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rippled/src/test/app/Invariants_test.cpp

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#include <test/jtx/AMM.h>
#include <test/jtx/Account.h>
#include <test/jtx/Env.h>
#include <test/jtx/TestHelpers.h>
#include <test/jtx/amount.h>
#include <test/jtx/envconfig.h>
#include <test/jtx/fee.h>
#include <test/jtx/mpt.h>
#include <test/jtx/pay.h>
#include <test/jtx/permissioned_domains.h>
#include <test/jtx/tags.h>
#include <test/jtx/token.h>
#include <test/jtx/trust.h>
#include <test/jtx/vault.h>
#include <test/unit_test/SuiteJournal.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/Number.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/base_uint.h>
#include <xrpl/basics/chrono.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/unit_test/suite.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Journal.h>
#include <xrpl/beast/utility/Zero.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/ApplyView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/OpenView.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/AccountRootHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/DirectoryHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/ledger/helpers/RippleStateHelpers.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/AccountID.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Book.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Feature.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Indexes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/InnerObjectFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Issue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Keylet.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/LedgerFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/MPTIssue.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Protocol.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/Rules.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SField.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SOTemplate.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STArray.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STLedgerEntry.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STObject.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/STTx.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SeqProxy.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/SystemParameters.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TER.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/TxFormats.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/UintTypes.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/XRPAmount.h>
#include <xrpl/protocol/jss.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/ApplyContext.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/Transactor.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/applySteps.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/AMMInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/DirectoryInvariant.h>
#include <xrpl/tx/invariants/VaultInvariant.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <array>
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
#include <functional>
#include <initializer_list>
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include <source_location>
#include <string>
#include <tuple>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
namespace xrpl {
// Test-only factory — not part of the public API.
// The returned Transactor holds a raw reference to ctx; the caller must ensure
// the ApplyContext outlives the Transactor. Implemented in applySteps.cpp
std::unique_ptr<Transactor>
makeTransactor(ApplyContext& ctx);
} // namespace xrpl
namespace xrpl::test {
class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::Suite
{
// The optional Preclose function is used to process additional transactions
// on the ledger after creating two accounts, but before closing it, and
// before the Precheck function. These should only be valid functions, and
// not direct manipulations. Preclose is not commonly used.
using Preclose = std::function<
bool(test::jtx::Account const& a, test::jtx::Account const& b, test::jtx::Env& env)>;
// this is common setup/method for running a failing invariant check. The
// precheck function is used to manipulate the ApplyContext with view
// changes that will cause the check to fail.
using Precheck = std::function<
bool(test::jtx::Account const& a, test::jtx::Account const& b, ApplyContext& ac)>;
static FeatureBitset
defaultAmendments()
{
return xrpl::test::jtx::testableAmendments() | fixCleanup3_1_3 | fixCleanup3_2_0;
}
test::jtx::Env
makeEnv(FeatureBitset features)
{
return {*this, test::jtx::envconfig(), features, nullptr, beast::Severity::Disabled};
}
/**
* Run a specific test case to put the ledger into a state that will be
* detected by an invariant. Simulates the actions of a transaction that
* would violate an invariant.
*
* @param expect_logs One or more messages related to the failing invariant
* that should be in the log output
* @precheck See "Precheck" above
* @fee If provided, the fee amount paid by the simulated transaction.
* @tx A mock transaction that took the actions to trigger the invariant. In
* most cases, only the type matters.
* @ters The TER results expected on the two passes of the invariant
* checker.
* @preclose See "Preclose" above. Note that @preclose runs *before*
* @precheck, but is the last parameter for historical reasons
* @setTxAccount optionally set to add sfAccount to tx (either A1 or A2)
*/
enum class TxAccount : int { None = 0, A1, A2 };
void
doInvariantCheck(
std::vector<std::string> const& expectLogs,
Precheck const& precheck,
XRPAmount fee = XRPAmount{},
STTx tx = STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
std::initializer_list<TER> ters = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
Preclose const& preclose = {},
TxAccount setTxAccount = TxAccount::None,
std::source_location const& loc = std::source_location::current(),
// Result fed to the invariant checker on the first pass. Defaults to
// tesSUCCESS; set to a specific tec to test result-dependent invariant
// behavior (e.g. the on-failure checks and their exempt codes).
TER initialResult = tesSUCCESS)
{
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(defaultAmendments()),
expectLogs,
precheck,
fee,
tx,
ters,
preclose,
setTxAccount,
loc,
initialResult);
}
void
doInvariantCheck(
test::jtx::Env&& env,
std::vector<std::string> const& expectLogs,
Precheck const& precheck,
XRPAmount fee = XRPAmount{},
STTx tx = STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
std::initializer_list<TER> ters = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
Preclose const& preclose = {},
TxAccount setTxAccount = TxAccount::None,
std::source_location const& loc = std::source_location::current(),
TER initialResult = tesSUCCESS)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
if (preclose)
BEAST_EXPECT(preclose(a1, a2, env));
env.close();
if (setTxAccount != TxAccount::None)
tx.setAccountID(sfAccount, setTxAccount == TxAccount::A1 ? a1.id() : a2.id());
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env), a1, a2, expectLogs, precheck, fee, tx, ters, loc, initialResult);
}
void
doInvariantCheck(
// NOLINTNEXTLINE(cppcoreguidelines-rvalue-reference-param-not-moved)
test::jtx::Env&& env,
test::jtx::Account const& a1,
test::jtx::Account const& a2,
std::vector<std::string> const& expectLogs,
Precheck const& precheck,
XRPAmount fee = XRPAmount{},
STTx tx = STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
std::initializer_list<TER> ters = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
std::source_location const& loc = std::source_location::current(),
TER initialResult = tesSUCCESS)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
OpenView ov{*env.current()};
test::StreamSink sink{beast::Severity::Warning};
beast::Journal const jlog{sink};
ApplyContext ac{env.app(), ov, tx, tesSUCCESS, env.current()->fees().base, TapNone, jlog};
// Invariants normally run in the Transaction's "apply" (operator()) context, and can always
// access global Rules.
CurrentTransactionRulesGuard const rulesGuard(ov.rules());
BEAST_EXPECT(precheck(a1, a2, ac));
auto transactor = makeTransactor(ac);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(transactor))
return;
// Invoke the check twice to cover the tec and tef cases. Both passes run
// against the same view -- unlike production, nothing is discarded in
// between (Transactor::reset would), so the second pass sees the same
// violation and escalates tec -> tef. A {tec, tef} pair therefore says
// "this invariant is enforced regardless of the incoming result", not
// that the transaction ends in tefINVARIANT_FAILED on ledger.
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(ters.size() == 2))
return;
TER terActual = initialResult;
for (TER const& terExpect : ters)
{
TER const terInput = terActual;
terActual = transactor->checkInvariants(terActual, fee);
expect(
terExpect == terActual,
"expected: " + transToken(terExpect) + " got: " + transToken(terActual),
loc.file_name(),
loc.line());
auto const messages = sink.messages().str();
// checkInvariants returns its input unchanged when nothing fires and
// an escalated failure code when an invariant fires. So a changed
// result means an invariant fired, and a firing invariant must log.
// A result that passes through unchanged (a success) fired nothing
// and needs no message.
if (terActual != terInput)
{
expect(
messages.starts_with("Invariant failed:") ||
messages.starts_with("Transaction caused an exception"),
messages,
loc.file_name(),
loc.line());
}
// std::cerr << messages << '\n';
for (auto const& m : expectLogs)
{
expect(messages.contains(m), m, loc.file_name(), loc.line());
}
}
}
void
testXRPNotCreated()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "XRP created";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"XRP net change was positive: 500"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// put a single account in the view and "manufacture" some XRP
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto amt = sle->getFieldAmount(sfBalance);
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, amt + STAmount{500});
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
}
void
testAccountRootsNotRemoved()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "account root removed";
// An account was deleted, but not by an AccountDelete transaction.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"an account root was deleted"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// remove an account from the view
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
// Clear the balance so the "account deletion left behind a
// non-zero balance" check doesn't trip earlier than the desired
// check.
sle->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
});
// Successful AccountDelete transaction that didn't delete an account.
//
// Note that this is a case where a second invocation of the invariant
// checker returns a tecINVARIANT_FAILED, not a tefINVARIANT_FAILED.
// After a discussion with the team, we believe that's okay.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion succeeded without deleting an account"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
// Successful AccountDelete that deleted more than one account.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion succeeded but deleted multiple accounts"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// remove two accounts from the view
auto sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
auto sleA2 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a2.id()));
if (!sleA1 || !sleA2)
return false;
// Clear the balance so the "account deletion left behind a
// non-zero balance" check doesn't trip earlier than the desired
// check.
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sleA2->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
ac.view().erase(sleA2);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
}
void
testAccountRootsDeletedClean()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "account root deletion left artifact";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a non-zero balance"}},
// NOLINTNEXTLINE(readability-identifier-naming)
[&](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// A1 has a balance. Delete A1
auto const a1 = A1.id();
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(*sleA1->at(sfBalance) != beast::kZero))
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a non-zero owner count"}},
// NOLINTNEXTLINE(readability-identifier-naming)
[&](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Increment A1's owner count, then delete A1
auto const a1 = A1.id();
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
// Clear the balance so the "account deletion left behind a
// non-zero balance" check doesn't trip earlier than the desired
// check.
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
BEAST_EXPECT(sleA1->at(sfOwnerCount) == 0);
increaseOwnerCount(ac.view(), sleA1, {}, 1, ac.journal);
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a sponsorship field"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sleA1->setFieldU32(sfSponsoredOwnerCount, 1);
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a sponsorship field"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sleA1->setFieldU32(sfSponsoringOwnerCount, 1);
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a sponsorship field"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const a1Id = a1.id();
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1Id));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sleA1->setFieldU32(sfSponsoringAccountCount, 1);
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a sponsorship field"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sleA1->setAccountID(sfSponsor, a2.id());
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
Env{*this, FeatureBitset{featureSponsor}},
{{"account deletion left behind a sponsorship field"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sleA1->setAccountID(sfSponsor, a2.id());
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
for (auto const& [keyletfunc, type, includeInTests] : kDirectAccountKeylets)
{
if (!includeInTests)
continue;
using namespace std::string_literals;
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a "s + type.cStr() + " object"}},
// NOLINTNEXTLINE(readability-identifier-naming)
[&](Account const& A1, Account const& A2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Add an object to the ledger for account A1, then delete
// A1
auto const a1 = A1.id();
auto sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1));
if (!sleA1)
return false;
auto const key = std::invoke(keyletfunc, a1);
auto const newSLE = std::make_shared<SLE>(key);
ac.view().insert(newSLE);
// Clear the balance so the "account deletion left behind a
// non-zero balance" check doesn't trip earlier than the
// desired check.
sleA1->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
ac.view().erase(sleA1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
}
// NFT special case
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a NFTokenPage object"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// remove an account from the view
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
// Clear the balance so the "account deletion left behind a
// non-zero balance" check doesn't trip earlier than the desired
// check.
sle->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sle->at(sfOwnerCount) = 0;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_DELETE, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, Env& env) {
// Preclose callback to mint the NFT which will be deleted in
// the Precheck callback above.
env(token::mint(a1));
return true;
});
// AMM special cases
AccountID ammAcctID;
uint256 ammKey;
Issue ammIssue;
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a DirectoryNode object"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Delete the AMM account without cleaning up the directory or
// deleting the AMM object
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(ammAcctID));
if (!sle)
return false;
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->at(~sfAMMID));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->at(~sfAMMID) == ammKey);
// Clear the balance so the "account deletion left behind a
// non-zero balance" check doesn't trip earlier than the desired
// check.
sle->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sle->at(sfOwnerCount) = 0;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
// Preclose callback to create the AMM which will be partially
// deleted in the Precheck callback above.
AMM const amm(env, a1, XRP(100), a1["USD"](50));
ammAcctID = amm.ammAccount();
ammKey = amm.ammID();
ammIssue = amm.lptIssue();
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account deletion left behind a AMM object"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Delete all the AMM's trust lines, remove the AMM from the AMM
// account's directory (this deletes the directory), and delete
// the AMM account. Do not delete the AMM object.
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(ammAcctID));
if (!sle)
return false;
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->at(~sfAMMID));
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->at(~sfAMMID) == ammKey);
for (auto const& trustKeylet :
{keylet::trustLine(ammAcctID, a1["USD"]), keylet::trustLine(a1, ammIssue)})
{
auto const line = ac.view().peek(trustKeylet);
if (!line)
{
return false;
}
STAmount const lowLimit = line->at(sfLowLimit);
STAmount const highLimit = line->at(sfHighLimit);
BEAST_EXPECT(
trustDelete(
ac.view(),
line,
lowLimit.getIssuer(),
highLimit.getIssuer(),
ac.journal) == tesSUCCESS);
}
auto const ammSle = ac.view().peek(keylet::amm(ammKey));
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(ammSle))
return false;
auto const ownerDirKeylet = keylet::ownerDir(ammAcctID);
BEAST_EXPECT(
ac.view().dirRemove(ownerDirKeylet, ammSle->at(sfOwnerNode), ammKey, false));
BEAST_EXPECT(
!ac.view().exists(ownerDirKeylet) || ac.view().emptyDirDelete(ownerDirKeylet));
// Clear the balance so the "account deletion left behind a
// non-zero balance" check doesn't trip earlier than the desired
// check.
sle->at(sfBalance) = beast::kZero;
sle->at(sfOwnerCount) = 0;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
// Preclose callback to create the AMM which will be partially
// deleted in the Precheck callback above.
AMM const amm(env, a1, XRP(100), a1["USD"](50));
ammAcctID = amm.ammAccount();
ammKey = amm.ammID();
ammIssue = amm.lptIssue();
return true;
});
}
void
testTypesMatch()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "ledger entry types don't match";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"ledger entry type mismatch"}, {"XRP net change of -1000000000 doesn't match fee 0"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// replace an entry in the table with an SLE of a different type
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(ltTICKET, sle->key());
ac.rawView().rawReplace(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"invalid ledger entry type added"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// add an entry in the table with an SLE of an invalid type
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
// make a dummy escrow ledger entry, then change the type to an
// unsupported value so that the valid type invariant check
// will fail.
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::escrow(a1, SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence] + 2)));
// We don't use ltNICKNAME directly since it's marked deprecated
// to prevent accidental use elsewhere.
