docs: show the memory_limit section form and name the cgroup limit in the budget warning

# Conflicts:
#	src/xrpld/core/detail/Config.cpp

.cspell.config.yaml

@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ words:
   - venv
   - vfalco
   - vinnie
+  - vkeylet
   - wasmi
   - wextra
   - wptr

.github/actions/setup-nix-env/action.yml

@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@ runs:
         # Unlike the Linux nix images, macOS needs no SSL_CERT_FILE: it has its
         # own trust store, and pinning would break TLS to hosts relying on it.
 
-        # In RUNNER_TEMP, which the runner empties per job, like the `.conan2`
-        # prepare-runner hands the system toolchain - but under its own name:
-        # that Conan is a different version, and the two would migrate each
-        # other's cache.
-        echo "CONAN_HOME=${RUNNER_TEMP}/.conan2-nix" >>"${GITHUB_ENV}"
+        # Workspace-local, so `cleanup-workspace` clears it, but not the
+        # `.conan2` prepare-runner hands the system toolchain: that Conan is a
+        # different version, and the two would migrate each other's cache.
+        echo "CONAN_HOME=${{ github.workspace }}/.conan2-nix" >>"${GITHUB_ENV}"
 
     # Config, profiles and remote, exactly as the dev shell sets them up on
     # entry; the `setup-conan` action is skipped for this toolchain.

.github/pull_request_template.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ If too broad, please consider splitting into multiple PRs.
 If there is a relevant task or issue, please link it here.
 -->
 
-## Context of Change
+### Context of Change
 
 <!--
 Please include the context of a change.
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ If a refactor, how is this better than the previous implementation?
 If there is a spec or design document for this feature, please link it here.
 -->
 
-## API Impact
+### API Impact
 
 <!--
 Please check [x] relevant options, delete irrelevant ones.

.github/scripts/strategy-matrix/linux.json

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
         "extra_cmake_args": "-Dvalidator_keys=ON",
         "package": {
           "type": "deb",
-          "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-49cdc10"
+          "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-b6a8995"
         }
       }
     ],
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
         "extra_cmake_args": "-Dvalidator_keys=ON",
         "package": {
           "type": "rpm",
-          "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-49cdc10"
+          "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-b6a8995"
         }
       }
     ]

.github/workflows/build-nix-images.yml

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ jobs:
             base_image: debian:bookworm
           - name: rhel
             base_image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest
-    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@034e87065fcd0100214cf0672923bd38d193cf78
+    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@65d5a0bd72be4ecea95cff0673a6e0672ab5243a
     with:
       image_name: xrpld/nix-${{ matrix.distro.name }}
       dockerfile: nix/docker/Dockerfile

.github/workflows/build-packaging-images.yml

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
           # AlmaLinux rather than UBI, which does not ship rpm-sign.
           - name: rhel
             base_image: almalinux:10
-    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@034e87065fcd0100214cf0672923bd38d193cf78
+    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@65d5a0bd72be4ecea95cff0673a6e0672ab5243a
     with:
       image_name: xrpld/packaging-${{ matrix.distro.name }}
       dockerfile: package/docker/Dockerfile

.github/workflows/build-pre-commit-image.yml

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
     permissions:
       contents: read
       packages: write
-    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@034e87065fcd0100214cf0672923bd38d193cf78
+    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@65d5a0bd72be4ecea95cff0673a6e0672ab5243a
     with:
       image_name: xrpld/pre-commit
       dockerfile: bin/pre-commit/Dockerfile

.github/workflows/check-tools.yml

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
         with:
           enable_ccache: false
 

.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ on:
 jobs:
   # Call the workflow in the XRPLF/actions repo that runs the pre-commit hooks.
   run-hooks:
-    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@279ec358f4a1be4088be3e024b07916fa97c75b6
+    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@f1952595d212e86169935135efc66294b4574131
     with:
       runs_on: ubuntu-latest
       container: '{ "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/pre-commit:sha-473fe44" }'

.github/workflows/publish-docs.yml

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
         with:
           enable_ccache: false
 
@@ -91,4 +91,4 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Deploy to GitHub Pages
         id: deploy
-        uses: actions/deploy-pages@368f82528645a54fb793d4d04e342629a3f51346 # v5.0.1
+        uses: actions/deploy-pages@cd2ce8fcbc39b97be8ca5fce6e763baed58fa128 # v5.0.0

.github/workflows/reusable-build-test-config.yml

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
         with:
           enable_ccache: ${{ inputs.ccache_enabled }}
 

.github/workflows/reusable-clang-tidy.yml

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
         with:
           enable_ccache: false
 

.github/workflows/reusable-package.yml

@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
-# Build, verify and publish Linux packages from the pre-built xrpld and
-# validator-keys artifacts, in three stages:
+# Build Linux packages from the pre-built xrpld and validator-keys artifacts:
 #
-#   - 'package' builds and signs one format per config that carries a "package"
-#     map in linux.json; that map names the container image and the format
-#   - 'test-install' installs what was built on a range of distros and runs the
-#     binaries there, so a package that cannot be installed never reaches Nexus
-#   - 'publish' uploads with the image's publish_pkg.py, doing a --dry-run
-#     unless 'publish: true'
+#   - one job per config that carries a "package" map in linux.json
+#   - that map names the container image and the format it builds there
+#   - every job ends with the image's publish_pkg.py, uploading what it built
+#     with 'publish: true' and doing a --dry-run otherwise
 #
-# Only linux/amd64 is supported; the runner is hardcoded in the jobs below.
+# Only linux/amd64 is supported; the runner is hardcoded in the job below.
 name: Package
 
 on:
@@ -42,7 +39,6 @@ defaults:
 
 env:
   BUILD_DIR: build
-  PACKAGE_DIR: packages
 
 jobs:
   generate-matrix:
@@ -74,14 +70,14 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
     runs-on: ["self-hosted", "Linux", "X64", "heavy"]
     container: ${{ matrix.image }}
-    timeout-minutes: 10
+    timeout-minutes: 30
 
     steps:
       - name: Checkout repository
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
         with:
           enable_ccache: false
 
@@ -116,184 +112,24 @@ jobs:
               --pkg-release "${PKG_RELEASE}" \
               --channel "${CHANNEL}"
 
-      # Before the upload, so the artifact, the tested package and the published
-      # package are the same bytes.
+      # Before the upload, so the artifact and the published package are the
+      # same bytes. DEBs are not signed, so the key is never set on that job.
       - name: Sign RPM
         if: ${{ inputs.publish && matrix.package_type == 'rpm' }}
         env:
           PKG_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.signing_key }}
         run: ./package/sign_rpm.py --package-dir "${BUILD_DIR}"
 
-      # Split from the debug symbols, which are an order of magnitude larger, so
-      # that test-install downloads only what it installs.
       - name: Upload package artifact
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
         with:
           name: ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}-pkg
           path: |
-            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/xrpld_*.deb
-            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/rpmbuild/RPMS/**/xrpld-[0-9]*.rpm
+            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/*.deb
+            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/*.ddeb
+            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/rpmbuild/RPMS/**/*.rpm
           if-no-files-found: error
 
-      - name: Upload debug symbol artifact
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          name: ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}-pkg-debug
-          path: |
-            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/xrpld-dbgsym_*.deb
-            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/xrpld-dbgsym_*.ddeb
-            ${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/rpmbuild/RPMS/**/xrpld-debuginfo-*.rpm
-          if-no-files-found: error
-
-  # Every distro family the packages target, oldest release first, so both ends
-  # of the dependency range they declare are exercised.
-  test-install:
-    needs: [package]
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        include:
-          - package_type: deb
-            image: debian:11
-          - package_type: deb
-            image: debian:12
-          - package_type: deb
-            image: debian:13
-          - package_type: deb
-            image: ubuntu:20.04
-          - package_type: deb
-            image: ubuntu:22.04
-          - package_type: deb
-            image: ubuntu:24.04
-          - package_type: deb
-            image: ubuntu:26.04
-
-          - package_type: rpm
-            image: almalinux:9
-          - package_type: rpm
-            image: almalinux:10
-          - package_type: rpm
-            image: rockylinux/rockylinux:9
-          - package_type: rpm
-            image: rockylinux/rockylinux:10
-          - package_type: rpm
-            image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi
-          - package_type: rpm
-            image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi10/ubi
-    name: "install ${{ matrix.package_type }} on ${{ matrix.image }}"
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    container: ${{ matrix.image }}
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-
-    steps:
-      # Both formats land in one directory; the step below picks its own by
-      # extension, so this stays independent of the artifact names.
-      - name: Download package artifacts
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
-        with:
-          pattern: "*-pkg"
-          merge-multiple: true
-          path: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }}
-
-      - name: Find the package
-        id: find
-        env:
-          PACKAGE_TYPE: ${{ matrix.package_type }}
-        run: |
-          package="$(find "${PACKAGE_DIR}" -type f -name "*.${PACKAGE_TYPE}" -print -quit)"
-          test -n "${package}" || {
-              echo "no .${PACKAGE_TYPE} found in ${PACKAGE_DIR}" >&2
-              exit 1
-          }
-          echo "package=${package}" >>"${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
-
-      # Debian 11 went end-of-life on 2026-08-31
-      # (https://www.debian.org/News/2026/20260831) and its packages are
-      # already partly gone from deb.debian.org, so switch to the
-      # snapshot.debian.org entries the image ships commented out in its
-      # sources.list: they are pinned to the snapshot the image was built
-      # from, so they serve every version it needs and never go away.
-      # Snapshots keep their original, long-passed Valid-Until, hence the
-      # disabled check; the retries absorb snapshot.debian.org's throttling.
-      - name: Switch Debian 11 to snapshot.debian.org
-        if: ${{ matrix.image == 'debian:11' }}
-        run: |
-          sed -i 's|^deb |# deb |; s|^# deb http://snapshot|deb http://snapshot|' /etc/apt/sources.list
-          printf '%s\n' \
-              'Acquire::Check-Valid-Until "false";' \
-              'Acquire::Retries "3";' \
-              >/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99snapshot
-
-      - name: Install the DEB
-        if: ${{ matrix.package_type == 'deb' }}
-        env:
-          DEBIAN_FRONTEND: noninteractive
-          PACKAGE: ${{ steps.find.outputs.package }}
-        run: |
-          # Stock Debian and Ubuntu images carry no package lists, so apt has
-          # nothing to resolve the systemd dependency from until it fetches them.
-          apt-get update -qq
-          apt-get install -y "./${PACKAGE}"
-
-      - name: Install the RPM
-        if: ${{ matrix.package_type == 'rpm' }}
-        env:
-          PACKAGE: ${{ steps.find.outputs.package }}
-        run: dnf install -y "./${PACKAGE}"
-
-      - name: Run xrpld
-        run: xrpld --version
-
-      - name: Run validator-keys
-        run: validator-keys --version
-
-      - name: Run rippled, the legacy compatibility symlink
-        run: rippled --version
-
-      - name: Check the service account
-        run: id xrpld
-
-      - name: Check the state directory
-        run: test -d /var/lib/xrpld
-
-      - name: Check the log directory
-        run: test -d /var/log/xrpld
-
-  publish:
-    needs: [generate-matrix, package, test-install]
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix: ${{ fromJson(needs.generate-matrix.outputs.matrix) }}
-    name: "publish ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}"
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-    runs-on: ["self-hosted", "Linux", "X64", "heavy"]
-    container: ${{ matrix.image }}
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-
-      - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
-        with:
-          enable_ccache: false
-
-      # Both artifacts, so the debug symbols are published alongside the package.
-      - name: Download package artifacts
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
-        with:
-          pattern: ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}-pkg*
-          merge-multiple: true
-          path: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }}
-
-      - name: Determine release info
-        id: release_info
-        uses: ./.github/actions/release-info
-
       - name: Publish package
         env:
           CHANNEL: ${{ steps.release_info.outputs.channel }}
@@ -304,6 +140,6 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           publish_pkg.py \
               --channel "${CHANNEL}" \
-              --package-dir "${PACKAGE_DIR}" \
+              --package-dir "${BUILD_DIR}" \
               --nexus-url "${NEXUS_URL}" \
               ${DRY_RUN_OPTION}

.github/workflows/reusable-upload-recipe.yml

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
         with:
           enable_ccache: false
 

.github/workflows/upload-conan-deps.yml

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Prepare runner
-        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
+        uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
         with:
           enable_ccache: false
 

.gitignore

@@ -72,16 +72,11 @@ DerivedData
 /.zed/
 
 # AI tools.
-# Shared/committable AI agent config (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, GEMINI.md, .claude/settings.json,
-# tool-specific rules files, etc.) should be checked in — see CONTRIBUTING.md. Only the
-# personal/local variants below are ignored.
 /.agent
 /.agents
 /.augment
-/.claude/settings.local.json
-AGENTS.override.md
-CLAUDE.local.md
-GEMINI.local.md
+/.claude
+/CLAUDE.md
 
 # Python
 __pycache__

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# AGENTS.md
-
-This file provides guidance to AI coding agents (Claude Code, and other AGENTS.md-compatible tools) when working with code in this repository.
-
-## Build
-
-Required on Linux/macOS: use the Nix devshell, which sets up the compiler, Conan, ccache, and (optionally) Rust automatically.
-
-```bash
-nix develop
-```
-
-For alternate devshell variants (specific compiler, no-compiler, coverage), see [docs/build/nix.md](./docs/build/nix.md). For the manual build steps, CMake options, and protocol codegen commands, see [BUILD.md](./BUILD.md) (`## Steps`, `## Options`, `## Code generation`).
-
-Rust crate tests (independent of the CMake build): `cargo test --manifest-path crates/Cargo.toml --workspace` (CI uses `cargo nextest`).
-
-## Testing
-
-Unit tests are a custom framework built into the `xrpld` binary itself (not Boost.Test/GTest/Catch); see [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md#unit-tests) for the basic invocation. Notes not covered there:
-
-- A suite's `--unittest` name is built from the arguments to its `BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE`/`BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE_PRIO` macro (usually at the bottom of the test file), in reverse order and joined with `.`: `BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(Credentials, app, xrpl)` → `xrpl.app.Credentials`.
-- `--unittest-arg` does nothing — don't use it.
-- Tests that run offline in under a minute should be automatic `--unittest` suites; anything else is a manual/integration test.
-- New tests should be written using `gtest` under `src/tests/` unless that isn't possible, in which case fall back to the legacy Beast framework under `src/test/`. `tests/` (top-level) holds integration tests exercised against `libxrpl`/`xrpld`.
-
-## Lint/Format
-
-See [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md#pre-commit-hooks) for `pre-commit` setup and [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md#clang-tidy) for `clang-tidy` (opt-in, needs local `clang-tidy` and generated headers).
-
-## Code Style
-
-New file placement and header levelization: see [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md#before-making-a-pull-request). Braces, whitespace, member order, and other conventions: see [docs/CodingStyle.md](./docs/CodingStyle.md). `XRPL_ASSERT`/`UNREACHABLE` contracts: see [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md#contracts-and-instrumentation). Commit messages: see [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md#good-commit-messages).
-
-## Architecture
-
-Paths below reflect the current layout; update this section if modularization moves a subsystem to a different directory.
-
-- `include/xrpl/` + `src/libxrpl/` — the core protocol library: ledger, shamap, consensus, crypto, json, resource, nodestore, rdb, peerfinder, and `tx/` (transaction application: `Transactor.cpp`, `applySteps.cpp`, invariants, payment paths). `tx/transactors/` has one file per transaction type, grouped by subsystem: `escrow/`, `vault/`, `lending/`, `sponsor/`, `nft/`, `token/` (MPT), `payment_channel/`, `permissioned_domain/`, `dex/`, `oracle/`, `did/`, `credentials/`, `bridge/`, `check/`, `delegate/`, `account/`, `system/`. Any change to transaction-processing behavior must be gated behind an Amendment.
-- `src/xrpld/` — the server application built on top of `libxrpl`: `app`, `core`, `overlay` (P2P networking), `peerfinder`, `perflog`, `rpc`, `shamap`. `main` builds an `ApplicationImp` implementing `Application`; most components hold a reference to it (`app_`), giving broad cross-component access — expect to trace call chains through `Application&`.
-- `src/test/` — unit tests mirroring the subsystems above, plus `jtx/` (the transaction-building test DSL — e.g. `jtx/escrow.h`, `jtx/vault.h`, `jtx/sponsor.h`, `jtx/permissioned_dex.h`) and `unit_test/` (the custom test framework itself, derived from Beast).
-- `src/tests/` — unit tests for `libxrpl` written in `gtest`, gradually replacing the `src/test` equivalents.
-- `crates/` — a Rust workspace (only built with `-Dxrpld -Drust=ON`) bridged into C++ via `cxxbridge`/the `cxx` crate; currently just a `hello_world` interop scaffold. Requires the Rust toolchain pinned in `rust-toolchain.toml` (the Nix devshell provides it automatically).

API-CHANGELOG.md

@@ -22,47 +22,19 @@ API version 2 is available in `xrpld` version 2.0.0 and later. See [API-VERSION-
 
 This version is supported by all `xrpld` versions. For WebSocket and HTTP JSON-RPC requests, it is currently the default API version used when no `api_version` is specified.
 
-## XRP Ledger server version 3.4.0
+## Unreleased
 
-Version 3.4.0 is not yet released. These changes are available in the 3.4.0 beta releases.
+This section contains changes targeting a future version.
 
-### Additions in 3.4.0
+### Additions
 
-- `ledger`: `nftoken_id`, `nftoken_ids`, and `offer_id` are now included in transaction metadata when transactions are expanded (`expand`, or admin-only `full`), matching the `tx`, `account_tx`, and `subscribe` (`transactions` stream) responses. ([#5706](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/5706))
+- `server_info` (admin): The `node_size` field has been removed along with the deprecated `[node_size]` config setting it reported. Admin responses now include `memory_limit`, the cache memory budget in gigabytes (0 when enforcement is disabled).
 
-### Bugfixes in 3.4.0
-
-- `sign`, `sign_for`, `submit`: `signature_target` now returns `invalidParams` unless it names `CounterpartySignature` or `SponsorSignature`. It previously accepted any inner object field, such as `Book` or `NFToken`, and signed into it.
-- `sign`, `sign_for`, `submit`, `submit_multisigned`: With `fixCleanup3_4_0` enabled, a signature in `CounterpartySignature` or `SponsorSignature` covers a different prefix than the transaction's own signature, so a signature can no longer be moved from one of those roles into another. Clients that build these signatures themselves must use the new prefixes: `CPT` and `CPM` (single- and multi-signing) for `CounterpartySignature`, and `SPN` and `SPM` for `SponsorSignature`.
-- `get_aggregate_price`: Duplicate entries in the `oracles` request array are now ignored. [#6586](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6586)
-- `vault_info`: Errors now identify what the request got wrong instead of reporting every failure as the unregistered token `malformedRequest`, and the `error`, `error_code` and `error_message` fields now agree with each other. An invalid `vault_id` or `seq` returns `invalidParams`, an invalid `owner` returns `actMalformed`, and a request that mixes `vault_id` with `owner`/`seq` or supplies neither returns `invalidParams` with a message naming the accepted combinations. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
-- `vault_info`: A well-formed all-zero `vault_id` now returns `entryNotFound` instead of being rejected as malformed, and `entryNotFound` responses now include `error_code` and `error_message`. Clients that request `ripplerpc` 3.0 or above therefore receive HTTP 400 with that error rather than HTTP 200. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
-- `vault_info`: `vault_id` and `owner` must now be strings, matching how `ledger_entry` reads the same fields. An object or an array in either field previously produced an internal error, and a number was silently converted to its decimal text; `vault_id` now returns `invalidParams` and `owner` returns `actMalformed`. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
-- `gateway_balances`: The `account` and `ident` fields now return an `invalidParams` error if the value is not a string, instead of an `internal` error. [#7655](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7655)
-- `account_lines`: The `peer` field now returns an error if the value is not a string. [#7728](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7728)
-- `ledger`: `delivered_amount` is now included in the metadata of successful `AccountDelete` transactions when transactions are expanded (`expand`, or admin-only `full`). Previously it was only added for `Payment` and `CheckCash`, which made `ledger` inconsistent with `tx` and `account_tx`. [#5706](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/5706)
-
-## XRP Ledger server version 3.3.0
-
-[Version 3.3.0](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.3.0) was released on Aug 6, 2026.
-
-### Additions in 3.3.0
-
-- `account_tx`: Added an optional `delegate` request object to filter delegated transactions. The object requires `delegate_filter`, which must be either `actor` for transactions owned by the requested account but signed by another account, or `authorizer` for transactions signed by the requested account on behalf of another account. The optional `counter_party` account narrows the results to a specific signer/delegate for `actor` or a specific owner/delegator for `authorizer`. Malformed `delegate`, `delegate_filter`, and `counter_party` values return standard invalid field errors, and invalid account IDs return `actMalformed`. When paginating delegate-filtered queries, a marker from a delegate-filtered query includes a `delegate` flag and is only valid for follow-up requests that also supply `delegate` (mixing marker conventions returns `invalidParams`). Because filtering is applied after the ledger scan, a page may contain fewer results than `limit` (possibly zero) while still returning a marker, so callers must continue until no marker is present. ([#6126](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6126))
-
-## XRP Ledger server version 3.2.1
-
-[Version 3.2.1](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.2.1) was released on Aug 1, 2026.
-
-This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
-
-## XRP Ledger server version 3.2.0
-
-[Version 3.2.0](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.2.0) was released on Jun 16, 2026.
-
-### Additions in 3.2.0
+- `account_tx`: Added an optional `delegate` request object to filter delegated transactions. The object requires `delegate_filter`, which must be either `actor` for transactions owned by the requested account but signed by another account, or `authorizer` for transactions signed by the requested account on behalf of another account. The optional `counter_party` account narrows the results to a specific signer/delegate for `actor` or a specific owner/delegator for `authorizer`. Malformed `delegate`, `delegate_filter`, and `counter_party` values return standard invalid field errors, and invalid account IDs return `actMalformed`.
+  When paginating delegate-filtered queries, a marker from a delegate-filtered query includes a `delegate` flag and is only valid for follow-up requests that also supply `delegate` (mixing marker conventions returns `invalidParams`). Because filtering is applied after the ledger scan, a page may contain fewer results than `limit` (possibly zero) while still returning a marker, so callers must continue until no marker is present.
 
 - `ledger_entry`, `account_objects`: The `Delegate` ledger entry now includes an optional `DestinationNode` field, which stores the index into the authorized account's owner directory. This field is present on entries created after bidirectional directory tracking was introduced and may appear in RPC responses for those entries. ([#6681](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6681))
+
 - `server_definitions`: Added the following new sections to the response ([#6321](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6321)):
   - `TRANSACTION_FORMATS`: Describes the fields and their optionality for each transaction type, including common fields shared across all transactions.
   - `LEDGER_ENTRY_FORMATS`: Describes the fields and their optionality for each ledger entry type, including common fields shared across all ledger entries.
@@ -70,8 +42,9 @@ This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
   - `LEDGER_ENTRY_FLAGS`: Maps ledger entry type names to their flags and flag values.
   - `ACCOUNT_SET_FLAGS`: Maps AccountSet flag names (asf flags) to their numeric values.
 
