Merge branch 'develop' into pratik/Fix_asan_boost_coroutine_issues

Signed-off-by: Pratik Mankawde <3397372+pratikmankawde@users.noreply.github.com>

.github/scripts/strategy-matrix/generate.py

@@ -32,13 +32,10 @@ We will further set additional CMake arguments as follows:
 """
 
 
-def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config, distro: str = "") -> list:
+def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config) -> list:
     configurations = []
-    os_entries = config.os
-    if distro:
-        os_entries = [o for o in os_entries if o["distro_name"] == distro]
     for architecture, os, build_type, cmake_args in itertools.product(
-        config.architecture, os_entries, config.build_type, config.cmake_args
+        config.architecture, config.os, config.build_type, config.cmake_args
     ):
         # The default CMake target is 'all' for Linux and MacOS and 'install'
         # for Windows, but it can get overridden for certain configurations.
@@ -226,7 +223,7 @@ def generate_strategy_matrix(all: bool, config: Config, distro: str = "") -> lis
         if (n := os["compiler_version"]) != "":
             config_name += f"-{n}"
         config_name += (
-            f"-{architecture['platform'][architecture['platform'].find('/') + 1 :]}"
+            f"-{architecture['platform'][architecture['platform'].find('/')+1:]}"
         )
         config_name += f"-{build_type.lower()}"
         if "-Dcoverage=ON" in cmake_args:
@@ -316,32 +313,21 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
         required=False,
         type=Path,
     )
-    parser.add_argument(
-        "-d",
-        "--distro",
-        help="Filter OS entries to only include those with this distro_name (e.g. 'debian', 'rhel', 'ubuntu').",
-        required=False,
-        type=str,
-        default="",
-    )
     args = parser.parse_args()
 
     matrix = []
     if args.config is None or args.config == "":
         matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
-            args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "linux.json"), args.distro
+            args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "linux.json")
         )
         matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
-            args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "macos.json"), args.distro
+            args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "macos.json")
         )
         matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
-            args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "windows.json"), args.distro
+            args.all, read_config(THIS_DIR / "windows.json")
         )
     else:
-        matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(
-            args.all, read_config(args.config), args.distro
-        )
+        matrix += generate_strategy_matrix(args.all, read_config(args.config))
 
     # Generate the strategy matrix.
     print(f"matrix={json.dumps({'include': matrix})}")
-    # print(json.dumps(matrix, indent=2))

.github/workflows/on-pr.yml

@@ -128,23 +128,12 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:
-        include:
-          - os: linux
-            distro: debian
-          - os: linux
-            distro: rhel
-          - os: linux
-            distro: ubuntu
-          - os: macos
-            distro: ""
-          - os: windows
-            distro: ""
+        os: [linux, macos, windows]
     with:
       # Enable ccache only for events targeting the XRPLF repository, since
       # other accounts will not have access to our remote cache storage.
       ccache_enabled: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' }}
       os: ${{ matrix.os }}
-      distro: ${{ matrix.distro }}
     secrets:
       CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
 

.github/workflows/on-trigger.yml

@@ -77,17 +77,7 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       fail-fast: ${{ github.event_name == 'merge_group' }}
       matrix:
-        include:
-          - os: linux
-            distro: debian
-          - os: linux
-            distro: rhel
-          - os: linux
-            distro: ubuntu
-          - os: macos
-            distro: ""
-          - os: windows
-            distro: ""
+        os: [linux, macos, windows]
     with:
       # Enable ccache only for events targeting the XRPLF repository, since
       # other accounts will not have access to our remote cache storage.
@@ -96,7 +86,6 @@ jobs:
       # not identical to a regular compilation.
       ccache_enabled: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'XRPLF' && !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/heads/release') }}
       os: ${{ matrix.os }}
-      distro: ${{ matrix.distro }}
       strategy_matrix: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && 'all' || 'minimal' }}
     secrets:
       CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ on:
 jobs:
   # Call the workflow in the XRPLF/actions repo that runs the pre-commit hooks.
   run-hooks:
-    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@56de1bdf19639e009639a50b8d17c28ca954f267
+    uses: XRPLF/actions/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml@320be44621ca2a080f05aeb15817c44b84518108
     with:
       runs_on: ubuntu-latest
       container: '{ "image": "ghcr.io/xrplf/ci/tools-rippled-pre-commit:sha-41ec7c1" }'

.github/workflows/reusable-build-test-config.yml

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ jobs:
     name: ${{ inputs.config_name }}
     runs-on: ${{ fromJSON(inputs.runs_on) }}
     container: ${{ inputs.image != '' && inputs.image || null }}
-    timeout-minutes: 60
+    timeout-minutes: ${{ inputs.sanitizers != '' && 360 || 60 }}
     env:
       # Use a namespace to keep the objects separate for each configuration.
       CCACHE_NAMESPACE: ${{ inputs.config_name }}
@@ -204,8 +204,14 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Set sanitizer options
         if: ${{ !inputs.build_only && env.SANITIZERS_ENABLED == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          CONFIG_NAME: ${{ inputs.config_name }}
         run: |
-          echo "ASAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:detect_container_overflow=0:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
+          ASAN_OPTS="halt_on_error=0:use_sigaltstack=0:print_stacktrace=1:detect_container_overflow=0:detect_stack_use_after_return=0:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp"
+          if [[ "${CONFIG_NAME}" == *gcc* ]]; then
+            ASAN_OPTS="${ASAN_OPTS}:alloc_dealloc_mismatch=0"
+          fi
+          echo "ASAN_OPTIONS=${ASAN_OPTS}" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
           echo "TSAN_OPTIONS=second_deadlock_stack=1:halt_on_error=0:suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/tsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
           echo "UBSAN_OPTIONS=suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/ubsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
           echo "LSAN_OPTIONS=suppressions=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/sanitizers/suppressions/lsan.supp" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}

.github/workflows/reusable-build-test.yml

@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@ on:
         type: string
         default: "minimal"
 
-      distro:
-        description: 'Filter to only include configs for this distro (e.g. "debian", "rhel", "ubuntu"). Leave empty for no filtering.'
-        required: false
-        type: string
-        default: ""
-
     secrets:
       CODECOV_TOKEN:
         description: "The Codecov token to use for uploading coverage reports."
@@ -44,11 +38,9 @@ jobs:
     with:
       os: ${{ inputs.os }}
       strategy_matrix: ${{ inputs.strategy_matrix }}
-      distro: ${{ inputs.distro }}
 
   # Build and test the binary for each configuration.
   build-test-config:
-    name: ${{ matrix.config_name }}
     needs:
       - generate-matrix
     uses: ./.github/workflows/reusable-build-test-config.yml

.github/workflows/reusable-strategy-matrix.yml

@@ -13,11 +13,6 @@ on:
         required: false
         type: string
         default: "minimal"
-      distro:
-        description: 'Filter to only include configs for this distro (e.g. "debian", "rhel", "ubuntu"). Leave empty for no filtering.'
-        required: false
-        type: string
-        default: ""
     outputs:
       matrix:
         description: "The generated strategy matrix."
@@ -47,5 +42,4 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GENERATE_CONFIG: ${{ inputs.os != '' && format('--config={0}.json', inputs.os) || '' }}
           GENERATE_OPTION: ${{ inputs.strategy_matrix == 'all' && '--all' || '' }}
-          GENERATE_DISTRO: ${{ inputs.distro != '' && format('--distro={0}', inputs.distro) || '' }}
-        run: ./generate.py ${GENERATE_OPTION} ${GENERATE_CONFIG} ${GENERATE_DISTRO} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
+        run: ./generate.py ${GENERATE_OPTION} ${GENERATE_CONFIG} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -61,15 +61,7 @@ repos:
     hooks:
       - id: nix-fmt
         name: Format Nix files
-        entry: |
-          bash -c '
-            if command -v nix &> /dev/null || [ "$GITHUB_ACTIONS" = "true" ]; then
-              nix --extra-experimental-features "nix-command flakes" fmt "$@"
-            else
-              echo "Skipping nix-fmt: nix not installed and not in GitHub Actions"
-              exit 0
-            fi
-          ' --
+        entry: nix --extra-experimental-features 'nix-command flakes' fmt
         language: system
         types:
           - nix

cmake/XrplConfig.cmake

@@ -17,12 +17,10 @@ find_dependency(Boost
                 chrono
                 container
                 context
-                coroutine
                 date_time
                 filesystem
                 program_options
                 regex
-                system
                 thread)
 #[=========================================================[
   OpenSSL

cmake/XrplInterface.cmake

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ target_compile_definitions(
               BOOST_FILESYSTEM_NO_DEPRECATED
               >
               $<$<NOT:$<BOOL:${boost_show_deprecated}>>:
-              BOOST_COROUTINES_NO_DEPRECATION_WARNING
+              BOOST_COROUTINES2_NO_DEPRECATION_WARNING
               BOOST_BEAST_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
               BOOST_FILESYSTEM_DEPRECATED
               >

cmake/deps/Boost.cmake

@@ -4,13 +4,12 @@ include(XrplSanitizers)
 find_package(Boost REQUIRED
              COMPONENTS chrono
                         container
-                        coroutine
+                        context
                         date_time
                         filesystem
                         json
                         program_options
                         regex
-                        system
                         thread)
 
 add_library(xrpl_boost INTERFACE)
@@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ target_link_libraries(
     INTERFACE Boost::headers
               Boost::chrono
               Boost::container
-              Boost::coroutine
+              Boost::context
               Boost::date_time
               Boost::filesystem
               Boost::json
@@ -32,14 +31,35 @@ target_link_libraries(
 if (Boost_COMPILER)
     target_link_libraries(xrpl_boost INTERFACE Boost::disable_autolinking)
 endif ()
-if (SANITIZERS_ENABLED AND is_clang)
-    # TODO: gcc does not support -fsanitize-blacklist...can we do something else for gcc ?
-    if (NOT Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS AND TARGET Boost::headers)
-        get_target_property(Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS Boost::headers INTERFACE_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES)
-    endif ()
-    message(STATUS "Adding [${Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS}] to sanitizer blacklist")
-    file(WRITE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/san_bl.txt "src:${Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS}/*")
-    target_compile_options(
-        opts INTERFACE # ignore boost headers for sanitizing
-                       -fsanitize-blacklist=${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/san_bl.txt)
+
+# GCC 14+ has a false positive -Wuninitialized warning in Boost.Coroutine2's
+# state.hpp when compiled with -O3. This is due to GCC's intentional behavior
+# change (Bug #98871, #119388) where warnings from inlined system header code
+# are no longer suppressed by -isystem. The warning occurs in operator|= in
+# boost/coroutine2/detail/state.hpp when inlined from push_control_block::destroy().
+# See: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=119388
+if (is_gcc AND CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_VERSION VERSION_GREATER_EQUAL 14)
+    target_compile_options(xrpl_boost INTERFACE -Wno-uninitialized)
 endif ()
+
+# Boost.Context's ucontext backend has ASAN fiber-switching annotations
+# (start/finish_switch_fiber) that are compiled in when BOOST_USE_ASAN is defined.
+# This tells ASAN about coroutine stack switches, preventing false positive
+# stack-use-after-scope errors. BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT ensures the ucontext backend
+# is selected (fcontext does not support ASAN annotations).
+# These defines must match what Boost was compiled with (see conan/profiles/sanitizers).
+if (enable_asan)
+    target_compile_definitions(xrpl_boost INTERFACE BOOST_USE_ASAN BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT)
+endif ()
+
+# if (SANITIZERS_ENABLED AND is_clang)
+#     # TODO: gcc does not support -fsanitize-blacklist...can we do something else for gcc ?
+#     if (NOT Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS AND TARGET Boost::headers)
+#         get_target_property(Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS Boost::headers INTERFACE_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES)
+#     endif ()
+#     message(STATUS "Adding [${Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS}] to sanitizer blacklist")
+#     file(WRITE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/san_bl.txt "src:${Boost_INCLUDE_DIRS}/*")
+#     target_compile_options(
+#         opts INTERFACE # ignore boost headers for sanitizing
+#                        -fsanitize-blacklist=${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/san_bl.txt)
+# endif ()

conan/profiles/sanitizers

@@ -7,16 +7,21 @@ include(default)
     {% if compiler == "gcc" %}
         {% if "address" in sanitizers or "thread" in sanitizers or "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
             {% set sanitizer_list = [] %}
+            {% set defines = [] %}
             {% set model_code = "" %}
             {% set extra_cxxflags = ["-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-O1", "-Wno-stringop-overflow"] %}
 
             {% if "address" in sanitizers %}
                 {% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("address") %}
                 {% set model_code = "-mcmodel=large" %}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_ASAN")%}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
             {% elif "thread" in sanitizers %}
                 {% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("thread") %}
                 {% set model_code = "-mcmodel=medium" %}
                 {% set _ = extra_cxxflags.append("-Wno-tsan") %}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_TSAN")%}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
             {% endif %}
 
             {% if "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
@@ -29,16 +34,22 @@ include(default)
             tools.build:cxxflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}} {{" ".join(extra_cxxflags)}}']
             tools.build:sharedlinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
             tools.build:exelinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
+            tools.build:defines+={{defines}}
         {% endif %}
     {% elif compiler == "apple-clang" or compiler == "clang" %}
         {% if "address" in sanitizers or "thread" in sanitizers or "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
             {% set sanitizer_list = [] %}
+            {% set defines = [] %}
             {% set extra_cxxflags = ["-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-O1"] %}
 
             {% if "address" in sanitizers %}
                 {% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("address") %}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_ASAN")%}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
             {% elif "thread" in sanitizers %}
                 {% set _ = sanitizer_list.append("thread") %}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_TSAN")%}
+                {% set _ = defines.append("BOOST_USE_UCONTEXT")%}
             {% endif %}
 
             {% if "undefinedbehavior" in sanitizers %}
@@ -52,8 +63,24 @@ include(default)
             tools.build:cxxflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}} {{" ".join(extra_cxxflags)}}']
             tools.build:sharedlinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
             tools.build:exelinkflags+=['{{sanitizer_flags}}']
+            tools.build:defines+={{defines}}
         {% endif %}
     {% endif %}
 {% endif %}
 
