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fix conflicts and update modularization

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This commit is contained in:
Shawn Xie
2026-03-09 14:23:22 -04:00
parent fff83c1d4a
commit a3a82faa3d
11 changed files with 103 additions and 64 deletions
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10
include/xrpl/protocol/detail/transactions.macro
View File

@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttLOAN_PAY, 84, LoanPay,
/** This transaction type converts into confidential MPT balance. */
#if TRANSACTION_INCLUDE
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvert.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvert.h>
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_CONVERT, 85, ConfidentialMPTConvert,
Delegation::delegable,
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_CONVERT, 85, ConfidentialMPTConvert,
/** This transaction type merges MPT inbox. */
#if TRANSACTION_INCLUDE
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.h>
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_MERGE_INBOX, 86, ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox,
Delegation::delegable,
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_MERGE_INBOX, 86, ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox,
/** This transaction type converts back into public MPT balance. */
#if TRANSACTION_INCLUDE
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.h>
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_CONVERT_BACK, 87, ConfidentialMPTConvertBack,
Delegation::delegable,
@@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_CONVERT_BACK, 87, ConfidentialMPTConvertBack,
}))
#if TRANSACTION_INCLUDE
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTSend.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTSend.h>
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_SEND, 88, ConfidentialMPTSend,
Delegation::delegable,
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_SEND, 88, ConfidentialMPTSend,
}))
#if TRANSACTION_INCLUDE
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTClawback.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTClawback.h>
#endif
TRANSACTION(ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_CLAWBACK, 89, ConfidentialMPTClawback,
Delegation::delegable,

3
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTClawback.h → include/xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTClawback.h
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -40,3 +40,4 @@ public:
};
} // namespace xrpl

3
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvert.h → include/xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvert.h
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -42,3 +42,4 @@ public:
};
} // namespace xrpl

3
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.h → include/xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.h
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -43,3 +43,4 @@ public:
};
} // namespace xrpl

3
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.h → include/xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.h
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -44,3 +44,4 @@ public:
};
} // namespace xrpl

3
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTSend.h → include/xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTSend.h
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#pragma once
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -50,3 +50,4 @@ public:
};
} // namespace xrpl

9
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTClawback.cpp → src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTClawback.cpp
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTClawback.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/ConfidentialTransfer.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
@@ -7,6 +5,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTClawback.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -83,7 +82,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTClawback::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (amount > (*sleIssuance)[~sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount].value_or(0))
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
auto const contextHash = getClawbackContextHash(account, mptIssuanceID, ctx.tx.getSeqProxy().value(), holder);
auto const contextHash =
getClawbackContextHash(account, mptIssuanceID, ctx.tx.getSeqProxy().value(), holder);
// Verify the revealed confidential amount by the issuer matches the exact
// confidential balance of the holder.
@@ -136,7 +136,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTClawback::doApply()
Slice const auditorPubKey = (*sleIssuance)[sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey];
auto const encZeroForAuditor = encryptCanonicalZeroAmount(auditorPubKey, holder, mptIssuanceID);
auto const encZeroForAuditor =
encryptCanonicalZeroAmount(auditorPubKey, holder, mptIssuanceID);
if (!encZeroForAuditor)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE

26
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvert.cpp → src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvert.cpp
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvert.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/ConfidentialTransfer.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
@@ -7,6 +5,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvert.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -92,7 +91,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
auto const mptIssue = MPTIssue{issuanceID};
STAmount const mptAmount = STAmount(MPTAmount{static_cast<MPTAmount::value_type>(amount)}, mptIssue);
STAmount const mptAmount =
STAmount(MPTAmount{static_cast<MPTAmount::value_type>(amount)}, mptIssue);
if (accountHolds(
ctx.view,
account,
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
{
holderPubKey = ctx.tx[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey];
auto const contextHash = getConvertContextHash(account, issuanceID, ctx.tx.getSeqProxy().value());
auto const contextHash =
getConvertContextHash(account, issuanceID, ctx.tx.getSeqProxy().value());
// when register new pk, verify through schnorr proof
if (!isTesSuccess(verifySchnorrProof(holderPubKey, ctx.tx[sfZKProof], contextHash)))
@@ -136,8 +137,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
std::optional<ConfidentialRecipient> auditor;
if (hasAuditor)
{
auditor.emplace(
ConfidentialRecipient{(*sleIssuance)[sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]});
auditor.emplace(ConfidentialRecipient{
(*sleIssuance)[sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]});
}
return verifyRevealedAmount(
@@ -188,7 +189,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::doApply()
// Case 1: Add to existing inbox balance (holder will merge later)
{
Buffer sum(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(holderEc, (*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceInbox], sum);
if (TER const ter =
homomorphicAdd(holderEc, (*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceInbox], sum);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -198,7 +200,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::doApply()
// homomorphically add issuer's encrypted balance
{
Buffer sum(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(issuerEc, (*sleMptoken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance], sum);
if (TER const ter =
homomorphicAdd(issuerEc, (*sleMptoken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance], sum);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -209,7 +212,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::doApply()
if (auditorEc)
{
Buffer sum(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(*auditorEc, (*sleMptoken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance], sum);
if (TER const ter =
homomorphicAdd(*auditorEc, (*sleMptoken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance], sum);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -231,8 +235,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvert::doApply()
// Spending balance starts at zero. Must use canonical zero encryption
// (deterministic ciphertext) so the ledger state is reproducible.
auto const zeroBalance =
encryptCanonicalZeroAmount((*sleMptoken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], account_, mptIssuanceID);
auto const zeroBalance = encryptCanonicalZeroAmount(
(*sleMptoken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], account_, mptIssuanceID);
if (!zeroBalance)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE

34
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.cpp → src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.cpp
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/ConfidentialTransfer.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
@@ -7,6 +5,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTConvertBack.h>
#include <cstddef>
@@ -57,7 +56,10 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvertBack::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
* All proofs are verified before returning any error to prevent timing attacks.
*/
static TER
verifyProofs(STTx const& tx, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuance, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& mptoken)
verifyProofs(
STTx const& tx,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuance,
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& mptoken)
{
if (!mptoken->isFieldPresent(sfHolderElGamalPublicKey))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -69,14 +71,18 @@ verifyProofs(STTx const& tx, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuance, std::sh
auto const holderPubKey = (*mptoken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey];
auto const contextHash = getConvertBackContextHash(
account, mptIssuanceID, tx.getSeqProxy().value(), (*mptoken)[~sfConfidentialBalanceVersion].value_or(0));
account,
mptIssuanceID,
tx.getSeqProxy().value(),
(*mptoken)[~sfConfidentialBalanceVersion].value_or(0));
// Prepare Auditor Info
std::optional<ConfidentialRecipient> auditor;
bool const hasAuditor = issuance->isFieldPresent(sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey);
if (hasAuditor)
{
auditor.emplace(ConfidentialRecipient{(*issuance)[sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey], tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]});
auditor.emplace(ConfidentialRecipient{
(*issuance)[sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey], tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]});
}
// Run all verifications before returning any error to prevent timing attacks
@@ -135,7 +141,8 @@ verifyProofs(STTx const& tx, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuance, std::sh
{
// Compute PC_rem = PC_balance - mG (the commitment to the remaining balance)
Buffer pcRem;
if (auto const ter = computeConvertBackRemainder(tx[sfBalanceCommitment], amount, pcRem); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (auto const ter = computeConvertBackRemainder(tx[sfBalanceCommitment], amount, pcRem);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
{
valid = false;
}
@@ -143,7 +150,8 @@ verifyProofs(STTx const& tx, std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& issuance, std::sh
// The bulletproof verifies that the remaining balance is non-negative
std::vector<Slice> commitments{Slice(pcRem.data(), pcRem.size())};
if (auto const ter = verifyAggregatedBulletproof(bulletproof, commitments, contextHash); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (auto const ter = verifyAggregatedBulletproof(bulletproof, commitments, contextHash);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
{
valid = false;
}
@@ -249,7 +257,9 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvertBack::doApply()
{
Buffer res(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(
(*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending], ctx_.tx[sfHolderEncryptedAmount], res);
(*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending],
ctx_.tx[sfHolderEncryptedAmount],
res);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -259,8 +269,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvertBack::doApply()
// homomorphically subtract issuer's encrypted balance
{
Buffer res(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter =
homomorphicSubtract((*sleMptoken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance], ctx_.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount], res);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(
(*sleMptoken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance], ctx_.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount], res);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -270,8 +280,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTConvertBack::doApply()
if (auditorEc)
{
Buffer res(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter =
homomorphicSubtract((*sleMptoken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance], ctx_.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount], res);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(
(*sleMptoken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance], ctx_.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount], res);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE

