Files
xahaud/src/ripple/app/misc/impl/Manifest.cpp
Scott Schurr afcc4ff296 Reduce likelihood of malformed SOTemplate:
Formerly an SOTemplate was default constructed and its elements
added using push_back().  This left open the possibility of a
malformed SOTemplate if adding one of the elements caused a throw.

With this commit the SOTemplate requires an initializer_list of
its elements at construction.  Elements may not be added after
construction.  With this approach either the SOTemplate is fully
constructed with all of its elements or the constructor throws,
which prevents an invalid SOTemplate from even existing.

This change requires all SOTemplate construction to be adjusted
at the call site.  Those changes are also in this commit.

The SOE_Flags enum is also renamed to SOEStyle, which harmonizes
the name with other uses in the code base.  SOEStyle elements
are renamed (slightly) to have an "soe" prefix rather than "SOE_".
This heads toward reserving identifiers with all upper case for
macros.  The new style also aligns with other prominent enums in
the code base like the collection of TER identifiers.

SOElement is adjusted so it can be stored directly in an STL
container, rather than requiring storage in a unique_ptr.
Correspondingly, unique_ptr usage is removed from both
SOTemplate and KnownFormats.
2019-04-26 11:17:45 -07:00

540 lines
16 KiB
C++

//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2012, 2013 Ripple Labs Inc.
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <ripple/app/misc/Manifest.h>
#include <ripple/basics/base64.h>
#include <ripple/basics/contract.h>
#include <ripple/basics/Log.h>
#include <ripple/basics/StringUtilities.h>
#include <ripple/beast/rfc2616.h>
#include <ripple/core/DatabaseCon.h>
#include <ripple/json/json_reader.h>
#include <ripple/protocol/PublicKey.h>
#include <ripple/protocol/Sign.h>
#include <boost/algorithm/clamp.hpp>
#include <boost/regex.hpp>
#include <numeric>
#include <stdexcept>
namespace ripple {
boost::optional<Manifest> deserializeManifest(Slice s)
{
if (s.empty())
return boost::none;
static SOTemplate const manifestFormat {
// A manifest must include:
// - the master public key
{sfPublicKey, soeREQUIRED},
// - a signature with that public key
{sfMasterSignature, soeREQUIRED},
// - a sequence number
{sfSequence, soeREQUIRED},
// It may, optionally, contain:
// - a version number which defaults to 0
{sfVersion, soeDEFAULT},
// - a domain name
{sfDomain, soeOPTIONAL},
// - an ephemeral signing key that can be changed as necessary
{sfSigningPubKey, soeOPTIONAL},
// - a signature using the ephemeral signing key, if it is present
{sfSignature, soeOPTIONAL},
};
try
{
SerialIter sit{ s };
STObject st{ sit, sfGeneric };
st.applyTemplate(manifestFormat);
// We only understand "version 0" manifests at this time:
if (st.isFieldPresent(sfVersion) && st.getFieldU16(sfVersion) != 0)
return boost::none;
auto const pk = st.getFieldVL (sfPublicKey);
if (! publicKeyType (makeSlice(pk)))
return boost::none;
Manifest m;
m.serialized.assign(reinterpret_cast<char const*>(s.data()), s.size());
m.masterKey = PublicKey(makeSlice(pk));
m.sequence = st.getFieldU32 (sfSequence);
if (st.isFieldPresent(sfDomain))
{
auto const d = st.getFieldVL(sfDomain);
// The domain must be between 4 and 128 characters long
if (boost::algorithm::clamp(d.size(), 4, 128) != d.size())
return boost::none;
m.domain.assign (reinterpret_cast<char const*>(d.data()), d.size());
// This regular expression should do a decent job of weeding out
// obviously wrong domain names but it isn't perfect. It does not
// really support IDNs. If this turns out to be an issue, a more
// thorough regex can be used or this check can just be removed.
static boost::regex const re(
"^" // Beginning of line
"(" // Beginning of a segment
"(?!-)" // - must not begin with '-'
"[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,63}" // - only alphanumeric and '-'
"(?<!-)" // - must not end with '-'
"\\." // segment separator
")+" // 1 or more segments
"[A-Za-z]{2,63}" // TLD
"$" // End of line
, boost::regex_constants::optimize);
if (!boost::regex_match(m.domain, re))
return boost::none;
}
bool const hasEphemeralKey = st.isFieldPresent(sfSigningPubKey);
bool const hasEphemeralSig = st.isFieldPresent(sfSignature);
if (m.revoked())
{
// Revocation manifests should not specify a new signing key
// or a signing key signature.
if (hasEphemeralKey)
return boost::none;
if (hasEphemeralSig)
return boost::none;
}
else
{
