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16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ed Hennis
72c700c3e0 Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-28 16:23:38 -04:00
Ed Hennis
4589fcbcfc Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-25 14:45:54 -04:00
Ed Hennis
86d840f53d Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-23 15:56:11 -04:00
Ed Hennis
741b61cdf3 Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-22 23:40:28 -04:00
Ed Hennis
6bb0989c9f Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-22 14:49:12 -04:00
Ed Hennis
9120506613 Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-22 13:10:44 -04:00
Ed Hennis
3b3de96bd4 Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-21 18:48:39 -04:00
Ed Hennis
c9ab6ab25f Merge remote-tracking branch 'XRPLF/develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache
* XRPLF/develop:
  chore: Remove empty Taker.h (6984)
  chore: Enable clang-tidy modernize checks (6975)
  ci: Upload clang-tidy git diff (6983)
  fix: Add rounding to Vault invariants (6217) (6955)
2026-04-21 18:46:58 -04:00
Ed Hennis
fb0605cfd3 Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-20 17:49:47 -04:00
Ed Hennis
156553bb5e Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-20 15:45:04 -04:00
Ed Hennis
781b56849b Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-20 11:39:06 -04:00
Ed Hennis
278c02bebb Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-17 18:11:31 -04:00
Ed Hennis
1d6fedf9a2 Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-16 13:44:37 -04:00
Ed Hennis
2e8de499aa Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-15 19:06:29 -04:00
Ed Hennis
0bce3639a6 Merge branch 'develop' into ximinez/fix/validator-cache 2026-04-15 14:28:55 -04:00
Ed Hennis
8f329e3bc6 Use Validator List (VL) cache files in more scenarios
- If any [validator_list_keys] are not available after all
  [validator_list_sites] have had a chance to be queried, then fall
  back to loading cache files. Currently, cache files are only used if
  no sites are defined, or the request to one of them has an error. It
  does not include cases where not enough sites are defined, or if a
  site returns an invalid VL (or something else entirely).
- Resolves #5320
2026-04-13 19:46:06 -04:00
5 changed files with 51 additions and 332 deletions

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ removeTokenOffersWithLimit(
Keylet const& directory,
std::size_t maxDeletableOffers);
/** Returns tesSUCCESS if NFToken has few enough offers that it can be burned */
TER
notTooManyOffers(ReadView const& view, uint256 const& nftokenID);
/** Finds the specified token in the owner's token directory. */
std::optional<STObject>
findToken(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& owner, uint256 const& nftokenID);

View File

@@ -621,6 +621,33 @@ removeTokenOffersWithLimit(ApplyView& view, Keylet const& directory, std::size_t
return deletedOffersCount;
}
TER
notTooManyOffers(ReadView const& view, uint256 const& nftokenID)
{
std::size_t totalOffers = 0;
{
Dir const buys(view, keylet::nft_buys(nftokenID));
for (auto iter = buys.begin(); iter != buys.end(); iter.next_page())
{
totalOffers += iter.page_size();
if (totalOffers > maxDeletableTokenOfferEntries)
return tefTOO_BIG;
}
}
{
Dir const sells(view, keylet::nft_sells(nftokenID));
for (auto iter = sells.begin(); iter != sells.end(); iter.next_page())
{
totalOffers += iter.page_size();
if (totalOffers > maxDeletableTokenOfferEntries)
return tefTOO_BIG;
}
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
bool
deleteTokenOffer(ApplyView& view, std::shared_ptr<SLE> const& offer)
{