-tools.info.package_id:confs+=["tools.build:cxxflags", "tools.build:exelinkflags", "tools.build:sharedlinkflags"]
+tools.info.package_id:confs+=["tools.build:cxxflags", "tools.build:exelinkflags", "tools.build:sharedlinkflags", "tools.build:defines"]
+
+[options]
+{% if sanitizers %}
+    {% if "address" in sanitizers %}
+        # Build Boost.Context with ucontext backend (not fcontext) so that
+        # ASAN fiber-switching annotations (__sanitizer_start/finish_switch_fiber)
+        # are compiled into the library. fcontext (assembly) has no ASAN support.
+        # define=BOOST_USE_ASAN=1 is critical: it must be defined when building
+        # Boost.Context itself so the ucontext backend compiles in the ASAN annotations.
+        boost/*:extra_b2_flags=context-impl=ucontext address-sanitizer=on define=BOOST_USE_ASAN=1
+        boost/*:without_context=False
+        # Boost stacktrace fails to build with some sanitizers
+        boost/*:without_stacktrace=True
+    {% endif %}
+{% endif %}

conanfile.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import re
+import os
 
 from conan.tools.cmake import CMake, CMakeToolchain, cmake_layout
 
@@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
         "tests": False,
         "unity": False,
         "xrpld": False,
+        "boost/*:without_context": False,
+        "boost/*:without_coroutine": True,
+        "boost/*:without_coroutine2": False,
         "date/*:header_only": True,
         "ed25519/*:shared": False,
         "grpc/*:shared": False,
@@ -125,6 +129,14 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
             self.options["boost"].visibility = "global"
         if self.settings.compiler in ["clang", "gcc"]:
             self.options["boost"].without_cobalt = True
+        self.options["boost"].without_context = False
+        self.options["boost"].without_coroutine = True
+        self.options["boost"].without_coroutine2 = False
+        # Check if environment variable exists
+        if "SANITIZERS" in os.environ:
+            sanitizers = os.environ["SANITIZERS"]
+            if "address" in sanitizers.lower():
+                self.default_options["fPIC"] = False
 
     def requirements(self):
         # Conan 2 requires transitive headers to be specified
@@ -196,7 +208,8 @@ class Xrpl(ConanFile):
             "boost::headers",
             "boost::chrono",
             "boost::container",
-            "boost::coroutine",
+            "boost::context",
+            "boost::coroutine2",
             "boost::date_time",
             "boost::filesystem",
             "boost::json",

cspell.config.yaml

@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ words:
   - endmacro
   - exceptioned
   - Falco
+  - fcontext
   - finalizers
   - firewalled
   - fmtdur

include/xrpl/core/Coro.ipp

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
 #pragma once
 
-#include <xrpl/basics/ByteUtilities.h>
-
 namespace xrpl {
 
 template <class F>
@@ -11,16 +9,18 @@ JobQueue::Coro::Coro(Coro_create_t, JobQueue& jq, JobType type, std::string cons
     , name_(name)
     , running_(false)
     , coro_(
+          // Stack size of 1MB wasn't sufficient for deep calls. ASAN tests flagged the issue. Hence
+          // increasing the size to 1.5MB.
+          boost::context::protected_fixedsize_stack(1536 * 1024),
           [this, fn = std::forward<F>(f)](
-              boost::coroutines::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::push_type& do_yield) {
+              boost::coroutines2::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::push_type& do_yield) {
               yield_ = &do_yield;
               yield();
               fn(shared_from_this());
 #ifndef NDEBUG
               finished_ = true;
 #endif
-          },
-          boost::coroutines::attributes(megabytes(1)))
+          })
 {
 }
 

include/xrpl/core/JobQueue.h

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 #include <xrpl/core/detail/Workers.h>
 #include <xrpl/json/json_value.h>
 
-#include <boost/coroutine/all.hpp>
+#include <boost/context/protected_fixedsize_stack.hpp>
+#include <boost/coroutine2/all.hpp>
 
 #include <set>
 
@@ -48,8 +49,8 @@ public:
         std::mutex mutex_;
         std::mutex mutex_run_;
         std::condition_variable cv_;
-        boost::coroutines::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::pull_type coro_;
-        boost::coroutines::asymmetric_coroutine<void>::push_type* yield_;
+        boost::coroutines2::coroutine<void>::pull_type coro_;
+        boost::coroutines2::coroutine<void>::push_type* yield_;
 #ifndef NDEBUG
         bool finished_ = false;
 #endif

include/xrpl/tx/InvariantCheck.h

@@ -0,0 +1,732 @@
+#pragma once
+
+#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
+#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
+#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
+#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
+
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <tuple>
+#include <unordered_set>
+
+namespace xrpl {
+
+class ReadView;
+
+#if GENERATING_DOCS
+/**
+ * @brief Prototype for invariant check implementations.
+ *
+ * __THIS CLASS DOES NOT EXIST__ - or rather it exists in documentation only to
+ * communicate the interface required of any invariant checker. Any invariant
+ * check implementation should implement the public methods documented here.
+ *
+ */
+class InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
+{
+public:
+    explicit InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE() = default;
+
+    /**
+     * @brief called for each ledger entry in the current transaction.
+     *
+     * @param isDelete true if the SLE is being deleted
+     * @param before ledger entry before modification by the transaction
+     * @param after ledger entry after modification by the transaction
+     */
+    void
+    visitEntry(
+        bool isDelete,
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
+
+    /**
+     * @brief called after all ledger entries have been visited to determine
+     * the final status of the check
+     *
+     * @param tx the transaction being applied
+     * @param tec the current TER result of the transaction
+     * @param fee the fee actually charged for this transaction
+     * @param view a ReadView of the ledger being modified
+     * @param j journal for logging
+     *
+     * @return true if check passes, false if it fails
+     */
+    bool
+    finalize(
+        STTx const& tx,
+        TER const tec,
+        XRPAmount const fee,
+        ReadView const& view,
+        beast::Journal const& j);
+};
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: We should never charge a transaction a negative fee or a
+ * fee that is larger than what the transaction itself specifies.
+ *
+ * We can, in some circumstances, charge less.
+ */
+class TransactionFeeCheck
+{
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: A transaction must not create XRP and should only destroy
+ * the XRP fee.
+ *
+ * We iterate through all account roots, payment channels and escrow entries
+ * that were modified and calculate the net change in XRP caused by the
+ * transactions.
+ */
+class XRPNotCreated
+{
+    std::int64_t drops_ = 0;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: we cannot remove an account ledger entry
+ *
+ * We iterate all account roots that were modified, and ensure that any that
+ * were present before the transaction was applied continue to be present
+ * afterwards unless they were explicitly deleted by a successful
+ * AccountDelete transaction.
+ */
+class AccountRootsNotDeleted
+{
+    std::uint32_t accountsDeleted_ = 0;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: a deleted account must not have any objects left
+ *
+ * We iterate all deleted account roots, and ensure that there are no
+ * objects left that are directly accessible with that account's ID.
+ *
+ * There should only be one deleted account, but that's checked by
+ * AccountRootsNotDeleted. This invariant will handle multiple deleted account
+ * roots without a problem.
+ */
+class AccountRootsDeletedClean
+{
+    // Pair is <before, after>. Before is used for most of the checks, so that
+    // if, for example, an object ID field is cleared, but the object is not
+    // deleted, it can still be found. After is used specifically for any checks
+    // that are expected as part of the deletion, such as zeroing out the
+    // balance.
+    std::vector<std::pair<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>, std::shared_ptr<SLE const>>> accountsDeleted_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: An account XRP balance must be in XRP and take a value
+ *                   between 0 and INITIAL_XRP drops, inclusive.
+ *
+ * We iterate all account roots modified by the transaction and ensure that
+ * their XRP balances are reasonable.
+ */
+class XRPBalanceChecks
+{
+    bool bad_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: corresponding modified ledger entries should match in type
+ *                   and added entries should be a valid type.
+ */
+class LedgerEntryTypesMatch
+{
+    bool typeMismatch_ = false;
+    bool invalidTypeAdded_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: Trust lines using XRP are not allowed.
+ *
+ * We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
+ * that they are against a valid issuer.
+ */
+class NoXRPTrustLines
+{
+    bool xrpTrustLine_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: Trust lines with deep freeze flag are not allowed if normal
+ * freeze flag is not set.
+ *
+ * We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
+ * that they don't have deep freeze flag set without normal freeze flag set.
+ */
+class NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze
+{
+    bool deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: frozen trust line balance change is not allowed.
+ *
+ * We iterate all affected trust lines and ensure that they don't have
+ * unexpected change of balance if they're frozen.
+ */
+class TransfersNotFrozen
+{
+    struct BalanceChange
+    {
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const line;
+        int const balanceChangeSign;
+    };
+
+    struct IssuerChanges
+    {
+        std::vector<BalanceChange> senders;
+        std::vector<BalanceChange> receivers;
+    };
+
+    using ByIssuer = std::map<Issue, IssuerChanges>;
+    ByIssuer balanceChanges_;
+
+    std::map<AccountID, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const> possibleIssuers_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+
+private:
+    bool
+    isValidEntry(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
+
+    STAmount
+    calculateBalanceChange(
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
+        bool isDelete);
+
+    void
+    recordBalance(Issue const& issue, BalanceChange change);
+
+    void
+    recordBalanceChanges(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after, STAmount const& balanceChange);
+
+    std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
+    findIssuer(AccountID const& issuerID, ReadView const& view);
+
+    bool
+    validateIssuerChanges(
+        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuer,
+        IssuerChanges const& changes,
+        STTx const& tx,
+        beast::Journal const& j,
+        bool enforce);
+
+    bool
+    validateFrozenState(
+        BalanceChange const& change,
+        bool high,
+        STTx const& tx,
+        beast::Journal const& j,
+        bool enforce,
+        bool globalFreeze);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: offers should be for non-negative amounts and must not
+ *                   be XRP to XRP.
+ *
+ * Examine all offers modified by the transaction and ensure that there are
+ * no offers which contain negative amounts or which exchange XRP for XRP.
+ */
+class NoBadOffers
+{
+    bool bad_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: an escrow entry must take a value between 0 and
+ *                   INITIAL_XRP drops exclusive.
+ */
+class NoZeroEscrow
+{
+    bool bad_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: a new account root must be the consequence of a payment,
+ *                   must have the right starting sequence, and the payment
+ *                   may not create more than one new account root.
+ */
+class ValidNewAccountRoot
+{
+    std::uint32_t accountsCreated_ = 0;
+    std::uint32_t accountSeq_ = 0;
+    bool pseudoAccount_ = false;
+    std::uint32_t flags_ = 0;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: Validates several invariants for NFToken pages.
+ *
+ * The following checks are made:
+ *  - The page is correctly associated with the owner.
+ *  - The page is correctly ordered between the next and previous links.
+ *  - The page contains at least one and no more than 32 NFTokens.
+ *  - The NFTokens on this page do not belong on a lower or higher page.
+ *  - The NFTokens are correctly sorted on the page.
+ *  - Each URI, if present, is not empty.
+ */
+class ValidNFTokenPage
+{
+    bool badEntry_ = false;
+    bool badLink_ = false;
+    bool badSort_ = false;
+    bool badURI_ = false;
+    bool invalidSize_ = false;
+    bool deletedFinalPage_ = false;
+    bool deletedLink_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: Validates counts of NFTokens after all transaction types.
+ *
+ * The following checks are made:
+ *  - The number of minted or burned NFTokens can only be changed by
+ *    NFTokenMint or NFTokenBurn transactions.
+ *  - A successful NFTokenMint must increase the number of NFTokens.
+ *  - A failed NFTokenMint must not change the number of minted NFTokens.
+ *  - An NFTokenMint transaction cannot change the number of burned NFTokens.
+ *  - A successful NFTokenBurn must increase the number of burned NFTokens.
+ *  - A failed NFTokenBurn must not change the number of burned NFTokens.
+ *  - An NFTokenBurn transaction cannot change the number of minted NFTokens.
+ */
+class NFTokenCountTracking
+{
+    std::uint32_t beforeMintedTotal = 0;
+    std::uint32_t beforeBurnedTotal = 0;
+    std::uint32_t afterMintedTotal = 0;
+    std::uint32_t afterBurnedTotal = 0;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariant: Token holder's trustline balance cannot be negative after
+ * Clawback.
+ *
+ * We iterate all the trust lines affected by this transaction and ensure
+ * that no more than one trustline is modified, and also holder's balance is
+ * non-negative.
+ */
+class ValidClawback
+{
+    std::uint32_t trustlinesChanged = 0;
+    std::uint32_t mptokensChanged = 0;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+class ValidMPTIssuance
+{
+    std::uint32_t mptIssuancesCreated_ = 0;
+    std::uint32_t mptIssuancesDeleted_ = 0;
+
+    std::uint32_t mptokensCreated_ = 0;
+    std::uint32_t mptokensDeleted_ = 0;
+    // non-MPT transactions may attempt to create
+    // MPToken by an issuer
+    bool mptCreatedByIssuer_ = false;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariants: Permissioned Domains must have some rules and
+ * AcceptedCredentials must have length between 1 and 10 inclusive.
+ *
+ * Since only permissions constitute rules, an empty credentials list
+ * means that there are no rules and the invariant is violated.
+ *
+ * Credentials must be sorted and no duplicates allowed
+ *
+ */
+class ValidPermissionedDomain
+{
+    struct SleStatus
+    {
+        std::size_t credentialsSize_{0};
+        bool isSorted_ = false;
+        bool isUnique_ = false;
+        bool isDelete_ = false;
+    };
+    std::vector<SleStatus> sleStatus_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariants: Pseudo-accounts have valid and consistent properties
+ *
+ * Pseudo-accounts have certain properties, and some of those properties are
+ * unique to pseudo-accounts. Check that all pseudo-accounts are following the
+ * rules, and that only pseudo-accounts look like pseudo-accounts.
+ *
+ */
+class ValidPseudoAccounts
+{
+    std::vector<std::string> errors_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+class ValidPermissionedDEX
+{
+    bool regularOffers_ = false;
+    bool badHybrids_ = false;
+    hash_set<uint256> domains_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+class ValidAMM
+{
+    std::optional<AccountID> ammAccount_;
+    std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
+    std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceBefore_;
+    bool ammPoolChanged_;
+
+public:
+    enum class ZeroAllowed : bool { No = false, Yes = true };
+
+    ValidAMM() : ammPoolChanged_{false}
+    {
+    }
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+
+private:
+    bool
+    finalizeBid(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
+    bool
+    finalizeVote(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
+    bool
+    finalizeCreate(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
+    bool
+    finalizeDelete(bool enforce, TER res, beast::Journal const&) const;
+    bool
+    finalizeDeposit(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
+    // Includes clawback
+    bool
+    finalizeWithdraw(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
+    bool
+    finalizeDEX(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
+    bool
+    generalInvariant(STTx const&, ReadView const&, ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed, beast::Journal const&)
+        const;
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariants: Some fields are unmodifiable
+ *
+ * Check that any fields specified as unmodifiable are not modified when the
+ * object is modified. Creation and deletion are ignored.
+ *
+ */
+class NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields
+{
+    // Pair is <before, after>.
+    std::set<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> changedEntries_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariants: Loan brokers are internally consistent
+ *
+ * 1. If `LoanBroker.OwnerCount = 0` the `DirectoryNode` will have at most one
+ *    node (the root), which will only hold entries for `RippleState` or
+ * `MPToken` objects.
+ *
+ */
+class ValidLoanBroker
+{
+    // Not all of these elements will necessarily be populated. Remaining items
+    // will be looked up as needed.
+    struct BrokerInfo
+    {
+        SLE::const_pointer brokerBefore = nullptr;
+        // After is used for most of the checks, except
+        // those that check changed values.
+        SLE::const_pointer brokerAfter = nullptr;
+    };
+    // Collect all the LoanBrokers found directly or indirectly through
+    // pseudo-accounts. Key is the brokerID / index. It will be used to find the
+    // LoanBroker object if brokerBefore and brokerAfter are nullptr
+    std::map<uint256, BrokerInfo> brokers_;
+    // Collect all the modified trust lines. Their high and low accounts will be
+    // loaded to look for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
+    std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> lines_;
+    // Collect all the modified MPTokens. Their accounts will be loaded to look
+    // for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
+    std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> mpts_;
+
+    bool
+    goodZeroDirectory(ReadView const& view, SLE::const_ref dir, beast::Journal const& j) const;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Invariants: Loans are internally consistent
+ *
+ * 1. If `Loan.PaymentRemaining = 0` then `Loan.PrincipalOutstanding = 0`
+ *
+ */
+class ValidLoan
+{
+    // Pair is <before, after>. After is used for most of the checks, except
+    // those that check changed values.
+    std::vector<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> loans_;
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+/*
+ * @brief Invariants: Vault object and MPTokenIssuance for vault shares
+ *
+ * - vault deleted and vault created is empty
+ * - vault created must be linked to pseudo-account for shares and assets
+ * - vault must have MPTokenIssuance for shares
+ * - vault without shares outstanding must have no shares
+ * - loss unrealized does not exceed the difference between assets total and
+ *   assets available
+ * - assets available do not exceed assets total
+ * - vault deposit increases assets and share issuance, and adds to:
+ *   total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
+ * - vault withdrawal and clawback reduce assets and share issuance, and
+ *   subtracts from: total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
+ * - vault set must not alter the vault assets or shares balance
+ * - no vault transaction can change loss unrealized (it's updated by loan
+ *   transactions)
+ *
+ */
+class ValidVault
+{
+    Number static constexpr zero{};
+
+    struct Vault final
+    {
+        uint256 key = beast::zero;
+        Asset asset = {};
+        AccountID pseudoId = {};
+        AccountID owner = {};
+        uint192 shareMPTID = beast::zero;
+        Number assetsTotal = 0;
+        Number assetsAvailable = 0;
+        Number assetsMaximum = 0;
+        Number lossUnrealized = 0;
+
+        Vault static make(SLE const&);
+    };
+
+    struct Shares final
+    {
+        MPTIssue share = {};
+        std::uint64_t sharesTotal = 0;
+        std::uint64_t sharesMaximum = 0;
+
+        Shares static make(SLE const&);
+    };
+
+    std::vector<Vault> afterVault_ = {};
+    std::vector<Shares> afterMPTs_ = {};
+    std::vector<Vault> beforeVault_ = {};
+    std::vector<Shares> beforeMPTs_ = {};
+    std::unordered_map<uint256, Number> deltas_ = {};
+
+public:
+    void
+    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
+
+    bool
+    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
+};
+
+// additional invariant checks can be declared above and then added to this
+// tuple
+using InvariantChecks = std::tuple<
+    TransactionFeeCheck,
+    AccountRootsNotDeleted,
+    AccountRootsDeletedClean,
+    LedgerEntryTypesMatch,
+    XRPBalanceChecks,
+    XRPNotCreated,
+    NoXRPTrustLines,
+    NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze,
+    TransfersNotFrozen,
+    NoBadOffers,
+    NoZeroEscrow,
+    ValidNewAccountRoot,
+    ValidNFTokenPage,
+    NFTokenCountTracking,
+    ValidClawback,
+    ValidMPTIssuance,
+    ValidPermissionedDomain,
+    ValidPermissionedDEX,
+    ValidAMM,
+    NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields,
+    ValidPseudoAccounts,
+    ValidLoanBroker,
+    ValidLoan,
+    ValidVault>;
+
+/**
+ * @brief get a tuple of all invariant checks
+ *
+ * @return std::tuple of instances that implement the required invariant check
+ * methods
+ *
+ * @see xrpl::InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
+ */
+inline InvariantChecks
+getInvariantChecks()
+{
+    return InvariantChecks{};
+}
+
+}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/AMMInvariant.h

