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fix: unify invariant overwrite tests into single parameterized helper

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Consolidate the regression tests and legacy tests into a single
testInvariantOverwrite(FeatureBitset) that tests both pre- and
post-amendment behavior for all three affected invariants.
This commit is contained in:
Vito
2026-04-03 15:03:31 +02:00
parent d5fa8485e8
commit 3cccbdf966
1 changed files with 42 additions and 100 deletions
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142
src/test/app/Invariants_test.cpp
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@@ -500,26 +500,6 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// Regression: two trust lines where the first is bad (XRP) and the
// second is valid. Plain assignment would overwrite the earlier true.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"an XRP trust line was created"}},
[](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// First: bad XRP trust line
auto const sleBad =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A2, xrpIssue().currency));
ac.view().insert(sleBad);
// Second: valid USD trust line — must NOT clear the flag
Account const A3{"A3"};
auto const sleGood =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A3, A1["USD"].currency));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, A1["USD"](0));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, A1["USD"](0));
ac.view().insert(sleGood);
return true;
});
}
void
@@ -598,31 +578,6 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// Regression: two trust lines where the first has deep freeze without
// freeze, and the second is valid. Plain assignment would overwrite
// the earlier true.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without normal freeze was "
"created"}},
[](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// First: bad — lowDeepFreeze without lowFreeze
auto const sleBad = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A2, A1["USD"].currency));
sleBad->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, A1["USD"](0));
sleBad->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, A1["USD"](0));
sleBad->setFieldU32(sfFlags, lsfLowDeepFreeze);
ac.view().insert(sleBad);
// Second: valid — no deep freeze flags at all
Account const A3{"A3"};
auto const sleGood =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, A3, A1["EUR"].currency));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, A1["EUR"](0));
sleGood->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, A1["EUR"](0));
sleGood->setFieldU32(sfFlags, 0u);
ac.view().insert(sleGood);
return true;
});
}
void
@@ -978,25 +933,6 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
return true;
});
// Regression: MPT OutstandingAmount exceeds max, but locked <=
// outstanding. Plain assignment would overwrite earlier bad_ = true.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(A1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{MPTIssue{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))}};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
// outstanding exceeds maxMPTokenAmount -> checkAmount sets bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, maxMPTokenAmount + 1);
// locked is valid and <= outstanding -> must NOT clear bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, 10);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT MPTAmount < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
@@ -3868,31 +3804,35 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
precloseMpt);
}
// Verify that without fixSecurity3_1_3, the overwrite bug is
// preserved: a valid entry after a bad entry overwrites the flag,
// causing the invariant to incorrectly pass.
// Test the invariant overwrite fix for both pre- and post-amendment
// behavior. With the fix enabled, |= accumulates violations across
// entries so a later valid entry cannot clear an earlier violation.
// Without the fix, = assignment means the last-visited entry wins.
void
testInvariantOverwriteLegacy()
testInvariantOverwrite(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
auto const features = defaultAmendments() - fixSecurity3_1_3;
bool const fixEnabled = features[fixSecurity3_1_3];
std::initializer_list<TER> const failTers = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED};
std::initializer_list<TER> const passTers = {tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS};
// NoXRPTrustLines: a trust line with sfLowLimit set to xrpIssue
// (bad), followed by a valid trust line visited last (higher key).
// Legacy = assignment overwrites the flag from true to false.
// The invariant checks sfLowLimit/sfHighLimit issue, not the
// keylet currency, so we use non-XRP keylet currencies to
// control the hash ordering.
testcase << "legacy overwrite: NoXRPTrustLines";
// Regression: bad XRP trust line followed by a valid trust line.
// With the fix, the invariant catches the violation.
// Without the fix, the valid entry overwrites the flag to false.
// We use non-XRP keylet currencies so we can control the hash
// ordering (the invariant checks sfLowLimit/sfHighLimit issue,
// not the keylet currency).
testcase << "overwrite: NoXRPTrustLines" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
Env(*this, features),
{},
fixEnabled ? std::vector<std::string>{{"an XRP trust line was created"}}
: std::vector<std::string>{},
[](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const A3{"A3"};
// Compute ordering once, then assign "bad" (XRP issue)
// to the lower-sorting key and "good" (proper IOU limits)
// to the higher-sorting key.
// Compute ordering: assign "bad" (XRP issue) to the
// lower-sorting key and "good" to the higher-sorting key,
// so that the good entry is visited last.
char const* const c1 = "AAA";
char const* const c2 = "ZZZ";
auto const k1 = keylet::line(A1, A2, A1[c1].currency);
@@ -3919,15 +3859,15 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS});
fixEnabled ? failTers : passTers);
// NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze: bad deep-freeze trust line
// and a valid trust line. Legacy = assignment means the last-visited
// entry determines the flag. We ensure good sorts after bad.
testcase << "legacy overwrite: NoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze";
// Regression: bad deep-freeze trust line followed by a valid one.
testcase << "overwrite: NoDeepFreeze" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
Env(*this, features),
{},
fixEnabled ? std::vector<std::string>{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without "
"normal freeze was created"}}
: std::vector<std::string>{},
[](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const A3{"A3"};
@@ -3958,34 +3898,35 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS});
fixEnabled ? failTers : passTers);
// NoZeroEscrow: MPT outstanding exceeds max, but locked <= outstanding.
// Legacy = assignment overwrites bad_ = true with the result of
// outstanding < locked (which is false), so NoZeroEscrow passes.
// ValidMPTIssuance still fires ("a MPT issuance was created"), so
// the overall result is tecINVARIANT_FAILED, but we verify that
// the NoZeroEscrow message is absent (it would be present with the
// fix enabled).
testcase << "legacy overwrite: NoZeroEscrow MPT";
// Regression: MPT OutstandingAmount exceeds max, but locked <=
// outstanding. Plain assignment would overwrite bad_ = true.
// With the fix, NoZeroEscrow catches it.
// Without the fix, NoZeroEscrow passes but ValidMPTIssuance
// still fires ("a MPT issuance was created").
testcase << "overwrite: NoZeroEscrow MPT" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
Env(*this, features),
{{"a MPT issuance was created"}},
[&](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
fixEnabled ? std::vector<std::string>{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}}
: std::vector<std::string>{{"a MPT issuance was created"}},
[](Account const& A1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(A1.id()));
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{MPTIssue{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))}};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
// outstanding exceeds maxMPTokenAmount -> checkAmount sets bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, maxMPTokenAmount + 1);
// locked is valid and <= outstanding -> must NOT clear bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, 10);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
fixEnabled ? failTers : failTers);
}
public:
@@ -4013,7 +3954,8 @@ public:
testValidPseudoAccounts();
testValidLoanBroker();
testVault();
testInvariantOverwriteLegacy();
testInvariantOverwrite(defaultAmendments());
testInvariantOverwrite(defaultAmendments() - fixSecurity3_1_3);
}
};