-### Bugfixes in 3.2.0
+### Bugfixes
 
+- `get_aggregate_price`: Duplicate entries in the `oracles` request array are now ignored. [#6586](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6586)
 - Peer Crawler: The `port` field in `overlay.active[]` now consistently returns an integer instead of a string for outbound peers. [#6318](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6318)
 - `ping`: The `ip` field is no longer returned as an empty string for proxied connections without a forwarded-for header. It is now omitted, consistent with the behavior for identified connections. [#6730](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6730)
 - gRPC `GetLedgerDiff`: Fixed error message that incorrectly said "base ledger not validated" when the desired ledger was not validated. [#6730](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6730)
@@ -83,24 +56,11 @@ This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
 - `submit`: The `fail_hard` field now returns an error if the value is not a boolean. [#6529](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6529)
 - `subscribe`: The `taker` field in the `books` array now returns `actMalformed` instead of `badIssuer` if the value is not a valid account. [#6529](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6529)
 - Fixed a bug in `Forwarded` HTTP header parsing where the extracted IP address could be incorrect when no comma or semicolon delimiter follows the address. This could cause the server to misidentify a client's IP address when operating behind a reverse proxy. [#6529](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6529)
-
-## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.3
-
-[Version 3.1.3](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.1.3) was released on May 8, 2026.
-
-This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
-
-## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.2
-
-[Version 3.1.2](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.1.2) was released on Mar 12, 2026.
-
-This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
-
-## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.1
-
-[Version 3.1.1](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.1.1) was released on Feb 23, 2026.
-
-This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
+- `vault_info`: Errors now identify what the request got wrong instead of reporting every failure as the unregistered token `malformedRequest`, and the `error`, `error_code` and `error_message` fields now agree with each other. An invalid `vault_id` or `seq` returns `invalidParams`, an invalid `owner` returns `actMalformed`, and a request that mixes `vault_id` with `owner`/`seq` or supplies neither returns `invalidParams` with a message naming the accepted combinations. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
+- `vault_info`: A well-formed all-zero `vault_id` now returns `entryNotFound` instead of being rejected as malformed, and `entryNotFound` responses now include `error_code` and `error_message`. Clients that request `ripplerpc` 3.0 or above therefore receive HTTP 400 with that error rather than HTTP 200. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
+- `vault_info`: `vault_id` and `owner` must now be strings, matching how `ledger_entry` reads the same fields. An object or an array in either field previously produced an internal error, and a number was silently converted to its decimal text; `vault_id` now returns `invalidParams` and `owner` returns `actMalformed`. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
+- `gateway_balances`: The `account` and `ident` fields now return an `invalidParams` error if the value is not a string, instead of an `internal` error. [#7655](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7655)
+- `account_lines`: The `peer` field now returns an error if the value is not a string. [#7728](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7728)
 
 ## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.0
 

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-AGENTS.md

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -59,17 +59,6 @@ to an existing XLS. Neither change will be released (in an amendment's
 case, marked as `Supported::yes`) until the corresponding XLS's status
 is `Final`.
 
-## AI coding agents
-
-[`AGENTS.md`](./AGENTS.md) (and its `CLAUDE.md` symlink, for Claude Code) holds shared, checked-in guidance for AI coding agents working in this repository — build/test/lint commands and architecture notes. Additional `AGENTS.md` files may exist in subdirectories to give agents context specific to that part of the codebase; whenever you add one, also add a `CLAUDE.md` symlink pointing to it (`ln -s AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md`) so Claude Code picks it up too.
-
-If you want to give an agent personal instructions that shouldn't be shared with other contributors (e.g. your own workflow preferences), those are gitignored, not checked in:
-
-- `CLAUDE.local.md` — read by Claude Code alongside `CLAUDE.md`.
-- `AGENTS.override.md` — read by AGENTS.md-compatible tools that support a personal override file layered on top of `AGENTS.md`.
-
-Likewise, `.claude/settings.local.json` is for personal, untracked Claude Code settings, while `.claude/settings.json` is shared.
-
 ## Before making a pull request
 
 (Or marking a draft pull request as ready.)
@@ -93,7 +82,7 @@ If you create new source files, they must be organized as follows:
   under `include/xrpl`, and source (`.cpp`) files must go under
   `src/libxrpl`.
 - All other non-test files must go under `src/xrpld`.
-- New test source files should use `gtest` and go under `src/tests`, unless that isn't possible, in which case they should use our legacy test framework and go under `src/test`.
+- All test source files must go under `src/test`.
 - All benchmark source files must go under `src/benchmarks`.
 
 The source must be formatted according to the style guide below. The easiest

bin/install-packaging-tools.sh

@@ -25,9 +25,7 @@ esac
 # Packaging runs in a vanilla distro image, so the tooling comes from the distro's
 # archive rather than from nixpkgs:
 #
-#   - debhelper and dpkg-dev build the DEB, and lintian checks it
-#   - binutils gives debian/rules the readelf its glibc-floor check runs; it
-#     already arrives via dpkg-dev, but that tool is called directly
+#   - debhelper and dpkg-dev build the DEB
 #   - rpm-build builds the RPM, with systemd-rpm-macros and redhat-rpm-config
 #     supplying the systemd and find-debuginfo macros the spec uses
 #   - rpm-sign and gnupg2 sign the built RPM
@@ -39,13 +37,11 @@ function install() {
         debian | ubuntu)
             apt-get update -y
             apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-                binutils \
                 ca-certificates \
                 debhelper \
                 debhelper-compat \
                 dpkg-dev \
                 git \
-                lintian \
                 python3
             ;;
 

cfg/xrpld-example.cfg

@@ -1368,23 +1368,41 @@
 #
 # [node_size]
 #
-#   Tunes the servers based on the expected load and available memory. Legal
-#   sizes are "tiny", "small", "medium", "large", and "huge". We recommend
-#   you start at the default and raise the setting if you have extra memory.
+#   DEPRECATED. Each size is now an alias for a [memory_limit] value:
+#   tiny = 4, small = 8, medium = 32, large = 64, huge = 128. Set
+#   [memory_limit] instead; setting this logs a warning at startup.
 #
-#   The code attempts to automatically determine the appropriate size for
-#   this parameter based on the amount of RAM and the number of execution
-#   cores available to the server. The current decision matrix is:
+# [memory_limit]
 #
-#   |         |         Cores          |
-#   |---------|------------------------|
-#   |   RAM   |   1  | 2 or 3 |   ≥ 4  |
-#   |---------|------|--------|--------|
-#   |  < ~8GB | tiny |   tiny |   tiny |
-#   | < ~12GB | tiny |  small |  small |
-#   | < ~16GB | tiny |  small | medium |
-#   | < ~24GB | tiny |  small |  large |
-#   | < ~32GB | tiny |  small |   huge |
+#   The memory budget, in gigabytes, that the server sizes its caches
+#   within. Cache sizes scale with the budget; the SHAMap tree node cache
+#   is capped to fit within half of it, enforced as it grows. Defaults to
+#   detected physical RAM (capped by the container limit when one is set);
+#   0 selects minimal sizes with no enforcement. Values above 1024 are
+#   rejected, and a value above detected RAM logs a warning.
+#   Set this when xrpld shares the machine with other services or runs in
+#   a container with a memory limit below the host's RAM. Thread counts
+#   are unrelated: they come from the core count and the [workers] /
+#   [io_workers] overrides.
+#
+#   Example:
+#       [memory_limit]
+#       16
+#
+# [tree_cache_age]
+#
+#   Seconds a SHAMap tree node stays cached after its last use. The default
+#   is 300. Accepted values are 10 to 3600.
+#
+# [ledger_cache_age]
+#
+#   Seconds a full ledger stays in the ledger cache after its last use. The
+#   default is 180. Accepted values are 10 to 3600.
+#
+# [ledger_fetch_size]
+#
+#   How many historical ledgers to acquire per fetch pass while backfilling.
+#   The default is 4. Accepted values are 1 to 16.
 #
 # [signing_support]
 #

include/xrpl/basics/TaggedCache.h

@@ -74,13 +74,20 @@ public:
     using shared_pointer_type = SharedPointerType;
 
 public:
+    /**
+     * @param cacheHardCap When positive, a hard upper bound on the number of
+     *     strongly-cached entries, enforced by demoting the approximately
+     *     oldest entry whenever growth would exceed it. 0 disables the cap
+     *     (the periodic sweep alone bounds the cache).
+     */
     TaggedCache(
         std::string const& name,
         int size,
         clock_type::duration expiration,
         clock_type& clock,
         beast::Journal journal,
-        beast::insight::Collector::ptr const& collector = beast::insight::NullCollector::make());
+        beast::insight::Collector::ptr const& collector = beast::insight::NullCollector::make(),
+        int cacheHardCap = 0);
 
 public:
     /**
@@ -357,6 +364,13 @@ private:
 
     using cache_type = hardened_partitioned_hash_map<key_type, Entry, Hash, KeyEqual>;
 
+    // Bounded approximate-LRU eviction from a single partition. Keeps the
+    // strong-entry count at/below cacheHardCap_ as new entries are inserted, so
+    // a burst can't drive the cache past its RAM budget between timer sweeps.
+    // No-op unless cacheHardCap_ > 0 (opt-in); caller holds mutex_.
+    void
+    evictForHardCap(cache_type::map_type& partition, cache_type::map_type::iterator const& keep);
+
     [[nodiscard]] std::thread
     sweepHelper(
         clock_type::time_point const& whenExpire,
@@ -390,8 +404,23 @@ private:
     // Desired maximum cache age
     clock_type::duration const targetAge_;
 
+    // Hard upper bound on strongly-cached entries, enforced by
+    // evictForHardCap whenever the strong count grows (fresh inserts and
+    // weak-to-strong revivals). 0 disables it (sweep-only sizing).
+    int const cacheHardCap_;
+
+    // Total hard-cap evictions (under mutex_); the first marks saturation
+    // onset for logging.
+    std::uint64_t hardCapEvictions_{0};
+
     // Number of items cached
     int cacheCount_{0};
+
+    // Rotating bucket cursor for evictForHardCap so successive over-cap
+    // evictions sweep the whole partition (CLOCK hand) instead of repeatedly
+    // sampling the head buckets. Advanced under mutex_.
+    std::size_t evictHand_{0};
+
     cache_type cache_;  // Hold strong reference to recent objects
     std::uint64_t hits_{0};
     std::uint64_t misses_{0};

include/xrpl/basics/TaggedCache.ipp

@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ inline TaggedCache<
         clock_type::duration expiration,
         clock_type& clock,
         beast::Journal journal,
-        beast::insight::Collector::ptr const& collector)
+        beast::insight::Collector::ptr const& collector,
+        int cacheHardCap)
     : journal_(journal)
     , clock_(clock)
     , stats_(
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ inline TaggedCache<
     , name_(name)
     , targetSize_(size)
     , targetAge_(expiration)
+    , cacheHardCap_(cacheHardCap)
 {
 }
 
@@ -219,6 +221,102 @@ TaggedCache<Key, T, IsKeyCache, SharedWeakUnionPointer, SharedPointerType, Hash,
     return true;
 }
 
+template <
+    class Key,
+    class T,
+    bool IsKeyCache,
+    class SharedWeakUnionPointer,
+    class SharedPointerType,
+    class Hash,
+    class KeyEqual,
+    class Mutex>
+inline void
+TaggedCache<Key, T, IsKeyCache, SharedWeakUnionPointer, SharedPointerType, Hash, KeyEqual, Mutex>::
+    evictForHardCap(cache_type::map_type& partition, cache_type::map_type::iterator const& keep)
+{
+    // Caller holds mutex_. Only value caches carry strong/weak entries; key
+    // caches never enable the hard cap, so this is a no-op for them.
+    if constexpr (!IsKeyCache)
+    {
+        std::size_t const bucketCount = partition.bucket_count();
+        if (bucketCount == 0)
+            return;
+
+        // Approximate LRU with bounded work per call: sample a window of
+        // strong entries starting at the rotating bucket cursor and demote
+        // the oldest, repeating until the count is back under the cap or the
+        // demotion budget is spent. Growth paths raise the count by one at a
+        // time, so the budget lets eviction catch up without stalling them.
+        constexpr int kEvictSampleBudget = 64;
+        constexpr int kMaxDemotionsPerCall = 8;
+        std::size_t const maxBuckets = std::min<std::size_t>(bucketCount, 4 * kEvictSampleBudget);
+
+        for (int demotions = 0; cacheCount_ > cacheHardCap_ && demotions < kMaxDemotionsPerCall;
+             ++demotions)
+        {
+            int sampled = 0;
+            std::size_t bucketsWalked = 0;
+            key_type oldestKey{};
+            bool haveOldest = false;
+            clock_type::time_point oldestAccess{};
+
+            std::size_t b = evictHand_ % bucketCount;
+            while (sampled < kEvictSampleBudget && bucketsWalked < maxBuckets)
+            {
+                for (auto lit = partition.begin(b); lit != partition.end(b); ++lit)
+                {
+                    if (lit->first == keep->first || lit->second.isWeak())
+                        continue;
+                    if (!haveOldest || lit->second.lastAccess < oldestAccess)
+                    {
+                        oldestAccess = lit->second.lastAccess;
+                        oldestKey = lit->first;
+                        haveOldest = true;
+                    }
+                    if (++sampled >= kEvictSampleBudget)
+                        break;
+                }
+                b = (b + 1) % bucketCount;
+                ++bucketsWalked;
+            }
+            evictHand_ = b;  // resume the scan here on the next over-cap call
+
+            if (!haveOldest)
+            {
+                JLOG(journal_.debug()) << name_ << ": over hard cap " << cacheHardCap_
+                                       << " but eviction sample found no strong entry to demote";
+                return;
+            }
+
+            auto oldest = partition.find(oldestKey);
+            if (oldest == partition.end() || oldest == keep || oldest->second.isWeak())
+                return;
+
+            if (oldest->second.ptr.useCount() == 1)
+            {
+                // Sole owner: release entirely.
+                partition.erase(oldest);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                // Others hold it: keep it weakly tracked.
+                oldest->second.ptr.convertToWeak();
+            }
+            --cacheCount_;
+
+            // First eviction marks saturation onset; then a heartbeat every
+            // 100k to avoid flooding.
+            ++hardCapEvictions_;
+            if (hardCapEvictions_ == 1 || hardCapEvictions_ % 100000 == 0)
+            {
+                JLOG(journal_.warn()) << name_ << ": hard-cap eviction #" << hardCapEvictions_
+                                      << " (cap " << cacheHardCap_ << ", strong " << cacheCount_
+                                      << ") - cache saturated, growth now evicts";
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 template <
     class Key,
     class T,
@@ -360,11 +458,17 @@ TaggedCache<Key, T, IsKeyCache, SharedWeakUnionPointer, SharedPointerType, Hash,
 
     if (cit == cache_.end())
     {
-        cache_.emplace(
-            std::piecewise_construct,
-            std::forward_as_tuple(key),
-            std::forward_as_tuple(clock_.now(), data));
+        auto const emplacedIt = cache_
+                                    .emplace(
+                                        std::piecewise_construct,
+                                        std::forward_as_tuple(key),
+                                        std::forward_as_tuple(clock_.now(), data))
+                                    .first;
         ++cacheCount_;
+        // The just-inserted entry is the newest; evictForHardCap skips it
+        // and drops the oldest in its partition.
+        if (cacheHardCap_ > 0 && cacheCount_ > cacheHardCap_)
+            evictForHardCap(*emplacedIt.ait, emplacedIt.mit);
         return false;
     }
 
@@ -415,11 +519,15 @@ TaggedCache<Key, T, IsKeyCache, SharedWeakUnionPointer, SharedPointerType, Hash,
         }
 
         ++cacheCount_;
+        if (cacheHardCap_ > 0 && cacheCount_ > cacheHardCap_)
+            evictForHardCap(*cit.ait, cit.mit);
         return true;
     }
 
     entry.ptr = data;
     ++cacheCount_;
+    if (cacheHardCap_ > 0 && cacheCount_ > cacheHardCap_)
+        evictForHardCap(*cit.ait, cit.mit);
 
     return false;
 }
@@ -729,6 +837,8 @@ TaggedCache<Key, T, IsKeyCache, SharedWeakUnionPointer, SharedPointerType, Hash,
     {
         // independent of cache size, so not counted as a hit
         ++cacheCount_;
+        if (cacheHardCap_ > 0 && cacheCount_ > cacheHardCap_)
+            evictForHardCap(*cit.ait, cit.mit);
         entry.touch(clock_.now());
         return entry.ptr.getStrong();
     }

include/xrpl/config/Constants.h

@@ -22,11 +22,14 @@ struct Sections
     static constexpr auto kIoWorkers = "io_workers";
     static constexpr auto kIps = "ips";
     static constexpr auto kIpsFixed = "ips_fixed";
+    static constexpr auto kLedgerCacheAge = "ledger_cache_age";
+    static constexpr auto kLedgerFetchSize = "ledger_fetch_size";
     static constexpr auto kLedgerHistory = "ledger_history";
     static constexpr auto kLedgerReplay = "ledger_replay";
     static constexpr auto kLedgerTxTables = "ledger_tx_tables";
     static constexpr auto kMaxSubscriptionsPerConnection = "max_subscriptions_per_connection";
     static constexpr auto kMaxTransactions = "max_transactions";
+    static constexpr auto kMemoryLimit = "memory_limit";
     static constexpr auto kNetworkId = "network_id";
     static constexpr auto kNetworkQuorum = "network_quorum";
     static constexpr auto kNodeDatabase = "node_db";
@@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ struct Sections
     static constexpr auto kSslVerifyFile = "ssl_verify_file";
     static constexpr auto kSweepInterval = "sweep_interval";
     static constexpr auto kTransactionQueue = "transaction_queue";
+    static constexpr auto kTreeCacheAge = "tree_cache_age";
     static constexpr auto kValidationSeed = "validation_seed";
     static constexpr auto kValidatorKeys = "validator_keys";
     static constexpr auto kValidatorKeyRevocation = "validator_key_revocation";

include/xrpl/core/HashRouter.h

@@ -34,10 +34,7 @@ enum class HashRouterFlags : std::uint16_t {
     PRIVATE4 = 0x0800,
     // Used in EscrowFinish.cpp
     PRIVATE5 = 0x1000,
-    PRIVATE6 = 0x2000,
-    // Used in apply.cpp
-    PRIVATE7 = 0x4000,
-    PRIVATE8 = 0x8000
+    PRIVATE6 = 0x2000
 };
 
 constexpr HashRouterFlags

include/xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STVector256.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
 
+#include <cstdint>
 #include <memory>
 #include <set>
 #include <utility>
@@ -33,6 +34,32 @@ checkExpired(SLE const& sleCredential, NetClock::time_point const& closed);
 [[nodiscard]] TER
 deleteSLE(ApplyView& view, SLE::ref sleCredential, beast::Journal j);
 
+/**
+ * @brief Remove credentials pinned to a pseudo-account's owner directory.
+ *
+ * Cleans up credentials that were linked to a pseudo-account (Vault, LoanBroker,
+ * AMM), which such an account can neither accept nor delete. Only credentials
+ * are removed; every other object is left in place. The walk visits at most
+ * @p maxNodesToDelete directory entries and charges the ones it leaves alone
+ * against that budget too, so a directory holding other objects yields fewer
+ * than @p maxNodesToDelete deletions. On reaching the bound the result is
+ * `tecINCOMPLETE` and the caller must propagate it so a later transaction
+ * resumes.
+ *
+ * @param view Mutable ledger view.
+ * @param pseudoAcct The pseudo-account whose directory is cleaned.
+ * @param maxNodesToDelete Upper bound on directory entries processed in one call.
+ * @param j Journal for diagnostics.
+ * @return tesSUCCESS once no credentials remain, tecINCOMPLETE if the bound was
+ *         reached, or a deletion error.
+ */
+[[nodiscard]] TER
+deletePseudoAccountCredentials(
+    ApplyView& view,
+    AccountID const& pseudoAcct,
+    std::uint16_t maxNodesToDelete,
+    beast::Journal j);
+
 // Amendment and parameters checks for sfCredentialIDs field
 NotTEC
 checkFields(STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules, beast::Journal j);

include/xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h

@@ -239,13 +239,8 @@ canTransfer(ReadView const& view, Issue const& issue, AccountID const& from, Acc
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
- * XRP and the issuer itself are always tesSUCCESS. Otherwise, after
- * fixCleanup3_4_0, an existing trust line returns tecDUPLICATE without
- * consulting issuer freeze or DefaultRipple; both still apply on the create
- * path (DefaultRipple off is terNO_RIPPLE). canAddHolding() ignores existing
- * holdings, so transactors that may create a holding in doApply should gate
- * their preclaim call on it: after the amendment only when no holding
- * exists, before it always.
+ * Any transactors that call addEmptyHolding() in doApply must call
+ * canAddHolding() in preflight with the same View and Asset
  */
 [[nodiscard]] TER
 addEmptyHolding(

include/xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h

@@ -38,12 +38,6 @@ enum class FreezeHandling { IgnoreFreeze, ZeroIfFrozen };
  */
 enum class AuthHandling { IgnoreAuth, ZeroIfUnauthorized };
 
-/**
- * Controls whether the recipient owner-reserve check is enforced when
- * auto-creating a trustline or MPToken during AMMWithdraw or AMMClawback.
- */
-enum class ReserveHandling : bool { EnforceReserve, IgnoreReserve };
-
 /**
  * Controls whether to include the account's full spendable balance
  */
@@ -325,12 +319,6 @@ transferRate(ReadView const& view, STAmount const& amount);
 [[nodiscard]] TER
 canAddHolding(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset);
 
-/**
- * True if the account already holds this asset (or is the issuer / XRP).
- */
-[[nodiscard]] bool
-holdingExists(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& asset);
-
 [[nodiscard]] TER
 addEmptyHolding(
     ApplyViewContext ctx,

include/xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h

@@ -92,26 +92,6 @@ enum class HashPrefix : std::uint32_t {
      * Batch
      */
     Batch = detail::makeHashPrefix('B', 'C', 'H'),
-
-    /**
-     * inner transaction to sign as the counterparty
-     */
-    CounterpartyTxSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('C', 'P', 'T'),
-
-    /**
-     * inner transaction to multi-sign as the counterparty
-     */
-    CounterpartyTxMultiSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('C', 'P', 'M'),
-
-    /**
-     * inner transaction to sign as the sponsor
-     */
-    SponsorTxSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('S', 'P', 'N'),
-
-    /**
-     * inner transaction to multi-sign as the sponsor
-     */
-    SponsorTxMultiSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('S', 'P', 'M'),
 };
 
 template <class Hasher>

include/xrpl/protocol/NFTSyntheticSerializer.h

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#pragma once
+
+#include <xrpl/json/json_forwards.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/TxMeta.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace xrpl::rpc {
+
+/**
+ * Adds common synthetic fields to transaction-related JSON responses
+ */
+/** @{ */
+void
+insertNFTSyntheticInJson(json::Value&, std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const&, TxMeta const&);
+/** @} */
+
+}  // namespace xrpl::rpc

include/xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 #include <chrono>
 #include <cstddef>
 #include <cstdint>
-#include <limits>
 
 namespace xrpl {
 
@@ -349,24 +348,13 @@ enum class VaultPhase : std::uint8_t {
     Redemption,
 };
 