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-#include <optional>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-class ValidAMM
-{
-    std::optional<AccountID> ammAccount_;
-    std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
-    std::optional<STAmount> lptAMMBalanceBefore_;
-    bool ammPoolChanged_;
-
-public:
-    enum class ZeroAllowed : bool { No = false, Yes = true };
-
-    ValidAMM() : ammPoolChanged_{false}
-    {
-    }
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-
-private:
-    bool
-    finalizeBid(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
-    bool
-    finalizeVote(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
-    bool
-    finalizeCreate(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
-    bool
-    finalizeDelete(bool enforce, TER res, beast::Journal const&) const;
-    bool
-    finalizeDeposit(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
-    // Includes clawback
-    bool
-    finalizeWithdraw(STTx const&, ReadView const&, bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
-    bool
-    finalizeDEX(bool enforce, beast::Journal const&) const;
-    bool
-    generalInvariant(STTx const&, ReadView const&, ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed, beast::Journal const&)
-        const;
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/FreezeInvariant.h

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-#include <map>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: frozen trust line balance change is not allowed.
- *
- * We iterate all affected trust lines and ensure that they don't have
- * unexpected change of balance if they're frozen.
- */
-class TransfersNotFrozen
-{
-    struct BalanceChange
-    {
-        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const line;
-        int const balanceChangeSign;
-    };
-
-    struct IssuerChanges
-    {
-        std::vector<BalanceChange> senders;
-        std::vector<BalanceChange> receivers;
-    };
-
-    using ByIssuer = std::map<Issue, IssuerChanges>;
-    ByIssuer balanceChanges_;
-
-    std::map<AccountID, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const> possibleIssuers_;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-
-private:
-    bool
-    isValidEntry(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
-
-    STAmount
-    calculateBalanceChange(
-        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
-        bool isDelete);
-
-    void
-    recordBalance(Issue const& issue, BalanceChange change);
-
-    void
-    recordBalanceChanges(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after, STAmount const& balanceChange);
-
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
-    findIssuer(AccountID const& issuerID, ReadView const& view);
-
-    bool
-    validateIssuerChanges(
-        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuer,
-        IssuerChanges const& changes,
-        STTx const& tx,
-        beast::Journal const& j,
-        bool enforce);
-
-    bool
-    validateFrozenState(
-        BalanceChange const& change,
-        bool high,
-        STTx const& tx,
-        beast::Journal const& j,
-        bool enforce,
-        bool globalFreeze);
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheck.h

@@ -1,385 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/AMMInvariant.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/FreezeInvariant.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/LoanInvariant.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/NFTInvariant.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDEXInvariant.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDomainInvariant.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.h>
-
-#include <cstdint>
-#include <tuple>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-#if GENERATING_DOCS
-/**
- * @brief Prototype for invariant check implementations.
- *
- * __THIS CLASS DOES NOT EXIST__ - or rather it exists in documentation only to
- * communicate the interface required of any invariant checker. Any invariant
- * check implementation should implement the public methods documented here.
- *
- */
-class InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
-{
-public:
-    explicit InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE() = default;
-
-    /**
-     * @brief called for each ledger entry in the current transaction.
-     *
-     * @param isDelete true if the SLE is being deleted
-     * @param before ledger entry before modification by the transaction
-     * @param after ledger entry after modification by the transaction
-     */
-    void
-    visitEntry(
-        bool isDelete,
-        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-        std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after);
-
-    /**
-     * @brief called after all ledger entries have been visited to determine
-     * the final status of the check
-     *
-     * @param tx the transaction being applied
-     * @param tec the current TER result of the transaction
-     * @param fee the fee actually charged for this transaction
-     * @param view a ReadView of the ledger being modified
-     * @param j journal for logging
-     *
-     * @return true if check passes, false if it fails
-     */
-    bool
-    finalize(
-        STTx const& tx,
-        TER const tec,
-        XRPAmount const fee,
-        ReadView const& view,
-        beast::Journal const& j);
-};
-#endif
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: We should never charge a transaction a negative fee or a
- * fee that is larger than what the transaction itself specifies.
- *
- * We can, in some circumstances, charge less.
- */
-class TransactionFeeCheck
-{
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: A transaction must not create XRP and should only destroy
- * the XRP fee.
- *
- * We iterate through all account roots, payment channels and escrow entries
- * that were modified and calculate the net change in XRP caused by the
- * transactions.
- */
-class XRPNotCreated
-{
-    std::int64_t drops_ = 0;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: we cannot remove an account ledger entry
- *
- * We iterate all account roots that were modified, and ensure that any that
- * were present before the transaction was applied continue to be present
- * afterwards unless they were explicitly deleted by a successful
- * AccountDelete transaction.
- */
-class AccountRootsNotDeleted
-{
-    std::uint32_t accountsDeleted_ = 0;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: a deleted account must not have any objects left
- *
- * We iterate all deleted account roots, and ensure that there are no
- * objects left that are directly accessible with that account's ID.
- *
- * There should only be one deleted account, but that's checked by
- * AccountRootsNotDeleted. This invariant will handle multiple deleted account
- * roots without a problem.
- */
-class AccountRootsDeletedClean
-{
-    // Pair is <before, after>. Before is used for most of the checks, so that
-    // if, for example, an object ID field is cleared, but the object is not
-    // deleted, it can still be found. After is used specifically for any checks
-    // that are expected as part of the deletion, such as zeroing out the
-    // balance.
-    std::vector<std::pair<std::shared_ptr<SLE const>, std::shared_ptr<SLE const>>> accountsDeleted_;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: An account XRP balance must be in XRP and take a value
- *                   between 0 and INITIAL_XRP drops, inclusive.
- *
- * We iterate all account roots modified by the transaction and ensure that
- * their XRP balances are reasonable.
- */
-class XRPBalanceChecks
-{
-    bool bad_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: corresponding modified ledger entries should match in type
- *                   and added entries should be a valid type.
- */
-class LedgerEntryTypesMatch
-{
-    bool typeMismatch_ = false;
-    bool invalidTypeAdded_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: Trust lines using XRP are not allowed.
- *
- * We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
- * that they are against a valid issuer.
- */
-class NoXRPTrustLines
-{
-    bool xrpTrustLine_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: Trust lines with deep freeze flag are not allowed if normal
- * freeze flag is not set.
- *
- * We iterate all the trust lines created by this transaction and ensure
- * that they don't have deep freeze flag set without normal freeze flag set.
- */
-class NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze
-{
-    bool deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: offers should be for non-negative amounts and must not
- *                   be XRP to XRP.
- *
- * Examine all offers modified by the transaction and ensure that there are
- * no offers which contain negative amounts or which exchange XRP for XRP.
- */
-class NoBadOffers
-{
-    bool bad_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: an escrow entry must take a value between 0 and
- *                   INITIAL_XRP drops exclusive.
- */
-class NoZeroEscrow
-{
-    bool bad_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: a new account root must be the consequence of a payment,
- *                   must have the right starting sequence, and the payment
- *                   may not create more than one new account root.
- */
-class ValidNewAccountRoot
-{
-    std::uint32_t accountsCreated_ = 0;
-    std::uint32_t accountSeq_ = 0;
-    bool pseudoAccount_ = false;
-    std::uint32_t flags_ = 0;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: Token holder's trustline balance cannot be negative after
- * Clawback.
- *
- * We iterate all the trust lines affected by this transaction and ensure
- * that no more than one trustline is modified, and also holder's balance is
- * non-negative.
- */
-class ValidClawback
-{
-    std::uint32_t trustlinesChanged = 0;
-    std::uint32_t mptokensChanged = 0;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariants: Pseudo-accounts have valid and consistent properties
- *
- * Pseudo-accounts have certain properties, and some of those properties are
- * unique to pseudo-accounts. Check that all pseudo-accounts are following the
- * rules, and that only pseudo-accounts look like pseudo-accounts.
- *
- */
-class ValidPseudoAccounts
-{
-    std::vector<std::string> errors_;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariants: Some fields are unmodifiable
- *
- * Check that any fields specified as unmodifiable are not modified when the
- * object is modified. Creation and deletion are ignored.
- *
- */
-class NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields
-{
-    // Pair is <before, after>.
-    std::set<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> changedEntries_;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-// additional invariant checks can be declared above and then added to this
-// tuple
-using InvariantChecks = std::tuple<
-    TransactionFeeCheck,
-    AccountRootsNotDeleted,
-    AccountRootsDeletedClean,
-    LedgerEntryTypesMatch,
-    XRPBalanceChecks,
-    XRPNotCreated,
-    NoXRPTrustLines,
-    NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze,
-    TransfersNotFrozen,
-    NoBadOffers,
-    NoZeroEscrow,
-    ValidNewAccountRoot,
-    ValidNFTokenPage,
-    NFTokenCountTracking,
-    ValidClawback,
-    ValidMPTIssuance,
-    ValidPermissionedDomain,
-    ValidPermissionedDEX,
-    ValidAMM,
-    NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields,
-    ValidPseudoAccounts,
-    ValidLoanBroker,
-    ValidLoan,
-    ValidVault>;
-
-/**
- * @brief get a tuple of all invariant checks
- *
- * @return std::tuple of instances that implement the required invariant check
- * methods
- *
- * @see xrpl::InvariantChecker_PROTOTYPE
- */
-inline InvariantChecks
-getInvariantChecks()
-{
-    return InvariantChecks{};
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-
-#include <type_traits>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-/*
-assert(enforce)
-
-There are several asserts (or XRPL_ASSERTs) in invariant check files that check
-a variable named `enforce` when an invariant fails. At first glance, those
-asserts may look incorrect, but they are not.
-
-Those asserts take advantage of two facts:
-1. `asserts` are not (normally) executed in release builds.
-2. Invariants should *never* fail, except in tests that specifically modify
-   the open ledger to break them.
-
-This makes `assert(enforce)` sort of a second-layer of invariant enforcement
-aimed at _developers_. It's designed to fire if a developer writes code that
-violates an invariant, and runs it in unit tests or a develop build that _does
-not have the relevant amendments enabled_. It's intentionally a pain in the neck
-so that bad code gets caught and fixed as early as possible.
-*/
-
-enum Privilege {
-    noPriv = 0x0000,              // The transaction can not do any of the enumerated operations
-    createAcct = 0x0001,          // The transaction can create a new ACCOUNT_ROOT object.
-    createPseudoAcct = 0x0002,    // The transaction can create a pseudo account,
-                                  // which implies createAcct
-    mustDeleteAcct = 0x0004,      // The transaction must delete an ACCOUNT_ROOT object
-    mayDeleteAcct = 0x0008,       // The transaction may delete an ACCOUNT_ROOT
-                                  // object, but does not have to
-    overrideFreeze = 0x0010,      // The transaction can override some freeze rules
-    changeNFTCounts = 0x0020,     // The transaction can mint or burn an NFT
-    createMPTIssuance = 0x0040,   // The transaction can create a new MPT issuance
-    destroyMPTIssuance = 0x0080,  // The transaction can destroy an MPT issuance
-    mustAuthorizeMPT = 0x0100,    // The transaction MUST create or delete an MPT
-                                  // object (except by issuer)
-    mayAuthorizeMPT = 0x0200,     // The transaction MAY create or delete an MPT
-                                  // object (except by issuer)
-    mayDeleteMPT = 0x0400,        // The transaction MAY delete an MPT object. May not create.
-    mustModifyVault = 0x0800,     // The transaction must modify, delete or create, a vault
-    mayModifyVault = 0x1000,      // The transaction MAY modify, delete or create, a vault
-};
-
-constexpr Privilege
-operator|(Privilege lhs, Privilege rhs)
-{
-    return safe_cast<Privilege>(
-        safe_cast<std::underlying_type_t<Privilege>>(lhs) |
-        safe_cast<std::underlying_type_t<Privilege>>(rhs));
-}
-
-bool
-hasPrivilege(STTx const& tx, Privilege priv);
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/LoanInvariant.h

