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42 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Denis Angell
4258eca938 fix: include TestHelpers.h in PayChan_test for the Gate helper from develop 2026-09-13 19:25:35 -04:00
Denis Angell
01919230a5 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/develop' into token-paychan 2026-09-13 19:19:33 -04:00
Sergey Kuznetsov
9403736199 ci: Exclude Rust unit tests from code coverage (#8203) 2026-09-10 11:38:25 +00:00
Mayukha Vadari
028783661d feat: Apply .macro changes from ripple/smart-escrow (#8157)
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-09 20:05:58 +00:00
Vito Tumas
21890d9daf feat: Register featureLendingProtocolV1_2 amendment (#8185)
Co-authored-by: Bart <bthomee@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-09 10:01:32 +00:00
Sergey Kuznetsov
060957ed39 ci: Add nightly Rust toolchain to the CI image (#8182)
Co-authored-by: Bart <bthomee@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-09 01:24:28 +00:00
Ayaz Salikhov
1381483c7a build: Fix test installation on debian:11 due to EOL (#8200) 2026-09-08 22:49:16 +00:00
dependabot[bot]
3e4bdf2782 ci: [DEPENDABOT] bump actions/deploy-pages from 5.0.0 to 5.0.1 in the github-actions group across 1 directory (#8180)
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-07 16:07:56 +00:00
Mayukha Vadari
e3c8996e44 feat: Add fixCleanup3_5_0 amendment placeholder (#8174) 2026-09-05 00:06:14 +00:00
yinyiqian1
d5bfe94f15 feat: Support key rotation in MPTokenIssuanceSet (#7915) 2026-09-03 21:13:06 +00:00
Bart
2ad4def35f chore: Bump version to 3.4.0-rc1 (#8171)
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 20:07:24 +00:00
Mayukha Vadari
f7f50caa6e docs: Backfill API-CHANGELOG.md for 3.1.1 through 3.3.0 (#8159) 2026-09-03 19:48:15 +00:00
Ayaz Salikhov
3e54e7d00b fix: Don't use github.workspace as it slow downs gcovr (#8173) 2026-09-03 19:20:38 +00:00
Valentin Balaschenko
827b50f169 fix: Flaky online delete tests, and cover the health checks added in #5531 (#8137) 2026-09-03 18:56:30 +00:00
Mayukha Vadari
58a59c37ed fix: Add signature prefixes for sfCounterpartySignature and sfSponsorSignature (#8162) 2026-09-03 17:19:07 +00:00
Ayaz Salikhov
986065c16f build: Verify glibc version was determined in debian package (#8170) 2026-09-03 16:54:54 +00:00
Denis Angell
37cb4cdbe3 fix: Recycle the escrow reserve in EscrowCancel and EscrowFinish (#8142) 2026-09-03 16:27:45 +00:00
Bart
2ddf6ee148 ci: Update pre-commit SHA (#8169)
Co-authored-by: Bart <11445373+bthomee@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 14:52:42 +00:00
Pratik Mankawde
8ce4f71427 docs: Use consistent heading levels in PR template (#8155) 2026-09-03 14:48:32 +00:00
Bart
6e1eb88e6e ci: Update prepare-runner SHA (#8168)
Co-authored-by: Bart <11445373+bthomee@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 11:52:08 +00:00
Ayaz Salikhov
49cdc105de fix: Correct and simplify Linux packaging (#8165) 2026-09-02 21:18:13 +00:00
Chenna Keshava B S
636d2d4851 fix: Reinforce the priority of AMMClawback in case of insufficient reserves (#7796)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 20:48:53 +00:00
Kassaking7
7d7275847d fix: PermissionedDEX (CreateOffer/Payment) never deletes expired credentials (#6827) 2026-09-02 19:38:01 +00:00
Bart
f0fd6ad85e fix: Clamp the depth used to index selectBranch's key byte (#7941)
Co-authored-by: Bart <11445373+bthomee@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 18:06:48 +00:00
Timur Yalymov
5d8fd9824e fix: Revert credential cleanup for pseudo-accounts (#8161) 2026-09-02 15:00:50 +00:00
Vito Tumas
346ea40f69 fix: Allow zero-value MPT vault withdraw when the asset holding is missing (#8153) 2026-09-02 13:45:52 +00:00
Denis Angell
2ba6f4cc68 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/develop' into token-paychan
# Conflicts:
#	include/xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h
#	src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/escrow/EscrowCreate.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/escrow/EscrowFinish.cpp
#	src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/payment_channel/PaymentChannelCreate.cpp
#	src/test/jtx/impl/TestHelpers.cpp
2026-08-31 11:35:47 -04:00
Denis Angell
c5ae59c4a0 fix: gate paychan claim MPToken invariant relaxation on featureTokenPaychan 2026-08-25 11:10:39 -04:00
Denis Angell
1ac1d40d06 fix: satisfy clang-tidy include-cleaner and brace style in paychan 2026-08-03 12:26:20 -04:00
Denis Angell
fb10515cff Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/develop' into token-paychan
# Conflicts:
#	include/xrpl/protocol/detail/features.macro
2026-08-03 11:38:43 -04:00
Denis Angell
3c85a0180f refactor: address review nits 2026-08-02 16:05:25 -04:00
Denis Angell
096fa967da fix: repair bad develop merge resolutions 2026-08-02 16:05:22 -04:00
dangell8
1ced7dc8f3 Merge branch 'develop' into token-paychan
Includes post-merge compile fixes (build-verified).
2026-07-17 15:02:03 +00:00
Denis Angell
df1458a136 test: expand token paychan transactor phase coverage 2026-07-13 19:25:43 -04:00
Denis Angell
cdd5ebf4c1 fix: validate paychan asset match in preclaim with tecWRONG_ASSET 2026-07-13 16:33:49 -04:00
Denis Angell
1a9a11fc31 style: remove includes flagged by misc-include-cleaner 2026-07-13 15:28:42 -04:00
Denis Angell
a9430d4778 style: conform doxygen comments to check-doxygen-style hook 2026-07-13 15:11:48 -04:00
Denis Angell
fed5093488 fix: adapt token paychan to develop merge helpers and sponsor reserve 2026-07-13 14:59:54 -04:00
Denis Angell
6c74fc1a7d Merge branch 'develop' into token-paychan 2026-07-13 14:05:56 -04:00
dangell8
939f8b1a49 Merge develop into token-paychan 2026-07-11 04:27:08 +00:00
Denis Angell
1f8c462c42 feat: XLS-93d Token-Enabled Payment Channels 2026-07-10 12:14:12 -04:00
Denis Angell
47df026dcc refactor: Move escrow lock/unlock helpers to EscrowHelpers.h 2026-07-10 11:55:13 -04:00
148 changed files with 12166 additions and 2264 deletions

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@@ -366,7 +366,6 @@ words:
- venv
- vfalco
- vinnie
- vkeylet
- wasmi
- wextra
- wptr

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@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ runs:
# Unlike the Linux nix images, macOS needs no SSL_CERT_FILE: it has its
# own trust store, and pinning would break TLS to hosts relying on it.
# Workspace-local, so `cleanup-workspace` clears it, but not the
# `.conan2` prepare-runner hands the system toolchain: that Conan is a
# different version, and the two would migrate each other's cache.
echo "CONAN_HOME=${{ github.workspace }}/.conan2-nix" >>"${GITHUB_ENV}"
# In RUNNER_TEMP, which the runner empties per job, like the `.conan2`
# prepare-runner hands the system toolchain - but under its own name:
# that Conan is a different version, and the two would migrate each
# other's cache.
echo "CONAN_HOME=${RUNNER_TEMP}/.conan2-nix" >>"${GITHUB_ENV}"
# Config, profiles and remote, exactly as the dev shell sets them up on
# entry; the `setup-conan` action is skipped for this toolchain.

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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ If too broad, please consider splitting into multiple PRs.
If there is a relevant task or issue, please link it here.
-->
### Context of Change
## Context of Change
<!--
Please include the context of a change.
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ If a refactor, how is this better than the previous implementation?
If there is a spec or design document for this feature, please link it here.
-->
### API Impact
## API Impact
<!--
Please check [x] relevant options, delete irrelevant ones.

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
"image_tag": "sha-473fe44",
"image_tag": "sha-060957e",
"configs": {
"ubuntu": [
{
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
"extra_cmake_args": "-Dvalidator_keys=ON",
"package": {
"type": "deb",
"image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-b6a8995"
"image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-49cdc10"
}
}
],
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
"extra_cmake_args": "-Dvalidator_keys=ON",
"package": {
"type": "rpm",
"image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-b6a8995"
"image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-49cdc10"
}
}
]

View File

@@ -5,15 +5,13 @@ on:
branches:
- develop
paths:
- ".github/workflows/build-nix-images.yml"
- "flake.nix"
- "flake.lock"
- "rust-toolchain.toml"
- "nix/**"
- "!nix/docker/README.md"
- "!nix/devshell.nix"
- "!nix/check-tools/*.txt"
- "bin/check-tools.sh"
- "!nix/check-tools/**"
- "bin/default-loader-path.sh"
- "bin/install-sanitizer-libs.sh"
pull_request:
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ on:
- "nix/**"
- "!nix/docker/README.md"
- "!nix/devshell.nix"
- "!nix/check-tools/*.txt"
- "!nix/check-tools/**"
- "bin/check-tools.sh"
- "bin/default-loader-path.sh"
- "bin/install-sanitizer-libs.sh"
@@ -60,7 +58,7 @@ jobs:
base_image: debian:bookworm
- name: rhel
base_image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@65d5a0bd72be4ecea95cff0673a6e0672ab5243a
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@034e87065fcd0100214cf0672923bd38d193cf78
with:
image_name: xrpld/nix-${{ matrix.distro.name }}
dockerfile: nix/docker/Dockerfile

View File

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
# AlmaLinux rather than UBI, which does not ship rpm-sign.
- name: rhel
base_image: almalinux:10
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@65d5a0bd72be4ecea95cff0673a6e0672ab5243a
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@034e87065fcd0100214cf0672923bd38d193cf78
with:
image_name: xrpld/packaging-${{ matrix.distro.name }}
dockerfile: package/docker/Dockerfile

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@65d5a0bd72be4ecea95cff0673a6e0672ab5243a
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/build-multiarch-image.yml@034e87065fcd0100214cf0672923bd38d193cf78
with:
image_name: xrpld/pre-commit
dockerfile: bin/pre-commit/Dockerfile

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ permissions:
jobs:
audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-473fe44
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-060957e
permissions:
contents: read
# Needed to open an issue on scheduled failures.

View File

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: false

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ on:
jobs:
# Call the workflow in the XRPLF/actions repo that runs the pre-commit hooks.
run-hooks:
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@f1952595d212e86169935135efc66294b4574131
uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@279ec358f4a1be4088be3e024b07916fa97c75b6
with:
runs_on: ubuntu-latest
container: '{ "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/pre-commit:sha-473fe44" }'

View File

@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ env:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-473fe44
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-060957e
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: false
@@ -91,4 +91,4 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Deploy to GitHub Pages
id: deploy
uses: actions/deploy-pages@cd2ce8fcbc39b97be8ca5fce6e763baed58fa128 # v5.0.0
uses: actions/deploy-pages@368f82528645a54fb793d4d04e342629a3f51346 # v5.0.1

View File

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: ${{ inputs.ccache_enabled }}

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
needs: [determine-files]
if: ${{ needs.determine-files.outputs.cpp_changed_files != '' || needs.determine-files.outputs.need_full_run == 'true' }}
runs-on: ["self-hosted", "Linux", "X64", "heavy"]
container: "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-debian:sha-473fe44"
container: "ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-debian:sha-060957e"
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: false

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
# Build Linux packages from the pre-built xrpld and validator-keys artifacts:
# Build, verify and publish Linux packages from the pre-built xrpld and
# validator-keys artifacts, in three stages:
#
# - one job per config that carries a "package" map in linux.json
# - that map names the container image and the format it builds there
# - every job ends with the image's publish_pkg.py, uploading what it built
# with 'publish: true' and doing a --dry-run otherwise
# - 'package' builds and signs one format per config that carries a "package"
# map in linux.json; that map names the container image and the format
# - 'test-install' installs what was built on a range of distros and runs the
# binaries there, so a package that cannot be installed never reaches Nexus
# - 'publish' uploads with the image's publish_pkg.py, doing a --dry-run
# unless 'publish: true'
#
# Only linux/amd64 is supported; the runner is hardcoded in the job below.
# Only linux/amd64 is supported; the runner is hardcoded in the jobs below.
name: Package
on:
@@ -39,6 +42,7 @@ defaults:
env:
BUILD_DIR: build
PACKAGE_DIR: packages
jobs:
generate-matrix:
@@ -70,14 +74,14 @@ jobs:
contents: read
runs-on: ["self-hosted", "Linux", "X64", "heavy"]
container: ${{ matrix.image }}
timeout-minutes: 30
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: false
@@ -112,24 +116,184 @@ jobs:
--pkg-release "${PKG_RELEASE}" \
--channel "${CHANNEL}"
# Before the upload, so the artifact and the published package are the
# same bytes. DEBs are not signed, so the key is never set on that job.
# Before the upload, so the artifact, the tested package and the published
# package are the same bytes.
- name: Sign RPM
if: ${{ inputs.publish && matrix.package_type == 'rpm' }}
env:
PKG_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.signing_key }}
run: ./package/sign_rpm.py --package-dir "${BUILD_DIR}"
# Split from the debug symbols, which are an order of magnitude larger, so
# that test-install downloads only what it installs.
- name: Upload package artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}-pkg
path: |
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/*.deb
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/*.ddeb
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/rpmbuild/RPMS/**/*.rpm
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/xrpld_*.deb
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/rpmbuild/RPMS/**/xrpld-[0-9]*.rpm
if-no-files-found: error
- name: Upload debug symbol artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}-pkg-debug
path: |
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/xrpld-dbgsym_*.deb
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/debbuild/xrpld-dbgsym_*.ddeb
${{ env.BUILD_DIR }}/rpmbuild/RPMS/**/xrpld-debuginfo-*.rpm
if-no-files-found: error
# Every distro family the packages target, oldest release first, so both ends
# of the dependency range they declare are exercised.
test-install:
needs: [package]
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- package_type: deb
image: debian:11
- package_type: deb
image: debian:12
- package_type: deb
image: debian:13
- package_type: deb
image: ubuntu:20.04
- package_type: deb
image: ubuntu:22.04
- package_type: deb
image: ubuntu:24.04
- package_type: deb
image: ubuntu:26.04
- package_type: rpm
image: almalinux:9
- package_type: rpm
image: almalinux:10
- package_type: rpm
image: rockylinux/rockylinux:9
- package_type: rpm
image: rockylinux/rockylinux:10
- package_type: rpm
image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi
- package_type: rpm
image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi10/ubi
name: "install ${{ matrix.package_type }} on ${{ matrix.image }}"
permissions:
contents: read
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ${{ matrix.image }}
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
# Both formats land in one directory; the step below picks its own by
# extension, so this stays independent of the artifact names.
- name: Download package artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
pattern: "*-pkg"
merge-multiple: true
path: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }}
- name: Find the package
id: find
env:
PACKAGE_TYPE: ${{ matrix.package_type }}
run: |
package="$(find "${PACKAGE_DIR}" -type f -name "*.${PACKAGE_TYPE}" -print -quit)"
test -n "${package}" || {
echo "no .${PACKAGE_TYPE} found in ${PACKAGE_DIR}" >&2
exit 1
}
echo "package=${package}" >>"${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
# Debian 11 went end-of-life on 2026-08-31
# (https://www.debian.org/News/2026/20260831) and its packages are
# already partly gone from deb.debian.org, so switch to the
# snapshot.debian.org entries the image ships commented out in its
# sources.list: they are pinned to the snapshot the image was built
# from, so they serve every version it needs and never go away.
# Snapshots keep their original, long-passed Valid-Until, hence the
# disabled check; the retries absorb snapshot.debian.org's throttling.
- name: Switch Debian 11 to snapshot.debian.org
if: ${{ matrix.image == 'debian:11' }}
run: |
sed -i 's|^deb |# deb |; s|^# deb http://snapshot|deb http://snapshot|' /etc/apt/sources.list
printf '%s\n' \
'Acquire::Check-Valid-Until "false";' \
'Acquire::Retries "3";' \
>/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99snapshot
- name: Install the DEB
if: ${{ matrix.package_type == 'deb' }}
env:
DEBIAN_FRONTEND: noninteractive
PACKAGE: ${{ steps.find.outputs.package }}
run: |
# Stock Debian and Ubuntu images carry no package lists, so apt has
# nothing to resolve the systemd dependency from until it fetches them.
apt-get update -qq
apt-get install -y "./${PACKAGE}"
- name: Install the RPM
if: ${{ matrix.package_type == 'rpm' }}
env:
PACKAGE: ${{ steps.find.outputs.package }}
run: dnf install -y "./${PACKAGE}"
- name: Run xrpld
run: xrpld --version
- name: Run validator-keys
run: validator-keys --version
- name: Run rippled, the legacy compatibility symlink
run: rippled --version
- name: Check the service account
run: id xrpld
- name: Check the state directory
run: test -d /var/lib/xrpld
- name: Check the log directory
run: test -d /var/log/xrpld
publish:
needs: [generate-matrix, package, test-install]
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix: ${{ fromJson(needs.generate-matrix.outputs.matrix) }}
name: "publish ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}"
permissions:
contents: read
runs-on: ["self-hosted", "Linux", "X64", "heavy"]
container: ${{ matrix.image }}
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: false
# Both artifacts, so the debug symbols are published alongside the package.
- name: Download package artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
pattern: ${{ matrix.xrpld_artifact_name }}-pkg*
merge-multiple: true
path: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }}
- name: Determine release info
id: release_info
uses: ./.github/actions/release-info
- name: Publish package
env:
CHANNEL: ${{ steps.release_info.outputs.channel }}
@@ -140,6 +304,6 @@ jobs:
run: |
publish_pkg.py \
--channel "${CHANNEL}" \
--package-dir "${BUILD_DIR}" \
--package-dir "${PACKAGE_DIR}" \
--nexus-url "${NEXUS_URL}" \
${DRY_RUN_OPTION}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
# Clippy, coverage and documentation for the Rust crates in crates/. Each runs
# as an independent job on a GitHub-hosted runner, but inside the same container
# image used to build the crates in the C++/Corrosion path, so the toolchain
# (and therefore the lints, coverage instrumentation and the cargo cache) matches
# what production builds use.
# (and therefore the lints and the cargo cache) matches what production builds
# use. Coverage is the exception: it needs the nightly rustc that honours
# #[coverage(off)], which the image carries alongside the pinned stable.
#
# Rust unit tests are deliberately NOT run here. They run as part of the C++
# build (reusable-build-test-config.yml), which already compiles the crates on a
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ permissions:
jobs:
clippy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-473fe44
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-060957e
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
@@ -40,11 +41,14 @@ jobs:
coverage:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-473fe44
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-060957e
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Use the nightly Rust toolchain
run: rust-nightly path >>"${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Use cargo artifacts cache
uses: ./.github/actions/cargo-cache
@@ -66,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
doc:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-473fe44
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-060957e
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1

View File

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ defaults:
jobs:
upload:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-473fe44
container: ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/nix-ubuntu:sha-060957e
env:
REMOTE_NAME: ${{ inputs.remote_name }}
CONAN_LOGIN_USERNAME_XRPLF: ${{ secrets.remote_username }}
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: false

View File

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- name: Prepare runner
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@7bf7ceca5932114abdd0d43493c3c30c5a654e13
uses: XRPLF/actions/prepare-runner@b3e255d74d785d053e4903da8ac90983cd7d9e82
with:
enable_ccache: false

View File

@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ repos:
language: system
types: [rust]
pass_filenames: false # rustfmt formats the whole workspace
- id: check-coverage-attrs
name: check Rust coverage attributes
entry: ./bin/pre-commit/check_rust_coverage_attrs.py
language: python
files: ^crates/.*\.rs$
- repo: https://github.com/BlankSpruce/gersemi-pre-commit
rev: e98930bdc210d3387007f9252d8c1694ea7e410f # frozen: 0.27.7