sleNew->type_ = static_cast<LedgerEntryType>('n');
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
}
void
testNoXRPTrustLine()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "trust lines with XRP not allowed";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"an XRP trust line was created"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// create simple trust SLE with xrp currency
auto const sleNew =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::trustLine(a1, a2, xrpIssue().currency));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
}
void
testNoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "trust lines with deep freeze flag without freeze "
"not allowed";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without normal freeze was "
"created"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleNew =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::trustLine(a1, a2, a1["USD"].currency));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, a1["USD"](0));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, a1["USD"](0));
std::uint32_t uFlags = 0u;
uFlags |= lsfLowDeepFreeze;
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, uFlags);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without normal freeze was "
"created"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleNew =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::trustLine(a1, a2, a1["USD"].currency));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, a1["USD"](0));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, a1["USD"](0));
std::uint32_t uFlags = 0u;
uFlags |= lsfHighDeepFreeze;
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, uFlags);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without normal freeze was "
"created"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleNew =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::trustLine(a1, a2, a1["USD"].currency));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, a1["USD"](0));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, a1["USD"](0));
std::uint32_t uFlags = 0u;
uFlags |= lsfLowDeepFreeze | lsfHighDeepFreeze;
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, uFlags);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without normal freeze was "
"created"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleNew =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::trustLine(a1, a2, a1["USD"].currency));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, a1["USD"](0));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, a1["USD"](0));
std::uint32_t uFlags = 0u;
uFlags |= lsfLowDeepFreeze | lsfHighFreeze;
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, uFlags);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without normal freeze was "
"created"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleNew =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::trustLine(a1, a2, a1["USD"].currency));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, a1["USD"](0));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, a1["USD"](0));
std::uint32_t uFlags = 0u;
uFlags |= lsfLowFreeze | lsfHighDeepFreeze;
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, uFlags);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
}
void
testTransfersNotFrozen()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "transfers when frozen";
Account const g1{"G1"};
// Helper function to establish the trustlines
auto const createTrustlines = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
// Preclose callback to establish trust lines with gateway
env.fund(XRP(1000), g1);
env.trust(g1["USD"](10000), a1);
env.trust(g1["USD"](10000), a2);
env.close();
env(pay(g1, a1, g1["USD"](1000)));
env(pay(g1, a2, g1["USD"](1000)));
env.close();
return true;
};
auto const a1FrozenByIssuer = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
createTrustlines(a1, a2, env);
env(trust(g1, a1["USD"](10000), tfSetFreeze));
env.close();
return true;
};
auto const a1DeepFrozenByIssuer = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
a1FrozenByIssuer(a1, a2, env);
env(trust(g1, a1["USD"](10000), tfSetDeepFreeze));
env.close();
return true;
};
auto const changeBalances = [&](Account const& a1,
Account const& a2,
ApplyContext& ac,
int a1Balance,
int a2Balance) {
auto const sleA1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(a1, g1["USD"]));
auto const sleA2 = ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(a2, g1["USD"]));
sleA1->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, g1["USD"](a1Balance));
sleA2->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, g1["USD"](a2Balance));
ac.view().update(sleA1);
ac.view().update(sleA2);
};
// test: imitating frozen A1 making a payment to A2.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Attempting to move frozen funds"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
changeBalances(a1, a2, ac, -900, -1100);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
a1FrozenByIssuer);
// test: imitating deep frozen A1 making a payment to A2.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Attempting to move frozen funds"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
changeBalances(a1, a2, ac, -900, -1100);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
a1DeepFrozenByIssuer);
// test: imitating A2 making a payment to deep frozen A1.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Attempting to move frozen funds"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
changeBalances(a1, a2, ac, -1100, -900);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
a1DeepFrozenByIssuer);
}
void
testXRPBalanceCheck()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "XRP balance checks";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Cannot return non-native STAmount as XRPAmount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// non-native balance
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
STAmount const nonNative(a2["USD"](51));
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, nonNative);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"incorrect account XRP balance"}, {"XRP net change was positive: 99999999000000001"}},
[this](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// balance exceeds genesis amount
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
// Use `drops(1)` to bypass a call to STAmount::canonicalize
// with an invalid value
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, kInitialXrp + drops(1));
BEAST_EXPECT(!sle->getFieldAmount(sfBalance).negative());
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"incorrect account XRP balance"},
{"XRP net change of -1000000001 doesn't match fee 0"}},
[this](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// balance is negative
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, STAmount{1, true});
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->getFieldAmount(sfBalance).negative());
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
}
void
testTransactionFeeCheck()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
using namespace std::string_literals;
testcase << "Transaction fee checks";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"fee paid was negative: -1"}, {"XRP net change of 0 doesn't match fee -1"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext&) { return true; },
XRPAmount{-1});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"fee paid exceeds system limit: "s + to_string(kInitialXrp)},
{"XRP net change of 0 doesn't match fee "s + to_string(kInitialXrp)}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext&) { return true; },
XRPAmount{kInitialXrp});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"fee paid is 20 exceeds fee specified in transaction."},
{"XRP net change of 0 doesn't match fee 20"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext&) { return true; },
XRPAmount{20},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject& tx) { tx.setFieldAmount(sfFee, XRPAmount{10}); }});
}
void
testNoBadOffers()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "no bad offers";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"offer with a bad amount"}}, [](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// offer with negative takerpays
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::offer(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence])));
sleNew->setAccountID(sfAccount, a1.id());
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, (*sle)[sfSequence]);
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, XRP(-1));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"offer with a bad amount"}}, [](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// offer with negative takergets
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::offer(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence])));
sleNew->setAccountID(sfAccount, a1.id());
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, (*sle)[sfSequence]);
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(-1));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"offer with a bad amount"}}, [](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// offer XRP to XRP
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::offer(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence])));
sleNew->setAccountID(sfAccount, a1.id());
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, (*sle)[sfSequence]);
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, XRP(10));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(11));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
}
void
testNoZeroEscrow()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "no zero escrow";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"XRP net change of -1000000 doesn't match fee 0"},
{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// escrow with negative amount
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::escrow(a1, SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence] + 2)));
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfAmount, XRP(-1));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"XRP net change was positive: 100000000000000001"},
{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// escrow with too-large amount
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::escrow(a1, SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence] + 2)));
// Use `drops(1)` to bypass a call to STAmount::canonicalize
// with an invalid value
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfAmount, kInitialXrp + drops(1));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// IOU < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// escrow with too-little iou
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::escrow(a1, SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence] + 2)));
Issue const usd{Currency(0x5553440000000000), AccountID(0x4985601)};
STAmount const amt(usd, -1);
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfAmount, amt);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// IOU bad currency
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// escrow with bad iou currency
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::escrow(a1, SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence] + 2)));
Issue const bad{badCurrency(), AccountID(0x4985601)};
STAmount const amt(bad, 1);
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfAmount, amt);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// escrow with too-little mpt
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::escrow(a1, SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence] + 2)));
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
STAmount const amt(mpt, -1);
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfAmount, amt);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT OutstandingAmount < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// mptissuance outstanding is negative
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, -1);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT LockedAmount < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// mptissuance locked is less than locked
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, -1);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT OutstandingAmount < LockedAmount
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// mptissuance outstanding is less than locked
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 1);
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, 10);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT MPTAmount < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// mptoken amount is negative
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptoken(mpt.getMptID(), a1));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, -1);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT LockedAmount < 0
doInvariantCheck(
{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// mptoken locked amount is negative
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptoken(mpt.getMptID(), a1));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, -1);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
}
void
testValidNewAccountRoot()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "valid new account root";
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account root created illegally"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Insert a new account root created by a non-payment into
// the view.
Account const a3{"A3"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a3);
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"multiple accounts created in a single transaction"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Insert two new account roots into the view.
{
Account const a3{"A3"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a3);
auto const sleA3 = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
ac.view().insert(sleA3);
}
{
Account const a4{"A4"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a4);
auto const sleA4 = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
ac.view().insert(sleA4);
}
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account created with wrong starting sequence number"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Insert a new account root with the wrong starting sequence.
Account const a3{"A3"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a3);
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, ac.view().seq() + 1);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"pseudo-account created by a wrong transaction type"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const a3{"A3"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a3);
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, 0);
sleNew->setFieldH256(sfAMMID, uint256(1));
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"account created with wrong starting sequence number"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const a3{"A3"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a3);
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, ac.view().seq());
sleNew->setFieldH256(sfAMMID, uint256(1));
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttAMM_CREATE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"pseudo-account created with wrong flags"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const a3{"A3"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a3);
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, 0);
sleNew->setFieldH256(sfAMMID, uint256(1));
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfFlags, lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"pseudo-account created with wrong flags"}},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const a3{"A3"};
Keylet const acctKeylet = keylet::account(a3);
auto const sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(acctKeylet);
sleNew->setFieldU32(sfSequence, 0);
sleNew->setFieldH256(sfAMMID, uint256(1));
sleNew->setFieldU32(
sfFlags,
lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth | lsfRequireDestTag);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttAMM_CREATE, [](STObject& tx) {}});
}
void
testNFTokenPageInvariants()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "NFTokenPage";
// lambda that returns an STArray of NFTokenIDs.
uint256 const firstNFTID(
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000000");
auto makeNFTokenIDs = [&firstNFTID](unsigned int nftCount) {
SOTemplate const* nfTokenTemplate =
InnerObjectFormats::getInstance().findSOTemplateBySField(sfNFToken);
uint256 nftID(firstNFTID);
STArray ret;
for (int i = 0; i < nftCount; ++i)
{
STObject newNFToken(*nfTokenTemplate, sfNFToken, [&nftID](STObject& object) {
object.setFieldH256(sfNFTokenID, nftID);
});
ret.pushBack(std::move(newNFToken));
++nftID;
}
return ret;
};
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT page has invalid size"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, makeNFTokenIDs(0));
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT page has invalid size"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, makeNFTokenIDs(33));
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFTs on page are not sorted"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
STArray nfTokens = makeNFTokenIDs(2);
std::iter_swap(nfTokens.begin(), nfTokens.begin() + 1);
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, nfTokens);
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT contains empty URI"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
STArray nfTokens = makeNFTokenIDs(1);
nfTokens[0].setFieldVL(sfURI, Blob{});
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, nfTokens);
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT page is improperly linked"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, makeNFTokenIDs(1));
nftPage->setFieldH256(sfPreviousPageMin, keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1).key);
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT page is improperly linked"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, makeNFTokenIDs(1));
nftPage->setFieldH256(sfPreviousPageMin, keylet::nftokenPageMin(a2).key);
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT page is improperly linked"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, makeNFTokenIDs(1));
nftPage->setFieldH256(sfNextPageMin, nftPage->key());
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT page is improperly linked"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
STArray nfTokens = makeNFTokenIDs(1);
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPage(
keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1), ++(nfTokens[0].getFieldH256(sfNFTokenID))));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, nfTokens);
nftPage->setFieldH256(sfNextPageMin, keylet::nftokenPageMax(a2).key);
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"NFT found in incorrect page"}},
[&makeNFTokenIDs](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
STArray nfTokens = makeNFTokenIDs(2);
auto nftPage = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::nftokenPage(
keylet::nftokenPageMax(a1), (nfTokens[1].getFieldH256(sfNFTokenID))));
nftPage->setFieldArray(sfNFTokens, nfTokens);
ac.view().insert(nftPage);
return true;
});
}
void
testAMMDeleteInvariants(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
bool const enforceAMMDelete = features[fixCleanup3_3_0];
testcase << "AMM delete invariants" + std::string(enforceAMMDelete ? " fix" : "");
Env env(*this, features);
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Issue const lptIssue{Currency(0x4c50540000000000), issuer.id()};
STAmount const zeroLP{lptIssue, 0};
STAmount const nonZeroLP{lptIssue, 1};
auto const makeAMM = [](STAmount const& lptBalance) {
auto sleAMM = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::amm(uint256(1)));
sleAMM->setFieldAmount(sfLPTokenBalance, lptBalance);
return sleAMM;
};
auto const checkInvariant = [&](TxType txType,
TER result,
std::optional<STAmount> const& deletedLPBalance,
bool expected,
std::string const& expectedLog) {
test::StreamSink sink{beast::Severity::Warning};
beast::Journal const jlog{sink};
ValidAMM invariant;
if (deletedLPBalance)
invariant.visitEntry(true, makeAMM(*deletedLPBalance), nullptr);
bool const actual = invariant.finalize(
STTx{txType, [](STObject&) {}}, result, XRPAmount{}, *env.current(), jlog);
BEAST_EXPECTS(actual == expected, "unexpected AMM delete invariant result");
auto const messages = sink.messages().str();
auto const expectedLogWhenEnforced = enforceAMMDelete ? expectedLog : "";
if (!expectedLogWhenEnforced.empty())
{
BEAST_EXPECTS(messages.contains(expectedLogWhenEnforced), expectedLogWhenEnforced);
}
else
{
BEAST_EXPECTS(messages.empty(), messages);
}
};
checkInvariant(
ttPAYMENT,
tesSUCCESS,
nonZeroLP,
!enforceAMMDelete,
"Invariant failed: AMM failed, unexpected AMM deletion by");
checkInvariant(
ttAMM_DELETE,
tesSUCCESS,
std::nullopt,
!enforceAMMDelete,
"Invariant failed: AMMDelete failed, AMM object remained on tesSUCCESS");
checkInvariant(
ttAMM_DELETE,
tesSUCCESS,
nonZeroLP,
!enforceAMMDelete,
"Invariant failed: AMMDelete failed, AMM object deleted with non-zero LP balance");
checkInvariant(
ttAMM_DELETE,
tecINCOMPLETE,
zeroLP,
!enforceAMMDelete,
"Invariant failed: AMMDelete failed, AMM object deleted when result is not tesSUCCESS");
checkInvariant(ttAMM_WITHDRAW, tesSUCCESS, nonZeroLP, true, "");
checkInvariant(ttAMM_CLAWBACK, tesSUCCESS, nonZeroLP, true, "");
checkInvariant(ttAMM_DELETE, tesSUCCESS, zeroLP, true, "");
checkInvariant(ttAMM_WITHDRAW, tesSUCCESS, zeroLP, true, "");
checkInvariant(ttAMM_CLAWBACK, tesSUCCESS, zeroLP, true, "");
}
static SLE::pointer
createPermissionedDomain(
ApplyContext& ac,
test::jtx::Account const& a1,
test::jtx::Account const& a2,
std::uint32_t numCreds = 2,
std::uint32_t seq = 10)
{
Keylet const pdKeylet = keylet::permissionedDomain(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(seq));
auto sle = std::make_shared<SLE>(pdKeylet);
sle->setAccountID(sfOwner, a1);
sle->setFieldU32(sfSequence, seq);
if (numCreds != 0u)
{
// This array is sorted naturally, but if you are going to change
// this behavior, don't forget to use credentials::makeSorted
STArray credentials(sfAcceptedCredentials, numCreds);
for (std::size_t n = 0; n < numCreds; ++n)
{
auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, a2);
auto credType = "cred_type" + std::to_string(n);
cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, Slice(credType.c_str(), credType.size()));
credentials.pushBack(std::move(cred));
}
sle->setFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials, credentials);
}
ac.view().insert(sle);
return sle;
};
void
testPermissionedDomainInvariants(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
bool const fixEnabled = features[fixCleanup3_1_3];
std::initializer_list<TER> const badTers = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED};
std::initializer_list<TER> const failTers = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED};
testcase << "PermissionedDomain" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain with no rules."}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
return createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2, 0).get();
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
testcase << "PermissionedDomain 2";
static constexpr auto kTooBig = kMaxPermissionedDomainCredentialsArraySize + 1;
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain bad credentials size " + std::to_string(kTooBig)}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
return !!createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2, kTooBig);
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
testcase << "PermissionedDomain 3";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain credentials aren't sorted"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto slePd = createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2, 0);
STArray credentials(sfAcceptedCredentials, 2);
for (std::size_t n = 0; n < 2; ++n)
{
auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, a2);
auto credType = std::string("cred_type") + std::to_string(9 - n);
cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, Slice(credType.c_str(), credType.size()));
credentials.pushBack(std::move(cred));
}
slePd->setFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials, credentials);
ac.view().update(slePd);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