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-#include <map>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariants: Loan brokers are internally consistent
- *
- * 1. If `LoanBroker.OwnerCount = 0` the `DirectoryNode` will have at most one
- *    node (the root), which will only hold entries for `RippleState` or
- * `MPToken` objects.
- *
- */
-class ValidLoanBroker
-{
-    // Not all of these elements will necessarily be populated. Remaining items
-    // will be looked up as needed.
-    struct BrokerInfo
-    {
-        SLE::const_pointer brokerBefore = nullptr;
-        // After is used for most of the checks, except
-        // those that check changed values.
-        SLE::const_pointer brokerAfter = nullptr;
-    };
-    // Collect all the LoanBrokers found directly or indirectly through
-    // pseudo-accounts. Key is the brokerID / index. It will be used to find the
-    // LoanBroker object if brokerBefore and brokerAfter are nullptr
-    std::map<uint256, BrokerInfo> brokers_;
-    // Collect all the modified trust lines. Their high and low accounts will be
-    // loaded to look for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
-    std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> lines_;
-    // Collect all the modified MPTokens. Their accounts will be loaded to look
-    // for LoanBroker pseudo-accounts.
-    std::vector<SLE::const_pointer> mpts_;
-
-    bool
-    goodZeroDirectory(ReadView const& view, SLE::const_ref dir, beast::Journal const& j) const;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariants: Loans are internally consistent
- *
- * 1. If `Loan.PaymentRemaining = 0` then `Loan.PrincipalOutstanding = 0`
- *
- */
-class ValidLoan
-{
-    // Pair is <before, after>. After is used for most of the checks, except
-    // those that check changed values.
-    std::vector<std::pair<SLE::const_pointer, SLE::const_pointer>> loans_;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.h

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-#include <cstdint>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-class ValidMPTIssuance
-{
-    std::uint32_t mptIssuancesCreated_ = 0;
-    std::uint32_t mptIssuancesDeleted_ = 0;
-
-    std::uint32_t mptokensCreated_ = 0;
-    std::uint32_t mptokensDeleted_ = 0;
-    // non-MPT transactions may attempt to create
-    // MPToken by an issuer
-    bool mptCreatedByIssuer_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/NFTInvariant.h

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-#include <cstdint>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: Validates several invariants for NFToken pages.
- *
- * The following checks are made:
- *  - The page is correctly associated with the owner.
- *  - The page is correctly ordered between the next and previous links.
- *  - The page contains at least one and no more than 32 NFTokens.
- *  - The NFTokens on this page do not belong on a lower or higher page.
- *  - The NFTokens are correctly sorted on the page.
- *  - Each URI, if present, is not empty.
- */
-class ValidNFTokenPage
-{
-    bool badEntry_ = false;
-    bool badLink_ = false;
-    bool badSort_ = false;
-    bool badURI_ = false;
-    bool invalidSize_ = false;
-    bool deletedFinalPage_ = false;
-    bool deletedLink_ = false;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariant: Validates counts of NFTokens after all transaction types.
- *
- * The following checks are made:
- *  - The number of minted or burned NFTokens can only be changed by
- *    NFTokenMint or NFTokenBurn transactions.
- *  - A successful NFTokenMint must increase the number of NFTokens.
- *  - A failed NFTokenMint must not change the number of minted NFTokens.
- *  - An NFTokenMint transaction cannot change the number of burned NFTokens.
- *  - A successful NFTokenBurn must increase the number of burned NFTokens.
- *  - A failed NFTokenBurn must not change the number of burned NFTokens.
- *  - An NFTokenBurn transaction cannot change the number of minted NFTokens.
- */
-class NFTokenCountTracking
-{
-    std::uint32_t beforeMintedTotal = 0;
-    std::uint32_t beforeBurnedTotal = 0;
-    std::uint32_t afterMintedTotal = 0;
-    std::uint32_t afterBurnedTotal = 0;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDEXInvariant.h

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-class ValidPermissionedDEX
-{
-    bool regularOffers_ = false;
-    bool badHybrids_ = false;
-    hash_set<uint256> domains_;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDomainInvariant.h

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-/**
- * @brief Invariants: Permissioned Domains must have some rules and
- * AcceptedCredentials must have length between 1 and 10 inclusive.
- *
- * Since only permissions constitute rules, an empty credentials list
- * means that there are no rules and the invariant is violated.
- *
- * Credentials must be sorted and no duplicates allowed
- *
- */
-class ValidPermissionedDomain
-{
-    struct SleStatus
-    {
-        std::size_t credentialsSize_{0};
-        bool isSorted_ = false;
-        bool isUnique_ = false;
-        bool isDelete_ = false;
-    };
-    std::vector<SleStatus> sleStatus_;
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

include/xrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.h

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-#pragma once
-
-#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
-#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/ReadView.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
-
-#include <unordered_map>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-/*
- * @brief Invariants: Vault object and MPTokenIssuance for vault shares
- *
- * - vault deleted and vault created is empty
- * - vault created must be linked to pseudo-account for shares and assets
- * - vault must have MPTokenIssuance for shares
- * - vault without shares outstanding must have no shares
- * - loss unrealized does not exceed the difference between assets total and
- *   assets available
- * - assets available do not exceed assets total
- * - vault deposit increases assets and share issuance, and adds to:
- *   total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
- * - vault withdrawal and clawback reduce assets and share issuance, and
- *   subtracts from: total assets, assets available, shares outstanding
- * - vault set must not alter the vault assets or shares balance
- * - no vault transaction can change loss unrealized (it's updated by loan
- *   transactions)
- *
- */
-class ValidVault
-{
-    Number static constexpr zero{};
-
-    struct Vault final
-    {
-        uint256 key = beast::zero;
-        Asset asset = {};
-        AccountID pseudoId = {};
-        AccountID owner = {};
-        uint192 shareMPTID = beast::zero;
-        Number assetsTotal = 0;
-        Number assetsAvailable = 0;
-        Number assetsMaximum = 0;
-        Number lossUnrealized = 0;
-
-        Vault static make(SLE const&);
-    };
-
-    struct Shares final
-    {
-        MPTIssue share = {};
-        std::uint64_t sharesTotal = 0;
-        std::uint64_t sharesMaximum = 0;
-
-        Shares static make(SLE const&);
-    };
-
-    std::vector<Vault> afterVault_ = {};
-    std::vector<Shares> afterMPTs_ = {};
-    std::vector<Vault> beforeVault_ = {};
-    std::vector<Shares> beforeMPTs_ = {};
-    std::unordered_map<uint256, Number> deltas_ = {};
-
-public:
-    void
-    visitEntry(bool, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const&);
-
-    bool
-    finalize(STTx const&, TER const, XRPAmount const, ReadView const&, beast::Journal const&);
-};
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp

@@ -1,15 +1,7 @@
 # The idea is to empty this file gradually by fixing the underlying issues and removing suppressions.
 #
 # ASAN_OPTIONS="print_stacktrace=1:detect_container_overflow=0:suppressions=sanitizers/suppressions/asan.supp:halt_on_error=0"
-#
-# The detect_container_overflow=0 option disables false positives from:
-# - Boost intrusive containers (slist_iterator.hpp, hashtable.hpp, aged_unordered_container.h)
-# - Boost context/coroutine stack switching (Workers.cpp, thread.h)
-#
-# See: https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerContainerOverflow
 
-# Boost
-interceptor_name:boost/asio
 
 # Leaks in Doctest tests: xrpl.test.*
 interceptor_name:src/libxrpl/net/HTTPClient.cpp
@@ -20,6 +12,25 @@ interceptor_name:xrpl/net/HTTPClient.h
 interceptor_name:xrpl/net/HTTPClientSSLContext.h
 interceptor_name:xrpl/net/RegisterSSLCerts.h
 
+# Boost.Context fiber/coroutine false positives
+# ASan doesn't fully support makecontext/swapcontext (see first warning in output)
+# The "attempting free on address which was not malloc()-ed" errors are false positives
+# caused by Boost.Context's fiber stack management.
+#
+# Suppress bad-free errors in Boost.Context fiber/coroutine stack deallocation
+# These are triggered when fiber stacks are deallocated but ASan doesn't recognize them
+# as having been allocated via malloc (because they use mmap via boost's stack allocator)
+# We ignore these files from intrumentation already on Clang, but on GCC, we need to suppress the issues.
+
+#interceptor_via_fun:swapcontext
+#interceptor_via_fun:makecontext
+#interceptor_via_fun:boost::context::basic_fixedsize_stack*deallocate
+#interceptor_via_fun:boost::context::fiber::~fiber
+#interceptor_name:boost/context/fiber_ucontext.hpp
+#interceptor_name:boost/context/fixedsize_stack.hpp
+#interceptor_name:Coro.ipp
+
+
 # Suppress false positive stack-buffer errors in thread stack allocation
 # Related to ASan's __asan_handle_no_return warnings (github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/189)
 # These occur during multi-threaded test initialization on macOS

src/libxrpl/tx/ApplyContext.cpp

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/ApplyContext.h>
-//
 #include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
 #include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
 #include <xrpl/json/to_string.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheck.h>
+#include <xrpl/tx/ApplyContext.h>
+#include <xrpl/tx/InvariantCheck.h>
 