View File

@@ -22,14 +22,46 @@ API version 2 is available in `xrpld` version 2.0.0 and later. See [API-VERSION-
This version is supported by all `xrpld` versions. For WebSocket and HTTP JSON-RPC requests, it is currently the default API version used when no `api_version` is specified.
## Unreleased
## XRP Ledger server version 3.4.0
This section contains changes targeting a future version.
Version 3.4.0 is not yet released. These changes are available in the 3.4.0 beta releases.
### Additions
### Additions in 3.4.0
- `ledger`: `nftoken_id`, `nftoken_ids`, and `offer_id` are now included in transaction metadata when transactions are expanded (`expand`, or admin-only `full`), matching the `tx`, `account_tx`, and `subscribe` (`transactions` stream) responses. ([#5706](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/5706))
### Bugfixes in 3.4.0
- `sign`, `sign_for`, `submit`: `signature_target` now returns `invalidParams` unless it names `CounterpartySignature` or `SponsorSignature`. It previously accepted any inner object field, such as `Book` or `NFToken`, and signed into it.
- `sign`, `sign_for`, `submit`, `submit_multisigned`: With `fixCleanup3_4_0` enabled, a signature in `CounterpartySignature` or `SponsorSignature` covers a different prefix than the transaction's own signature, so a signature can no longer be moved from one of those roles into another. Clients that build these signatures themselves must use the new prefixes: `CPT` and `CPM` (single- and multi-signing) for `CounterpartySignature`, and `SPN` and `SPM` for `SponsorSignature`.
- `get_aggregate_price`: Duplicate entries in the `oracles` request array are now ignored. [#6586](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6586)
- `vault_info`: Errors now identify what the request got wrong instead of reporting every failure as the unregistered token `malformedRequest`, and the `error`, `error_code` and `error_message` fields now agree with each other. An invalid `vault_id` or `seq` returns `invalidParams`, an invalid `owner` returns `actMalformed`, and a request that mixes `vault_id` with `owner`/`seq` or supplies neither returns `invalidParams` with a message naming the accepted combinations. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
- `vault_info`: A well-formed all-zero `vault_id` now returns `entryNotFound` instead of being rejected as malformed, and `entryNotFound` responses now include `error_code` and `error_message`. Clients that request `ripplerpc` 3.0 or above therefore receive HTTP 400 with that error rather than HTTP 200. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
- `vault_info`: `vault_id` and `owner` must now be strings, matching how `ledger_entry` reads the same fields. An object or an array in either field previously produced an internal error, and a number was silently converted to its decimal text; `vault_id` now returns `invalidParams` and `owner` returns `actMalformed`. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
- `gateway_balances`: The `account` and `ident` fields now return an `invalidParams` error if the value is not a string, instead of an `internal` error. [#7655](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7655)
- `account_lines`: The `peer` field now returns an error if the value is not a string. [#7728](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7728)
- `ledger`: `delivered_amount` is now included in the metadata of successful `AccountDelete` transactions when transactions are expanded (`expand`, or admin-only `full`). Previously it was only added for `Payment` and `CheckCash`, which made `ledger` inconsistent with `tx` and `account_tx`. [#5706](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/5706)
## XRP Ledger server version 3.3.0
[Version 3.3.0](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.3.0) was released on Aug 6, 2026.
### Additions in 3.3.0
- `account_tx`: Added an optional `delegate` request object to filter delegated transactions. The object requires `delegate_filter`, which must be either `actor` for transactions owned by the requested account but signed by another account, or `authorizer` for transactions signed by the requested account on behalf of another account. The optional `counter_party` account narrows the results to a specific signer/delegate for `actor` or a specific owner/delegator for `authorizer`. Malformed `delegate`, `delegate_filter`, and `counter_party` values return standard invalid field errors, and invalid account IDs return `actMalformed`. When paginating delegate-filtered queries, a marker from a delegate-filtered query includes a `delegate` flag and is only valid for follow-up requests that also supply `delegate` (mixing marker conventions returns `invalidParams`). Because filtering is applied after the ledger scan, a page may contain fewer results than `limit` (possibly zero) while still returning a marker, so callers must continue until no marker is present. ([#6126](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6126))
## XRP Ledger server version 3.2.1
[Version 3.2.1](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.2.1) was released on Aug 1, 2026.
This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
## XRP Ledger server version 3.2.0
[Version 3.2.0](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.2.0) was released on Jun 16, 2026.
### Additions in 3.2.0
- `account_tx`: Added an optional `delegate` request object to filter delegated transactions. The object requires `delegate_filter`, which must be either `actor` for transactions owned by the requested account but signed by another account, or `authorizer` for transactions signed by the requested account on behalf of another account. The optional `counter_party` account narrows the results to a specific signer/delegate for `actor` or a specific owner/delegator for `authorizer`. Malformed `delegate`, `delegate_filter`, and `counter_party` values return standard invalid field errors, and invalid account IDs return `actMalformed`.
When paginating delegate-filtered queries, a marker from a delegate-filtered query includes a `delegate` flag and is only valid for follow-up requests that also supply `delegate` (mixing marker conventions returns `invalidParams`). Because filtering is applied after the ledger scan, a page may contain fewer results than `limit` (possibly zero) while still returning a marker, so callers must continue until no marker is present.
- `ledger_entry`, `account_objects`: The `Delegate` ledger entry now includes an optional `DestinationNode` field, which stores the index into the authorized account's owner directory. This field is present on entries created after bidirectional directory tracking was introduced and may appear in RPC responses for those entries. ([#6681](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6681))
- `server_definitions`: Added the following new sections to the response ([#6321](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6321)):
- `TRANSACTION_FORMATS`: Describes the fields and their optionality for each transaction type, including common fields shared across all transactions.
@@ -37,11 +69,9 @@ This section contains changes targeting a future version.
- `TRANSACTION_FLAGS`: Maps transaction type names to their supported flags and flag values.
- `LEDGER_ENTRY_FLAGS`: Maps ledger entry type names to their flags and flag values.
- `ACCOUNT_SET_FLAGS`: Maps AccountSet flag names (asf flags) to their numeric values.
- `ledger`: `nftoken_id`, `nftoken_ids`, and `offer_id` are now included in transaction metadata when transactions are expanded (`expand`, or admin-only `full`), matching the `tx`, `account_tx`, and `subscribe` (`transactions` stream) responses. ([#5706](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/5706))
### Bugfixes
### Bugfixes in 3.2.0
- `get_aggregate_price`: Duplicate entries in the `oracles` request array are now ignored. [#6586](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6586)
- Peer Crawler: The `port` field in `overlay.active[]` now consistently returns an integer instead of a string for outbound peers. [#6318](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6318)
- `ping`: The `ip` field is no longer returned as an empty string for proxied connections without a forwarded-for header. It is now omitted, consistent with the behavior for identified connections. [#6730](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6730)
- gRPC `GetLedgerDiff`: Fixed error message that incorrectly said "base ledger not validated" when the desired ledger was not validated. [#6730](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6730)
@@ -53,12 +83,24 @@ This section contains changes targeting a future version.
- `submit`: The `fail_hard` field now returns an error if the value is not a boolean. [#6529](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6529)
- `subscribe`: The `taker` field in the `books` array now returns `actMalformed` instead of `badIssuer` if the value is not a valid account. [#6529](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6529)
- Fixed a bug in `Forwarded` HTTP header parsing where the extracted IP address could be incorrect when no comma or semicolon delimiter follows the address. This could cause the server to misidentify a client's IP address when operating behind a reverse proxy. [#6529](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/6529)
- `vault_info`: Errors now identify what the request got wrong instead of reporting every failure as the unregistered token `malformedRequest`, and the `error`, `error_code` and `error_message` fields now agree with each other. An invalid `vault_id` or `seq` returns `invalidParams`, an invalid `owner` returns `actMalformed`, and a request that mixes `vault_id` with `owner`/`seq` or supplies neither returns `invalidParams` with a message naming the accepted combinations. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
- `vault_info`: A well-formed all-zero `vault_id` now returns `entryNotFound` instead of being rejected as malformed, and `entryNotFound` responses now include `error_code` and `error_message`. Clients that request `ripplerpc` 3.0 or above therefore receive HTTP 400 with that error rather than HTTP 200. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
- `vault_info`: `vault_id` and `owner` must now be strings, matching how `ledger_entry` reads the same fields. An object or an array in either field previously produced an internal error, and a number was silently converted to its decimal text; `vault_id` now returns `invalidParams` and `owner` returns `actMalformed`. [#8015](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/8015)
- `gateway_balances`: The `account` and `ident` fields now return an `invalidParams` error if the value is not a string, instead of an `internal` error. [#7655](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7655)
- `account_lines`: The `peer` field now returns an error if the value is not a string. [#7728](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/7728)
- `ledger`: `delivered_amount` is now included in the metadata of successful `AccountDelete` transactions when transactions are expanded (`expand`, or admin-only `full`). Previously it was only added for `Payment` and `CheckCash`, which made `ledger` inconsistent with `tx` and `account_tx`. [#5706](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/pull/5706)
## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.3
[Version 3.1.3](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.1.3) was released on May 8, 2026.
This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.2
[Version 3.1.2](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.1.2) was released on Mar 12, 2026.
This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.1
[Version 3.1.1](https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/releases/tag/3.1.1) was released on Feb 23, 2026.
This release contains bug fixes only and no API changes.
## XRP Ledger server version 3.1.0

View File

@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ if [ "${os}" = "linux" ] || [ "${os}" = "macos" ]; then
check cargo-nextest cargo nextest --version
check clippy-driver
check rust-analyzer
check rust-nightly rust-nightly run rustc --version
check rustc
check rustfmt
fi

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ esac
# Packaging runs in a vanilla distro image, so the tooling comes from the distro's
# archive rather than from nixpkgs:
#
# - debhelper and dpkg-dev build the DEB
# - debhelper and dpkg-dev build the DEB, and lintian checks it
# - binutils gives debian/rules the readelf its glibc-floor check runs; it
# already arrives via dpkg-dev, but that tool is called directly
# - rpm-build builds the RPM, with systemd-rpm-macros and redhat-rpm-config
# supplying the systemd and find-debuginfo macros the spec uses
# - rpm-sign and gnupg2 sign the built RPM
@@ -37,11 +39,13 @@ function install() {
debian | ubuntu)
apt-get update -y
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
binutils \
ca-certificates \
debhelper \
debhelper-compat \
dpkg-dev \
git \
lintian \
python3
;;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Check that Rust unit tests stay out of the coverage report.
cargo-llvm-cov instruments the test code along with everything else, so a test
module that is not excluded counts its own body as covered and inflates the
reported number. Excluding it takes two attributes:
* every `#[cfg(test)]` module carries
`#[cfg_attr(coverage_nightly, coverage(off))]`;
* every crate root (lib.rs, main.rs) carries
`#![cfg_attr(coverage_nightly, feature(coverage_attribute))]`, which the
attribute above needs in order to compile.
Both are inert outside the coverage job: cargo-llvm-cov defines
`coverage_nightly` only when it runs on a nightly toolchain.
The crate-root gate is checked even in a crate that has no tests yet, because
that is what lets the first test module added later carry the attribute without
a build failure. Missing it is a hard error, so it cannot go unnoticed; a
missing `coverage(off)` fails open, which is why this check exists.
Matching is on exact attribute text, which works because `cargo fmt` runs over
the whole workspace in the hook ahead of this one: rustfmt puts every attribute
on its own line and normalizes what is inside it, turning `#[cfg( test )]`
and `#[cfg(test,)]` alike into `#[cfg(test)]`. So there is nothing here that
parses Rust. The price is that a cfg this file does not spell out literally --
`all(test, ...)`, `any(test, ...)`, `not(test)` -- is reported rather than
classified, on the grounds that guessing at coverage semantics is how a check
like this ends up quietly wrong.
Usage: ./bin/pre-commit/check_rust_coverage_attrs.py <file1> <file2> ...
Exit status is non-zero if any violation is found.
"""
import re
import sys
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
CRATE_ROOTS = {"lib.rs", "main.rs"}
FEATURE_ATTR = "#![cfg_attr(coverage_nightly, feature(coverage_attribute))]"
COVERAGE_OFF_ATTR = "#[cfg_attr(coverage_nightly, coverage(off))]"
CFG_TEST_ATTR = "#[cfg(test)]"
# Any other cfg that mentions `test`. String literals are blanked before this
# runs, so `feature = "test"` does not read as the `test` cfg.
RE_CFG_MENTIONS_TEST = re.compile(r"^#\[cfg\(.*\btest\b.*\)\]$")
RE_STRING = re.compile(r'"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"')
RE_MOD = re.compile(r"^(?:pub(?:\([^)]*\))?\s+)?mod\s+([A-Za-z_]\w*)")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Finding:
line: int
label: str
message: str
def _check_module(attrs: list[str], line: int, name: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Findings for one module, given the attributes attached to it."""
if COVERAGE_OFF_ATTR in attrs:
return [] # excluded from coverage; which cfg gates it does not matter
if CFG_TEST_ATTR in attrs:
return [
Finding(
line,
"missing-coverage-off",
f"`mod {name}` is #[cfg(test)] but not excluded from coverage; "
f"add {COVERAGE_OFF_ATTR}",
)
]
unclassified = [
attr for attr in attrs if RE_CFG_MENTIONS_TEST.match(RE_STRING.sub('""', attr))
]
if unclassified:
return [
Finding(
line,
"unclassified-cfg",
f"`mod {name}` is gated on {unclassified[0]}, which this check "
f"cannot tell apart from a module that ships in the library; "
f"add {COVERAGE_OFF_ATTR} if it is test-only, or teach this "
f"check the cfg if it is not",
)
]
return []
def _check_test_modules(lines: list[str]) -> list[Finding]:
"""Findings for every test module that is not excluded from coverage."""
findings: list[Finding] = []
attrs: list[str] = []
attrs_line = 0
for number, raw in enumerate(lines, start=1):
stripped = raw.strip()
# Blank lines and comments are allowed between an attribute and its item.
if not stripped or stripped.startswith("//"):
continue
if stripped.startswith("#["):
if not attrs:
attrs_line = number
attrs.append(stripped)
continue
module = RE_MOD.match(stripped)
if module is not None and attrs:
findings += _check_module(attrs, attrs_line, module.group(1))
attrs = []
return findings
def _check_crate_root(name: str, lines: list[str]) -> list[Finding]:
"""A finding if a crate root is missing the coverage_attribute feature gate."""
if name not in CRATE_ROOTS:
return []
if any(line.strip() == FEATURE_ATTR for line in lines):
return []
return [
Finding(
1,
"missing-feature-gate",
f"crate root is missing {FEATURE_ATTR}",
)
]
def check_source(name: str, text: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Findings for one file's contents; `name` is its base name (lib.rs, ...)."""
lines = text.splitlines()
return _check_crate_root(name, lines) + _check_test_modules(lines)
def check_file(path: Path) -> list[Finding]:
return check_source(path.name, path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
def main() -> int:
total = 0
for path in (Path(name) for name in sys.argv[1:]):
for finding in check_file(path):
total += 1
print(f"{path}:{finding.line}: {finding.label}: {finding.message}")
return 1 if total else 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ cxx = { version = "1.0.198", features = ["c++20"] }
[workspace.package]
edition = "2024"
[workspace.lints.rust]
unexpected_cfgs = { level = "warn", check-cfg = [ 'cfg(coverage)', 'cfg(coverage_nightly)' ] }
[profile.release]
opt-level = 3
overflow-checks = true

View File

@@ -8,3 +8,6 @@ crate-type = ["staticlib"]
[dependencies]
cxx.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
#![cfg_attr(coverage_nightly, feature(coverage_attribute))]
#[cxx::bridge(namespace = "rs::hello_world")]
mod ffi {
extern "Rust" {
@@ -8,3 +10,14 @@ mod ffi {
pub fn hello_world() -> String {
"hello_world".to_string()
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[cfg_attr(coverage_nightly, coverage(off))]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn hello_world_returns_hello_world() {
assert_eq!(hello_world(), "hello_world")
}
}

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,10 @@ enum class HashRouterFlags : std::uint16_t {
PRIVATE4 = 0x0800,
// Used in EscrowFinish.cpp
PRIVATE5 = 0x1000,
PRIVATE6 = 0x2000
PRIVATE6 = 0x2000,
// Used in apply.cpp
PRIVATE7 = 0x4000,
PRIVATE8 = 0x8000
};
constexpr HashRouterFlags

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/STVector256.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <memory>
#include <set>
#include <utility>
@@ -34,32 +33,6 @@ checkExpired(SLE const& sleCredential, NetClock::time_point const& closed);
[[nodiscard]] TER
deleteSLE(ApplyView& view, SLE::ref sleCredential, beast::Journal j);
/**
* @brief Remove credentials pinned to a pseudo-account's owner directory.
*
* Cleans up credentials that were linked to a pseudo-account (Vault, LoanBroker,
* AMM), which such an account can neither accept nor delete. Only credentials
* are removed; every other object is left in place. The walk visits at most
* @p maxNodesToDelete directory entries and charges the ones it leaves alone
* against that budget too, so a directory holding other objects yields fewer
* than @p maxNodesToDelete deletions. On reaching the bound the result is
* `tecINCOMPLETE` and the caller must propagate it so a later transaction
* resumes.
*
* @param view Mutable ledger view.
* @param pseudoAcct The pseudo-account whose directory is cleaned.
* @param maxNodesToDelete Upper bound on directory entries processed in one call.
* @param j Journal for diagnostics.
* @return tesSUCCESS once no credentials remain, tecINCOMPLETE if the bound was
* reached, or a deletion error.
*/
[[nodiscard]] TER
deletePseudoAccountCredentials(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& pseudoAcct,
std::uint16_t maxNodesToDelete,
beast::Journal j);
// Amendment and parameters checks for sfCredentialIDs field
NotTEC
checkFields(STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules, beast::Journal j);

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h>
@@ -27,6 +29,291 @@
namespace xrpl {
/**
* Validate that @p account may lock @p amount of a token for later delivery
* to @p dest.
*
* The lock-side counterpart of escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper: every issuer
* control (locking opt-in, authorization, freeze/lock, transferability,
* spendable balance) that gates locking token value lives here, so any
* transactor that locks funds applies the same rules. The signature is
* view-based rather than PreclaimContext-based so it can also run from
* doApply.
*/
template <ValidIssueType T>
TER
escrowLockPreclaimHelper(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const& account,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal j);
template <>
inline TER
escrowLockPreclaimHelper<Issue>(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const& account,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal j)
{
auto const& issue = amount.get<Issue>();
auto const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tecNO_PERMISSION
if (issuer == account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the lsfAllowTrustLineLocking is not enabled, return tecNO_PERMISSION
auto const sleIssuer = view.read(keylet::account(issuer));
if (!sleIssuer)
return tecNO_ISSUER;
if (!sleIssuer->isFlag(lsfAllowTrustLineLocking))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the account does not have a trustline to the issuer, return tecNO_LINE
auto const sleRippleState = view.read(keylet::trustLine(account, issuer, issue.currency));
if (!sleRippleState)
return tecNO_LINE;
STAmount const balance = (*sleRippleState)[sfBalance];
// If balance is positive, issuer must have higher address than account
if (balance > beast::kZero && issuer < account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If balance is negative, issuer must have lower address than account
if (balance < beast::kZero && issuer > account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the account is authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(view, issue, account); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the destination is authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(view, issue, dest); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has frozen the account, return tecFROZEN
if (isFrozen(view, account, issue))
return tecFROZEN;
// If the issuer has frozen the destination, return tecFROZEN
if (isFrozen(view, dest, issue))
return tecFROZEN;
STAmount const spendableAmount =
accountHolds(view, account, issue.currency, issuer, FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze, j);
// If the balance is less than or equal to 0, return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount <= beast::kZero)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
// If the spendable amount is less than the amount, return
// tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount < amount)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
// If the amount is not addable to the balance, return tecPRECISION_LOSS
if (!canAdd(spendableAmount, amount))
return tecPRECISION_LOSS;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
inline TER
escrowLockPreclaimHelper<MPTIssue>(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const& account,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal j)
{
AccountID const issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tecNO_PERMISSION
if (issuer == account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the mpt does not exist, return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND
auto const issuanceKey = keylet::mptokenIssuance(amount.get<MPTIssue>().getMptID());
auto const sleIssuance = view.read(issuanceKey);
if (!sleIssuance)
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
// If the lsfMPTCanEscrow is not enabled, return tecNO_PERMISSION
if (!sleIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTCanEscrow))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the issuer is not the same as the issuer of the mpt, return
// tecNO_PERMISSION
if (sleIssuance->getAccountID(sfIssuer) != issuer)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If the account does not have the mpt, return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND
if (!view.exists(keylet::mptoken(issuanceKey.key, account)))
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the account is
// authorized
auto const& mptIssue = amount.get<MPTIssue>();
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(view, mptIssue, account, AuthType::WeakAuth);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the destination is
// authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(view, mptIssue, dest, AuthType::WeakAuth); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has frozen the account, return tecLOCKED
if (isFrozen(view, account, *sleIssuance))
return tecLOCKED;
// If the issuer has frozen the destination, return tecLOCKED
if (isFrozen(view, dest, *sleIssuance))
return tecLOCKED;
// If the mpt cannot be transferred, return tecNO_AUTH
if (auto const ter = canTransfer(view, mptIssue, account, dest); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
STAmount const spendableAmount = accountHolds(
view,
account,
amount.get<MPTIssue>(),
FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
j);
// If the balance is less than or equal to 0, return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount <= beast::kZero)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
// If the spendable amount is less than the amount, return
// tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount < amount)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
TER
escrowLockApplyHelper(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& issuer,
AccountID const& sender,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal journal);
template <>
inline TER
escrowLockApplyHelper<Issue>(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& issuer,
AccountID const& sender,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal journal)
{
// Defensive: Issuer cannot create an escrow
if (issuer == sender)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const ter =
directSendNoFee(view, sender, issuer, amount, !amount.holds<MPTIssue>(), journal);
if (!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
inline TER
escrowLockApplyHelper<MPTIssue>(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& issuer,
AccountID const& sender,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal journal)
{
// Defensive: Issuer cannot create an escrow
if (issuer == sender)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const ter = lockEscrowMPT(view, sender, amount, journal);
if (!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
TER
escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const& account,
STAmount const& amount,
bool checkFreeze = true);
template <>
inline TER
escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper<Issue>(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const& account,
STAmount const& amount,
bool checkFreeze)
{
AccountID const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tesSUCCESS
if (issuer == account)
return tesSUCCESS;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the destination is authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(view, amount.get<Issue>(), account); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has deep frozen the destination, return tecFROZEN
if (checkFreeze &&
isDeepFrozen(view, account, amount.get<Issue>().currency, amount.getIssuer()))
return tecFROZEN;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
inline TER
escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper<MPTIssue>(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const& account,
STAmount const& amount,
bool checkFreeze)
{
AccountID const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tesSUCCESS
if (issuer == account)
return tesSUCCESS;
// If the mpt does not exist, return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND
auto const issuanceKey = keylet::mptokenIssuance(amount.get<MPTIssue>().getMptID());
auto const sleIssuance = view.read(issuanceKey);
if (!sleIssuance)
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the account is
// authorized
auto const& mptIssue = amount.get<MPTIssue>();
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(view, mptIssue, account, AuthType::WeakAuth);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has frozen the account, return tecLOCKED
if (checkFreeze && isFrozen(view, account, *sleIssuance))
return tecLOCKED;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template <ValidIssueType T>
TER
escrowUnlockApplyHelper(
@@ -55,9 +342,6 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper<Issue>(
bool createAsset,
beast::Journal journal)
{
auto const& issue = amount.get<Issue>();
Keylet const trustLineKey = keylet::trustLine(receiver, issue);
bool const recvLow = issuer > receiver;
bool const senderIssuer = issuer == sender;
bool const receiverIssuer = issuer == receiver;
@@ -67,6 +351,10 @@ escrowUnlockApplyHelper<Issue>(
if (receiverIssuer)
return tesSUCCESS;
auto const& issue = amount.get<Issue>();
Keylet const trustLineKey = keylet::trustLine(receiver, issue);
bool const recvLow = issuer > receiver;
if (!ctx.view.exists(trustLineKey) && createAsset)
{
// Can the account cover the trust line's reserve?