testcase << "PermissionedDomain 4";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain credentials aren't unique"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto slePd = createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2, 0);
STArray credentials(sfAcceptedCredentials, 2);
for (std::size_t n = 0; n < 2; ++n)
{
auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, a2);
cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, Slice("cred_type", 9));
credentials.pushBack(std::move(cred));
}
slePd->setFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials, credentials);
ac.view().update(slePd);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
testcase << "PermissionedDomain Set 1";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain with no rules."}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// create PD
auto slePd = createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2);
// update PD with empty rules
{
STArray const credentials(sfAcceptedCredentials, 2);
slePd->setFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials, credentials);
ac.view().update(slePd);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
testcase << "PermissionedDomain Set 2";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain bad credentials size " + std::to_string(kTooBig)}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// create PD
auto slePd = createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2);
// update PD
{
STArray credentials(sfAcceptedCredentials, kTooBig);
for (std::size_t n = 0; n < kTooBig; ++n)
{
auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, a2);
auto credType = "cred_type2" + std::to_string(n);
cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, Slice(credType.c_str(), credType.size()));
credentials.pushBack(std::move(cred));
}
slePd->setFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials, credentials);
ac.view().update(slePd);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
testcase << "PermissionedDomain Set 3";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain credentials aren't sorted"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// create PD
auto slePd = createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2);
// update PD
{
STArray credentials(sfAcceptedCredentials, 2);
for (std::size_t n = 0; n < 2; ++n)
{
auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, a2);
auto credType = std::string("cred_type2") + std::to_string(9 - n);
cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, Slice(credType.c_str(), credType.size()));
credentials.pushBack(std::move(cred));
}
slePd->setFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials, credentials);
ac.view().update(slePd);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
testcase << "PermissionedDomain Set 4";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"permissioned domain credentials aren't unique"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// create PD
auto slePd = createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2);
// update PD
{
STArray credentials(sfAcceptedCredentials, 2);
for (std::size_t n = 0; n < 2; ++n)
{
auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, a2);
cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, Slice("cred_type", 9));
credentials.pushBack(std::move(cred));
}
slePd->setFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials, credentials);
ac.view().update(slePd);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : badTers);
std::initializer_list<TER> const goodTers = {tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS};
std::vector<std::string> const badMoreThan1{
{"transaction affected more than 1 permissioned domain entry."}};
std::vector<std::string> const emptyV;
std::vector<std::string> const badNoDomains{{"no domain objects affected by"}};
std::vector<std::string> const badNotDeleted{
{"domain object modified, but not deleted by "}};
std::vector<std::string> const badDeleted{{"domain object deleted by"}};
std::vector<std::string> const badTx{
{"domain object(s) affected by an unauthorized transaction."}};
{
testcase << "PermissionedDomain set 2 domains ";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
fixEnabled ? badMoreThan1 : emptyV,
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2);
createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2, 2, 11);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : goodTers);
}
{
testcase << "PermissionedDomain del 2 domains";
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq2, pd2] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env1),
a1,
a2,
fixEnabled ? badMoreThan1 : emptyV,
[&pd1, &pd2](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle1 = ac.view().peek({ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN, pd1});
auto sle2 = ac.view().peek({ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN, pd2});
ac.view().erase(sle1);
ac.view().erase(sle2);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : goodTers);
}
{
testcase << "PermissionedDomain set 0 domains ";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
fixEnabled ? badNoDomains : emptyV,
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext&) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? badTers : goodTers);
}
{
testcase << "PermissionedDomain del 0 domains";
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq2, pd2] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
a1,
a2,
fixEnabled ? badNoDomains : emptyV,
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext&) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? badTers : goodTers);
}
{
testcase << "PermissionedDomain set, delete domain";
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env1),
a1,
a2,
fixEnabled ? badDeleted : emptyV,
[&pd1](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle1 = ac.view().peek({ltPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN, pd1});
ac.view().erase(sle1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : goodTers);
}
{
testcase << "PermissionedDomain del, create domain ";
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
fixEnabled ? badNotDeleted : emptyV,
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPERMISSIONED_DOMAIN_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : goodTers);
}
{
testcase << "PermissionedDomain invalid tx";
doInvariantCheck(
fixEnabled ? badTx : emptyV,
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
createPermissionedDomain(ac, a1, a2);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
failTers);
}
}
void
testValidPseudoAccounts()
{
testcase << "valid pseudo accounts";
using namespace jtx;
AccountID pseudoAccountID;
Preclose const createPseudo = [&, this](Account const& a, Account const& b, Env& env) {
PrettyAsset const xrpAsset{xrpIssue(), 1'000'000};
// Create vault
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, vKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = a, .asset = xrpAsset});
env(tx);
env.close();
if (auto const vSle = env.le(vKeylet); BEAST_EXPECT(vSle))
{
pseudoAccountID = vSle->at(sfAccount);
}
return BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(keylet::account(pseudoAccountID)));
};
/* Cases to check
"pseudo-account has 0 pseudo-account fields set"
"pseudo-account has 2 pseudo-account fields set"
"pseudo-account sequence changed"
"pseudo-account flags are not set"
"pseudo-account has a regular key"
"pseudo-account has a sponsorship field"
*/
struct Mod
{
std::string expectedFailure;
std::function<void(SLE::pointer&)> func;
};
auto const mods = std::to_array<Mod>({
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account has 0 pseudo-account fields set",
.func =
[this](SLE::pointer& sle) {
BEAST_EXPECT(sle->at(~sfVaultID));
sle->at(~sfVaultID) = std::nullopt;
},
},
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account sequence changed",
.func = [](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfSequence) = 12345; },
},
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account flags are not set",
.func = [](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfFlags) = lsfNoFreeze; },
},
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account has a regular key",
.func = [](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfRegularKey) = Account("regular").id(); },
},
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account has a sponsorship field",
.func = [](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfSponsoredOwnerCount) = 1; },
},
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account has a sponsorship field",
.func = [](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfSponsoringOwnerCount) = 1; },
},
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account has a sponsorship field",
.func = [](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfSponsoringAccountCount) = 1; },
},
{
.expectedFailure = "pseudo-account has a sponsorship field",
.func = [](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfSponsor) = Account("sponsor").id(); },
},
});
for (auto const& mod : mods)
{
doInvariantCheck(
{{mod.expectedFailure}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(pseudoAccountID));
if (!sle)
return false;
mod.func(sle);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createPseudo);
}
for (auto const pField : getPseudoAccountFields())
{
// createPseudo creates a vault, so sfVaultID will be set, and
// setting it again will not cause an error
if (pField == &sfVaultID)
continue;
doInvariantCheck(
{{"pseudo-account has 2 pseudo-account fields set"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(pseudoAccountID));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto const vaultID = ~sle->at(~sfVaultID);
BEAST_EXPECT(vaultID && !sle->isFieldPresent(*pField));
sle->setFieldH256(*pField, *vaultID);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createPseudo);
}
// Take one of the regular accounts and set the sequence to 0, which
// will make it look like a pseudo-account
doInvariantCheck(
{{"pseudo-account has 0 pseudo-account fields set"},
{"pseudo-account sequence changed"},
{"pseudo-account flags are not set"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->at(sfSequence) = 0;
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
}
static std::pair<std::uint32_t, uint256>
createPermissionedDomainEnv(
test::jtx::Env& env,
test::jtx::Account const& a1,
test::jtx::Account const& a2,
std::uint32_t numCreds = 2)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
pdomain::Credentials credentials;
for (std::size_t n = 0; n < numCreds; ++n)
{
auto credType = "cred_type" + std::to_string(n);
credentials.push_back({.issuer = a2, .credType = credType});
}
std::uint32_t const seq = env.seq(a1);
env(pdomain::setTx(a1, credentials));
uint256 const key = pdomain::getNewDomain(env.meta());
// std::cout << "PD, acc: " << A1.id() << ", seq: " << seq << ", k: " <<
// key << std::endl;
return {seq, key};
}
void
testPermissionedDEX(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
bool const fixEnabled = features[fixCleanup3_1_3];
testcase << "PermissionedDEX" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"domain doesn't exist"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
Keylet const offerKey = keylet::offer(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(10));
auto sleOffer = std::make_shared<SLE>(offerKey);
sleOffer->setAccountID(sfAccount, a1);
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
ac.view().insert(sleOffer);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttOFFER_CREATE,
[](STObject& tx) {
tx.setFieldH256(
sfDomainID,
uint256{"F10D0CC9A0F9A3CBF585B80BE09A186483668FDBDD39AA7E33"
"70F3649CE134E5"});
Account const a1{"A1"};
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
// missing domain ID in offer object
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
{{"hybrid offer is malformed"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Keylet const offerKey = keylet::offer(a2.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(10));
auto sleOffer = std::make_shared<SLE>(offerKey);
sleOffer->setAccountID(sfAccount, a2);
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
sleOffer->setFlag(lsfHybrid);
STArray bookArr;
bookArr.pushBack(STObject::makeInnerObject(sfBook));
sleOffer->setFieldArray(sfAdditionalBooks, bookArr);
ac.view().insert(sleOffer);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttOFFER_CREATE, [&](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
// more than one entry in sfAdditionalBooks
{
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env1),
a1,
a2,
{{"hybrid offer is malformed"}},
[&pd1](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Keylet const offerKey = keylet::offer(a2.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(10));
auto sleOffer = std::make_shared<SLE>(offerKey);
sleOffer->setAccountID(sfAccount, a2);
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
sleOffer->setFlag(lsfHybrid);
sleOffer->setFieldH256(sfDomainID, pd1);
STArray bookArr;
bookArr.pushBack(STObject::makeInnerObject(sfBook));
bookArr.pushBack(STObject::makeInnerObject(sfBook));
sleOffer->setFieldArray(sfAdditionalBooks, bookArr);
ac.view().insert(sleOffer);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttOFFER_CREATE, [&](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// empty sfAdditionalBooks (size 0)
{
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env1),
a1,
a2,
fixEnabled ? std::vector<std::string>{{"hybrid offer is malformed"}}
: std::vector<std::string>{},
[&pd1](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Keylet const offerKey = keylet::offer(a2.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(10));
auto sleOffer = std::make_shared<SLE>(offerKey);
sleOffer->setAccountID(sfAccount, a2);
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
sleOffer->setFlag(lsfHybrid);
sleOffer->setFieldH256(sfDomainID, pd1);
STArray const bookArr; // empty array, size 0
sleOffer->setFieldArray(sfAdditionalBooks, bookArr);
ac.view().insert(sleOffer);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttOFFER_CREATE, [&](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? std::initializer_list<TER>{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED}
: std::initializer_list<TER>{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS});
}
// hybrid offer missing sfAdditionalBooks
{
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env1),
a1,
a2,
{{"hybrid offer is malformed"}},
[&pd1](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Keylet const offerKey = keylet::offer(a2.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(10));
auto sleOffer = std::make_shared<SLE>(offerKey);
sleOffer->setAccountID(sfAccount, a2);
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
sleOffer->setFlag(lsfHybrid);
sleOffer->setFieldH256(sfDomainID, pd1);
ac.view().insert(sleOffer);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttOFFER_CREATE, [&](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
{
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq2, pd2] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env1),
a1,
a2,
{{"transaction consumed wrong domains"}},
[&pd1](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Keylet const offerKey = keylet::offer(a2.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(10));
auto sleOffer = std::make_shared<SLE>(offerKey);
sleOffer->setAccountID(sfAccount, a2);
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
sleOffer->setFieldH256(sfDomainID, pd1);
ac.view().insert(sleOffer);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttOFFER_CREATE,
[&pd2, &a1](STObject& tx) {
tx.setFieldH256(sfDomainID, pd2);
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
{
Env env1(*this, features);
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env1.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env1.close();
[[maybe_unused]] auto [seq1, pd1] = createPermissionedDomainEnv(env1, a1, a2);
env1.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env1),
a1,
a2,
{{"domain transaction affected regular offers"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Keylet const offerKey = keylet::offer(a2.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(10));
auto sleOffer = std::make_shared<SLE>(offerKey);
sleOffer->setAccountID(sfAccount, a2);
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
sleOffer->setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
ac.view().insert(sleOffer);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttOFFER_CREATE,
[&](STObject& tx) {
Account const a1{"A1"};
tx.setFieldH256(sfDomainID, pd1);
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, a1["USD"](10));
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, XRP(1));
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
}
void
testBookDirectoryExchangeRate()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "book directory exchange rate";
auto const getBookRootKey = [](Account const& account, std::uint64_t quality) {
Book const book{xrpIssue(), account["USD"], std::nullopt};
return keylet::quality(keylet::book(book), quality);
};
// Root book-directory pages carry exchange-rate metadata that must
// match the quality encoded in the directory key.
auto const makeRootPage = [](Keylet const& dir, std::uint64_t exchangeRate) {
auto sleDir = std::make_shared<SLE>(dir);
sleDir->setFieldH256(sfRootIndex, dir.key);
STVector256 indexes;
indexes.pushBack(uint256{1});
sleDir->setFieldV256(sfIndexes, indexes);
sleDir->setFieldU64(sfExchangeRate, exchangeRate);
return sleDir;
};
// Child pages do not carry quality metadata; they only point back to
// the root directory.
auto const makeChildPage = [](Keylet const& rootDir) {
auto sleDir = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::page(rootDir, 1));
sleDir->setFieldH256(sfRootIndex, rootDir.key);
STVector256 indexes;
indexes.pushBack(uint256{2});
sleDir->setFieldV256(sfIndexes, indexes);
return sleDir;
};
auto const makeOfferCreateTx = [] {
return STTx{ttOFFER_CREATE, [](STObject& tx) {
Account const account{"A1"};
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerPays, XRP(1));
tx.setFieldAmount(sfTakerGets, account["USD"](1));
}};
};
std::initializer_list<TER> const failTers = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED};
// Creating a root book directory with mismatched exchange-rate
// metadata violates the invariant.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"book directory exchange rate does not match directory quality"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const directoryQuality = STAmount::kURateOne;
auto const dir = getBookRootKey(a1, directoryQuality);
ac.view().insert(makeRootPage(dir, directoryQuality + 1));
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
makeOfferCreateTx(),
failTers);
// A new child page must point to an existing root page.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"book directory root missing"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const directoryQuality = STAmount::kURateOne;
auto const rootDir = getBookRootKey(a1, directoryQuality);
// Insert only the child page. It points at rootDir, but the
// corresponding root page is intentionally missing.
ac.view().insert(makeChildPage(rootDir));
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
makeOfferCreateTx(),
failTers);
// Legacy bad-root tolerance:
// - The view contains a pre-existing root page with bad sfExchangeRate
// metadata.
// - The simulated transaction only creates a child page pointing to
// that root.
// - The invariant must pass because this transaction did not create
// the bad root, only adding a child page.
{
Env env{*this, defaultAmendments()};
Account const a1{"A1"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), a1);
env.close();
OpenView view{*env.current()};
auto const directoryQuality = STAmount::kURateOne;
auto const rootDir = getBookRootKey(a1, directoryQuality);
view.rawInsert(makeRootPage(rootDir, directoryQuality + 1));
ValidBookDirectory invariant;
invariant.visitEntry(false, nullptr, makeChildPage(rootDir));
test::StreamSink sink{beast::Severity::Warning};
beast::Journal const jlog{sink};
BEAST_EXPECT(
invariant.finalize(makeOfferCreateTx(), tesSUCCESS, XRPAmount{}, view, jlog));
}
// A bad root is rejected when added, ignored when a legacy bad root is
// modified without changing sfRootIndex or deleted, and checked when a
// modified directory changes sfRootIndex.
{
Env env{*this, defaultAmendments()};
Account const a1{"A1"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), a1);
env.close();
OpenView view{*env.current()};
auto const directoryQuality = STAmount::kURateOne;
auto const rootDir = getBookRootKey(a1, directoryQuality);
auto const missingRootDir = getBookRootKey(a1, directoryQuality + 1);
auto const badRoot = makeRootPage(rootDir, directoryQuality + 1);
view.rawInsert(badRoot);
test::StreamSink sink{beast::Severity::Warning};
beast::Journal const jlog{sink};
{
// add
ValidBookDirectory invariant;
invariant.visitEntry(false, nullptr, badRoot);
BEAST_EXPECT(
!invariant.finalize(makeOfferCreateTx(), tesSUCCESS, XRPAmount{}, view, jlog));
}
{
// modify (without changing the sfRootIndex)
ValidBookDirectory invariant;
invariant.visitEntry(false, badRoot, badRoot);
BEAST_EXPECT(
invariant.finalize(makeOfferCreateTx(), tesSUCCESS, XRPAmount{}, view, jlog));
}
{
// modify (changing sfRootIndex to a missing root)
auto const childBefore = makeChildPage(rootDir);
auto const childAfter = std::make_shared<SLE>(*childBefore, childBefore->key());
childAfter->setFieldH256(sfRootIndex, missingRootDir.key);
ValidBookDirectory invariant;
invariant.visitEntry(false, childBefore, childAfter);
test::StreamSink missingRootSink{beast::Severity::Warning};
beast::Journal const missingRootJlog{missingRootSink};
BEAST_EXPECT(!invariant.finalize(
makeOfferCreateTx(), tesSUCCESS, XRPAmount{}, view, missingRootJlog));
BEAST_EXPECT(
missingRootSink.messages().str().contains("book directory root missing"));
}
{
// delete
view.rawErase(badRoot);
BEAST_EXPECT(!view.exists(rootDir));
ValidBookDirectory invariant;
invariant.visitEntry(true, badRoot, badRoot);
BEAST_EXPECT(
invariant.finalize(makeOfferCreateTx(), tesSUCCESS, XRPAmount{}, view, jlog));
}
}
}
Keylet
createLoanBroker(jtx::Account const& a, jtx::Env& env, jtx::PrettyAsset const& asset)
{
using namespace jtx;
// Create vault
uint256 vaultID;
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, vKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = a, .asset = asset});
env(tx);
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(vKeylet));
vaultID = vKeylet.key;
// Create Loan Broker
using namespace loan_broker;
auto const loanBrokerKeylet = keylet::loanBroker(a.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(env.seq(a)));
// Create a Loan Broker with all default values.
env(set(a, vaultID), Fee(kIncrement));
return loanBrokerKeylet;
};
void
testNoModifiedUnmodifiableFields()
{
testcase("no modified unmodifiable fields");
using namespace jtx;
// Initialize with a placeholder value because there's no default ctor
Keylet loanBrokerKeylet = keylet::amendments();
Preclose const createLoanBroker = [&, this](Account const& a, Account const& b, Env& env) {
PrettyAsset const xrpAsset{xrpIssue(), 1'000'000};
loanBrokerKeylet = this->createLoanBroker(a, env, xrpAsset);
return BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(loanBrokerKeylet));
};
{
auto const mods = std::to_array<std::function<void(SLE::pointer&)>>({
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfSequence) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfOwnerNode) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfVaultNode) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfVaultID) = uint256(1u); },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfAccount) = sle->at(sfOwner); },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfOwner) = sle->at(sfAccount); },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfManagementFeeRate) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfCoverRateMinimum) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfCoverRateLiquidation) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfLedgerEntryType) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfLedgerIndex) = sle->at(sfVaultID).value(); },
});
for (auto const& mod : mods)
{
doInvariantCheck(
{{"changed an unchangeable field"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(loanBrokerKeylet);
if (!sle)
return false;
mod(sle);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createLoanBroker);
}
}
// TODO: Loan Object
// VaultKind, SubscriptionDate and RedemptionDate are immutable once set at creation.
// Enforced by NoModifiedUnmodifiableFields on ltVAULT via kFieldChanged.