 namespace xrpl {
 

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/AMMInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,305 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/AMMInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/AMM/AMMHelpers.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/AMM/AMMUtils.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-void
-ValidAMM::visitEntry(
-    bool isDelete,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    if (isDelete)
-        return;
-
-    if (after)
-    {
-        auto const type = after->getType();
-        // AMM object changed
-        if (type == ltAMM)
-        {
-            ammAccount_ = after->getAccountID(sfAccount);
-            lptAMMBalanceAfter_ = after->getFieldAmount(sfLPTokenBalance);
-        }
-        // AMM pool changed
-        else if (
-            (type == ltRIPPLE_STATE && after->getFlags() & lsfAMMNode) ||
-            (type == ltACCOUNT_ROOT && after->isFieldPresent(sfAMMID)))
-        {
-            ammPoolChanged_ = true;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (before)
-    {
-        // AMM object changed
-        if (before->getType() == ltAMM)
-        {
-            lptAMMBalanceBefore_ = before->getFieldAmount(sfLPTokenBalance);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-static bool
-validBalances(
-    STAmount const& amount,
-    STAmount const& amount2,
-    STAmount const& lptAMMBalance,
-    ValidAMM::ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed)
-{
-    bool const positive =
-        amount > beast::zero && amount2 > beast::zero && lptAMMBalance > beast::zero;
-    if (zeroAllowed == ValidAMM::ZeroAllowed::Yes)
-        return positive ||
-            (amount == beast::zero && amount2 == beast::zero && lptAMMBalance == beast::zero);
-    return positive;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalizeVote(bool enforce, beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    if (lptAMMBalanceAfter_ != lptAMMBalanceBefore_ || ammPoolChanged_)
-    {
-        // LPTokens and the pool can not change on vote
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMVote invariant failed: " << lptAMMBalanceBefore_.value_or(STAmount{})
-                        << " " << lptAMMBalanceAfter_.value_or(STAmount{}) << " "
-                        << ammPoolChanged_;
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalizeBid(bool enforce, beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    if (ammPoolChanged_)
-    {
-        // The pool can not change on bid
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMBid invariant failed: pool changed";
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-    // LPTokens are burnt, therefore there should be fewer LPTokens
-    else if (
-        lptAMMBalanceBefore_ && lptAMMBalanceAfter_ &&
-        (*lptAMMBalanceAfter_ > *lptAMMBalanceBefore_ || *lptAMMBalanceAfter_ <= beast::zero))
-    {
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMBid invariant failed: " << *lptAMMBalanceBefore_ << " "
-                        << *lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalizeCreate(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    bool enforce,
-    beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    if (!ammAccount_)
-    {
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMCreate invariant failed: AMM object is not created";
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        auto const [amount, amount2] = ammPoolHolds(
-            view,
-            *ammAccount_,
-            tx[sfAmount].get<Issue>(),
-            tx[sfAmount2].get<Issue>(),
-            fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
-            j);
-        // Create invariant:
-        // sqrt(amount * amount2) == LPTokens
-        // all balances are greater than zero
-        if (!validBalances(amount, amount2, *lptAMMBalanceAfter_, ZeroAllowed::No) ||
-            ammLPTokens(amount, amount2, lptAMMBalanceAfter_->issue()) != *lptAMMBalanceAfter_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMCreate invariant failed: " << amount << " " << amount2 << " "
-                            << *lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
-            if (enforce)
-                return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalizeDelete(bool enforce, TER res, beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    if (ammAccount_)
-    {
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        std::string const msg = (res == tesSUCCESS) ? "AMM object is not deleted on tesSUCCESS"
-                                                    : "AMM object is changed on tecINCOMPLETE";
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMDelete invariant failed: " << msg;
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalizeDEX(bool enforce, beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    if (ammAccount_)
-    {
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMM swap invariant failed: AMM object changed";
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::generalInvariant(
-    xrpl::STTx const& tx,
-    xrpl::ReadView const& view,
-    ZeroAllowed zeroAllowed,
-    beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    auto const [amount, amount2] = ammPoolHolds(
-        view,
-        *ammAccount_,
-        tx[sfAsset].get<Issue>(),
-        tx[sfAsset2].get<Issue>(),
-        fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
-        j);
-    // Deposit and Withdrawal invariant:
-    // sqrt(amount * amount2) >= LPTokens
-    // all balances are greater than zero
-    // unless on last withdrawal
-    auto const poolProductMean = root2(amount * amount2);
-    bool const nonNegativeBalances =
-        validBalances(amount, amount2, *lptAMMBalanceAfter_, zeroAllowed);
-    bool const strongInvariantCheck = poolProductMean >= *lptAMMBalanceAfter_;
-    // Allow for a small relative error if strongInvariantCheck fails
-    auto weakInvariantCheck = [&]() {
-        return *lptAMMBalanceAfter_ != beast::zero &&
-            withinRelativeDistance(poolProductMean, Number{*lptAMMBalanceAfter_}, Number{1, -11});
-    };
-    if (!nonNegativeBalances || (!strongInvariantCheck && !weakInvariantCheck()))
-    {
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMM " << tx.getTxnType()
-                        << " invariant failed: " << tx.getHash(HashPrefix::transactionID) << " "
-                        << ammPoolChanged_ << " " << amount << " " << amount2 << " "
-                        << poolProductMean << " " << lptAMMBalanceAfter_->getText() << " "
-                        << ((*lptAMMBalanceAfter_ == beast::zero)
-                                ? Number{1}
-                                : ((*lptAMMBalanceAfter_ - poolProductMean) / poolProductMean));
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalizeDeposit(
-    xrpl::STTx const& tx,
-    xrpl::ReadView const& view,
-    bool enforce,
-    beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    if (!ammAccount_)
-    {
-        // LCOV_EXCL_START
-        JLOG(j.error()) << "AMMDeposit invariant failed: AMM object is deleted";
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-        // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-    }
-    else if (!generalInvariant(tx, view, ZeroAllowed::No, j) && enforce)
-        return false;
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalizeWithdraw(
-    xrpl::STTx const& tx,
-    xrpl::ReadView const& view,
-    bool enforce,
-    beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    if (!ammAccount_)
-    {
-        // Last Withdraw or Clawback deleted AMM
-    }
-    else if (!generalInvariant(tx, view, ZeroAllowed::Yes, j))
-    {
-        if (enforce)
-            return false;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidAMM::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const result,
-    XRPAmount const,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    // Delete may return tecINCOMPLETE if there are too many
-    // trustlines to delete.
-    if (result != tesSUCCESS && result != tecINCOMPLETE)
-        return true;
-
-    bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(fixAMMv1_3);
-
-    switch (tx.getTxnType())
-    {
-        case ttAMM_CREATE:
-            return finalizeCreate(tx, view, enforce, j);
-        case ttAMM_DEPOSIT:
-            return finalizeDeposit(tx, view, enforce, j);
-        case ttAMM_CLAWBACK:
-        case ttAMM_WITHDRAW:
-            return finalizeWithdraw(tx, view, enforce, j);
-        case ttAMM_BID:
-            return finalizeBid(enforce, j);
-        case ttAMM_VOTE:
-            return finalizeVote(enforce, j);
-        case ttAMM_DELETE:
-            return finalizeDelete(enforce, result, j);
-        case ttCHECK_CASH:
-        case ttOFFER_CREATE:
-        case ttPAYMENT:
-            return finalizeDEX(enforce, j);
-        default:
-            break;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/FreezeInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/FreezeInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-void
-TransfersNotFrozen::visitEntry(
-    bool isDelete,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    /*
-     * A trust line freeze state alone doesn't determine if a transfer is
-     * frozen. The transfer must be examined "end-to-end" because both sides of
-     * the transfer may have different freeze states and freeze impact depends
-     * on the transfer direction. This is why first we need to track the
-     * transfers using IssuerChanges senders/receivers.
-     *
-     * Only in validateIssuerChanges, after we collected all changes can we
-     * determine if the transfer is valid.
-     */
-    if (!isValidEntry(before, after))
-    {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    auto const balanceChange = calculateBalanceChange(before, after, isDelete);
-    if (balanceChange.signum() == 0)
-    {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    recordBalanceChanges(after, balanceChange);
-}
-
-bool
-TransfersNotFrozen::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const ter,
-    XRPAmount const fee,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    /*
-     * We check this invariant regardless of deep freeze amendment status,
-     * allowing for detection and logging of potential issues even when the
-     * amendment is disabled.
-     *
-     * If an exploit that allows moving frozen assets is discovered,
-     * we can alert operators who monitor fatal messages and trigger assert in
-     * debug builds for an early warning.
-     *
-     * In an unlikely event that an exploit is found, this early detection
-     * enables encouraging the UNL to expedite deep freeze amendment activation
-     * or deploy hotfixes via new amendments. In case of a new amendment, we'd
-     * only have to change this line setting 'enforce' variable.
-     * enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureDeepFreeze) ||
-     *           view.rules().enabled(fixFreezeExploit);
-     */
-    [[maybe_unused]] bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureDeepFreeze);
-
-    for (auto const& [issue, changes] : balanceChanges_)
-    {
-        auto const issuerSle = findIssuer(issue.account, view);
-        // It should be impossible for the issuer to not be found, but check
-        // just in case so rippled doesn't crash in release.
-        if (!issuerSle)
-        {
-            // The comment above starting with "assert(enforce)" explains this
-            // assert.
-            XRPL_ASSERT(
-                enforce,
-                "xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::finalize : enforce "
-                "invariant.");
-            if (enforce)
-            {
-                return false;
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if (!validateIssuerChanges(issuerSle, changes, tx, j, enforce))
-        {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-TransfersNotFrozen::isValidEntry(
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    // `after` can never be null, even if the trust line is deleted.
-    XRPL_ASSERT(after, "xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::isValidEntry : valid after.");
-    if (!after)
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (after->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT)
-    {
-        possibleIssuers_.emplace(after->at(sfAccount), after);
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    /* While LedgerEntryTypesMatch invariant also checks types, all invariants
-     * are processed regardless of previous failures.
-     *
-     * This type check is still necessary here because it prevents potential
-     * issues in subsequent processing.
-     */
-    return after->getType() == ltRIPPLE_STATE && (!before || before->getType() == ltRIPPLE_STATE);
-}
-
-STAmount
-TransfersNotFrozen::calculateBalanceChange(
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
-    bool isDelete)
-{
-    auto const getBalance = [](auto const& line, auto const& other, bool zero) {
-        STAmount amt = line ? line->at(sfBalance) : other->at(sfBalance).zeroed();
-        return zero ? amt.zeroed() : amt;
-    };
-
-    /* Trust lines can be created dynamically by other transactions such as
-     * Payment and OfferCreate that cross offers. Such trust line won't be
-     * created frozen, but the sender might be, so the starting balance must be
-     * treated as zero.
-     */
-    auto const balanceBefore = getBalance(before, after, false);
-
-    /* Same as above, trust lines can be dynamically deleted, and for frozen
-     * trust lines, payments not involving the issuer must be blocked. This is
-     * achieved by treating the final balance as zero when isDelete=true to
-     * ensure frozen line restrictions are enforced even during deletion.
-     */
-    auto const balanceAfter = getBalance(after, before, isDelete);
-
-    return balanceAfter - balanceBefore;
-}
-
-void
-TransfersNotFrozen::recordBalance(Issue const& issue, BalanceChange change)
-{
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        change.balanceChangeSign,
-        "xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::recordBalance : valid trustline "
-        "balance sign.");
-    auto& changes = balanceChanges_[issue];
-    if (change.balanceChangeSign < 0)
-        changes.senders.emplace_back(std::move(change));
-    else
-        changes.receivers.emplace_back(std::move(change));
-}
-
-void
-TransfersNotFrozen::recordBalanceChanges(
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after,
-    STAmount const& balanceChange)
-{
-    auto const balanceChangeSign = balanceChange.signum();
-    auto const currency = after->at(sfBalance).getCurrency();
-
-    // Change from low account's perspective, which is trust line default
-    recordBalance({currency, after->at(sfHighLimit).getIssuer()}, {after, balanceChangeSign});
-
-    // Change from high account's perspective, which reverses the sign.
-    recordBalance({currency, after->at(sfLowLimit).getIssuer()}, {after, -balanceChangeSign});
-}
-
-std::shared_ptr<SLE const>
-TransfersNotFrozen::findIssuer(AccountID const& issuerID, ReadView const& view)
-{
-    if (auto it = possibleIssuers_.find(issuerID); it != possibleIssuers_.end())
-    {
-        return it->second;
-    }
-
-    return view.read(keylet::account(issuerID));
-}
-
-bool
-TransfersNotFrozen::validateIssuerChanges(
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuer,
-    IssuerChanges const& changes,
-    STTx const& tx,
-    beast::Journal const& j,
-    bool enforce)
-{
-    if (!issuer)
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    bool const globalFreeze = issuer->isFlag(lsfGlobalFreeze);
-    if (changes.receivers.empty() || changes.senders.empty())
-    {
-        /* If there are no receivers, then the holder(s) are returning
-         * their tokens to the issuer. Likewise, if there are no
-         * senders, then the issuer is issuing tokens to the holder(s).
-         * This is allowed regardless of the issuer's freeze flags. (The
-         * holder may have contradicting freeze flags, but that will be
-         * checked when the holder is treated as issuer.)
-         */
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    for (auto const& actors : {changes.senders, changes.receivers})
-    {
-        for (auto const& change : actors)
-        {
-            bool const high = change.line->at(sfLowLimit).getIssuer() == issuer->at(sfAccount);
-
-            if (!validateFrozenState(change, high, tx, j, enforce, globalFreeze))
-            {
-                return false;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-TransfersNotFrozen::validateFrozenState(
-    BalanceChange const& change,
-    bool high,
-    STTx const& tx,
-    beast::Journal const& j,
-    bool enforce,
-    bool globalFreeze)
-{
-    bool const freeze =
-        change.balanceChangeSign < 0 && change.line->isFlag(high ? lsfLowFreeze : lsfHighFreeze);
-    bool const deepFreeze = change.line->isFlag(high ? lsfLowDeepFreeze : lsfHighDeepFreeze);
-    bool const frozen = globalFreeze || deepFreeze || freeze;
-
-    bool const isAMMLine = change.line->isFlag(lsfAMMNode);
-
-    if (!frozen)
-    {
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    // AMMClawbacks are allowed to override some freeze rules
-    if ((!isAMMLine || globalFreeze) && hasPrivilege(tx, overrideFreeze))
-    {
-        JLOG(j.debug()) << "Invariant check allowing funds to be moved "
-                        << (change.balanceChangeSign > 0 ? "to" : "from")
-                        << " a frozen trustline for AMMClawback " << tx.getTransactionID();
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Attempting to move frozen funds for "
-                    << tx.getTransactionID();
-    // The comment above starting with "assert(enforce)" explains this assert.
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        enforce,
-        "xrpl::TransfersNotFrozen::validateFrozenState : enforce "
-        "invariant.");
-
-    if (enforce)
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/LoanInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/LoanInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STNumber.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-void
-ValidLoanBroker::visitEntry(
-    bool isDelete,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    if (after)
-    {
-        if (after->getType() == ltLOAN_BROKER)
-        {
-            auto& broker = brokers_[after->key()];
-            broker.brokerBefore = before;
-            broker.brokerAfter = after;
-        }
-        else if (after->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT && after->isFieldPresent(sfLoanBrokerID))
-        {
-            auto const& loanBrokerID = after->at(sfLoanBrokerID);
-            // create an entry if one doesn't already exist
-            brokers_.emplace(loanBrokerID, BrokerInfo{});
-        }
-        else if (after->getType() == ltRIPPLE_STATE)
-        {
-            lines_.emplace_back(after);
-        }
-        else if (after->getType() == ltMPTOKEN)
-        {
-            mpts_.emplace_back(after);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-bool
-ValidLoanBroker::goodZeroDirectory(
-    ReadView const& view,
-    SLE::const_ref dir,
-    beast::Journal const& j) const
-{
-    auto const next = dir->at(~sfIndexNext);
-    auto const prev = dir->at(~sfIndexPrevious);
-    if ((prev && *prev) || (next && *next))
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker with zero "
-                           "OwnerCount has multiple directory pages";
-        return false;
-    }
-    auto indexes = dir->getFieldV256(sfIndexes);
-    if (indexes.size() > 1)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker with zero "
-                           "OwnerCount has multiple indexes in the Directory root";
-        return false;
-    }
-    if (indexes.size() == 1)
-    {
-        auto const index = indexes.value().front();
-        auto const sle = view.read(keylet::unchecked(index));
-        if (!sle)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker directory corrupt";
-            return false;
-        }
-        if (sle->getType() != ltRIPPLE_STATE && sle->getType() != ltMPTOKEN)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker with zero "
-                               "OwnerCount has an unexpected entry in the directory";
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidLoanBroker::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const,
-    XRPAmount const,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    // Loan Brokers will not exist on ledger if the Lending Protocol amendment
-    // is not enabled, so there's no need to check it.
-
-    for (auto const& line : lines_)
-    {
-        for (auto const& field : {&sfLowLimit, &sfHighLimit})
-        {
-            auto const account = view.read(keylet::account(line->at(*field).getIssuer()));
-            // This Invariant doesn't know about the rules for Trust Lines, so
-            // if the account is missing, don't treat it as an error. This
-            // loop is only concerned with finding Broker pseudo-accounts
-            if (account && account->isFieldPresent(sfLoanBrokerID))
-            {
-                auto const& loanBrokerID = account->at(sfLoanBrokerID);
-                // create an entry if one doesn't already exist
-                brokers_.emplace(loanBrokerID, BrokerInfo{});
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    for (auto const& mpt : mpts_)
-    {
-        auto const account = view.read(keylet::account(mpt->at(sfAccount)));
-        // This Invariant doesn't know about the rules for MPTokens, so
-        // if the account is missing, don't treat is as an error. This
-        // loop is only concerned with finding Broker pseudo-accounts
-        if (account && account->isFieldPresent(sfLoanBrokerID))
-        {
-            auto const& loanBrokerID = account->at(sfLoanBrokerID);
-            // create an entry if one doesn't already exist
-            brokers_.emplace(loanBrokerID, BrokerInfo{});
-        }
-    }
-
-    for (auto const& [brokerID, broker] : brokers_)
-    {
-        auto const& after =
-            broker.brokerAfter ? broker.brokerAfter : view.read(keylet::loanbroker(brokerID));
-
-        if (!after)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker missing";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        auto const& before = broker.brokerBefore;
-
-        // https://github.com/Tapanito/XRPL-Standards/blob/xls-66-lending-protocol/XLS-0066d-lending-protocol/README.md#3123-invariants
-        // If `LoanBroker.OwnerCount = 0` the `DirectoryNode` will have at most
-        // one node (the root), which will only hold entries for `RippleState`
-        // or `MPToken` objects.
-        if (after->at(sfOwnerCount) == 0)
-        {
-            auto const dir = view.read(keylet::ownerDir(after->at(sfAccount)));
-            if (dir)
-            {
-                if (!goodZeroDirectory(view, dir, j))
-                {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        if (before && before->at(sfLoanSequence) > after->at(sfLoanSequence))
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker sequence number "
-                               "decreased";
-            return false;
-        }
-        if (after->at(sfDebtTotal) < 0)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker debt total is negative";
-            return false;
-        }
-        if (after->at(sfCoverAvailable) < 0)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker cover available is negative";
-            return false;
-        }
-        auto const vault = view.read(keylet::vault(after->at(sfVaultID)));
-        if (!vault)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker vault ID is invalid";
-            return false;
-        }
-        auto const& vaultAsset = vault->at(sfAsset);
-        if (after->at(sfCoverAvailable) < accountHolds(
-                                              view,
-                                              after->at(sfAccount),
-                                              vaultAsset,
-                                              FreezeHandling::fhIGNORE_FREEZE,
-                                              AuthHandling::ahIGNORE_AUTH,
-                                              j))
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Broker cover available "
-                               "is less than pseudo-account asset balance";
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-    return true;
-}
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-void
-ValidLoan::visitEntry(
-    bool isDelete,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    if (after && after->getType() == ltLOAN)
-    {
-        loans_.emplace_back(before, after);
-    }
-}
-
-bool
-ValidLoan::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const,
-    XRPAmount const,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    // Loans will not exist on ledger if the Lending Protocol amendment
-    // is not enabled, so there's no need to check it.
-
-    for (auto const& [before, after] : loans_)
-    {
-        // https://github.com/Tapanito/XRPL-Standards/blob/xls-66-lending-protocol/XLS-0066d-lending-protocol/README.md#3223-invariants