-/**
- * Minimum gap between a closed-ended loan's final scheduled payment and the
- * vault's RedemptionDate. LoanSet rejects a schedule whose final payment is
- * fewer than this many seconds before RedemptionDate.
- */
-constexpr std::uint32_t kLoanRedemptionBuffer = std::chrono::seconds{60}.count();
-
 /**
  * Bounds on the length of a closed-ended vault's Investment phase
  * (RedemptionDate - SubscriptionDate). At vault creation the gap must satisfy
  * kMinInvestmentPeriod <= gap < kMaxInvestmentPeriod.
- *
- * 180s is enough to originate a loan that uses the minimum payment interval
- * and kLoanRedemptionBuffer after StartDate, which is strictly after
- * SubscriptionDate. The interval and buffer need not be equal; only their
- * sum plus one second must fit in this floor.
  */
-constexpr std::uint32_t kMinInvestmentPeriod = std::chrono::seconds{180}.count();
+constexpr std::uint32_t kMinInvestmentPeriod =
+    std::chrono::seconds{std::chrono::minutes{1}}.count();
 // This is 946708560 seconds which 30 x 365.2425 days (the average length of a Gregorian year).
 constexpr std::uint32_t kMaxInvestmentPeriod = std::chrono::seconds{std::chrono::years{30}}.count();
 
@@ -408,6 +396,16 @@ using TxID = uint256;
  */
 constexpr std::uint16_t kMaxDeletableAmmTrustLines = 512;
 
+/**
+ * The maximum number of owner-directory entries to walk when clearing
+ * credentials pinned to a pseudo-account, in a single transaction.
+ *
+ * The walk stops after this many entries whether or not each one turns out to
+ * be a credential, so a directory that also holds other objects yields fewer
+ * deletions per transaction.
+ */
+constexpr std::uint16_t kMaxDeletablePseudoAccountCredentials = 512;
+
 /**
  * The maximum length of a URI inside an Oracle
  */
@@ -545,11 +543,6 @@ constexpr std::size_t kEcClawbackProofLength = SECP256K1_COMPACT_CLAWBACK_PROOF_
  */
 constexpr std::uint32_t kConfidentialFeeMultiplier = 9;
 
-/**
- * Maximum value a confidential MPT key epoch may reach.
- */
-constexpr std::uint32_t kMaxKeyEpoch = std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max();
-
 /**
  * Compressed EC point prefix for even y-coordinate
  */

include/xrpl/protocol/STTx.h

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
 #include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
 #include <xrpl/json/json_value.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
@@ -14,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SeqProxy.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Sign.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
 
 #include <boost/container/flat_set.hpp>
@@ -107,36 +105,14 @@ public:
     [[nodiscard]] json::Value
     getJson(JsonOptions options, bool binary) const;
 
-    /**
-     * Sign the transaction as its account.
-     *
-     * @param publicKey The public key for signing.
-     * @param secretKey The secret key for signing.
-     */
-    void
-    sign(PublicKey const& publicKey, SecretKey const& secretKey);
-
-    /**
-     * Sign the transaction in one of its signature fields.
-     *
-     * The signature is bound to the role that made it, so it cannot be moved
-     * into another role.
-     *
-     * @param publicKey The public key for signing.
-     * @param secretKey The secret key for signing.
-     * @param role The role signing the transaction.
-     * @param rules The current ledger rules.
-     */
     void
     sign(
         PublicKey const& publicKey,
         SecretKey const& secretKey,
-        SignatureRole role,
-        Rules const& rules);
+        std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<SField const>> signatureTarget = {});
 
     /**
      * Check the signature.
-     *
      * @param rules The current ledger rules.
      * @return `true` if valid signature. If invalid, the error message string.
      */
@@ -144,7 +120,7 @@ public:
     checkSign(Rules const& rules) const;
 
     [[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
-    checkBatchSign() const;
+    checkBatchSign(Rules const& rules) const;
 
     // SQL Functions with metadata.
     static std::string const&
@@ -186,28 +162,28 @@ public:
 private:
     /**
      * Check the signature.
-     *
      * @param rules The current ledger rules.
      * @param sigObject Reference to object that contains the signature fields.
      *     Will be *this more often than not.
-     * @param role The role that made the signature in sigObject. Determines
-     *     the signing prefix, which binds the signature to that role.
      * @return `true` if valid signature. If invalid, the error message string.
      */
     [[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
-    checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject, SignatureRole role) const;
+    checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const;
 
     [[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
-    checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const;
+    checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject) const;
 
     [[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
-    checkMultiSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const;
+    checkMultiSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const;
 
     [[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
     checkBatchSingleSign(STObject const& batchSigner, std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const;
 
     [[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
-    checkBatchMultiSign(STObject const& batchSigner, std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const;
+    checkBatchMultiSign(
+        STObject const& batchSigner,
+        Rules const& rules,
+        std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const;
 
     void
     buildBatchTxns();

include/xrpl/protocol/Sign.h

@@ -4,65 +4,13 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/KeyType.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
 
-#include <optional>
-
 namespace xrpl {
 
-/**
- * The signature slots on a transaction.
- *
- * Each role signs different bytes, so a signature cannot be moved from the
- * role that made it into another role. See signingPrefix.
- */
-enum class SignatureRole {
-    /**
-     * The transaction's own signature, in sfTxnSignature or sfSigners.
-     */
-    Transaction,
-    /**
-     * The counterparty's signature, in sfCounterpartySignature.
-     */
-    Counterparty,
-    /**
-     * The sponsor's signature, in sfSponsorSignature.
-     */
-    Sponsor
-};
-
-/**
- * The field that holds this role's signature.
- *
- * @return The signature field, or nullptr for SignatureRole::Transaction,
- * whose signature lives at the top level of the transaction.
- */
-[[nodiscard]] SField const*
-signatureField(SignatureRole role);
-
-/**
- * The role that signs into the given field.
- *
- * @return The role, or an unseated optional if the field does not hold a
- * transaction signature.
- */
-[[nodiscard]] std::optional<SignatureRole>
-signatureRole(SField const& sigField);
-
-/**
- * The hash prefix that binds a transaction signature to the role that made it.
- *
- * @param role The role making the signature.
- * @param multiSigning Whether the signature is a multi-signature.
- * @param rules The current ledger rules.
- */
-[[nodiscard]] HashPrefix
-signingPrefix(SignatureRole role, bool multiSigning, Rules const& rules);
-
 /**
  * Sign an STObject
  *
@@ -101,12 +49,9 @@ verify(
 
 /**
  * Return a Serializer suitable for computing a multisigning TxnSignature.
- *
- * @param prefix Prefix to insert before the serialized object. Get it from
- * signingPrefix, so that the signature is bound to the role making it.
  */
 Serializer
-buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID, HashPrefix prefix);
+buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID);
 
 /**
  * Break the multi-signing hash computation into 2 parts for optimization.
@@ -122,7 +67,7 @@ buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID, HashPrefi
  *     signer's unique data.
  */
 Serializer
-startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, HashPrefix prefix);
+startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj);
 
 inline void
 finishMultiSigningData(AccountID const& signingID, Serializer& s)

include/xrpl/protocol/TER.h

@@ -129,11 +129,8 @@ enum TEMcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
     temARRAY_TOO_LARGE,
     temBAD_TRANSFER_FEE,
     temINVALID_INNER_BATCH,
-
     temBAD_MPT,
     temBAD_CIPHERTEXT,
-    temINVALID_BYTECODE,
-    temTEMP_DISABLED,
 };
 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -182,8 +179,6 @@ enum TEFcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
     tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE,
     tefNO_DST_PARTIAL,
     tefBAD_PATH_COUNT,
-    tefNO_BYTECODE,
-    tefBYTECODE_NOT_INCLUDED,
 };
 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -375,8 +370,6 @@ enum TECcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
     tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION = 198,
     tecBAD_PROOF = 199,
     tecNO_SPONSOR_PERMISSION = 200,
-    tecOUT_OF_GAS = 201,
-    tecBYTECODE_REJECTED = 202,
 };
 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/features.macro

@@ -15,10 +15,6 @@
 // Add new amendments to the top of this list.
 // Keep it sorted in reverse chronological order.
 
-XRPL_FEATURE(SmartEscrow,                 Supported::No,  VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
-XRPL_FEATURE(LendingProtocolV1_2,         Supported::No,  VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
-XRPL_FIX    (Cleanup3_5_0,                Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
-XRPL_FEATURE(ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation,  Supported::No,  VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FIX    (Cleanup3_4_0,                Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FEATURE(Sponsor,                     Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
 XRPL_FEATURE(BatchV1_1,                   Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/ledger_entries.macro

@@ -309,11 +309,6 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltFEE_SETTINGS, 0x0073, FeeSettings, fee, ({
     {sfBaseFeeDrops,           SoeOptional},
     {sfReserveBaseDrops,       SoeOptional},
     {sfReserveIncrementDrops,  SoeOptional},
-    // Smart Escrow fields
-    {sfGasLimit,               SoeOptional},
-    {sfBytecodeSizeLimit,      SoeOptional},
-    {sfGasPrice,               SoeOptional},
-
     {sfPreviousTxnID,          SoeOptional},
     {sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq,      SoeOptional},
 }))
@@ -344,8 +339,6 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltESCROW, 0x0075, Escrow, escrow, ({
     {sfCondition,            SoeOptional},
     {sfCancelAfter,          SoeOptional},
     {sfFinishAfter,          SoeOptional},
-    {sfBytecode,             SoeOptional},
-    {sfData,                 SoeOptional},
     {sfSourceTag,            SoeOptional},
     {sfDestinationTag,       SoeOptional},
     {sfOwnerNode,            SoeRequired},
@@ -415,8 +408,6 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE, 0x007e, MPTokenIssuance, mpt_issuance, ({
     {sfReferenceHolding,         SoeOptional},
     {sfIssuerEncryptionKey,      SoeOptional},
     {sfAuditorEncryptionKey,     SoeOptional},
-    {sfIssuerKeyEpoch,           SoeOptional},
-    {sfAuditorKeyEpoch,          SoeOptional},
     {sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount, SoeDefault},
 }))
 

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/sfields.macro

@@ -119,15 +119,6 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemainingOwnerCount,      UINT32,    73)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfSponsorFlags,             UINT32,    74)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfSubscriptionDate,         UINT32,    75)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfRedemptionDate,           UINT32,    76)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfIssuerKeyEpoch,           UINT32,    77)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorKeyEpoch,          UINT32,    78)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfIssuerKeyMirrorEpoch,     UINT32,    79)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorKeyMirrorEpoch,    UINT32,    80)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfGasLimit,                 UINT32,    81)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfBytecodeSizeLimit,        UINT32,    82)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfGasPrice,                 UINT32,    83)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfGas,                      UINT32,    84)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfGasUsed,                  UINT32,    85)
 
 // 64-bit integers (common)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfIndexNext,                UINT64,     1)
@@ -243,7 +234,6 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfManagementFeeOutstanding, NUMBER,     17, SField::kSmdNeedsAsset
 // 32-bit signed (common)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfLoanScale,                INT32,      1)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemainingOwnerCountDelta, INT32,      2)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfVMReturnCode,             INT32,      3)
 
 // currency amount (common)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfAmount,                   AMOUNT,     1)
@@ -328,7 +318,6 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorEncryptedAmount,      VL,     43)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorEncryptionKey,        VL,     44)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfAmountCommitment,            VL,     45)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfBalanceCommitment,           VL,     46)
-TYPED_SFIELD(sfBytecode,                    VL,     47)
 
 // account (common)
 TYPED_SFIELD(sfAccount,                  ACCOUNT,    1)

include/xrpl/protocol/detail/transactions.macro

@@ -66,13 +66,11 @@ TRANSACTION(ttPAYMENT, 0, Payment,
 #endif
 TRANSACTION(ttESCROW_CREATE, 1, EscrowCreate, ({.delegable = Delegation::Delegable}), ({
     {sfDestination, SoeRequired},
-    {sfDestinationTag, SoeOptional},
     {sfAmount, SoeRequired, SoeMptSupported},
     {sfCondition, SoeOptional},
     {sfCancelAfter, SoeOptional},
     {sfFinishAfter, SoeOptional},
-    {sfBytecode, SoeOptional},
-    {sfData, SoeOptional},
+    {sfDestinationTag, SoeOptional},
 }))
 
 /** This transaction type completes an existing escrow. */
@@ -85,7 +83,6 @@ TRANSACTION(ttESCROW_FINISH, 2, EscrowFinish, ({.delegable = Delegation::Delegab
     {sfFulfillment, SoeOptional},
     {sfCondition, SoeOptional},
     {sfCredentialIDs, SoeOptional},
-    {sfGas, SoeOptional},
 }))
 
 
@@ -1164,10 +1161,6 @@ TRANSACTION(ttFEE, 101, SetFee,
     {sfBaseFeeDrops, SoeOptional},
     {sfReserveBaseDrops, SoeOptional},
     {sfReserveIncrementDrops, SoeOptional},
-    // Smart Escrow fields
-    {sfGasLimit, SoeOptional},
-    {sfBytecodeSizeLimit, SoeOptional},
-    {sfGasPrice, SoeOptional},
 }))
 
 /** This system-generated transaction type is used to update the network's negative UNL

include/xrpl/protocol/jss.h

@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ JSS(mean);                        // out: get_aggregate_price
 JSS(median);                      // out: get_aggregate_price
 JSS(median_fee);                  // out: TxQ
 JSS(median_level);                // out: TxQ
+JSS(memory_limit);                // out: server_info
 JSS(message);                     // error.
 JSS(meta);                        // out: NetworkOPs, AccountTx*, Tx
 JSS(meta_blob);                   // out: NetworkOPs, AccountTx*, Tx
@@ -435,7 +436,6 @@ JSS(node_read_retries);           // out: GetCounts
 JSS(node_reads_hit);              // out: GetCounts
 JSS(node_reads_total);            // out: GetCounts
 JSS(node_reads_duration_us);      // out: GetCounts
-JSS(node_size);                   // out: server_info
 JSS(nodes);                       // out: VaultInfo
 JSS(nodestore);                   // out: GetCounts
 JSS(node_writes);                 // out: GetCounts

include/xrpl/protocol_autogen/ledger_entries/Escrow.h

@@ -174,54 +174,6 @@ public:
         return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfFinishAfter);
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
-    getBytecode() const
-    {
-        if (hasBytecode())
-            return this->sle_->at(sfBytecode);
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfBytecode is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasBytecode() const
-    {
-        return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecode);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfData (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
-    getData() const
-    {
-        if (hasData())
-            return this->sle_->at(sfData);
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfData is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasData() const
-    {
-        return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfData);
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Get sfSourceTag (SoeOptional)
      * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
@@ -501,28 +453,6 @@ public:
         return *this;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    EscrowBuilder&
-    setBytecode(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfBytecode] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfData (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    EscrowBuilder&
-    setData(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfData] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Set sfSourceTag (SoeOptional)
      * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.

include/xrpl/protocol_autogen/ledger_entries/FeeSettings.h

@@ -213,78 +213,6 @@ public:
         return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfReserveIncrementDrops);
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getGasLimit() const
-    {
-        if (hasGasLimit())
-            return this->sle_->at(sfGasLimit);
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfGasLimit is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasGasLimit() const
-    {
-        return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfGasLimit);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getBytecodeSizeLimit() const
-    {
-        if (hasBytecodeSizeLimit())
-            return this->sle_->at(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfBytecodeSizeLimit is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasBytecodeSizeLimit() const
-    {
-        return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getGasPrice() const
-    {
-        if (hasGasPrice())
-            return this->sle_->at(sfGasPrice);
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfGasPrice is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasGasPrice() const
-    {
-        return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfGasPrice);
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Get sfPreviousTxnID (SoeOptional)
      * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
@@ -447,39 +375,6 @@ public:
         return *this;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    FeeSettingsBuilder&
-    setGasLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfGasLimit] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    FeeSettingsBuilder&
-    setBytecodeSizeLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfBytecodeSizeLimit] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    FeeSettingsBuilder&
-    setGasPrice(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfGasPrice] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Set sfPreviousTxnID (SoeOptional)
      * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.

include/xrpl/protocol_autogen/ledger_entries/MPTokenIssuance.h

@@ -351,54 +351,6 @@ public:
         return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey);
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfIssuerKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getIssuerKeyEpoch() const
-    {
-        if (hasIssuerKeyEpoch())
-            return this->sle_->at(sfIssuerKeyEpoch);
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfIssuerKeyEpoch is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasIssuerKeyEpoch() const
-    {
-        return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerKeyEpoch);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfAuditorKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getAuditorKeyEpoch() const
-    {
-        if (hasAuditorKeyEpoch())
-            return this->sle_->at(sfAuditorKeyEpoch);
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfAuditorKeyEpoch is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasAuditorKeyEpoch() const
-    {
-        return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorKeyEpoch);
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Get sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount (SoeDefault)
      * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
@@ -648,28 +600,6 @@ public:
         return *this;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfIssuerKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    MPTokenIssuanceBuilder&
-    setIssuerKeyEpoch(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfIssuerKeyEpoch] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfAuditorKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    MPTokenIssuanceBuilder&
-    setAuditorKeyEpoch(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfAuditorKeyEpoch] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Set sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount (SoeDefault)
      * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.

include/xrpl/protocol_autogen/transactions/EscrowCreate.h

@@ -58,32 +58,6 @@ public:
         return this->tx_->at(sfDestination);
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getDestinationTag() const
-    {
-        if (hasDestinationTag())
-        {
-            return this->tx_->at(sfDestinationTag);
-        }
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfDestinationTag is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasDestinationTag() const
-    {
-        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfDestinationTag);
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Get sfAmount (SoeRequired)
      * @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
@@ -175,55 +149,29 @@ public:
     }
 
     /**
-     * @brief Get sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
+     * @brief Get sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
      * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
      */
     [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
-    getBytecode() const
+    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
+    getDestinationTag() const
     {
-        if (hasBytecode())
+        if (hasDestinationTag())
         {
-            return this->tx_->at(sfBytecode);
+            return this->tx_->at(sfDestinationTag);
         }
         return std::nullopt;
     }
 
     /**
-     * @brief Check if sfBytecode is present.
+     * @brief Check if sfDestinationTag is present.
      * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
      */
     [[nodiscard]]
     bool
-    hasBytecode() const
+    hasDestinationTag() const
     {
-        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecode);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfData (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
-    getData() const
-    {
-        if (hasData())
-        {
-            return this->tx_->at(sfData);
-        }
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfData is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasData() const
-    {
-        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfData);
+        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfDestinationTag);
     }
 };
 
@@ -284,17 +232,6 @@ public:
         return *this;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    EscrowCreateBuilder&
-    setDestinationTag(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfDestinationTag] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Set sfAmount (SoeRequired)
      * @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
@@ -341,24 +278,13 @@ public:
     }
 
     /**
-     * @brief Set sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
+     * @brief Set sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
      * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
      */
     EscrowCreateBuilder&
-    setBytecode(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
+    setDestinationTag(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
     {
-        object_[sfBytecode] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfData (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    EscrowCreateBuilder&
-    setData(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfData] = value;
+        object_[sfDestinationTag] = value;
         return *this;
     }
 

include/xrpl/protocol_autogen/transactions/EscrowFinish.h

@@ -146,32 +146,6 @@ public:
     {
         return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfCredentialIDs);
     }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfGas (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getGas() const
-    {
-        if (hasGas())
-        {
-            return this->tx_->at(sfGas);
-        }
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfGas is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasGas() const
-    {
-        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfGas);
-    }
 };
 
 /**
@@ -275,17 +249,6 @@ public:
         return *this;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfGas (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    EscrowFinishBuilder&
-    setGas(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfGas] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Build and return the EscrowFinish wrapper.
      * @param publicKey The public key for signing.

include/xrpl/protocol_autogen/transactions/SetFee.h

@@ -254,84 +254,6 @@ public:
     {
         return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfReserveIncrementDrops);
     }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getGasLimit() const
-    {
-        if (hasGasLimit())
-        {
-            return this->tx_->at(sfGasLimit);
-        }
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfGasLimit is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasGasLimit() const
-    {
-        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfGasLimit);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getBytecodeSizeLimit() const
-    {
-        if (hasBytecodeSizeLimit())
-        {
-            return this->tx_->at(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
-        }
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfBytecodeSizeLimit is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasBytecodeSizeLimit() const
-    {
-        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Get sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
-     * @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
-    getGasPrice() const
-    {
-        if (hasGasPrice())
-        {
-            return this->tx_->at(sfGasPrice);
-        }
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Check if sfGasPrice is present.
-     * @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]]
-    bool
-    hasGasPrice() const
-    {
-        return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfGasPrice);
-    }
 };
 
 /**
@@ -464,39 +386,6 @@ public:
         return *this;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    SetFeeBuilder&
-    setGasLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfGasLimit] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    SetFeeBuilder&
-    setBytecodeSizeLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfBytecodeSizeLimit] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Set sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
-     * @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
-     */
-    SetFeeBuilder&
-    setGasPrice(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
-    {
-        object_[sfGasPrice] = value;
-        return *this;
-    }
-
     /**
      * @brief Build and return the SetFee wrapper.
      * @param publicKey The public key for signing.

include/xrpl/tx/Transactor.h

@@ -259,13 +259,6 @@ public:
     static XRPAmount
     calculateBaseFee(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx, std::uint32_t extraBaseFeeMultiplier);
 
-    // Exposed for invariant checks (e.g. ValidVault) that need to know which
-    // ledger entry actually pays a transaction's fee, distinguishing an
-    // ordinary sender, a delegate, and pre-funded vs. co-signed fee
-    // sponsorship.
-    static FeePayer
-    getFeePayer(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx);
-
     /* Do NOT define an invokePreflight function in a derived class.
        Instead, define:
 
@@ -532,6 +525,9 @@ private:
     std::pair<TER, XRPAmount>
     reset(XRPAmount fee);
 
+    static FeePayer
+    getFeePayer(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx);
+
     TER
     consumeSeqProxy(SLE::pointer const& sleAccount);
     TER

