{
  "description": "Expected span inventory for xrpld telemetry validation. Attribute keys follow the 2026-05-13 span-attr naming redesign (bare/underscore form; dotted xrpl.* reserved for resource attributes). Sourced from the *SpanNames.h headers and verified against the emitting call sites. Spans marked \"optional\": true are conditional — they only fire under traffic the harness may not produce (e.g. gRPC client, path-finding RPC, missing-ledger fetch, mode transitions) and are not failed when absent. \"parent\" is documentation only (validate_telemetry.py asserts hierarchy from parent_child_relationships, not from this field) and records the parent as the code actually produces it: null means the span is a root or an explicit freshRoot. required_attributes lists only attributes set on EVERY code path that creates the span — attributes set after an early return are described in the span's note instead, because _validate_span_attributes_otlp samples a single trace and would fail on a legitimate short-circuit path. total_unique_attributes is the size of the union of all required_attributes; total_span_types is len(spans). Span EVENTS (consensus.round phase.*/outcome.*, consensus.update_positions dispute.resolve, consensus.accept.apply tx.included) are NOT represented: validate_telemetry.py reads only span name, attributes and timestamps from Tempo, so an \"events\" key would be silently ignored. They are documented in the relevant span notes until the validator gains event support.",
  "spans": [
    {
      "name": "rpc.ws_message",
      "category": "rpc",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["command"],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "note": "WebSocket RPC root span. The load generator uses WS, so this is the RPC entry span (not rpc.http_request, which needs an HTTP/JSON-RPC client)."
    },
    {
      "name": "rpc.ws_upgrade",
      "category": "rpc",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "WebSocket handshake span (ServerHandler::onHandoff, ServerHandler.cpp:272-273). A freshRoot with no attributes — only setOk() on success or recordException() on an upgrade failure. Fires once per WS connection, so the load generator produces only a handful of these at connect time; by the time validation runs after the propagation wait they may fall outside the Tempo search window. Optional for that reason, not because the code path is conditional."
    },
    {
      "name": "rpc.process",
      "category": "rpc",
      "parent": "rpc.http_request",
      "required_attributes": [],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "HTTP-only. Created solely in ServerHandler::processRequest() (ServerHandler.cpp:705), which is reached only from processSession(Session, coro) (ServerHandler.cpp:646) — the HTTP/JSON-RPC path that roots rpc.http_request at ServerHandler.cpp:640-641. The WebSocket path (processSession(WSSession, coro, jv), ServerHandler.cpp:467) never calls processRequest, so this span never appears under a WebSocket request. It does still appear under this harness, 5 traces on a normal run, because run-full-validation.sh polls each node over HTTP with curl (:449, :502) and those requests take the HTTP path. Corrected 2026-08-26; this note previously concluded the span cannot appear at all, which sent a reader looking for a way to make the harness speak HTTP that it already speaks."
    },
    {
      "name": "rpc.command.*",
      "category": "rpc",
      "parent": "rpc.ws_message",
      "required_attributes": ["command", "version", "rpc_role", "rpc_status"],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "note": "Wildcard — matches rpc.command.server_info, rpc.command.ledger, etc. Created as an ambient (scoped) child in rpc::doCommand / rpc::callMethod (RPCHandler.cpp:168, :271), so its parent is whichever transport span is active on the thread: rpc.ws_message on the WebSocket path (the harness workload) and rpc.process on the HTTP/JSON-RPC path."
    },
    {
      "name": "rpc.http_request",
      "category": "rpc",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["request_payload_size"],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "HTTP/JSON-RPC root span. It DOES fire under this harness, 5 traces on a normal run -- one per node -- even though the load generator is WebSocket-only, because run-full-validation.sh polls each node's HTTP port with curl for readiness and validated-ledger progress (:449, :502). Corrected 2026-08-26; this note previously said it does not fire. Kept optional rather than promoted to required because those polls are harness scaffolding rather than workload: a future change to how the script waits for a node could remove them without anything being wrong with the node."
    },
    {
      "name": "tx.process",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["tx_hash", "local", "path"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions"
    },
    {
      "name": "tx.receive",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["tx_hash", "peer_id", "suppressed"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "note": "Cross-node span: parent context propagated from the sender's tx.process via protobuf. Also carries tx_type and peer_version. tx_status is only set when a tx is suppressed/known-bad, so it is not a required attribute on every tx.receive."