14
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.cpp → src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.cpp
View File

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/ConfidentialTransfer.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -37,7 +36,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (sleIssuance->getAccountID(sfIssuer) == ctx.tx[sfAccount])
return tefINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const sleMptoken = ctx.view.read(keylet::mptoken(ctx.tx[sfMPTokenIssuanceID], ctx.tx[sfAccount]));
auto const sleMptoken =
ctx.view.read(keylet::mptoken(ctx.tx[sfMPTokenIssuanceID], ctx.tx[sfAccount]));
if (!sleMptoken)
return tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@ ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox::doApply()
// transfers sit in inbox and cannot be spent or converted back.
Buffer sum(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(
(*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending], (*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceInbox], sum);
(*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending],
(*sleMptoken)[sfConfidentialBalanceInbox],
sum);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -78,8 +80,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox::doApply()
// Reset inbox to encrypted zero. Must use canonical zero encryption
// (deterministic ciphertext) so the ledger state is reproducible.
auto const zeroEncryption =
encryptCanonicalZeroAmount((*sleMptoken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], account_, mptIssuanceID);
auto const zeroEncryption = encryptCanonicalZeroAmount(
(*sleMptoken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], account_, mptIssuanceID);
if (!zeroEncryption)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE

59
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTSend.cpp → src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTSend.cpp
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/ConfidentialMPTSend.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/CredentialHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/View.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/ConfidentialTransfer.h>
@@ -8,6 +6,7 @@
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/transactors/MPT/ConfidentialMPTSend.h>
namespace xrpl {
@@ -44,17 +43,20 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::preflight(PreflightContext const& ctx)
auto const sizeEquality = secp256k1_mpt_proof_equality_shared_r_size(recipientCount);
auto const sizePedersenLinkage = 2 * ecPedersenProofLength;
if (ctx.tx[sfZKProof].length() != sizeEquality + sizePedersenLinkage + ecDoubleBulletproofLength)
if (ctx.tx[sfZKProof].length() !=
sizeEquality + sizePedersenLinkage + ecDoubleBulletproofLength)
return temMALFORMED;
// Check the Pedersen commitments are valid
if (!isValidCompressedECPoint(ctx.tx[sfBalanceCommitment]) || !isValidCompressedECPoint(ctx.tx[sfAmountCommitment]))
if (!isValidCompressedECPoint(ctx.tx[sfBalanceCommitment]) ||
!isValidCompressedECPoint(ctx.tx[sfAmountCommitment]))
return temMALFORMED;
// Check the encrypted amount formats, this is more expensive so put it at
// the end
if (!isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfSenderEncryptedAmount]) ||
!isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount]) || !isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount]))
!isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount]) ||
!isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount]))
return temBAD_CIPHERTEXT;
if (hasAuditor && !isValidCiphertext(ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]))
@@ -123,13 +125,17 @@ verifySendProofs(
std::vector<ConfidentialRecipient> recipients;
recipients.reserve(recipientCount);
recipients.push_back({(*sleSenderMPToken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfSenderEncryptedAmount]});
recipients.push_back({(*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount]});
recipients.push_back({(*sleIssuance)[sfIssuerElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount]});
recipients.push_back(
{(*sleSenderMPToken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfSenderEncryptedAmount]});
recipients.push_back(
{(*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfHolderElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfDestinationEncryptedAmount]});
recipients.push_back(
{(*sleIssuance)[sfIssuerElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfIssuerEncryptedAmount]});
if (hasAuditor)
{
recipients.push_back({(*sleIssuance)[sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]});
recipients.push_back(
{(*sleIssuance)[sfAuditorElGamalPublicKey], ctx.tx[sfAuditorEncryptedAmount]});
}
// Prepare the context hash
@@ -140,12 +146,13 @@ verifySendProofs(
ctx.tx[sfDestination],
(*sleSenderMPToken)[~sfConfidentialBalanceVersion].value_or(0));
// Use a boolean flag to track validity instead of returning early on failure to prevent leaking information about
