* Create the FeeSettings object in genesis ledger.
* Initialize with default values from the config. Removes the need to
pass a Config down into the Ledger initialization functions, including
setup().
* Drop the undocumented fee config settings in favor of the [voting]
section.
* Fix#3734.
* If you previously used fee_account_reserve and/or fee_owner_reserve,
you should change to using the [voting] section instead. Example:
```
[voting]
account_reserve=10000000
owner_reserve=2000000
```
* Because old Mainnet ledgers (prior to 562177 - yes, I looked it up)
don't have FeeSettings, some of the other ctors will default them to
the config values before setup() tries to load the object.
* Update default Config fee values to match Mainnet.
* Fix unit tests:
* Updated fees: Some tests are converted to use computed values of fee
object, but the default Env config was also updated to fix the rest.
* Unit tests that check the structure of the ledger have updated
hashes and counts.
Without the protocol amendment introduced by this commit, an NFT ID can
be reminted in this manner:
1. Alice creates an account and mints an NFT.
2. Alice burns the NFT with an `NFTokenBurn` transaction.
3. Alice deletes her account with an `AccountDelete` transaction.
4. Alice re-creates her account.
5. Alice mints an NFT with an `NFTokenMint` transaction with params:
`NFTokenTaxon` = 0, `Flags` = 9).
This will mint a NFT with the same `NFTokenID` as the one minted in step
1. The params that construct the NFT ID will cause a collision in
`NFTokenID` if their values are equal before and after the remint.
With the `fixNFTokenRemint` amendment, there is a new sequence number
construct which avoids this scenario:
- A new `AccountRoot` field, `FirstNFTSequence`, stays constant over
time.
- This field is set to the current account sequence when the account
issues their first NFT.
- Otherwise, it is not set.
- The sequence of a newly-minted NFT is computed by: `FirstNFTSequence +
MintedNFTokens`.
- `MintedNFTokens` is then incremented by 1 for each mint.
Furthermore, there is a new account deletion restriction:
- An account can only be deleted if `FirstNFTSequence + MintedNFTokens +
256` is less than the current ledger sequence.
- 256 was chosen because it already exists in the current account
deletion constraint.
Without this restriction, an NFT may still be remintable. Example
scenario:
1. Alice's account sequence is at 1.
2. Bob is Alice's authorized minter.
3. Bob mints 500 NFTs for Alice. The NFTs will have sequences 1-501, as
NFT sequence is computed by `FirstNFTokenSequence + MintedNFTokens`).
4. Alice deletes her account at ledger 257 (as required by the existing
`AccountDelete` amendment).
5. Alice re-creates her account at ledger 258.
6. Alice mints an NFT. `FirstNFTokenSequence` initializes to her account
sequence (258), and `MintedNFTokens` initializes as 0. This
newly-minted NFT would have a sequence number of 258, which is a
duplicate of what she issued through authorized minting before she
deleted her account.
---------
Signed-off-by: Shawn Xie <shawnxie920@gmail.com>
* Follow-up to #4336
* NFToken is the naming convention in the codebase (rather than NFT)
* Rename `lsfDisallowIncomingNFTOffer` to `lsfDisallowIncomingNFTokenOffer`
* Rename `asfDisallowIncomingNFTOffer` to `asfDisallowIncomingNFTokenOffer`
Without this amendment, for NFTs using broker mode, if the sell offer contains a destination and that destination is the buyer account, anyone can broker the transaction. Also, if a buy offer contains a destination and that destination is the seller account, anyone can broker the transaction. This is not ideal and is misleading.
Instead, with this amendment: If you set a destination, that destination needs to be the account settling the transaction. So, the broker must be the destination if they want to settle. If the buyer is the destination, then the buyer must accept the sell offer, as you cannot broker your own offers.
If users want their offers open to the public, then they should not set a destination. On the other hand, if users want to limit who can settle the offers, then they would set a destination.
