updated — making the
* rotation crash-safe.
*
* @param newBackend Freshly prepared backend to install as the new writable.
* Ownership is transferred; the caller's pointer is null on return.
* @param f Callback invoked after the swap, outside the mutex.
* Receives the new writable name and the new archive name (the former
* writable). Must persist these names to durable storage before
* returning so the node can recover the correct layout after a crash.
* @note The callback is invoked outside the mutex, so other methods
* (including `getName()` and even `rotate()`) may be called from within
* @p f without deadlocking. Re-entering `rotate()` from @p f is
* technically safe but should never occur in production code.
*/
void
rotate(
std::unique_ptr<NodeStore::Backend>&& newBackend,
std::function<void(std::string const& writableName, std::string const& archiveName)> const&
f) override;
/** Return the name of the current writable backend.
*
* Acquires the mutex to take a consistent snapshot of `writableBackend_`.
*
* @return A human-readable identifier for the writable backend.
*/
std::string
getName() const override;
/** Return the estimated pending write count from the writable backend.
*
* Acquires the mutex to snapshot `writableBackend_`, then queries it
* outside the lock.
*
* @return Pending write count; 0 if the backend does not batch writes.
*/
std::int32_t
getWriteLoad() const override;
/** Bulk-import all objects from @p source into the current writable backend.
*
* Snapshots `writableBackend_` under the mutex, then delegates to
* `importInternal()`. A rotation that occurs concurrently will not affect
* the import — it continues writing to the backend that was writable when
* it started.
*
* @param source Source database to read from; must remain valid and
* quiescent (no concurrent writes) for the duration of the call.
*/
void
importDatabase(Database& source) override;
/** Return `true`, since both backends form a single logical namespace.
*
* The async read pool calls this to decide whether two in-flight fetches
* for the same hash (with different ledger sequence numbers) can share a
* single backend read. Because the rotating store presents one logical
* keyspace across both tiers, this always returns `true`.
*
* @return Always `true`.
*/
bool
isSameDB(std::uint32_t, std::uint32_t) override
{
// rotating store acts as one logical database
return true;
}
/** Store a node object in the current writable backend.
*
* Snapshots `writableBackend_` under the mutex, constructs a `NodeObject`
* from the supplied data, then writes it outside the lock. The ledger
* sequence parameter is accepted for interface compatibility but ignored —
* all writes always go to the current writable backend regardless of age.
*
* @param type Semantic type of the object.
* @param data Serialized payload; moved into the backend.
* @param hash 256-bit content hash; not re-verified.
* @param ledgerSeq Ignored; present for `Database` interface compatibility.
*/
void
store(NodeObjectType type, Blob&& data, uint256 const& hash, std::uint32_t) override;
/** Flush the writable backend to durable storage.
*
* Holds the mutex for the entire sync call. Acceptable because this is a
* maintenance path, not a latency-sensitive read/write path.
*/
void
sync() override;
private:
/** Active backend; receives all new `store()` calls. */
std::shared_ptr<Backend> writableBackend_;
/** Read-only backend holding data from before the last rotation. */
std::shared_ptr<Backend> archiveBackend_;
/** Guards swaps of `writableBackend_` and `archiveBackend_`.
* Held only for pointer capture or swap — never across I/O.
*/
mutable std::mutex mutex_;
/** Two-tier fetch with optional archive-to-writable promotion.
*
* Snapshots both backend pointers under the mutex, then tries the writable
* backend first. On a miss, tries the archive backend. If the object is
* found in the archive and @p duplicate is `true`, the writable pointer is
* refreshed under the mutex (to handle a concurrent rotation) and the
* object is written back into the current writable tier.
*
* Backend errors are handled conservatively: `DataCorrupt` is logged at
* fatal severity and returns `nullptr` (cache miss); unknown status codes
* are logged at warning level; exceptions are logged and rethrown via
* `Rethrow()`.
*
* @param hash 256-bit content hash of the desired object.
* @param ledgerSeq Ignored; accepted for `Database` virtual interface.
* @param fetchReport Out-param; `wasFound` is set to `true` on a hit.
* @param duplicate When `true`, a hit in the archive is promoted to
* the writable backend.
* @return The found `NodeObject`, or `nullptr` on miss or error.
*/
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>
fetchNodeObject(uint256 const& hash, std::uint32_t, FetchReport& fetchReport, bool duplicate)
override;
/** Visit every object in both backends sequentially.
*
* Snapshots both backend pointers under the mutex, then calls
* `writable->forEach(f)` followed by `archive->forEach(f)` outside the
* lock. Used by `importInternal()` during bulk import.
*
* @param f Callable invoked with each `NodeObject`; must not call any
* method that acquires `mutex_` to avoid deadlock.
* @note Not safe to call concurrently with `rotate()` or other writes if
* the backend's `for_each` re-opens the database (e.g. NuDB).
*/
void
forEach(std::function<void(std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>)> f) override;
};

