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Address coding style comments (#6966)

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This commit is contained in:
yinyiqian1
2026-04-20 13:31:09 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 09778f2fec
commit f08121de35
10 changed files with 83 additions and 59 deletions
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2
include/xrpl/protocol/ConfidentialTransfer.h
View File

@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ verifyRevealedAmount(
* @param hasAuditor Whether the issuance has an auditor configured.
* @return The number of recipients (3 or 4).
*/
constexpr std::size_t
constexpr uint8_t
getConfidentialRecipientCount(bool hasAuditor)
{
return hasAuditor ? 4 : 3;

42
src/libxrpl/protocol/ConfidentialTransfer.cpp
View File

@@ -101,11 +101,7 @@ makeEcPair(Slice const& buffer)
return std::nullopt; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto parsePubKey = [](Slice const& slice, secp256k1_pubkey& out) {
return secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(
secp256k1Context(),
&out,
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char const*>(slice.data()),
slice.length());
return secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(secp256k1Context(), &out, slice.data(), slice.length());
};
Slice const s1{buffer.data(), ecGamalEncryptedLength};
@@ -123,13 +119,13 @@ serializeEcPair(EcPair const& pair)
{
auto serializePubKey = [](secp256k1_pubkey const& pub, unsigned char* out) {
size_t outLen = ecGamalEncryptedLength; // 33 bytes
int const ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
auto const ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
secp256k1Context(), out, &outLen, &pub, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
return ret == 1 && outLen == ecGamalEncryptedLength;
};
Buffer buffer(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
unsigned char* ptr = buffer.data();
auto const ptr = buffer.data();
bool const res1 = serializePubKey(pair.c1, ptr);
bool const res2 = serializePubKey(pair.c2, ptr + ecGamalEncryptedLength);
@@ -195,7 +191,7 @@ homomorphicSubtract(Slice const& a, Slice const& b)
return std::nullopt;
EcPair diff{};
if (auto res = secp256k1_elgamal_subtract(
if (auto const res = secp256k1_elgamal_subtract(
secp256k1Context(), &diff.c1, &diff.c2, &pairA->c1, &pairA->c2, &pairB->c1, &pairB->c2);
res != 1)
{
@@ -268,7 +264,9 @@ verifyRevealedAmount(
holder.encryptedAmount.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength ||
issuer.publicKey.size() != ecPubKeyLength ||
issuer.encryptedAmount.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength)
{
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
auto toParticipant = [](ConfidentialRecipient const& r) {
mpt_confidential_participant p;
@@ -285,14 +283,18 @@ verifyRevealedAmount(
{
if (auditor->publicKey.size() != ecPubKeyLength ||
auditor->encryptedAmount.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength)
{
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
auditorP = toParticipant(*auditor);
auditorPtr = &auditorP;
}
if (mpt_verify_revealed_amount(amount, blindingFactor.data(), &holderP, &issuerP, auditorPtr) !=
0)
{
return tecBAD_PROOF;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -305,11 +307,15 @@ checkEncryptedAmountFormat(STObject const& object)
// are present.
if (!object.isFieldPresent(sfHolderEncryptedAmount) ||
!object.isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptedAmount))
{
return temMALFORMED; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
if (object[sfHolderEncryptedAmount].length() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength ||
object[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount].length() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength)
{
return temBAD_CIPHERTEXT;
}
bool const hasAuditor = object.isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptedAmount);
if (hasAuditor && object[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount].length() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength)
@@ -317,7 +323,9 @@ checkEncryptedAmountFormat(STObject const& object)
if (!isValidCiphertext(object[sfHolderEncryptedAmount]) ||
!isValidCiphertext(object[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount]))
{
return temBAD_CIPHERTEXT;
}
if (hasAuditor && !isValidCiphertext(object[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]))
return temBAD_CIPHERTEXT;
@@ -347,11 +355,15 @@ verifyClawbackProof(
{
if (ciphertext.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength || pubKeySlice.size() != ecPubKeyLength ||
proof.size() != ecClawbackProofLength)
{
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
if (mpt_verify_clawback_proof(
proof.data(), amount, pubKeySlice.data(), ciphertext.data(), contextHash.data()) != 0)
{
return tecBAD_PROOF;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -378,7 +390,9 @@ verifySendProof(
spendingBalance.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength ||
amountCommitment.size() != ecPedersenCommitmentLength ||
balanceCommitment.size() != ecPedersenCommitmentLength)
{
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
auto makeParticipant = [](ConfidentialRecipient const& r) {
mpt_confidential_participant p;
@@ -395,19 +409,23 @@ verifySendProof(
{
if (auditor->publicKey.size() != ecPubKeyLength ||
auditor->encryptedAmount.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength)
return tecINTERNAL;
{
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
participants[3] = makeParticipant(*auditor);
}
if (mpt_verify_send_proof(
proof.data(),
participants.data(),
static_cast<uint8_t>(recipientCount),
recipientCount,
spendingBalance.data(),
amountCommitment.data(),
balanceCommitment.data(),
contextHash.data()) != 0)
{
return tecBAD_PROOF;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -424,7 +442,9 @@ verifyConvertBackProof(
if (proof.size() != ecConvertBackProofLength || pubKeySlice.size() != ecPubKeyLength ||
spendingBalance.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength ||
balanceCommitment.size() != ecPedersenCommitmentLength)
{
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
if (mpt_verify_convert_back_proof(
proof.data(),
@@ -433,7 +453,9 @@ verifyConvertBackProof(
balanceCommitment.data(),
amount,
contextHash.data()) != 0)
{
return tecBAD_PROOF;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}