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.h

@@ -215,13 +215,6 @@ class ValidMPTTransfer
     // Deleted MPToken
     // MPToken key: true if MPTAuthorized is set
     hash_map<uint256, bool> deletedAuthorized_;
-    // Every touched AccountRoot (not only pseudos):
-    // AccountID -> whether it was a pseudo-account BEFORE this transaction
-    // applied. Needed because a transaction may erase a pseudo-account and
-    // move MPT out of it in the same transaction; by finalize() time the
-    // view no longer shows it as a pseudo-account (or as existing at all).
-    // False entries freeze the pre-tx classification for touched non-pseudos.
-    hash_map<AccountID, bool> pseudoAccountsBefore_;
 
 public:
     /**

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.h

@@ -131,57 +131,20 @@ private:
     deltaAssets(AccountID const& id) const;
 
     /**
-     * @brief Return the AccountRoot whose XRP balance actually absorbed a
-     *        transaction's fee, if any.
+     * @brief Return the vault-asset delta for the transaction's sending
+     *        account, adjusted for the fee.
      *
-     * Mirrors @c Transactor::getFeePayer, but resolves to @c std::nullopt for
-     * a pre-funded sponsorship: that fee is drawn from the @c ltSponsorship
-     * object's @c sfFeeAmount, never from the sponsor's own AccountRoot, so
-     * there is no balance to add back there.
+     * Calls @c deltaAssets for @c tx[sfAccount] and, for non-delegated XRP
+     * transactions, adds the consumed fee back so the invariant sees the net
+     * asset movement rather than the fee-reduced balance change.
      *
-     * @param view Read-only view of the ledger after the transaction.
-     * @param tx   The transaction being applied.
-     * @return The fee-paying AccountRoot's id, or @c std::nullopt when the
-     *         fee was not drawn from any AccountRoot balance.
-     */
-    [[nodiscard]] static std::optional<AccountID>
-    feePayerAccountRoot(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx);
-
-    /**
-     * @brief Return the vault-asset delta for a party inspected as a
-     *        withdrawal/deposit counterparty, adjusted for the fee.
-     *
-     * Calls @c deltaAssets for @p id and, for XRP transactions, adds the
-     * consumed fee back only when @p id is the AccountRoot that actually
-     * paid it (per @c feePayerAccountRoot) -- so the invariant sees the net
-     * asset movement rather than a fee-reduced balance change, regardless of
-     * whether @p id is the sender, a distinct destination, a delegate, or a
-     * co-signed fee sponsor. Post-@c fixCleanup3_4_0, any resulting
-     * economically-zero delta is always normalized to absence.
-     *
-     * Pre-@c fixCleanup3_4_0 this replicates the legacy behaviour exactly:
-     * only @c tx[sfAccount] could ever receive a fee correction (and only
-     * when it was itself, per @c STTx::getFeePayerID, the fee payer). After
-     * that sender-only correction a zero delta is collapsed to absence; if
-     * the correction does not apply, a present-zero delta is kept as-is.
-     *
-     * @param view          Read-only view of the ledger after the transaction.
-     * @param id            Account being inspected as sender or destination.
-     * @param tx            The transaction being applied.
-     * @param fee           Fee charged by this transaction.
-     * @param fix340Enabled Whether @c fixCleanup3_4_0 is enabled, as already
-     *                      determined once by @c finalize.
+     * @param tx  The transaction being applied.
+     * @param fee Fee charged by this transaction.
      * @return The fee-adjusted delta, or @c std::nullopt if the net delta is
-     *         zero (always post-amendment; pre-amendment only after the
-     *         sender-only fee correction) or the entry was not touched.
+     *         zero or the account entry was not touched.
      */
     [[nodiscard]] std::optional<DeltaInfo>
-    deltaAssetsForParty(
-        ReadView const& view,
-        AccountID const& id,
-        STTx const& tx,
-        XRPAmount fee,
-        bool fix340Enabled) const;
+    deltaAssetsTxAccount(STTx const& tx, XRPAmount fee) const;
 
     /**
      * @brief Return the vault-share balance-change delta for an account.
@@ -211,8 +174,8 @@ private:
      *
      * For a closed-ended vault, a loan may only be originated while the vault is in the Investment
      * phase (strictly past @c SubscriptionDate and before @c RedemptionDate). Open-ended vaults (@c
-     * NoPhase) are unaffected. The complementary maturity bound (final payment precedes @c
-     * RedemptionDate by at least @c kLoanRedemptionBuffer) is enforced by @c ValidLoan.
+     * NoPhase) are unaffected. The complementary maturity bound (final payment strictly precedes @c
+     * RedemptionDate) is enforced by @c ValidLoan.
      */
     [[nodiscard]] bool
     finalizeLoanSet(ReadView const& view, beast::Journal const& j) const;

include/xrpl/tx/transactors/dex/AMMWithdraw.h

@@ -109,11 +109,6 @@ public:
      * @param lpTokens current LPT balance
      * @param lpTokensWithdraw amount of tokens to withdraw
      * @param tfee trading fee in basis points
-     * @param freezeHandling whether a frozen balance is reported as zero
-     * @param authHandling whether an unauthorized MPT balance is reported as
-     *        zero
-     * @param reserveHandling whether the recipient owner-reserve check is
-     *        enforced when a trustline or MPToken has to be auto-created
      * @param withdrawAll if withdrawing all lptokens
      * @param priorBalance balance before fees
      * @return
@@ -133,7 +128,6 @@ public:
         std::uint16_t tfee,
         FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
         AuthHandling authHandling,
-        ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
         WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
         XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
         beast::Journal const& journal);
@@ -156,11 +150,6 @@ public:
      * @param lpTokensAMMBalance current AMM LPT balance
      * @param lpTokensWithdraw amount of lptokens to withdraw
      * @param tfee trading fee in basis points
-     * @param freezeHandling whether a frozen balance is reported as zero
-     * @param authHandling whether an unauthorized MPT balance is reported as
-     *        zero
-     * @param reserveHandling whether the recipient owner-reserve check is
-     *        enforced when a trustline or MPToken has to be auto-created
      * @param withdrawAll if withdraw all lptokens
      * @param priorBalance balance before fees
      * @return
@@ -180,7 +169,6 @@ public:
         std::uint16_t tfee,
         FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
         AuthHandling authHandling,
-        ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
         WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
         XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
         beast::Journal const& journal);

nix/docker/Dockerfile

@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ RUN mkdir -p ~/.config/nix && \
 COPY nix/ci-env.nix /tmp/build/nix/ci-env.nix
 COPY nix/linux.nix /tmp/build/nix/linux.nix
 COPY nix/packages.nix /tmp/build/nix/packages.nix
-COPY nix/rust-nightly.sh /tmp/build/nix/rust-nightly.sh
-COPY nix/rust.nix /tmp/build/nix/rust.nix
 COPY nix/utils.nix /tmp/build/nix/utils.nix
 COPY flake.nix /tmp/build/
 COPY flake.lock /tmp/build/

nix/packages.nix

@@ -16,7 +16,23 @@ let
     exec ${pkgs.python3}/bin/python3 ${llvmPackages.clang-unwrapped}/bin/run-clang-tidy "$@"
   '';
 
-  rust = import ./rust.nix { inherit pkgs; };
+  # rust-overlay's toolchain propagates the *default* stdenv.cc onto the PATH (so
+  # cargo has a linker). That default may be different from the clang we pin here,
+  # so it shadows our clang and the build can silently use a different compiler
+  # version. Drop that cc from every propagation channel instead of pinning a
+  # replacement: the toolchain then carries no compiler and cargo just uses the
+  # active shell's stdenv cc. Must cover all channels — rust-overlay uses both
+  # propagatedBuildInputs and depsHostHostPropagated.
+  rustToolchainBase = pkgs.rust-bin.fromRustupToolchainFile ../rust-toolchain.toml;
+  rustToolchain =
+    let
+      defaultCc = pkgs.stdenv.cc; # default compiler from nixpkgs stdenv
+      withoutDefaultCc = builtins.filter (dep: (dep.outPath or "") != defaultCc.outPath);
+    in
+    rustToolchainBase.overrideAttrs (old: {
+      propagatedBuildInputs = withoutDefaultCc (old.propagatedBuildInputs or [ ]);
+      depsHostHostPropagated = withoutDefaultCc (old.depsHostHostPropagated or [ ]);
+    });
 
   # Nix wraps its toolchain so that binaries are exposed only under unsuffixed
   # names (gcc, g++, clang-tidy, ...). Several tools probe for a
@@ -92,38 +108,41 @@ in
     mkGcov
     ;
 
-  commonPackages =
-    (with pkgs; [
-      clangToolLinks
-      runClangTidyLink
-      ccache
-      clangbuildanalyzer
-      clangTools
-      cmake
-      conan
-      curlMinimal # needed for codecov/codecov-action
-      doxygen
-      file # needed for cpack in Clio
-      gcovr
-      gh
-      git
-      git-cliff
-      git-lfs
-      gnumake
-      gnupg # needed for signing commits & codecov/codecov-action
-      graphviz
-      less # needed for git diff
-      mold
-      nettools # provides netstat, used to debug failures in CI
-      ninja
-      patchelf
-      perl # needed for openssl
-      pkg-config
-      pre-commit
-      python3
-      runClangTidy
-      vim
-      zip
-    ])
-    ++ rust.packages;
+  commonPackages = with pkgs; [
+    clangToolLinks
+    runClangTidyLink
+    ccache
+    clangbuildanalyzer
+    clangTools
+    cmake
+    conan
+    curlMinimal # needed for codecov/codecov-action
+    doxygen
+    file # needed for cpack in Clio
+    gcovr
+    gh
+    git
+    git-cliff
+    git-lfs
+    gnumake
+    gnupg # needed for signing commits & codecov/codecov-action
+    graphviz
+    less # needed for git diff
+    mold
+    nettools # provides netstat, used to debug failures in CI
+    ninja
+    patchelf
+    perl # needed for openssl
+    pkg-config
+    pre-commit
+    python3
+    runClangTidy
+    vim
+    zip
+    # Rust packages
+    cargo-audit
+    cargo-llvm-cov
+    cargo-nextest
+    rustToolchain
+  ];
 }

nix/rust-nightly.sh

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-#!@runtimeShell@
-# Reaches the nightly Rust toolchain, which is deliberately kept off PATH.
-# Packaged by nix/rust.nix, which explains why.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-usage() {
-    echo "usage: rust-nightly (path | run <command>...)" >&2
-    exit 2
-}
-
-case "${1-}" in
-    path) printf '%s\n' "@rustNightlyBin@" ;;
-    run)
-        shift
-        if [[ $# -eq 0 ]]; then
-            usage
-        fi
-        export PATH="@rustNightlyBin@:${PATH}"
-        exec "$@"
-        ;;
-    *) usage ;;
-esac

nix/rust.nix

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-# The Rust half of the tool set shared by the CI environment and the dev shell:
-# the stable toolchain pinned by rust-toolchain.toml, the nightly the Rust
-# coverage job needs, and the cargo plugins. Consumed by packages.nix.
-{ pkgs }:
-let
-  # rust-overlay's toolchain propagates the *default* stdenv.cc onto the PATH (so
-  # cargo has a linker). That default may be different from the clang we pin
-  # elsewhere, so it shadows our clang and the build can silently use a different
-  # compiler version. Drop that cc from every propagation channel instead of
-  # pinning a replacement: the toolchain then carries no compiler and cargo just
-  # uses the active shell's stdenv cc.
-  #
-  # The channel list is every list mkDerivation propagates to a dependent's
-  # environment (including the two legacy aliases). rust-overlay currently only
-  # uses propagatedBuildInputs and depsHostHostPropagated, but covering all of
-  # them means an upstream switch to another channel cannot quietly put the
-  # compiler back on PATH.
-  dropDefaultCc =
-    toolchain:
-    let
-      defaultCc = pkgs.stdenv.cc; # default compiler from nixpkgs stdenv
-      withoutDefaultCc = builtins.filter (dep: (dep.outPath or "") != defaultCc.outPath);
-    in
-    toolchain.overrideAttrs (
-      old:
-      pkgs.lib.genAttrs [
-        "depsBuildBuildPropagated"
-        "propagatedNativeBuildInputs" # alias of depsBuildHostPropagated
-        "depsBuildTargetPropagated"
-        "depsHostHostPropagated"
-        "propagatedBuildInputs" # alias of depsHostTargetPropagated
-        "depsTargetTargetPropagated"
-      ] (channel: withoutDefaultCc (old.${channel} or [ ]))
-    );
-
-  rustToolchain = dropDefaultCc (pkgs.rust-bin.fromRustupToolchainFile ../rust-toolchain.toml);
-
-  # cargo-llvm-cov honours the #[coverage(off)] that keeps unit tests out of the
-  # coverage report only under a nightly rustc, and looks for llvm-profdata and
-  # llvm-cov in that same toolchain's sysroot — hence llvm-tools-preview.
-  #
-  # Not every nightly ships every component, so `nightly.latest` breaks on the
-  # days llvm-tools-preview is absent; selectLatestNightlyWith walks back to the
-  # newest one that has it. The result is the newest such nightly *known to the
-  # locked rust-overlay*, which means updating flake.lock moves the compiler that
-  # produces the coverage numbers — and with it the rustc version recorded in
-  # nix/check-tools/*.txt, so those snapshots need regenerating alongside.
-  rustNightly = dropDefaultCc (
-    pkgs.rust-bin.selectLatestNightlyWith (
-      toolchain: toolchain.minimal.override { extensions = [ "llvm-tools-preview" ]; }
-    )
-  );
-
-  # A second toolchain cannot go on PATH: its cargo and rustc would collide with
-  # the pinned stable's in the ci-env buildEnv, which resolves collisions by
-  # picking one silently. Reaching the nightly only through this wrapper keeps it
-  # in the image closure (the Docker build copies the whole closure, not just
-  # what is linked into /bin) while leaving it inactive everywhere that does not
-  # ask for it.
-  #
-  # The script's `path` subcommand exists for scopes wider than one command — a
-  # CI job appending to $GITHUB_PATH, so that the cargo cache action's own
-  # `rustc -vV` probe, which runs in a step of its own, agrees with the toolchain
-  # the build will use.
-  rustNightlyScript = pkgs.replaceVarsWith {
-    name = "rust-nightly";
-    src = ./rust-nightly.sh;
-    dir = "bin";
-    isExecutable = true;
-    replacements = {
-      inherit (pkgs) runtimeShell;
-      rustNightlyBin = "${rustNightly}/bin";
-    };
-  };
-in
-{
-  packages = [
-    pkgs.cargo-audit
-    pkgs.cargo-llvm-cov
-    pkgs.cargo-nextest
-    rustNightlyScript
-    rustToolchain
-  ];
-}

package/README.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ package/
     publish_pkg.py      Uploads built packages to the XRPLF Nexus repositories (called by CI, and shipped in that image)
   rpm/
     xrpld.spec      RPM spec
-  debian/           Debian control files (control, rules, copyright, xrpld.docs, xrpld.links, xrpld.lintian-overrides, source/format)
+  debian/           Debian control files (control, rules, copyright, xrpld.docs, xrpld.links, source/format)
   shared/
     xrpld.service       systemd unit file (used by both RPM and DEB)
     xrpld.sysusers      sysusers.d config (used by both RPM and DEB)
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ image and both CI and local builds pick it up — and names the format that imag
 builds in `type`, which CI passes to `build_pkg.py` as `--package-type`; the two
 have to stay in step.
 
-| Package type | Image (`configs.<distro>[].package.image` in `linux.json`) | Tools required                                                 |
-| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| RPM          | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-<sha>`             | `rpmbuild`, `rpmsign`                                          |
-| DEB          | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-<sha>`           | `dpkg-buildpackage`, debhelper with compat level 13, `lintian` |
+| Package type | Image (`configs.<distro>[].package.image` in `linux.json`) | Tools required                                      |
+| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
+| RPM          | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-<sha>`             | `rpmbuild`, `rpmsign`                               |
+| DEB          | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-<sha>`           | `dpkg-buildpackage`, debhelper with compat level 13 |
 
 To print the full packaging matrix (artifact names and images) for the current
 `linux.json`:
@@ -51,19 +51,13 @@ To print the full packaging matrix (artifact names and images) for the current
 ### Via CI
 
 Caller workflows (`on-pr.yml`, `on-tag.yml`, `on-trigger.yml`) call
-`reusable-package.yml`, which runs in three stages:
-
-1. `package` fans out one job per config carrying a `package` map, building and
-   signing in that config's container, and uploading `<config>-pkg` alongside
-   `<config>-pkg-debug` for the much larger debug symbols.
-2. `test-install` installs `<config>-pkg` in the container of every distro the
-   packages target and runs the binaries there, so one that cannot be installed
-   never reaches Nexus.
-3. `publish` uploads both artifacts, or lists what it would upload.
-
-The packaging script derives the package version from the downloaded binary's
-`xrpld --version` output; no CMake configure or build step is needed inside the
-packaging job.
+`reusable-package.yml`. That workflow generates its own packaging matrix from
+the configs that carry a `package` map (via `generate.py --packaging`) and fans
+out one job per distro. Each job downloads the pre-built `xrpld` and
+`validator-keys` binary artifacts and runs in that distro's container, building
+the format `package.type` declares. The packaging script derives the package
+version from the downloaded binary's `xrpld --version` output; no CMake
+configure or build step is needed inside the packaging job.
 
 The binaries come from the `debian` and `rhel` build configs themselves — the
 ones carrying the `package` map — which pass `-Dvalidator_keys=ON` so that the
@@ -100,7 +94,8 @@ docker run --rm \
     --pkg-release "${PKG_RELEASE}" \
     --channel UNRELEASED
 
-# Output (the deb image writes build/debbuild/*.deb instead):
+# Output:
+#   build/debbuild/*.deb         (DEB + dbgsym; Debian names both .deb)
 #   build/rpmbuild/RPMS/x86_64/*.rpm
 ```
 
@@ -160,9 +155,9 @@ the last, and the date and hash say which commit a package on
 `packages.xrplf.org` came from. Both reach the packaging scripts as arguments,
 so neither script derives anything itself.
 
-Publishing is its own job, gated behind `test-install`, uploading from the same
-image that built the packages with the `publish_pkg.py` shipped in it — the
-same copy other repositories run. Without `publish: true` the job is a
+Publishing is the last step of each packaging job, uploading from the container
+that built the packages with the `publish_pkg.py` shipped in the image — the
+same copy other repositories run. Without `publish: true` the step is a
 `--dry-run`, listing the uploads it would make without needing credentials, so
 any run that builds packages also exercises the upload routing. `on-trigger.yml`
 passes `publish: true` for develop pushes in `XRPLF/rippled` and `on-tag.yml`
@@ -207,9 +202,6 @@ the final release. If that normalized package version still contains `-`,
 packaging fails because RPM forbids `-` in `Version`, and Debian uses `-` as
 the upstream/revision separator.
 
-> [!NOTE]
-> Debug and sanitizer builds are not packaged yet.
-
 `pkg_version` is the normalized package metadata version derived inside
 `build_pkg.py` from the binary-reported `xrpld` version (`-` pre-release
 separator converted to `~`). It is not a separate user input.
@@ -287,45 +279,37 @@ service restart.
 2. Stages the binaries, configs, `README.md`, `LICENSE.md`, and
    `validator-keys-LICENSE`.
 3. Copies `package/debian/` control files into `debbuild/source/debian/`.
-4. Copies shared service/sysusers/tmpfiles/logrotate into `debian/` where `dh_installsystemd`, `dh_installsysusers`, `dh_installtmpfiles` and `dh_installlogrotate` pick them up automatically.
+4. Copies shared service/sysusers/tmpfiles into `debian/` where `dh_installsystemd`, `dh_installsysusers`, and `dh_installtmpfiles` pick them up automatically.
 5. Generates a minimal `debian/changelog` using `${pkg_version}-${PKG_RELEASE}`,
    where `pkg_version` is derived from the binary-reported `xrpld` version.
 6. Runs `dpkg-buildpackage -b --no-sign -d` (`-d` skips the build-dependency check, since the binary is already built). `debian/rules` uses manual `install` commands.
-
-   It also rewrites the `libc6` bound to `LIBC_MIN` in `debian/rules`, the glibc
-   the Nix toolchain builds against. `dpkg-shlibdeps` would otherwise derive it
-   from the build host's symbols file — on trixie that yields `libc6 (>= 2.34)`
-   because of `sysconf`, locking out distros the binaries run on. A check fails
-   the build if either binary outgrows `LIBC_MIN`.
-
 7. Output: `debbuild/*.deb`, the binary package and the `-dbgsym` package.
    Debian gives dbgsym packages a `.deb` extension; only Ubuntu uses `.ddeb`.
 
 ## Post-build verification
 
 ```bash
-# DEB (one invocation per package: the dbgsym package is a .deb too)
-for deb in debbuild/*.deb; do dpkg-deb -c "${deb}"; done | grep -E 'systemd|sysusers|tmpfiles'
-lintian -I debbuild/*.deb
+# DEB
+dpkg-deb -c debbuild/*.deb | grep -E 'systemd|sysusers|tmpfiles'
 
 # RPM
 rpm -qlp rpmbuild/RPMS/x86_64/*.rpm
-```
 
-`lintian` still reports `embedded-library zlib`, `no-manual-page` and
-`initial-upload-closes-no-bugs`; only the `/usr/local` tags are overridden.
+# Optional, and not in the packaging image: apt-get install -y lintian
+lintian -I debbuild/*.deb
+```
 
 ## Reproducibility
 
-Both formats build reproducibly as they are: the same binaries at the same
-commit give byte-identical packages on a rebuild, and nothing has to be
-exported by hand.
+`build_pkg.py` sets `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` from the latest git commit time and
+exports it; the RPM spec clamps file modification times to it via
+`%build_mtime_policy`. The remaining variables
+below further improve reproducibility but are _not_ set by the script — export
+them yourself if needed:
 
-`build_pkg.py` sets `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` from the latest git commit time.
-`dpkg-buildpackage` honours it on its own; the RPM spec sets three macros:
-
-- `%clamp_mtime_to_source_date_epoch` — file modification times, from
-  `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH`.
-- `%use_source_date_epoch_as_buildtime` — the `BUILDTIME` header, from the
-  same.
-- `%_buildhost` — pinned, so the builder's hostname stays out of the header.
+```bash
+export TZ=UTC
+export LC_ALL=C.UTF-8
+export GZIP=-n
+export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS="noautodbgsym reproducible=+fixfilepath"
+```

package/build_pkg.py

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 # This script lives in the repository it packages.
 SRC_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
 
-PRE_RELEASE = re.compile(r"^(b|rc)(0|[1-9][0-9]*)(\+.*)?$")
+PRE_RELEASE = re.compile(r"^(b0|b[1-9][0-9]*|rc[0-9]+)(\+.*)?$")
 