View File

@@ -4,30 +4,84 @@
namespace xrpl::NodeStore {
/** Parsed key/value blob into NodeObject components.
This will extract the information required to construct a NodeObject. It
also does consistency checking and returns the result, so it is possible
to determine if the data is corrupted without throwing an exception. Not
all forms of corruption are detected so further analysis will be needed
to eliminate false negatives.
@note This defines the database format of a NodeObject!
*/
/** Deserializes a raw backend key/value buffer into the components of a
* `NodeObject`.
*
* This is the read-direction half of the NodeStore on-disk format, paired
* with `EncodedBlob`. Together they define the canonical binary schema for
* persisted node objects; any format change must be reflected in both classes.
*
* On-disk layout (canonical reference):
* - Bytes 07: Unused prefix. Historically stored a ledger index; written
* as eight zero bytes today and silently ignored on read.
* - Byte 8: `NodeObjectType` discriminant (one-byte enum value).
* - Bytes 9+: Raw serialized object payload.
*
* Validation is intentionally minimal and non-throwing: the constructor sets
* an internal success flag rather than raising an exception, allowing callers
* to handle corruption gracefully (see `wasOk()`). Not all corruption is
* detected — this is a fast sanity check, not a cryptographic integrity proof.
*
* `DecodedBlob` holds non-owning pointers into the caller-supplied buffers;
* the backing storage must remain valid until `createObject()` is called or
* the `DecodedBlob` is destroyed.
*
* @note This class defines the database format of a `NodeObject`.
* @see EncodedBlob for the write-direction counterpart.
*/
class DecodedBlob
{
public:
/** Construct the decoded blob from raw data. */
/** Parse a raw backend buffer into its constituent NodeObject fields.
*
* Validates the on-disk layout without performing any heap allocation.
* `key_` and `objectData_` are set to non-owning pointers into the
* caller-supplied buffers; the actual payload copy is deferred to
* `createObject()`. The caller must keep both buffers alive for the
* lifetime of this object.
*
* Parsing succeeds (`wasOk()` returns `true`) only when `valueBytes > 9`
* and the type byte at offset 8 is one of the four recognised values:
* `hotUNKNOWN`, `hotLEDGER`, `hotACCOUNT_NODE`, or `hotTRANSACTION_NODE`.
* `hotDUMMY` (value 512) and any unrecognised byte leave the object in a
* failed state without throwing.
*
* @param key Pointer to the 32-byte hash that was used as the
* storage key; not validated or dereferenced here.
* @param value Pointer to the raw value buffer retrieved from the
* backend.
* @param valueBytes Total byte length of `value`. Values of 9 or fewer
* bytes produce a failed parse.
*/
DecodedBlob(void const* key, void const* value, int valueBytes);
/** Determine if the decoding was successful. */
/** Returns `true` if the constructor successfully parsed a well-formed
* buffer with a recognised `NodeObjectType`.
*
* Must be checked before calling `createObject()`. Calling `createObject()`
* on a failed `DecodedBlob` fires `XRPL_ASSERT` in debug builds.
*/
[[nodiscard]] bool
wasOk() const noexcept
{
return success_;
}
/** Create a NodeObject from this data. */
/** Allocate and return a `NodeObject` from the previously parsed fields.
*
* Copies the payload slice into an owning `Blob` and reconstructs the
* full hash key from the stored pointer. This is the only heap allocation
* in the decode path. The returned `NodeObject` owns its data
* independently, so the caller may release the backend fetch buffer
* immediately after this call returns.
*
* @pre `wasOk()` must return `true`. Calling this on a failed parse fires
* `XRPL_ASSERT` in debug builds; in release builds a null
* `shared_ptr` is returned as a defensive fallback.
* @return A fully constructed `NodeObject`, or `nullptr` if the parse had
* failed (release-build defensive path — callers must always check
* `wasOk()` first).
*/
std::shared_ptr<NodeObject>
createObject();

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