// Regular manifests should contain a signing key and an
// associated signature.
if (!hasEphemeralKey)
return boost::none;
if (!hasEphemeralSig)
return boost::none;
auto const spk = st.getFieldVL(sfSigningPubKey);
if (!publicKeyType (makeSlice(spk)))
return boost::none;
m.signingKey = PublicKey(makeSlice(spk));
}
return std::move(m);
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
return boost::none;
}
}
template<class Stream>
Stream&
logMftAct (
Stream& s,
std::string const& action,
PublicKey const& pk,
std::uint32_t seq)
{
s << "Manifest: " << action <<
";Pk: " << toBase58 (TokenType::NodePublic, pk) <<
";Seq: " << seq << ";";
return s;
}
template<class Stream>
Stream& logMftAct (
Stream& s,
std::string const& action,
PublicKey const& pk,
std::uint32_t seq,
std::uint32_t oldSeq)
{
s << "Manifest: " << action <<
";Pk: " << toBase58 (TokenType::NodePublic, pk) <<
";Seq: " << seq <<
";OldSeq: " << oldSeq << ";";
return s;
}
bool Manifest::verify () const
{
STObject st (sfGeneric);
SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ());
st.set (sit);
// Signing key and signature are not required for
// master key revocations
if (! revoked () && ! ripple::verify (st, HashPrefix::manifest, signingKey))
return false;
return ripple::verify (
st, HashPrefix::manifest, masterKey, sfMasterSignature);
}
uint256 Manifest::hash () const
{
STObject st (sfGeneric);
SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ());
st.set (sit);
return st.getHash (HashPrefix::manifest);
}
bool Manifest::revoked () const
{
/*
The maximum possible sequence number means that the master key
has been revoked.
*/
return sequence == std::numeric_limits<std::uint32_t>::max ();
}
Blob Manifest::getSignature () const
{
STObject st (sfGeneric);
SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ());
st.set (sit);
return st.getFieldVL (sfSignature);
}
Blob Manifest::getMasterSignature () const
{
STObject st (sfGeneric);
SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ());
st.set (sit);
return st.getFieldVL (sfMasterSignature);
}
ValidatorToken::ValidatorToken(std::string const& m, SecretKey const& valSecret)
: manifest(m)
, validationSecret(valSecret)
{
}
boost::optional<ValidatorToken>
ValidatorToken::make_ValidatorToken(std::vector<std::string> const& tokenBlob)
{
try
{
std::string tokenStr;
tokenStr.reserve (
std::accumulate (tokenBlob.cbegin(), tokenBlob.cend(), std::size_t(0),
[] (std::size_t init, std::string const& s)
{
return init + s.size();
}));
for (auto const& line : tokenBlob)
tokenStr += beast::rfc2616::trim(line);
tokenStr = base64_decode(tokenStr);
Json::Reader r;
Json::Value token;
if (! r.parse (tokenStr, token))
return boost::none;
if (token.isMember("manifest") && token["manifest"].isString() &&
token.isMember("validation_secret_key") &&
token["validation_secret_key"].isString())
{
auto const ret = strUnHex (token["validation_secret_key"].asString());
if (! ret.second || ret.first.empty())
return boost::none;
return ValidatorToken(
token["manifest"].asString(),
SecretKey(Slice{ret.first.data(), ret.first.size()}));
}
else
{
return boost::none;
}
}
catch (std::exception const&)
{
return boost::none;
}
}
PublicKey
ManifestCache::getSigningKey (PublicKey const& pk) const
{
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock{read_mutex_};
auto const iter = map_.find (pk);
if (iter != map_.end () && !iter->second.revoked ())
return iter->second.signingKey;
return pk;
}
PublicKey
ManifestCache::getMasterKey (PublicKey const& pk) const
{
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock{read_mutex_};
auto const iter = signingToMasterKeys_.find (pk);
if (iter != signingToMasterKeys_.end ())
return iter->second;
return pk;
}
bool
ManifestCache::revoked (PublicKey const& pk) const
{
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock{read_mutex_};
auto const iter = map_.find (pk);
if (iter != map_.end ())
return iter->second.revoked ();
return false;
}
ManifestDisposition
ManifestCache::applyManifest (Manifest m)
{
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> applyLock{apply_mutex_};
/*
before we spend time checking the signature, make sure the
sequence number is newer than any we have.
*/
auto const iter = map_.find(m.masterKey);
if (iter != map_.end() &&
m.sequence <= iter->second.sequence)
{
/*
A manifest was received for a validator we're tracking, but
its sequence number is not higher than the one already stored.
This will happen normally when a peer without the latest gossip
connects.
*/