 # Files both packaging systems consume, staged under the same names.
 STAGED_FROM_BUILD = ("xrpld", "validator-keys", "validator-keys-LICENSE")
@@ -133,14 +133,6 @@ def stage_common(build_dir: Path, dest: Path) -> None:
         shutil.copy2(build_dir / name, dest / name)
     for source, name in STAGED_FROM_SRC.items():
         shutil.copy2(SRC_DIR / source, dest / name)
-
-
-def stage_units(dest: Path) -> None:
-    """Copy the systemd, sysusers, tmpfiles and logrotate files into dest.
-
-    Each format wants them somewhere else: rpmbuild reads them from SOURCES,
-    debhelper from debian/.
-    """
     for name in STAGED_UNITS:
         shutil.copy2(SRC_DIR / "package" / "shared" / name, dest / name)
 
@@ -154,7 +146,6 @@ def build_rpm(build_dir: Path, *, version: str, pkg_release: str) -> None:
     spec = topdir / "SPECS" / "xrpld.spec"
     shutil.copy2(SRC_DIR / "package" / "rpm" / "xrpld.spec", spec)
     stage_common(build_dir, topdir / "SOURCES")
-    stage_units(topdir / "SOURCES")
 
     run(
         "rpmbuild",
@@ -187,7 +178,8 @@ def build_deb(
     shutil.copytree(SRC_DIR / "package" / "debian", staging / "debian")
 
     # debhelper picks these up from debian/ automatically.
-    stage_units(staging / "debian")
+    for name in STAGED_UNITS:
+        shutil.copy2(staging / name, staging / "debian" / name)
 
     date = datetime.fromtimestamp(epoch, timezone.utc).strftime(
         "%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S %z"
@@ -201,6 +193,8 @@ def build_deb(
         """)
     (staging / "debian" / "changelog").write_text(changelog)
 
+    (staging / "debian" / "rules").chmod(0o755)
+
     run("dpkg-buildpackage", "-b", "--no-sign", "-d", cwd=staging)
 
 

package/debian/control

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ Priority: optional
 Maintainer: XRPL Foundation <contact@xrplf.org>
 Rules-Requires-Root: no
 Build-Depends:
- binutils,
  debhelper-compat (= 13)
 Standards-Version: 4.7.0
 Homepage: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
@@ -12,6 +11,8 @@ Vcs-Git: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled.git
 Vcs-Browser: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
 
 Package: xrpld
+Section: net
+Priority: optional
 Architecture: any
 Depends:
  ${shlibs:Depends},

package/debian/copyright

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 Format: https://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/
-Upstream-Name: xrpld
+Upstream-Name: rippled
 Source: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
 
 Files: *
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Copyright: 2016, Ripple Labs Inc.
  2009-2010, Satoshi Nakamoto
  2011, The Bitcoin developers
  2003-2005, Tom Wu
-License: ISC and BSL-1.0 and MIT and Tom-Wu
+License: ISC
 Comment: Built from https://github.com/ripple/validator-keys-tool at the commit
  pinned in cmake/XrplValidatorKeys.cmake. Besides ISC-licensed code it
  incorporates work under the Boost Software License 1.0 (ASIO), the MIT/X11
@@ -35,74 +35,3 @@ License: ISC
  WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
  ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
  OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-
-License: BSL-1.0
- Boost Software License - Version 1.0 - August 17th, 2003
- .
- Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person or organization
- obtaining a copy of the software and accompanying documentation covered by
- this license (the "Software") to use, reproduce, display, distribute,
- execute, and transmit the Software, and to prepare derivative works of the
- Software, and to permit third-parties to whom the Software is furnished to
- do so, all subject to the following:
- .
- The copyright notices in the Software and this entire statement, including
- the above license grant, this restriction and the following disclaimer,
- must be included in all copies of the Software, in whole or in part, and
- all derivative works of the Software, unless such copies or derivative
- works are solely in the form of machine-executable object code generated by
- a source language processor.
- .
- THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
- IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
- FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT
- SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR ANYONE DISTRIBUTING THE SOFTWARE BE LIABLE
- FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE,
- ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
- DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
-
-License: MIT
- Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
- copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
- to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
- the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
- and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
- Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
- .
- The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
- all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- .
- THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
- IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
- FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
- LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
- FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
- DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
-
-License: Tom-Wu
- Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
- a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
- "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
- without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
- distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
- permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
- the following conditions:
- .
- The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
- included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- .
- THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS-IS" AND WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
- EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY
- WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
- .
- IN NO EVENT SHALL TOM WU BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL,
- INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER
- RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER OR NOT ADVISED OF
- THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE, AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, ARISING OUT
- OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- .
- In addition, the following condition applies:
- .
- All redistributions must retain an intact copy of this copyright notice
- and disclaimer.

package/debian/rules

@@ -2,12 +2,6 @@
 
 export DH_VERBOSE = 1
 
-# The glibc the Nix toolchain builds against, and so the real floor for the
-# binaries. dpkg-shlibdeps would instead derive libc6 (>= 2.34) from the build
-# host's symbols file, where sysconf carries that minver, locking out distros
-# the binaries actually run on.
-LIBC_MIN = 2.31
-
 %:
 	dh $@
 
@@ -17,8 +11,6 @@ override_dh_auto_configure override_dh_auto_build override_dh_auto_test:
 override_dh_installsystemd:
 	dh_installsystemd --no-stop-on-upgrade xrpld.service
 
-# The tmpfiles snippet sets ownership to the xrpld user, so the sysusers snippet
-# has to be emitted first: run it early and make its own sequence slot a no-op.
 execute_before_dh_installtmpfiles:
 	dh_installsysusers
 
@@ -30,23 +22,5 @@ override_dh_install:
 	install -D -m 0644 xrpld.cfg        debian/xrpld/etc/xrpld/xrpld.cfg
 	install -D -m 0644 validators.txt   debian/xrpld/etc/xrpld/validators.txt
 
-override_dh_shlibdeps:
-	dh_shlibdeps
-	# Guards against the toolchain moving past LIBC_MIN and the packages then
-	# claiming a floor they do not meet.
-	for binary in xrpld validator-keys; do \
-		needed=$$(readelf --dyn-syms --wide $$binary \
-			| grep -o 'GLIBC_[0-9.]*' | sed 's/GLIBC_//' | sort -uV | tail -1); \
-		if [ -z "$$needed" ]; then \
-			echo "$$binary: no GLIBC_ symbol versions read, cannot check LIBC_MIN" >&2; \
-			exit 1; \
-		fi; \
-		if dpkg --compare-versions "$$needed" gt "$(LIBC_MIN)"; then \
-			echo "$$binary needs glibc $$needed, above LIBC_MIN $(LIBC_MIN)" >&2; \
-			exit 1; \
-		fi; \
-	done
-	sed -i 's/libc6 (>= [0-9.]*)/libc6 (>= $(LIBC_MIN))/' debian/xrpld.substvars
-
 override_dh_dwz:
 	@:

package/debian/xrpld.docs

@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
 README.md
-LICENSE.md
 validator-keys-LICENSE

package/debian/xrpld.links

@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
-# Legacy compatibility for pre-FHS package layouts.
-# TODO: remove after rippled fully deprecated.
+# Legacy compat symlinks (remove next major release)
 usr/bin/xrpld          usr/local/bin/rippled

package/debian/xrpld.lintian-overrides

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# The /usr/local/bin/rippled symlink is deliberate compatibility for pre-FHS
-# layouts, so the Policy 9.1.2 tags it raises are expected.
-# TODO: remove alongside debian/xrpld.links after rippled fully deprecated.
-xrpld: dir-in-usr-local [usr/local/bin/]
-xrpld: file-in-usr-local [usr/local/bin/rippled]
-xrpld: file-in-unusual-dir [usr/local/bin/rippled]

package/docker/Dockerfile

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ ARG BASE_IMAGE=debian:trixie
 
 FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}
 
-# Bind-mounted rather than copied in, so the installer never lands in a layer.
-RUN --mount=type=bind,source=bin/install-packaging-tools.sh,target=/install-packaging-tools.sh \
-    /install-packaging-tools.sh
+COPY bin/install-packaging-tools.sh /tmp/install-packaging-tools.sh
+
+RUN /tmp/install-packaging-tools.sh
 
 # See ../README.md, "Publishing from other repositories".
 COPY package/docker/publish_pkg.py /usr/local/bin/publish_pkg.py

package/docker/publish_pkg.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Publish built DEB and RPM packages to the XRPLF repositories on Nexus.
 
-Knows nothing about what it uploads beyond the channel, so it publishes whatever
-built the packages; see package/README.md, "Publishing from other repositories".
+Takes packages and a channel, and nothing else, so it publishes whatever built
+them; see package/README.md, "Publishing from other repositories".
 
 RPMs are uploaded to the hosted repository, but yum clients install from the
 'rpm-<channel>' group repository in front of it, which serves signed metadata.
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ STALL_TIMEOUT = 300
 ATTEMPTS = 4
 RETRY_DELAY = 5
 
-# 429 is Nexus asking to slow down, not a rejection, so it retries like a 5xx.
-RETRYABLE_STATUSES = (429,)
-
 
 def build_opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
     """An opener with no redirect handler, so a 3xx raises instead of being followed.
@@ -50,9 +47,9 @@ def build_opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
 def upload(url: str, method: str, headers: dict[str, str], package: Path) -> None:
     """Send one package, retrying only what is worth retrying.
 
-    A 4xx other than 429 is a deterministic rejection, so it is reported at once
-    rather than re-sending the whole body three more times. Nexus explains what
-    it rejected in the response body, so that body is always surfaced.
+    A 4xx is a deterministic rejection, so it is reported at once rather than
+    re-sending the whole body three more times. Nexus explains what it rejected
+    in the response body, so that body is always surfaced.
     """
     opener = build_opener()
 
@@ -70,7 +67,7 @@ def upload(url: str, method: str, headers: dict[str, str], package: Path) -> Non
         except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
             detail = error.read().decode(errors="replace").strip()
             reason = f"HTTP {error.code}: {detail}"
-            retryable = error.code >= 500 or error.code in RETRYABLE_STATUSES
+            retryable = error.code >= 500
         except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError) as error:
             reason = str(error)
             retryable = True
@@ -124,8 +121,6 @@ def main() -> None:
         token = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode()
         auth = {"Authorization": f"Basic {token}"}
 
-    # Deliberately not shared with sign_rpm.py: this script ships standalone in
-    # the packaging image for other repositories to run.
     packages = sorted(
         path
         for path in package_dir.rglob("*")

package/rpm/xrpld.spec

@@ -17,11 +17,6 @@ URL:      https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
 ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
 BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 
-# These have to precede %%debug_package: it opens the debuginfo subpackage, and
-# any tag after it is silently dropped from the main package.
-%{?systemd_requires}
-%{?sysusers_requires_compat}
-
 %undefine _debugsource_packages
 %debug_package
 # Level 3 rather than the el9 default of 19: it shrinks the multi-gigabyte
@@ -30,13 +25,10 @@ BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 %global _binary_payload w3.zstdio
 %global _find_debuginfo_dwz_opts %{nil}
 
-# Reproducibility: the first two take their value from the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
-# build_pkg.py exports. Without these the header records the wall clock and the
-# build container's hostname, so two builds of the same commit differ.
-%global clamp_mtime_to_source_date_epoch 1
-%global use_source_date_epoch_as_buildtime 1
-%global _buildhost xrplf.org
+%build_mtime_policy clamp_to_source_date_epoch
 
+%{?systemd_requires}
+%{?sysusers_requires_compat}
 
 %description
 xrpld is the reference implementation of the XRP Ledger protocol. It
@@ -61,7 +53,7 @@ install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/validators.txt       %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/%{
 install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.service        %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xrpld.service
 install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.sysusers       %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/xrpld.conf
 install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.tmpfiles       %{buildroot}%{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf
-install -d %{buildroot}%{_presetdir}
+install -Dm0644 /dev/null %{buildroot}%{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset
 cat >%{buildroot}%{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset <<'EOF'
 enable xrpld.service
 EOF
@@ -84,7 +76,7 @@ ln -s %{_bindir}/%{name} %{buildroot}/usr/local/bin/rippled
 %sysusers_create_package %{name} %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.sysusers
 
 %post
-%tmpfiles_create_package %{name} %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.tmpfiles
+systemd-tmpfiles --create %{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf || :
 %systemd_post xrpld.service
 
 %preun
@@ -94,12 +86,11 @@ ln -s %{_bindir}/%{name} %{buildroot}/usr/local/bin/rippled
 %systemd_postun xrpld.service
 
 %files
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_docdir}/%{name}
 %license %{_docdir}/%{name}/LICENSE.md
 %license %{_docdir}/%{name}/validator-keys-LICENSE
 %doc %{_docdir}/%{name}/README.md
 
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
+%dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
 
 %{_bindir}/%{name}
 %{_bindir}/validator-keys
@@ -110,7 +101,7 @@ ln -s %{_bindir}/%{name} %{buildroot}/usr/local/bin/rippled
 
 
 %{_unitdir}/xrpld.service
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset
+%{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset
 %{_sysusersdir}/xrpld.conf
 %{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf
 %ghost %dir /var/lib/xrpld

package/shared/xrpld.service

@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ ProtectHome=true
 PrivateTmp=true
 User=xrpld
 Group=xrpld
-# xrpld.tmpfiles creates these at install and boot; these recreate them on
-# every start, so a removed directory does not stop the service.
 StateDirectory=xrpld
 StateDirectoryMode=0750
 LogsDirectory=xrpld

package/sign_rpm.py

@@ -107,8 +107,6 @@ def main() -> None:
     args = parser.parse_args()
     package_dir: Path = args.package_dir
 
-    # Deliberately not shared with publish_pkg.py, which ships standalone in the
-    # packaging image.
     rpms = sorted(path for path in package_dir.rglob("*.rpm") if path.is_file())
     # Signing nothing would otherwise look like a successful signing.
     assert rpms, f"no RPMs found in {package_dir}"

src/libxrpl/ledger/View.cpp

@@ -543,19 +543,12 @@ doWithdraw(
 {
     auto const dstSle = ctx.view.read(keylet::account(dstAcct));
 
-    // Create a trust line or MPToken for a self-destination only when there
-    // is a payout to credit. Post-fixCleanup3_4_0, a zero-value withdraw
-    // (e.g. share redemption from a fully impaired vault) must not insert
-    // an empty holding: that records a one-sided zero delta and can also
-    // create+delete MPTokens in the same transaction.
+    // Create trust line or MPToken for the receiving account
     if (dstAcct == senderAcct)
     {
-        if (amount > beast::kZero || !ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
-        {
-            if (auto const ter = addEmptyHolding(ctx, senderAcct, priorBalance, amount.asset(), j);
-                !isTesSuccess(ter) && ter != tecDUPLICATE)
-                return ter;
-        }
+        if (auto const ter = addEmptyHolding(ctx, senderAcct, priorBalance, amount.asset(), j);
+            !isTesSuccess(ter) && ter != tecDUPLICATE)
+            return ter;
     }
     else
     {

src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/AMMHelpers.cpp

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/Sandbox.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
+#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
@@ -690,6 +691,12 @@ deleteAMMTrustLines(
 
                 return {deleteAMMTrustLine(sb, sleItem, ammAccountID, j), SkipEntry::No};
             }
+            // A credential naming the pseudo-account as subject can't be
+            // accepted or deleted by it and would otherwise permanently pin the
+            // AMM. Clean it up here, inside the same bounded walk, so the
+            // pinned AMM can still be deleted.
+            if (sb.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) && nodeType == ltCREDENTIAL)
+                return {credentials::deleteSLE(sb, sleItem, j), SkipEntry::No};
             // LCOV_EXCL_START
             JLOG(j.error()) << "deleteAMMObjects: deleting non-trustline or non-MPT " << nodeType;
             return {tecINTERNAL, SkipEntry::No};
@@ -767,6 +774,8 @@ deleteAMMAccount(Sandbox& sb, Asset const& asset, Asset const& asset2, beast::Jo
         // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
     }
 
+    // deleteAMMTrustLines also removes any credentials pinned to the AMM
+    // pseudo-account, within its bounded walk.
     if (auto const ter = deleteAMMTrustLines(sb, ammAccountID, kMaxDeletableAmmTrustLines, j);
         !isTesSuccess(ter))
         return ter;
@@ -908,6 +917,11 @@ isOnlyLiquidityProvider(ReadView const& view, Issue const& ammIssue, AccountID c
                 ++nMPT;
                 continue;
             }
+            // A credential naming the pseudo-account as subject can be pinned
+            // to its owner directory. Ignore it here; deleteAMMTrustLines
+            // removes it when the AMM is deleted.
+            if (view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) && entryType == ltCREDENTIAL)
+                continue;
             if (entryType != ltRIPPLE_STATE)
                 return std::unexpected<TER>(tecINTERNAL);  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
             auto const lowLimit = sle->getFieldAmount(sfLowLimit);

src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.cpp

@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@
 #include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
 #include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
+#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
@@ -127,6 +129,36 @@ deleteSLE(ApplyView& view, SLE::ref sleCredential, beast::Journal j)
     return tesSUCCESS;
 }
 
+TER
+deletePseudoAccountCredentials(
+    ApplyView& view,
+    AccountID const& pseudoAcct,
+    std::uint16_t maxNodesToDelete,
+    beast::Journal j)
+{
+    XRPL_ASSERT(
+        isPseudoAccount(view.read(keylet::account(pseudoAcct))),
+        "xrpl::credentials::deletePseudoAccountCredentials : is a pseudo-account");
+
+    // Delete the credentials linked into the pseudo-account's owner directory,
+    // visiting at most maxNodesToDelete entries. Any other object is left in
+    // place; the caller's own checks decide whether the remaining directory
+    // blocks deletion. If the bound is reached, cleanupOnAccountDelete returns
+    // tecINCOMPLETE and the caller propagates it so a later transaction resumes.
+    return cleanupOnAccountDelete(
+        view,
+        keylet::ownerDir(pseudoAcct),
+        [&view, &j](LedgerEntryType nodeType, uint256 const&, SLE::pointer& sleItem)
+            -> std::pair<TER, SkipEntry> {
+            if (nodeType == ltCREDENTIAL)
+                return {deleteSLE(view, sleItem, j), SkipEntry::No};
+
+            return {tesSUCCESS, SkipEntry::Yes};
+        },
+        j,
+        maxNodesToDelete);
+}
+
 NotTEC
 checkFields(STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules, beast::Journal j)
 {

src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.cpp

@@ -184,8 +184,6 @@ addEmptyHolding(
     auto const mpt = ctx.view.peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mptID));
     if (!mpt)
         return tefINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-    // Unlike IOU addEmptyHolding (post-fixCleanup3_4_0), a locked issuance is
-    // still rejected before the "MPToken already exists" short circuit.
     if (mpt->isFlag(lsfMPTLocked))
         return tefINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
     if (ctx.view.peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, accountID)))

src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.cpp

@@ -652,32 +652,21 @@ addEmptyHolding(
 
     auto const& issuerId = issue.getIssuer();
     auto const& currency = issue.currency;
+    if (isGlobalFrozen(ctx.view, issuerId))
+        return tecFROZEN;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+
     auto const& srcId = issuerId;
     auto const& dstId = accountID;
     auto const high = srcId > dstId;
     auto const index = keylet::trustLine(srcId, dstId, currency);
-    // Post-fixCleanup3_4_0: an existing line is a no-op. Issuer freeze and
-    // DefaultRipple only matter when this function has to create a line.
-    bool const fix340Enabled = ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
-    if (fix340Enabled && ctx.view.exists(index))
-        return tecDUPLICATE;
-
-    if (isGlobalFrozen(ctx.view, issuerId))
-        return tecFROZEN;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-
     auto const sleSrc = ctx.view.peek(keylet::account(srcId));
     auto const sleDst = ctx.view.peek(keylet::account(dstId));
     if (!sleDst || !sleSrc)
         return tefINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-    // Create path: DefaultRipple is still required. terNO_RIPPLE is
-    // intentional so VaultWithdraw / CoverWithdraw fail in preclaim via
-    // canAddHolding (retryable, no fee) rather than claiming a tec* fee
-    // in doApply. Transactor::operator() will not apply and will not
-    // convert it to tefINTERNAL.
     if (!sleSrc->isFlag(lsfDefaultRipple))
-        return fix340Enabled ? TER{terNO_RIPPLE} : tecINTERNAL;
+        return tecINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
     // If the line already exists, don't create it again.
-    if (!fix340Enabled && ctx.view.exists(index))
+    if (ctx.view.read(index))
         return tecDUPLICATE;
 
     // A reserve sponsor only covers tx.Account's own objects.

src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.cpp

@@ -583,32 +583,6 @@ canAddHolding(ReadView const& view, Asset const& asset)
         asset.value());
 }
 
-[[nodiscard]] bool
-holdingExists(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Issue const& issue)
-{
-    if (issue.native() || account == issue.getIssuer())
-        return true;
-    return view.exists(keylet::trustLine(account, issue));
-}
-
-[[nodiscard]] bool
-holdingExists(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, MPTIssue const& mptIssue)
-{
-    if (account == mptIssue.getIssuer())
-        return true;
-    return view.exists(keylet::mptoken(mptIssue.getMptID(), account));
-}
-
-[[nodiscard]] bool
-holdingExists(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& account, Asset const& asset)
-{
-    return std::visit(
-        [&]<ValidIssueType TIss>(TIss const& issue) -> bool {
-            return holdingExists(view, account, issue);
-        },
-        asset.value());
-}
-
 TER
 addEmptyHolding(
     ApplyViewContext ctx,

src/libxrpl/protocol/BuildInfo.cpp

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ namespace {
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // clang-format off
 // NOLINTNEXTLINE(readability-identifier-naming)
-char const* const versionString = "3.4.0-rc1"
+char const* const versionString = "3.4.0-b3"
     // clang-format on
     ;
 

src/libxrpl/protocol/NFTSyntheticSerializer.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#include <xrpl/protocol/NFTSyntheticSerializer.h>
+
+#include <xrpl/json/json_value.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/NFTokenID.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/NFTokenOfferID.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/TxMeta.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace xrpl::rpc {
+
+void
+insertNFTSyntheticInJson(
+    json::Value& response,
+    std::shared_ptr<STTx const> const& transaction,
+    TxMeta const& transactionMeta)
+{
+    insertNFTokenID(response[jss::meta], transaction, transactionMeta);
+    insertNFTokenOfferID(response[jss::meta], transaction, transactionMeta);
+}
+
+}  // namespace xrpl::rpc

src/libxrpl/protocol/STTx.cpp

@@ -168,10 +168,10 @@ STTx::getMentionedAccounts() const
 }
 
 static Blob
-getSigningData(STTx const& that, HashPrefix prefix)
+getSigningData(STTx const& that)
 {
     Serializer s;
-    s.add32(prefix);
+    s.add32(HashPrefix::TxSign);
     that.addWithoutSigningFields(s);
     return s.getData();
 }
@@ -212,42 +212,30 @@ STTx::getSeqProxy() const
     return SeqProxy::rawTicket(*ticketSeq);
 }
 
-void
-STTx::sign(PublicKey const& publicKey, SecretKey const& secretKey)
-{
-    // The account's own signature always covers the plain transaction prefix;
-    // see signingPrefix for the role signatures that do not.
-    auto const data = getSigningData(*this, HashPrefix::TxSign);
-
-    setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, xrpl::sign(publicKey, secretKey, makeSlice(data)));
-    tid_ = getHash(HashPrefix::TransactionId);
-}
-
 void
 STTx::sign(
     PublicKey const& publicKey,
     SecretKey const& secretKey,
-    SignatureRole role,
-    Rules const& rules)
+    std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<SField const>> signatureTarget)
 {
-    auto const data = getSigningData(*this, signingPrefix(role, false, rules));
+    auto const data = getSigningData(*this);
 
     auto const sig = xrpl::sign(publicKey, secretKey, makeSlice(data));
 
-    if (auto const target = signatureField(role))
+    if (signatureTarget)
     {
-        peekFieldObject(*target).setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, sig);
+        auto& target = peekFieldObject(*signatureTarget);
+        target.setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, sig);
     }
     else
     {
         setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, sig);
     }
-
     tid_ = getHash(HashPrefix::TransactionId);
 }
 
 std::expected<void, std::string>
-STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject, SignatureRole role) const
+STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const
 {
     try
     {
@@ -256,10 +244,8 @@ STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject, SignatureRole rol
         // multi-signing.  Otherwise we're single-signing.
 