Keylet closedEndedVaultKeylet = keylet::amendments();
Preclose const createClosedEndedVault = [&, this](
Account const& a, Account const&, Env& env) {
auto const sub = env.now().time_since_epoch().count() + 60;
auto const red = sub + kMinInvestmentPeriod + 1'000'000;
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create(
{.owner = a,
.asset = xrpIssue(),
.vaultKind = std::to_underlying(VaultKind::ClosedEnded),
.subscriptionDate = sub,
.redemptionDate = red});
env(tx);
closedEndedVaultKeylet = keylet;
return BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(closedEndedVaultKeylet));
};
{
// Each mutation must keep the vault otherwise valid so that only the immutability check
// fires. Shifting both dates by the same offset preserves the gap; bumping sfVaultKind
// stays within the recognised range.
auto const mods = std::to_array<std::function<void(SLE::pointer&)>>({
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfVaultKind) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfSubscriptionDate) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfRedemptionDate) += 1; },
});
for (auto const& mod : mods)
{
doInvariantCheck(
{{"changed an unchangeable field"}},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(closedEndedVaultKeylet);
if (!sle)
return false;
mod(sle);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createClosedEndedVault);
}
}
{
auto const mods = std::to_array<std::function<void(SLE::pointer&)>>({
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfLedgerEntryType) += 1; },
[](SLE::pointer& sle) { sle->at(sfLedgerIndex) = uint256(1u); },
});
for (auto const& mod : mods)
{
doInvariantCheck(
{{"changed an unchangeable field"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
mod(sle);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
}
}
}
void
testValidLoanBroker()
{
testcase << "valid loan broker";
using namespace jtx;
enum class Asset { XRP, IOU, MPT };
auto const assetTypes = std::to_array({Asset::XRP, Asset::IOU, Asset::MPT});
for (auto const assetType : assetTypes)
{
// Initialize with a placeholder value because there's no default
// ctor
auto const setupAsset =
[&](Account const& alice, Account const& issuer, Env& env) -> PrettyAsset {
switch (assetType)
{
case Asset::IOU: {
PrettyAsset const iouAsset = issuer["IOU"];
env(trust(alice, iouAsset(1000)));
env(pay(issuer, alice, iouAsset(1000)));
env.close();
return iouAsset;
}
case Asset::MPT: {
MPTTester mptt{env, issuer, kMptInitNoFund};
mptt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanClawback | tfMPTCanTransfer | tfMPTCanLock});
PrettyAsset const mptAsset = mptt.issuanceID();
mptt.authorize({.account = alice});
env(pay(issuer, alice, mptAsset(1000)));
env.close();
return mptAsset;
}
case Asset::XRP:
default:
return PrettyAsset{xrpIssue(), 1'000'000};
}
};
Keylet loanBrokerKeylet = keylet::amendments();
Preclose const createLoanBroker =
[&, this](Account const& alice, Account const& issuer, Env& env) {
auto const asset = setupAsset(alice, issuer, env);
loanBrokerKeylet = this->createLoanBroker(alice, env, asset);
return BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(loanBrokerKeylet));
};
// Ensure the test scenarios are set up completely. The test cases
// will need to recompute any of these values it needs for itself
// rather than trying to return a bunch of items
auto setupTest = [&, this](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac)
-> std::optional<std::pair<SLE::pointer, SLE::pointer>> {
if (loanBrokerKeylet.type != ltLOAN_BROKER)
return {};
auto sleBroker = ac.view().peek(loanBrokerKeylet);
if (!sleBroker)
return {};
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(sleBroker->at(sfOwnerCount) == 0))
return {};
// Need to touch sleBroker so that it is included in the
// modified entries for the invariant to find
ac.view().update(sleBroker);
// The pseudo-account holds the directory, so get it
auto const pseudoAccountID = sleBroker->at(sfAccount);
auto const pseudoAccountKeylet = keylet::account(pseudoAccountID);
// Strictly speaking, we don't need to load the
// ACCOUNT_ROOT, but check anyway
auto slePseudo = ac.view().peek(pseudoAccountKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(slePseudo))
return {};
// Make sure the directory doesn't already exist
auto const dirKeylet = keylet::ownerDir(pseudoAccountID);
auto sleDir = ac.view().peek(dirKeylet);
auto const describe = describeOwnerDir(pseudoAccountID);
if (!sleDir)
{
// Create the directory
BEAST_EXPECT(
::xrpl::directory::createRoot(
ac.view(), dirKeylet, loanBrokerKeylet.key, describe) == 0);
sleDir = ac.view().peek(dirKeylet);
}
return std::make_pair(slePseudo, sleDir);
};
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Loan Broker with zero OwnerCount has multiple directory "
"pages"}},
[&setupTest, this](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto test = setupTest(a1, a2, ac);
if (!test || !test->first || !test->second)
return false;
auto slePseudo = test->first;
auto sleDir = test->second;
auto const describe = describeOwnerDir(slePseudo->at(sfAccount));
BEAST_EXPECT(
::xrpl::directory::insertPage(
ac.view(),
0,
sleDir,
0,
sleDir,
slePseudo->key(),
keylet::page(sleDir->key(), 0),
describe) == 1);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createLoanBroker);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Loan Broker with zero OwnerCount has multiple indexes in "
"the Directory root"}},
[&setupTest](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto test = setupTest(a1, a2, ac);
if (!test || !test->first || !test->second)
return false;
auto slePseudo = test->first;
auto sleDir = test->second;
auto indexes = sleDir->getFieldV256(sfIndexes);
// Put some extra garbage into the directory
for (auto const& key : {slePseudo->key(), sleDir->key()})
{
::xrpl::directory::insertKey(ac.view(), sleDir, 0, false, indexes, key);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createLoanBroker);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Loan Broker directory corrupt"}},
[&setupTest](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto test = setupTest(a1, a2, ac);
if (!test || !test->first || !test->second)
return false;
auto slePseudo = test->first;
auto sleDir = test->second;
auto const describe = describeOwnerDir(slePseudo->at(sfAccount));
// Empty vector will overwrite the existing entry for the
// holding, if any, avoiding the "has multiple indexes"
// failure.
STVector256 indexes;
// Put one meaningless key into the directory
auto const key = keylet::account(Account("random").id()).key;
::xrpl::directory::insertKey(ac.view(), sleDir, 0, false, indexes, key);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createLoanBroker);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Loan Broker with zero OwnerCount has an unexpected entry in "
"the directory"}},
[&setupTest](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto test = setupTest(a1, a2, ac);
if (!test || !test->first || !test->second)
return false;
auto slePseudo = test->first;
auto sleDir = test->second;
// Empty vector will overwrite the existing entry for the
// holding, if any, avoiding the "has multiple indexes"
// failure.
STVector256 indexes;
::xrpl::directory::insertKey(
ac.view(), sleDir, 0, false, indexes, slePseudo->key());
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createLoanBroker);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Loan Broker sequence number decreased"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
if (loanBrokerKeylet.type != ltLOAN_BROKER)
return false;
auto sleBroker = ac.view().peek(loanBrokerKeylet);
if (!sleBroker)
return false;
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(sleBroker->at(sfLoanSequence) > 0))
return false;
// Need to touch sleBroker so that it is included in the
// modified entries for the invariant to find
ac.view().update(sleBroker);
sleBroker->at(sfLoanSequence) -= 1;
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createLoanBroker);
// Test: cover available less than pseudo-account asset balance
{
Keylet brokerKeylet = keylet::amendments();
Preclose const createBrokerWithCover =
[&, this](Account const& alice, Account const& issuer, Env& env) {
auto const asset = setupAsset(alice, issuer, env);
brokerKeylet = this->createLoanBroker(alice, env, asset);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(brokerKeylet)))
return false;
env(loan_broker::coverDeposit(alice, brokerKeylet.key, asset(10)));
env.close();
return BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(brokerKeylet));
};
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Loan Broker cover available is less than pseudo-account asset balance"}},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(brokerKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
return false;
// Pseudo-account holds 10 units, set cover to 5
sle->at(sfCoverAvailable) = Number(5);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createBrokerWithCover);
}
// Test: cover available greater than pseudo-account asset balance
// (requires fixCleanup3_1_3)
doInvariantCheck(
{{"Loan Broker cover available is greater than pseudo-account asset balance"}},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(loanBrokerKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
return false;
// Pseudo-account has no cover deposited; set cover
// higher than any incidental balance
sle->at(sfCoverAvailable) = Number(1'000'000);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
createLoanBroker);
}
}
void
testVault() // NOLINT(readability-function-size)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
struct AccountAmount
{
AccountID account;
int amount;
};
struct Adjustments
{
// NOLINTBEGIN(readability-redundant-member-init)
std::optional<int> assetsTotal = std::nullopt;
std::optional<int> assetsAvailable = std::nullopt;
std::optional<int> lossUnrealized = std::nullopt;
std::optional<int> assetsMaximum = std::nullopt;
std::optional<int> sharesTotal = std::nullopt;
std::optional<int> vaultAssets = std::nullopt;
std::optional<AccountAmount> accountAssets = std::nullopt;
std::optional<AccountAmount> accountShares = std::nullopt;
// NOLINTEND(readability-redundant-member-init)
};
constexpr auto kAdjust = [&](ApplyView& ac, xrpl::Keylet keylet, Adjustments args) {
auto sleVault = ac.peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto const mptIssuanceID = (*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID];
auto sleShares = ac.peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mptIssuanceID));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
// These two fields are adjusted in absolute terms
if (args.lossUnrealized)
(*sleVault)[sfLossUnrealized] = *args.lossUnrealized;
if (args.assetsMaximum)
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsMaximum] = *args.assetsMaximum;
// Remaining fields are adjusted in terms of difference
if (args.assetsTotal)
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsTotal] = *(*sleVault)[sfAssetsTotal] + *args.assetsTotal;
if (args.assetsAvailable)
{
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsAvailable] =
*(*sleVault)[sfAssetsAvailable] + *args.assetsAvailable;
}
ac.update(sleVault);
if (args.sharesTotal)
{
(*sleShares)[sfOutstandingAmount] =
*(*sleShares)[sfOutstandingAmount] + *args.sharesTotal;
ac.update(sleShares);
}
auto const assets = *(*sleVault)[sfAsset];
auto const pseudoId = *(*sleVault)[sfAccount];
if (args.vaultAssets)
{
if (assets.native())
{
auto slePseudoAccount = ac.peek(keylet::account(pseudoId));
if (!slePseudoAccount)
return false;
(*slePseudoAccount)[sfBalance] =
*(*slePseudoAccount)[sfBalance] + *args.vaultAssets;
ac.update(slePseudoAccount);
}
else if (assets.holds<MPTIssue>())
{
auto const mptId = assets.get<MPTIssue>().getMptID();
auto sleMPToken = ac.peek(keylet::mptoken(mptId, pseudoId));
if (!sleMPToken)
return false;
(*sleMPToken)[sfMPTAmount] = *(*sleMPToken)[sfMPTAmount] + *args.vaultAssets;
ac.update(sleMPToken);
}
else
{
return false; // Not supporting testing with IOU
}
}
if (args.accountAssets)
{
auto const& pair = *args.accountAssets;
if (assets.native())
{
auto sleAccount = ac.peek(keylet::account(pair.account));
if (!sleAccount)
return false;
(*sleAccount)[sfBalance] = *(*sleAccount)[sfBalance] + pair.amount;
ac.update(sleAccount);
}
else if (assets.holds<MPTIssue>())
{
auto const mptID = assets.get<MPTIssue>().getMptID();
auto sleMPToken = ac.peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, pair.account));
if (!sleMPToken)
return false;
(*sleMPToken)[sfMPTAmount] = *(*sleMPToken)[sfMPTAmount] + pair.amount;
ac.update(sleMPToken);
}
else
{
return false; // Not supporting testing with IOU
}
}
if (args.accountShares)
{
auto const& pair = *args.accountShares;
auto sleMPToken = ac.peek(keylet::mptoken(mptIssuanceID, pair.account));
if (!sleMPToken)
return false;
(*sleMPToken)[sfMPTAmount] = *(*sleMPToken)[sfMPTAmount] + pair.amount;
ac.update(sleMPToken);
}
return true;
};
static constexpr auto kArgs = [](AccountID id, int adjustment, auto fn) -> Adjustments {
Adjustments sample = {
.assetsTotal = adjustment,
.assetsAvailable = adjustment,
.lossUnrealized = 0,
.sharesTotal = adjustment,
.vaultAssets = adjustment,
.accountAssets = //
AccountAmount{.account = id, .amount = -adjustment},
.accountShares = //
AccountAmount{.account = id, .amount = adjustment}};
fn(sample);
return sample;
};
Account const a3{"A3"};
Account const a4{"A4"};
auto const precloseXrp = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
env.fund(XRP(1000), a3, a4);
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a1, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a2, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a3, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
return true;
};
testcase << "Vault general checks";
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault deletion succeeded without deleting a vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault updated by a wrong transaction type",
"deleted Vault without deleting its pseudo-account"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault updated by a wrong transaction type"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault updated by a wrong transaction type"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sequence = ac.view().seq();
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(sequence));
auto sleVault = std::make_shared<SLE>(vaultKeylet);
auto const vaultPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(a1.id()), sleVault->key(), describeOwnerDir(a1.id()));
sleVault->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *vaultPage);
sleVault->setAccountID(sfAccount, a1.id());
ac.view().insert(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault deleted by a wrong transaction type",
"deleted Vault without deleting its pseudo-account"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation updated more than single vault",
"deleted Vault without deleting its pseudo-account"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
{
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleVault);
}
{
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a2.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleVault);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
{
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
}
{
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a2, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
}
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation updated more than single vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sequence = ac.view().seq();
auto const insertVault = [&](Account const a) {
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(a.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(sequence));
auto sleVault = std::make_shared<SLE>(vaultKeylet);
auto const vaultPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(a.id()), sleVault->key(), describeOwnerDir(a.id()));
sleVault->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *vaultPage);
sleVault->setAccountID(sfAccount, a.id());
ac.view().insert(sleVault);
};
insertVault(a1);
insertVault(a2);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED});
doInvariantCheck(
{"deleted vault must also delete shares",
"deleted Vault without deleting its pseudo-account"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"deleted vault must have no shares outstanding",
"deleted vault must have no assets outstanding",
"deleted vault must have no assets available"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleVault);
ac.view().erase(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a1, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation succeeded without modifying a vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
// Note, such an "orphaned" update of MPT issuance attached to a
// vault is invalid; ttVAULT_SET must also update Vault object.
sleShares->setFieldH256(sfDomainID, uint256(13));
ac.view().update(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation succeeded without modifying a vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation succeeded without modifying a vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation succeeded without modifying a vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation succeeded without modifying a vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CLAWBACK, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation succeeded without modifying a vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"updated vault must have shares"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsMaximum] = 200;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, _] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault operation succeeded without updating shares",
"assets available must not be greater than assets outstanding"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsTotal] = 9;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a1, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"set must not change assets outstanding",
"set must not change assets available",
"set must not change shares outstanding",
"set must not change vault balance",
"assets available must not be negative",
"assets available must not be greater than assets outstanding",
"assets outstanding must not be negative"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto slePseudoAccount = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(*(*sleVault)[sfAccount]));
if (!slePseudoAccount)
return false;
(*slePseudoAccount)[sfBalance] = *(*slePseudoAccount)[sfBalance] - 10;
ac.view().update(slePseudoAccount);
// Move 10 drops to A4 to enforce total XRP balance
auto sleA4 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a4.id()));
if (!sleA4)
return false;
(*sleA4)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA4)[sfBalance] + 10;
ac.view().update(sleA4);
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsAvailable = (kDropsPerXrp * -100).value();
sample.assetsTotal = (kDropsPerXrp * -200).value();
sample.sharesTotal = -1;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"violation of vault immutable data"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
sleVault->setFieldIssue(sfAsset, STIssue{sfAsset, MPTIssue(MPTID(42))});
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
doInvariantCheck(
{"violation of vault immutable data"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
sleVault->setAccountID(sfAccount, a2.id());
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
doInvariantCheck(
{"violation of vault immutable data"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
(*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID] = MPTID(42);
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault transaction must not change loss unrealized",
"set must not change assets outstanding"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.lossUnrealized = 13;
sample.assetsTotal = 20;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"loss unrealized must not exceed the difference "
"between assets outstanding and available",
"vault transaction must not change loss unrealized"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 100, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.lossUnrealized = 13;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx.setFieldAmount(sfAmount, XRPAmount(200)); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
// A negative loss unrealized must trip the invariant. ttLOAN_MANAGE is
// allowed to change loss unrealized, so it isolates this check from the
// "must not change loss unrealized" invariant. Gated behind
// fixCleanup3_4_0 (see below).
doInvariantCheck(
{"loss unrealized must not be negative"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.lossUnrealized = -1;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_MANAGE, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
// Without fixCleanup3_4_0 the same state must NOT trip the invariant,
// preserving pre-amendment behavior (no fork risk).
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_4_0),
{},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.lossUnrealized = -1;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_MANAGE, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"set assets outstanding must not exceed assets maximum"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsMaximum = 1;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"assets maximum must not be negative"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsMaximum = -1;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"set must not change shares outstanding",
"updated zero sized vault must have no assets outstanding",
"updated zero sized vault must have no assets available"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
(*sleShares)[sfOutstandingAmount] = 0;
ac.view().update(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"updated shares must not exceed maximum"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
(*sleShares)[sfMaximumAmount] = 10;
ac.view().update(sleShares);
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [](Adjustments&) {}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"updated shares must not exceed maximum"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [](Adjustments&) {}));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
(*sleShares)[sfOutstandingAmount] = kMaxMpTokenAmount + 1;
ac.view().update(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
testcase << "Vault create";
doInvariantCheck(
{
"created vault must be empty",
"updated zero sized vault must have no assets outstanding",
"create operation must not have updated a vault",
},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsTotal] = 9;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{
"created vault must be empty",
"updated zero sized vault must have no assets available",
"assets available must not be greater than assets outstanding",
"create operation must not have updated a vault",
},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsAvailable] = 9;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{
"created vault must be empty",
"loss unrealized must not exceed the difference between assets "
"outstanding and available",
"vault transaction must not change loss unrealized",
"create operation must not have updated a vault",
},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
(*sleVault)[sfLossUnrealized] = 1;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{
"created vault must be empty",
"create operation must not have updated a vault",
},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
(*sleShares)[sfOutstandingAmount] = 9;
ac.view().update(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{
"assets maximum must not be negative",
"create operation must not have updated a vault",
},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
(*sleVault)[sfAssetsMaximum] = Number(-1);
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"create operation must not have updated a vault",
"shares issuer and vault pseudo-account must be the same",
"shares issuer must be a pseudo-account",
"shares issuer pseudo-account must point back to the vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto sleShares = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance((*sleVault)[sfShareMPTID]));
if (!sleShares)
return false;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
(*sleShares)[sfIssuer] = a1.id();
ac.view().update(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{"vault created by a wrong transaction type", "account root created illegally"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// The code below will create a valid vault with (almost) all
// the invariants holding. Except one: it is created by the
// wrong transaction type.
auto const sequence = ac.view().seq();
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(sequence));
auto sleVault = std::make_shared<SLE>(vaultKeylet);
auto const vaultPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(a1.id()), sleVault->key(), describeOwnerDir(a1.id()));
sleVault->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *vaultPage);
auto pseudoId = pseudoAccountAddress(ac.view(), vaultKeylet.key);
// Create pseudo-account.
