The `visitDifferences` guard said an inner node at leaf depth could be seeded by a peer through an
earlier fetch-pack exchange, while the code marks the branch `UNREACHABLE`, which is documented as a
line that must not be reached in normal use or under fuzzing. Both cannot hold: a peer-reachable
assert is a peer-triggered abort. The code is the correct half. `addKnownNode` marks the map invalid
instead of hooking such a node in, fetch-pack blobs are checked against their content hash in
`LedgerMaster::getFetchPack`, and the parent child-hash slots they attach to chain up to a validated
root, so provoking this needs a preimage rather than a crafted message.
The comment now attributes the branch to a defect or a corrupt store, and records why the node is
still reported into the pack before its children are skipped: the wire form of an inner node carries
only child hashes, so the bad depth is never transmitted, and the recipient hooks blobs in by hash at
positions its own traversal picks. Withholding it would instead surface as a peer that cannot
complete a ledger, with nothing to diagnose locally.
The `hasLeafNode` comment credited its caller with a bound that does not apply. That guard limits the
depth of the caller's own traversal, whereas `hasLeafNode` runs on the map passed in and descends
from that map's root, so the check here is the only thing between a malformed map and the throw in
`getChildNodeID`, not a second line of defense. `hasInnerNode` is the one bounded by its caller.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The check that the terminal leaf of a proof path actually holds the key being proved had no test
covering it, because the substitution it guards against cannot be built by swapping a leaf under a
genuine root: the hash comparison one level up rejects that first.
This test forges the root instead. It puts a genuine leaf from elsewhere in the map at the bottom of
a two-element path and wraps it in an inner node whose branch for the proved key carries that leaf's
hash, so the chain up to the root hash validates even though the leaf belongs to another key. A
control case runs the same forged root over the proved key's own leaf and expects acceptance, which
pins the leaf key comparison as the only reason the substituted path is rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A SHAMap has 65 levels, and nibbles run out at level 64: `selectBranch` indexes
the key byte at `depth / 2`, so at depth 64 it reads byte 32 of a 32-byte key.
Only the leaf terminating a path may sit at that depth, but proof path nodes
come off the wire, so a peer could send 65 hash-chained inner nodes and drive
that read past the end of the buffer.
The existing length bound cannot be tightened to catch this: a path for two
keys sharing all 63 leading nibbles legitimately holds 64 inner nodes plus a
leaf, so 65 elements is valid. The claimed node type at the final depth is the
thing to reject, using `>=` rather than `==` to match the convention every
other `kLeafDepth` comparison in this codebase already follows.
Reachable from `TMProofPathResponse` via `LedgerReplayMsgHandler`; confirmed
under ASan with asserts compiled out that the unguarded read lands one byte
past a 32-byte heap allocation. Also closes a second gap: nothing checked the
terminal leaf's own key against `key`, so the hash chain alone let a peer
substitute any leaf whose subtree hashes matched at every level above it.
Pinned by tests: the 65-element path that must verify for both keys sharing
the deep prefix, and the forged all-inner path that must not.
Also guards `visitDifferences` against an inner node claimed at leaf depth:
`hasLeafNode` only checked the comparison map, not the map being walked, so a
corrupt node in the map under `visitDifferences` itself could still throw
uncaught. Skip such a node's children instead.
* upstream/release/3.3.x: (41 commits)
chore: Bump version to 3.3.0
chore: Bump version to 3.3.0-rc7
fix: Increase manifest protocol message size cap and fix manifests relay
fix: Cap untrusted manifests per message and drop oversized ones
chore: Bump version to 3.2.1
chore: Bump version to 3.2.1-rc1
fix: Cap untrusted manifests per message and drop oversized ones
fix: Reject oversized validator manifest before decoding
fix: Reduce untrusted manifest cache cap to 100
fix: Bound untrusted manifest cache
chore: Bump version to 3.3.0-rc6
feat: Package validator-keys inside rippled
chore: Bump version to 3.3.0-rc5
fix: Switch SponsorshipSet to use a delta for sfFeeAmount
fix: Re-revert "fix: Set request size limits and differential pricing for get-object-by-hash calls"
chore: Bump version to 3.3.0-rc4
fix: Revert "fix: Set request size limits and differential pricing for get-object-by-hash calls"
chore: Bump version to 3.3.0-rc3
fix: Reduce untrusted manifest cache cap to 100
fix: Revert "fix: Reject oversized SHAMap nodes in gotStaleData and fetch-pack path"
...