6
src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/token/ConfidentialMPTClawback.cpp
View File

@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTClawback::doApply()
auto const clawAmount = ctx_.tx[sfMPTAmount];
Slice const holderPubKey = (*sleHolderMPToken)[sfHolderEncryptionKey];
Slice const issuerPubKey = (*sleIssuance)[sfIssuerEncryptionKey];
auto const holderPubKey = (*sleHolderMPToken)[sfHolderEncryptionKey];
auto const issuerPubKey = (*sleIssuance)[sfIssuerEncryptionKey];
// After clawback, the balance should be encrypted zero.
auto const encZeroForHolder = encryptCanonicalZeroAmount(holderPubKey, holder, mptIssuanceID);
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTClawback::doApply()
if (!sleIssuance->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptionKey))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
Slice const auditorPubKey = (*sleIssuance)[sfAuditorEncryptionKey];
auto const auditorPubKey = (*sleIssuance)[sfAuditorEncryptionKey];
auto encZeroForAuditor = encryptCanonicalZeroAmount(auditorPubKey, holder, mptIssuanceID);

9
src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/token/ConfidentialMPTConvert.cpp
View File

@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (!sleIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTCanConfidentialAmount) ||
!sleIssuance->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptionKey))
{
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
// already checked in preflight, but should also check that issuer on the
// issuance isn't the account either
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, mptIssue, account); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
STAmount const mptAmount =
auto const mptAmount =
STAmount(MPTAmount{static_cast<MPTAmount::value_type>(amount)}, mptIssue);
if (accountHolds(
ctx.view,
@@ -203,9 +205,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::doApply()
(*sleMptoken)[sfMPTAmount] = amt - amtToConvert;
(*sleIssuance)[sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount] = currentCOA + amtToConvert;
Slice const holderEc = ctx_.tx[sfHolderEncryptedAmount];
Slice const issuerEc = ctx_.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount];
auto const holderEc = ctx_.tx[sfHolderEncryptedAmount];
auto const issuerEc = ctx_.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount];
auto const auditorEc = ctx_.tx[~sfAuditorEncryptedAmount];
// Two cases for Convert:

2
src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/token/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.cpp
View File

@@ -164,9 +164,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvertBack::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
// holder is trying to convert back, we know for sure this txn should
// fail
if ((*sleIssuance)[~sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount].value_or(0) < amount)
{
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
}
// Check lock
MPTIssue const mptIssue(mptIssuanceID);

2
src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/token/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.cpp
View File

@@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (!sleMptoken->isFieldPresent(sfConfidentialBalanceInbox) ||
!sleMptoken->isFieldPresent(sfConfidentialBalanceSpending) ||
!sleMptoken->isFieldPresent(sfHolderEncryptionKey))
{
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
// Check lock
auto const account = ctx.tx[sfAccount];