View File

@@ -2,28 +2,85 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Concepts.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/UintTypes.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <optional>
namespace xrpl {
/**
* Validate the token amount of a PaymentChannelCreate or PaymentChannelFund
* transaction during preflight.
*
* @param rules The current ledger rules used to check amendment status.
* @param amount The channel or funding amount from the transaction.
* @return tesSUCCESS if the amount is valid; temBAD_AMOUNT, temBAD_CURRENCY,
* or temDISABLED otherwise.
*/
template <ValidIssueType T>
NotTEC
payChanAmountPreflightHelper(Rules const& rules, STAmount const& amount);
template <>
inline NotTEC
payChanAmountPreflightHelper<Issue>(Rules const&, STAmount const& amount)
{
if (amount.native() || amount <= beast::kZero)
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
if (badCurrency() == amount.get<Issue>().currency)
return temBAD_CURRENCY;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
inline NotTEC
payChanAmountPreflightHelper<MPTIssue>(Rules const& rules, STAmount const& amount)
{
if (!rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && !rules.enabled(featureMPTokensV1))
return temDISABLED;
if (amount.native() || amount.mpt() > MPTAmount{kMaxMpTokenAmount} || amount <= beast::kZero)
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
/**
* Close a payment channel and return its remaining funds to the channel owner.
*
* @param slep The SLE for the PayChannel object to close.
* @param view The apply view in which ledger state modifications are made.
* @param key The ledger key identifying the PayChannel entry.
* @param j Journal used for fatal-level diagnostic messages.
* @return tesSUCCESS on success; tefBAD_LEDGER if a directory removal
* fails; tefINTERNAL if the source account SLE cannot be found.
* @param slep The SLE for the PayChannel object to close.
* @param ctx The apply view context (view and transaction) in which ledger
* state modifications are made.
* @param key The ledger key identifying the PayChannel entry.
* @param txAccount The account submitting the transaction that closes the
* channel.
* @param j Journal used for fatal-level diagnostic messages.
* @return tesSUCCESS on success; tefBAD_LEDGER if a directory removal
* fails; tefINTERNAL if the source account SLE cannot be found.
*/
TER
closeChannel(SLE::ref slep, ApplyView& view, uint256 const& key, beast::Journal j);
closeChannel(
SLE::ref slep,
ApplyViewContext ctx,
uint256 const& key,
AccountID const& txAccount,
beast::Journal j);
/**
* Add two uint32_t values with saturation at UINT32_MAX.

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ enum class FreezeHandling { IgnoreFreeze, ZeroIfFrozen };
*/
enum class AuthHandling { IgnoreAuth, ZeroIfUnauthorized };
/**
* Controls whether the recipient owner-reserve check is enforced when
* auto-creating a trustline or MPToken during AMMWithdraw or AMMClawback.
*/
enum class ReserveHandling : bool { EnforceReserve, IgnoreReserve };
/**
* Controls whether to include the account's full spendable balance
*/

View File

@@ -92,6 +92,26 @@ enum class HashPrefix : std::uint32_t {
* Batch
*/
Batch = detail::makeHashPrefix('B', 'C', 'H'),
/**
* inner transaction to sign as the counterparty
*/
CounterpartyTxSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('C', 'P', 'T'),
/**
* inner transaction to multi-sign as the counterparty
*/
CounterpartyTxMultiSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('C', 'P', 'M'),
/**
* inner transaction to sign as the sponsor
*/
SponsorTxSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('S', 'P', 'N'),
/**
* inner transaction to multi-sign as the sponsor
*/
SponsorTxMultiSign = detail::makeHashPrefix('S', 'P', 'M'),
};
template <class Hasher>

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/IOUAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/UintTypes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/XRPAmount.h>
#include <cstdint>
namespace xrpl {
inline void
@@ -15,4 +25,70 @@ serializePayChanAuthorization(Serializer& msg, uint256 const& key, XRPAmount con
msg.add64(amt.drops());
}
inline void
serializePayChanAuthorization(
Serializer& msg,
uint256 const& key,
IOUAmount const& amt,
Currency const& cur,
AccountID const& iss)
{
msg.add32(HashPrefix::PaymentChannelClaim);
msg.addBitString(key);
if (amt == beast::kZero)
{
msg.add64(STAmount::kIssuedCurrency);
}
else if (amt.signum() == -1)
{ // 512 = not native; the sign is encoded by omitting the 256 flag, so
// the mantissa must be serialized as its absolute value
msg.add64(
static_cast<std::uint64_t>(-amt.mantissa()) |
(static_cast<std::uint64_t>(amt.exponent() + 512 + 97) << (64 - 10)));
}
else
{ // 256 = positive
msg.add64(
amt.mantissa() |
(static_cast<std::uint64_t>(amt.exponent() + 512 + 256 + 97) << (64 - 10)));
}
msg.addBitString(cur);
msg.addBitString(iss);
}
inline void
serializePayChanAuthorization(
Serializer& msg,
uint256 const& key,
MPTAmount const& amt,
MPTID const& mptID,
AccountID const& iss)
{
msg.add32(HashPrefix::PaymentChannelClaim);
msg.addBitString(key);
msg.add64(amt.value());
msg.addBitString(mptID);
msg.addBitString(iss);
}
inline void
serializePayChanAuthorization(Serializer& msg, uint256 const& key, STAmount const& amt)
{
if (amt.native())
{
serializePayChanAuthorization(msg, key, amt.xrp());
}
else if (amt.holds<Issue>())
{
serializePayChanAuthorization(
msg, key, amt.iou(), amt.get<Issue>().currency, amt.get<Issue>().account);
}
else if (amt.holds<MPTIssue>())
{
auto const& mpt = amt.get<MPTIssue>();
auto const& mptID = mpt.getMptID();
serializePayChanAuthorization(msg, key, amt.mpt(), mptID, amt.getIssuer());
}
}
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <chrono>
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
#include <limits>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -407,16 +408,6 @@ using TxID = uint256;
*/
constexpr std::uint16_t kMaxDeletableAmmTrustLines = 512;
/**
* The maximum number of owner-directory entries to walk when clearing
* credentials pinned to a pseudo-account, in a single transaction.
*
* The walk stops after this many entries whether or not each one turns out to
* be a credential, so a directory that also holds other objects yields fewer
* deletions per transaction.
*/
constexpr std::uint16_t kMaxDeletablePseudoAccountCredentials = 512;
/**
* The maximum length of a URI inside an Oracle
*/
@@ -554,6 +545,11 @@ constexpr std::size_t kEcClawbackProofLength = SECP256K1_COMPACT_CLAWBACK_PROOF_
*/
constexpr std::uint32_t kConfidentialFeeMultiplier = 9;
/**
* Maximum value a confidential MPT key epoch may reach.
*/
constexpr std::uint32_t kMaxKeyEpoch = std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max();
/**
* Compressed EC point prefix for even y-coordinate
*/

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/json/json_value.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SeqProxy.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Sign.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
#include <boost/container/flat_set.hpp>
@@ -105,14 +107,36 @@ public:
[[nodiscard]] json::Value
getJson(JsonOptions options, bool binary) const;
/**
* Sign the transaction as its account.
*
* @param publicKey The public key for signing.
* @param secretKey The secret key for signing.
*/
void
sign(PublicKey const& publicKey, SecretKey const& secretKey);
/**
* Sign the transaction in one of its signature fields.
*
* The signature is bound to the role that made it, so it cannot be moved
* into another role.
*
* @param publicKey The public key for signing.
* @param secretKey The secret key for signing.
* @param role The role signing the transaction.
* @param rules The current ledger rules.
*/
void
sign(
PublicKey const& publicKey,
SecretKey const& secretKey,
std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<SField const>> signatureTarget = {});
SignatureRole role,
Rules const& rules);
/**
* Check the signature.
*
* @param rules The current ledger rules.
* @return `true` if valid signature. If invalid, the error message string.
*/
@@ -120,7 +144,7 @@ public:
checkSign(Rules const& rules) const;
[[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
checkBatchSign(Rules const& rules) const;
checkBatchSign() const;
// SQL Functions with metadata.
static std::string const&
@@ -162,28 +186,28 @@ public:
private:
/**
* Check the signature.
*
* @param rules The current ledger rules.
* @param sigObject Reference to object that contains the signature fields.
* Will be *this more often than not.
* @param role The role that made the signature in sigObject. Determines
* the signing prefix, which binds the signature to that role.
* @return `true` if valid signature. If invalid, the error message string.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const;
checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject, SignatureRole role) const;
[[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject) const;
checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const;
[[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
checkMultiSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const;
checkMultiSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const;
[[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
checkBatchSingleSign(STObject const& batchSigner, std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const;
[[nodiscard]] std::expected<void, std::string>
checkBatchMultiSign(
STObject const& batchSigner,
Rules const& rules,
std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const;
checkBatchMultiSign(STObject const& batchSigner, std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const;
void
buildBatchTxns();

View File

@@ -4,13 +4,65 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/KeyType.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
#include <optional>
namespace xrpl {
/**
* The signature slots on a transaction.
*
* Each role signs different bytes, so a signature cannot be moved from the
* role that made it into another role. See signingPrefix.
*/
enum class SignatureRole {
/**
* The transaction's own signature, in sfTxnSignature or sfSigners.
*/
Transaction,
/**
* The counterparty's signature, in sfCounterpartySignature.
*/
Counterparty,
/**
* The sponsor's signature, in sfSponsorSignature.
*/
Sponsor
};
/**
* The field that holds this role's signature.
*
* @return The signature field, or nullptr for SignatureRole::Transaction,
* whose signature lives at the top level of the transaction.
*/
[[nodiscard]] SField const*
signatureField(SignatureRole role);
/**
* The role that signs into the given field.
*
* @return The role, or an unseated optional if the field does not hold a
* transaction signature.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<SignatureRole>
signatureRole(SField const& sigField);
/**
* The hash prefix that binds a transaction signature to the role that made it.
*
* @param role The role making the signature.
* @param multiSigning Whether the signature is a multi-signature.
* @param rules The current ledger rules.
*/
[[nodiscard]] HashPrefix
signingPrefix(SignatureRole role, bool multiSigning, Rules const& rules);
/**
* Sign an STObject
*
@@ -49,9 +101,12 @@ verify(
/**
* Return a Serializer suitable for computing a multisigning TxnSignature.
*
* @param prefix Prefix to insert before the serialized object. Get it from
* signingPrefix, so that the signature is bound to the role making it.
*/
Serializer
buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID);
buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID, HashPrefix prefix);
/**
* Break the multi-signing hash computation into 2 parts for optimization.
@@ -67,7 +122,7 @@ buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID);
* signer's unique data.
*/
Serializer
startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj);
startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, HashPrefix prefix);
inline void
finishMultiSigningData(AccountID const& signingID, Serializer& s)

View File

@@ -129,8 +129,11 @@ enum TEMcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
temARRAY_TOO_LARGE,
temBAD_TRANSFER_FEE,
temINVALID_INNER_BATCH,
temBAD_MPT,
temBAD_CIPHERTEXT,
temINVALID_BYTECODE,
temTEMP_DISABLED,
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -179,6 +182,8 @@ enum TEFcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE,
tefNO_DST_PARTIAL,
tefBAD_PATH_COUNT,
tefNO_BYTECODE,
tefBYTECODE_NOT_INCLUDED,
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -370,6 +375,8 @@ enum TECcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION = 198,
tecBAD_PROOF = 199,
tecNO_SPONSOR_PERMISSION = 200,
tecOUT_OF_GAS = 201,
tecBYTECODE_REJECTED = 202,
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
// Keep it sorted in reverse chronological order.
XRPL_FIX (Cleanup3_4_0, Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(TokenPaychan, Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(Sponsor, Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(BatchV1_1, Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(LendingProtocolV1_1, Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
@@ -144,3 +145,7 @@ XRPL_RETIRE_FEATURE(SortedDirectories)
XRPL_RETIRE_FEATURE(TicketBatch)
XRPL_RETIRE_FEATURE(TickSize)
XRPL_RETIRE_FEATURE(TrustSetAuth)
XRPL_FEATURE(SmartEscrow, Supported::No, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(LendingProtocolV1_2, Supported::No, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (Cleanup3_5_0, Supported::Yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(ConfidentialMPTKeyRotation, Supported::No, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)

View File

@@ -309,6 +309,11 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltFEE_SETTINGS, 0x0073, FeeSettings, fee, ({
{sfBaseFeeDrops, SoeOptional},
{sfReserveBaseDrops, SoeOptional},
{sfReserveIncrementDrops, SoeOptional},
// Smart Escrow fields
{sfGasLimit, SoeOptional},
{sfBytecodeSizeLimit, SoeOptional},
{sfGasPrice, SoeOptional},
{sfPreviousTxnID, SoeOptional},
{sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq, SoeOptional},
}))
@@ -339,6 +344,8 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltESCROW, 0x0075, Escrow, escrow, ({
{sfCondition, SoeOptional},
{sfCancelAfter, SoeOptional},
{sfFinishAfter, SoeOptional},
{sfBytecode, SoeOptional},
{sfData, SoeOptional},
{sfSourceTag, SoeOptional},
{sfDestinationTag, SoeOptional},
{sfOwnerNode, SoeRequired},
@@ -369,6 +376,8 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltPAYCHAN, 0x0078, PayChannel, payment_channel, ({
{sfPreviousTxnID, SoeRequired},
{sfPreviousTxnLgrSeq, SoeRequired},
{sfDestinationNode, SoeOptional},
{sfTransferRate, SoeOptional},
{sfIssuerNode, SoeOptional},
}))
/** The ledger object which tracks the AMM.
@@ -408,6 +417,8 @@ LEDGER_ENTRY(ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE, 0x007e, MPTokenIssuance, mpt_issuance, ({
{sfReferenceHolding, SoeOptional},
{sfIssuerEncryptionKey, SoeOptional},
{sfAuditorEncryptionKey, SoeOptional},
{sfIssuerKeyEpoch, SoeOptional},
{sfAuditorKeyEpoch, SoeOptional},
{sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount, SoeDefault},
}))

View File

@@ -119,6 +119,15 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemainingOwnerCount, UINT32, 73)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfSponsorFlags, UINT32, 74)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfSubscriptionDate, UINT32, 75)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRedemptionDate, UINT32, 76)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfIssuerKeyEpoch, UINT32, 77)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorKeyEpoch, UINT32, 78)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfIssuerKeyMirrorEpoch, UINT32, 79)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorKeyMirrorEpoch, UINT32, 80)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfGasLimit, UINT32, 81)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfBytecodeSizeLimit, UINT32, 82)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfGasPrice, UINT32, 83)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfGas, UINT32, 84)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfGasUsed, UINT32, 85)
// 64-bit integers (common)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfIndexNext, UINT64, 1)
@@ -234,6 +243,7 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfManagementFeeOutstanding, NUMBER, 17, SField::kSmdNeedsAsset
// 32-bit signed (common)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfLoanScale, INT32, 1)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfRemainingOwnerCountDelta, INT32, 2)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfVMReturnCode, INT32, 3)
// currency amount (common)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAmount, AMOUNT, 1)
@@ -318,6 +328,7 @@ TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorEncryptedAmount, VL, 43)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAuditorEncryptionKey, VL, 44)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAmountCommitment, VL, 45)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfBalanceCommitment, VL, 46)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfBytecode, VL, 47)
// account (common)
TYPED_SFIELD(sfAccount, ACCOUNT, 1)

View File

@@ -66,11 +66,13 @@ TRANSACTION(ttPAYMENT, 0, Payment,
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttESCROW_CREATE, 1, EscrowCreate, ({.delegable = Delegation::Delegable}), ({
{sfDestination, SoeRequired},
{sfDestinationTag, SoeOptional},
{sfAmount, SoeRequired, SoeMptSupported},
{sfCondition, SoeOptional},
{sfCancelAfter, SoeOptional},
{sfFinishAfter, SoeOptional},
{sfDestinationTag, SoeOptional},
{sfBytecode, SoeOptional},
{sfData, SoeOptional},
}))
/** This transaction type completes an existing escrow. */
@@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttESCROW_FINISH, 2, EscrowFinish, ({.delegable = Delegation::Delegab
{sfFulfillment, SoeOptional},
{sfCondition, SoeOptional},
{sfCredentialIDs, SoeOptional},
{sfGas, SoeOptional},
}))
@@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttSIGNER_LIST_SET, 12, SignerListSet,
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttPAYCHAN_CREATE, 13, PaymentChannelCreate, ({.delegable = Delegation::Delegable}), ({
{sfDestination, SoeRequired},
{sfAmount, SoeRequired},
{sfAmount, SoeRequired, SoeMptSupported},
{sfSettleDelay, SoeRequired},
{sfPublicKey, SoeRequired},
{sfCancelAfter, SoeOptional},
@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttPAYCHAN_CREATE, 13, PaymentChannelCreate, ({.delegable = Delegatio
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttPAYCHAN_FUND, 14, PaymentChannelFund, ({.delegable = Delegation::Delegable}), ({
{sfChannel, SoeRequired},
{sfAmount, SoeRequired},
{sfAmount, SoeRequired, SoeMptSupported},
{sfExpiration, SoeOptional},
}))
@@ -202,8 +205,8 @@ TRANSACTION(ttPAYCHAN_FUND, 14, PaymentChannelFund, ({.delegable = Delegation::D
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttPAYCHAN_CLAIM, 15, PaymentChannelClaim, ({.delegable = Delegation::Delegable}), ({
{sfChannel, SoeRequired},
{sfAmount, SoeOptional},
{sfBalance, SoeOptional},
{sfAmount, SoeOptional, SoeMptSupported},
{sfBalance, SoeOptional, SoeMptSupported},
{sfSignature, SoeOptional},
{sfPublicKey, SoeOptional},
{sfCredentialIDs, SoeOptional},
@@ -1161,6 +1164,10 @@ TRANSACTION(ttFEE, 101, SetFee,
{sfBaseFeeDrops, SoeOptional},
{sfReserveBaseDrops, SoeOptional},
{sfReserveIncrementDrops, SoeOptional},
// Smart Escrow fields
{sfGasLimit, SoeOptional},
{sfBytecodeSizeLimit, SoeOptional},
{sfGasPrice, SoeOptional},
}))
/** This system-generated transaction type is used to update the network's negative UNL

View File

@@ -174,6 +174,54 @@ public:
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfFinishAfter);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
getBytecode() const
{
if (hasBytecode())
return this->sle_->at(sfBytecode);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfBytecode is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasBytecode() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecode);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfData (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
getData() const
{
if (hasData())
return this->sle_->at(sfData);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfData is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasData() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfData);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfSourceTag (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
@@ -453,6 +501,28 @@ public:
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
EscrowBuilder&
setBytecode(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfBytecode] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfData (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
EscrowBuilder&
setData(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfData] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfSourceTag (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.

View File

@@ -213,6 +213,78 @@ public:
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfReserveIncrementDrops);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getGasLimit() const
{
if (hasGasLimit())
return this->sle_->at(sfGasLimit);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfGasLimit is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasGasLimit() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfGasLimit);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getBytecodeSizeLimit() const
{
if (hasBytecodeSizeLimit())
return this->sle_->at(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfBytecodeSizeLimit is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasBytecodeSizeLimit() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getGasPrice() const
{
if (hasGasPrice())
return this->sle_->at(sfGasPrice);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfGasPrice is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasGasPrice() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfGasPrice);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfPreviousTxnID (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
@@ -375,6 +447,39 @@ public:
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
FeeSettingsBuilder&
setGasLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfGasLimit] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
FeeSettingsBuilder&
setBytecodeSizeLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfBytecodeSizeLimit] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
FeeSettingsBuilder&
setGasPrice(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfGasPrice] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfPreviousTxnID (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.