// which proof failed through timing differences
// Use a boolean flag to track validity instead of returning early on failure to prevent leaking
// information about which proof failed through timing differences
bool valid = true;
// Verify the multi-ciphertext equality proof
if (auto const ter = verifyMultiCiphertextEqualityProof(equalityProof, recipients, recipientCount, contextHash);
if (auto const ter = verifyMultiCiphertextEqualityProof(
equalityProof, recipients, recipientCount, contextHash);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
{
valid = false;
@@ -180,7 +187,8 @@ verifySendProofs(
Buffer pcRem;
// Derive PC_rem = PC_balance - PC_amount
if (auto const ter = computeSendRemainder(ctx.tx[sfBalanceCommitment], ctx.tx[sfAmountCommitment], pcRem);
if (auto const ter = computeSendRemainder(
ctx.tx[sfBalanceCommitment], ctx.tx[sfAmountCommitment], pcRem);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
{
valid = false;
@@ -193,7 +201,8 @@ verifySendProofs(
commitments.push_back(ctx.tx[sfAmountCommitment]);
commitments.push_back(Slice{pcRem.data(), pcRem.size()});
if (auto const ter = verifyAggregatedBulletproof(rangeProof, commitments, contextHash); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (auto const ter = verifyAggregatedBulletproof(rangeProof, commitments, contextHash);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
{
valid = false;
}
@@ -294,7 +303,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if (auto const ter = requireAuth(ctx.view, mptIssue, destination); !isTesSuccess(ter))
return ter;
if (auto const err = credentials::valid(ctx.tx, ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.j); !isTesSuccess(err))
if (auto const err = credentials::valid(ctx.tx, ctx.view, ctx.tx[sfAccount], ctx.j);
!isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
return verifySendProofs(ctx, sleSenderMPToken, sleDestinationMPToken, sleIssuance);
@@ -314,7 +324,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
if (!sleSenderMPToken || !sleDestinationMPToken || !sleDestAcct)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
if (auto err = verifyDepositPreauth(ctx_.tx, ctx_.view(), account_, destination, sleDestAcct, ctx_.journal);
if (auto err = verifyDepositPreauth(
ctx_.tx, ctx_.view(), account_, destination, sleDestAcct, ctx_.journal);
!isTesSuccess(err))
return err;
@@ -329,7 +340,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
Slice const curSpending = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending];
Buffer newSpending(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(curSpending, senderEc, newSpending); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(curSpending, senderEc, newSpending);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
(*sleSenderMPToken)[sfConfidentialBalanceSpending] = newSpending;
@@ -340,7 +352,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
Slice const curIssuerEnc = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance];
Buffer newIssuerEnc(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(curIssuerEnc, issuerEc, newIssuerEnc); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(curIssuerEnc, issuerEc, newIssuerEnc);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
(*sleSenderMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance] = newIssuerEnc;
@@ -352,7 +365,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
Slice const curAuditorEnc = (*sleSenderMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance];
Buffer newAuditorEnc(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(curAuditorEnc, *auditorEc, newAuditorEnc); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (TER const ter = homomorphicSubtract(curAuditorEnc, *auditorEc, newAuditorEnc);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
(*sleSenderMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance] = newAuditorEnc;
@@ -374,7 +388,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
Slice const curIssuerEnc = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance];
Buffer newIssuerEnc(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(curIssuerEnc, issuerEc, newIssuerEnc); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(curIssuerEnc, issuerEc, newIssuerEnc);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
(*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfIssuerEncryptedBalance] = newIssuerEnc;
@@ -386,7 +401,8 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
Slice const curAuditorEnc = (*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance];
Buffer newAuditorEnc(ecGamalEncryptedTotalLength);
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(curAuditorEnc, *auditorEc, newAuditorEnc); !isTesSuccess(ter))
if (TER const ter = homomorphicAdd(curAuditorEnc, *auditorEc, newAuditorEnc);
!isTesSuccess(ter))
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
(*sleDestinationMPToken)[sfAuditorEncryptedBalance] = newAuditorEnc;
@@ -399,4 +415,5 @@ ConfidentialMPTSend::doApply()
view().update(sleDestinationMPToken);
return tesSUCCESS;
}
} // namespace xrpl