32
src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/token/ConfidentialMPTSend.cpp
View File

@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
if (ctx.tx[sfSenderEncryptedAmount].length() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength ||
ctx.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount].length() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength ||
ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount].length() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength)
{
return temBAD_CIPHERTEXT;
}
bool const hasAuditor = ctx.tx.isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptedAmount);
if (hasAuditor && ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount].length() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength)
@@ -46,14 +48,18 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
// Check the Pedersen commitments are valid
if (!isValidCompressedECPoint(ctx.tx[sfBalanceCommitment]) ||
!isValidCompressedECPoint(ctx.tx[sfAmountCommitment]))
{
return temMALFORMED;
}
// Check the encrypted amount formats, this is more expensive so put it at
// the end
if (!isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfSenderEncryptedAmount]) ||
!isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount]) ||
!isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount]))
{
return temBAD_CIPHERTEXT;
}
if (hasAuditor && !isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]))
return temBAD_CIPHERTEXT;
@@ -154,7 +160,9 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (!sleSenderMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfHolderEncryptionKey) ||
!sleSenderMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfConfidentialBalanceSpending) ||
!sleSenderMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptedBalance))
{
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
// Check destination's MPToken existence
auto const sleDestinationMPToken = ctx.view.read(keylet::mptoken(mptIssuanceID, destination));
@@ -165,14 +173,18 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (!sleDestinationMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfHolderEncryptionKey) ||
!sleDestinationMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfConfidentialBalanceInbox) ||
!sleDestinationMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfIssuerEncryptedBalance))
{
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
}
// Sanity check: Both MPTokens' auditor fields must be present if auditing
// is enabled
if (requiresAuditor &&
(!sleSenderMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptedBalance) ||
!sleDestinationMPToken->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorEncryptedBalance)))
{
return tefINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
// Check lock
MPTIssue const mptIssue(mptIssuanceID);
@@ -205,7 +217,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
auto sleSenderMPToken = view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptIssuanceID, account_));
auto sleDestinationMPToken = view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptIssuanceID, destination));
auto sleDestAcct = view().peek(keylet::account(destination));
auto const sleDestAcct = view().peek(keylet::account(destination));
if (!sleSenderMPToken || !sleDestinationMPToken || !sleDestAcct)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -215,15 +227,15 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
!isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
Slice const senderEc = ctx_.tx[sfSenderEncryptedAmount];
Slice const destEc = ctx_.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount];
Slice const issuerEc = ctx_.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount];
auto const senderEc = ctx_.tx[sfSenderEncryptedAmount];
auto const destEc = ctx_.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount];
auto const issuerEc = ctx_.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount];
auto const auditorEc = ctx_.tx[~sfAuditorEncryptedAmount];
// Subtract from sender's spending balance
{
Slice const curSpending = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending];
auto const curSpending = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending];
auto newSpending = homomorphicSubtract(curSpending, senderEc);
if (!newSpending)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -233,7 +245,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
// Subtract from issuer's balance
{
Slice const curIssuerEnc = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance];
auto const curIssuerEnc = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance];
auto newIssuerEnc = homomorphicSubtract(curIssuerEnc, issuerEc);
if (!newIssuerEnc)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -244,7 +256,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
// Subtract from auditor's balance if present
if (auditorEc)
{
Slice const curAuditorEnc = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance];
auto const curAuditorEnc = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance];
auto newAuditorEnc = homomorphicSubtract(curAuditorEnc, *auditorEc);
if (!newAuditorEnc)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -254,7 +266,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
// Add to destination's inbox balance
{
Slice const curInbox = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfConfidentialBalanceInbox];
auto const curInbox = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfConfidentialBalanceInbox];
auto newInbox = homomorphicAdd(curInbox, destEc);
if (!newInbox)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -264,7 +276,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
// Add to issuer's balance
{
Slice const curIssuerEnc = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance];
auto const curIssuerEnc = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance];
auto newIssuerEnc = homomorphicAdd(curIssuerEnc, issuerEc);
if (!newIssuerEnc)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -275,7 +287,7 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
// Add to auditor's balance if present
if (auditorEc)
{
Slice const curAuditorEnc = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance];
auto const curAuditorEnc = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance];
auto newAuditorEnc = homomorphicAdd(curAuditorEnc, *auditorEc);
if (!newAuditorEnc)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE

6
src/test/app/ConfidentialTransfer_test.cpp
View File

@@ -3247,7 +3247,7 @@ class ConfidentialTransfer_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// Get the share MPTID from vault
auto const vaultSle = env.le(vaultKeylet);
BEAST_EXPECT(vaultSle != nullptr);
MPTID share = vaultSle->at(sfShareMPTID);
auto const share = vaultSle->at(sfShareMPTID);
// Depositor deposits into vault
tx = vault.deposit(
@@ -3272,7 +3272,7 @@ class ConfidentialTransfer_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
view.rawReplace(issuance);
auto const k = keylet::mptoken(share, depositor.id());
auto sle = std::const_pointer_cast<SLE>(view.read(k));
auto const sle = std::const_pointer_cast<SLE>(view.read(k));
if (!sle)
return false;
// Inject dummy confidential balance fields
@@ -5368,11 +5368,13 @@ class ConfidentialTransfer_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
.err = expectedResult,
});
else
{
mptAlice.convert({
.account = bob,
.amt = amt,
.err = expectedResult,
});
}
if (expectedResult == tesSUCCESS)
{

40
src/test/jtx/impl/mpt.cpp
View File

@@ -577,6 +577,7 @@ MPTTester::checkDomainID(std::optional<uint256> expected) const
});
}
// todo: remove this function, which is only for debugging
[[nodiscard]] bool
MPTTester::printMPT(Account const& holder_) const
{
@@ -833,14 +834,11 @@ MPTTester::getConfidentialSendProof(
std::uint64_t const amount,
std::vector<ConfidentialRecipient> const& recipients,
Slice const& blindingFactor,
std::size_t const nRecipients,
uint256 const& contextHash,
PedersenProofParams const& amountParams,
PedersenProofParams const& balanceParams) const
{
auto const pedersenBalanceParams = makePedersenParams(balanceParams);
if (recipients.size() != nRecipients)
return std::nullopt;
if (blindingFactor.size() != ecBlindingFactorLength)
return std::nullopt;
@@ -857,13 +855,15 @@ MPTTester::getConfidentialSendProof(
return std::nullopt;
// Build mpt_confidential_participant array
std::vector<mpt_confidential_participant> participants(nRecipients);
for (size_t i = 0; i < nRecipients; ++i)
std::vector<mpt_confidential_participant> participants(recipients.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < recipients.size(); ++i)
{
auto const& r = recipients[i];
if (r.encryptedAmount.size() != ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength ||
r.publicKey.size() != ecPubKeyLength)
{
return std::nullopt;
}
std::memcpy(participants[i].pubkey, r.publicKey.data(), kMPT_PUBKEY_SIZE);
std::memcpy(participants[i].ciphertext, r.encryptedAmount.data(), kMPT_ELGAMAL_TOTAL_SIZE);
}
@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ MPTTester::getConfidentialSendProof(
senderPubKey->data(),
amount,
participants.data(),
nRecipients,
recipients.size(),
blindingFactor.data(),
contextHash.data(),
amountParams.pedersenCommitment.data(),
@@ -1353,7 +1353,6 @@ MPTTester::send(MPTConfidentialSend const& arg)
auto const ctxHash =
getSendContextHash(arg.account->id(), *id_, seq, arg.dest->id(), version);
auto const nRecipients = getConfidentialRecipientCount(auditorAmt.has_value());
std::vector<ConfidentialRecipient> recipients;
auto const senderPubKey = getPubKey(*arg.account);
@@ -1361,8 +1360,7 @@ MPTTester::send(MPTConfidentialSend const& arg)
auto const issuerPubKey = getPubKey(issuer_);
// If a key is missing, we skip adding the recipient. This intentionally
// causes proof generation to fail (due to recipient count mismatch),
// triggering the dummy proof fallback.
// causes proof generation to fail, triggering the dummy proof fallback.
if (senderPubKey)
recipients.push_back({Slice(*senderPubKey), senderAmt});
if (destPubKey)