View File

@@ -351,6 +351,54 @@ public:
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfIssuerKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getIssuerKeyEpoch() const
{
if (hasIssuerKeyEpoch())
return this->sle_->at(sfIssuerKeyEpoch);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfIssuerKeyEpoch is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasIssuerKeyEpoch() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerKeyEpoch);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfAuditorKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getAuditorKeyEpoch() const
{
if (hasAuditorKeyEpoch())
return this->sle_->at(sfAuditorKeyEpoch);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfAuditorKeyEpoch is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasAuditorKeyEpoch() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorKeyEpoch);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount (SoeDefault)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
@@ -600,6 +648,28 @@ public:
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfIssuerKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
MPTokenIssuanceBuilder&
setIssuerKeyEpoch(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfIssuerKeyEpoch] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfAuditorKeyEpoch (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
MPTokenIssuanceBuilder&
setAuditorKeyEpoch(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfAuditorKeyEpoch] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount (SoeDefault)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.

View File

@@ -287,6 +287,54 @@ public:
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfDestinationNode);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfTransferRate (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getTransferRate() const
{
if (hasTransferRate())
return this->sle_->at(sfTransferRate);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfTransferRate is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasTransferRate() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfTransferRate);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfIssuerNode (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT64::type::value_type>
getIssuerNode() const
{
if (hasIssuerNode())
return this->sle_->at(sfIssuerNode);
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfIssuerNode is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasIssuerNode() const
{
return this->sle_->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerNode);
}
};
/**
@@ -508,6 +556,28 @@ public:
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfTransferRate (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
PayChannelBuilder&
setTransferRate(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfTransferRate] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfIssuerNode (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
PayChannelBuilder&
setIssuerNode(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT64::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfIssuerNode] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Build and return the completed PayChannel wrapper.
* @param index The ledger entry index.

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,32 @@ public:
return this->tx_->at(sfDestination);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getDestinationTag() const
{
if (hasDestinationTag())
{
return this->tx_->at(sfDestinationTag);
}
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfDestinationTag is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasDestinationTag() const
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfDestinationTag);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfAmount (SoeRequired)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
@@ -149,29 +175,55 @@ public:
}
/**
* @brief Get sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
* @brief Get sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getDestinationTag() const
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
getBytecode() const
{
if (hasDestinationTag())
if (hasBytecode())
{
return this->tx_->at(sfDestinationTag);
return this->tx_->at(sfBytecode);
}
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfDestinationTag is present.
* @brief Check if sfBytecode is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasDestinationTag() const
hasBytecode() const
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfDestinationTag);
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecode);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfData (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_VL::type::value_type>
getData() const
{
if (hasData())
{
return this->tx_->at(sfData);
}
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfData is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasData() const
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfData);
}
};
@@ -232,6 +284,17 @@ public:
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
EscrowCreateBuilder&
setDestinationTag(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfDestinationTag] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfAmount (SoeRequired)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
@@ -278,13 +341,24 @@ public:
}
/**
* @brief Set sfDestinationTag (SoeOptional)
* @brief Set sfBytecode (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
EscrowCreateBuilder&
setDestinationTag(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
setBytecode(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfDestinationTag] = value;
object_[sfBytecode] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfData (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
EscrowCreateBuilder&
setData(std::decay_t<typename SF_VL::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfData] = value;
return *this;
}

View File

@@ -146,6 +146,32 @@ public:
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfCredentialIDs);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfGas (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getGas() const
{
if (hasGas())
{
return this->tx_->at(sfGas);
}
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfGas is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasGas() const
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfGas);
}
};
/**
@@ -249,6 +275,17 @@ public:
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfGas (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
EscrowFinishBuilder&
setGas(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfGas] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Build and return the EscrowFinish wrapper.
* @param publicKey The public key for signing.

View File

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Get sfAmount (SoeOptional)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Get sfBalance (SoeOptional)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
@@ -246,6 +248,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Set sfAmount (SoeOptional)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
PaymentChannelClaimBuilder&
@@ -257,6 +260,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Set sfBalance (SoeOptional)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
PaymentChannelClaimBuilder&

View File

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Get sfAmount (SoeRequired)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return The field value.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
@@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Set sfAmount (SoeRequired)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
PaymentChannelCreateBuilder&

View File

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Get sfAmount (SoeRequired)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return The field value.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
@@ -155,6 +156,7 @@ public:
/**
* @brief Set sfAmount (SoeRequired)
* @note This field supports MPT (Multi-Purpose Token) amounts.
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
PaymentChannelFundBuilder&

View File

@@ -254,6 +254,84 @@ public:
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfReserveIncrementDrops);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getGasLimit() const
{
if (hasGasLimit())
{
return this->tx_->at(sfGasLimit);
}
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfGasLimit is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasGasLimit() const
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfGasLimit);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getBytecodeSizeLimit() const
{
if (hasBytecodeSizeLimit())
{
return this->tx_->at(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
}
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfBytecodeSizeLimit is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasBytecodeSizeLimit() const
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfBytecodeSizeLimit);
}
/**
* @brief Get sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
* @return The field value, or std::nullopt if not present.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
protocol_autogen::Optional<SF_UINT32::type::value_type>
getGasPrice() const
{
if (hasGasPrice())
{
return this->tx_->at(sfGasPrice);
}
return std::nullopt;
}
/**
* @brief Check if sfGasPrice is present.
* @return True if the field is present, false otherwise.
*/
[[nodiscard]]
bool
hasGasPrice() const
{
return this->tx_->isFieldPresent(sfGasPrice);
}
};
/**
@@ -386,6 +464,39 @@ public:
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfGasLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
SetFeeBuilder&
setGasLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfGasLimit] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfBytecodeSizeLimit (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
SetFeeBuilder&
setBytecodeSizeLimit(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfBytecodeSizeLimit] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Set sfGasPrice (SoeOptional)
* @return Reference to this builder for method chaining.
*/
SetFeeBuilder&
setGasPrice(std::decay_t<typename SF_UINT32::type::value_type> const& value)
{
object_[sfGasPrice] = value;
return *this;
}
/**
* @brief Build and return the SetFee wrapper.
* @param publicKey The public key for signing.

View File

@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ public:
* @param lpTokens current LPT balance
* @param lpTokensWithdraw amount of tokens to withdraw
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @param freezeHandling whether a frozen balance is reported as zero
* @param authHandling whether an unauthorized MPT balance is reported as
* zero
* @param reserveHandling whether the recipient owner-reserve check is
* enforced when a trustline or MPToken has to be auto-created
* @param withdrawAll if withdrawing all lptokens
* @param priorBalance balance before fees
* @return
@@ -128,6 +133,7 @@ public:
std::uint16_t tfee,
FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
AuthHandling authHandling,
ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
beast::Journal const& journal);
@@ -150,6 +156,11 @@ public:
* @param lpTokensAMMBalance current AMM LPT balance
* @param lpTokensWithdraw amount of lptokens to withdraw
* @param tfee trading fee in basis points
* @param freezeHandling whether a frozen balance is reported as zero
* @param authHandling whether an unauthorized MPT balance is reported as
* zero
* @param reserveHandling whether the recipient owner-reserve check is
* enforced when a trustline or MPToken has to be auto-created
* @param withdrawAll if withdraw all lptokens
* @param priorBalance balance before fees
* @return
@@ -169,6 +180,7 @@ public:
std::uint16_t tfee,
FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
AuthHandling authHandling,
ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
beast::Journal const& journal);

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ public:
static TxConsequences
makeTxConsequences(PreflightContext const& ctx);
static bool
checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx);
static NotTEC
preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx);

View File

@@ -23,9 +23,15 @@ public:
static TxConsequences
makeTxConsequences(PreflightContext const& ctx);
static bool
checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx);
static NotTEC
preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx);
static TER
preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx);
TER
doApply() override;

View File

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ Rust toolchain:
✅ rust-analyzer
rust-analyzer 1.97.1 (8bab26f4 2026-07-14)
/nix/store/j6apc5pmd0giy15da9p650r8zklslmvi-rust-analyzer-preview-1.97.1-aarch64-apple-darwin/bin/rust-analyzer
✅ rust-nightly
rustc 1.99.0-nightly (87e5904f5 2026-07-20)
/nix/store/fqpjz4l0nsnji8b2pz57mnj0akbp6hcl-rust-nightly/bin/rust-nightly
✅ rustc
rustc 1.97.1 (8bab26f4f 2026-07-14)
/nix/store/bnfk1sl4s9angb0vj1cj9a5y5zvqinwy-rust-minimal-1.97.1/bin/rustc
@@ -140,4 +143,4 @@ Rust toolchain:
Skipping git-over-HTTPS check (CHECK_TOOLS_SKIP_CLONE is set).
✅ All 44 checked tools are present and runnable.
✅ All 45 checked tools are present and runnable.

View File

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ Rust toolchain:
✅ rust-analyzer
rust-analyzer 1.97.1 (8bab26f 2026-07-14)
/nix/store/lr3m97p3hx1k22a7c44pb0wa7rbayhfi-rust-analyzer-preview-1.97.1-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/bin/rust-analyzer
✅ rust-nightly
rustc 1.99.0-nightly (87e5904f5 2026-07-20)
/nix/store/j7kf7a5h4xypzp6x1skg4dsdx2k4fwb3-rust-nightly/bin/rust-nightly
✅ rustc
rustc 1.97.1 (8bab26f4f 2026-07-14)
/nix/store/40d3mzka7r1ps71l0yv2fs6616nbw85m-rust-minimal-1.97.1/bin/rustc
@@ -168,4 +171,4 @@ Mold:
Skipping git-over-HTTPS check (CHECK_TOOLS_SKIP_CLONE is set).
✅ All 52 checked tools are present and runnable.
✅ All 53 checked tools are present and runnable.

View File

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ Rust toolchain:
✅ rust-analyzer
rust-analyzer 1.97.1 (8bab26f 2026-07-14)
/nix/store/262830dlw2517lnagfx7i7agqgl4fmsd-rust-analyzer-preview-1.97.1-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/bin/rust-analyzer
✅ rust-nightly
rustc 1.99.0-nightly (87e5904f5 2026-07-20)
/nix/store/c59pxk1yikdlf129qwyg4fplmxcrha0k-rust-nightly/bin/rust-nightly
✅ rustc
rustc 1.97.1 (8bab26f4f 2026-07-14)
/nix/store/a6p27cg6b8szfixfyvkssx6l0c345zw8-rust-minimal-1.97.1/bin/rustc
@@ -168,4 +171,4 @@ Mold:
Skipping git-over-HTTPS check (CHECK_TOOLS_SKIP_CLONE is set).
✅ All 52 checked tools are present and runnable.
✅ All 53 checked tools are present and runnable.

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ RUN mkdir -p ~/.config/nix && \
COPY nix/ci-env.nix /tmp/build/nix/ci-env.nix
COPY nix/linux.nix /tmp/build/nix/linux.nix
COPY nix/packages.nix /tmp/build/nix/packages.nix
COPY nix/rust-nightly.sh /tmp/build/nix/rust-nightly.sh
COPY nix/rust.nix /tmp/build/nix/rust.nix
COPY nix/utils.nix /tmp/build/nix/utils.nix
COPY flake.nix /tmp/build/
COPY flake.lock /tmp/build/

View File

@@ -16,23 +16,7 @@ let
exec ${pkgs.python3}/bin/python3 ${llvmPackages.clang-unwrapped}/bin/run-clang-tidy "$@"
'';
# rust-overlay's toolchain propagates the *default* stdenv.cc onto the PATH (so
# cargo has a linker). That default may be different from the clang we pin here,
# so it shadows our clang and the build can silently use a different compiler
# version. Drop that cc from every propagation channel instead of pinning a
# replacement: the toolchain then carries no compiler and cargo just uses the
# active shell's stdenv cc. Must cover all channels — rust-overlay uses both
# propagatedBuildInputs and depsHostHostPropagated.
rustToolchainBase = pkgs.rust-bin.fromRustupToolchainFile ../rust-toolchain.toml;
rustToolchain =
let
defaultCc = pkgs.stdenv.cc; # default compiler from nixpkgs stdenv
withoutDefaultCc = builtins.filter (dep: (dep.outPath or "") != defaultCc.outPath);
in
rustToolchainBase.overrideAttrs (old: {
propagatedBuildInputs = withoutDefaultCc (old.propagatedBuildInputs or [ ]);
depsHostHostPropagated = withoutDefaultCc (old.depsHostHostPropagated or [ ]);
});
rust = import ./rust.nix { inherit pkgs; };
# Nix wraps its toolchain so that binaries are exposed only under unsuffixed
# names (gcc, g++, clang-tidy, ...). Several tools probe for a
@@ -108,41 +92,38 @@ in
mkGcov
;
commonPackages = with pkgs; [
clangToolLinks
runClangTidyLink
ccache
clangbuildanalyzer
clangTools
cmake
conan
curlMinimal # needed for codecov/codecov-action
doxygen
file # needed for cpack in Clio
gcovr
gh
git
git-cliff
git-lfs
gnumake
gnupg # needed for signing commits & codecov/codecov-action
graphviz
less # needed for git diff
mold
nettools # provides netstat, used to debug failures in CI
ninja
patchelf
perl # needed for openssl
pkg-config
pre-commit
python3
runClangTidy
vim
zip
# Rust packages
cargo-audit
cargo-llvm-cov
cargo-nextest
rustToolchain
];
commonPackages =
(with pkgs; [
clangToolLinks
runClangTidyLink
ccache
clangbuildanalyzer
clangTools
cmake
conan
curlMinimal # needed for codecov/codecov-action
doxygen
file # needed for cpack in Clio
gcovr
gh
git
git-cliff
git-lfs
gnumake
gnupg # needed for signing commits & codecov/codecov-action
graphviz
less # needed for git diff
mold
nettools # provides netstat, used to debug failures in CI
ninja
patchelf
perl # needed for openssl
pkg-config
pre-commit
python3
runClangTidy
vim
zip
])
++ rust.packages;
}

23
nix/rust-nightly.sh Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!@runtimeShell@
# Reaches the nightly Rust toolchain, which is deliberately kept off PATH.
# Packaged by nix/rust.nix, which explains why.
set -euo pipefail
usage() {
echo "usage: rust-nightly (path | run <command>...)" >&2
exit 2
}
case "${1-}" in
path) printf '%s\n' "@rustNightlyBin@" ;;
run)
shift
if [[ $# -eq 0 ]]; then
usage
fi
export PATH="@rustNightlyBin@:${PATH}"
exec "$@"
;;
*) usage ;;
esac

84
nix/rust.nix Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
# The Rust half of the tool set shared by the CI environment and the dev shell:
# the stable toolchain pinned by rust-toolchain.toml, the nightly the Rust
# coverage job needs, and the cargo plugins. Consumed by packages.nix.
{ pkgs }:
let
# rust-overlay's toolchain propagates the *default* stdenv.cc onto the PATH (so
# cargo has a linker). That default may be different from the clang we pin
# elsewhere, so it shadows our clang and the build can silently use a different
# compiler version. Drop that cc from every propagation channel instead of
# pinning a replacement: the toolchain then carries no compiler and cargo just
# uses the active shell's stdenv cc.
#
# The channel list is every list mkDerivation propagates to a dependent's
# environment (including the two legacy aliases). rust-overlay currently only
# uses propagatedBuildInputs and depsHostHostPropagated, but covering all of
# them means an upstream switch to another channel cannot quietly put the
# compiler back on PATH.
dropDefaultCc =
toolchain:
let
defaultCc = pkgs.stdenv.cc; # default compiler from nixpkgs stdenv
withoutDefaultCc = builtins.filter (dep: (dep.outPath or "") != defaultCc.outPath);
in
toolchain.overrideAttrs (
old:
pkgs.lib.genAttrs [
"depsBuildBuildPropagated"
"propagatedNativeBuildInputs" # alias of depsBuildHostPropagated
"depsBuildTargetPropagated"
"depsHostHostPropagated"
"propagatedBuildInputs" # alias of depsHostTargetPropagated
"depsTargetTargetPropagated"
] (channel: withoutDefaultCc (old.${channel} or [ ]))
);
rustToolchain = dropDefaultCc (pkgs.rust-bin.fromRustupToolchainFile ../rust-toolchain.toml);
# cargo-llvm-cov honours the #[coverage(off)] that keeps unit tests out of the
# coverage report only under a nightly rustc, and looks for llvm-profdata and
# llvm-cov in that same toolchain's sysroot — hence llvm-tools-preview.
#
# Not every nightly ships every component, so `nightly.latest` breaks on the
# days llvm-tools-preview is absent; selectLatestNightlyWith walks back to the
# newest one that has it. The result is the newest such nightly *known to the
# locked rust-overlay*, which means updating flake.lock moves the compiler that
# produces the coverage numbers — and with it the rustc version recorded in
# nix/check-tools/*.txt, so those snapshots need regenerating alongside.
rustNightly = dropDefaultCc (
pkgs.rust-bin.selectLatestNightlyWith (
toolchain: toolchain.minimal.override { extensions = [ "llvm-tools-preview" ]; }
)
);
# A second toolchain cannot go on PATH: its cargo and rustc would collide with
# the pinned stable's in the ci-env buildEnv, which resolves collisions by
# picking one silently. Reaching the nightly only through this wrapper keeps it
# in the image closure (the Docker build copies the whole closure, not just
# what is linked into /bin) while leaving it inactive everywhere that does not
# ask for it.
#
# The script's `path` subcommand exists for scopes wider than one command — a
# CI job appending to $GITHUB_PATH, so that the cargo cache action's own
# `rustc -vV` probe, which runs in a step of its own, agrees with the toolchain
# the build will use.
rustNightlyScript = pkgs.replaceVarsWith {
name = "rust-nightly";
src = ./rust-nightly.sh;
dir = "bin";
isExecutable = true;
replacements = {
inherit (pkgs) runtimeShell;
rustNightlyBin = "${rustNightly}/bin";
};
};
in
{
packages = [
pkgs.cargo-audit
pkgs.cargo-llvm-cov
pkgs.cargo-nextest
rustNightlyScript
rustToolchain
];
}