-        // If `Loan.PaymentRemaining = 0` then the loan MUST be fully paid off
-        if (after->at(sfPaymentRemaining) == 0 &&
-            (after->at(sfTotalValueOutstanding) != beast::zero ||
-             after->at(sfPrincipalOutstanding) != beast::zero ||
-             after->at(sfManagementFeeOutstanding) != beast::zero))
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan with zero payments "
-                               "remaining has not been paid off";
-            return false;
-        }
-        // If `Loan.PaymentRemaining != 0` then the loan MUST NOT be fully paid
-        // off
-        if (after->at(sfPaymentRemaining) != 0 &&
-            after->at(sfTotalValueOutstanding) == beast::zero &&
-            after->at(sfPrincipalOutstanding) == beast::zero &&
-            after->at(sfManagementFeeOutstanding) == beast::zero)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan with zero payments "
-                               "remaining has not been paid off";
-            return false;
-        }
-        if (before && (before->isFlag(lsfLoanOverpayment) != after->isFlag(lsfLoanOverpayment)))
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Loan Overpayment flag changed";
-            return false;
-        }
-        // Must not be negative - STNumber
-        for (auto const field :
-             {&sfLoanServiceFee,
-              &sfLatePaymentFee,
-              &sfClosePaymentFee,
-              &sfPrincipalOutstanding,
-              &sfTotalValueOutstanding,
-              &sfManagementFeeOutstanding})
-        {
-            if (after->at(*field) < 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: " << field->getName() << " is negative ";
-                return false;
-            }
-        }
-        // Must be positive - STNumber
-        for (auto const field : {
-                 &sfPeriodicPayment,
-             })
-        {
-            if (after->at(*field) <= 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: " << field->getName()
-                                << " is zero or negative ";
-                return false;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return true;
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/MPTInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-void
-ValidMPTIssuance::visitEntry(
-    bool isDelete,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    if (after && after->getType() == ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE)
-    {
-        if (isDelete)
-            mptIssuancesDeleted_++;
-        else if (!before)
-            mptIssuancesCreated_++;
-    }
-
-    if (after && after->getType() == ltMPTOKEN)
-    {
-        if (isDelete)
-            mptokensDeleted_++;
-        else if (!before)
-        {
-            mptokensCreated_++;
-            MPTIssue const mptIssue{after->at(sfMPTokenIssuanceID)};
-            if (mptIssue.getIssuer() == after->at(sfAccount))
-                mptCreatedByIssuer_ = true;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-bool
-ValidMPTIssuance::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const result,
-    XRPAmount const _fee,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    if (result == tesSUCCESS)
-    {
-        auto const& rules = view.rules();
-        [[maybe_unused]]
-        bool enforceCreatedByIssuer =
-            rules.enabled(featureSingleAssetVault) || rules.enabled(featureLendingProtocol);
-        if (mptCreatedByIssuer_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPToken created for the MPT issuer";
-            // The comment above starting with "assert(enforce)" explains this
-            // assert.
-            XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
-                enforceCreatedByIssuer, "xrpl::ValidMPTIssuance::finalize", "no issuer MPToken");
-            if (enforceCreatedByIssuer)
-                return false;
-        }
-
-        auto const txnType = tx.getTxnType();
-        if (hasPrivilege(tx, createMPTIssuance))
-        {
-            if (mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction "
-                                   "succeeded without creating a MPT issuance";
-            }
-            else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ != 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction "
-                                   "succeeded while removing MPT issuances";
-            }
-            else if (mptIssuancesCreated_ > 1)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction "
-                                   "succeeded but created multiple issuances";
-            }
-
-            return mptIssuancesCreated_ == 1 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0;
-        }
-
-        if (hasPrivilege(tx, destroyMPTIssuance))
-        {
-            if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
-                                   "succeeded without removing a MPT issuance";
-            }
-            else if (mptIssuancesCreated_ > 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
-                                   "succeeded while creating MPT issuances";
-            }
-            else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ > 1)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT issuance deletion "
-                                   "succeeded but deleted multiple issuances";
-            }
-
-            return mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 1;
-        }
-
-        bool const lendingProtocolEnabled = view.rules().enabled(featureLendingProtocol);
-        // ttESCROW_FINISH may authorize an MPT, but it can't have the
-        // mayAuthorizeMPT privilege, because that may cause
-        // non-amendment-gated side effects.
-        bool const enforceEscrowFinish = (txnType == ttESCROW_FINISH) &&
-            (view.rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault) || lendingProtocolEnabled);
-        if (hasPrivilege(tx, mustAuthorizeMPT | mayAuthorizeMPT) || enforceEscrowFinish)
-        {
-            bool const submittedByIssuer = tx.isFieldPresent(sfHolder);
-
-            if (mptIssuancesCreated_ > 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize "
-                                   "succeeded but created MPT issuances";
-                return false;
-            }
-            else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ > 0)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize "
-                                   "succeeded but deleted issuances";
-                return false;
-            }
-            else if (lendingProtocolEnabled && mptokensCreated_ + mptokensDeleted_ > 1)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize succeeded "
-                                   "but created/deleted bad number mptokens";
-                return false;
-            }
-            else if (submittedByIssuer && (mptokensCreated_ > 0 || mptokensDeleted_ > 0))
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize submitted by issuer "
-                                   "succeeded but created/deleted mptokens";
-                return false;
-            }
-            else if (
-                !submittedByIssuer && hasPrivilege(tx, mustAuthorizeMPT) &&
-                (mptokensCreated_ + mptokensDeleted_ != 1))
-            {
-                // if the holder submitted this tx, then a mptoken must be
-                // either created or deleted.
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: MPT authorize submitted by holder "
-                                   "succeeded but created/deleted bad number of mptokens";
-                return false;
-            }
-
-            return true;
-        }
-        if (txnType == ttESCROW_FINISH)
-        {
-            // ttESCROW_FINISH may authorize an MPT, but it can't have the
-            // mayAuthorizeMPT privilege, because that may cause
-            // non-amendment-gated side effects.
-            XRPL_ASSERT_PARTS(
-                !enforceEscrowFinish, "xrpl::ValidMPTIssuance::finalize", "not escrow finish tx");
-            return true;
-        }
-
-        if (hasPrivilege(tx, mayDeleteMPT) && mptokensDeleted_ == 1 && mptokensCreated_ == 0 &&
-            mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0)
-            return true;
-    }
-
-    if (mptIssuancesCreated_ != 0)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPT issuance was created";
-    }
-    else if (mptIssuancesDeleted_ != 0)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPT issuance was deleted";
-    }
-    else if (mptokensCreated_ != 0)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPToken was created";
-    }
-    else if (mptokensDeleted_ != 0)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a MPToken was deleted";
-    }
-
-    return mptIssuancesCreated_ == 0 && mptIssuancesDeleted_ == 0 && mptokensCreated_ == 0 &&
-        mptokensDeleted_ == 0;
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/NFTInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/NFTInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/nftPageMask.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/NFT/NFTokenUtils.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-void
-ValidNFTokenPage::visitEntry(
-    bool isDelete,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    static constexpr uint256 const& pageBits = nft::pageMask;
-    static constexpr uint256 const accountBits = ~pageBits;
-
-    if ((before && before->getType() != ltNFTOKEN_PAGE) ||
-        (after && after->getType() != ltNFTOKEN_PAGE))
-        return;
-
-    auto check = [this, isDelete](std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& sle) {
-        uint256 const account = sle->key() & accountBits;
-        uint256 const hiLimit = sle->key() & pageBits;
-        std::optional<uint256> const prev = (*sle)[~sfPreviousPageMin];
-
-        // Make sure that any page links...
-        //  1. Are properly associated with the owning account and
-        //  2. The page is correctly ordered between links.
-        if (prev)
-        {
-            if (account != (*prev & accountBits))
-                badLink_ = true;
-
-            if (hiLimit <= (*prev & pageBits))
-                badLink_ = true;
-        }
-
-        if (auto const next = (*sle)[~sfNextPageMin])
-        {
-            if (account != (*next & accountBits))
-                badLink_ = true;
-
-            if (hiLimit >= (*next & pageBits))
-                badLink_ = true;
-        }
-
-        {
-            auto const& nftokens = sle->getFieldArray(sfNFTokens);
-
-            // An NFTokenPage should never contain too many tokens or be empty.
-            if (std::size_t const nftokenCount = nftokens.size();
-                (!isDelete && nftokenCount == 0) || nftokenCount > dirMaxTokensPerPage)
-                invalidSize_ = true;
-
-            // If prev is valid, use it to establish a lower bound for
-            // page entries.  If prev is not valid the lower bound is zero.
-            uint256 const loLimit = prev ? *prev & pageBits : uint256(beast::zero);
-
-            // Also verify that all NFTokenIDs in the page are sorted.
-            uint256 loCmp = loLimit;
-            for (auto const& obj : nftokens)
-            {
-                uint256 const tokenID = obj[sfNFTokenID];
-                if (!nft::compareTokens(loCmp, tokenID))
-                    badSort_ = true;
-                loCmp = tokenID;
-
-                // None of the NFTs on this page should belong on lower or
-                // higher pages.
-                if (uint256 const tokenPageBits = tokenID & pageBits;
-                    tokenPageBits < loLimit || tokenPageBits >= hiLimit)
-                    badEntry_ = true;
-
-                if (auto uri = obj[~sfURI]; uri && uri->empty())
-                    badURI_ = true;
-            }
-        }
-    };
-
-    if (before)
-    {
-        check(before);
-
-        // While an account's NFToken directory contains any NFTokens, the last
-        // NFTokenPage (with 96 bits of 1 in the low part of the index) should
-        // never be deleted.
-        if (isDelete && (before->key() & nft::pageMask) == nft::pageMask &&
-            before->isFieldPresent(sfPreviousPageMin))
-        {
-            deletedFinalPage_ = true;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (after)
-        check(after);
-
-    if (!isDelete && before && after)
-    {
-        // If the NFTokenPage
-        //  1. Has a NextMinPage field in before, but loses it in after, and
-        //  2. This is not the last page in the directory
-        // Then we have identified a corruption in the links between the
-        // NFToken pages in the NFToken directory.
-        if ((before->key() & nft::pageMask) != nft::pageMask &&
-            before->isFieldPresent(sfNextPageMin) && !after->isFieldPresent(sfNextPageMin))
-        {
-            deletedLink_ = true;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-bool
-ValidNFTokenPage::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const result,
-    XRPAmount const,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    if (badLink_)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT page is improperly linked.";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (badEntry_)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT found in incorrect page.";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (badSort_)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFTs on page are not sorted.";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (badURI_)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT contains empty URI.";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (invalidSize_)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: NFT page has invalid size.";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (view.rules().enabled(fixNFTokenPageLinks))
-    {
-        if (deletedFinalPage_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Last NFT page deleted with "
-                               "non-empty directory.";
-            return false;
-        }
-        if (deletedLink_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: Lost NextMinPage link.";
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-void
-NFTokenCountTracking::visitEntry(
-    bool,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    if (before && before->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT)
-    {
-        beforeMintedTotal += (*before)[~sfMintedNFTokens].value_or(0);
-        beforeBurnedTotal += (*before)[~sfBurnedNFTokens].value_or(0);
-    }
-
-    if (after && after->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT)
-    {
-        afterMintedTotal += (*after)[~sfMintedNFTokens].value_or(0);
-        afterBurnedTotal += (*after)[~sfBurnedNFTokens].value_or(0);
-    }
-}
-
-bool
-NFTokenCountTracking::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const result,
-    XRPAmount const,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    if (!hasPrivilege(tx, changeNFTCounts))
-    {
-        if (beforeMintedTotal != afterMintedTotal)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: the number of minted tokens "
-                               "changed without a mint transaction!";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        if (beforeBurnedTotal != afterBurnedTotal)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: the number of burned tokens "
-                               "changed without a burn transaction!";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    if (tx.getTxnType() == ttNFTOKEN_MINT)
-    {
-        if (result == tesSUCCESS && beforeMintedTotal >= afterMintedTotal)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: successful minting didn't increase "
-                               "the number of minted tokens.";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        if (result != tesSUCCESS && beforeMintedTotal != afterMintedTotal)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: failed minting changed the "
-                               "number of minted tokens.";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        if (beforeBurnedTotal != afterBurnedTotal)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: minting changed the number of "
-                               "burned tokens.";
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (tx.getTxnType() == ttNFTOKEN_BURN)
-    {
-        if (result == tesSUCCESS)
-        {
-            if (beforeBurnedTotal >= afterBurnedTotal)
-            {
-                JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: successful burning didn't increase "
-                                   "the number of burned tokens.";
-                return false;
-            }
-        }
-
-        if (result != tesSUCCESS && beforeBurnedTotal != afterBurnedTotal)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: failed burning changed the "
-                               "number of burned tokens.";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        if (beforeMintedTotal != afterMintedTotal)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: burning changed the number of "
-                               "minted tokens.";
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDEXInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDEXInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STArray.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-void
-ValidPermissionedDEX::visitEntry(
-    bool,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    if (after && after->getType() == ltDIR_NODE)
-    {
-        if (after->isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
-            domains_.insert(after->getFieldH256(sfDomainID));
-    }
-
-    if (after && after->getType() == ltOFFER)
-    {
-        if (after->isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
-            domains_.insert(after->getFieldH256(sfDomainID));
-        else
-            regularOffers_ = true;
-
-        // if a hybrid offer is missing domain or additional book, there's
-        // something wrong
-        if (after->isFlag(lsfHybrid) &&
-            (!after->isFieldPresent(sfDomainID) || !after->isFieldPresent(sfAdditionalBooks) ||
-             after->getFieldArray(sfAdditionalBooks).size() > 1))
-            badHybrids_ = true;
-    }
-}
-
-bool
-ValidPermissionedDEX::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const result,
-    XRPAmount const,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    auto const txType = tx.getTxnType();
-    if ((txType != ttPAYMENT && txType != ttOFFER_CREATE) || result != tesSUCCESS)
-        return true;
-
-    // For each offercreate transaction, check if
-    // permissioned offers are valid
-    if (txType == ttOFFER_CREATE && badHybrids_)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: hybrid offer is malformed";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (!tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomainID))
-        return true;
-
-    auto const domain = tx.getFieldH256(sfDomainID);
-
-    if (!view.exists(keylet::permissionedDomain(domain)))
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain doesn't exist";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    // for both payment and offercreate, there shouldn't be another domain
-    // that's different from the domain specified
-    for (auto const& d : domains_)
-    {
-        if (d != domain)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction"
-                               " consumed wrong domains";
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (regularOffers_)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain transaction"
-                           " affected regular offers";
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDomainInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/PermissionedDomainInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/CredentialHelpers.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STArray.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-void
-ValidPermissionedDomain::visitEntry(
-    bool isDel,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    if (before && before->getType() != ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN)
-        return;
-    if (after && after->getType() != ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN)
-        return;
-
-    auto check = [isDel](std::vector<SleStatus>& sleStatus, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& sle) {
-        auto const& credentials = sle->getFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials);
-        auto const sorted = credentials::makeSorted(credentials);
-
-        SleStatus ss{credentials.size(), false, !sorted.empty(), isDel};
-
-        // If array have duplicates then all the other checks are invalid
-        if (ss.isUnique_)
-        {
-            unsigned i = 0;
-            for (auto const& cred : sorted)
-            {
-                auto const& credTx = credentials[i++];
-                ss.isSorted_ =
-                    (cred.first == credTx[sfIssuer]) && (cred.second == credTx[sfCredentialType]);
-                if (!ss.isSorted_)
-                    break;
-            }
-        }
-        sleStatus.emplace_back(std::move(ss));
-    };
-
-    if (after)
-        check(sleStatus_, after);
-}
-
-bool
-ValidPermissionedDomain::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const result,
-    XRPAmount const,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    auto check = [](SleStatus const& sleStatus, beast::Journal const& j) {
-        if (!sleStatus.credentialsSize_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain with "
-                               "no rules.";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        if (sleStatus.credentialsSize_ > maxPermissionedDomainCredentialsArraySize)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain bad "
-                               "credentials size "
-                            << sleStatus.credentialsSize_;
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        if (!sleStatus.isUnique_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain credentials "
-                               "aren't unique";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        if (!sleStatus.isSorted_)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: permissioned domain credentials "
-                               "aren't sorted";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        return true;
-    };
-
-    if (view.rules().enabled(fixPermissionedDomainInvariant))
-    {
-        // No permissioned domains should be affected if the transaction failed
-        if (result != tesSUCCESS)
-            // If nothing changed, all is good. If there were changes, that's
-            // bad.
-            return sleStatus_.empty();
-
-        if (sleStatus_.size() > 1)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: transaction affected more "
-                               "than 1 permissioned domain entry.";
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        switch (tx.getTxnType())
-        {
-            case ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET: {
-                if (sleStatus_.empty())
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: no domain objects affected by "
-                                       "PermissionedDomainSet";
-                    return false;
-                }
-
-                auto const& sleStatus = sleStatus_[0];
-                if (sleStatus.isDelete_)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain object "
-                                       "deleted by PermissionedDomainSet";
-                    return false;
-                }
-                return check(sleStatus, j);
-            }
-            case ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE: {
-                if (sleStatus_.empty())
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: no domain objects affected by "
-                                       "PermissionedDomainDelete";
-                    return false;
-                }
-
-                if (!sleStatus_[0].isDelete_)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: domain object "
-                                       "modified, but not deleted by "
-                                       "PermissionedDomainDelete";
-                    return false;
-                }
-                return true;
-            }
-            default: {
-                if (!sleStatus_.empty())
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: " << sleStatus_.size()
-                                    << " domain object(s) affected by an "
-                                       "unauthorized transaction. "
-                                    << tx.getTxnType();
-                    return false;
-                }
-                return true;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        if (tx.getTxnType() != ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET || result != tesSUCCESS ||
-            sleStatus_.empty())
-            return true;
-        return check(sleStatus_[0], j);
-    }
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.cpp