auto sleAccount = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::account(pseudoId));
sleAccount->setAccountID(sfAccount, pseudoId);
sleAccount->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, STAmount{});
std::uint32_t const seqno = //
ac.view().rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault) //
? 0 //
: sequence;
sleAccount->setFieldU32(sfSequence, seqno);
sleAccount->setFieldU32(
sfFlags, lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth);
sleAccount->setFieldH256(sfVaultID, vaultKeylet.key);
ac.view().insert(sleAccount);
auto const sharesMptId = makeMptID(sequence, pseudoId);
auto const sharesKeylet = keylet::mptokenIssuance(sharesMptId);
auto sleShares = std::make_shared<SLE>(sharesKeylet);
auto const sharesPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(pseudoId), sharesKeylet, describeOwnerDir(pseudoId));
sleShares->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *sharesPage);
sleShares->at(sfFlags) = 0;
sleShares->at(sfIssuer) = pseudoId;
sleShares->at(sfOutstandingAmount) = 0;
sleShares->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
sleVault->at(sfAccount) = pseudoId;
sleVault->at(sfFlags) = 0;
sleVault->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
sleVault->at(sfOwner) = a1.id();
sleVault->at(sfAssetsTotal) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfAssetsAvailable) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfLossUnrealized) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfShareMPTID) = sharesMptId;
sleVault->at(sfWithdrawalPolicy) = kVaultStrategyFirstComeFirstServe;
ac.view().insert(sleVault);
ac.view().insert(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
doInvariantCheck(
{"shares issuer and vault pseudo-account must be the same",
"shares issuer pseudo-account must point back to the vault"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sequence = ac.view().seq();
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(sequence));
auto sleVault = std::make_shared<SLE>(vaultKeylet);
auto const vaultPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(a1.id()), sleVault->key(), describeOwnerDir(a1.id()));
sleVault->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *vaultPage);
auto pseudoId = pseudoAccountAddress(ac.view(), vaultKeylet.key);
// Create pseudo-account.
auto sleAccount = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::account(pseudoId));
sleAccount->setAccountID(sfAccount, pseudoId);
sleAccount->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, STAmount{});
std::uint32_t const seqno = //
ac.view().rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault) //
? 0 //
: sequence;
sleAccount->setFieldU32(sfSequence, seqno);
sleAccount->setFieldU32(
sfFlags, lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth);
// sleAccount->setFieldH256(sfVaultID, vaultKeylet.key);
// Setting wrong vault key
sleAccount->setFieldH256(sfVaultID, uint256(42));
ac.view().insert(sleAccount);
auto const sharesMptId = makeMptID(sequence, pseudoId);
auto const sharesKeylet = keylet::mptokenIssuance(sharesMptId);
auto sleShares = std::make_shared<SLE>(sharesKeylet);
auto const sharesPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(pseudoId), sharesKeylet, describeOwnerDir(pseudoId));
sleShares->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *sharesPage);
sleShares->at(sfFlags) = 0;
sleShares->at(sfIssuer) = pseudoId;
sleShares->at(sfOutstandingAmount) = 0;
sleShares->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
// sleVault->at(sfAccount) = pseudoId;
// Setting wrong pseudo account ID
sleVault->at(sfAccount) = a2.id();
sleVault->at(sfFlags) = 0;
sleVault->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
sleVault->at(sfOwner) = a1.id();
sleVault->at(sfAssetsTotal) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfAssetsAvailable) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfLossUnrealized) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfShareMPTID) = sharesMptId;
sleVault->at(sfWithdrawalPolicy) = kVaultStrategyFirstComeFirstServe;
ac.view().insert(sleVault);
ac.view().insert(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
doInvariantCheck(
{"shares issuer and vault pseudo-account must be the same", "shares issuer must exist"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sequence = ac.view().seq();
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(sequence));
auto sleVault = std::make_shared<SLE>(vaultKeylet);
auto const vaultPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(a1.id()), sleVault->key(), describeOwnerDir(a1.id()));
sleVault->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *vaultPage);
auto const sharesMptId = makeMptID(sequence, a2.id());
auto const sharesKeylet = keylet::mptokenIssuance(sharesMptId);
auto sleShares = std::make_shared<SLE>(sharesKeylet);
auto const sharesPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(a2.id()), sharesKeylet, describeOwnerDir(a2.id()));
sleShares->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *sharesPage);
sleShares->at(sfFlags) = 0;
// Setting wrong pseudo account ID
sleShares->at(sfIssuer) = AccountID(42);
sleShares->at(sfOutstandingAmount) = 0;
sleShares->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
sleVault->at(sfAccount) = a2.id();
sleVault->at(sfFlags) = 0;
sleVault->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
sleVault->at(sfOwner) = a1.id();
sleVault->at(sfAssetsTotal) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfAssetsAvailable) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfLossUnrealized) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfShareMPTID) = sharesMptId;
sleVault->at(sfWithdrawalPolicy) = kVaultStrategyFirstComeFirstServe;
ac.view().insert(sleVault);
ac.view().insert(sleShares);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
testcase << "Vault deposit";
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit must change vault balance"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.vaultAssets.reset();
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit assets outstanding must not exceed assets maximum"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 200, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsMaximum = 1;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx.setFieldAmount(sfAmount, XRPAmount(200)); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
// This really convoluted unit tests makes the zero balance on the
// depositor, by sending them the same amount as the transaction fee.
// The operation makes no sense, but the defensive check in
// ValidVault::finalize is otherwise impossible to trigger.
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit must increase vault balance", "deposit must change depositor balance"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
// Move 10 drops to A4 to enforce total XRP balance
auto sleA4 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a4.id()));
if (!sleA4)
return false;
(*sleA4)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA4)[sfBalance] + 10;
ac.view().update(sleA4);
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a3.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountAssets->amount = -100;
}));
},
XRPAmount{100},
STTx{
ttVAULT_DEPOSIT,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfFee] = XRPAmount(100);
tx[sfAccount] = a3.id();
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit must increase vault balance",
"deposit must decrease depositor balance",
"deposit must change vault and depositor balance by equal amount",
"deposit and assets outstanding must add up",
"deposit and assets available must add up"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
// Move 10 drops from A2 to A3 to enforce total XRP balance
auto sleA3 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a3.id()));
if (!sleA3)
return false;
(*sleA3)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA3)[sfBalance] + 10;
ac.view().update(sleA3);
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.vaultAssets = -20;
sample.accountAssets->amount = 10;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit must change depositor balance"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
// Move 10 drops from A3 to vault to enforce total XRP balance
auto sleA3 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a3.id()));
if (!sleA3)
return false;
(*sleA3)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA3)[sfBalance] - 10;
ac.view().update(sleA3);
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountAssets->amount = 0;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit must change depositor shares"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountShares.reset();
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit must change vault shares"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.sharesTotal = 0;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit must increase depositor shares",
"deposit must change depositor and vault shares by equal amount",
"deposit must not change vault balance by more than deposited "
"amount"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountShares->amount = -5;
sample.sharesTotal = -10;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(5); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit and assets outstanding must add up"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleA3 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a3.id()));
(*sleA3)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA3)[sfBalance] - 2000;
ac.view().update(sleA3);
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsTotal = 11;
}));
},
XRPAmount{2000},
STTx{
ttVAULT_DEPOSIT,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10);
tx[sfDelegate] = a3.id();
tx[sfFee] = XRPAmount(2000);
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit and assets outstanding must add up",
"deposit and assets available must add up"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsTotal = 7;
sample.assetsAvailable = 7;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
testcase << "Vault withdrawal";
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal must change vault balance"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.vaultAssets.reset();
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
// Almost identical to the really convoluted test for deposit, where the
// depositor spends only the transaction fee. In case of withdrawal,
// this test is almost the same as normal withdrawal where the
// sfDestination would have been A4, but has been omitted.
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal must change one destination balance"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
// Move 10 drops to A4 to enforce total XRP balance
auto sleA4 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a4.id()));
if (!sleA4)
return false;
(*sleA4)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA4)[sfBalance] + 10;
ac.view().update(sleA4);
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a3.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountAssets->amount = -100;
}));
},
XRPAmount{100},
STTx{
ttVAULT_WITHDRAW,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfFee] = XRPAmount(100);
tx[sfAccount] = a3.id();
// This commented out line causes the invariant violation.
// tx[sfDestination] = A4.id();
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
doInvariantCheck(
{
"withdrawal must change vault and destination balance by equal amount",
"withdrawal must decrease vault balance",
"withdrawal must increase destination balance",
"withdrawal and assets outstanding must add up",
"withdrawal and assets available must add up",
},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
// Move 10 drops from A2 to A3 to enforce total XRP balance
auto sleA3 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a3.id()));
if (!sleA3)
return false;
(*sleA3)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA3)[sfBalance] + 10;
ac.view().update(sleA3);
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.vaultAssets = 10;
sample.accountAssets->amount = -20;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal must change one destination balance"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
if (!kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
*sample.vaultAssets -= 5;
})))
return false;
auto sleA3 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a3.id()));
if (!sleA3)
return false;
(*sleA3)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA3)[sfBalance] + 5;
ac.view().update(sleA3);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [&](STObject& tx) { tx.setAccountID(sfDestination, a3.id()); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal must change depositor shares"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountShares.reset();
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal must change vault shares"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.sharesTotal = 0;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal must decrease depositor shares",
"withdrawal must change depositor and vault shares by equal "
"amount"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountShares->amount = 5;
sample.sharesTotal = 10;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal and assets outstanding must add up",
"withdrawal and assets available must add up"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsTotal = -15;
sample.assetsAvailable = -15;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal and assets outstanding must add up"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleA3 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a3.id()));
(*sleA3)[sfBalance] = *(*sleA3)[sfBalance] - 2000;
ac.view().update(sleA3);
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.assetsTotal = -7;
}));
},
XRPAmount{2000},
STTx{
ttVAULT_WITHDRAW,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10);
tx[sfDelegate] = a3.id();
tx[sfFee] = XRPAmount(2000);
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp,
TxAccount::A2);
auto const precloseMpt = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
env.fund(XRP(1000), a3, a4);
// Create MPT asset
{
json::Value jv;
jv[sfAccount] = a3.human();
jv[sfTransactionType] = jss::MPTokenIssuanceCreate;
jv[sfFlags] = tfMPTCanTransfer;
env(jv);
env.close();
}
auto const mptID = makeMptID(env.seq(a3) - 1, a3);
Asset const asset = MPTIssue(mptID);
// Authorize A1 A2 A4
{
json::Value jv;
jv[sfAccount] = a1.human();
jv[sfTransactionType] = jss::MPTokenAuthorize;
jv[sfMPTokenIssuanceID] = to_string(mptID);
env(jv);
jv[sfAccount] = a2.human();
env(jv);
jv[sfAccount] = a4.human();
env(jv);
env.close();
}
// Send tokens to A1 A2 A4
{
env(pay(a3, a1, asset(1000)));
env(pay(a3, a2, asset(1000)));
env(pay(a3, a4, asset(1000)));
env.close();
}
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = asset});
env(tx);
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a1, .id = keylet.key, .amount = asset(10)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a2, .id = keylet.key, .amount = asset(10)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a4, .id = keylet.key, .amount = asset(10)}));
return true;
};
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal must decrease depositor shares",
"withdrawal must change depositor and vault shares by equal "
"amount"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq() - 2));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountShares->amount = 5;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [&](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAccount] = a3.id(); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseMpt,
TxAccount::A2);
testcase << "Vault clawback";
doInvariantCheck(
{"clawback must change vault balance"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq() - 2));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -1, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.vaultAssets.reset();
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CLAWBACK, [&](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAccount] = a3.id(); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseMpt);
// Not the same as below check: attempt to clawback XRP
doInvariantCheck(
{"clawback may only be performed by the asset issuer"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq()));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CLAWBACK, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseXrp);
// Not the same as above check: attempt to clawback MPT by bad account
doInvariantCheck(
{"clawback may only be performed by the asset issuer"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq() - 2));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 0, [&](Adjustments& sample) {}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CLAWBACK, [&](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAccount] = a4.id(); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseMpt);
doInvariantCheck(
{"clawback must decrease vault balance",
"clawback must decrease holder shares",
"clawback must change vault shares"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq() - 2));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a4.id(), 10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.sharesTotal = 0;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttVAULT_CLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = a3.id();
tx[sfHolder] = a4.id();
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseMpt);
doInvariantCheck(
{"clawback must change holder shares"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq() - 2));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a4.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountShares.reset();
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttVAULT_CLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = a3.id();
tx[sfHolder] = a4.id();
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseMpt);
doInvariantCheck(
{"clawback must change holder and vault shares by equal amount",
"clawback and assets outstanding must add up",
"clawback and assets available must add up"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const keylet =
keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ac.view().seq() - 2));
return kAdjust(ac.view(), keylet, kArgs(a4.id(), -10, [&](Adjustments& sample) {
sample.accountShares->amount = -8;
sample.assetsTotal = -7;
sample.assetsAvailable = -7;
}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttVAULT_CLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = a3.id();
tx[sfHolder] = a4.id();
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseMpt);
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Closed-ended vault invariants added in ValidVault::finalize (create must supply both
// dates and satisfy the redemption-buffer gap), deposit only in Subscription / NoPhase,
// withdraw not in Investment, loan origination only in Investment.
using d = NetClock::duration;
using tp = NetClock::time_point;
auto const closedEnded = std::to_underlying(VaultKind::ClosedEnded);
// Vault keylet captured by precloseClosedEnded so precheck does not have to rederive it
// from ac.view().seq(), which depends on how many env.close() calls preclose issued.
Keylet closedEndedKeylet = keylet::amendments();
// Preclose that creates a closed-ended vault (in Subscription), optionally seeds it with
// three deposits (so a1/a2/a3 hold a share MPToken that kAdjust can then adjust), and
// optionally advances parent close time past SubscriptionDate. A negative @p advanceBySub
// leaves the vault in Subscription.
auto const precloseClosedEnded = [&](std::int32_t advanceBySub, bool doDeposit) {
return [&, advanceBySub, doDeposit](
Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
env.fund(XRP(1000), a3, a4);
auto const sub = env.now().time_since_epoch().count() + 60;
auto const red = sub + kMinInvestmentPeriod + 1'000'000;
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create(
{.owner = a1,
.asset = xrpIssue(),
.vaultKind = closedEnded,
.subscriptionDate = sub,
.redemptionDate = red});
env(tx);
closedEndedKeylet = keylet;
if (doDeposit)
{
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a1, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a2, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a3, .id = keylet.key, .amount = XRP(10)}));
}
if (advanceBySub >= 0)
env.close(tp{d{sub + advanceBySub}});
return true;
};
};
// Manually insert a bare closed-ended vault (+ pseudo-account + share MPTokenIssuance)
// directly into the view, bypassing the transactor path. Used to synthesize ttVAULT_CREATE
// states no legitimate transactor would produce.
auto const insertBareClosedEndedVault =
[closedEnded](
ApplyContext& ac,
Account const& owner,
std::optional<std::uint32_t> subscriptionDate,
std::optional<std::uint32_t> redemptionDate) -> bool {
auto const sequence = ac.view().seq();
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(owner.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(sequence));
auto sleVault = std::make_shared<SLE>(vaultKeylet);
auto const vaultPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(owner.id()), sleVault->key(), describeOwnerDir(owner.id()));
if (!vaultPage)
return false;
sleVault->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *vaultPage);
auto const pseudoId = pseudoAccountAddress(ac.view(), vaultKeylet.key);
auto sleAccount = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::account(pseudoId));
sleAccount->setAccountID(sfAccount, pseudoId);
sleAccount->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, STAmount{});
sleAccount->setFieldU32(sfSequence, 0);
sleAccount->setFieldU32(sfFlags, lsfDisableMaster | lsfDefaultRipple | lsfDepositAuth);
sleAccount->setFieldH256(sfVaultID, vaultKeylet.key);
ac.view().insert(sleAccount);
auto const sharesMptId = makeMptID(sequence, pseudoId);
auto const sharesKeylet = keylet::mptokenIssuance(sharesMptId);
auto sleShares = std::make_shared<SLE>(sharesKeylet);
auto const sharesPage = ac.view().dirInsert(
keylet::ownerDir(pseudoId), sharesKeylet, describeOwnerDir(pseudoId));
if (!sharesPage)
return false;
sleShares->setFieldU64(sfOwnerNode, *sharesPage);
sleShares->at(sfFlags) = 0;
sleShares->at(sfIssuer) = pseudoId;
sleShares->at(sfOutstandingAmount) = 0;
sleShares->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
sleVault->at(sfAccount) = pseudoId;
sleVault->at(sfFlags) = 0;
sleVault->at(sfSequence) = sequence;
sleVault->at(sfOwner) = owner.id();
sleVault->setFieldIssue(sfAsset, STIssue{sfAsset, Asset{xrpIssue()}});
sleVault->at(sfAssetsTotal) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfAssetsAvailable) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfLossUnrealized) = Number(0);
sleVault->at(sfShareMPTID) = sharesMptId;
sleVault->at(sfWithdrawalPolicy) = kVaultStrategyFirstComeFirstServe;
sleVault->at(sfVaultKind) = closedEnded;
if (subscriptionDate)
sleVault->at(sfSubscriptionDate) = *subscriptionDate;
if (redemptionDate)
sleVault->at(sfRedemptionDate) = *redemptionDate;
ac.view().insert(sleVault);
ac.view().insert(sleShares);
return true;
};
testcase << "Vault create closed-ended";
// A fresh closed-ended vault must carry both SubscriptionDate and RedemptionDate.
