This has no actual effect since we do not set TransferRate in
mptIssuance of the vault shares; and transfers to the issuer are never
subject to TransferRate.
- Detects if the consensus process is "stalled". If it is, then we can declare a
consensus and end successfully even if we do not have 80% agreement on
our proposal.
- "Stalled" is defined as:
- We have a close time consensus
- Each disputed transaction is individually stalled:
- It has been in the final "stuck" 95% requirement for at least 2
(avMIN_ROUNDS) "inner rounds" of phaseEstablish,
- and either all of the other trusted proposers or this validator, if proposing,
have had the same vote(s) for at least 4 (avSTALLED_ROUNDS) "inner
rounds", and at least 80% of the validators (including this one, if
appropriate) agree about the vote (whether yes or no).
- If we have been in the establish phase for more than 10x the previous
consensus establish phase's time, then consensus is considered "expired",
and we will leave the round, which sends a partial validation (indicating
that the node is moving on without validating). Two restrictions avoid
prematurely exiting, or having an extended exit in extreme situations.
- The 10x time is clamped to be within a range of 15s
(ledgerMAX_CONSENSUS) to 120s (ledgerABANDON_CONSENSUS).
- If consensus has not had an opportunity to walk through all avalanche
states (defined as not going through 8 "inner rounds" of phaseEstablish),
then ConsensusState::Expired is treated as ConsensusState::No.
- When enough nodes leave the round, any remaining nodes will see they've
fallen behind, and move on, too, generally before hitting the timeout. Any
validations or partial validations sent during this time will help the
consensus process bring the nodes back together.
One of the failure conditions for VaultSet is:
* The transaction does not specify any of the modifiable fields.
This section was added because I've misread the specification as:
"The transaction does not modify any of the modifiable fields."
Turns out I was wrong, should have read more carefully.
This change removes the existing undefined behavior from `LogicError`, so we can be certain that there will be always a stacktrace.
De-referencing a null pointer is an old trick to generate `SIGSEGV`, which would typically also create a stacktrace. However it is also an undefined behaviour and compilers can do something else. A more robust way to create a stacktrace while crashing the program is to use `std::abort`, which we have also used in this location for a long time. If we combine the two, we might not get the expected behaviour - namely, the nullpointer deref followed by `std::abort`, as handled in certain compiler versions may not immediately cause a crash. We have observed stacktrace being wiped instead, and thread put in indeterminate state, then stacktrace created without any useful information.
The Trustline RPC `no_ripple` flag gets set depending on `lsfDefaultRipple` flag, which is not a flag of a trustline but of the account root. The `lsfDefaultRipple` flag does not provide any insight if this particular trust line has `lsfLowNoRipple` or `lsfHighNoRipple` flag set, so it should not be used here at all. This change simplifies the logic.
The `end_marker` is used to limit the range of ledger entries to fetch. If `end_marker` is less than `marker`, a crash can occur. This change adds an additional check.
Changes the error to `malformedAddress` for `permissioned_domain` in the `ledger_entry` rpc, when the account is not a string. This change makes it more clear to a user what is wrong with their request.
What the LoadManager class does is stall detection, which is not the same as deadlock detection. In the condition of severe CPU starvation, LoadManager will currently intentionally crash rippled reporting `LogicError: Deadlock detected`. This error message is misleading as the condition being detected is not a deadlock. This change fixes and refactors the code in response.
