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3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Vito
311719daeb fix: amendment-gate invariant bool overwrite fix (fixInvariantOverwrite)
Three invariant checks used = instead of |= to accumulate their
boolean flag across multiple visited entries. A later "good" entry
could overwrite a violation detected by an earlier "bad" entry.

Gate the corrected |= behavior behind fixInvariantOverwrite to
preserve pre-amendment consensus. Each affected class tracks both
the fixed (|=) and legacy (=) values; finalize picks which to use
based on the amendment.

Affected invariants:
- NoZeroEscrow (bad_ for MPT locked vs outstanding)
- NoXRPTrustLines (xrpTrustLine_)
- NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze (deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_)
2026-03-21 14:37:09 +01:00
Vito Tumas
d08e7b4495 Merge branch 'develop' into tapanito/invariant-bugfix 2026-03-20 17:46:18 +01:00
Vito
90f9a3f318 fix: prevents overwritting a bool value in an invariant 2026-03-20 17:44:31 +01:00
4 changed files with 103 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
// Add new amendments to the top of this list.
// Keep it sorted in reverse chronological order.
XRPL_FIX (InvariantOverwrite, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (PermissionedDomainInvariant, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (ExpiredNFTokenOfferRemoval, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (BatchInnerSigs, Supported::no, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)

View File

@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ public:
class NoXRPTrustLines
{
bool xrpTrustLine_ = false;
bool xrpTrustLineLegacy_ = false;
public:
void
@@ -246,6 +247,7 @@ public:
class NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze
{
bool deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_ = false;
bool deepFreezeWithoutFreezeLegacy_ = false;
public:
void
@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ public:
class NoZeroEscrow
{
bool bad_ = false;
bool badLegacy_ = false;
public:
void

View File

@@ -306,14 +306,25 @@ NoZeroEscrow::visitEntry(
};
if (before && before->getType() == ltESCROW)
bad_ |= isBad((*before)[sfAmount]);
{
auto const b = isBad((*before)[sfAmount]);
bad_ |= b;
badLegacy_ |= b;
}
if (after && after->getType() == ltESCROW)
bad_ |= isBad((*after)[sfAmount]);
{
auto const b = isBad((*after)[sfAmount]);
bad_ |= b;
badLegacy_ |= b;
}
auto checkAmount = [this](std::int64_t amount) {
if (amount > maxMPTokenAmount || amount < 0)
{
bad_ = true;
badLegacy_ = true;
}
};
if (after && after->getType() == ltMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE)
@@ -323,7 +334,8 @@ NoZeroEscrow::visitEntry(
if (auto const locked = (*after)[~sfLockedAmount])
{
checkAmount(*locked);
bad_ = outstanding < *locked;
bad_ |= outstanding < *locked;
badLegacy_ = outstanding < *locked;
}
}
@@ -346,7 +358,9 @@ NoZeroEscrow::finalize(
ReadView const& rv,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (bad_)
bool const effectiveBad = rv.rules().enabled(fixInvariantOverwrite) ? bad_ : badLegacy_;
if (effectiveBad)
{
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: escrow specifies invalid amount";
return false;
@@ -598,8 +612,10 @@ NoXRPTrustLines::visitEntry(
// checking the issue directly here instead of
// relying on .native() just in case native somehow
// were systematically incorrect
xrpTrustLine_ = after->getFieldAmount(sfLowLimit).issue() == xrpIssue() ||
bool const isXrp = after->getFieldAmount(sfLowLimit).issue() == xrpIssue() ||
after->getFieldAmount(sfHighLimit).issue() == xrpIssue();
xrpTrustLine_ |= isXrp;
xrpTrustLineLegacy_ = isXrp;
}
}
@@ -608,10 +624,13 @@ NoXRPTrustLines::finalize(
STTx const&,
TER const,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const&,
ReadView const& rv,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (!xrpTrustLine_)
bool const bad =
rv.rules().enabled(fixInvariantOverwrite) ? xrpTrustLine_ : xrpTrustLineLegacy_;
if (!bad)
return true;
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: an XRP trust line was created";
@@ -635,7 +654,9 @@ NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze::visitEntry(
bool const highFreeze = uFlags & lsfHighFreeze;
bool const highDeepFreeze = uFlags & lsfHighDeepFreeze;
deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_ = (lowDeepFreeze && !lowFreeze) || (highDeepFreeze && !highFreeze);
bool const bad = (lowDeepFreeze && !lowFreeze) || (highDeepFreeze && !highFreeze);
deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_ |= bad;
deepFreezeWithoutFreezeLegacy_ = bad;
}
}
@@ -644,10 +665,13 @@ NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze::finalize(
STTx const&,
TER const,
XRPAmount const,
ReadView const&,
ReadView const& rv,
beast::Journal const& j) const
{
if (!deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_)
bool const bad = rv.rules().enabled(fixInvariantOverwrite) ? deepFreezeWithoutFreeze_
: deepFreezeWithoutFreezeLegacy_;
if (!bad)
return true;
JLOG(j.fatal()) << "Invariant failed: a trust line with deep freeze flag "

View File

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
defaultAmendments()
{
return xrpl::test::jtx::testable_amendments() | featureInvariantsV1_1 |
featureSingleAssetVault;
featureSingleAssetVault | fixInvariantOverwrite;
}
/** Run a specific test case to put the ledger into a state that will be
@@ -498,6 +498,26 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// Regression: two trust lines where the first is bad (XRP) and the
// second is valid. Plain assignment would overwrite the earlier true.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"an XRP trust line was created"}},
[](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// First: bad XRP trust line
auto const sleBad =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A2, xrpIssue().currency));
ac.view().insert(sleBad);
// Second: valid USD trust line — must NOT clear the flag
Account const A3{"A3"};
auto const sleGood =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A3, A1["USD"].currency));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, A1["USD"](0));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, A1["USD"](0));
ac.view().insert(sleGood);
return true;
});
}
void
@@ -576,6 +596,31 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// Regression: two trust lines where the first has deep freeze without
// freeze, and the second is valid. Plain assignment would overwrite
// the earlier true.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without normal freeze was "
"created"}},
[](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// First: bad — lowDeepFreeze without lowFreeze
auto const sleBad = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A2, A1["USD"].currency));
sleBad->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, A1["USD"](0));
sleBad->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, A1["USD"](0));
sleBad->setFieldU32(sfFlags, lsfLowDeepFreeze);
ac.view().insert(sleBad);
// Second: valid — no deep freeze flags at all
Account const A3{"A3"};
auto const sleGood =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A3, A1["EUR"].currency));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, A1["EUR"](0));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, A1["EUR"](0));
sleGood->setFieldU32(sfFlags, 0u);
ac.view().insert(sleGood);
return true;
});
}
void
@@ -931,6 +976,25 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
return true;
});
// MPT OutstandingAmount exceeds max, but locked <= outstanding
// (regression: plain assignment would overwrite earlier bad_ = true)
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(A1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{MPTIssue{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))}};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
// outstanding exceeds maxMPTokenAmount -> checkAmount sets bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, maxMPTokenAmount + 1);
// locked is valid and <= outstanding -> must NOT clear bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, 10);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT MPTAmount < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},