doInvariantCheck(
{"closed-ended vault must have SubscriptionDate and RedemptionDate"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
return insertBareClosedEndedVault(ac, a1, std::nullopt, std::nullopt);
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
// Gap smaller than MIN_INVESTMENT_PERIOD but with RedemptionDate > SubscriptionDate;
// exercises the sub-minimum branch of the gap check.
doInvariantCheck(
{"closed-ended vault RedemptionDate - SubscriptionDate must be "
"within [MIN_INVESTMENT_PERIOD, MAX_INVESTMENT_PERIOD)"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
std::uint32_t const sub = 1'000'000'000;
std::uint32_t const red = sub + kMinInvestmentPeriod - 1;
return insertBareClosedEndedVault(ac, a1, sub, red);
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
// RedemptionDate strictly before SubscriptionDate; the signed int64 gap is negative and
// is caught by the sub-minimum branch of the gap check.
doInvariantCheck(
{"closed-ended vault RedemptionDate - SubscriptionDate must be "
"within [MIN_INVESTMENT_PERIOD, MAX_INVESTMENT_PERIOD)"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
std::uint32_t const sub = 1'000'000'000;
std::uint32_t const red = sub - 1;
return insertBareClosedEndedVault(ac, a1, sub, red);
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
// Gap exactly MAX_INVESTMENT_PERIOD is out of range (bound is half-open on the right).
doInvariantCheck(
{"closed-ended vault RedemptionDate - SubscriptionDate must be "
"within [MIN_INVESTMENT_PERIOD, MAX_INVESTMENT_PERIOD)"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
std::uint32_t const sub = 1'000'000'000;
std::uint32_t const red = sub + kMaxInvestmentPeriod;
return insertBareClosedEndedVault(ac, a1, sub, red);
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_CREATE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
testcase << "Vault deposit closed-ended";
// A deposit into a closed-ended vault that has advanced past SubscriptionDate. kArgs
// simulates an otherwise valid deposit shape so only the phase invariant fires.
doInvariantCheck(
{"deposit only allowed in Subscription or NoPhase"},
[&](Account const&, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
return kAdjust(
ac.view(), closedEndedKeylet, kArgs(a2.id(), 10, [](Adjustments&) {}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DEPOSIT, [](STObject& tx) { tx[sfAmount] = XRPAmount(10); }},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseClosedEnded(/*advanceBySub=*/1, /*doDeposit=*/true),
TxAccount::A2);
testcase << "Vault withdrawal closed-ended";
// A withdrawal from a closed-ended vault in the Investment phase.
doInvariantCheck(
{"withdrawal not allowed during Investment phase"},
[&](Account const&, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
return kAdjust(
ac.view(), closedEndedKeylet, kArgs(a2.id(), -10, [](Adjustments&) {}));
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseClosedEnded(/*advanceBySub=*/1, /*doDeposit=*/true),
TxAccount::A2);
testcase << "Vault loan set";
// ttLOAN_SET against a closed-ended vault that is not in Investment. finalizeLoanSet fires
// on any vault mutation; touching the vault SLE with no field change is sufficient.
doInvariantCheck(
{"loan origination only allowed in Investment phase"},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(closedEndedKeylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseClosedEnded(/*advanceBySub=*/-1, /*doDeposit=*/false));
testcase << "Vault loan set - closed-ended final payment past "
"RedemptionDate";
// A newly-created loan against a closed-ended vault must satisfy StartDate +
// PaymentInterval * PaymentRemaining < RedemptionDate. LoanSet::preclaim enforces the same
// bound; this test synthesises an invalid loan directly in the ApplyView so the invariant
// catches it even when preclaim is bypassed.
Keylet closedEndedBrokerKeylet = keylet::amendments();
std::uint32_t closedEndedRed = 0;
doInvariantCheck(
{"closed-ended loan final payment must precede RedemptionDate"},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// Touch the vault so ValidVault::finalizeLoanSet sees an
// entry in afterVault_; the vault is in Investment, so
// finalizeLoanSet itself passes.
auto sleVault = ac.view().peek(closedEndedKeylet);
if (!sleVault)
return false;
ac.view().update(sleVault);
// Read the broker's next loan sequence to build the loan
// keylet the same way LoanSet::doApply would.
auto sleBroker = ac.view().peek(closedEndedBrokerKeylet);
if (!sleBroker)
return false;
std::uint32_t const loanSeq = sleBroker->at(sfLoanSequence);
// Synthesize a Loan whose final scheduled payment lands
// exactly at RedemptionDate: StartDate = red, interval = 60,
// remaining = 1 => red + 60 >= red.
auto sleLoan = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::loan(closedEndedBrokerKeylet.key, SeqProxy::rawSequence(loanSeq)));
sleLoan->at(sfLoanBrokerID) = closedEndedBrokerKeylet.key;
sleLoan->at(sfLoanSequence) = loanSeq;
sleLoan->at(sfBorrower) = a1.id();
sleLoan->at(sfStartDate) = closedEndedRed;
sleLoan->at(sfPaymentInterval) = 60;
sleLoan->at(sfPaymentRemaining) = 1;
sleLoan->at(sfTotalValueOutstanding) = Number(100);
sleLoan->at(sfPeriodicPayment) = Number(1);
ac.view().insert(sleLoan);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, Env& env) -> bool {
auto const sub = env.now().time_since_epoch().count() + 60;
auto const red = sub + kMinInvestmentPeriod + 1'000'000;
closedEndedRed = red;
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create(
{.owner = a1,
.asset = xrpIssue(),
.vaultKind = closedEnded,
.subscriptionDate = sub,
.redemptionDate = red});
env(tx);
closedEndedKeylet = keylet;
// Create the loan broker; LoanBrokerSet has no phase gate.
closedEndedBrokerKeylet =
keylet::loanBroker(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(env.seq(a1)));
env(loan_broker::set(a1, keylet.key));
// Advance parent close time into Investment so
// ValidVault::finalizeLoanSet is satisfied.
env.close(tp{d{sub + 1}});
return true;
});
}
void
testMPT()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "MPT";
MPTIssue const nonCanonicalMPTIssue{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
auto const nonCanonicalMPTAmount = [&](SField const& field) {
return STAmount{
field,
nonCanonicalMPTIssue,
kMaxMpTokenAmount + std::uint64_t{1},
0,
false,
STAmount::Unchecked{}};
};
auto const negativeMPTAmount = [&](SField const& field) {
return STAmount{field, nonCanonicalMPTIssue, 2, 0, true, STAmount::Unchecked{}};
};
auto const nonCanonicalMPTPayment = [&]() {
return STTx{ttPAYMENT, [&](STObject& tx) {
tx.setFieldAmount(sfAmount, nonCanonicalMPTAmount(sfAmount));
}};
};
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_2_0),
{},
[](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext&) { return true; },
XRPAmount{},
nonCanonicalMPTPayment(),
{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"ledger entry contains non-canonical MPT or XRP amount"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::check(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence])));
sleNew->setAccountID(sfAccount, a1.id());
sleNew->setAccountID(sfDestination, a2.id());
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfSendMax, nonCanonicalMPTAmount(sfSendMax));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{"ledger entry contains non-canonical MPT or XRP amount"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(
keylet::check(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence((*sle)[sfSequence])));
sleNew->setAccountID(sfAccount, a1.id());
sleNew->setAccountID(sfDestination, a2.id());
sleNew->setFieldAmount(sfSendMax, negativeMPTAmount(sfSendMax));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPT OutstandingAmount > MaximumAmount
doInvariantCheck(
{{"OutstandingAmount overflow"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
// mptissuance outstanding is negative
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence), a1)};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 110);
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfMaximumAmount, 100);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// MPTToken amount doesn't add up to OutstandingAmount
doInvariantCheck(
{{"invalid OutstandingAmount balance"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
// mptissuance outstanding is negative
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence), a1)};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 100);
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfMaximumAmount, 100);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptoken(mpt.getMptID(), a2));
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 90);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
});
// Overflow/Invalid balance on payment
auto testPayment = [&](std::string const& log, auto&& update) {
MPTID id;
doInvariantCheck(
{{log}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
return update(id, ac, a1);
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Account const gw("gw");
env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = gw, .holders = {a1}, .pay = 100, .maxAmt = 100});
id = mpt.issuanceID();
return true;
});
};
testPayment(
"invalid OutstandingAmount balance",
[&](MPTID const& id, ApplyContext& ac, Account const& a1) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, a1));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 101);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
testPayment(
"OutstandingAmount overflow", [&](MPTID const& id, ApplyContext& ac, Account const&) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 101);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
// The on-failure MPT checks (OutstandingAmount balance / transfer) apply
// to every non-tesSUCCESS result, with no per-result exemption. No
// transactor reaches the invariant check with an MPT change on a tec:
// Transactor::operator() routes every tec through
// processPersistentChanges -> reset() -> ApplyContext::discard(), and
// re-applies only offer / trust line / NFT offer / credential
// deletions. So a change that survives to here on a failure result is a
// bug, whatever the code. The result is supplied via doInvariantCheck's
// initialResult seed — a tec cannot arise naturally here, since the
// harness runs only the invariant check, not doApply.
{
MPTID id;
// preclose: gw issues an MPT held by A1 and A2.
auto const setup = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Account const gw("gw");
env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = gw, .holders = {a1, a2}, .pay = 50, .maxAmt = 1'000});
id = mpt.issuanceID();
return true;
};
// Consistent mint: OutstandingAmount and A1's balance both grow by
// 10, so conservation holds but OutstandingAmount changed — only the
// balance-change on-failure check is sensitive to it.
Precheck const mint = [&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleIss = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
auto sleTok = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, a1.id()));
if (!sleIss || !sleTok)
return false;
(*sleIss)[sfOutstandingAmount] = (*sleIss)[sfOutstandingAmount] + 10;
(*sleTok)[sfMPTAmount] = (*sleTok)[sfMPTAmount] + 10;
ac.view().update(sleIss);
ac.view().update(sleTok);
return true;
};
// Holder-to-holder transfer (A1 -> A2 by 10): OutstandingAmount
// unchanged, so only the transfer on-failure check is sensitive. Set
// CanTransfer so the ordinary transfer check stays quiet.
Precheck const transfer = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleIss = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
auto sleA = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, a1.id()));
auto sleB = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, a2.id()));
if (!sleIss || !sleA || !sleB)
return false;
(*sleIss)[sfFlags] = (*sleIss)[sfFlags] | lsfMPTCanTransfer;
(*sleA)[sfMPTAmount] = (*sleA)[sfMPTAmount] - 10;
(*sleB)[sfMPTAmount] = (*sleB)[sfMPTAmount] + 10;
ac.view().update(sleIss);
ac.view().update(sleA);
ac.view().update(sleB);
return true;
};
STTx const payment{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}};
// tecKILLED and tecINCOMPLETE are not special: an MPT change paired
// with either fires the check, exactly as any other failure does.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"OutstandingAmount balance changed on failure"}},
mint,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecKILLED);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"OutstandingAmount balance changed on failure"}},
mint,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecINCOMPLETE);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"MPToken balance changed on failure"}},
transfer,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecKILLED);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"MPToken balance changed on failure"}},
transfer,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecINCOMPLETE);
// The same change under another failure result, for symmetry: the
// check keys off "not tesSUCCESS", nothing finer.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"OutstandingAmount balance changed on failure"}},
mint,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecEXPIRED);
doInvariantCheck(
{{"MPToken balance changed on failure"}},
transfer,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecEXPIRED);
// A one-sided lock (spendable -> locked within one holder) is not a
// two-sided transfer, yet must still be caught on failure — this is
// the gap the `senders || receivers` condition closes.
// OutstandingAmount and the holder total are unchanged, so only the
// transfer-side on-failure check sees it.
Precheck const lock = [&](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleTok = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, a1.id()));
if (!sleTok || (*sleTok)[sfMPTAmount] < 10)
return false;
// Move 10 from spendable to locked (a fresh MPToken has no
// locked amount, so set it directly). Holder total and
// OutstandingAmount are unchanged.
(*sleTok)[sfMPTAmount] = (*sleTok)[sfMPTAmount] - 10;
sleTok->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, 10);
ac.view().update(sleTok);
return true;
};
doInvariantCheck(
{{"MPToken balance changed on failure"}},
lock,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecKILLED);
// The one-sided lock is caught under any failure result.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"MPToken balance changed on failure"}},
lock,
XRPAmount{},
payment,
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
setup,
TxAccount::None,
std::source_location::current(),
tecEXPIRED);
}
// Invalid IOU clawback delta must fail once MPTokensV2 enforces before/after validation.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
env.trust(usd(100), holder);
env(pay(issuer, holder, usd(100)));
env.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: trustline clawback balance change is invalid"}},
[issuer, usd](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle =
ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(holder.id(), issuer.id(), usd.currency));
if (!sle)
return false;
STAmount balance{Issue{usd.currency, issuer.id()}, 80};
if (holder.id() > issuer.id())
balance.negate();
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, balance);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{Issue{usd.currency, holder.id()}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// Full IOU clawback may delete the trustline; missing after-SLE represents zero balance.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
env.trust(usd(100), holder);
env(pay(issuer, holder, usd(100)));
env.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{},
[issuer, usd](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle =
ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(holder.id(), issuer.id(), usd.currency));
if (!sle)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{Issue{usd.currency, holder.id()}, 100};
}},
{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS});
}
// Pre-MPTokensV2 invalid IOU clawback delta logs but remains non-enforcing.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments() - featureMPTokensV2);
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
env.trust(usd(100), holder);
env(pay(issuer, holder, usd(100)));
env.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: trustline clawback balance change is invalid"}},
[issuer, usd](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle =
ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(holder.id(), issuer.id(), usd.currency));
if (!sle)
return false;
STAmount balance{Issue{usd.currency, issuer.id()}, 80};
if (holder.id() > issuer.id())
balance.negate();
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, balance);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{Issue{usd.currency, holder.id()}, 10};
}},
{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS});
}
// Invalid MPT clawback delta must fail when raw MPToken debit mismatches sfAmount.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = issuer, .holders = {holder}, .pay = 100, .maxAmt = 100});
auto const id = mpt.issuanceID();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: MPT clawback balance change is invalid"}},
[id](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, holder));
auto const sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sleToken || !sleIssuance)
return false;
sleToken->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 80);
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 80);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfHolder] = holder.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{MPTIssue{id}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// A clawback that mutates both IOU and MPT entries must fail under MPTokensV2.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
env.trust(usd(100), holder);
env(pay(issuer, holder, usd(100)));
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = issuer, .holders = {holder}, .pay = 100, .maxAmt = 100});
auto const id = mpt.issuanceID();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: trustline and MPToken both changed"}},
[issuer, usd, id](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleLine =
ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(holder.id(), issuer.id(), usd.currency));
auto const sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, holder.id()));
auto const sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sleLine || !sleToken || !sleIssuance)
return false;
STAmount balance{Issue{usd.currency, issuer.id()}, 90};
if (holder.id() > issuer.id())
balance.negate();
sleLine->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, balance);
sleToken->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 90);
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 90);
ac.view().update(sleLine);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfHolder] = holder.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{MPTIssue{id}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// Clawback that modifies a trustline other than the one implied by the
// tx amount: clawbackTrustLineBalanceInHolderTerms returns nullopt for
// the mismatched line.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
auto const eur = issuer["EUR"];
env.trust(eur(100), holder);
env(pay(issuer, holder, eur(100)));
env.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: trustline clawback changed the wrong line"}},
[issuer, eur](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle =
ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(holder.id(), issuer.id(), eur.currency));
if (!sle)
return false;
STAmount balance{Issue{eur.currency, issuer.id()}, 90};
if (holder.id() > issuer.id())
balance.negate();
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, balance);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{Issue{usd.currency, holder.id()}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// Clawback leaving the holder's balance negative.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
env.trust(usd(100), holder);
env(pay(issuer, holder, usd(100)));
env.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: trustline or MPT balance is negative"}},
[issuer, usd](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle =
ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(holder.id(), issuer.id(), usd.currency));
if (!sle)
return false;
// Make the holder's balance negative from their perspective.
STAmount balance{Issue{usd.currency, issuer.id()}, 80};
if (holder.id() < issuer.id())
balance.negate();
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, balance);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{Issue{usd.currency, holder.id()}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// IOU-amount clawback while only an MPToken changed: no trustline was
// recorded, so iou_.before is empty.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = issuer, .holders = {holder}, .pay = 100, .maxAmt = 100});
auto const id = mpt.issuanceID();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: trustline clawback changed the wrong line"}},
[id](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, holder));
auto const sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sleToken || !sleIssuance)
return false;
sleToken->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 90);
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 90);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{Issue{usd.currency, holder.id()}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// Valid trustline change but a zero clawback amount.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
auto const usd = issuer["USD"];
env.trust(usd(100), holder);
env(pay(issuer, holder, usd(100)));
env.close();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: trustline clawback amount is invalid"}},
[issuer, usd](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle =
ac.view().peek(keylet::trustLine(holder.id(), issuer.id(), usd.currency));
if (!sle)
return false;
STAmount balance{Issue{usd.currency, issuer.id()}, 90};
if (holder.id() > issuer.id())
balance.negate();
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, balance);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{Issue{usd.currency, holder.id()}, 0};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// MPT clawback tx missing the Holder field.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = issuer, .holders = {holder}, .pay = 100, .maxAmt = 100});
auto const id = mpt.issuanceID();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: MPT clawback missing holder"}},
[id](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, holder));
auto const sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sleToken || !sleIssuance)
return false;
sleToken->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 90);
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 90);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{MPTIssue{id}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// MPT clawback where the holder's MPToken was deleted (after is empty).