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ package/
publish_pkg.py Uploads built packages to the XRPLF Nexus repositories (called by CI, and shipped in that image)
rpm/
xrpld.spec RPM spec
debian/ Debian control files (control, rules, copyright, xrpld.docs, xrpld.links, source/format)
debian/ Debian control files (control, rules, copyright, xrpld.docs, xrpld.links, xrpld.lintian-overrides, source/format)
shared/
xrpld.service systemd unit file (used by both RPM and DEB)
xrpld.sysusers sysusers.d config (used by both RPM and DEB)
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ image and both CI and local builds pick it up — and names the format that imag
builds in `type`, which CI passes to `build_pkg.py` as `--package-type`; the two
have to stay in step.
| Package type | Image (`configs.<distro>[].package.image` in `linux.json`) | Tools required |
| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
| RPM | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-<sha>` | `rpmbuild`, `rpmsign` |
| DEB | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-<sha>` | `dpkg-buildpackage`, debhelper with compat level 13 |
| Package type | Image (`configs.<distro>[].package.image` in `linux.json`) | Tools required |
| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
| RPM | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-rhel:sha-<sha>` | `rpmbuild`, `rpmsign` |
| DEB | `ghcr.io/xrplf/xrpld/packaging-debian:sha-<sha>` | `dpkg-buildpackage`, debhelper with compat level 13, `lintian` |
To print the full packaging matrix (artifact names and images) for the current
`linux.json`:
@@ -51,13 +51,19 @@ To print the full packaging matrix (artifact names and images) for the current
### Via CI
Caller workflows (`on-pr.yml`, `on-tag.yml`, `on-trigger.yml`) call
`reusable-package.yml`. That workflow generates its own packaging matrix from
the configs that carry a `package` map (via `generate.py --packaging`) and fans
out one job per distro. Each job downloads the pre-built `xrpld` and
`validator-keys` binary artifacts and runs in that distro's container, building
the format `package.type` declares. The packaging script derives the package
version from the downloaded binary's `xrpld --version` output; no CMake
configure or build step is needed inside the packaging job.
`reusable-package.yml`, which runs in three stages:
1. `package` fans out one job per config carrying a `package` map, building and
signing in that config's container, and uploading `<config>-pkg` alongside
`<config>-pkg-debug` for the much larger debug symbols.
2. `test-install` installs `<config>-pkg` in the container of every distro the
packages target and runs the binaries there, so one that cannot be installed
never reaches Nexus.
3. `publish` uploads both artifacts, or lists what it would upload.
The packaging script derives the package version from the downloaded binary's
`xrpld --version` output; no CMake configure or build step is needed inside the
packaging job.
The binaries come from the `debian` and `rhel` build configs themselves — the
ones carrying the `package` map — which pass `-Dvalidator_keys=ON` so that the
@@ -94,8 +100,7 @@ docker run --rm \
--pkg-release "${PKG_RELEASE}" \
--channel UNRELEASED
# Output:
# build/debbuild/*.deb (DEB + dbgsym; Debian names both .deb)
# Output (the deb image writes build/debbuild/*.deb instead):
# build/rpmbuild/RPMS/x86_64/*.rpm
```
@@ -155,9 +160,9 @@ the last, and the date and hash say which commit a package on
`packages.xrplf.org` came from. Both reach the packaging scripts as arguments,
so neither script derives anything itself.
Publishing is the last step of each packaging job, uploading from the container
that built the packages with the `publish_pkg.py` shipped in the image — the
same copy other repositories run. Without `publish: true` the step is a
Publishing is its own job, gated behind `test-install`, uploading from the same
image that built the packages with the `publish_pkg.py` shipped in it — the
same copy other repositories run. Without `publish: true` the job is a
`--dry-run`, listing the uploads it would make without needing credentials, so
any run that builds packages also exercises the upload routing. `on-trigger.yml`
passes `publish: true` for develop pushes in `XRPLF/rippled` and `on-tag.yml`
@@ -202,6 +207,9 @@ the final release. If that normalized package version still contains `-`,
packaging fails because RPM forbids `-` in `Version`, and Debian uses `-` as
the upstream/revision separator.
> [!NOTE]
> Debug and sanitizer builds are not packaged yet.
`pkg_version` is the normalized package metadata version derived inside
`build_pkg.py` from the binary-reported `xrpld` version (`-` pre-release
separator converted to `~`). It is not a separate user input.
@@ -279,37 +287,45 @@ service restart.
2. Stages the binaries, configs, `README.md`, `LICENSE.md`, and
`validator-keys-LICENSE`.
3. Copies `package/debian/` control files into `debbuild/source/debian/`.
4. Copies shared service/sysusers/tmpfiles into `debian/` where `dh_installsystemd`, `dh_installsysusers`, and `dh_installtmpfiles` pick them up automatically.
4. Copies shared service/sysusers/tmpfiles/logrotate into `debian/` where `dh_installsystemd`, `dh_installsysusers`, `dh_installtmpfiles` and `dh_installlogrotate` pick them up automatically.
5. Generates a minimal `debian/changelog` using `${pkg_version}-${PKG_RELEASE}`,
where `pkg_version` is derived from the binary-reported `xrpld` version.
6. Runs `dpkg-buildpackage -b --no-sign -d` (`-d` skips the build-dependency check, since the binary is already built). `debian/rules` uses manual `install` commands.
It also rewrites the `libc6` bound to `LIBC_MIN` in `debian/rules`, the glibc
the Nix toolchain builds against. `dpkg-shlibdeps` would otherwise derive it
from the build host's symbols file — on trixie that yields `libc6 (>= 2.34)`
because of `sysconf`, locking out distros the binaries run on. A check fails
the build if either binary outgrows `LIBC_MIN`.
7. Output: `debbuild/*.deb`, the binary package and the `-dbgsym` package.
Debian gives dbgsym packages a `.deb` extension; only Ubuntu uses `.ddeb`.
## Post-build verification
```bash
# DEB
dpkg-deb -c debbuild/*.deb | grep -E 'systemd|sysusers|tmpfiles'
# DEB (one invocation per package: the dbgsym package is a .deb too)
for deb in debbuild/*.deb; do dpkg-deb -c "${deb}"; done | grep -E 'systemd|sysusers|tmpfiles'
lintian -I debbuild/*.deb
# RPM
rpm -qlp rpmbuild/RPMS/x86_64/*.rpm
# Optional, and not in the packaging image: apt-get install -y lintian
lintian -I debbuild/*.deb
```
`lintian` still reports `embedded-library zlib`, `no-manual-page` and
`initial-upload-closes-no-bugs`; only the `/usr/local` tags are overridden.
## Reproducibility
`build_pkg.py` sets `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` from the latest git commit time and
exports it; the RPM spec clamps file modification times to it via
`%build_mtime_policy`. The remaining variables
below further improve reproducibility but are _not_ set by the script — export
them yourself if needed:
Both formats build reproducibly as they are: the same binaries at the same
commit give byte-identical packages on a rebuild, and nothing has to be
exported by hand.
```bash
export TZ=UTC
export LC_ALL=C.UTF-8
export GZIP=-n
export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS="noautodbgsym reproducible=+fixfilepath"
```
`build_pkg.py` sets `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` from the latest git commit time.
`dpkg-buildpackage` honours it on its own; the RPM spec sets three macros:
- `%clamp_mtime_to_source_date_epoch` — file modification times, from
`SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH`.
- `%use_source_date_epoch_as_buildtime` — the `BUILDTIME` header, from the
same.
- `%_buildhost` — pinned, so the builder's hostname stays out of the header.

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
# This script lives in the repository it packages.
SRC_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
PRE_RELEASE = re.compile(r"^(b0|b[1-9][0-9]*|rc[0-9]+)(\+.*)?$")
PRE_RELEASE = re.compile(r"^(b|rc)(0|[1-9][0-9]*)(\+.*)?$")
# Files both packaging systems consume, staged under the same names.
STAGED_FROM_BUILD = ("xrpld", "validator-keys", "validator-keys-LICENSE")
@@ -133,6 +133,14 @@ def stage_common(build_dir: Path, dest: Path) -> None:
shutil.copy2(build_dir / name, dest / name)
for source, name in STAGED_FROM_SRC.items():
shutil.copy2(SRC_DIR / source, dest / name)
def stage_units(dest: Path) -> None:
"""Copy the systemd, sysusers, tmpfiles and logrotate files into dest.
Each format wants them somewhere else: rpmbuild reads them from SOURCES,
debhelper from debian/.
"""
for name in STAGED_UNITS:
shutil.copy2(SRC_DIR / "package" / "shared" / name, dest / name)
@@ -146,6 +154,7 @@ def build_rpm(build_dir: Path, *, version: str, pkg_release: str) -> None:
spec = topdir / "SPECS" / "xrpld.spec"
shutil.copy2(SRC_DIR / "package" / "rpm" / "xrpld.spec", spec)
stage_common(build_dir, topdir / "SOURCES")
stage_units(topdir / "SOURCES")
run(
"rpmbuild",
@@ -178,8 +187,7 @@ def build_deb(
shutil.copytree(SRC_DIR / "package" / "debian", staging / "debian")
# debhelper picks these up from debian/ automatically.
for name in STAGED_UNITS:
shutil.copy2(staging / name, staging / "debian" / name)
stage_units(staging / "debian")
date = datetime.fromtimestamp(epoch, timezone.utc).strftime(
"%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S %z"
@@ -193,8 +201,6 @@ def build_deb(
""")
(staging / "debian" / "changelog").write_text(changelog)
(staging / "debian" / "rules").chmod(0o755)
run("dpkg-buildpackage", "-b", "--no-sign", "-d", cwd=staging)

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Priority: optional
Maintainer: XRPL Foundation <contact@xrplf.org>
Rules-Requires-Root: no
Build-Depends:
binutils,
debhelper-compat (= 13)
Standards-Version: 4.7.0
Homepage: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
@@ -11,8 +12,6 @@ Vcs-Git: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled.git
Vcs-Browser: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
Package: xrpld
Section: net
Priority: optional
Architecture: any
Depends:
${shlibs:Depends},

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Format: https://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/
Upstream-Name: rippled
Upstream-Name: xrpld
Source: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
Files: *
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Copyright: 2016, Ripple Labs Inc.
2009-2010, Satoshi Nakamoto
2011, The Bitcoin developers
2003-2005, Tom Wu
License: ISC
License: ISC and BSL-1.0 and MIT and Tom-Wu
Comment: Built from https://github.com/ripple/validator-keys-tool at the commit
pinned in cmake/XrplValidatorKeys.cmake. Besides ISC-licensed code it
incorporates work under the Boost Software License 1.0 (ASIO), the MIT/X11
@@ -35,3 +35,74 @@ License: ISC
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
License: BSL-1.0
Boost Software License - Version 1.0 - August 17th, 2003
.
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person or organization
obtaining a copy of the software and accompanying documentation covered by
this license (the "Software") to use, reproduce, display, distribute,
execute, and transmit the Software, and to prepare derivative works of the
Software, and to permit third-parties to whom the Software is furnished to
do so, all subject to the following:
.
The copyright notices in the Software and this entire statement, including
the above license grant, this restriction and the following disclaimer,
must be included in all copies of the Software, in whole or in part, and
all derivative works of the Software, unless such copies or derivative
works are solely in the form of machine-executable object code generated by
a source language processor.
.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT
SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR ANYONE DISTRIBUTING THE SOFTWARE BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE,
ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
License: MIT
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
.
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
License: Tom-Wu
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
"Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
the following conditions:
.
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS-IS" AND WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
.
IN NO EVENT SHALL TOM WU BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL,
INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER
RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER OR NOT ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE, AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, ARISING OUT
OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
.
In addition, the following condition applies:
.
All redistributions must retain an intact copy of this copyright notice
and disclaimer.

26
package/debian/rules Normal file → Executable file
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
export DH_VERBOSE = 1
# The glibc the Nix toolchain builds against, and so the real floor for the
# binaries. dpkg-shlibdeps would instead derive libc6 (>= 2.34) from the build
# host's symbols file, where sysconf carries that minver, locking out distros
# the binaries actually run on.
LIBC_MIN = 2.31
%:
dh $@
@@ -11,6 +17,8 @@ override_dh_auto_configure override_dh_auto_build override_dh_auto_test:
override_dh_installsystemd:
dh_installsystemd --no-stop-on-upgrade xrpld.service
# The tmpfiles snippet sets ownership to the xrpld user, so the sysusers snippet
# has to be emitted first: run it early and make its own sequence slot a no-op.
execute_before_dh_installtmpfiles:
dh_installsysusers
@@ -22,5 +30,23 @@ override_dh_install:
install -D -m 0644 xrpld.cfg debian/xrpld/etc/xrpld/xrpld.cfg
install -D -m 0644 validators.txt debian/xrpld/etc/xrpld/validators.txt
override_dh_shlibdeps:
dh_shlibdeps
# Guards against the toolchain moving past LIBC_MIN and the packages then
# claiming a floor they do not meet.
for binary in xrpld validator-keys; do \
needed=$$(readelf --dyn-syms --wide $$binary \
| grep -o 'GLIBC_[0-9.]*' | sed 's/GLIBC_//' | sort -uV | tail -1); \
if [ -z "$$needed" ]; then \
echo "$$binary: no GLIBC_ symbol versions read, cannot check LIBC_MIN" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi; \
if dpkg --compare-versions "$$needed" gt "$(LIBC_MIN)"; then \
echo "$$binary needs glibc $$needed, above LIBC_MIN $(LIBC_MIN)" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi; \
done
sed -i 's/libc6 (>= [0-9.]*)/libc6 (>= $(LIBC_MIN))/' debian/xrpld.substvars
override_dh_dwz:
@:

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
README.md
LICENSE.md
validator-keys-LICENSE

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
# Legacy compat symlinks (remove next major release)
# Legacy compatibility for pre-FHS package layouts.
# TODO: remove after rippled fully deprecated.
usr/bin/xrpld usr/local/bin/rippled

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
# The /usr/local/bin/rippled symlink is deliberate compatibility for pre-FHS
# layouts, so the Policy 9.1.2 tags it raises are expected.
# TODO: remove alongside debian/xrpld.links after rippled fully deprecated.
xrpld: dir-in-usr-local [usr/local/bin/]
xrpld: file-in-usr-local [usr/local/bin/rippled]
xrpld: file-in-unusual-dir [usr/local/bin/rippled]

View File

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ ARG BASE_IMAGE=debian:trixie
FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}
COPY bin/install-packaging-tools.sh /tmp/install-packaging-tools.sh
RUN /tmp/install-packaging-tools.sh
# Bind-mounted rather than copied in, so the installer never lands in a layer.
RUN --mount=type=bind,source=bin/install-packaging-tools.sh,target=/install-packaging-tools.sh \
/install-packaging-tools.sh
# See ../README.md, "Publishing from other repositories".
COPY package/docker/publish_pkg.py /usr/local/bin/publish_pkg.py

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Publish built DEB and RPM packages to the XRPLF repositories on Nexus.
Takes packages and a channel, and nothing else, so it publishes whatever built
them; see package/README.md, "Publishing from other repositories".
Knows nothing about what it uploads beyond the channel, so it publishes whatever
built the packages; see package/README.md, "Publishing from other repositories".
RPMs are uploaded to the hosted repository, but yum clients install from the
'rpm-<channel>' group repository in front of it, which serves signed metadata.
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ STALL_TIMEOUT = 300
ATTEMPTS = 4
RETRY_DELAY = 5
# 429 is Nexus asking to slow down, not a rejection, so it retries like a 5xx.
RETRYABLE_STATUSES = (429,)
def build_opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
"""An opener with no redirect handler, so a 3xx raises instead of being followed.
@@ -47,9 +50,9 @@ def build_opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
def upload(url: str, method: str, headers: dict[str, str], package: Path) -> None:
"""Send one package, retrying only what is worth retrying.
A 4xx is a deterministic rejection, so it is reported at once rather than
re-sending the whole body three more times. Nexus explains what it rejected
in the response body, so that body is always surfaced.
A 4xx other than 429 is a deterministic rejection, so it is reported at once
rather than re-sending the whole body three more times. Nexus explains what
it rejected in the response body, so that body is always surfaced.
"""
opener = build_opener()
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ def upload(url: str, method: str, headers: dict[str, str], package: Path) -> Non
except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
detail = error.read().decode(errors="replace").strip()
reason = f"HTTP {error.code}: {detail}"
retryable = error.code >= 500
retryable = error.code >= 500 or error.code in RETRYABLE_STATUSES
except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError) as error:
reason = str(error)
retryable = True
@@ -121,6 +124,8 @@ def main() -> None:
token = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode()
auth = {"Authorization": f"Basic {token}"}
# Deliberately not shared with sign_rpm.py: this script ships standalone in
# the packaging image for other repositories to run.
packages = sorted(
path
for path in package_dir.rglob("*")

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ URL: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
# These have to precede %%debug_package: it opens the debuginfo subpackage, and
# any tag after it is silently dropped from the main package.
%{?systemd_requires}
%{?sysusers_requires_compat}
%undefine _debugsource_packages
%debug_package
# Level 3 rather than the el9 default of 19: it shrinks the multi-gigabyte
@@ -25,10 +30,13 @@ BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
%global _binary_payload w3.zstdio
%global _find_debuginfo_dwz_opts %{nil}
%build_mtime_policy clamp_to_source_date_epoch
# Reproducibility: the first two take their value from the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
# build_pkg.py exports. Without these the header records the wall clock and the
# build container's hostname, so two builds of the same commit differ.
%global clamp_mtime_to_source_date_epoch 1
%global use_source_date_epoch_as_buildtime 1
%global _buildhost xrplf.org
%{?systemd_requires}
%{?sysusers_requires_compat}
%description
xrpld is the reference implementation of the XRP Ledger protocol. It
@@ -53,7 +61,7 @@ install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/validators.txt %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/%{
install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.service %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xrpld.service
install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.sysusers %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/xrpld.conf
install -Dm0644 %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.tmpfiles %{buildroot}%{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf
install -Dm0644 /dev/null %{buildroot}%{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset
install -d %{buildroot}%{_presetdir}
cat >%{buildroot}%{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset <<'EOF'
enable xrpld.service
EOF
@@ -76,7 +84,7 @@ ln -s %{_bindir}/%{name} %{buildroot}/usr/local/bin/rippled
%sysusers_create_package %{name} %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.sysusers
%post
systemd-tmpfiles --create %{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf || :
%tmpfiles_create_package %{name} %{_sourcedir}/xrpld.tmpfiles
%systemd_post xrpld.service
%preun
@@ -86,11 +94,12 @@ systemd-tmpfiles --create %{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf || :
%systemd_postun xrpld.service
%files
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_docdir}/%{name}
%license %{_docdir}/%{name}/LICENSE.md
%license %{_docdir}/%{name}/validator-keys-LICENSE
%doc %{_docdir}/%{name}/README.md
%dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
%{_bindir}/%{name}
%{_bindir}/validator-keys
@@ -101,7 +110,7 @@ systemd-tmpfiles --create %{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf || :
%{_unitdir}/xrpld.service
%{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_presetdir}/50-xrpld.preset
%{_sysusersdir}/xrpld.conf
%{_tmpfilesdir}/xrpld.conf
%ghost %dir /var/lib/xrpld

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ ProtectHome=true
PrivateTmp=true
User=xrpld
Group=xrpld
# xrpld.tmpfiles creates these at install and boot; these recreate them on
# every start, so a removed directory does not stop the service.
StateDirectory=xrpld
StateDirectoryMode=0750
LogsDirectory=xrpld

View File

@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ def main() -> None:
args = parser.parse_args()
package_dir: Path = args.package_dir
# Deliberately not shared with publish_pkg.py, which ships standalone in the
# packaging image.
rpms = sorted(path for path in package_dir.rglob("*.rpm") if path.is_file())
# Signing nothing would otherwise look like a successful signing.
assert rpms, f"no RPMs found in {package_dir}"

View File

@@ -543,12 +543,19 @@ doWithdraw(
{
auto const dstSle = ctx.view.read(keylet::account(dstAcct));
// Create trust line or MPToken for the receiving account
// Create a trust line or MPToken for a self-destination only when there
// is a payout to credit. Post-fixCleanup3_4_0, a zero-value withdraw
// (e.g. share redemption from a fully impaired vault) must not insert
// an empty holding: that records a one-sided zero delta and can also
// create+delete MPTokens in the same transaction.
if (dstAcct == senderAcct)
{
if (auto const ter = addEmptyHolding(ctx, senderAcct, priorBalance, amount.asset(), j);
!isTesSuccess(ter) && ter != tecDUPLICATE)
return ter;
if (amount > beast::kZero || !ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
{
if (auto const ter = addEmptyHolding(ctx, senderAcct, priorBalance, amount.asset(), j);
!isTesSuccess(ter) && ter != tecDUPLICATE)
return ter;
}
}
else
{

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/Sandbox.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
@@ -691,12 +690,6 @@ deleteAMMTrustLines(
return {deleteAMMTrustLine(sb, sleItem, ammAccountID, j), SkipEntry::No};
}
// A credential naming the pseudo-account as subject can't be
// accepted or deleted by it and would otherwise permanently pin the
// AMM. Clean it up here, inside the same bounded walk, so the
// pinned AMM can still be deleted.
if (sb.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) && nodeType == ltCREDENTIAL)
return {credentials::deleteSLE(sb, sleItem, j), SkipEntry::No};
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.error()) << "deleteAMMObjects: deleting non-trustline or non-MPT " << nodeType;
return {tecINTERNAL, SkipEntry::No};
@@ -774,8 +767,6 @@ deleteAMMAccount(Sandbox& sb, Asset const& asset, Asset const& asset2, beast::Jo
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
// deleteAMMTrustLines also removes any credentials pinned to the AMM
// pseudo-account, within its bounded walk.
if (auto const ter = deleteAMMTrustLines(sb, ammAccountID, kMaxDeletableAmmTrustLines, j);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
@@ -917,11 +908,6 @@ isOnlyLiquidityProvider(ReadView const& view, Issue const& ammIssue, AccountID c
++nMPT;
continue;
}
// A credential naming the pseudo-account as subject can be pinned
// to its owner directory. Ignore it here; deleteAMMTrustLines
// removes it when the AMM is deleted.
if (view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) && entryType == ltCREDENTIAL)
continue;
if (entryType != ltRIPPLE_STATE)
return std::unexpected<TER>(tecINTERNAL); // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const lowLimit = sle->getFieldAmount(sfLowLimit);

View File

@@ -5,10 +5,8 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
@@ -129,36 +127,6 @@ deleteSLE(ApplyView& view, SLE::ref sleCredential, beast::Journal j)