         Blob const& signingPubKey = sigObject.getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey);
-        bool const multiSigning = signingPubKey.empty();
-        auto const prefix = signingPrefix(role, multiSigning, rules);
-        return multiSigning ? checkMultiSign(sigObject, prefix)
-                            : checkSingleSign(sigObject, prefix);
+        return signingPubKey.empty() ? checkMultiSign(rules, sigObject)
+                                     : checkSingleSign(sigObject);
     }
     catch (...)
     {
@@ -270,20 +256,20 @@ STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject, SignatureRole rol
 std::expected<void, std::string>
 STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules) const
 {
-    if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, *this, SignatureRole::Transaction); !ret)
+    if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, *this); !ret)
         return ret;
 
     if (isFieldPresent(sfCounterpartySignature))
     {
         auto const counterSig = getFieldObject(sfCounterpartySignature);
-        if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, counterSig, SignatureRole::Counterparty); !ret)
+        if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, counterSig); !ret)
             return std::unexpected("Counterparty: " + ret.error());
     }
 
     if (isFieldPresent(sfSponsorSignature))
     {
         auto const sponsorSignatureObj = getFieldObject(sfSponsorSignature);
-        if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, sponsorSignatureObj, SignatureRole::Sponsor); !ret)
+        if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, sponsorSignatureObj); !ret)
             return std::unexpected("Sponsor: " + ret.error());
     }
 
@@ -291,14 +277,14 @@ STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules) const
     // of signature checking.
     if (isFieldPresent(sfBatchSigners))
     {
-        if (auto const ret = checkBatchSign(); !ret)
+        if (auto const ret = checkBatchSign(rules); !ret)
             return ret;
     }
     return {};
 }
 
 std::expected<void, std::string>
-STTx::checkBatchSign() const
+STTx::checkBatchSign(Rules const& rules) const
 {
     try
     {
@@ -332,7 +318,7 @@ STTx::checkBatchSign() const
         for (auto const& signer : signers)
         {
             Blob const& signingPubKey = signer.getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey);
-            auto const result = signingPubKey.empty() ? checkBatchMultiSign(signer, txIds)
+            auto const result = signingPubKey.empty() ? checkBatchMultiSign(signer, rules, txIds)
                                                       : checkBatchSingleSign(signer, txIds);
 
             if (!result)
@@ -461,9 +447,9 @@ singleSignHelper(STObject const& sigObject, Slice const& data)
 }
 
 std::expected<void, std::string>
-STTx::checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const
+STTx::checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject) const
 {
-    auto const data = getSigningData(*this, prefix);
+    auto const data = getSigningData(*this);
     return singleSignHelper(sigObject, makeSlice(data));
 }
 
@@ -481,7 +467,8 @@ std::expected<void, std::string>
 multiSignHelper(
     STObject const& sigObject,
     std::optional<AccountID> txnAccountID,
-    std::function<Serializer(AccountID const&)> makeMsg)
+    std::function<Serializer(AccountID const&)> makeMsg,
+    Rules const& rules)
 {
     // Make sure the MultiSigners are present.  Otherwise they are not
     // attempting multi-signing and we just have a bad SigningPubKey.
@@ -554,7 +541,10 @@ multiSignHelper(
 }
 
 std::expected<void, std::string>
-STTx::checkBatchMultiSign(STObject const& batchSigner, std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const
+STTx::checkBatchMultiSign(
+    STObject const& batchSigner,
+    Rules const& rules,
+    std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const
 {
     XRPL_ASSERT(getTxnType() == ttBATCH, "STTx::checkBatchMultiSign : batch transaction");
     // We can ease the computational load inside the loop a bit by
@@ -565,15 +555,18 @@ STTx::checkBatchMultiSign(STObject const& batchSigner, std::vector<uint256> cons
     serializeBatch(dataStart, getAccountID(sfAccount), getSeqProxy().value(), getFlags(), txIds);
     dataStart.addBitString(batchSignerAccount);
     return multiSignHelper(
-        batchSigner, batchSignerAccount, [&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
+        batchSigner,
+        batchSignerAccount,
+        [&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
             Serializer s = dataStart;
             finishMultiSigningData(accountID, s);
             return s;
-        });
+        },
+        rules);
 }
 
 std::expected<void, std::string>
-STTx::checkMultiSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const
+STTx::checkMultiSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const
 {
     // Used inside the loop in multiSignHelper to enforce that
     // the account owner may not multisign for themselves.
@@ -585,13 +578,16 @@ STTx::checkMultiSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const
     // We can ease the computational load inside the loop a bit by
     // pre-constructing part of the data that we hash.  Fill a Serializer
     // with the stuff that stays constant from signature to signature.
-    Serializer dataStart = startMultiSigningData(*this, prefix);
+    Serializer dataStart = startMultiSigningData(*this);
     return multiSignHelper(
-        sigObject, txnAccountID, [&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
+        sigObject,
+        txnAccountID,
+        [&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
             Serializer s = dataStart;
             finishMultiSigningData(accountID, s);
             return s;
-        });
+        },
+        rules);
 }
 
 void

src/libxrpl/protocol/STValidation.cpp

@@ -59,10 +59,6 @@ STValidation::validationFormat()
         {sfBaseFeeDrops,          SoeOptional},
         {sfReserveBaseDrops,      SoeOptional},
         {sfReserveIncrementDrops, SoeOptional},
-        // featureSmartEscrow
-        {sfGasLimit,               SoeOptional},
-        {sfBytecodeSizeLimit,      SoeOptional},
-        {sfGasPrice,               SoeOptional},
     };
     // clang-format on
 

src/libxrpl/protocol/Sign.cpp

@@ -1,77 +1,17 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Sign.h>
 
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/KeyType.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STExchange.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
 
-#include <optional>
-
 namespace xrpl {
 
-SField const*
-signatureField(SignatureRole role)
-{
-    switch (role)
-    {
-        case SignatureRole::Transaction:
-            return nullptr;
-        case SignatureRole::Counterparty:
-            return &sfCounterpartySignature;
-        case SignatureRole::Sponsor:
-            return &sfSponsorSignature;
-    }
-    UNREACHABLE("xrpl::signatureField : unknown SignatureRole");
-    return nullptr;
-}
-
-std::optional<SignatureRole>
-signatureRole(SField const& sigField)
-{
-    if (sigField == sfCounterpartySignature)
-        return SignatureRole::Counterparty;
-    if (sigField == sfSponsorSignature)
-        return SignatureRole::Sponsor;
-    return std::nullopt;
-}
-
-// Signature validity depends on fixCleanup3_4_0: a role signature covers
-// different bytes before and after the amendment activates. checkValidity
-// caches its verdict per transaction ID, so it keeps two separate cache slots
-// for role-signature transactions (kSfSiggoodOldPrefix / kSfSigbadOldPrefix in
-// tx/apply.cpp) to keep a pre-fix verdict from being reused in the post-fix
-// era, and vice versa. See the block comment in tx/apply.cpp for the details
-// and the reason both directions matter.
-HashPrefix
-signingPrefix(SignatureRole role, bool multiSigning, Rules const& rules)
-{
-    // Before fixCleanup3_4_0 every signature on a transaction covered the same
-    // bytes, so a signature could be moved from one role to another.
-    if (!rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
-        return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::TxMultiSign : HashPrefix::TxSign;
-
-    switch (role)
-    {
-        case SignatureRole::Transaction:
-            return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::TxMultiSign : HashPrefix::TxSign;
-        case SignatureRole::Counterparty:
-            return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::CounterpartyTxMultiSign
-                                : HashPrefix::CounterpartyTxSign;
-        case SignatureRole::Sponsor:
-            return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::SponsorTxMultiSign : HashPrefix::SponsorTxSign;
-    }
-    UNREACHABLE("xrpl::signingPrefix : unknown SignatureRole");
-    return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::TxMultiSign : HashPrefix::TxSign;
-}
-
 void
 sign(
     STObject& st,
@@ -130,18 +70,18 @@ verify(STObject const& st, HashPrefix const& prefix, PublicKey const& pk, SF_VL
 // So, if we support multiple levels of signing, then we'll need to
 // incorporate the "signing for" accounts into the signing data as well.
 Serializer
-buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID, HashPrefix prefix)
+buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID)
 {
-    Serializer s{startMultiSigningData(obj, prefix)};
+    Serializer s{startMultiSigningData(obj)};
     finishMultiSigningData(signingID, s);
     return s;
 }
 
 Serializer
-startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, HashPrefix prefix)
+startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj)
 {
     Serializer s;
-    s.add32(prefix);
+    s.add32(HashPrefix::TxMultiSign);
     obj.addWithoutSigningFields(s);
     return s;
 }

src/libxrpl/protocol/TER.cpp

@@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ transResults()
         MAKE_ERROR(tecPRECISION_LOSS,                "The amounts used by the transaction cannot interact."),
         MAKE_ERROR(tecBAD_PROOF,                     "Proof cannot be verified"),
         MAKE_ERROR(tecNO_SPONSOR_PERMISSION,         "Sponsor has not authorized this transaction."),
-        MAKE_ERROR(tecOUT_OF_GAS,                    "The WASM code ran out of gas during execution."),
-        MAKE_ERROR(tecBYTECODE_REJECTED,             "The custom WASM code that was run rejected your transaction."),
 
         MAKE_ERROR(tefALREADY,                     "The exact transaction was already in this ledger."),
         MAKE_ERROR(tefBAD_ADD_AUTH,                "Not authorized to add account."),
@@ -135,8 +133,6 @@ transResults()
         MAKE_ERROR(tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE,     "The LedgerFixType field has an invalid value."),
         MAKE_ERROR(tefNO_DST_PARTIAL,              "Partial payment to create account not allowed."),
         MAKE_ERROR(tefBAD_PATH_COUNT,              "Malformed: Too many paths."),
-        MAKE_ERROR(tefNO_BYTECODE,                 "There is no WASM code to run, but a WASM-specific field was included."),
-        MAKE_ERROR(tefBYTECODE_NOT_INCLUDED,       "WASM code requires a field that was not included."),
 
         MAKE_ERROR(telLOCAL_ERROR,            "Local failure."),
         MAKE_ERROR(telBAD_DOMAIN,             "Domain too long."),
@@ -208,8 +204,6 @@ transResults()
         MAKE_ERROR(temBAD_TRANSFER_FEE,          "Malformed: Transfer fee is outside valid range."),
         MAKE_ERROR(temINVALID_INNER_BATCH,       "Malformed: Invalid inner batch transaction."),
         MAKE_ERROR(temBAD_CIPHERTEXT,            "Malformed: Invalid ciphertext."),
-        MAKE_ERROR(temINVALID_BYTECODE,          "Malformed: Provided byte code is invalid."),
-        MAKE_ERROR(temTEMP_DISABLED,             "The transaction requires logic that is currently temporarily disabled."),
 
         MAKE_ERROR(terRETRY,                  "Retry transaction."),
         MAKE_ERROR(terFUNDS_SPENT,            "DEPRECATED."),

src/libxrpl/shamap/SHAMapNodeID.cpp

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
 #include <xrpl/shamap/SHAMap.h>
 
-#include <algorithm>
 #include <cstddef>
 #include <optional>
 #include <stdexcept>
@@ -41,41 +40,11 @@ depthMask(unsigned int depth)
     return kMasks.entry[depth];
 }
 
-// The prefix of `key` at `depth`: the leading nibbles naming the subtree a node at that depth
-// identifies, with the remainder of the key masked off.
-static uint256
-maskedToDepth(uint256 const& key, unsigned int depth)
-{
-    return key & depthMask(depth);
-}
-
-// Whether `id` at `depth` is what `key` looks like once masked down to that depth, i.e.
-// whether an ID with this depth and id names a subtree that `key` falls under.
-static bool
-isPrefixOfAtDepth(uint256 const& id, unsigned int depth, uint256 const& key)
-{
-    return maskedToDepth(key, depth) == id;
-}
-
 // canonicalize the hash to a node ID for this depth
 SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID(unsigned int depth, uint256 const& hash) : id_(hash), depth_(depth)
 {
-    // Every SHAMapNodeID's depth is stored here, so this is the one place that can stop an
-    // out-of-range one from being kept: a depth past kLeafDepth would go on to index depthMask
-    // out of bounds, and getRawString would narrow it to a byte, silently renaming the node.
-    // Clamp rather than throw, since node IDs are built from peer-supplied depths on the ledger
-    // data path, where no caller catches an exception before it reaches a thread boundary.
-    if (depth_ > SHAMap::kLeafDepth)
-    {
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        UNREACHABLE("xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID : depth within tree");
-        depth_ = SHAMap::kLeafDepth;
-        id_ = maskedToDepth(id_, depth_);
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-
-    // Reads the clamped member rather than the depth argument, so it cannot index depthMask past
-    // its last entry even once the clamp above has reported the bad input and carried on.
+    XRPL_ASSERT(
+        depth <= SHAMap::kLeafDepth, "xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID : maximum depth input");
     XRPL_ASSERT(
         isPrefixOf(id_), "xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID : hash and depth inputs do match");
 }
@@ -120,7 +89,7 @@ SHAMapNodeID::getChildNodeID(unsigned int branch) const
 bool
 SHAMapNodeID::isPrefixOf(uint256 const& key) const
 {
-    return isPrefixOfAtDepth(id_, depth_, key);
+    return (key & depthMask(depth_)) == id_;
 }
 
 [[nodiscard]] std::optional<SHAMapNodeID>
@@ -133,9 +102,9 @@ deserializeSHAMapNodeID(void const* data, std::size_t size)
         unsigned int const depth = *(static_cast<unsigned char const*>(data) + 32);
         if (depth <= SHAMap::kLeafDepth)
         {
-            // Reject a serialized ID carrying bits below its own depth. Checked before
-            // constructing, since the constructor asserts that same property.
-            if (auto const id = uint256::fromVoid(data); isPrefixOfAtDepth(id, depth, id))
+            auto const id = uint256::fromVoid(data);
+
+            if (id == (id & depthMask(depth)))
                 ret.emplace(depth, id);
         }
     }
@@ -146,11 +115,7 @@ deserializeSHAMapNodeID(void const* data, std::size_t size)
 [[nodiscard]] unsigned int
 selectBranch(SHAMapNodeID const& id, uint256 const& hash)
 {
-    XRPL_ASSERT(id.getDepth() < SHAMap::kLeafDepth, "xrpl::selectBranch : depth below leaf depth");
-
-    // A depth-64 ID has no nibble left to select. Callers must not ask, but clamp anyway to keep
-    // the read below the end of the 32-byte key.
-    auto const depth = std::min(id.getDepth(), SHAMap::kLeafDepth - 1u);
+    auto const depth = id.getDepth();
     auto branch = static_cast<unsigned int>(*(hash.begin() + (depth / 2)));
 
     if ((depth & 1) != 0u)
@@ -169,18 +134,8 @@ selectBranch(SHAMapNodeID const& id, uint256 const& hash)
 SHAMapNodeID
 SHAMapNodeID::createID(unsigned int depth, uint256 const& key)
 {
-    // The mask is chosen here, before the constructor runs, so the clamp there cannot cover this
-    // call: an out-of-range depth would index depthMask's table while still evaluating this
-    // argument. A public factory has to hold its own bound.
-    if (depth > SHAMap::kLeafDepth)
-    {
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        UNREACHABLE("xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::createID : depth within tree");
-        depth = SHAMap::kLeafDepth;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-
-    return SHAMapNodeID(depth, maskedToDepth(key, depth));
+    XRPL_ASSERT(depth <= SHAMap::kLeafDepth, "xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::createID : valid depth");
+    return SHAMapNodeID(depth, key & depthMask(depth));
 }
 
 }  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# AGENTS.md — tx
-
-See the repo-level [AGENTS.md](../../../AGENTS.md) for general build/test/style guidance.
-
-Any change to transaction-processing behavior must be gated behind an amendment. New amendments (and fixes, i.e. `fix*` amendments) are added to [`include/xrpl/protocol/detail/features.macro`](../../../include/xrpl/protocol/detail/features.macro), as an `XRPL_FEATURE(...)` or `XRPL_FIX(...)` entry added to the top of the list (the list is kept in reverse chronological order). Once the pre-amendment code path for a retired amendment is removed, move its entry to `XRPL_RETIRE_FEATURE(...)`/`XRPL_RETIRE_FIX(...)` instead of deleting it.

src/libxrpl/tx/CLAUDE.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-AGENTS.md

src/libxrpl/tx/Transactor.cpp

@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ removeExpiredNFTokenOffers(
 }
 
 static void
-removeExpiredCredentials(ApplyView& view, std::vector<uint256> const& creds, beast::Journal viewJ)
+removeDeletedCredentials(ApplyView& view, std::vector<uint256> const& creds, beast::Journal viewJ)
 {
     for (auto const& index : creds)
     {
@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ removeExpiredCredentials(ApplyView& view, std::vector<uint256> const& creds, bea
             if (auto const ter = credentials::deleteSLE(view, sle, viewJ); !isTesSuccess(ter))
             {
                 JLOG(viewJ.error())
-                    << "removeExpiredCredentials: failed to delete expired credential. Err: "
+                    << "removeDeletedCredentials: failed to delete credential. Err: "
                     << transToken(ter);
             }
         }
@@ -1437,7 +1437,8 @@ Transactor::processPersistentChanges(TER result, XRPAmount fee)
     //        should be used, making it possible to do more useful work
     //        when transactions fail with a `tec` code.
 
-    auto typesForResult = [](TER const ter) {
+    auto typesForResult = [credentialCleanup =
+                               view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0)](TER const ter) {
         std::unordered_set<LedgerEntryType> types;
         if ((ter == tecOVERSIZE) || (ter == tecKILLED))
         {
@@ -1446,6 +1447,11 @@ Transactor::processPersistentChanges(TER result, XRPAmount fee)
         else if (ter == tecINCOMPLETE)
         {
             types.insert(ltRIPPLE_STATE);
+            // A bounded pseudo-account credential cleanup (VaultDelete /
+            // LoanBrokerDelete) persists its partial credential deletions so a
+            // later transaction can resume.
+            if (credentialCleanup)
+                types.insert(ltCREDENTIAL);
         }
         else if (ter == tecEXPIRED)
         {
@@ -1523,7 +1529,7 @@ Transactor::processPersistentChanges(TER result, XRPAmount fee)
                     removeDeletedTrustLines(view(), ids, viewJ);
                     break;
                 case ltCREDENTIAL:
-                    removeExpiredCredentials(view(), ids, viewJ);
+                    removeDeletedCredentials(view(), ids, viewJ);
                     break;
                 // LCOV_EXCL_START
                 default:

src/libxrpl/tx/apply.cpp

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
 #include <xrpl/core/ServiceRegistry.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/OpenView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
@@ -24,38 +23,13 @@
 
 namespace xrpl {
 
-// This file owns HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE1-4 and PRIVATE7-8 in HashRouter.h.
-// These are the first four; the other two are below.
+// These are the same flags defined as HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE1-4 in
+// HashRouter.h
 constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSigbad = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE1;     // Signature is bad
 constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSiggood = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE2;    // Signature is good
 constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfLocalbad = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE3;   // Local checks failed
 constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfLocalgood = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE4;  // Local checks passed
 
-// Before fixCleanup3_4_0, a signature in an alternate role field, such as
-// sfSponsorSignature, covered the same bytes as the top level signature. Which
-// bytes a role signature must cover therefore depends on whether the fix is
-// enabled, but the four flags above record only the verdict, not the rules that
-// produced it. A verdict reached under one prefix would otherwise be reused
-// under the other.
-//
-// The two flags below hold the verdict for the pre-fix prefixes, so the pre-fix
-// and post-fix verdicts occupy separate slots and neither is ever read in the
-// other's era. Nothing is cleared when the amendment activates: setFlags only
-// sets bits, so a stale pre-fix verdict simply stops being read and ages out
-// with the rest of the routing table.
-//
-// This is not one switchover at a single instant. The era is chosen per call
-// from the rules passed in, and callers do not agree on the rules: relay and
-// submit verify against the validated rules, which lag the open ledger rules
-// that preflight2 verifies against. At the amendment's flag ledger the same
-// transaction can therefore be checked under both prefixes, on the same node,
-// at the same time.
-//
-// Remove these two flags, and oldPrefixSig below, when Cleanup3_4_0 is retired
-// in features.macro.
-constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSigbadOldPrefix = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE7;
-constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSiggoodOldPrefix = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE8;
-
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 std::pair<Validity, std::string>
@@ -74,41 +48,21 @@ checkValidity(HashRouter& router, STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules)
         return {Validity::SigBad, "Batch inner transactions are never considered validly signed."};
     }
 