@@ -1397,7 +1395,6 @@ MPTTester::send(MPTConfidentialSend const& arg)
*arg.amt,
recipients,
blindingFactor,
nRecipients,
ctxHash,
{amountCommitment, *arg.amt, senderAmt, blindingFactor},
{balanceCommitment,
@@ -1611,7 +1608,6 @@ MPTTester::sendJV(
auto const ctxHash =
getSendContextHash(arg.account->id(), *id_, seq, arg.dest->id(), version);
auto const nRecipients = getConfidentialRecipientCount(auditorAmt.has_value());
std::vector<ConfidentialRecipient> recipients;
auto const senderPubKey = getPubKey(*arg.account);
@@ -1645,7 +1641,6 @@ MPTTester::sendJV(
*arg.amt,
recipients,
blindingFactor,
nRecipients,
ctxHash,
{amountCommitment, *arg.amt, senderAmt, blindingFactor},
{balanceCommitment,
@@ -1808,7 +1803,9 @@ MPTTester::generateKeyPair(Account const& account)
if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
secp256k1Context(), compressedPubKey, &outLen, &pubKey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) != 1 ||
outLen != ecPubKeyLength)
{
Throw<std::runtime_error>("failed to serialize public key");
}
pubKeys.insert({account.id(), Buffer{compressedPubKey, ecPubKeyLength}});
privKeys.insert({account.id(), Buffer{privKey, ecPrivKeyLength}});
@@ -1817,11 +1814,8 @@ MPTTester::generateKeyPair(Account const& account)
std::optional<Buffer>
MPTTester::getPubKey(Account const& account) const
{
auto it = pubKeys.find(account.id());
if (it != pubKeys.end())
{
if (auto const it = pubKeys.find(account.id()); it != pubKeys.end())
return it->second;
}
return std::nullopt;
}
@@ -1829,11 +1823,8 @@ MPTTester::getPubKey(Account const& account) const
std::optional<Buffer>
MPTTester::getPrivKey(Account const& account) const
{
auto it = privKeys.find(account.id());
if (it != privKeys.end())
{
if (auto const it = privKeys.find(account.id()); it != privKeys.end())
return it->second;
}
return std::nullopt;
}
@@ -1879,9 +1870,8 @@ MPTTester::decryptAmount(Account const& account, Buffer const& amt) const
std::optional<uint64_t>
MPTTester::getDecryptedBalance(Account const& account, EncryptedBalanceType balanceType) const
{
auto encryptedAmt = getEncryptedBalance(account, balanceType);
auto const encryptedAmt = getEncryptedBalance(account, balanceType);
// Return zero to test cases like Feature Disabled, where the ledger object
// does not exist.
@@ -2058,8 +2048,7 @@ MPTTester::convertBack(MPTConvertBack const& arg)
// if the caller generated ciphertexts themselves, they should also
// generate the proof themselves from the blinding factor
auto const seq = arg.ticketSeq.value_or(env_.seq(*arg.account));
uint256 const contextHash =
getConvertBackContextHash(arg.account->id(), *id_, seq, version);
auto const contextHash = getConvertBackContextHash(arg.account->id(), *id_, seq, version);
auto const prevEncryptedSpendingBalance =
getEncryptedBalance(*arg.account, HOLDER_ENCRYPTED_SPENDING);
@@ -2194,8 +2183,7 @@ MPTTester::convertBackJV(MPTConvertBack const& arg, std::uint32_t seq)
{
auto const version = getMPTokenVersion(*arg.account);
auto const prevEncSpending = getEncryptedBalance(*arg.account, HOLDER_ENCRYPTED_SPENDING);
uint256 const contextHash =
getConvertBackContextHash(arg.account->id(), *id_, seq, version);
auto const contextHash = getConvertBackContextHash(arg.account->id(), *id_, seq, version);
Buffer proof;
if (!prevEncSpending)

1
src/test/jtx/mpt.h
View File

@@ -567,7 +567,6 @@ public:
std::uint64_t const amount,
std::vector<ConfidentialRecipient> const& recipients,
Slice const& blindingFactor,
std::size_t const nRecipients,
uint256 const& contextHash,
PedersenProofParams const& amountParams,
PedersenProofParams const& balanceParams) const;