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
deletePseudoAccountCredentials(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& pseudoAcct,
std::uint16_t maxNodesToDelete,
beast::Journal j)
{
XRPL_ASSERT(
isPseudoAccount(view.read(keylet::account(pseudoAcct))),
"xrpl::credentials::deletePseudoAccountCredentials : is a pseudo-account");
// Delete the credentials linked into the pseudo-account's owner directory,
// visiting at most maxNodesToDelete entries. Any other object is left in
// place; the caller's own checks decide whether the remaining directory
// blocks deletion. If the bound is reached, cleanupOnAccountDelete returns
// tecINCOMPLETE and the caller propagates it so a later transaction resumes.
return cleanupOnAccountDelete(
view,
keylet::ownerDir(pseudoAcct),
[&view, &j](LedgerEntryType nodeType, uint256 const&, SLE::pointer& sleItem)
-> std::pair<TER, SkipEntry> {
if (nodeType == ltCREDENTIAL)
return {deleteSLE(view, sleItem, j), SkipEntry::No};
return {tesSUCCESS, SkipEntry::Yes};
},
j,
maxNodesToDelete);
}
NotTEC
checkFields(STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules, beast::Journal j)
{

View File

@@ -3,14 +3,19 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Concepts.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rate.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
@@ -18,12 +23,19 @@
#include <cstdint>
#include <limits>
#include <optional>
#include <variant>
namespace xrpl {
TER
closeChannel(SLE::ref slep, ApplyView& view, uint256 const& key, beast::Journal j)
closeChannel(
SLE::ref slep,
ApplyViewContext ctx,
uint256 const& key,
AccountID const& txAccount,
beast::Journal j)
{
ApplyView& view = ctx.view;
AccountID const src = (*slep)[sfAccount];
// Remove PayChan from owner directory
{
@@ -38,9 +50,9 @@ closeChannel(SLE::ref slep, ApplyView& view, uint256 const& key, beast::Journal
}
// Remove PayChan from recipient's owner directory, if present.
AccountID const dst = (*slep)[sfDestination];
if (auto const page = (*slep)[~sfDestinationNode])
{
auto const dst = (*slep)[sfDestination];
if (!view.dirRemove(keylet::ownerDir(dst), *page, key, true))
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
@@ -57,7 +69,63 @@ closeChannel(SLE::ref slep, ApplyView& view, uint256 const& key, beast::Journal
XRPL_ASSERT(
(*slep)[sfAmount] >= (*slep)[sfBalance], "xrpl::closeChannel : minimum channel amount");
(*sle)[sfBalance] = (*sle)[sfBalance] + (*slep)[sfAmount] - (*slep)[sfBalance];
auto const reqDelta = (*slep)[sfAmount] - (*slep)[sfBalance];
auto const& issuer = reqDelta.getIssuer();
// Only update the balance if there is a positive delta.
if (reqDelta > beast::kZero)
{
if (isXRP(reqDelta))
{
(*sle)[sfBalance] = (*sle)[sfBalance] + reqDelta;
}
else
{
if (!view.rules().enabled(featureTokenPaychan))
return temDISABLED;
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper<T>(view, src, reqDelta, false);
},
reqDelta.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
bool const createAsset = src == txAccount;
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowUnlockApplyHelper<T>(
ctx,
kParityRate,
sle,
STAmount{(*sle)[sfBalance]}.xrp(),
reqDelta,
issuer,
src,
src,
createAsset,
j);
},
reqDelta.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
}
// Remove PayChan from issuer's owner directory, if present.
if (auto const optPage = (*slep)[~sfIssuerNode])
{
if (!view.dirRemove(keylet::ownerDir(issuer), *optPage, key, true))
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Could not remove paychan from issuer owner directory";
return tefBAD_LEDGER;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
}
decreaseOwnerCountForObject(view, sle, slep, 1, j);
view.update(sle);

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ namespace {
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// clang-format off
// NOLINTNEXTLINE(readability-identifier-naming)
char const* const versionString = "3.4.0-b3"
char const* const versionString = "3.4.0-rc1"
// clang-format on
;

View File

@@ -168,10 +168,10 @@ STTx::getMentionedAccounts() const
}
static Blob
getSigningData(STTx const& that)
getSigningData(STTx const& that, HashPrefix prefix)
{
Serializer s;
s.add32(HashPrefix::TxSign);
s.add32(prefix);
that.addWithoutSigningFields(s);
return s.getData();
}
@@ -212,30 +212,42 @@ STTx::getSeqProxy() const
return SeqProxy::rawTicket(*ticketSeq);
}
void
STTx::sign(PublicKey const& publicKey, SecretKey const& secretKey)
{
// The account's own signature always covers the plain transaction prefix;
// see signingPrefix for the role signatures that do not.
auto const data = getSigningData(*this, HashPrefix::TxSign);
setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, xrpl::sign(publicKey, secretKey, makeSlice(data)));
tid_ = getHash(HashPrefix::TransactionId);
}
void
STTx::sign(
PublicKey const& publicKey,
SecretKey const& secretKey,
std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<SField const>> signatureTarget)
SignatureRole role,
Rules const& rules)
{
auto const data = getSigningData(*this);
auto const data = getSigningData(*this, signingPrefix(role, false, rules));
auto const sig = xrpl::sign(publicKey, secretKey, makeSlice(data));
if (signatureTarget)
if (auto const target = signatureField(role))
{
auto& target = peekFieldObject(*signatureTarget);
target.setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, sig);
peekFieldObject(*target).setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, sig);
}
else
{
setFieldVL(sfTxnSignature, sig);
}
tid_ = getHash(HashPrefix::TransactionId);
}
std::expected<void, std::string>
STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const
STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject, SignatureRole role) const
{
try
{
@@ -244,8 +256,10 @@ STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const
// multi-signing. Otherwise we're single-signing.
Blob const& signingPubKey = sigObject.getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey);
return signingPubKey.empty() ? checkMultiSign(rules, sigObject)
: checkSingleSign(sigObject);
bool const multiSigning = signingPubKey.empty();
auto const prefix = signingPrefix(role, multiSigning, rules);
return multiSigning ? checkMultiSign(sigObject, prefix)
: checkSingleSign(sigObject, prefix);
}
catch (...)
{
@@ -256,20 +270,20 @@ STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const
std::expected<void, std::string>
STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules) const
{
if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, *this); !ret)
if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, *this, SignatureRole::Transaction); !ret)
return ret;
if (isFieldPresent(sfCounterpartySignature))
{
auto const counterSig = getFieldObject(sfCounterpartySignature);
if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, counterSig); !ret)
if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, counterSig, SignatureRole::Counterparty); !ret)
return std::unexpected("Counterparty: " + ret.error());
}
if (isFieldPresent(sfSponsorSignature))
{
auto const sponsorSignatureObj = getFieldObject(sfSponsorSignature);
if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, sponsorSignatureObj); !ret)
if (auto const ret = checkSign(rules, sponsorSignatureObj, SignatureRole::Sponsor); !ret)
return std::unexpected("Sponsor: " + ret.error());
}
@@ -277,14 +291,14 @@ STTx::checkSign(Rules const& rules) const
// of signature checking.
if (isFieldPresent(sfBatchSigners))
{
if (auto const ret = checkBatchSign(rules); !ret)
if (auto const ret = checkBatchSign(); !ret)
return ret;
}
return {};
}
std::expected<void, std::string>
STTx::checkBatchSign(Rules const& rules) const
STTx::checkBatchSign() const
{
try
{
@@ -318,7 +332,7 @@ STTx::checkBatchSign(Rules const& rules) const
for (auto const& signer : signers)
{
Blob const& signingPubKey = signer.getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey);
auto const result = signingPubKey.empty() ? checkBatchMultiSign(signer, rules, txIds)
auto const result = signingPubKey.empty() ? checkBatchMultiSign(signer, txIds)
: checkBatchSingleSign(signer, txIds);
if (!result)
@@ -447,9 +461,9 @@ singleSignHelper(STObject const& sigObject, Slice const& data)
}
std::expected<void, std::string>
STTx::checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject) const
STTx::checkSingleSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const
{
auto const data = getSigningData(*this);
auto const data = getSigningData(*this, prefix);
return singleSignHelper(sigObject, makeSlice(data));
}
@@ -467,8 +481,7 @@ std::expected<void, std::string>
multiSignHelper(
STObject const& sigObject,
std::optional<AccountID> txnAccountID,
std::function<Serializer(AccountID const&)> makeMsg,
Rules const& rules)
std::function<Serializer(AccountID const&)> makeMsg)
{
// Make sure the MultiSigners are present. Otherwise they are not
// attempting multi-signing and we just have a bad SigningPubKey.
@@ -541,10 +554,7 @@ multiSignHelper(
}
std::expected<void, std::string>
STTx::checkBatchMultiSign(
STObject const& batchSigner,
Rules const& rules,
std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const
STTx::checkBatchMultiSign(STObject const& batchSigner, std::vector<uint256> const& txIds) const
{
XRPL_ASSERT(getTxnType() == ttBATCH, "STTx::checkBatchMultiSign : batch transaction");
// We can ease the computational load inside the loop a bit by
@@ -555,18 +565,15 @@ STTx::checkBatchMultiSign(
serializeBatch(dataStart, getAccountID(sfAccount), getSeqProxy().value(), getFlags(), txIds);
dataStart.addBitString(batchSignerAccount);
return multiSignHelper(
batchSigner,
batchSignerAccount,
[&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
batchSigner, batchSignerAccount, [&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
Serializer s = dataStart;
finishMultiSigningData(accountID, s);
return s;
},
rules);
});
}
std::expected<void, std::string>
STTx::checkMultiSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const
STTx::checkMultiSign(STObject const& sigObject, HashPrefix prefix) const
{
// Used inside the loop in multiSignHelper to enforce that
// the account owner may not multisign for themselves.
@@ -578,16 +585,13 @@ STTx::checkMultiSign(Rules const& rules, STObject const& sigObject) const
// We can ease the computational load inside the loop a bit by
// pre-constructing part of the data that we hash. Fill a Serializer
// with the stuff that stays constant from signature to signature.
Serializer dataStart = startMultiSigningData(*this);
Serializer dataStart = startMultiSigningData(*this, prefix);
return multiSignHelper(
sigObject,
txnAccountID,
[&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
sigObject, txnAccountID, [&dataStart](AccountID const& accountID) -> Serializer {
Serializer s = dataStart;
finishMultiSigningData(accountID, s);
return s;
},
rules);
});
}
void

View File

@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ STValidation::validationFormat()
{sfBaseFeeDrops, SoeOptional},
{sfReserveBaseDrops, SoeOptional},
{sfReserveIncrementDrops, SoeOptional},
// featureSmartEscrow
{sfGasLimit, SoeOptional},
{sfBytecodeSizeLimit, SoeOptional},
{sfGasPrice, SoeOptional},
};
// clang-format on

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,77 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/Sign.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/HashPrefix.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/KeyType.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STExchange.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SecretKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
#include <optional>
namespace xrpl {
SField const*
signatureField(SignatureRole role)
{
switch (role)
{
case SignatureRole::Transaction:
return nullptr;
case SignatureRole::Counterparty:
return &sfCounterpartySignature;
case SignatureRole::Sponsor:
return &sfSponsorSignature;
}
UNREACHABLE("xrpl::signatureField : unknown SignatureRole");
return nullptr;
}
std::optional<SignatureRole>
signatureRole(SField const& sigField)
{
if (sigField == sfCounterpartySignature)
return SignatureRole::Counterparty;
if (sigField == sfSponsorSignature)
return SignatureRole::Sponsor;
return std::nullopt;
}
// Signature validity depends on fixCleanup3_4_0: a role signature covers
// different bytes before and after the amendment activates. checkValidity
// caches its verdict per transaction ID, so it keeps two separate cache slots
// for role-signature transactions (kSfSiggoodOldPrefix / kSfSigbadOldPrefix in
// tx/apply.cpp) to keep a pre-fix verdict from being reused in the post-fix
// era, and vice versa. See the block comment in tx/apply.cpp for the details
// and the reason both directions matter.
HashPrefix
signingPrefix(SignatureRole role, bool multiSigning, Rules const& rules)
{
// Before fixCleanup3_4_0 every signature on a transaction covered the same
// bytes, so a signature could be moved from one role to another.
if (!rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::TxMultiSign : HashPrefix::TxSign;
switch (role)
{
case SignatureRole::Transaction:
return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::TxMultiSign : HashPrefix::TxSign;
case SignatureRole::Counterparty:
return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::CounterpartyTxMultiSign
: HashPrefix::CounterpartyTxSign;
case SignatureRole::Sponsor:
return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::SponsorTxMultiSign : HashPrefix::SponsorTxSign;
}
UNREACHABLE("xrpl::signingPrefix : unknown SignatureRole");
return multiSigning ? HashPrefix::TxMultiSign : HashPrefix::TxSign;
}
void
sign(
STObject& st,
@@ -70,18 +130,18 @@ verify(STObject const& st, HashPrefix const& prefix, PublicKey const& pk, SF_VL
// So, if we support multiple levels of signing, then we'll need to
// incorporate the "signing for" accounts into the signing data as well.
Serializer
buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID)
buildMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, AccountID const& signingID, HashPrefix prefix)
{
Serializer s{startMultiSigningData(obj)};
Serializer s{startMultiSigningData(obj, prefix)};
finishMultiSigningData(signingID, s);
return s;
}
Serializer
startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj)
startMultiSigningData(STObject const& obj, HashPrefix prefix)
{
Serializer s;
s.add32(HashPrefix::TxMultiSign);
s.add32(prefix);
obj.addWithoutSigningFields(s);
return s;
}

View File

@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ transResults()
MAKE_ERROR(tecPRECISION_LOSS, "The amounts used by the transaction cannot interact."),
MAKE_ERROR(tecBAD_PROOF, "Proof cannot be verified"),
MAKE_ERROR(tecNO_SPONSOR_PERMISSION, "Sponsor has not authorized this transaction."),
MAKE_ERROR(tecOUT_OF_GAS, "The WASM code ran out of gas during execution."),
MAKE_ERROR(tecBYTECODE_REJECTED, "The custom WASM code that was run rejected your transaction."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefALREADY, "The exact transaction was already in this ledger."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefBAD_ADD_AUTH, "Not authorized to add account."),
@@ -133,6 +135,8 @@ transResults()
MAKE_ERROR(tefINVALID_LEDGER_FIX_TYPE, "The LedgerFixType field has an invalid value."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefNO_DST_PARTIAL, "Partial payment to create account not allowed."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefBAD_PATH_COUNT, "Malformed: Too many paths."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefNO_BYTECODE, "There is no WASM code to run, but a WASM-specific field was included."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefBYTECODE_NOT_INCLUDED, "WASM code requires a field that was not included."),
MAKE_ERROR(telLOCAL_ERROR, "Local failure."),
MAKE_ERROR(telBAD_DOMAIN, "Domain too long."),
@@ -204,6 +208,8 @@ transResults()
MAKE_ERROR(temBAD_TRANSFER_FEE, "Malformed: Transfer fee is outside valid range."),
MAKE_ERROR(temINVALID_INNER_BATCH, "Malformed: Invalid inner batch transaction."),
MAKE_ERROR(temBAD_CIPHERTEXT, "Malformed: Invalid ciphertext."),
MAKE_ERROR(temINVALID_BYTECODE, "Malformed: Provided byte code is invalid."),
MAKE_ERROR(temTEMP_DISABLED, "The transaction requires logic that is currently temporarily disabled."),
MAKE_ERROR(terRETRY, "Retry transaction."),
MAKE_ERROR(terFUNDS_SPENT, "DEPRECATED."),

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/Serializer.h>
#include <xrpl/shamap/SHAMap.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <cstddef>
#include <optional>
#include <stdexcept>
@@ -40,11 +41,41 @@ depthMask(unsigned int depth)
return kMasks.entry[depth];
}
// The prefix of `key` at `depth`: the leading nibbles naming the subtree a node at that depth
// identifies, with the remainder of the key masked off.
static uint256
maskedToDepth(uint256 const& key, unsigned int depth)
{
return key & depthMask(depth);
}
// Whether `id` at `depth` is what `key` looks like once masked down to that depth, i.e.
// whether an ID with this depth and id names a subtree that `key` falls under.
static bool
isPrefixOfAtDepth(uint256 const& id, unsigned int depth, uint256 const& key)
{
return maskedToDepth(key, depth) == id;
}
// canonicalize the hash to a node ID for this depth
SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID(unsigned int depth, uint256 const& hash) : id_(hash), depth_(depth)
{
XRPL_ASSERT(
depth <= SHAMap::kLeafDepth, "xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID : maximum depth input");
// Every SHAMapNodeID's depth is stored here, so this is the one place that can stop an
// out-of-range one from being kept: a depth past kLeafDepth would go on to index depthMask
// out of bounds, and getRawString would narrow it to a byte, silently renaming the node.
// Clamp rather than throw, since node IDs are built from peer-supplied depths on the ledger
// data path, where no caller catches an exception before it reaches a thread boundary.
if (depth_ > SHAMap::kLeafDepth)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
UNREACHABLE("xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID : depth within tree");
depth_ = SHAMap::kLeafDepth;
id_ = maskedToDepth(id_, depth_);
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
// Reads the clamped member rather than the depth argument, so it cannot index depthMask past
// its last entry even once the clamp above has reported the bad input and carried on.
XRPL_ASSERT(
isPrefixOf(id_), "xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::SHAMapNodeID : hash and depth inputs do match");
}
@@ -89,7 +120,7 @@ SHAMapNodeID::getChildNodeID(unsigned int branch) const
bool
SHAMapNodeID::isPrefixOf(uint256 const& key) const
{
return (key & depthMask(depth_)) == id_;
return isPrefixOfAtDepth(id_, depth_, key);
}
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<SHAMapNodeID>
@@ -102,9 +133,9 @@ deserializeSHAMapNodeID(void const* data, std::size_t size)
unsigned int const depth = *(static_cast<unsigned char const*>(data) + 32);
if (depth <= SHAMap::kLeafDepth)
{
auto const id = uint256::fromVoid(data);
if (id == (id & depthMask(depth)))
// Reject a serialized ID carrying bits below its own depth. Checked before
// constructing, since the constructor asserts that same property.
if (auto const id = uint256::fromVoid(data); isPrefixOfAtDepth(id, depth, id))
ret.emplace(depth, id);
}
}
@@ -115,7 +146,11 @@ deserializeSHAMapNodeID(void const* data, std::size_t size)
[[nodiscard]] unsigned int
selectBranch(SHAMapNodeID const& id, uint256 const& hash)
{
auto const depth = id.getDepth();
XRPL_ASSERT(id.getDepth() < SHAMap::kLeafDepth, "xrpl::selectBranch : depth below leaf depth");
// A depth-64 ID has no nibble left to select. Callers must not ask, but clamp anyway to keep
// the read below the end of the 32-byte key.
auto const depth = std::min(id.getDepth(), SHAMap::kLeafDepth - 1u);
auto branch = static_cast<unsigned int>(*(hash.begin() + (depth / 2)));
if ((depth & 1) != 0u)
@@ -134,8 +169,18 @@ selectBranch(SHAMapNodeID const& id, uint256 const& hash)
SHAMapNodeID
SHAMapNodeID::createID(unsigned int depth, uint256 const& key)
{
XRPL_ASSERT(depth <= SHAMap::kLeafDepth, "xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::createID : valid depth");
return SHAMapNodeID(depth, key & depthMask(depth));
// The mask is chosen here, before the constructor runs, so the clamp there cannot cover this
// call: an out-of-range depth would index depthMask's table while still evaluating this
// argument. A public factory has to hold its own bound.
if (depth > SHAMap::kLeafDepth)
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
UNREACHABLE("xrpl::SHAMapNodeID::createID : depth within tree");
depth = SHAMap::kLeafDepth;
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
return SHAMapNodeID(depth, maskedToDepth(key, depth));
}
} // namespace xrpl

View File

@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ removeExpiredNFTokenOffers(
}
static void
removeDeletedCredentials(ApplyView& view, std::vector<uint256> const& creds, beast::Journal viewJ)
removeExpiredCredentials(ApplyView& view, std::vector<uint256> const& creds, beast::Journal viewJ)
{
for (auto const& index : creds)
{
@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ removeDeletedCredentials(ApplyView& view, std::vector<uint256> const& creds, bea
if (auto const ter = credentials::deleteSLE(view, sle, viewJ); !isTesSuccess(ter))
{
JLOG(viewJ.error())
<< "removeDeletedCredentials: failed to delete credential. Err: "
<< "removeExpiredCredentials: failed to delete expired credential. Err: "
<< transToken(ter);
}
}
@@ -1437,8 +1437,7 @@ Transactor::processPersistentChanges(TER result, XRPAmount fee)
// should be used, making it possible to do more useful work
// when transactions fail with a `tec` code.
auto typesForResult = [credentialCleanup =
view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0)](TER const ter) {
auto typesForResult = [](TER const ter) {
std::unordered_set<LedgerEntryType> types;
if ((ter == tecOVERSIZE) || (ter == tecKILLED))
{
@@ -1447,11 +1446,6 @@ Transactor::processPersistentChanges(TER result, XRPAmount fee)
else if (ter == tecINCOMPLETE)
{
types.insert(ltRIPPLE_STATE);
// A bounded pseudo-account credential cleanup (VaultDelete /
// LoanBrokerDelete) persists its partial credential deletions so a
// later transaction can resume.
if (credentialCleanup)
types.insert(ltCREDENTIAL);
}
else if (ter == tecEXPIRED)
{
@@ -1529,7 +1523,7 @@ Transactor::processPersistentChanges(TER result, XRPAmount fee)
removeDeletedTrustLines(view(), ids, viewJ);
break;
case ltCREDENTIAL:
removeDeletedCredentials(view(), ids, viewJ);
removeExpiredCredentials(view(), ids, viewJ);
break;
// LCOV_EXCL_START
default:

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <xrpl/core/ServiceRegistry.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/OpenView.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
@@ -23,13 +24,38 @@
namespace xrpl {
// These are the same flags defined as HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE1-4 in
// HashRouter.h
// This file owns HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE1-4 and PRIVATE7-8 in HashRouter.h.
// These are the first four; the other two are below.
constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSigbad = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE1; // Signature is bad
constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSiggood = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE2; // Signature is good
constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfLocalbad = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE3; // Local checks failed
constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfLocalgood = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE4; // Local checks passed
// Before fixCleanup3_4_0, a signature in an alternate role field, such as
// sfSponsorSignature, covered the same bytes as the top level signature. Which
// bytes a role signature must cover therefore depends on whether the fix is
// enabled, but the four flags above record only the verdict, not the rules that
// produced it. A verdict reached under one prefix would otherwise be reused
// under the other.
//
// The two flags below hold the verdict for the pre-fix prefixes, so the pre-fix
// and post-fix verdicts occupy separate slots and neither is ever read in the
// other's era. Nothing is cleared when the amendment activates: setFlags only
// sets bits, so a stale pre-fix verdict simply stops being read and ages out
// with the rest of the routing table.
//
// This is not one switchover at a single instant. The era is chosen per call
// from the rules passed in, and callers do not agree on the rules: relay and
// submit verify against the validated rules, which lag the open ledger rules
// that preflight2 verifies against. At the amendment's flag ledger the same
// transaction can therefore be checked under both prefixes, on the same node,
// at the same time.
//
// Remove these two flags, and oldPrefixSig below, when Cleanup3_4_0 is retired
// in features.macro.
constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSigbadOldPrefix = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE7;
constexpr HashRouterFlags kSfSiggoodOldPrefix = HashRouterFlags::PRIVATE8;
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::pair<Validity, std::string>
@@ -48,21 +74,41 @@ checkValidity(HashRouter& router, STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules)
return {Validity::SigBad, "Batch inner transactions are never considered validly signed."};
}
if (any(flags & kSfSigbad))
// Pick the cache slot for this call's era; see kSfSiggoodOldPrefix above.
// Only a transaction that carries a role signature, and only while the fix
// is disabled, uses the separate slot. Every other transaction, and every
// transaction once the fix is enabled, uses the ordinary flags and verifies
// exactly once, so there is no steady state cost.
//
// Both directions matter. A good verdict from before the fix must not let a
// signature moved between roles survive the amendment, and a bad verdict
// from before the fix must not condemn a transaction that the new prefixes
// accept.
//
// Whether a transaction carries a role signature is fixed for its ID: the
// fields are kNotSigning, so they are excluded from the signed bytes, but
// they are still covered by the transaction ID. Repeat calls for one ID
// therefore always agree on which slot pair to use.
bool const oldPrefixSig = !rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) &&
(tx.isFieldPresent(sfSponsorSignature) || tx.isFieldPresent(sfCounterpartySignature));
auto const sigbadFlag = oldPrefixSig ? kSfSigbadOldPrefix : kSfSigbad;
auto const siggoodFlag = oldPrefixSig ? kSfSiggoodOldPrefix : kSfSiggood;
if (any(flags & sigbadFlag))
{
// Signature is known bad
return {Validity::SigBad, "Transaction has bad signature."};
}
if (!any(flags & kSfSiggood))
if (!any(flags & siggoodFlag))
{
auto const sigVerify = tx.checkSign(rules);
if (!sigVerify)
{
router.setFlags(id, kSfSigbad);
router.setFlags(id, sigbadFlag);
return {Validity::SigBad, sigVerify.error()};
}
router.setFlags(id, kSfSiggood);
router.setFlags(id, siggoodFlag);
}
// Signature is now known good
@@ -94,6 +140,19 @@ checkValidity(HashRouter& router, STTx const& tx, Rules const& rules)
void
forceValidity(HashRouter& router, uint256 const& txid, Validity validity)
{
// Callers reach here when they deliberately skip signature verification,
// such as a cluster peer that trusts its neighbor's checks, or a
// configuration that turns signature checks off. Nothing was verified, so
// there is no prefix era to record. Mark both of checkValidity's signature
// slots good: otherwise the forced verdict is ignored for a role-signature
// transaction until fixCleanup3_4_0 is enabled, and the signature the
// caller meant to skip gets verified after all. Marking both cannot leak a
// verdict across eras, because no verdict was reached, and this is the only
// place the distinction can be recorded: kSfSiggood alone does not say
// whether checkValidity verified a post-fix signature or a caller forced
// the result. An already cached bad verdict still wins, since checkValidity
// tests its bad flag first. Drop kSfSiggoodOldPrefix when Cleanup3_4_0 is
// retired.
HashRouterFlags flags = HashRouterFlags::UNDEFINED;
switch (validity)
{
@@ -101,7 +160,7 @@ forceValidity(HashRouter& router, uint256 const& txid, Validity validity)
flags |= kSfLocalgood;
[[fallthrough]];
case Validity::SigGoodOnly:
flags |= kSfSiggood;
flags |= kSfSiggood | kSfSiggoodOldPrefix;
[[fallthrough]];
case Validity::SigBad:
// would be silly to call directly

View File

@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ XRPNotCreated::visitEntry(bool isDelete, SLE::const_ref before, SLE::const_ref a
drops_ -= (*before)[sfBalance].xrp().drops();
break;
case ltPAYCHAN:
drops_ -= ((*before)[sfAmount] - (*before)[sfBalance]).xrp().drops();
if (isXRP((*before)[sfAmount]))
drops_ -= ((*before)[sfAmount] - (*before)[sfBalance]).xrp().drops();
break;
case ltESCROW:
if (isXRP((*before)[sfAmount]))
@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ XRPNotCreated::visitEntry(bool isDelete, SLE::const_ref before, SLE::const_ref a
drops_ += (*after)[sfBalance].xrp().drops();
break;
case ltPAYCHAN:
if (!isDelete)
if (!isDelete && isXRP((*after)[sfAmount]))
drops_ += ((*after)[sfAmount] - (*after)[sfBalance]).xrp().drops();
break;
case ltESCROW:

View File

@@ -234,14 +234,6 @@ ValidMPTIssuance::finalize(
if (hasPrivilege(tx, Privilege::DestroyMptIssuance))
{
// A VaultDelete that is still cleaning up credentials pinned to its
// pseudo-account returns tecINCOMPLETE and has not yet reached the
// share issuance. Don't require the issuance to be removed until
// the deletion completes (a later transaction).
if (rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) && txnType == ttVAULT_DELETE &&
result == tecINCOMPLETE)
return mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0 && mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0;
if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
@@ -388,6 +380,12 @@ ValidMPTIssuance::finalize(
return true;
}
// A token paychan claim may auto-create the destination's MPToken.
if (rules.enabled(featureTokenPaychan) && txnType == ttPAYCHAN_CLAIM &&
mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0 && mptokensDeleted_ == 0 &&
mptokensCreated_ <= 1)
return true;
if (hasPrivilege(tx, Privilege::MayDeleteMpt) &&
((txnType == ttAMM_DELETE && mptokensDeleted_ <= 2) || mptokensDeleted_ == 1) &&
mptokensCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0)

View File

@@ -1129,9 +1129,7 @@ ValidVault::finalize(
// only. If the receiver's trust line sits at a coarser scale, the inflow
// may safely round down to zero.
//
// XRP and MPT remain strict. Because they are integer-exact, a zero
// destination delta indicates a true accounting bug, not a rounding
// artifact.
// XRP and MPT remain strict for rounding artifacts.
bool const tolerateZeroDelta =
view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && !vaultAsset.integral();
auto const invalidBalanceChange = tolerateZeroDelta

View File

@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ AMMClawback::applyGuts(Sandbox& sb)
0,
FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
WithdrawAll::Yes,
preFeeBalance_,
ctx_.journal);
@@ -345,6 +346,7 @@ AMMClawback::equalWithdrawMatchingOneAmount(
0,
FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
WithdrawAll::Yes,
preFeeBalance_,
ctx_.journal);
@@ -385,6 +387,7 @@ AMMClawback::equalWithdrawMatchingOneAmount(
0,
FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
WithdrawAll::No,
preFeeBalance_,
ctx_.journal);
@@ -406,6 +409,7 @@ AMMClawback::equalWithdrawMatchingOneAmount(
0,
FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve,
WithdrawAll::No,
preFeeBalance_,
ctx_.journal);

View File

@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ AMMWithdraw::withdraw(
tfee,
issuerFreezeHandling(),
AuthHandling::ZeroIfUnauthorized,
ReserveHandling::EnforceReserve,
isWithdrawAll(ctx_.tx),
preFeeBalance_,
j_);
@@ -548,6 +549,7 @@ AMMWithdraw::withdraw(
std::uint16_t tfee,
FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
AuthHandling authHandling,
ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
beast::Journal const& journal)
@@ -681,6 +683,14 @@ AMMWithdraw::withdraw(
});
if (assetNotExists)
{
// Intentionally ignore the reserve check for AMMClawback, so the
// holder can not avoid clawback by deleting the trustline/MPToken
// and keeping a low spendable balance. AMMClawback has a higher
// priority than the reserve check.
if (view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0) &&
reserveHandling == ReserveHandling::IgnoreReserve)
return tesSUCCESS;
auto sleAccount = view.peek(keylet::account(account));
if (!sleAccount)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -850,6 +860,7 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
tfee,
issuerFreezeHandling(),
AuthHandling::ZeroIfUnauthorized,
ReserveHandling::EnforceReserve,
isWithdrawAll(ctx_.tx),
preFeeBalance_,
ctx_.journal);
@@ -903,6 +914,7 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
std::uint16_t tfee,
FreezeHandling freezeHandling,
AuthHandling authHandling,
ReserveHandling reserveHandling,
WithdrawAll withdrawAll,
XRPAmount const& priorBalance,
beast::Journal const& journal)
@@ -926,6 +938,7 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
tfee,
freezeHandling,
authHandling,
reserveHandling,
WithdrawAll::Yes,
priorBalance,
journal);
@@ -962,6 +975,7 @@ AMMWithdraw::equalWithdrawTokens(
tfee,
freezeHandling,
authHandling,
reserveHandling,
withdrawAll,
priorBalance,
journal);

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <xrpl/ledger/Sandbox.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/DirectoryHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/OfferHelpers.h>
@@ -242,8 +243,31 @@ OfferCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
// is part of the domain
if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
{
if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, id, ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
{
auto const domainID = ctx.tx[sfDomainID];
auto const sleDomain = ctx.view.read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
if (!sleDomain)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// Domain owner is always considered in the domain, no credential check
// needed. For all other accounts, use validDomain which detects expired
// credentials. Suppress tecEXPIRED here so doApply can run and delete
// the expired credential SLEs from the ledger.
if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) != id)
{
// validDomain returns tecNO_AUTH when no matching credential is
// found. Map it to tecNO_PERMISSION to preserve existing behavior.
if (auto const err = credentials::validDomain(ctx.view, domainID, id);
!isTesSuccess(err) && err != tecEXPIRED)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
}
else
{
if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, id, ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
}
if (auto const ter = canTrade(ctx.view, saTakerPays.asset()); !isTesSuccess(ter))
@@ -1000,6 +1024,27 @@ OfferCreate::applyGuts(Sandbox& sb, Sandbox& sbCancel)
TER
OfferCreate::doApply()
{
// If a DomainID is present, verify the account is still in the domain and
// delete any expired credential SLEs. This must happen before the Sandboxes
// are created: if we return a tec error, the engine applies sbCancel (not
// sb) to rawView, so deletions made inside sb would be lost. Deletions made
// directly to ctx_.view() here are preserved regardless of which branch
// applyGuts takes.
if (ctx_.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID) && ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
{
auto const domainID = ctx_.tx[sfDomainID];
auto const sleDomain = ctx_.view().read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
if (!sleDomain)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) != accountID_)
{
if (auto const err = verifyValidDomain(ctx_.view(), accountID_, domainID, j_);
!isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
}
}
// This is the ledger view that we work against. Transactions are applied
// as we go on processing transactions.
Sandbox sb(&ctx_.view());

View File

@@ -5,15 +5,10 @@
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Concepts.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rate.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
@@ -34,60 +29,6 @@ EscrowCancel::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
static TER
escrowCancelPreclaimHelper(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& account,
STAmount const& amount);
template <>
TER
escrowCancelPreclaimHelper<Issue>(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& account,
STAmount const& amount)
{
AccountID const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tecINTERNAL
if (issuer == account)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the account is authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, amount.get<Issue>(), account); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
TER
escrowCancelPreclaimHelper<MPTIssue>(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& account,
STAmount const& amount)
{
AccountID const issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tecINTERNAL
if (issuer == account)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If the mpt does not exist, return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND
auto const issuanceKey = keylet::mptokenIssuance(amount.get<MPTIssue>().getMptID());
auto const sleIssuance = ctx.view.read(issuanceKey);
if (!sleIssuance)
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the account is
// authorized
auto const& mptIssue = amount.get<MPTIssue>();
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, mptIssue, account, AuthType::WeakAuth);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
EscrowCancel::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
@@ -106,7 +47,7 @@ EscrowCancel::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowCancelPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx, account, amount);
return escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx.view, account, amount, false);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
@@ -169,6 +110,12 @@ EscrowCancel::doApply()
auto const sle = ctx_.view().peek(keylet::account(account));
STAmount const amount = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount);
// The return can re-create a holding the owner deleted while the escrow
// was pending; the removed escrow must not be counted against its reserve.
bool const recycleReserve = ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
if (recycleReserve)
decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), sle, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
// Transfer amount back to the owner
if (isXRP(amount))
{
@@ -212,7 +159,8 @@ EscrowCancel::doApply()
}
}
decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), sle, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
if (!recycleReserve)
decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), sle, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
// Remove escrow from ledger
ctx_.view().erase(slep);

View File

@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/DirectoryHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/SponsorHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
@@ -18,6 +17,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Keylet.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
@@ -88,8 +88,13 @@ EscrowCreate::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
// Only require featureMPTokensV1 when the escrow amount is an MPT and
// fixCleanup3_2_0 is active; XRP/IOU escrows are unaffected by this gate.
if (ctx.rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && ctx.tx[sfAmount].holds<MPTIssue>())
return ctx.rules.enabled(featureMPTokensV1);
return true;
{
if (!ctx.rules.enabled(featureMPTokensV1))
return false;
}
return (!ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfBytecode) && !ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfData)) ||
ctx.rules.enabled(featureSmartEscrow);
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
@@ -179,162 +184,6 @@ EscrowCreate::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
static TER
escrowCreatePreclaimHelper(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& account,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount);
template <>
TER
escrowCreatePreclaimHelper<Issue>(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& account,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount)
{
auto const& issue = amount.get<Issue>();
AccountID const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tecNO_PERMISSION
if (issuer == account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the lsfAllowTrustLineLocking is not enabled, return tecNO_PERMISSION
auto const sleIssuer = ctx.view.read(keylet::account(issuer));
if (!sleIssuer)
return tecNO_ISSUER;
if (!sleIssuer->isFlag(lsfAllowTrustLineLocking))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the account does not have a trustline to the issuer, return tecNO_LINE
auto const sleRippleState = ctx.view.read(keylet::trustLine(account, issuer, issue.currency));
if (!sleRippleState)
return tecNO_LINE;
STAmount const balance = (*sleRippleState)[sfBalance];
// If balance is positive, issuer must have higher address than account
if (balance > beast::kZero && issuer < account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If balance is negative, issuer must have lower address than account
if (balance < beast::kZero && issuer > account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the account is authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, issue, account); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the destination is authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, issue, dest); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has frozen the account, return tecFROZEN
if (isFrozen(ctx.view, account, issue))
return tecFROZEN;
// If the issuer has frozen the destination, return tecFROZEN
if (isFrozen(ctx.view, dest, issue))
return tecFROZEN;
STAmount const spendableAmount = accountHolds(
ctx.view, account, issue.currency, issuer, FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze, ctx.j);
// If the balance is less than or equal to 0, return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount <= beast::kZero)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
// If the spendable amount is less than the amount, return
// tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount < amount)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
// If the amount is not addable to the balance, return tecPRECISION_LOSS
if (!canAdd(spendableAmount, amount))
return tecPRECISION_LOSS;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
TER
escrowCreatePreclaimHelper<MPTIssue>(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& account,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount)
{
AccountID const issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tecNO_PERMISSION
if (issuer == account)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the mpt does not exist, return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND
auto const issuanceKey = keylet::mptokenIssuance(amount.get<MPTIssue>().getMptID());
auto const sleIssuance = ctx.view.read(issuanceKey);
if (!sleIssuance)
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
// If the lsfMPTCanEscrow is not enabled, return tecNO_PERMISSION
if (!sleIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTCanEscrow))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// If the issuer is not the same as the issuer of the mpt, return
// tecNO_PERMISSION
if (sleIssuance->getAccountID(sfIssuer) != issuer)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
// If the account does not have the mpt, return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND
if (!ctx.view.exists(keylet::mptoken(issuanceKey.key, account)))
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the account is
// authorized
auto const& mptIssue = amount.get<MPTIssue>();
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, mptIssue, account, AuthType::WeakAuth);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the destination is
// authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, mptIssue, dest, AuthType::WeakAuth);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has frozen the account, return tecLOCKED
if (isFrozen(ctx.view, account, *sleIssuance))
return tecLOCKED;
// If the issuer has frozen the destination, return tecLOCKED
if (isFrozen(ctx.view, dest, *sleIssuance))
return tecLOCKED;
// If the mpt cannot be transferred, return tecNO_AUTH
if (auto const ter = canTransfer(ctx.view, mptIssue, account, dest); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
STAmount const spendableAmount = accountHolds(
ctx.view,
account,
amount.get<MPTIssue>(),
FreezeHandling::IgnoreFreeze,
AuthHandling::IgnoreAuth,
ctx.j);
// If the balance is less than or equal to 0, return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount <= beast::kZero)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
// If the spendable amount is less than the amount, return
// tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
if (spendableAmount < amount)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
EscrowCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
@@ -360,7 +209,7 @@ EscrowCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowCreatePreclaimHelper<T>(ctx, account, dest, amount);
return escrowLockPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx.view, account, dest, amount, ctx.j);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
@@ -369,54 +218,6 @@ EscrowCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
static TER
escrowLockApplyHelper(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& issuer,
AccountID const& sender,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal journal);
template <>
TER
escrowLockApplyHelper<Issue>(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& issuer,
AccountID const& sender,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal journal)
{
// Defensive: Issuer cannot create an escrow
if (issuer == sender)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const ter =
directSendNoFee(view, sender, issuer, amount, !amount.holds<MPTIssue>(), journal);
if (!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
TER
escrowLockApplyHelper<MPTIssue>(
ApplyView& view,
AccountID const& issuer,
AccountID const& sender,
STAmount const& amount,
beast::Journal journal)
{
// Defensive: Issuer cannot create an escrow
if (issuer == sender)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const ter = lockEscrowMPT(view, sender, amount, journal);
if (!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
EscrowCreate::doApply()
{

View File

@@ -12,15 +12,10 @@
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/MPTokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Concepts.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rate.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
@@ -65,7 +60,13 @@ checkCondition(Slice f, Slice c)
bool
EscrowFinish::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
return !ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfCredentialIDs) || ctx.rules.enabled(featureCredentials);
if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfCredentialIDs) && !ctx.rules.enabled(featureCredentials))
return false;
if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfGas) && !ctx.rules.enabled(featureSmartEscrow))
return false;
return true;
}
NotTEC
@@ -130,68 +131,6 @@ EscrowFinish::calculateBaseFee(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
return Transactor::calculateBaseFee(view, tx) + extraFee;
}
template <ValidIssueType T>
static TER
escrowFinishPreclaimHelper(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount);
template <>
TER
escrowFinishPreclaimHelper<Issue>(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount)
{
AccountID const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the account, return tesSUCCESS
if (issuer == dest)
return tesSUCCESS;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the destination is authorized
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, amount.get<Issue>(), dest); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has deep frozen the destination, return tecFROZEN
if (isDeepFrozen(ctx.view, dest, amount.get<Issue>().currency, amount.getIssuer()))
return tecFROZEN;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
template <>
TER
escrowFinishPreclaimHelper<MPTIssue>(
PreclaimContext const& ctx,
AccountID const& dest,
STAmount const& amount)
{
AccountID const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
// If the issuer is the same as the dest, return tesSUCCESS
if (issuer == dest)
return tesSUCCESS;
// If the mpt does not exist, return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND
auto const issuanceKey = keylet::mptokenIssuance(amount.get<MPTIssue>().getMptID());
auto const sleIssuance = ctx.view.read(issuanceKey);
if (!sleIssuance)
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
// If the issuer has requireAuth set, check if the destination is
// authorized
auto const& mptIssue = amount.get<MPTIssue>();
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, mptIssue, dest, AuthType::WeakAuth);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
// If the issuer has frozen the destination, return tecLOCKED
if (isFrozen(ctx.view, dest, *sleIssuance))
return tecLOCKED;
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
EscrowFinish::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
@@ -217,7 +156,7 @@ EscrowFinish::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowFinishPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx, dest, amount);
return escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx.view, dest, amount);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
@@ -343,14 +282,12 @@ EscrowFinish::doApply()
}
}
// With the Sponsor amendment, release the escrow reserve before delivery.
// Token delivery can auto-create a destination holding, and the same
// sponsor (or the same account, for a self-escrow) may cover both the
// escrow being removed and the holding being created. Without the
// amendment, keep the legacy order: releasing early changes the reserve
// arithmetic for self-escrows and would break consensus if not gated.
bool const sponsorEnabled = ctx_.view().rules().enabled(featureSponsor);
if (sponsorEnabled)
// Delivery can auto-create the destination's holding; the removed escrow
// must not be counted against its reserve. The two share a reserve payer
// for a self-escrow, or when one sponsor covers both.
bool const recycleReserve =
ctx_.view().rules().enabled(featureSponsor) || ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0);
if (recycleReserve)
decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), account, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
STAmount const amount = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount);
@@ -402,8 +339,7 @@ EscrowFinish::doApply()
ctx_.view().update(sled);
// Adjust source owner count (legacy position, pre-Sponsor)
if (!sponsorEnabled)
if (!recycleReserve)
decreaseOwnerCountForObject(ctx_.view(), account, slep, 1, ctx_.journal);
// Remove escrow from ledger

View File

@@ -4,13 +4,11 @@
#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/LendingHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Asset.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
@@ -142,19 +140,6 @@ LoanBrokerDelete::doApply()
auto const brokerPseudoID = broker->at(sfAccount);
// Remove any credentials pinned to the broker pseudo-account before anything
// else. They would otherwise keep its owner directory alive and block
// deletion with tecHAS_OBLIGATIONS. Doing it first means a bounded,
// tecINCOMPLETE cleanup can be resumed by a later transaction without having
// already torn down the broker.
if (view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
{
if (auto const ter = credentials::deletePseudoAccountCredentials(
view(), brokerPseudoID, kMaxDeletablePseudoAccountCredentials, j_);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
}
if (!view().dirRemove(
keylet::ownerDir(accountID_), broker->at(sfOwnerNode), broker->key(), false))
{

View File

@@ -458,11 +458,41 @@ Payment::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
{
if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
{
auto const domainID = ctx.tx[sfDomainID];
auto const sleDomain = ctx.view.read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
if (!sleDomain)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfDestination], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
// Domain owner is always considered in the domain. For other accounts,
// suppress tecEXPIRED so doApply can run and delete expired credential
// SLEs from the ledger.
auto const checkAccount = [&](AccountID const& acct) -> TER {
if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) == acct)
return tesSUCCESS;
// validDomain returns tecNO_AUTH when no matching credential is
// found. Map it to tecNO_PERMISSION to preserve existing behavior.
if (auto const err = credentials::validDomain(ctx.view, domainID, acct);
!isTesSuccess(err) && err != tecEXPIRED)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tesSUCCESS;
};
if (auto const err = checkAccount(ctx.tx[sfAccount]); !isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
if (auto const err = checkAccount(ctx.tx[sfDestination]); !isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
}
else
{
if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
if (!permissioned_dex::accountInDomain(
ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfDestination], ctx.tx[sfDomainID]))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
}
return tesSUCCESS;
@@ -471,6 +501,31 @@ Payment::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
TER
Payment::doApply()
{
// If a DomainID is present, verify both sender and destination are still in
// the domain and delete any expired credential SLEs from the ledger.
if (ctx_.tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID) && ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_4_0))
{
auto const domainID = ctx_.tx[sfDomainID];
auto const sleDomain = ctx_.view().read(keylet::permissionedDomain(domainID));
if (!sleDomain)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const cleanupFor = [&](AccountID const& acct) -> TER {
if (sleDomain->getAccountID(sfOwner) == acct)
return tesSUCCESS;
return verifyValidDomain(ctx_.view(), acct, domainID, j_);
};
auto const destination = ctx_.tx[sfDestination];
auto const senderErr = cleanupFor(accountID_);
auto const destinationErr = accountID_ == destination ? senderErr : cleanupFor(destination);
if (!isTesSuccess(senderErr))
return senderErr;
if (!isTesSuccess(destinationErr))
return destinationErr;
}
auto const deliverMin = ctx_.tx[~sfDeliverMin];
// Ripple if source or destination is non-native or if there are paths.

View File

@@ -4,14 +4,17 @@
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/PaymentChannelHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Concepts.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Keylet.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PayChan.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rate.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
@@ -24,6 +27,7 @@
#include <cstdint>
#include <optional>
#include <variant>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -46,11 +50,19 @@ PaymentChannelClaim::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
return temMALFORMED;
auto const bal = ctx.tx[~sfBalance];
if (bal && (!isXRP(*bal) || *bal <= beast::kZero))
if (bal && *bal <= beast::kZero)
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
auto const amt = ctx.tx[~sfAmount];
if (amt && (!isXRP(*amt) || *amt <= beast::kZero))
if (amt && *amt <= beast::kZero)
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
if (((bal && !isXRP(*bal)) || (amt && !isXRP(*amt))) && !ctx.rules.enabled(featureTokenPaychan))
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
// Both bal and amt must reference the same asset before comparing,
// otherwise STAmount comparison throws.
if (bal && amt && bal->asset() != amt->asset())
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
if (bal && amt && *bal > *amt)
@@ -70,8 +82,8 @@ PaymentChannelClaim::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
// The signature isn't needed if txAccount == src, but if it's
// present, check it
auto const reqBalance = bal->xrp();
auto const authAmt = amt ? amt->xrp() : reqBalance;
auto const reqBalance = *bal;
auto const authAmt = amt ? *amt : reqBalance;
if (reqBalance > authAmt)
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
@@ -96,12 +108,45 @@ PaymentChannelClaim::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
TER
PaymentChannelClaim::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
if (!ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureCredentials))
return Transactor::preclaim(ctx);
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureCredentials))
{
if (auto const err = credentials::valid(ctx.tx, ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.j);
!isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
}
if (auto const err = credentials::valid(ctx.tx, ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.j);
!isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureTokenPaychan))
{
Keylet const k{ltPAYCHAN, ctx.tx[sfChannel]};
auto const slep = ctx.view.read(k);
if (!slep)
return tecNO_TARGET;
AccountID const dest = (*slep)[sfDestination];
auto const& chanFunds = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount);
if (auto const bal = ctx.tx[~sfBalance])
{
// The requested balance (and optional amount) must match the
// channel's asset; otherwise STAmount comparisons/subtractions
// in doApply would throw on mismatched issues.
if (bal->asset() != chanFunds.asset())
return tecWRONG_ASSET;
if (auto const amt = ctx.tx[~sfAmount]; amt && amt->asset() != chanFunds.asset())
return tecWRONG_ASSET;
}
if (!isXRP(chanFunds) && ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfBalance))
{
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowUnlockPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx.view, dest, chanFunds);
},
chanFunds.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -116,25 +161,35 @@ PaymentChannelClaim::doApply()
AccountID const src = (*slep)[sfAccount];
AccountID const dst = (*slep)[sfDestination];
AccountID const txAccount = ctx_.tx[sfAccount];
auto const curExpiration = (*slep)[~sfExpiration];
if (isChannelExpired(ctx_.view(), (*slep)[~sfCancelAfter]) ||
isChannelExpired(ctx_.view(), curExpiration))
{
return closeChannel(slep, ctx_.view(), k.key, ctx_.registry.get().getJournal("View"));
return closeChannel(
slep,
ctx_.getApplyViewContext(),
k.key,
accountID_,
ctx_.registry.get().getJournal("View"));
}
if (txAccount != src && txAccount != dst)
if (accountID_ != src && accountID_ != dst)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
if (ctx_.tx[~sfBalance])
{
auto const chanBalance = slep->getFieldAmount(sfBalance).xrp();
auto const chanFunds = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount).xrp();
auto const reqBalance = ctx_.tx[sfBalance].xrp();
auto const chanBalance = slep->getFieldAmount(sfBalance);
auto const chanFunds = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount);
auto const reqBalance = ctx_.tx[sfBalance];
if (txAccount == dst && !ctx_.tx[~sfSignature])
// Asset consistency between the requested balance/amount and the
// channel was validated in preclaim.
XRPL_ASSERT(
reqBalance.asset() == chanFunds.asset(),
"xrpl::PaymentChannelClaim::doApply : balance matches channel asset");
if (accountID_ == dst && !ctx_.tx[~sfSignature])
{
return ctx_.view().rules().enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) ? TER{tecNO_PERMISSION}
: TER{temBAD_SIGNATURE};
@@ -164,22 +219,56 @@ PaymentChannelClaim::doApply()
return tecNO_DST;
if (auto err =
verifyDepositPreauth(ctx_.tx, ctx_.view(), txAccount, dst, sled, ctx_.journal);
verifyDepositPreauth(ctx_.tx, ctx_.view(), accountID_, dst, sled, ctx_.journal);
!isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
(*slep)[sfBalance] = ctx_.tx[sfBalance];
XRPAmount const reqDelta = reqBalance - chanBalance;
STAmount const reqDelta = reqBalance - chanBalance;
XRPL_ASSERT(
reqDelta >= beast::kZero, "xrpl::PaymentChannelClaim::doApply : minimum balance delta");
(*sled)[sfBalance] = (*sled)[sfBalance] + reqDelta;
// Transfer amount to destination
if (isXRP(reqDelta))
{
(*sled)[sfBalance] = (*sled)[sfBalance] + reqDelta;
}
else
{
if (!ctx_.view().rules().enabled(featureTokenPaychan))
return temDISABLED;
Rate lockedRate = slep->isFieldPresent(sfTransferRate)
? xrpl::Rate(slep->getFieldU32(sfTransferRate))
: kParityRate;
auto const& issuer = reqDelta.getIssuer();
bool const createAsset = dst == accountID_;
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowUnlockApplyHelper<T>(
ctx_.getApplyViewContext(),
lockedRate,
sled,
preFeeBalance_,
reqDelta,
issuer,
src,
dst,
createAsset,
j_);
},
reqDelta.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
ctx_.view().update(sled);
ctx_.view().update(slep);
}
if (ctx_.tx.isFlag(tfRenew))
{
if (src != txAccount)
if (src != accountID_)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
(*slep)[~sfExpiration] = std::nullopt;
ctx_.view().update(slep);
@@ -188,8 +277,15 @@ PaymentChannelClaim::doApply()
if (ctx_.tx.isFlag(tfClose))
{
// Channel will close immediately if dry or the receiver closes
if (dst == txAccount || (*slep)[sfBalance] == (*slep)[sfAmount])
return closeChannel(slep, ctx_.view(), k.key, ctx_.registry.get().getJournal("View"));
if (dst == accountID_ || (*slep)[sfBalance] == (*slep)[sfAmount])
{
return closeChannel(
slep,
ctx_.getApplyViewContext(),
k.key,
accountID_,
ctx_.registry.get().getJournal("View"));
}
auto const settleExpiration = saturatingAdd(
ctx_.view().rules(),

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,25 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/payment_channel/PaymentChannelCreate.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/core/ServiceRegistry.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/DirectoryHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/PaymentChannelHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/SponsorHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/TokenHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Concepts.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Keylet.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rate.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
@@ -23,6 +30,7 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/applySteps.h>
#include <memory>
#include <variant>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -51,14 +59,40 @@ namespace xrpl {
TxConsequences
PaymentChannelCreate::makeTxConsequences(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
return TxConsequences{ctx.tx, ctx.tx[sfAmount].xrp()};
return TxConsequences{ctx.tx, isXRP(ctx.tx[sfAmount]) ? ctx.tx[sfAmount].xrp() : beast::kZero};
}
bool
PaymentChannelCreate::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
// Only require featureMPTokensV1 when the channel amount is an MPT and
// fixCleanup3_2_0 is active; XRP/IOU channels are unaffected by this gate.
if (ctx.rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && ctx.tx[sfAmount].holds<MPTIssue>())
return ctx.rules.enabled(featureMPTokensV1);
return true;
}
NotTEC
PaymentChannelCreate::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
if (!isXRP(ctx.tx[sfAmount]) || (ctx.tx[sfAmount] <= beast::kZero))
auto const amount = ctx.tx[sfAmount];
if (!isXRP(amount))
{
if (!ctx.rules.enabled(featureTokenPaychan))
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return payChanAmountPreflightHelper<T>(ctx.rules, amount);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
else if (amount <= beast::kZero)
{
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
}
if (ctx.tx[sfAccount] == ctx.tx[sfDestination])
return temDST_IS_SRC;
@@ -77,6 +111,8 @@ PaymentChannelCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (!sle)
return terNO_ACCOUNT;
auto const amount = ctx.tx[sfAmount];
// Check reserve and funds availability
if (!ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureSponsor))
{
@@ -86,15 +122,15 @@ PaymentChannelCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (balance < reserve)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE;
if (balance < reserve + ctx.tx[sfAmount])
if (isXRP(amount) && balance < reserve + ctx.tx[sfAmount])
return tecUNFUNDED;
}
auto const dst = ctx.tx[sfDestination];
auto const dest = ctx.tx[sfDestination];
{
// Check destination account
auto const sled = ctx.view.read(keylet::account(dst));
auto const sled = ctx.view.read(keylet::account(dest));
if (!sled)
return tecNO_DST;
@@ -115,6 +151,17 @@ PaymentChannelCreate::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
if (!isXRP(amount))
{
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowLockPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx.view, account, dest, amount, ctx.j);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -122,6 +169,7 @@ TER
PaymentChannelCreate::doApply()
{
auto const account = ctx_.tx[sfAccount];
auto const amount = ctx_.tx[sfAmount];
auto const sle = ctx_.view().peek(keylet::account(account));
if (!sle)
return tefINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -159,25 +207,28 @@ PaymentChannelCreate::doApply()
// - unsponsored: 1 — source owes reserve including the new increment.
auto const sourceReserve = accountReserve(
ctx_.view(), sle, j_, {.ownerCountDelta = getTxReserveSponsorID(ctx_.tx) ? 0 : 1});
if (preFeeBalance_ - ctx_.tx[sfAmount].xrp() < sourceReserve)
// Token channels lock no XRP, so only a native amount reduces the
// source's spendable balance.
auto const lockedXrp = isXRP(amount) ? amount.xrp() : XRPAmount{0};
if (preFeeBalance_ - lockedXrp < sourceReserve)
return tecUNFUNDED;
}
auto const dst = ctx_.tx[sfDestination];
auto const dest = ctx_.tx[sfDestination];
// Create PayChan in ledger.
//
// Note that we use the value from the sequence or ticket as the
// payChan sequence. For more explanation see comments in SeqProxy.h.
Keylet const payChanKeylet = keylet::payChannel(account, dst, ctx_.tx.getSeqProxy());
Keylet const payChanKeylet = keylet::payChannel(account, dest, ctx_.tx.getSeqProxy());
auto const slep = std::make_shared<SLE>(payChanKeylet);
// Funds held in this channel
(*slep)[sfAmount] = ctx_.tx[sfAmount];
(*slep)[sfAmount] = amount;
// Amount channel has already paid
(*slep)[sfBalance] = ctx_.tx[sfAmount].zeroed();
(*slep)[sfBalance] = amount.zeroed();
(*slep)[sfAccount] = account;
(*slep)[sfDestination] = dst;
(*slep)[sfDestination] = dest;
(*slep)[sfSettleDelay] = ctx_.tx[sfSettleDelay];
(*slep)[sfPublicKey] = ctx_.tx[sfPublicKey];
(*slep)[~sfCancelAfter] = ctx_.tx[~sfCancelAfter];
@@ -188,6 +239,13 @@ PaymentChannelCreate::doApply()
(*slep)[sfSequence] = ctx_.tx.getSeqProxy().value();
}
if (ctx_.view().rules().enabled(featureTokenPaychan) && !isXRP(amount))
{
auto const xferRate = transferRate(ctx_.view(), amount);
if (xferRate != kParityRate)
(*slep)[sfTransferRate] = xferRate.value;
}
ctx_.view().insert(slep);
// Add PayChan to owner directory
@@ -202,14 +260,39 @@ PaymentChannelCreate::doApply()
// Add PayChan to the recipient's owner directory
{
auto const page =
ctx_.view().dirInsert(keylet::ownerDir(dst), payChanKeylet, describeOwnerDir(dst));
ctx_.view().dirInsert(keylet::ownerDir(dest), payChanKeylet, describeOwnerDir(dest));
if (!page)
return tecDIR_FULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
(*slep)[sfDestinationNode] = *page;
}
// Add PayChan to the issuer's owner directory, if applicable
auto const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
if (!isXRP(amount) && issuer != accountID_ && issuer != dest && !amount.holds<MPTIssue>())
{
auto page = ctx_.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(issuer), payChanKeylet, describeOwnerDir(issuer));
if (!page)
return tecDIR_FULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
(*slep)[sfIssuerNode] = *page;
}
// Deduct owner's balance, increment owner count
(*sle)[sfBalance] = (*sle)[sfBalance] - ctx_.tx[sfAmount];
if (isXRP(amount))
{
(*sle)[sfBalance] = (*sle)[sfBalance] - amount;
}
else
{
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowLockApplyHelper<T>(ctx_.view(), issuer, accountID_, amount, j_);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
increaseOwnerCount(ctx_.getApplyViewContext(), sle, 1, ctx_.journal);
addSponsorToLedgerEntry(ctx_.getApplyViewContext(), slep);
ctx_.view().update(sle);

View File

@@ -2,15 +2,19 @@
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/EscrowHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/PaymentChannelHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Concepts.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Keylet.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
@@ -20,12 +24,25 @@
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/applySteps.h>
#include <memory>
#include <variant>
namespace xrpl {
TxConsequences
PaymentChannelFund::makeTxConsequences(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
return TxConsequences{ctx.tx, ctx.tx[sfAmount].xrp()};
return TxConsequences{ctx.tx, isXRP(ctx.tx[sfAmount]) ? ctx.tx[sfAmount].xrp() : beast::kZero};
}
bool
PaymentChannelFund::checkExtraFeatures(PreflightContext const& ctx)
{
// Only require featureMPTokensV1 when the funding amount is an MPT and
// fixCleanup3_2_0 is active; XRP/IOU channels are unaffected by this gate.
if (ctx.rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && ctx.tx[sfAmount].holds<MPTIssue>())
return ctx.rules.enabled(featureMPTokensV1);
return true;
}
NotTEC
@@ -34,8 +51,43 @@ PaymentChannelFund::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
if (ctx.rules.enabled(fixCleanup3_2_0) && ctx.tx[sfChannel] == beast::kZero)
return temMALFORMED;
if (!isXRP(ctx.tx[sfAmount]) || (ctx.tx[sfAmount] <= beast::kZero))
auto const amount = ctx.tx[sfAmount];
if (!isXRP(amount))
{
if (!ctx.rules.enabled(featureTokenPaychan))
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return payChanAmountPreflightHelper<T>(ctx.rules, amount);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
else if (amount <= beast::kZero)
{
return temBAD_AMOUNT;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
PaymentChannelFund::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(featureTokenPaychan))
{
Keylet const k{ltPAYCHAN, ctx.tx[sfChannel]};
auto const slep = ctx.view.read(k);
if (!slep)
return tecNO_ENTRY;
// The funded asset must match the channel's asset; otherwise the
// STAmount accumulation in doApply would throw on mismatched issues.
if (ctx.tx[sfAmount].asset() != (*slep)[sfAmount].asset())
return tecWRONG_ASSET;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -49,16 +101,21 @@ PaymentChannelFund::doApply()
return tecNO_ENTRY;
AccountID const src = (*slep)[sfAccount];
auto const txAccount = ctx_.tx[sfAccount];
AccountID const dst = (*slep)[sfDestination];
auto const curExpiration = (*slep)[~sfExpiration];
if (isChannelExpired(ctx_.view(), (*slep)[~sfCancelAfter]) ||
isChannelExpired(ctx_.view(), curExpiration))
{
return closeChannel(slep, ctx_.view(), k.key, ctx_.registry.get().getJournal("View"));
return closeChannel(
slep,
ctx_.getApplyViewContext(),
k.key,
accountID_,
ctx_.registry.get().getJournal("View"));
}
if (src != txAccount)
if (src != accountID_)
{
// only the owner can add funds or extend
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
@@ -82,10 +139,19 @@ PaymentChannelFund::doApply()
ctx_.view().update(slep);
}
auto const sle = ctx_.view().peek(keylet::account(txAccount));
auto const sle = ctx_.view().peek(keylet::account(accountID_));
if (!sle)
return tefINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const amount = ctx_.tx[sfAmount];
auto const& chanAmt = slep->getFieldAmount(sfAmount);
// Asset consistency between the funded amount and the channel was
// validated in preclaim.
XRPL_ASSERT(
amount.asset() == chanAmt.asset(),
"xrpl::PaymentChannelFund::doApply : amount matches channel asset");
{
// Check reserve and funds availability
STAmount const balance = (*sle)[sfBalance];
@@ -99,20 +165,56 @@ PaymentChannelFund::doApply()
// when a sponsor is present and would ignore the source's post-lock
// balance entirely. Funding an existing channel adds no owned object,
// so there is no owner-count delta.
if (balance < accountReserve(ctx_.view(), sle, j_) + ctx_.tx[sfAmount])
if (isXRP(amount) && balance < accountReserve(ctx_.view(), sle, j_) + amount)
return tecUNFUNDED;
}
// do not allow adding funds if dst does not exist
if (AccountID const dst = (*slep)[sfDestination]; !ctx_.view().read(keylet::account(dst)))
if (!ctx_.view().read(keylet::account(dst)))
{
return tecNO_DST;
}
(*slep)[sfAmount] = (*slep)[sfAmount] + ctx_.tx[sfAmount];
ctx_.view().update(slep);
if (!isXRP(amount))
{
// Funding is subject to the same issuer controls (locking opt-in,
// authorization, freeze/lock, transferability, spendable balance)
// as channel creation.
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowLockPreclaimHelper<T>(ctx_.view(), accountID_, dst, amount, j_);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
(*sle)[sfBalance] = (*sle)[sfBalance] - ctx_.tx[sfAmount];
// Guard the channel-amount accumulation itself: a small IOU amount
// added to a much larger channel amount would be rounded away below
// after the source had already been debited. MPT amounts are exact
// integers bounded by the outstanding supply, so only IOUs can lose
// precision here.
if (amount.holds<Issue>() && !canAdd(chanAmt, amount))
return tecPRECISION_LOSS;
}
if (isXRP(amount))
{
(*sle)[sfBalance] = (*sle)[sfBalance] - amount;
}
else
{
auto const& issuer = amount.getIssuer();
if (auto const ret = std::visit(
[&]<typename T>(T const&) {
return escrowLockApplyHelper<T>(ctx_.view(), issuer, accountID_, amount, j_);
},
amount.asset().value());
!isTesSuccess(ret))
return ret;
}
(*slep)[sfAmount] = chanAmt + amount;
ctx_.view().update(slep);
ctx_.view().update(sle);
return tesSUCCESS;

View File

@@ -123,6 +123,12 @@ Change::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfReserveIncrementDrops))
return temDISABLED;
}
// The ttFEE transaction format defines these fields as optional,
// but they are unconditionally forbidden until FeeVoteImpl is
// updated to populate them (SmartEscrow behavioral port).
if (ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfGasLimit) || ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfBytecodeSizeLimit) ||
ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfGasPrice))
return temDISABLED;
return tesSUCCESS;
case ttAMENDMENT:
case ttUNL_MODIFY:

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