-    // Pick the cache slot for this call's era; see kSfSiggoodOldPrefix above.
-    // Only a transaction that carries a role signature, and only while the fix
-    // is disabled, uses the separate slot. Every other transaction, and every
-    // transaction once the fix is enabled, uses the ordinary flags and verifies
-    // exactly once, so there is no steady state cost.
-    //
-    // Both directions matter. A good verdict from before the fix must not let a
-    // signature moved between roles survive the amendment, and a bad verdict
-    // from before the fix must not condemn a transaction that the new prefixes
-    // accept.
-    //
-    // Whether a transaction carries a role signature is fixed for its ID: the
-    // fields are kNotSigning, so they are excluded from the signed bytes, but
-    // they are still covered by the transaction ID. Repeat calls for one ID
-    // therefore always agree on which slot pair to use.
-    bool const oldPrefixSig = !rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) &&
-        (tx.isFieldPresent(sfSponsorSignature) || tx.isFieldPresent(sfCounterpartySignature));
-    auto const sigbadFlag = oldPrefixSig ? kSfSigbadOldPrefix : kSfSigbad;
-    auto const siggoodFlag = oldPrefixSig ? kSfSiggoodOldPrefix : kSfSiggood;
-
-    if (any(flags & sigbadFlag))
+    if (any(flags & kSfSigbad))
     {
         // Signature is known bad
         return {Validity::SigBad, "Transaction has bad signature."};
     }
 
-    if (!any(flags & siggoodFlag))
+    if (!any(flags & kSfSiggood))
     {
         auto const sigVerify = tx.checkSign(rules);
         if (!sigVerify)
         {
-            router.setFlags(id, sigbadFlag);
+            router.setFlags(id, kSfSigbad);
             return {Validity::SigBad, sigVerify.error()};
         }
-        router.setFlags(id, siggoodFlag);
+        router.setFlags(id, kSfSiggood);
     }
 
     // Signature is now known good
@@ -140,19 +94,6 @@ checkValidity(HashRouter& router, STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules)
 void
 forceValidity(HashRouter& router, uint256 const& txid, Validity validity)
 {
-    // Callers reach here when they deliberately skip signature verification,
-    // such as a cluster peer that trusts its neighbor's checks, or a
-    // configuration that turns signature checks off. Nothing was verified, so
-    // there is no prefix era to record. Mark both of checkValidity's signature
-    // slots good: otherwise the forced verdict is ignored for a role-signature
-    // transaction until fixCleanup3_4_0 is enabled, and the signature the
-    // caller meant to skip gets verified after all. Marking both cannot leak a
-    // verdict across eras, because no verdict was reached, and this is the only
-    // place the distinction can be recorded: kSfSiggood alone does not say
-    // whether checkValidity verified a post-fix signature or a caller forced
-    // the result. An already cached bad verdict still wins, since checkValidity
-    // tests its bad flag first. Drop kSfSiggoodOldPrefix when Cleanup3_4_0 is
-    // retired.
     HashRouterFlags flags = HashRouterFlags::UNDEFINED;
     switch (validity)
     {
@@ -160,7 +101,7 @@ forceValidity(HashRouter& router, uint256 const& txid, Validity validity)
             flags |= kSfLocalgood;
             [[fallthrough]];
         case Validity::SigGoodOnly:
-            flags |= kSfSiggood | kSfSiggoodOldPrefix;
+            flags |= kSfSiggood;
             [[fallthrough]];
         case Validity::SigBad:
             // would be silly to call directly

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/LoanInvariant.cpp

@@ -62,11 +62,10 @@ ValidLoan::finalize(
     // Ledger entry validation checks.
     for (auto const& [before, after] : loans_)
     {
-        // A closed-ended vault must not accept a loan whose final scheduled payment falls fewer
-        // than kLoanRedemptionBuffer seconds before the vault's RedemptionDate. This mirrors the
-        // LoanSet::preclaim gate and only fires on loan creation; once the loan exists, its
-        // StartDate / PaymentInterval are immutable and PaymentRemaining only decreases, so the
-        // bound is preserved.
+        // A closed-ended vault must not accept a loan whose final scheduled payment falls on or
+        // after the vault's RedemptionDate. This mirrors the LoanSet::preclaim gate and only fires
+        // on loan creation; once the loan exists, its StartDate / PaymentInterval are immutable and
+        // PaymentRemaining only decreases, so the bound is preserved.
         if (!before && isTesSuccess(result))
         {
             auto const broker = view.read(keylet::loanBroker(after->at(sfLoanBrokerID)));
@@ -81,13 +80,11 @@ ValidLoan::finalize(
                     std::uint32_t const interval = after->at(sfPaymentInterval);
                     std::uint32_t const remaining = after->at(sfPaymentRemaining);
                     std::uint32_t const redemption = vault->at(sfRedemptionDate);
-                    if (std::uint64_t{startDate} + (std::uint64_t{interval} * remaining) +
-                            kLoanRedemptionBuffer >
+                    if (std::uint64_t{startDate} + (std::uint64_t{interval} * remaining) >=
                         redemption)
                     {
                         JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: closed-ended loan final payment "
-                                           "must precede RedemptionDate by at least "
-                                           "kLoanRedemptionBuffer";
+                                           "must precede RedemptionDate";
                         return false;
                     }
                 }

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.cpp

@@ -234,6 +234,14 @@ ValidMPTIssuance::finalize(
 
         if (hasPrivilege(tx, Privilege::DestroyMptIssuance))
         {
+            // A VaultDelete that is still cleaning up credentials pinned to its
+            // pseudo-account returns tecINCOMPLETE and has not yet reached the
+            // share issuance. Don't require the issuance to be removed until
+            // the deletion completes (a later transaction).
+            if (rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) && txnType == ttVAULT_DELETE &&
+                result == tecINCOMPLETE)
+                return mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0 && mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0;
+
             if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0)
             {
                 JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
@@ -824,14 +832,6 @@ ValidMPTTransfer::visitEntry(
 
     if (after)
         update(*after, false);
-
-    // Record whether every touched AccountRoot was a pseudo-account BEFORE
-    // the transaction applied (true and false). A transaction that erases a
-    // pseudo-account (and moves MPT out of it) in the same transaction leaves
-    // no trace of its pseudo-account status in the post-transaction view
-    // isAuthorized() sees at finalize() time.
-    if (before && before->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT)
-        pseudoAccountsBefore_[before->at(sfAccount)] = isPseudoAccount(before);
 }
 
 bool
@@ -844,19 +844,10 @@ ValidMPTTransfer::isAuthorized(
     // Pseudo-accounts (Vault, LoanBroker, AMM) hold assets on behalf of their
     // participants and are implicitly authorized for any MPT they hold,
     // including vault shares whose underlying asset would otherwise require
-    // auth. Exempt them here rather than relying on requireAuth: the recursive
+    // auth.  Exempt them here rather than relying on requireAuth: the recursive
     // share -> underlying descent in requireAuth fails for a pseudo-account
     // that holds the share but not the underlying.
-    //
-    // Use the pre-transaction classification for any account this
-    // transaction touched (pseudoAccountsBefore_): the post-transaction view
-    // is wrong for an account this same transaction erased. Untouched
-    // accounts aren't in the map, so fall back to the current view, which is
-    // still accurate for them since nothing changed.
-    auto const pseudoIt = pseudoAccountsBefore_.find(holder);
-    bool const isPseudo =
-        pseudoIt != pseudoAccountsBefore_.end() ? pseudoIt->second : isPseudoAccount(view, holder);
-    if (isPseudo)
+    if (isPseudoAccount(view, holder))
         return true;
 
     auto const key = keylet::mptoken(mptid, holder);

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.cpp

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
 #include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/XRPAmount.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
 #include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
 
 #include <algorithm>
@@ -236,57 +235,21 @@ ValidVault::deltaAssets(AccountID const& id) const
         vaultAsset.value());
 }
 
-std::optional<AccountID>
-ValidVault::feePayerAccountRoot(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
-{
-    auto const feePayer = Transactor::getFeePayer(view, tx);
-    if (feePayer.type == FeePayerType::SponsorPreFunded)
-        return std::nullopt;
-    return feePayer.id;
-}
-
 std::optional<ValidVault::DeltaInfo>
-ValidVault::deltaAssetsForParty(
-    ReadView const& view,
-    AccountID const& id,
-    STTx const& tx,
-    XRPAmount fee,
-    bool fix340Enabled) const
+ValidVault::deltaAssetsTxAccount(STTx const& tx, XRPAmount fee) const
 {
     auto const& vaultAsset = afterVault_[0].asset;
-    auto ret = deltaAssets(id);
+    auto ret = deltaAssets(tx[sfAccount]);
     if (!ret.has_value() || !vaultAsset.native())
         return ret;
 
-    if (!fix340Enabled)
-    {
-        // Legacy behaviour: only tx[sfAccount] was ever considered for a fee
-        // correction, and only when STTx::getFeePayerID identified it as the
-        // fee payer (which is never true for a sponsor, since
-        // self-sponsorship is disallowed). After that sender-only correction
-        // a zero delta is collapsed to absence; if the correction does not
-        // apply, a present-zero is returned as-is.
-        if (id != tx[sfAccount] || tx.getFeePayerID() != id)
-            return ret;
-
-        ret->delta += fee.drops();
-        if (ret->delta == kZero)
-            return std::nullopt;
-
+    // Only add the fee back if tx[sfAccount] actually paid it. When the fee is
+    // paid by someone else (a delegate or a fee sponsor), the
+    // account's XRP balance moved only by the vault amount.
+    if (tx.getFeePayerID() != tx[sfAccount])
         return ret;
-    }
 
-    // Add the fee back only onto the AccountRoot that actually paid it: an
-    // ordinary sender, a delegate, or a co-signed fee sponsor -- but never a
-    // pre-funded sponsorship, whose fee is drawn from the ltSponsorship
-    // object rather than the sponsor's own XRP balance.
-    if (auto const payer = feePayerAccountRoot(view, tx); payer && *payer == id)
-        ret->delta += fee.drops();
-
-    // Normalize an economically zero delta to absence regardless of who (if
-    // anyone) paid the fee, so a touched-but-unchanged AccountRoot (e.g. the
-    // sender in a third-party withdrawal, touched only for sequence/ticket
-    // processing) is never misread as a second payout recipient.
+    ret->delta += fee.drops();
     if (ret->delta == kZero)
         return std::nullopt;
 
@@ -417,7 +380,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
     beast::Journal const& j)
 {
     bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault);
-    bool const fix340Enabled = view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
+    bool const fixEnabled = view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
 
     if (!isTesSuccess(ret))
         return true;  // Do not perform checks
@@ -609,7 +572,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
     else
     {
         bool const gapExceeded = [&] {
-            if (!fix340Enabled)
+            if (!fixEnabled)
             {
                 return afterVault.lossUnrealized >
                     afterVault.assetsTotal - afterVault.assetsAvailable;
@@ -631,7 +594,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
         }
     }
 
-    if (fix340Enabled && afterVault.lossUnrealized < kZero)
+    if (fixEnabled && afterVault.lossUnrealized < kZero)
     {
         JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: loss unrealized must not be negative";
         result = false;
@@ -802,13 +765,8 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                     result = false;
                 }
 
-                // AssetsTotal may exceed AssetsMaximum when the excess is interest. After
-                // fixCleanup3_4_0, only reject a VaultSet that supplies sfAssetsMaximum or
-                // otherwise changes the cap to a nonzero value still below AssetsTotal.
                 if (afterVault.assetsMaximum > kZero &&
-                    afterVault.assetsTotal > afterVault.assetsMaximum &&
-                    (!fix340Enabled || tx.isFieldPresent(sfAssetsMaximum) ||
-                     beforeVault.assetsMaximum != afterVault.assetsMaximum))
+                    afterVault.assetsTotal > afterVault.assetsMaximum)
                 {
                     JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
                         "Invariant failed: set assets outstanding must not "
@@ -897,8 +855,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
 
                 if (!issuerDeposit)
                 {
-                    auto const maybeAccDeltaAssets =
-                        deltaAssetsForParty(view, tx[sfAccount], tx, fee, fix340Enabled);
+                    auto const maybeAccDeltaAssets = deltaAssetsTxAccount(tx, fee);
                     if (!maybeAccDeltaAssets)
                     {
                         JLOG(j.fatal())
@@ -923,7 +880,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                         result = false;
                     }
 
-                    bool const acctVaultAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                    bool const acctVaultAddsUp = fixEnabled
                         ? agreesWithinOneUnit(
                               localVaultDeltaAssets * -1,
                               accountDeltaAssets,
@@ -978,7 +935,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
 
                 auto const assetTotalDelta = roundToAsset(
                     vaultAsset, afterVault.assetsTotal - beforeVault.assetsTotal, minScale);
-                bool const totalAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                bool const totalAddsUp = fixEnabled
                     ? agreesWithinOneUnit(assetTotalDelta, vaultDeltaAssets, vaultAsset, minScale)
                     : assetTotalDelta == vaultDeltaAssets;
                 if (!totalAddsUp)
@@ -990,7 +947,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
 
                 auto const assetAvailableDelta = roundToAsset(
                     vaultAsset, afterVault.assetsAvailable - beforeVault.assetsAvailable, minScale);
-                bool const availableAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                bool const availableAddsUp = fixEnabled
                     ? agreesWithinOneUnit(
                           assetAvailableDelta, vaultDeltaAssets, vaultAsset, minScale)
                     : assetAvailableDelta == vaultDeltaAssets;
@@ -1036,7 +993,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                 // value merely rounds down to zero, so a missing delta while
                 // the pool still held positive effective value indicates a
                 // real accounting bug, not this exception.
-                bool const zeroDeltaIsLegitimate = fix340Enabled && !maybeVaultDeltaAssets &&
+                bool const zeroDeltaIsLegitimate = fixEnabled && !maybeVaultDeltaAssets &&
                     beforeVault.assetsTotal == beforeVault.lossUnrealized;
 
                 if (!maybeVaultDeltaAssets && !zeroDeltaIsLegitimate)
@@ -1071,39 +1028,21 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
 
                 if (!issuerWithdrawal)
                 {
-                    // Identify the intended recipient explicitly from
-                    // sfDestination (falling back to sfAccount for a
-                    // self-withdrawal), rather than inferring it from which
-                    // side happens to show a delta. When a distinct
-                    // destination is named, the sending account must not
-                    // also show a real economic delta -- that would mean two
-                    // accounts were paid, which is always a bug, regardless
-                    // of what (if anything) the named destination received.
-                    auto const destinationField = tx[~sfDestination];
-                    AccountID const recipient = destinationField.value_or(tx[sfAccount]);
-                    bool const distinctDestination =
-                        destinationField.has_value() && *destinationField != tx[sfAccount];
+                    auto const maybeAccDelta = deltaAssetsTxAccount(tx, fee);
+                    auto const maybeOtherAccDelta = [&]() -> std::optional<DeltaInfo> {
+                        if (auto const destination = tx[~sfDestination];
+                            destination && *destination != tx[sfAccount])
+                            return deltaAssets(*destination);
+                        return std::nullopt;
+                    }();
 
-                    // Intentionally ungated: `fix340Enabled &&` here would let the
-                    // pre-amendment sponsored case succeed and change consensus.
-                    if (distinctDestination &&
-                        deltaAssetsForParty(view, tx[sfAccount], tx, fee, fix340Enabled)
-                            .has_value())
+                    if (maybeAccDelta.has_value() == maybeOtherAccDelta.has_value())
                     {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: withdrawal must change one destination balance";
-                        return false;
-                    }
-
-                    auto const maybeRecipientDelta =
-                        deltaAssetsForParty(view, recipient, tx, fee, fix340Enabled);
-
-                    if (!maybeRecipientDelta.has_value())
-                    {
-                        // A legitimate zero-value withdrawal moves nothing to
-                        // the recipient either; there is nothing left to
-                        // cross-check.
-                        if (!zeroDeltaIsLegitimate)
+                        // Both changed is always a bug. Neither changed is
+                        // consistent only with a legitimate zero-value
+                        // withdrawal, which moves nothing on either side —
+                        // there is nothing left to cross-check.
+                        if (!zeroDeltaIsLegitimate || maybeAccDelta.has_value())
                         {
                             JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
                                 "Invariant failed: withdrawal must change one destination balance";
@@ -1115,7 +1054,8 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                         // A one-sided change is cross-checked even for a
                         // legitimate zero vault delta: the destination must
                         // then have moved by (rounded) zero as well.
-                        auto const destinationDelta = *maybeRecipientDelta;
+                        auto const destinationDelta =
+                            *maybeAccDelta.or_else([&] { return maybeOtherAccDelta; });
 
                         // the scale of destinationDelta can be coarser than
                         // minScale, so we take that into account when rounding
@@ -1129,7 +1069,9 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                         // only. If the receiver's trust line sits at a coarser scale, the inflow
                         // may safely round down to zero.
                         //
-                        // XRP and MPT remain strict for rounding artifacts.
+                        // XRP and MPT remain strict. Because they are integer-exact, a zero
+                        // destination delta indicates a true accounting bug, not a rounding
+                        // artifact.
                         bool const tolerateZeroDelta =
                             view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && !vaultAsset.integral();
                         auto const invalidBalanceChange = tolerateZeroDelta
@@ -1158,7 +1100,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                                 vaultDeltaAssets.delta * -1 - destinationDelta.delta,
                                 destinationScale,
                                 Number::RoundingMode::Downward) == kZero;
-                        bool const withdrawAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                        bool const withdrawAddsUp = fixEnabled
                             ? agreesWithinOneUnit(
                                   localPseudoDeltaAssets * -1,
                                   roundedDestinationDelta,
@@ -1208,7 +1150,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                 auto const assetTotalDelta = roundToAsset(
                     vaultAsset, afterVault.assetsTotal - beforeVault.assetsTotal, minScale);
                 // Note, vaultBalance is negative (see check above)
-                bool const totalAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                bool const totalAddsUp = fixEnabled
                     ? agreesWithinOneUnit(
                           assetTotalDelta, vaultPseudoDeltaAssets, vaultAsset, minScale)
                     : assetTotalDelta == vaultPseudoDeltaAssets;
@@ -1222,7 +1164,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                 auto const assetAvailableDelta = roundToAsset(
                     vaultAsset, afterVault.assetsAvailable - beforeVault.assetsAvailable, minScale);
 
-                bool const availableAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                bool const availableAddsUp = fixEnabled
                     ? agreesWithinOneUnit(
                           assetAvailableDelta, vaultPseudoDeltaAssets, vaultAsset, minScale)
                     : assetAvailableDelta == vaultPseudoDeltaAssets;
@@ -1271,7 +1213,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
 
                     auto const assetsTotalDelta = roundToAsset(
                         vaultAsset, afterVault.assetsTotal - beforeVault.assetsTotal, minScale);
-                    bool const totalAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                    bool const totalAddsUp = fixEnabled
                         ? agreesWithinOneUnit(
                               assetsTotalDelta, vaultDeltaAssets, vaultAsset, minScale)
                         : assetsTotalDelta == vaultDeltaAssets;
@@ -1286,7 +1228,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
                         vaultAsset,
                         afterVault.assetsAvailable - beforeVault.assetsAvailable,
                         minScale);
-                    bool const availableAddsUp = fix340Enabled
+                    bool const availableAddsUp = fixEnabled
                         ? agreesWithinOneUnit(
                               assetAvailableDelta, vaultDeltaAssets, vaultAsset, minScale)
                         : assetAvailableDelta == vaultDeltaAssets;

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/dex/AMMClawback.cpp

@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ AMMClawback::applyGuts(Sandbox& sb)
                 0,
                 FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
                 AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
-                ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
                 WithdrawAll::Yes,
                 preFeeBalance_,
                 ctx_.journal);
@@ -346,7 +345,6 @@ AMMClawback::equalWithdrawMatchingOneAmount(
             0,
             FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
             AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
-            ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
             WithdrawAll::Yes,
             preFeeBalance_,
             ctx_.journal);
@@ -387,7 +385,6 @@ AMMClawback::equalWithdrawMatchingOneAmount(
             0,
             FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
             AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
-            ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
             WithdrawAll::No,
             preFeeBalance_,
             ctx_.journal);
@@ -409,7 +406,6 @@ AMMClawback::equalWithdrawMatchingOneAmount(
         0,
         FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
         AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
-        ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
         WithdrawAll::No,
         preFeeBalance_,
         ctx_.journal);

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/dex/AMMWithdraw.cpp

@@ -527,7 +527,6 @@ AMMWithdraw::withdraw(
         tfee,
         issuerFreezeHandling(),
         AuthHandling::ZeroIfUnauthorized,
-        ReserveHandling::EnforceReserve,
         isWithdrawAll(ctx_.tx),
         preFeeBalance_,
         j_);
@@ -549,7 +548,6 @@ AMMWithdraw::withdraw(
     std::uint16_t tfee,
     FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
     AuthHandling authHandling,
-    ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
     WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
     XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
     beast::Journal const& journal)
@@ -683,14 +681,6 @@ AMMWithdraw::withdraw(
             });
         if (assetNotExists)
         {
-            // Intentionally ignore the reserve check for AMMClawback, so the
-            // holder can not avoid clawback by deleting the trustline/MPToken
-            // and keeping a low spendable balance. AMMClawback has a higher
-            // priority than the reserve check.
-            if (view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) &&
-                reserveHandling == ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve)
-                return tesSUCCESS;
-
             auto sleAccount = view.peek(keylet::account(account));
             if (!sleAccount)
                 return tecINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -860,7 +850,6 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
         tfee,
         issuerFreezeHandling(),
         AuthHandling::ZeroIfUnauthorized,
-        ReserveHandling::EnforceReserve,
         isWithdrawAll(ctx_.tx),
         preFeeBalance_,
         ctx_.journal);
@@ -914,7 +903,6 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
     std::uint16_t tfee,
     FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
     AuthHandling authHandling,
-    ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
     WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
     XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
     beast::Journal const& journal)
@@ -938,7 +926,6 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
                 tfee,
                 freezeHandling,
                 authHandling,
-                reserveHandling,
                 WithdrawAll::Yes,
                 priorBalance,
                 journal);
@@ -975,7 +962,6 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
             tfee,
             freezeHandling,
             authHandling,
-            reserveHandling,
             withdrawAll,
             priorBalance,
             journal);