Unit tests:
1. The broker cannot broker a destination offer to the buyer and the buyer must accept the sell offer. (0 transfer)
2. If the broker is the destination, the broker will take the difference. (broker mode)
Fixes#4374
It was possible for a broker to combine a sell and a buy offer from an account that already owns an NFT. Such brokering extracts money from the NFT owner and provides no benefit in return.
With this amendment, the code detects when a broker is returning an NFToken to its initial owner and prohibits the transaction. This forbids a broker from selling an NFToken to the account that already owns the token. This fixes a bug in the original implementation of XLS-20.
Thanks to @nixer89 for suggesting this fix.
Fixes 3 issues:
In the following scenario, an account cannot perform NFTokenAcceptOffer even though it should be allowed to:
- BROKER has < S
- ALICE offers to sell token for S
- BOB offers to buy token for > S
- BROKER tries to bridge the two offers
This currently results in `tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS`, but should not because BROKER is not spending any funds in this transaction, beyond the transaction fee.
When trading an NFT using IOUs, and when the issuer of the IOU has any non-zero value set for TransferFee on their account via AccountSet (not a TransferFee on the NFT), and when the sale amount is equal to the total balance of that IOU that the buyer has, the resulting balance for the issuer of the IOU will become positive. This means that the buyer of the NFT was supposed to have caused a certain amount of IOU to be burned. That amount was unable to be burned because the buyer couldn't cover it. This results in the buyer owing this amount back to the issuer. In a real world scenario, this is appropriate and can be settled off-chain.
Currency issuers could not make offers for NFTs using their own currency, receiving `tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS` if they tried to do so.
With this fix, they are now able to buy/sell NFTs using their own currency.
featureDisallowIncoming is a new amendment that would allow users to opt-out of incoming Checks, Payment Channels, NFTokenOffers, and trust lines. This commit includes tests.
Adds four new AccountSet Flags:
1. asfDisallowIncomingNFTOffer
2. asfDisallowIncomingCheck
3. asfDisallowIncomingPayChan
4. asfDisallowIncomingTrustline
featureDisallowIncoming is a new amendment that would allow users to opt-out of incoming Checks, Payment Channels, NFTokenOffers, and trust lines. This commit includes tests.
Adds four new AccountSet Flags:
1. asfDisallowIncomingNFTOffer
2. asfDisallowIncomingCheck
3. asfDisallowIncomingPayChan
4. asfDisallowIncomingTrustline
It turns out that the feature enabled by the tfTrustLine flag
on an NFTokenMint transaction could be used as a means to
attack the NFToken issuer. Details are in
https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled/issues/4300
The fixRemoveNFTokenAutoTrustLine amendment removes the
ability to set the tfTrustLine flag on an NFTokenMint
transaction.
Closes 4300.
The XLS-20 implementation contained two bugs that would require the
introduction of amendments. This complicates the adoption of XLS-20
by requiring a staggered amendment activation, first of the two fix
amendments, followed by the `NonFungibleTokensV1` amendment.
After consideration, the consensus among node operators is that the
process should be simplified by the introduction of a new amendment
that, if enabled, would behaves as if the `NonFungibleTokensV1` and
the two fix amendments (`fixNFTokenDirV1` and `fixNFTokenNegOffer`)
were activated at once.
This commit implements this proposal; it does not introduce any new
functionality or additional features, above and beyond that offered
by the existing amendments.
The existing code would, incorrectly, allow negative amounts in offers
for non-fungible tokens. Such offers would be handled very differently
depending on the context: a direct offer would fail with an error code
indicating an internal processing error, whereas brokered offers would
improperly succeed.
This commit introduces the `fixNFTokenNegOffer` amendment that detects
such offers during creation and returns an appropriate error code.
The commit also extends the existing code to allow for buy offers that
contain a `Destination` field, so that a specific broker can be set in
the offer.
o Fixes an off-by-one when determining which NFTokenPage an
NFToken belongs on.
o Improves handling of packed sets of 32 NFTs with
identical low 96-bits.
o Fixes marker handling by the account_nfts RPC command.
o Tightens constraints of NFTokenPage invariant checks.
Adds unit tests to exercise the fixed cases as well as tests
for previously untested functionality.