@@ -1,926 +0,0 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.h>
-//
-#include <xrpl/basics/Log.h>
-#include <xrpl/beast/utility/instrumentation.h>
-#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/STNumber.h>
-#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
-#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/InvariantCheckPrivilege.h>
-
-namespace xrpl {
-
-ValidVault::Vault
-ValidVault::Vault::make(SLE const& from)
-{
-    XRPL_ASSERT(from.getType() == ltVAULT, "ValidVault::Vault::make : from Vault object");
-
-    ValidVault::Vault self;
-    self.key = from.key();
-    self.asset = from.at(sfAsset);
-    self.pseudoId = from.getAccountID(sfAccount);
-    self.owner = from.at(sfOwner);
-    self.shareMPTID = from.getFieldH192(sfShareMPTID);
-    self.assetsTotal = from.at(sfAssetsTotal);
-    self.assetsAvailable = from.at(sfAssetsAvailable);
-    self.assetsMaximum = from.at(sfAssetsMaximum);
-    self.lossUnrealized = from.at(sfLossUnrealized);
-    return self;
-}
-
-ValidVault::Shares
-ValidVault::Shares::make(SLE const& from)
-{
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        from.getType() == ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE,
-        "ValidVault::Shares::make : from MPTokenIssuance object");
-
-    ValidVault::Shares self;
-    self.share = MPTIssue(makeMptID(from.getFieldU32(sfSequence), from.getAccountID(sfIssuer)));
-    self.sharesTotal = from.at(sfOutstandingAmount);
-    self.sharesMaximum = from[~sfMaximumAmount].value_or(maxMPTokenAmount);
-    return self;
-}
-
-void
-ValidVault::visitEntry(
-    bool isDelete,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& before,
-    std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& after)
-{
-    // If `before` is empty, this means an object is being created, in which
-    // case `isDelete` must be false. Otherwise `before` and `after` are set and
-    // `isDelete` indicates whether an object is being deleted or modified.
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        after != nullptr && (before != nullptr || !isDelete),
-        "xrpl::ValidVault::visitEntry : some object is available");
-
-    // Number balanceDelta will capture the difference (delta) between "before"
-    // state (zero if created) and "after" state (zero if destroyed), so the
-    // invariants can validate that the change in account balances matches the
-    // change in vault balances, stored to deltas_ at the end of this function.
-    Number balanceDelta{};
-
-    std::int8_t sign = 0;
-    if (before)
-    {
-        switch (before->getType())
-        {
-            case ltVAULT:
-                beforeVault_.push_back(Vault::make(*before));
-                break;
-            case ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE:
-                // At this moment we have no way of telling if this object holds
-                // vault shares or something else. Save it for finalize.
-                beforeMPTs_.push_back(Shares::make(*before));
-                balanceDelta = static_cast<std::int64_t>(before->getFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount));
-                sign = 1;
-                break;
-            case ltMPTOKEN:
-                balanceDelta = static_cast<std::int64_t>(before->getFieldU64(sfMPTAmount));
-                sign = -1;
-                break;
-            case ltACCOUNT_ROOT:
-            case ltRIPPLE_STATE:
-                balanceDelta = before->getFieldAmount(sfBalance);
-                sign = -1;
-                break;
-            default:;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (!isDelete && after)
-    {
-        switch (after->getType())
-        {
-            case ltVAULT:
-                afterVault_.push_back(Vault::make(*after));
-                break;
-            case ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE:
-                // At this moment we have no way of telling if this object holds
-                // vault shares or something else. Save it for finalize.
-                afterMPTs_.push_back(Shares::make(*after));
-                balanceDelta -=
-                    Number(static_cast<std::int64_t>(after->getFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount)));
-                sign = 1;
-                break;
-            case ltMPTOKEN:
-                balanceDelta -= Number(static_cast<std::int64_t>(after->getFieldU64(sfMPTAmount)));
-                sign = -1;
-                break;
-            case ltACCOUNT_ROOT:
-            case ltRIPPLE_STATE:
-                balanceDelta -= Number(after->getFieldAmount(sfBalance));
-                sign = -1;
-                break;
-            default:;
-        }
-    }
-
-    uint256 const key = (before ? before->key() : after->key());
-    // Append to deltas if sign is non-zero, i.e. an object of an interesting
-    // type has been updated. A transaction may update an object even when
-    // its balance has not changed, e.g. transaction fee equals the amount
-    // transferred to the account. We intentionally do not compare balanceDelta
-    // against zero, to avoid missing such updates.
-    if (sign != 0)
-        deltas_[key] = balanceDelta * sign;
-}
-
-bool
-ValidVault::finalize(
-    STTx const& tx,
-    TER const ret,
-    XRPAmount const fee,
-    ReadView const& view,
-    beast::Journal const& j)
-{
-    bool const enforce = view.rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault);
-
-    if (!isTesSuccess(ret))
-        return true;  // Do not perform checks
-
-    if (afterVault_.empty() && beforeVault_.empty())
-    {
-        if (hasPrivilege(tx, mustModifyVault))
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                "Invariant failed: vault operation succeeded without modifying "
-                "a vault";
-            XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault noop invariant");
-            return !enforce;
-        }
-
-        return true;  // Not a vault operation
-    }
-    else if (!(hasPrivilege(tx, mustModifyVault) || hasPrivilege(tx, mayModifyVault)))
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-            "Invariant failed: vault updated by a wrong transaction type";
-        XRPL_ASSERT(
-            enforce,
-            "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : illegal vault transaction "
-            "invariant");
-        return !enforce;  // Also not a vault operation
-    }
-
-    if (beforeVault_.size() > 1 || afterVault_.size() > 1)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-            "Invariant failed: vault operation updated more than single vault";
-        XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : single vault invariant");
-        return !enforce;  // That's all we can do here
-    }
-
-    auto const txnType = tx.getTxnType();
-
-    // We do special handling for ttVAULT_DELETE first, because it's the only
-    // vault-modifying transaction without an "after" state of the vault
-    if (afterVault_.empty())
-    {
-        if (txnType != ttVAULT_DELETE)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                "Invariant failed: vault deleted by a wrong transaction type";
-            XRPL_ASSERT(
-                enforce,
-                "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : illegal vault deletion "
-                "invariant");
-            return !enforce;  // That's all we can do here
-        }
-
-        // Note, if afterVault_ is empty then we know that beforeVault_ is not
-        // empty, as enforced at the top of this function
-        auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
-
-        // At this moment we only know a vault is being deleted and there
-        // might be some MPTokenIssuance objects which are deleted in the
-        // same transaction. Find the one matching this vault.
-        auto const deletedShares = [&]() -> std::optional<Shares> {
-            for (auto const& e : beforeMPTs_)
-            {
-                if (e.share.getMptID() == beforeVault.shareMPTID)
-                    return std::move(e);
-            }
-            return std::nullopt;
-        }();
-
-        if (!deletedShares)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must also "
-                               "delete shares";
-            XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : shares deletion invariant");
-            return !enforce;  // That's all we can do here
-        }
-
-        bool result = true;
-        if (deletedShares->sharesTotal != 0)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must have no "
-                               "shares outstanding";
-            result = false;
-        }
-        if (beforeVault.assetsTotal != zero)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must have no "
-                               "assets outstanding";
-            result = false;
-        }
-        if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable != zero)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deleted vault must have no "
-                               "assets available";
-            result = false;
-        }
-
-        return result;
-    }
-    else if (txnType == ttVAULT_DELETE)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: vault deletion succeeded without "
-                           "deleting a vault";
-        XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault deletion invariant");
-        return !enforce;  // That's all we can do here
-    }
-
-    // Note, `afterVault_.empty()` is handled above
-    auto const& afterVault = afterVault_[0];
-    XRPL_ASSERT(
-        beforeVault_.empty() || beforeVault_[0].key == afterVault.key,
-        "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : single vault operation");
-
-    auto const updatedShares = [&]() -> std::optional<Shares> {
-        // At this moment we only know that a vault is being updated and there
-        // might be some MPTokenIssuance objects which are also updated in the
-        // same transaction. Find the one matching the shares to this vault.
-        // Note, we expect updatedMPTs collection to be extremely small. For
-        // such collections linear search is faster than lookup.
-        for (auto const& e : afterMPTs_)
-        {
-            if (e.share.getMptID() == afterVault.shareMPTID)
-                return e;
-        }
-
-        auto const sleShares = view.read(keylet::mptIssuance(afterVault.shareMPTID));
-
-        return sleShares ? std::optional<Shares>(Shares::make(*sleShares)) : std::nullopt;
-    }();
-
-    bool result = true;
-
-    // Universal transaction checks
-    if (!beforeVault_.empty())
-    {
-        auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
-        if (afterVault.asset != beforeVault.asset || afterVault.pseudoId != beforeVault.pseudoId ||
-            afterVault.shareMPTID != beforeVault.shareMPTID)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: violation of vault immutable data";
-            result = false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (!updatedShares)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: updated vault must have shares";
-        XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault has shares invariant");
-        return !enforce;  // That's all we can do here
-    }
-
-    if (updatedShares->sharesTotal == 0)
-    {
-        if (afterVault.assetsTotal != zero)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: updated zero sized "
-                               "vault must have no assets outstanding";
-            result = false;
-        }
-        if (afterVault.assetsAvailable != zero)
-        {
-            JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: updated zero sized "
-                               "vault must have no assets available";
-            result = false;
-        }
-    }
-    else if (updatedShares->sharesTotal > updatedShares->sharesMaximum)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-            << "Invariant failed: updated shares must not exceed maximum "
-            << updatedShares->sharesMaximum;
-        result = false;
-    }
-
-    if (afterVault.assetsAvailable < zero)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets available must be positive";
-        result = false;
-    }
-
-    if (afterVault.assetsAvailable > afterVault.assetsTotal)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets available must "
-                           "not be greater than assets outstanding";
-        result = false;
-    }
-    else if (afterVault.lossUnrealized > afterVault.assetsTotal - afterVault.assetsAvailable)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-            << "Invariant failed: loss unrealized must not exceed "
-               "the difference between assets outstanding and available";
-        result = false;
-    }
-
-    if (afterVault.assetsTotal < zero)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets outstanding must be positive";
-        result = false;
-    }
-
-    if (afterVault.assetsMaximum < zero)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: assets maximum must be positive";
-        result = false;
-    }
-
-    // Thanks to this check we can simply do `assert(!beforeVault_.empty()` when
-    // enforcing invariants on transaction types other than ttVAULT_CREATE
-    if (beforeVault_.empty() && txnType != ttVAULT_CREATE)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-            "Invariant failed: vault created by a wrong transaction type";
-        XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault creation invariant");
-        return !enforce;  // That's all we can do here
-    }
-
-    if (!beforeVault_.empty() && afterVault.lossUnrealized != beforeVault_[0].lossUnrealized &&
-        txnType != ttLOAN_MANAGE && txnType != ttLOAN_PAY)
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-            "Invariant failed: vault transaction must not change loss "
-            "unrealized";
-        result = false;
-    }
-
-    auto const beforeShares = [&]() -> std::optional<Shares> {
-        if (beforeVault_.empty())
-            return std::nullopt;
-        auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
-
-        for (auto const& e : beforeMPTs_)
-        {
-            if (e.share.getMptID() == beforeVault.shareMPTID)
-                return std::move(e);
-        }
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }();
-
-    if (!beforeShares &&
-        (tx.getTxnType() == ttVAULT_DEPOSIT ||   //
-         tx.getTxnType() == ttVAULT_WITHDRAW ||  //
-         tx.getTxnType() == ttVAULT_CLAWBACK))
-    {
-        JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: vault operation succeeded "
-                           "without updating shares";
-        XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : shares noop invariant");
-        return !enforce;  // That's all we can do here
-    }
-
-    auto const& vaultAsset = afterVault.asset;
-    auto const deltaAssets = [&](AccountID const& id) -> std::optional<Number> {
-        auto const get =  //
-            [&](auto const& it, std::int8_t sign = 1) -> std::optional<Number> {
-            if (it == deltas_.end())
-                return std::nullopt;
-
-            return it->second * sign;
-        };
-
-        return std::visit(
-            [&]<typename TIss>(TIss const& issue) {
-                if constexpr (std::is_same_v<TIss, Issue>)
-                {
-                    if (isXRP(issue))
-                        return get(deltas_.find(keylet::account(id).key));
-                    return get(
-                        deltas_.find(keylet::line(id, issue).key), id > issue.getIssuer() ? -1 : 1);
-                }
-                else if constexpr (std::is_same_v<TIss, MPTIssue>)
-                {
-                    return get(deltas_.find(keylet::mptoken(issue.getMptID(), id).key));
-                }
-            },
-            vaultAsset.value());
-    };
-    auto const deltaAssetsTxAccount = [&]() -> std::optional<Number> {
-        auto ret = deltaAssets(tx[sfAccount]);
-        // Nothing returned or not XRP transaction
-        if (!ret.has_value() || !vaultAsset.native())
-            return ret;
-
-        // Delegated transaction; no need to compensate for fees
-        if (auto const delegate = tx[~sfDelegate];
-            delegate.has_value() && *delegate != tx[sfAccount])
-            return ret;
-
-        *ret += fee.drops();
-        if (*ret == zero)
-            return std::nullopt;
-
-        return ret;
-    };
-    auto const deltaShares = [&](AccountID const& id) -> std::optional<Number> {
-        auto const it = [&]() {
-            if (id == afterVault.pseudoId)
-                return deltas_.find(keylet::mptIssuance(afterVault.shareMPTID).key);
-            return deltas_.find(keylet::mptoken(afterVault.shareMPTID, id).key);
-        }();
-
-        return it != deltas_.end() ? std::optional<Number>(it->second) : std::nullopt;
-    };
-
-    auto const vaultHoldsNoAssets = [&](Vault const& vault) {
-        return vault.assetsAvailable == 0 && vault.assetsTotal == 0;
-    };
-
-    // Technically this does not need to be a lambda, but it's more
-    // convenient thanks to early "return false"; the not-so-nice