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = issuer, .holders = {holder}, .pay = 100, .maxAmt = 100});
auto const id = mpt.issuanceID();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: MPT clawback token is missing"}},
[id](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, holder));
auto const sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sleToken || !sleIssuance)
return false;
// Keep the issuance consistent after removing the token.
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 0);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
ac.view().erase(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfHolder] = holder.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{MPTIssue{id}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// MPT clawback that changed a different holder's MPToken.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env,
.issuer = issuer,
.holders = {holder, other},
.pay = 100,
.maxAmt = 200});
auto const id = mpt.issuanceID();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: MPT clawback changed the wrong token"}},
[id](Account const&, Account const& other, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, other));
auto const sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sleToken || !sleIssuance)
return false;
sleToken->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 90);
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 190);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfHolder] = holder.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{MPTIssue{id}, 10};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// Valid MPToken change but a zero MPT clawback amount.
{
Env env(*this, defaultAmendments());
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const holder{"holder"};
Account const other{"other"};
env.fund(XRP(1'000), issuer, holder, other);
MPTTester const mpt(
{.env = env, .issuer = issuer, .holders = {holder}, .pay = 100, .maxAmt = 100});
auto const id = mpt.issuanceID();
doInvariantCheck(
std::move(env),
holder,
other,
{{"Invariant failed: MPT clawback amount is invalid"}},
[id](Account const& holder, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, holder));
auto const sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!sleToken || !sleIssuance)
return false;
sleToken->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 90);
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, 90);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
ttCLAWBACK,
[&](STObject& tx) {
tx[sfAccount] = issuer.id();
tx[sfHolder] = holder.id();
tx[sfAmount] = STAmount{MPTIssue{id}, 0};
}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// More MPTokens created than expected
std::array<std::pair<xrpl::TxType, std::uint8_t>, 4> const tests = {
std::make_pair(ttAMM_WITHDRAW, 2),
std::make_pair(ttAMM_CLAWBACK, 2),
std::make_pair(ttAMM_CREATE, 3),
std::make_pair(ttCHECK_CASH, 2)};
for (auto const& [tx, nTokens] : tests)
{
doInvariantCheck(
{{std::string("MPToken created for the MPT issuer")}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
auto seq = sle->getFieldU32(sfSequence);
for (int i = 0; i < nTokens; ++i)
{
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(seq + i, a1)};
auto sleNew =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptoken(mpt.getMptID(), a2));
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{tx, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED});
}
// More MPTokens deleted than expected
for (auto const& tx : {ttAMM_WITHDRAW, ttAMM_CLAWBACK})
{
MPTID id;
Account const a3("A3");
doInvariantCheck(
{{"MPT authorize succeeded but created/deleted bad number of mptokens"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
for (auto const& a : {a1, a2, a3})
{
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, a));
if (!sle)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sle);
}
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{tx, [](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Account const gw("gw");
env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw, a3);
MPTTester const mpt({.env = env, .issuer = gw, .holders = {a1, a2, a3}});
id = mpt.issuanceID();
return true;
});
}
// sfReferenceHolding can only be set on creation by VaultCreate. A
// non-VaultCreate transaction that creates an MPTokenIssuance with
// sfReferenceHolding present must trip the invariant.
doInvariantCheck(
{{"sfReferenceHolding set on a new MPTokenIssuance by a "
"non-VaultCreate transaction"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleAcct = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sleAcct)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(sleAcct->getFieldU32(sfSequence), a1)};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
sleNew->setFieldH256(sfReferenceHolding, uint256{1});
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}});
// sfReferenceHolding is immutable: changing the field on an
// existing MPTokenIssuance must trip the invariant. Set up a real
// vault via preclose (so the share issuance carries
// sfReferenceHolding), then mutate it in precheck to produce a
// before/after pair.
{
uint256 vaultKey;
doInvariantCheck(
{{"sfReferenceHolding was modified on an existing "
"MPTokenIssuance"}},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet::vault(vaultKey));
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto sleIssuance =
ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(sleVault->at(sfShareMPTID)));
if (!sleIssuance)
return false;
sleIssuance->setFieldH256(sfReferenceHolding, uint256{2});
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, Env& env) {
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
env.fund(XRP(10'000), issuer);
env.close();
MPTTester mptt{env, issuer, kMptInitNoFund};
mptt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanTransfer | tfMPTCanLock});
PrettyAsset const asset = mptt.issuanceID();
mptt.authorize({.account = a1});
env.close();
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = asset});
env(tx);
env.close();
vaultKey = keylet.key;
return true;
});
}
// A vault pseudo-account's MPToken cannot be deleted by anything
// other than a VaultDelete transaction. Set up a vault, then have
// an arbitrary tx erase the pseudo's MPToken in precheck.
{
uint256 vaultKey;
doInvariantCheck(
{{"vault pseudo-account holding deleted by a "
"non-VaultDelete transaction"}},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sleVault = ac.view().peek(keylet::vault(vaultKey));
if (!sleVault)
return false;
auto const sleIssuance =
ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(sleVault->at(sfShareMPTID)));
if (!sleIssuance || !sleIssuance->isFieldPresent(sfReferenceHolding))
return false;
auto sleHolding = ac.view().peek(
keylet::unchecked(sleIssuance->getFieldH256(sfReferenceHolding)));
if (!sleHolding)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sleHolding);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const&, Env& env) {
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
env.fund(XRP(10'000), issuer);
env.close();
MPTTester mptt{env, issuer, kMptInitNoFund};
mptt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanTransfer | tfMPTCanLock});
PrettyAsset const asset = mptt.issuanceID();
mptt.authorize({.account = a1});
env.close();
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = asset});
env(tx);
env.close();
vaultKey = keylet.key;
return true;
});
}
// Invalid transfer
std::array<std::pair<TxType, bool>, 3> const invalidTransferTests = {
std::make_pair(ttAMM_WITHDRAW, false),
std::make_pair(ttPAYMENT, false),
std::make_pair(ttPAYMENT, true)};
// The two amendments that gate enforcement, in all four combinations.
FeatureBitset const gatesEnabled{featureMPTokensV2, fixCleanup3_4_0};
for (auto const gates :
{gatesEnabled,
gatesEnabled - featureMPTokensV2,
gatesEnabled - fixCleanup3_4_0,
FeatureBitset{}})
{
for (auto const& [tx, crossCurrencyPayment] : invalidTransferTests)
{
for (auto const flag :
{static_cast<std::uint32_t>(lsfMPTLocked),
~lsfMPTCanTransfer,
~lsfMPTCanTrade,
0u})
{
MPTID id{};
auto const isSuccess = !gates.any() || flag == 0 ||
(tx == ttPAYMENT && !crossCurrencyPayment && (flag == ~lsfMPTCanTrade)) ||
(tx == ttAMM_WITHDRAW &&
(flag == ~lsfMPTCanTrade || flag == ~lsfMPTCanTransfer));
std::pair<TER, TER> const error = isSuccess
? std::make_pair(TER(tesSUCCESS), TER(tesSUCCESS))
: std::make_pair(TER(tecINVARIANT_FAILED), TER(tefINVARIANT_FAILED));
doInvariantCheck(
{{isSuccess ? "" : "invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto update = [&](AccountID const& a, std::uint64_t v) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(id, a));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->at(sfMPTAmount) = v;
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
};
auto issuanceSle = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(id));
if (!issuanceSle)
return false;
auto const flags = issuanceSle->at(sfFlags);
if (flag == lsfMPTLocked)
{
issuanceSle->at(sfFlags) = flags | lsfMPTLocked;
}
else if (flag != 0u)
{
issuanceSle->at(sfFlags) = flags & flag;
}
issuanceSle->at(sfOutstandingAmount) = 200;
ac.view().update(issuanceSle);
return update(a1, 101) && update(a2, 99);
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{
tx,
[&](STObject& tx) {
if (crossCurrencyPayment)
{
tx.setFieldAmount(
sfSendMax, STAmount(MPTAmount{100}, MPTIssue{id}));
}
}},
{error.first, error.second},
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
Account const gw("gw");
env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
MPTTester const usd(
{.env = env, .issuer = gw, .holders = {a1, a2}, .pay = 100});
id = usd.issuanceID();
// Enforcement is gated on featureMPTokensV2 OR
// fixCleanup3_4_0, so the advisory path must
// disable both to stay non-enforcing. Disabling
// happens after the MPT is set up; doInvariantCheck
// closes the ledger next, which is what makes it
// take effect.
if (!gates[featureMPTokensV2])
env.disableFeature(featureMPTokensV2);
if (!gates[fixCleanup3_4_0])
env.disableFeature(fixCleanup3_4_0);
return true;
});
}
}
}
// Vault-share freeze invariant: isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen descends
// through sfReferenceHolding to test the vault's underlying asset for
// each changed holder.
{
Account const gw{"gw"};
MPTID shareID{};
// Vault setup: a1 and a2 both deposit IOU and hold vault shares.
auto const setupVault = [&](Account const& a1,
Account const& a2,
Env& env) -> std::tuple<MPTID, AccountID> {
env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
env.trust(gw["IOU"](10'000), a1);
env.trust(gw["IOU"](10'000), a2);
env.close();
env(pay(gw, a1, gw["IOU"](500)));
env(pay(gw, a2, gw["IOU"](500)));
env.close();
Vault const vault{env};
auto [createTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = gw["IOU"]});
env(createTx);
env.close();
env(vault.deposit(
{.depositor = a1, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = gw["IOU"](100)}));
env(vault.deposit(
{.depositor = a2, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = gw["IOU"](100)}));
env.close();
return {env.le(vaultKeylet)->at(sfShareMPTID), env.le(vaultKeylet)->at(sfAccount)};
};
// Simulate a vault-share transfer: a1 sends 10 shares to a2.
auto const precheck =
[&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) -> bool {
auto sle1 = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(shareID, a1.id()));
auto sle2 = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(shareID, a2.id()));
if (!sle1 || !sle2)
return false;
(*sle1)[sfMPTAmount] -= 10;
(*sle2)[sfMPTAmount] += 10;
ac.view().update(sle1);
ac.view().update(sle2);
return true;
};
// Case: vault pseudo-account's IOU trustline is frozen.
{
auto const preclose = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
auto [sid, vid] = setupVault(a1, a2, env);
shareID = sid;
env(trust(gw, gw["IOU"](0), Account{"vaultPseudo", vid}, tfSetFreeze));
env.close();
return true;
};
doInvariantCheck(
Env{*this, defaultAmendments()},
{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
precheck,
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
preclose);
}
// Case: receiver's (a2's) IOU trustline is frozen.
{
auto const preclose = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
auto [sid, vid] = setupVault(a1, a2, env);
shareID = sid;
env(trust(gw, gw["IOU"](0), a2, tfSetFreeze));
env.close();
return true;
};
doInvariantCheck(
Env{*this, defaultAmendments()},
{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
precheck,
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
preclose);
}
}
}
void
testAMM()
{
testcase << "AMM";
using namespace jtx;
MPTID mptID{};
uint256 ammID{};
AccountID ammAccountID{};
Account const gw{"gw"};
Issue lptIssue{};
PrettyAsset poolAsset{xrpIssue()};
auto deleteAMMAccount = [&](ApplyContext& ac, bool) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(ammAccountID));
if (!sle)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
};
auto updateLPTokensBalance = [&](ApplyContext& ac, std::int64_t amount) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::amm(ammID));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldAmount(sfLPTokenBalance, STAmount{lptIssue, amount});
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
};
auto updateLPTokensBadAmount = [&](ApplyContext& ac, bool) {
return updateLPTokensBalance(ac, -1);
};
auto updateLPTokensBadBalance = [&](ApplyContext& ac, bool) {
return updateLPTokensBalance(ac, 200'000'000);
};
auto updateAMM = [&](ApplyContext& ac, bool) { return updateLPTokensBalance(ac, 10); };
auto updateAMMPool = [&](ApplyContext& ac, bool isMPT) {
if (isMPT)
{
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, ammAccountID));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, 1);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
}
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(ammAccountID));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, XRP(1));
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
};
auto test = [&](auto const txType,
auto&& update,
bool isMPT,
TER error = tecINVARIANT_FAILED) {
doInvariantCheck(
{{"AMM"}},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) { return update(ac, isMPT); },
XRPAmount{},
STTx{txType, [&](STObject& tx) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, error},
[&](Account const&, Account const&, Env& env) {
env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
poolAsset = [&]() -> PrettyAsset {
if (isMPT)
{
MPT const mpt = MPTTester({.env = env, .issuer = gw});
mptID = mpt.issuanceID;
return mpt;
}
return gw["USD"];
}();
AMM const amm(env, gw, XRP(100), poolAsset(100));
ammAccountID = amm.ammAccount();
ammID = amm.ammID();
lptIssue = amm.lptIssue();
return true;
});
};
for (bool const isMPT : {false, true})
{
// Both IOU and MPT pools now escalate to tefINVARIANT_FAILED on the
// second invariant pass (MPT balance invariants enforce under
// fixCleanup3_4_0), so the AMM pool-change check fails on both.
auto const error = TER(tefINVARIANT_FAILED);
for (auto txType : {ttAMM_CREATE, ttAMM_DEPOSIT, ttAMM_CLAWBACK, ttAMM_WITHDRAW})
{
test(txType, deleteAMMAccount, isMPT, tefINVARIANT_FAILED);
test(txType, updateLPTokensBadAmount, isMPT);
test(txType, updateLPTokensBadBalance, isMPT);
}
for (auto txType : {ttAMM_BID, ttAMM_VOTE})
{
test(txType, updateAMMPool, isMPT, error);
test(txType, updateLPTokensBadAmount, isMPT);
test(txType, updateLPTokensBadBalance, isMPT);
}
for (auto txType : {ttAMM_DELETE, ttCHECK_CASH, ttOFFER_CREATE, ttPAYMENT})
{
test(txType, updateAMM, isMPT);
}
}
}
// Test the invariant overwrite fix for both pre- and post-amendment
// behavior. With the fix enabled, |= accumulates violations across
// entries so a later valid entry cannot clear an earlier violation.
// Without the fix, = assignment means the last-visited entry wins.
void
testInvariantOverwrite(FeatureBitset features)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
bool const fixEnabled = features[fixCleanup3_1_3];
std::initializer_list<TER> const failTers = {tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED};
std::initializer_list<TER> const passTers = {tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS};
// Insert two trust line SLEs in hash-sorted order, with the "bad"
// entry at the lower-sorting key so it is visited first by
// ApplyStateTable::visit(). The configurer callables receive the
// SLE and the Issue corresponding to that side's keylet currency.
auto const insertOrderedTrustLinePair = [](ApplyContext& ac,
Account const& a1,
Account const& a2,
Account const& a3,
auto const& badConfig,
auto const& goodConfig) {
char const* const c1 = "USD";
char const* const c2 = "EUR";
auto const k1 = keylet::trustLine(a1, a2, a1[c1].currency);
auto const k2 = keylet::trustLine(a1, a3, a1[c2].currency);
bool const k1First = k1.key < k2.key;
auto const& badKey = k1First ? k1 : k2;
auto const& goodKey = k1First ? k2 : k1;
Issue const badIss{k1First ? a1[c1].currency : a1[c2].currency, a1.id()};
Issue const goodIss{k1First ? a1[c2].currency : a1[c1].currency, a1.id()};
auto const sleBad = std::make_shared<SLE>(badKey);
badConfig(*sleBad, badIss);
ac.view().insert(sleBad);
auto const sleGood = std::make_shared<SLE>(goodKey);
goodConfig(*sleGood, goodIss);
ac.view().insert(sleGood);
};
// Regression: bad XRP trust line followed by a valid trust line.
// With the fix, the invariant catches the violation. Without it,
// the valid entry overwrites the flag to false. The keylet
// currencies are non-XRP (the invariant inspects sfLowLimit /
// sfHighLimit issue, not the keylet currency).
testcase << "overwrite: NoXRPTrustLines" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
fixEnabled ? std::vector<std::string>{{"an XRP trust line was created"}}
: std::vector<std::string>{},
[&insertOrderedTrustLinePair](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const a3{"A3"};
insertOrderedTrustLinePair(
ac,
a1,
a2,
a3,
[](SLE& sle, Issue const& iss) {
// sfLowLimit has xrpIssue, making isXrp = true
sle.setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, STAmount{xrpIssue(), 0});
sle.setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, STAmount{iss, 0});
},
[](SLE& sle, Issue const& iss) {
sle.setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, STAmount{iss, 0});
sle.setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, STAmount{iss, 0});
});
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : passTers);
// Regression: bad deep-freeze trust line followed by a valid one.
testcase << "overwrite: NoDeepFreeze" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
fixEnabled ? std::vector<std::string>{{"a trust line with deep freeze flag without "
"normal freeze was created"}}
: std::vector<std::string>{},
[&insertOrderedTrustLinePair](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Account const a3{"A3"};
insertOrderedTrustLinePair(
ac,
a1,
a2,
a3,
[](SLE& sle, Issue const& iss) {
sle.setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, STAmount{iss, 0});
sle.setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, STAmount{iss, 0});
sle.setFieldU32(sfFlags, lsfLowDeepFreeze);
},
[](SLE& sle, Issue const& iss) {
sle.setFieldAmount(sfLowLimit, STAmount{iss, 0});
sle.setFieldAmount(sfHighLimit, STAmount{iss, 0});
sle.setFieldU32(sfFlags, 0u);
});
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
fixEnabled ? failTers : passTers);
// Regression: MPT OutstandingAmount exceeds max, but locked <=
// outstanding. Plain assignment would overwrite bad_ = true.