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include <test/jtx/escrow.h>
#include <test/jtx/fee.h>
#include <test/jtx/flags.h>
#include <test/jtx/mpt.h>
#include <test/jtx/offer.h>
#include <test/jtx/paths.h>
#include <test/jtx/pay.h>
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@
#include <test/jtx/ter.h>
#include <test/jtx/trust.h>
#include <test/jtx/txflags.h>
#include <test/jtx/vault.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
@@ -37,7 +35,6 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Quality.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
@@ -7063,200 +7060,10 @@ private:
{all});
}
// Create a single-asset vault, deposit assets so the depositor receives
// shares (an MPT issued by the vault pseudo-account), then pair those
// shares with XRP in an AMM. Finally do a single-asset deposit of more
// shares into the AMM.
void
testVaultSharesAMM()
{
testcase("Vault Shares paired with XRP in AMM");
using namespace jtx;
// Vaults rely on featureSingleAssetVault (which the AMM_test class
// strips by default). MPT-AMM pairs require featureMPTokensV2.
FeatureBitset const features{
jtx::testable_amendments() | featureSingleAssetVault | featureMPTokensV2};
Env env{*this, features};
Account const owner{"vaultOwner"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000'000), owner);
env.close();
// Use XRP as the vault asset for simplicity.
PrettyAsset const asset{xrpIssue(), 1'000'000};
Vault const vault{env};
auto [vaultTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = owner, .asset = asset});
env(vaultTx);
env.close();
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(vaultKeylet)))
return;
// Deposit 10,000 XRP into the vault. Owner receives shares (MPT)
// issued by the vault's pseudo-account.
env(vault.deposit(
{.depositor = owner, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(10'000).value()}));
env.close();
auto const vaultSle = env.le(vaultKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(vaultSle))
return;
MPTID const shareMptID = vaultSle->at(sfShareMPTID);
MPTIssue const shareIssue{shareMptID};
// The share MPT is issued by the vault's pseudo-account. Memoize so
// env.balance() can format share amounts.
env.memoize(Account{"vaultPseudo", vaultSle->at(sfAccount)});
// XRP vaults use scale=6, so a 10,000 XRP deposit yields
// 10,000 * 1e6 = 10^10 share units (raw MPT amount).
STAmount const sharesHeld = env.balance(owner, shareIssue);
BEAST_EXPECT(sharesHeld.mantissa() == 10'000'000'000ull);
BEAST_EXPECT(sharesHeld.asset() == shareIssue);
// Seed the AMM with half the shares + 5,000 XRP.
STAmount const halfShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{5'000'000'000});
AMM ammOwner(env, owner, halfShares, XRP(5'000));
BEAST_EXPECT(ammOwner.ammExists());
// Single-asset deposit: add 2,500,000,000 more shares (a quarter of
// the original holding) to the share side of the pool.
STAmount const extraShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{2'500'000'000});
ammOwner.deposit(owner, extraShares);
// The share-side pool should now equal halfShares + extraShares,
// while the XRP-side balance is unchanged at 5,000 XRP.
auto const [shareBalance, xrpBalance, lpt] = ammOwner.balances(shareIssue, xrpIssue());
BEAST_EXPECT(shareBalance == halfShares + extraShares);
BEAST_EXPECT(xrpBalance == XRP(5'000));
// Owner now holds the original 10B shares minus what was put into the
// AMM (5B seed + 2.5B single-asset deposit) = 2.5B.
STAmount const expectedOwnerShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{2'500'000'000});
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(owner, shareIssue) == expectedOwnerShares);
}
// Create a Vault whose underlying asset is a lockable / clawback-able
// MPT. Pair the vault shares with XRP in an AMM. Transfer half of the
// owner's LP tokens to a second account, then issuer-lock the
// underlying MPT, then try to transfer LP tokens / cash out again.
//
// Locking the underlying MPT cascades up via
// `isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen`: the vault-share MPT is treated as
// frozen because its underlying is locked. So:
// - LP-token Payment after lock fails (`tecPATH_DRY`).
// - AMM withdrawal of LP tokens fails (`tecFROZEN`).
// The LP tokens are effectively stuck for as long as the underlying
// MPT remains locked.
void
testLockedVaultMPTCashOut()
{
testcase("Cash out LP Tokens after vault MPT locked");
using namespace jtx;
FeatureBitset const features{
jtx::testable_amendments() | featureSingleAssetVault | featureMPTokensV2};
Env env{*this, features};
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const owner{"vaultOwner"};
Account const trader{"trader"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000'000), issuer, owner, trader);
env.close();
// Underlying MPT supports lock + clawback. MPTDEXFlags adds
// CanTransfer + CanTrade so the vault and AMM can route it.
MPTTester mpt(
{.env = env,
.issuer = issuer,
.holders = {owner},
.pay = 100'000,
.flags = tfMPTCanLock | tfMPTCanClawback | MPTDEXFlags});
PrettyAsset const asset = MPT(mpt);
// Create the vault.
Vault const vault{env};
auto [vaultTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = owner, .asset = asset});
env(vaultTx);
env.close();
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(vaultKeylet)))
return;
// Deposit 50,000 of the underlying MPT.
env(vault.deposit(
{.depositor = owner, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(50'000).value()}));
env.close();
auto const vaultSle = env.le(vaultKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(vaultSle))
return;
MPTID const shareMptID = vaultSle->at(sfShareMPTID);
MPTIssue const shareIssue{shareMptID};
env.memoize(Account{"vaultPseudo", vaultSle->at(sfAccount)});
// MPT vaults use scale=0, so 50,000 deposit -> 50,000 share units.
STAmount const sharesHeld = env.balance(owner, shareIssue);
BEAST_EXPECT(sharesHeld.mantissa() == 50'000);
// Create the AMM: 25,000 vault shares + 1,000 XRP.
STAmount const seedShares(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{25'000});
AMM ammOwner(env, owner, seedShares, XRP(1'000));
BEAST_EXPECT(ammOwner.ammExists());
// The AMM pseudo-account issues the LP tokens; memoize so
// env.balance() can format LP-token amounts.
env.memoize(Account{"ammPseudo", ammOwner.ammAccount()});
// Owner's LP token balance after AMM creation.
auto const lptIssue = ammOwner.lptIssue();
STAmount const lptOwner0 = env.balance(owner, lptIssue);
STAmount const lptZero(lptIssue, std::uint32_t{0});
BEAST_EXPECT(lptOwner0 != lptZero);
// Trader needs a trust line to receive LP tokens.
STAmount const lptTrustLimit(lptIssue, std::uint64_t{1'000'000'000});
env(trust(trader, lptTrustLimit));
env.close();
// Step 1: transfer half the LP tokens from owner -> trader.
STAmount const halfLpt(lptIssue, lptOwner0.mantissa() / 2, lptOwner0.exponent());
env(pay(owner, trader, halfLpt));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, lptIssue) == halfLpt);
// Step 2: issuer locks the underlying MPT.
mpt.set({.flags = tfMPTLock});
env.close();
// Step 3: transfer LP tokens again. The lock on the underlying MPT
// cascades through the vault-share issuance via
// isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen, so the AMM-routed Payment fails.
STAmount const quarterLpt(lptIssue, lptOwner0.mantissa() / 4, lptOwner0.exponent());
env(pay(owner, trader, quarterLpt), ter(tecPATH_DRY));
env.close();
// Trader's balance is still just the half from before the lock.
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, lptIssue) == halfLpt);
// Step 4: try to cash out the LP tokens. The AMM withdrawal must
// touch the vault-share side, which is now treated as frozen
// because its underlying is locked, so the withdrawal fails.
ammOwner.withdrawAll(trader, std::nullopt, ter(tecFROZEN));
env.close();
// Trader still holds the LP tokens; nothing was redeemed.
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, lptIssue) == halfLpt);
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(trader, shareIssue) == STAmount(shareIssue, std::uint64_t{0}));
}
void
run() override
{
FeatureBitset const all{testable_amendments()};
testVaultSharesAMM();
testLockedVaultMPTCashOut();
testInvalidInstance();
testInstanceCreate();
testInvalidDeposit(all);