-    // alternatives are several layers of nested if/else or more complex
-    // (i.e. brittle) if statements.
-    result &= [&]() {
-        switch (txnType)
-        {
-            case ttVAULT_CREATE: {
-                bool result = true;
-
-                if (!beforeVault_.empty())
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-                        << "Invariant failed: create operation must not have "
-                           "updated a vault";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (afterVault.assetsAvailable != zero || afterVault.assetsTotal != zero ||
-                    afterVault.lossUnrealized != zero || updatedShares->sharesTotal != 0)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-                        << "Invariant failed: created vault must be empty";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (afterVault.pseudoId != updatedShares->share.getIssuer())
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-                        << "Invariant failed: shares issuer and vault "
-                           "pseudo-account must be the same";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                auto const sleSharesIssuer =
-                    view.read(keylet::account(updatedShares->share.getIssuer()));
-                if (!sleSharesIssuer)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-                        << "Invariant failed: shares issuer must exist";
-                    return false;
-                }
-
-                if (!isPseudoAccount(sleSharesIssuer))
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-                        << "Invariant failed: shares issuer must be a "
-                           "pseudo-account";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (auto const vaultId = (*sleSharesIssuer)[~sfVaultID];
-                    !vaultId || *vaultId != afterVault.key)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal())  //
-                        << "Invariant failed: shares issuer pseudo-account "
-                           "must point back to the vault";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                return result;
-            }
-            case ttVAULT_SET: {
-                bool result = true;
-
-                XRPL_ASSERT(
-                    !beforeVault_.empty(), "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : set updated a vault");
-                auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
-
-                auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
-                if (vaultDeltaAssets)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: set must not change vault balance";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (beforeVault.assetsTotal != afterVault.assetsTotal)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: set must not change assets "
-                        "outstanding";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (afterVault.assetsMaximum > zero &&
-                    afterVault.assetsTotal > afterVault.assetsMaximum)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: set assets outstanding must not "
-                        "exceed assets maximum";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable != afterVault.assetsAvailable)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: set must not change assets "
-                        "available";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (beforeShares && updatedShares &&
-                    beforeShares->sharesTotal != updatedShares->sharesTotal)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: set must not change shares "
-                        "outstanding";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                return result;
-            }
-            case ttVAULT_DEPOSIT: {
-                bool result = true;
-
-                XRPL_ASSERT(
-                    !beforeVault_.empty(), "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : deposit updated a vault");
-                auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
-
-                auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
-
-                if (!vaultDeltaAssets)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit must change vault balance";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                if (*vaultDeltaAssets > tx[sfAmount])
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit must not change vault "
-                        "balance by more than deposited amount";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (*vaultDeltaAssets <= zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit must increase vault balance";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                // Any payments (including deposits) made by the issuer
-                // do not change their balance, but create funds instead.
-                bool const issuerDeposit = [&]() -> bool {
-                    if (vaultAsset.native())
-                        return false;
-                    return tx[sfAccount] == vaultAsset.getIssuer();
-                }();
-
-                if (!issuerDeposit)
-                {
-                    auto const accountDeltaAssets = deltaAssetsTxAccount();
-                    if (!accountDeltaAssets)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: deposit must change depositor "
-                            "balance";
-                        return false;
-                    }
-
-                    if (*accountDeltaAssets >= zero)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: deposit must decrease depositor "
-                            "balance";
-                        result = false;
-                    }
-
-                    if (*accountDeltaAssets * -1 != *vaultDeltaAssets)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: deposit must change vault and "
-                            "depositor balance by equal amount";
-                        result = false;
-                    }
-                }
-
-                if (afterVault.assetsMaximum > zero &&
-                    afterVault.assetsTotal > afterVault.assetsMaximum)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit assets outstanding must not "
-                        "exceed assets maximum";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                auto const accountDeltaShares = deltaShares(tx[sfAccount]);
-                if (!accountDeltaShares)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit must change depositor "
-                        "shares";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                if (*accountDeltaShares <= zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit must increase depositor "
-                        "shares";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                auto const vaultDeltaShares = deltaShares(afterVault.pseudoId);
-                if (!vaultDeltaShares || *vaultDeltaShares == zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit must change vault shares";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                if (*vaultDeltaShares * -1 != *accountDeltaShares)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: deposit must change depositor and "
-                        "vault shares by equal amount";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (beforeVault.assetsTotal + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsTotal)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deposit and assets "
-                                       "outstanding must add up";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-                if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsAvailable)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: deposit and assets "
-                                       "available must add up";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                return result;
-            }
-            case ttVAULT_WITHDRAW: {
-                bool result = true;
-
-                XRPL_ASSERT(
-                    !beforeVault_.empty(),
-                    "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : withdrawal updated a "
-                    "vault");
-                auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
-
-                auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
-
-                if (!vaultDeltaAssets)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal must "
-                                       "change vault balance";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                if (*vaultDeltaAssets >= zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal must "
-                                       "decrease vault balance";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                // Any payments (including withdrawal) going to the issuer
-                // do not change their balance, but destroy funds instead.
-                bool const issuerWithdrawal = [&]() -> bool {
-                    if (vaultAsset.native())
-                        return false;
-                    auto const destination = tx[~sfDestination].value_or(tx[sfAccount]);
-                    return destination == vaultAsset.getIssuer();
-                }();
-
-                if (!issuerWithdrawal)
-                {
-                    auto const accountDeltaAssets = deltaAssetsTxAccount();
-                    auto const otherAccountDelta = [&]() -> std::optional<Number> {
-                        if (auto const destination = tx[~sfDestination];
-                            destination && *destination != tx[sfAccount])
-                            return deltaAssets(*destination);
-                        return std::nullopt;
-                    }();
-
-                    if (accountDeltaAssets.has_value() == otherAccountDelta.has_value())
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: withdrawal must change one "
-                            "destination balance";
-                        return false;
-                    }
-
-                    auto const destinationDelta =  //
-                        accountDeltaAssets ? *accountDeltaAssets : *otherAccountDelta;
-
-                    if (destinationDelta <= zero)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: withdrawal must increase "
-                            "destination balance";
-                        result = false;
-                    }
-
-                    if (*vaultDeltaAssets * -1 != destinationDelta)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: withdrawal must change vault "
-                            "and destination balance by equal amount";
-                        result = false;
-                    }
-                }
-
-                auto const accountDeltaShares = deltaShares(tx[sfAccount]);
-                if (!accountDeltaShares)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: withdrawal must change depositor "
-                        "shares";
-                    return false;
-                }
-
-                if (*accountDeltaShares >= zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: withdrawal must decrease depositor "
-                        "shares";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                auto const vaultDeltaShares = deltaShares(afterVault.pseudoId);
-                if (!vaultDeltaShares || *vaultDeltaShares == zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: withdrawal must change vault shares";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                if (*vaultDeltaShares * -1 != *accountDeltaShares)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: withdrawal must change depositor "
-                        "and vault shares by equal amount";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                // Note, vaultBalance is negative (see check above)
-                if (beforeVault.assetsTotal + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsTotal)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal and "
-                                       "assets outstanding must add up";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsAvailable)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: withdrawal and "
-                                       "assets available must add up";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                return result;
-            }
-            case ttVAULT_CLAWBACK: {
-                bool result = true;
-
-                XRPL_ASSERT(
-                    !beforeVault_.empty(), "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : clawback updated a vault");
-                auto const& beforeVault = beforeVault_[0];
-
-                if (vaultAsset.native() || vaultAsset.getIssuer() != tx[sfAccount])
-                {
-                    // The owner can use clawback to force-burn shares when the
-                    // vault is empty but there are outstanding shares
-                    if (!(beforeShares && beforeShares->sharesTotal > 0 &&
-                          vaultHoldsNoAssets(beforeVault) && beforeVault.owner == tx[sfAccount]))
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: clawback may only be performed "
-                            "by the asset issuer, or by the vault owner of an "
-                            "empty vault";
-                        return false;  // That's all we can do
-                    }
-                }
-
-                auto const vaultDeltaAssets = deltaAssets(afterVault.pseudoId);
-                if (vaultDeltaAssets)
-                {
-                    if (*vaultDeltaAssets >= zero)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: clawback must decrease vault "
-                            "balance";
-                        result = false;
-                    }
-
-                    if (beforeVault.assetsTotal + *vaultDeltaAssets != afterVault.assetsTotal)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: clawback and assets outstanding "
-                            "must add up";
-                        result = false;
-                    }
-
-                    if (beforeVault.assetsAvailable + *vaultDeltaAssets !=
-                        afterVault.assetsAvailable)
-                    {
-                        JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                            "Invariant failed: clawback and assets available "
-                            "must add up";
-                        result = false;
-                    }
-                }
-                else if (!vaultHoldsNoAssets(beforeVault))
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: clawback must change vault balance";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                auto const accountDeltaShares = deltaShares(tx[sfHolder]);
-                if (!accountDeltaShares)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: clawback must change holder shares";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                if (*accountDeltaShares >= zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: clawback must decrease holder "
-                        "shares";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                auto const vaultDeltaShares = deltaShares(afterVault.pseudoId);
-                if (!vaultDeltaShares || *vaultDeltaShares == zero)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: clawback must change vault shares";
-                    return false;  // That's all we can do
-                }
-
-                if (*vaultDeltaShares * -1 != *accountDeltaShares)
-                {
-                    JLOG(j.fatal()) <<  //
-                        "Invariant failed: clawback must change holder and "
-                        "vault shares by equal amount";
-                    result = false;
-                }
-
-                return result;
-            }
-
-            case ttLOAN_SET:
-            case ttLOAN_MANAGE:
-            case ttLOAN_PAY: {
-                // TBD
-                return true;
-            }
-
-            default:
-                // LCOV_EXCL_START
-                UNREACHABLE("xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : unknown transaction type");
-                return false;
-                // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
-        }
-    }();
-
-    if (!result)
-    {
-        // The comment at the top of this file starting with "assert(enforce)"
-        // explains this assert.
-        XRPL_ASSERT(enforce, "xrpl::ValidVault::finalize : vault invariants");
-        return !enforce;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-}  // namespace xrpl

src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/PermissionedDomain/PermissionedDomainSet.cpp

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
-#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/PermissionedDomain/PermissionedDomainSet.h>
-//
 #include <xrpl/ledger/CredentialHelpers.h>
 #include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
 #include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
+#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/PermissionedDomain/PermissionedDomainSet.h>
+
+#include <optional>
 
 namespace xrpl {