// With the fix, NoZeroEscrow catches it.
// Without the fix, NoZeroEscrow passes but ValidMPTIssuance
// still fires ("a MPT issuance was created").
testcase << "overwrite: NoZeroEscrow MPT" + std::string(fixEnabled ? " fix" : "");
doInvariantCheck(
makeEnv(features),
fixEnabled ? std::vector<std::string>{{"escrow specifies invalid amount"}}
: std::vector<std::string>{{"a MPT issuance was created"}},
[](Account const& a1, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
MPTIssue const mpt{makeMptID(1, AccountID(0x4985601))};
auto sleNew = std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mpt.getMptID()));
// outstanding exceeds kMaxMpTokenAmount -> checkAmount sets bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount, kMaxMpTokenAmount + 1);
// locked is valid and <= outstanding -> must NOT clear bad_
sleNew->setFieldU64(sfLockedAmount, 10);
ac.view().insert(sleNew);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
failTers);
}
void
testVaultComputeCoarsestScale()
{
using namespace jtx;
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
PrettyAsset const vaultAsset = issuer["IOU"];
struct TestCase
{
std::string name;
std::int32_t expectedMinScale;
std::vector<ValidVault::DeltaInfo> values;
};
for (auto const mantissaScale : MantissaRange::getAllScales())
{
if (mantissaScale == MantissaRange::MantissaScale::Small)
continue;
NumberMantissaScaleGuard const g{mantissaScale};
auto makeDelta = [&vaultAsset](Number const& n) -> ValidVault::DeltaInfo {
return {.delta = n, .scale = scale(n, vaultAsset.raw())};
};
auto const testCases = std::vector<TestCase>{
{
.name = "No values",
.expectedMinScale = 0,
.values = {},
},
{
.name = "Mixed integer and Number values",
.expectedMinScale = -15,
.values = {makeDelta(1), makeDelta(-1), makeDelta(Number{10, -1})},
},
{
.name = "Mixed scales",
.expectedMinScale = -17,
.values =
{makeDelta(Number{1, -2}),
makeDelta(Number{5, -3}),
makeDelta(Number{3, -2})},
},
{
.name = "Equal scales",
.expectedMinScale = -16,
.values =
{makeDelta(Number{1, -1}),
makeDelta(Number{5, -1}),
makeDelta(Number{1, -1})},
},
{
.name = "Mixed mantissa sizes",
.expectedMinScale = -12,
.values =
{makeDelta(Number{1}),
makeDelta(Number{1234, -3}),
makeDelta(Number{12345, -6}),
makeDelta(Number{123, 1})},
},
};
for (auto const& tc : testCases)
{
testcase("vault computeCoarsestScale: " + tc.name);
auto const actualScale = ValidVault::computeCoarsestScale(tc.values);
BEAST_EXPECTS(
actualScale == tc.expectedMinScale,
"expected: " + std::to_string(tc.expectedMinScale) +
", actual: " + std::to_string(actualScale));
for (auto const& num : tc.values)
{
// None of these scales are far enough apart that rounding the
// values would lose information, so check that the rounded
// value matches the original.
auto const actualRounded = roundToAsset(vaultAsset, num.delta, actualScale);
BEAST_EXPECTS(
actualRounded == num.delta,
"number " + to_string(num.delta) + " rounded to scale " +
std::to_string(actualScale) + " is " + to_string(actualRounded));
}
}
auto const testCases2 = std::vector<TestCase>{
{
.name = "False equivalence",
.expectedMinScale = -15,
.values =
{
makeDelta(Number{1234567890123456789, -18}),
makeDelta(Number{12345, -4}),
makeDelta(Number{1}),
},
},
};
// Unlike the first set of test cases, the values in these test could
// look equivalent if using the wrong scale.
for (auto const& tc : testCases2)
{
testcase("vault computeCoarsestScale: " + tc.name);
auto const actualScale = ValidVault::computeCoarsestScale(tc.values);
BEAST_EXPECTS(
actualScale == tc.expectedMinScale,
"expected: " + std::to_string(tc.expectedMinScale) +
", actual: " + std::to_string(actualScale));
std::optional<Number> first;
Number firstRounded;
for (auto const& num : tc.values)
{
if (!first)
{
first = num.delta;
firstRounded = roundToAsset(vaultAsset, num.delta, actualScale);
continue;
}
auto const numRounded = roundToAsset(vaultAsset, num.delta, actualScale);
BEAST_EXPECTS(
numRounded != firstRounded,
"at a scale of " + std::to_string(actualScale) + " " +
to_string(num.delta) + " == " + to_string(*first));
}
}
}
}
void
testSponsorship()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
using namespace std::string_literals;
testcase("Sponsorship");
{
auto const expectMessage =
"SponsoredOwnerCount does not equal SponsoringOwnerCount delta.";
doInvariantCheck(
{{expectMessage}}, [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldU32(sfSponsoredOwnerCount, 1);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{expectMessage}}, [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldU32(sfSponsoringOwnerCount, 1);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
}
{
auto const expectMessage =
"OwnerCount must be greater than or equal to SponsoredOwnerCount.";
doInvariantCheck(
{{expectMessage}}, [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldU32(sfOwnerCount, 0);
sle->setFieldU32(sfSponsoredOwnerCount, 1);
ac.view().update(sle);
auto const sle2 = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a2.id()));
if (!sle2)
return false;
sle2->setFieldU32(sfSponsoringOwnerCount, 1);
ac.view().update(sle2);
return true;
});
}
{
auto const expectMessage =
"SponsoredObjectOwnerCount does not equal SponsoredOwnerCount delta.";
uint256 checkID;
doInvariantCheck(
{{expectMessage}},
[&](Account const&, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const check = ac.view().peek(keylet::check(checkID));
if (!check)
return false;
check->setAccountID(sfSponsor, a2.id());
ac.view().update(check);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttACCOUNT_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&checkID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) {
checkID = keylet::check(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(env.seq(a1))).key;
env(check::create(a1, a2, XRP(1)));
return true;
});
}
{
auto const expectMessage =
"Invariant failed: Net delta of SponsoringAccountCount does "
"not match net delta of sfSponsor presence.";
doInvariantCheck(
{{expectMessage}}, [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setFieldU32(sfSponsoringAccountCount, 1);
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
doInvariantCheck(
{{expectMessage}}, [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto const sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::account(a1.id()));
if (!sle)
return false;
sle->setAccountID(sfSponsor, a2.id());
ac.view().update(sle);
return true;
});
}
}
void
testObjectHasPseudoAccount()
{
testcase << "object has pseudo-account";
using namespace jtx;
auto const amendments = defaultAmendments() | fixCleanup3_3_0;
// Vault: object deleted without its pseudo-account
{
Keylet vaultKeylet = keylet::amendments();
doInvariantCheck(
Env{*this, amendments},
{{"deleted Vault without deleting its pseudo-account"}},
[&vaultKeylet](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(vaultKeylet);
if (!sle)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttVAULT_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&vaultKeylet](Account const& a1, Account const&, Env& env) {
Vault const vault{env};
auto [tx, keylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = xrpIssue()});
env(tx);
vaultKeylet = keylet;
return true;
});
}
// AMM: object deleted without its pseudo-account
{
uint256 ammID{};
Account const gw{"gw"};
doInvariantCheck(
Env{*this, amendments},
{{"deleted AMM without deleting its pseudo-account"}},
[&ammID](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(keylet::amm(ammID));
if (!sle)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttAMM_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&ammID, &gw](Account const&, Account const&, Env& env) {
env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
AMM const amm(env, gw, XRP(100), gw["USD"](100));
ammID = amm.ammID();
return true;
});
}
// LoanBroker: object deleted without its pseudo-account
{
Keylet loanBrokerKeylet = keylet::amendments();
doInvariantCheck(
Env{*this, amendments},
{{"deleted LoanBroker without deleting its pseudo-account"}},
[&loanBrokerKeylet](Account const&, Account const&, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sle = ac.view().peek(loanBrokerKeylet);
if (!sle)
return false;
ac.view().erase(sle);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttLOAN_BROKER_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
[&loanBrokerKeylet, this](Account const& a1, Account const&, Env& env) {
PrettyAsset const xrpAsset{xrpIssue(), 1'000'000};
loanBrokerKeylet = this->createLoanBroker(a1, env, xrpAsset);
return BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(loanBrokerKeylet));
});
}
// Deleted object missing sfAccount field (defensive check).
// Manually construct the view to place a vault SLE without
// sfAccount into the base ledger, then erase it.
{
Env env{*this, amendments};
Account const a1{"A1"};
Account const a2{"A2"};
env.fund(XRP(1000), a1, a2);
env.close();
OpenView ov{*env.current()};
auto const vaultKeylet = keylet::vault(a1.id(), SeqProxy::rawSequence(ov.seq()));
auto sleVault = std::make_shared<SLE>(vaultKeylet);
sleVault->makeFieldAbsent(sfAccount);
ov.rawInsert(sleVault);
STTx const tx{ttVAULT_DELETE, [](STObject&) {}};
test::StreamSink sink{beast::Severity::Warning};
beast::Journal const jlog{sink};
ApplyContext ac{
env.app(), ov, tx, tesSUCCESS, env.current()->fees().base, TapNone, jlog};
CurrentTransactionRulesGuard const rulesGuard(ov.rules());
auto sle = ac.view().peek(vaultKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(sle))
return;
ac.view().erase(sle);
auto transactor = makeTransactor(ac);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(transactor))
return;
TER const result = transactor->checkInvariants(tesSUCCESS, XRPAmount{});
BEAST_EXPECT(result == tecINVARIANT_FAILED);
BEAST_EXPECT(sink.messages().str().contains("is missing pseudo-account field"));
}
}
void
testConfidentialMPTTransfer()
{
using namespace test::jtx;
testcase << "ValidConfidentialMPToken";
MPTID mptID;
// Generate an MPT with privacy, issue 100 tokens to A2.
// Perform a confidential conversion to populate encrypted state.
auto const precloseConfidential =
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
MPTTester mpt(env, a1, {.holders = {a2}, .fund = false});
mpt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanTransfer | tfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance});
mptID = mpt.issuanceID();
mpt.authorize({.account = a2});
mpt.pay(a1, a2, 100);
mpt.generateKeyPair(a1);
mpt.set({.account = a1, .issuerPubKey = mpt.getPubKey(a1)});
mpt.generateKeyPair(a2);
mpt.convert({
.account = a2,
.amt = 100,
.holderPubKey = mpt.getPubKey(a2),
});
return true;
};
// badDelete
doInvariantCheck(
{"MPToken deleted with encrypted fields while COA > 0"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, a2.id()));
if (!sleToken)
return false;
// Force an erase of the object while the COA remains 100
ac.view().erase(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_AUTHORIZE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
// badConsistency
doInvariantCheck(
{"MPToken encrypted field existence inconsistency"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, a2.id()));
if (!sleToken)
return false;
// Remove one of the required encrypted fields to create a mismatch
sleToken->makeFieldAbsent(sfIssuerEncryptedBalance);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_AUTHORIZE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
doInvariantCheck(
{"MPToken encrypted field existence inconsistency"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, a2.id()));
if (!sleToken)
return false;
sleToken->makeFieldAbsent(sfIssuerEncryptedBalance);
sleToken->makeFieldAbsent(sfConfidentialBalanceInbox);
sleToken->makeFieldAbsent(sfConfidentialBalanceSpending);
sleToken->setFieldVL(sfAuditorEncryptedBalance, Blob{0x00});
ac.view().update(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_AUTHORIZE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
// requiresPrivacyFlag
auto const precloseNoPrivacy = [&mptID](
Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
MPTTester mpt(env, a1, {.holders = {a2}, .fund = false});
// completely omitted the tfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance flag here.
mpt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanTransfer});
mptID = mpt.issuanceID();
mpt.authorize({.account = a2});
mpt.pay(a1, a2, 100);
return true;
};
doInvariantCheck(
{"MPToken has encrypted fields but Issuance does not have "
"lsfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance "
"set"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, a2.id()));
if (!sleToken)
return false;
// Inject all three encrypted fields consistently (inbox+spending+issuer must be
// in sync or badConsistency fires first and masks requiresPrivacyFlag).
sleToken->setFieldVL(sfConfidentialBalanceInbox, Blob{0x00});
sleToken->setFieldVL(sfConfidentialBalanceSpending, Blob{0x00});
sleToken->setFieldVL(sfIssuerEncryptedBalance, Blob{0x00});
ac.view().update(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_AUTHORIZE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseNoPrivacy);
// badCOA
doInvariantCheck(
{"Confidential outstanding amount exceeds total outstanding amount"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mptID));
if (!sleIssuance)
return false;
// Total outstanding is natively 100; bloat the COA over 100
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount, 200);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE_SET, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
// Conservation Violation
doInvariantCheck(
{"Token conservation violation for MPT"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mptID));
if (!sleIssuance)
return false;
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(
sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount,
sleIssuance->getFieldU64(sfConfidentialOutstandingAmount) - 10);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_AUTHORIZE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
// Send/MergeInbox must not change OutstandingAmount (coaDelta == 0)
doInvariantCheck(
{"Invariant failed: OutstandingAmount changed "
"by confidential transaction that should not "
"modify it for MPT"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleIssuance = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptokenIssuance(mptID));
if (!sleIssuance)
return false;
sleIssuance->setFieldU64(
sfOutstandingAmount, sleIssuance->getFieldU64(sfOutstandingAmount) + 1);
ac.view().update(sleIssuance);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_SEND, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
// Send/MergeInbox and zero-COA-delta confidential transactions must not
// change public holder MPTAmount.
doInvariantCheck(
{"Invariant failed: MPTAmount changed by confidential "
"transaction that should not modify this field."},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, a2.id()));
if (!sleToken)
return false;
sleToken->setFieldU64(sfMPTAmount, sleToken->getFieldU64(sfMPTAmount) + 1);
ac.view().update(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttCONFIDENTIAL_MPT_SEND, [](STObject&) {}},
// Second pass is tef, not tec: the bumped holder MPTAmount also trips
// ValidMPTTransfer's on-failure "balance changed" check (fixCleanup3_4_0),
// which fires on the pass-2 tec input and escalates it to tef.
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
// badVersion
doInvariantCheck(
{"MPToken sfConfidentialBalanceVersion not updated when sfConfidentialBalanceSpending "
"changed"},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
Blob const kChangedConfidentialSpending = {0xBA, 0xDD};
auto sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, a2.id()));
if (!sleToken)
return false;
sleToken->setFieldVL(sfConfidentialBalanceSpending, kChangedConfidentialSpending);
// DO NOT update sfConfidentialBalanceVersion
ac.view().update(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_AUTHORIZE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tecINVARIANT_FAILED},
precloseConfidential);
// Skipping Deleted MPTs (Issuance deleted)
auto const precloseOrphan = [&mptID](
Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
MPTTester mpt(env, a1, {.holders = {a2}, .fund = false});
mpt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanTransfer | tfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance});
mptID = mpt.issuanceID();
mpt.authorize({.account = a2});
// Generate privacy keys and convert 0 amount so Bob has the encrypted fields
mpt.generateKeyPair(a1);
mpt.set({.account = a1, .issuerPubKey = mpt.getPubKey(a1)});
mpt.generateKeyPair(a2);
mpt.convert({
.account = a2,
.amt = 0,
.holderPubKey = mpt.getPubKey(a2),
});
// Immediately destroy the issuance. A2's empty, encrypted token object lives on.
mpt.destroy();
return true;
};
doInvariantCheck(
{},
[&mptID](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) {
auto sleToken = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(mptID, a2.id()));
if (!sleToken)
return false;
// Safely able to erase the deleted token.
ac.view().erase(sleToken);
return true;
},
XRPAmount{},
STTx{ttMPTOKEN_AUTHORIZE, [](STObject&) {}},
{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS},
precloseOrphan);
}
public:
void
run() override
{
testXRPNotCreated();
testAccountRootsNotRemoved();
testAccountRootsDeletedClean();
testTypesMatch();
testNoXRPTrustLine();
testNoDeepFreezeTrustLinesWithoutFreeze();
testTransfersNotFrozen();
testXRPBalanceCheck();
testTransactionFeeCheck();
testNoBadOffers();
testNoZeroEscrow();
testValidNewAccountRoot();
testNFTokenPageInvariants();
testAMMDeleteInvariants(defaultAmendments());
testAMMDeleteInvariants(defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_3_0);
testPermissionedDomainInvariants(defaultAmendments() | fixCleanup3_1_3);
testPermissionedDomainInvariants(defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_1_3);
testPermissionedDEX(defaultAmendments() | fixCleanup3_1_3);
testPermissionedDEX(defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_1_3);
testBookDirectoryExchangeRate();
testNoModifiedUnmodifiableFields();
testValidPseudoAccounts();
testValidLoanBroker();
testVault();
testConfidentialMPTTransfer();
testMPT();
testInvariantOverwrite(defaultAmendments());
testInvariantOverwrite(defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_1_3);
testVaultComputeCoarsestScale();
testAMM();
testObjectHasPseudoAccount();
testSponsorship();
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE(Invariants, app, xrpl);
} // namespace xrpl::test
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