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/dex/OfferCreate.cpp

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
 #include <xrpl/ledger/Sandbox.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/DirectoryHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/OfferHelpers.h>
@@ -243,31 +242,8 @@ OfferCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
     // is part of the domain
     if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
     {
-        if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
-        {
-            auto const domainID = ctx.tx[sfDomainID];
-            auto const sleDomain = ctx.view.read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
-            if (!sleDomain)
-                return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-
-            // Domain owner is always considered in the domain, no credential check
-            // needed. For all other accounts, use validDomain which detects expired
-            // credentials. Suppress tecEXPIRED here so doApply can run and delete
-            // the expired credential SLEs from the ledger.
-            if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) != id)
-            {
-                // validDomain returns tecNO_AUTH when no matching credential is
-                // found. Map it to tecNO_PERMISSION to preserve existing behavior.
-                if (auto const err = credentials::validDomain(ctx.view, domainID, id);
-                    !isTesSuccess(err) && err != tecEXPIRED)
-                    return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-            }
-        }
-        else
-        {
-            if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, id, ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
-                return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-        }
+        if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, id, ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
+            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
     }
 
     if (auto const ter = canTrade(ctx.view, saTakerPays.asset()); !isTesSuccess(ter))
@@ -1024,27 +1000,6 @@ OfferCreate::applyGuts(Sandbox& sb, Sandbox& sbCancel)
 TER
 OfferCreate::doApply()
 {
-    // If a DomainID is present, verify the account is still in the domain and
-    // delete any expired credential SLEs. This must happen before the Sandboxes
-    // are created: if we return a tec error, the engine applies sbCancel (not
-    // sb) to rawView, so deletions made inside sb would be lost. Deletions made
-    // directly to ctx_.view() here are preserved regardless of which branch
-    // applyGuts takes.
-    if (ctx_.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID) && ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
-    {
-        auto const domainID = ctx_.tx[sfDomainID];
-        auto const sleDomain = ctx_.view().read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
-        if (!sleDomain)
-            return tecINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-
-        if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) != accountID_)
-        {
-            if (auto const err = verifyValidDomain(ctx_.view(), accountID_, domainID, j_);
-                !isTesSuccess(err))
-                return err;
-        }
-    }
-
     // This is the ledger view that we work against. Transactions are applied
     // as we go on processing transactions.
     Sandbox sb(&ctx_.view());

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/escrow/EscrowCancel.cpp

@@ -169,12 +169,6 @@ EscrowCancel::doApply()
     auto const sle = ctx_.view().peek(keylet::account(account));
     STAmount const amount = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount);
 
-    // The return can re-create a holding the owner deleted while the escrow
-    // was pending; the removed escrow must not be counted against its reserve.
-    bool const recycleReserve = ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
-    if (recycleReserve)
-        decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), sle, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
-
     // Transfer amount back to the owner
     if (isXRP(amount))
     {
@@ -218,8 +212,7 @@ EscrowCancel::doApply()
         }
     }
 
-    if (!recycleReserve)
-        decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), sle, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
+    decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), sle, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
 
     // Remove escrow from ledger
     ctx_.view().erase(slep);

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/escrow/EscrowCreate.cpp

@@ -88,13 +88,8 @@ EscrowCreate::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
     // Only require featureMPTokensV1 when the escrow amount is an MPT and
     // fixCleanup3_2_0 is active; XRP/IOU escrows are unaffected by this gate.
     if (ctx.rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && ctx.tx[sfAmount].holds<MPTIssue>())
-    {
-        if (!ctx.rules.enabled(featureMPTokensV1))
-            return false;
-    }
-
-    return (!ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfBytecode) && !ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfData)) ||
-        ctx.rules.enabled(featureSmartEscrow);
+        return ctx.rules.enabled(featureMPTokensV1);
+    return true;
 }
 
 template <ValidIssueType T>

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/escrow/EscrowFinish.cpp

@@ -65,13 +65,7 @@ checkCondition(Slice f, Slice c)
 bool
 EscrowFinish::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
 {
-    if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfCredentialIDs) && !ctx.rules.enabled(featureCredentials))
-        return false;
-
-    if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfGas) && !ctx.rules.enabled(featureSmartEscrow))
-        return false;
-
-    return true;
+    return !ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfCredentialIDs) || ctx.rules.enabled(featureCredentials);
 }
 
 NotTEC
@@ -349,12 +343,14 @@ EscrowFinish::doApply()
         }
     }
 
-    // Delivery can auto-create the destination's holding; the removed escrow
-    // must not be counted against its reserve. The two share a reserve payer
-    // for a self-escrow, or when one sponsor covers both.
-    bool const recycleReserve =
-        ctx_.view().rules().enabled(featureSponsor) || ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
-    if (recycleReserve)
+    // With the Sponsor amendment, release the escrow reserve before delivery.
+    // Token delivery can auto-create a destination holding, and the same
+    // sponsor (or the same account, for a self-escrow) may cover both the
+    // escrow being removed and the holding being created. Without the
+    // amendment, keep the legacy order: releasing early changes the reserve
+    // arithmetic for self-escrows and would break consensus if not gated.
+    bool const sponsorEnabled = ctx_.view().rules().enabled(featureSponsor);
+    if (sponsorEnabled)
         decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), account, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
 
     STAmount const amount = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount);
@@ -406,7 +402,8 @@ EscrowFinish::doApply()
 
     ctx_.view().update(sled);
 
-    if (!recycleReserve)
+    // Adjust source owner count (legacy position, pre-Sponsor)
+    if (!sponsorEnabled)
         decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), account, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
 
     // Remove escrow from ledger

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/lending/LoanBrokerCoverWithdraw.cpp

@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ LoanBrokerCoverWithdraw::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
 {
     auto const fix320Enabled = ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0);
     auto const fix330Enabled = ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_3_0);
-    auto const fix340Enabled = ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
     auto const& tx = ctx.tx;
 
     auto const account = tx[sfAccount];
@@ -141,12 +140,6 @@ LoanBrokerCoverWithdraw::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
     if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, vaultAsset, dstAcct, authType))
         return ter;
 
-    if (fix340Enabled && account == dstAcct && !holdingExists(ctx.view, dstAcct, vaultAsset))
-    {
-        if (auto const ter = canAddHolding(ctx.view, vaultAsset); !isTesSuccess(ter))
-            return ter;
-    }
-
     if (fix330Enabled)
     {
         if (auto const ret =

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/lending/LoanBrokerDelete.cpp

@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@
 #include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
+#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/LendingHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Asset.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
@@ -140,6 +142,19 @@ LoanBrokerDelete::doApply()
 
     auto const brokerPseudoID = broker->at(sfAccount);
 
+    // Remove any credentials pinned to the broker pseudo-account before anything
+    // else. They would otherwise keep its owner directory alive and block
+    // deletion with tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS. Doing it first means a bounded,
+    // tecINCOMPLETE cleanup can be resumed by a later transaction without having
+    // already torn down the broker.
+    if (view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
+    {
+        if (auto const ter = credentials::deletePseudoAccountCredentials(
+                view(), brokerPseudoID, kMaxDeletablePseudoAccountCredentials, j_);
+            !isTesSuccess(ter))
+            return ter;
+    }
+
     if (!view().dirRemove(
             keylet::ownerDir(accountID_), broker->at(sfOwnerNode), broker->key(), false))
     {

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/lending/LoanBrokerSet.cpp

@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/LendingHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
+#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/VaultHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Asset.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
@@ -144,6 +146,20 @@ LoanBrokerSet::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
     }
     else
     {
+        // LP V1.1: only closed-ended vaults may host a loan broker. The
+        // lending protocol relies on the closed-ended Subscription /
+        // Investment / Redemption phase structure; attaching a broker to
+        // an open-ended vault has no well-defined lifecycle. VaultCreate
+        // stays unrestricted so existing open-ended flows keep working;
+        // the constraint is enforced here, at the point where the vault
+        // is first bound to the lending protocol.
+        if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureLendingProtocolV1_1) &&
+            getVaultKind(sleVault) != VaultKind::ClosedEnded)
+        {
+            JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "LoanBroker requires a closed-ended Vault.";
+            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
+        }
+
         if (auto const ter = canAddHolding(ctx.view, asset))
             return ter;
 

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/lending/LoanSet.cpp

@@ -40,12 +40,6 @@
 
 namespace xrpl {
 
-// StartDate is strictly after SubscriptionDate. A min-gap vault must still
-// fit a minimum-interval loan plus kLoanRedemptionBuffer. The interval and
-// buffer constants are independent; only their sum (plus the +1 for a
-// strictly-later StartDate) is required to fit in kMinInvestmentPeriod.
-static_assert(kMinInvestmentPeriod >= LoanSet::kMinPaymentInterval + kLoanRedemptionBuffer + 1);
-
 bool
 LoanSet::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
 {
@@ -333,22 +327,16 @@ LoanSet::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
         {
             auto const finalPayment =
                 std::uint64_t{getStartDate(ctx.view)} + (std::uint64_t{interval} * total);
-            if (finalPayment + kLoanRedemptionBuffer > vault->at(sfRedemptionDate))
+            if (finalPayment >= vault->at(sfRedemptionDate))
             {
-                JLOG(ctx.j.warn())
-                    << "Final loan payment date is fewer than " << kLoanRedemptionBuffer
-                    << " seconds before the vault's redemption date.";
+                JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Final loan payment date is on or after "
+                                      "the vault's redemption date.";
                 return tecNO_PERMISSION;
             }
         }
     }
 
-    // Accrual origination credits interestDue into AssetsTotal, so a vault
-    // already at AssetsMaximum cannot take another loan. Cash-basis origination
-    // does not change AssetsTotal (see cash_basis::loanOriginationDeltas), so
-    // this leftover accrual gate must not apply there.
-    if (getVaultVersion(vault) != VaultVersion::CashBasis && vault->at(sfAssetsMaximum) != 0 &&
-        vault->at(sfAssetsTotal) >= vault->at(sfAssetsMaximum))
+    if (vault->at(sfAssetsMaximum) != 0 && vault->at(sfAssetsTotal) >= vault->at(sfAssetsMaximum))
     {
         JLOG(ctx.j.warn()) << "Vault at maximum assets limit. Can't add another loan.";
         return tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED;
@@ -372,24 +360,8 @@ LoanSet::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
         }
     }
 
-    // canAddHolding is an issuer-level check (DefaultRipple for IOU,
-    // lsfMPTCanTransfer for MPT); neither overload looks at the
-    // destination, so the holdingExists() clauses only decide whether a
-    // create path is reachable at all. It always runs before
-    // fixCleanup3_4_0: IOU addEmptyHolding checks DefaultRipple ahead of
-    // the existing-line case, so only preclaim can turn an existing line
-    // under a cleared DefaultRipple into terNO_RIPPLE rather than
-    // tecINTERNAL. After the amendment an existing line short-circuits to
-    // tecDUPLICATE, which doApply ignores, so run the check only when the
-    // borrower lacks a holding, or the origination fee is nonzero and the
-    // broker owner lacks one.
-    auto const originationFee = tx[~sfLoanOriginationFee].value_or(Number{});
-    if (!ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) || !holdingExists(ctx.view, borrower, asset) ||
-        (originationFee != beast::kZero && !holdingExists(ctx.view, brokerOwner, asset)))
-    {
-        if (auto const ter = canAddHolding(ctx.view, asset))
-            return ter;
-    }
+    if (auto const ter = canAddHolding(ctx.view, asset))
+        return ter;
 
     // vaultPseudo is going to send funds, so it can't be frozen.
     if (auto const ret = checkFrozen(ctx.view, vaultPseudo, asset))
@@ -495,11 +467,9 @@ LoanSet::doApply()
         properties.loanState.managementFeeDue);
 
     XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
-        *vaultSle->at(sfAssetsMaximum) == 0 ||
-            getVaultVersion(vaultSle) == VaultVersion::CashBasis ||
-            *vaultSle->at(sfAssetsMaximum) > *vaultTotalProxy,
+        *vaultSle->at(sfAssetsMaximum) == 0 || *vaultSle->at(sfAssetsMaximum) > *vaultTotalProxy,
         "xrpl::LoanSet::doApply",
-        "accrual vault is below maximum limit");
+        "Vault is below maximum limit");
 
     if (loanOriginationExceedsVaultMaximum(vaultSle, vaultTotalProxy, state.interestDue))
     {

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/payment/Payment.cpp

@@ -458,41 +458,11 @@ Payment::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
 
     if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
     {
-        if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
-        {
-            auto const domainID = ctx.tx[sfDomainID];
-            auto const sleDomain = ctx.view.read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
-            if (!sleDomain)
-                return tecNO_PERMISSION;
+        if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
+            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
 
-            // Domain owner is always considered in the domain. For other accounts,
-            // suppress tecEXPIRED so doApply can run and delete expired credential
-            // SLEs from the ledger.
-            auto const checkAccount = [&](AccountID const& acct) -> TER {
-                if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) == acct)
-                    return tesSUCCESS;
-                // validDomain returns tecNO_AUTH when no matching credential is
-                // found. Map it to tecNO_PERMISSION to preserve existing behavior.
-                if (auto const err = credentials::validDomain(ctx.view, domainID, acct);
-                    !isTesSuccess(err) && err != tecEXPIRED)
-                    return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-                return tesSUCCESS;
-            };
-
-            if (auto const err = checkAccount(ctx.tx[sfAccount]); !isTesSuccess(err))
-                return err;
-            if (auto const err = checkAccount(ctx.tx[sfDestination]); !isTesSuccess(err))
-                return err;
-        }
-        else
-        {
-            if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
-                return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-
-            if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(
-                    ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfDestination], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
-                return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-        }
+        if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfDestination], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
+            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
     }
 
     return tesSUCCESS;
@@ -501,31 +471,6 @@ Payment::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
 TER
 Payment::doApply()
 {
-    // If a DomainID is present, verify both sender and destination are still in
-    // the domain and delete any expired credential SLEs from the ledger.
-    if (ctx_.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID) && ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
-    {
-        auto const domainID = ctx_.tx[sfDomainID];
-        auto const sleDomain = ctx_.view().read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
-        if (!sleDomain)
-            return tecINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-
-        auto const cleanupFor = [&](AccountID const& acct) -> TER {
-            if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) == acct)
-                return tesSUCCESS;
-            return verifyValidDomain(ctx_.view(), acct, domainID, j_);
-        };
-
-        auto const destination = ctx_.tx[sfDestination];
-        auto const senderErr = cleanupFor(accountID_);
-        auto const destinationErr = accountID_ == destination ? senderErr : cleanupFor(destination);
-
-        if (!isTesSuccess(senderErr))
-            return senderErr;
-        if (!isTesSuccess(destinationErr))
-            return destinationErr;
-    }
-
     auto const deliverMin = ctx_.tx[~sfDeliverMin];
 
     // Ripple if source or destination is non-native or if there are paths.

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/system/Change.cpp

@@ -123,12 +123,6 @@ Change::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
                     ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfReserveIncrementDrops))
                     return temDISABLED;
             }
-            // The ttFEE transaction format defines these fields as optional,
-            // but they are unconditionally forbidden until FeeVoteImpl is
-            // updated to populate them (SmartEscrow behavioral port).
-            if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfGasLimit) || ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfBytecodeSizeLimit) ||
-                ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfGasPrice))
-                return temDISABLED;
             return tesSUCCESS;
         case ttAMENDMENT:
         case ttUNL_MODIFY:

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/token/MPTokenIssuanceSet.cpp

@@ -119,15 +119,7 @@ MPTokenIssuanceSet::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
     if (hasHolder && (hasIssuerElGamalKey || hasAuditorElGamalKey))
         return temMALFORMED;
 
-    // Pre-ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation amendment, the auditor key could not be
-    // registered independently of the issuer key. The issuer could either:
-    // - Register only the issuer key (in which case an auditor key could not be added later), or
-    // - Register both the issuer and auditor keys simultaneously.
-    //
-    // Post-ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation amendment, the auditor key can be
-    // registered after the issuer key has already been registered.
-    if (hasAuditorElGamalKey && !hasIssuerElGamalKey &&
-        !ctx.rules.enabled(featureConfidentialMPTKeyRotation))
+    if (hasAuditorElGamalKey && !hasIssuerElGamalKey)
         return temMALFORMED;
 
     if (hasIssuerElGamalKey && !isValidCompressedECPoint(ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptionKey]))
@@ -227,57 +219,18 @@ MPTokenIssuanceSet::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
             return tecNO_PERMISSION;
     }
 
-    // Updating an existing encryption key requires the
-    // ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation amendment.
-    bool const canRotateKey = ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureConfidentialMPTKeyRotation);
-
-    bool const txHasIssuerKey = ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptionKey);
-    bool const txHasAuditorKey = ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey);
-    bool const sleHasIssuerKey = sleMptIssuance->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptionKey);
-    bool const sleHasAuditorKey = sleMptIssuance->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey);
-
-    if (canRotateKey)
+    // cannot update issuer public key
+    if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptionKey) &&
+        sleMptIssuance->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptionKey))
     {
-        // Post-ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation amendment, the encryption keys can be updated.
-        // A first-time auditor key registration requires an issuer key,
-        // either already on the issuance or set by the same transaction.
-        bool const registersAuditorKey = txHasAuditorKey && !sleHasAuditorKey;
-        bool const issuerKeyExists = sleHasIssuerKey || txHasIssuerKey;
-        if (registersAuditorKey && !issuerKeyExists)
-            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-
-        // Rotating a key to its current value is not permitted: a key epoch
-        // increment must always correspond to an actual key change.
-        if (txHasIssuerKey && sleHasIssuerKey &&
-            ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptionKey] == (*sleMptIssuance)[sfIssuerEncryptionKey])
-            return tecDUPLICATE;
-
-        if (txHasAuditorKey && sleHasAuditorKey &&
-            ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptionKey] == (*sleMptIssuance)[sfAuditorEncryptionKey])
-            return tecDUPLICATE;
-
-        // Key epochs must never wrap. Epoch 0 serves as the sentinel for "never
-        // rotated." Holders' mirror epochs are checked against it for equality,
-        // so a wrap would cause stale mirror ciphertexts to appear valid instead
-        // of failing loudly.
-        if (txHasIssuerKey && sleHasIssuerKey &&
-            (*sleMptIssuance)[~sfIssuerKeyEpoch].value_or(0) == kMaxKeyEpoch)
-            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
-
-        if (txHasAuditorKey && sleHasAuditorKey &&
-            (*sleMptIssuance)[~sfAuditorKeyEpoch].value_or(0) == kMaxKeyEpoch)
-            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
+        return tecNO_PERMISSION;
     }
-    else
-    {
-        // Pre-ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation amendment, the encryption keys can not be updated.
-        // cannot update issuer public key
-        if (txHasIssuerKey && sleHasIssuerKey)
-            return tecNO_PERMISSION;
 
-        // cannot update auditor public key
-        if (txHasAuditorKey && sleHasAuditorKey)
-            return tecNO_PERMISSION;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+    // cannot update auditor public key
+    if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey) &&
+        sleMptIssuance->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey))
+    {
+        return tecNO_PERMISSION;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
     }
 
     auto const enablesConfidentialBalance =
@@ -288,30 +241,25 @@ MPTokenIssuanceSet::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
 
     // Encryption keys can only be set if confidential amounts are already
     // enabled on the issuance OR if the transaction is enabling it
-    if (txHasIssuerKey && !sleMptIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance) &&
-        !enablesConfidentialBalance)
+    if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptionKey) &&
+        !sleMptIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance) && !enablesConfidentialBalance)
     {
         return tecNO_PERMISSION;
     }
 
-    if (txHasAuditorKey && !sleMptIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance) &&
-        !enablesConfidentialBalance)
+    if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey) &&
+        !sleMptIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance) && !enablesConfidentialBalance)
     {
         return tecNO_PERMISSION;
     }
 
-    bool const hasConfidentialOA =
-        (*sleMptIssuance)[~sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount].value_or(0) > 0;
-
-    // Pre-ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation amendment, keys cannot be uploaded while
-    // COA > 0. Post-amendment they can be uploaded even if COA > 0.
-    if (!canRotateKey && (txHasIssuerKey || txHasAuditorKey) && hasConfidentialOA)
+    // cannot upload key if there's circulating supply of COA
+    if ((ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptionKey) ||
+         ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey) || enablesConfidentialBalance) &&
+        (*sleMptIssuance)[~sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount].value_or(0) > 0)
+    {
         return tecNO_PERMISSION;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-
-    // Enabling confidential balances when COA > 0 is not permitted, regardless of
-    // ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation.
-    if (enablesConfidentialBalance && hasConfidentialOA)
-        return tecNO_PERMISSION;
+    }
 
     return tesSUCCESS;
 }
@@ -429,69 +377,25 @@ MPTokenIssuanceSet::doApply()
         }
     }
 
-    // Sets an encryption key on the issuance. Overwriting an existing key
-    // (a rotation) increments the corresponding key epoch; a first-time
-    // registration leaves the epoch absent (epoch 0), matching issuances
-    // whose keys were registered before the ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation
-    // amendment.
-    bool const canRotateKey = view().rules().enabled(featureConfidentialMPTKeyRotation);
-    auto const setEncryptionKey = [&](SF_VL const& keyField, SF_UINT32 const& epochField) -> TER {
-        auto const pubKey = ctx_.tx[~keyField];
-        if (!pubKey)
-            return tesSUCCESS;
-
-        // This is enforced in preflight, which rejects a transaction carrying
-        // both sfHolder and an encryption key.
+    if (auto const pubKey = ctx_.tx[~sfIssuerEncryptionKey])
+    {
+        // This is enforced in preflight.
         XRPL_ASSERT(
             sle->getType() == ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE,
             "MPTokenIssuanceSet::doApply : modifying MPTokenIssuance");
 
-        // Add sanity check under the amendment ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation.
-        // Pre-confidentialMPTKeyRotation did not return tecINTERNAL so
-        // this should be under the amendment guard.
-        if (canRotateKey && sle->getType() != ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE)
-            return tecINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+        sle->setFieldVL(sfIssuerEncryptionKey, *pubKey);
+    }
 
-        // NOTE: presence must be checked before the key is overwritten below.
-        bool const isRotation = sle->isFieldPresent(keyField);
-        sle->setFieldVL(keyField, *pubKey);
+    if (auto const pubKey = ctx_.tx[~sfAuditorEncryptionKey])
+    {
+        // This is enforced in preflight.
+        XRPL_ASSERT(
+            sle->getType() == ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE,
+            "MPTokenIssuanceSet::doApply : modifying MPTokenIssuance");
 
-        if (isRotation)
-        {
-            // Preclaim rejects overwriting an existing key unless the amendment is
-            // enabled.
-            if (!canRotateKey)
-            {
-                // LCOV_EXCL_START
-                UNREACHABLE("xrpl::MPTokenIssuanceSet::doApply : rotation without amendment");
-                return tecINTERNAL;
-                // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-            }
-
-            auto const epoch = (*sle)[~epochField].valueOr(0);
-
-            // Preclaim rejects a rotation that would wrap the epoch. So this should never happen.
-            if (epoch >= kMaxKeyEpoch)
-            {
-                // LCOV_EXCL_START
-                UNREACHABLE("xrpl::MPTokenIssuanceSet::doApply : key epoch overflow");
-                return tecINTERNAL;
-                // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-            }
-
-            (*sle)[epochField] = epoch + 1;
-        }
-
-        return tesSUCCESS;
-    };
-
-    if (auto const ter = setEncryptionKey(sfIssuerEncryptionKey, sfIssuerKeyEpoch);
-        !isTesSuccess(ter))
-        return ter;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-
-    if (auto const ter = setEncryptionKey(sfAuditorEncryptionKey, sfAuditorKeyEpoch);
-        !isTesSuccess(ter))
-        return ter;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+        sle->setFieldVL(sfAuditorEncryptionKey, *pubKey);
+    }
 
     view().update(sle);