View File

@@ -6139,141 +6139,6 @@ class Vault_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
runTest(amendments);
}
// Issuer mutates the underlying MPT's lsfMPTCanTransfer / lsfMPTCanTrade
// flags after holders have already deposited into a vault. Demonstrates:
//
// - VaultDeposit and VaultWithdraw both go through `canTransfer`,
// so clearing lsfMPTCanTransfer freezes every holder's funds in
// the vault until the issuer re-enables the flag (`tecNO_AUTH`).
//
// - The issuer is exempt: `canTransfer` short-circuits when either
// side of the transfer is the issuer, so the issuer can still
// deposit and withdraw.
//
// - lsfMPTCanTrade is *not* checked by VaultDeposit/VaultWithdraw at
// all — clearing it has no effect on vault I/O. (It only gates
// DEX/AMM operations via `canTrade`.)
void
testMutateCanTransferAfterDeposit()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase("MPT vault: clearing CanTransfer/CanTrade after deposit");
Env env{*this, testable_amendments() | featureSingleAssetVault};
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const alice{"alice"};
Account const bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, alice, bob);
env.close();
// MPT is transferable, tradable, lockable, and clawback-capable. Both
// CanTransfer and CanTrade are mutable so the issuer can flip them
// later via MPTokenIssuanceSet.
MPTTester mptt{env, issuer, mptInitNoFund};
mptt.create(
{.flags = tfMPTCanTransfer | tfMPTCanTrade | tfMPTCanLock | tfMPTCanClawback,
.mutableFlags = tmfMPTCanMutateCanTransfer | tmfMPTCanMutateCanTrade});
PrettyAsset const asset = mptt.issuanceID();
mptt.authorize({.account = alice});
mptt.authorize({.account = bob});
env(pay(issuer, alice, asset(100'000)));
env(pay(issuer, bob, asset(100'000)));
env.close();
Vault const vault{env};
auto [createTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = alice, .asset = asset});
env(createTx);
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(vaultKeylet));
// Both holders deposit. Issuer also deposits (issuer can be a
// depositor too) so we can later confirm the issuer-exempt path.
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(50'000)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = bob, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(30'000)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(20'000)}));
env.close();
// -- 1. Issuer clears lsfMPTCanTransfer ---------------------------
mptt.set({.mutableFlags = tmfMPTClearCanTransfer});
env.close();
{
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::mptIssuance(asset.raw().get<MPTIssue>().getMptID()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTransfer));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTrade));
}
// 2. Holder deposits and withdrawals are blocked: vault pseudo-
// account is neither sender nor receiver = issuer, so
// canTransfer returns tecNO_AUTH.
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = bob, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
// 3. Issuer-as-depositor is exempt — `canTransfer` short-circuits
// on the issuer side. Both deposit and withdraw succeed.
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(5'000)}));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(5'000)}));
env.close();
// 3b. A holder can also escape by withdrawing *to the issuer* via
// sfDestination. `canTransfer`'s issuer short-circuit fires on
// `to == issuer`, so the withdrawal succeeds even though
// CanTransfer is cleared. The holder's shares are burned and
// the underlying MPT lands at the issuer (presumably part of
// an off-ledger redemption arrangement).
auto const aliceMptBefore = env.balance(alice, asset);
auto withdrawToIssuer =
vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(2'000)});
withdrawToIssuer[sfDestination] = issuer.human();
env(withdrawToIssuer);
env.close();
// Alice's MPT balance is unchanged — the asset went to the issuer,
// not back to her — but her share holding was burned.
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(alice, asset) == aliceMptBefore);
// -- 4. Also clear lsfMPTCanTrade. Vault paths don't consult
// CanTrade, so this changes nothing for vault I/O. ----------
mptt.set({.mutableFlags = tmfMPTClearCanTrade});
env.close();
{
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::mptIssuance(asset.raw().get<MPTIssue>().getMptID()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTrade));
}
// Holder ops still fail the same way (CanTransfer-driven), and the
// issuer is still exempt.
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = issuer, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(1'000)}));
env.close();
// -- 5. Re-enable CanTransfer; leave CanTrade cleared. ------------
mptt.set({.mutableFlags = tmfMPTSetCanTransfer});
env.close();
// Holders can now withdraw all their stake — confirms CanTrade is
// not consulted by the vault transactors. Alice already redeemed
// 2,000 to the issuer, so only 48,000 remains for her.
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = alice, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(48'000)}));
env(vault.withdraw({.depositor = bob, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = asset(30'000)}));
env.close();
{
auto const sle = env.le(keylet::mptIssuance(asset.raw().get<MPTIssue>().getMptID()));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTransfer));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle && !sle->isFlag(lsfMPTCanTrade));
}
}
public:
void
run() override
@@ -6297,7 +6162,6 @@ public:
testAssetsMaximum();
testBug6_LimitBypassWithShares();
testRemoveEmptyHoldingLockedAmount();
testMutateCanTransferAfterDeposit();
}
};

View File

@@ -161,7 +161,11 @@ ValidatorSite::load(
{
try
{
sites_.emplace_back(uri);
// This is not super efficient, but it doesn't happen often.
bool found = std::ranges::any_of(
sites_, [&uri](auto const& site) { return site.loadedResource->uri == uri; });
if (!found)
sites_.emplace_back(uri);
}
catch (std::exception const& e)
{
@@ -222,7 +226,17 @@ ValidatorSite::setTimer(
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> const& site_lock,
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> const& state_lock)
{
auto next = std::ranges::min_element(
if (!sites_.empty() && //
std::ranges::all_of(
sites_, [](auto const& site) { return site.lastRefreshStatus.has_value(); }))
{
// If all of the sites have been handled at least once (including
// errors and timeouts), call missingSite, which will load the cache
// files for any lists that are still unavailable.
missingSite(site_lock);
}
auto const next = std::ranges::min_element(
sites_, [](Site const& a, Site const& b) { return a.nextRefresh < b.nextRefresh; });
if (next != sites_.end())
@@ -333,7 +347,7 @@ ValidatorSite::onRequestTimeout(std::size_t siteIdx, error_code const& ec)
// processes a network error. Usually, this function runs first,
// but on extremely rare occasions, the response handler can run
// first, which will leave activeResource empty.
auto const& site = sites_[siteIdx];
auto& site = sites_[siteIdx];
if (site.activeResource)
{
JLOG(j_.warn()) << "Request for " << site.activeResource->uri << " took too long";
@@ -341,6 +355,9 @@ ValidatorSite::onRequestTimeout(std::size_t siteIdx, error_code const& ec)
else
JLOG(j_.error()) << "Request took too long, but a response has "
"already been processed";
if (!site.lastRefreshStatus)
site.lastRefreshStatus.emplace(
Site::Status{clock_type::now(), ListDisposition::invalid, "timeout"});
}
std::lock_guard const lock_state{state_mutex_};