if (auto stream = j_.debug())
logMftAct(stream, "Stale", m.masterKey, m.sequence, iter->second.sequence);
return ManifestDisposition::stale; // not a newer manifest, ignore
}
if (! m.verify())
{
/*
A manifest's signature is invalid.
This shouldn't happen normally.
*/
if (auto stream = j_.warn())
logMftAct(stream, "Invalid", m.masterKey, m.sequence);
return ManifestDisposition::invalid;
}
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> readLock{read_mutex_};
bool const revoked = m.revoked();
if (revoked)
{
/*
A validator master key has been compromised, so its manifests
are now untrustworthy. In order to prevent us from accepting
a forged manifest signed by the compromised master key, store
this manifest, which has the highest possible sequence number
and therefore can't be superseded by a forged one.
*/
if (auto stream = j_.warn())
logMftAct(stream, "Revoked", m.masterKey, m.sequence);
}
if (iter == map_.end ())
{
/*
This is the first received manifest for a trusted master key
(possibly our own). This only happens once per validator per
run.
*/
if (auto stream = j_.info())
logMftAct(stream, "AcceptedNew", m.masterKey, m.sequence);
if (! revoked)
signingToMasterKeys_[m.signingKey] = m.masterKey;
auto masterKey = m.masterKey;
map_.emplace(std::move(masterKey), std::move(m));
}
else
{
/*
An ephemeral key was revoked and superseded by a new key.
This is expected, but should happen infrequently.
*/
if (auto stream = j_.info())
logMftAct(stream, "AcceptedUpdate",
m.masterKey, m.sequence, iter->second.sequence);
signingToMasterKeys_.erase (iter->second.signingKey);
if (! revoked)
signingToMasterKeys_[m.signingKey] = m.masterKey;
iter->second = std::move (m);
}
return ManifestDisposition::accepted;
}
void
ManifestCache::load (
DatabaseCon& dbCon, std::string const& dbTable)
{
// Load manifests stored in database
std::string const sql =
"SELECT RawData FROM " + dbTable + ";";
auto db = dbCon.checkoutDb ();
soci::blob sociRawData (*db);
soci::statement st =
(db->prepare << sql,
soci::into (sociRawData));
st.execute ();
while (st.fetch ())
{
std::string serialized;
convert (sociRawData, serialized);
if (auto mo = deserializeManifest(serialized))
{
if (!mo->verify())
{
JLOG(j_.warn())
<< "Unverifiable manifest in db";
continue;
}
applyManifest (std::move(*mo));
}
else
{
JLOG(j_.warn())
<< "Malformed manifest in database";
}
}
}
bool
ManifestCache::load (
DatabaseCon& dbCon, std::string const& dbTable,
std::string const& configManifest,
std::vector<std::string> const& configRevocation)
{
load (dbCon, dbTable);
if (! configManifest.empty())
{
auto mo = deserializeManifest(base64_decode(configManifest));
if (! mo)
{
JLOG (j_.error()) << "Malformed validator_token in config";
return false;
}
if (mo->revoked())
{
JLOG (j_.warn()) <<
"Configured manifest revokes public key";
}
if (applyManifest (std::move(*mo)) ==
ManifestDisposition::invalid)
{
JLOG (j_.error()) << "Manifest in config was rejected";
return false;
}
}
if (! configRevocation.empty())
{
std::string revocationStr;
revocationStr.reserve (
std::accumulate (configRevocation.cbegin(), configRevocation.cend(), std::size_t(0),
[] (std::size_t init, std::string const& s)
{
return init + s.size();
}));
for (auto const& line : configRevocation)
revocationStr += beast::rfc2616::trim(line);
auto mo = deserializeManifest(base64_decode(revocationStr));
if (! mo || ! mo->revoked() ||
applyManifest (std::move(*mo)) == ManifestDisposition::invalid)
{
JLOG (j_.error()) << "Invalid validator key revocation in config";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
void ManifestCache::save (
DatabaseCon& dbCon, std::string const& dbTable,
std::function <bool (PublicKey const&)> isTrusted)
{
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock{apply_mutex_};
auto db = dbCon.checkoutDb ();
soci::transaction tr(*db);
*db << "DELETE FROM " << dbTable;
std::string const sql =
"INSERT INTO " + dbTable + " (RawData) VALUES (:rawData);";
for (auto const& v : map_)
{
// Save all revocation manifests,
// but only save trusted non-revocation manifests.
if (! v.second.revoked() && ! isTrusted (v.second.masterKey))
{
JLOG(j_.info())
<< "Untrusted manifest in cache not saved to db";
continue;
}
// soci does not support bulk insertion of blob data
// Do not reuse blob because manifest ecdsa signatures vary in length
// but blob write length is expected to be >= the last write
soci::blob rawData(*db);
convert (v.second.serialized, rawData);
*db << sql,
soci::use (rawData);
}
tr.commit ();
}
}