Files
xahaud/include/xrpl/protocol/ExportLimits.h
2026-06-26 20:06:57 +07:00

44 lines
1.7 KiB
C++

#ifndef RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_EXPORT_LIMITS_H_INCLUDED
#define RIPPLE_PROTOCOL_EXPORT_LIMITS_H_INCLUDED
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
namespace ripple {
// Export system caps.
//
// These limits bound the DoS surface of the export signature system:
// - Each pending export requires every validator to sign it every round
// (sign-once, attach once via TMProposeSet)
// - Inbound signature processing involves crypto verification per sig
// - The open-ledger cap (maxPendingExports) is the root constraint;
// signing throughput and inbound processing are transitively bounded by it
struct ExportLimits
{
// Maximum exports a single hook execution may produce
// (also enforced by hook_api::max_export in Enum.h)
static constexpr std::uint8_t maxExportsPerHook = 2;
// Maximum pending export transactions in an open/apply ledger.
// Hook-emitted export backlog drains into the open ledger at this cap.
// This transitively caps:
// - signatures per TMProposeSet message (1 per pending export)
// - inbound proposal signature processing (clamped to this)
// - validator signing work per round
static constexpr std::uint8_t maxPendingExports = 8;
// Maximum byte length of a single export-signature wire blob:
// txHash(32) + validator pubkey(33) + multisign signature(<= 72).
// A fully-canonical secp256k1 signature is at most 72 bytes (ed25519 is
// 64), so 137 is the true upper bound for a well-formed entry. The proposal
// ingress path hashes these blobs BEFORE the proposal signature is
// verified, so bounding the per-blob size caps pre-auth hashing/copy work
// (DoS).
static constexpr std::size_t maxExportSignatureBytes = 32 + 33 + 72;
};
} // namespace ripple
#endif