    },
    {
      "name": "tx.apply",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": "ledger.build",
      "required_attributes": ["tx_count", "tx_failed"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "note": "Apply-step span inside BuildLedger. Carries tx_count/tx_failed (ledger_seq lives on the parent ledger.build span)."
    },
    {
      "name": "tx.preflight",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["stage", "tx_type", "ter_result"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "note": "Apply-pipeline stage span (stage=preflight). Shares a deterministic trace_id (txID[0:16]) with tx.preclaim/tx.transactor."
    },
    {
      "name": "tx.preclaim",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["stage", "tx_type", "ter_result"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "note": "Apply-pipeline stage span (stage=preclaim)."
    },
    {
      "name": "tx.transactor",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["stage", "tx_type"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "note": "Apply-pipeline stage span (stage=apply). Also carries applied."
    },
    {
      "name": "txq.enqueue",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": "tx.process",
      "required_attributes": ["tx_hash", "tx_type", "txq_status"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Only fires when a tx is queued (fee below open-ledger level). Requires fee escalation \u2014 driven by the txq-burst workload phase. tx_hash/tx_type/txq_status are set on every code path; fee_level_paid/required_fee_level are conditional (TxQ.cpp ~895-898, after the rejected and applied_direct early exits), so they are NOT guaranteed on every txq.enqueue span and cannot be required."
    },
    {
      "name": "txq.apply_direct",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": "txq.enqueue",
      "required_attributes": [],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Child of txq.enqueue when the tx applies directly without queueing."
    },
    {
      "name": "txq.batch_clear",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": "txq.enqueue",
      "required_attributes": ["num_cleared"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "optional": true
    },
    {
      "name": "txq.accept",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["queue_size", "ledger_changed"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Ledger-close accept loop (TxQ::accept, TxQ.cpp:1499). Only meaningful when the queue is non-empty. Root on BOTH call paths, verified: the consensus path (RCLConsensus.cpp:823, inside doAccept) and the switchLastClosedLedger jump path (NetworkOPs.cpp:2150). The span is a ScopedSpanGuard, so it adopts whatever OTel context is ambient — but consensus.accept and consensus.accept.apply are unscoped thread-free SpanGuards and activate() is never called outside unit tests, so no consensus span is ever the ambient parent on the JtAccept worker. ledger.build's ScopedSpanGuard has already been destroyed by the time OpenLedger::accept runs."
    },
    {
      "name": "txq.accept_tx",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": "txq.accept",
      "required_attributes": [
        "tx_hash",
        "ter_code",
        "retries_remaining",
        "txq_status"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "optional": true
    },
    {
      "name": "txq.cleanup",
      "category": "transaction",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["ledger_seq", "expired_count"],
      "config_flag": "trace_transactions",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "TxQ::processClosedLedger (TxQ.cpp:1403). Root on BOTH call paths for the same reason as txq.accept: the consensus path (RCLConsensus.cpp:950) and the switchLastClosedLedger jump path (NetworkOPs.cpp:2121) both run with no consensus span activated as ambient context."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.round",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [
        "consensus_ledger_id",
        "ledger_seq",
        "consensus_mode",
        "consensus_round_id",
        "consensus_phase"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "Root consensus span created per round. Also carries trace_strategy, previous_ledger_seq, previous_proposers, previous_round_time_ms. Emits seven span EVENTS that this manifest cannot assert: phase.open, phase.recovery, phase.establish, phase.accepted, outcome.yes, outcome.moved_on, outcome.expired (declared ConsensusSpanNames.h:265-277; emitted RCLConsensus.cpp:1344 and via onPhaseEvent/onOutcomeEvent from Consensus.h:764, 793, 1047, 1517-1525, 1530, 1566). validate_telemetry.py reads only span name, attributes and start/end timestamps from the Tempo OTLP payload — it has no event assertion support — so adding an \"events\" key here would be silently ignored. Recorded as a note instead; asserting events needs validator support first."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.phase.open",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "required_attributes": [],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus"
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.proposal.send",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "required_attributes": ["consensus_round"],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "Also carries is_bow_out."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.ledger_close",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "required_attributes": ["ledger_seq", "consensus_mode"],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "Also carries tx_count_open, close_time_resolution_ms."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.establish",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "required_attributes": [
        "converge_percent",
        "establish_count",
        "proposers",
        "disputes_count"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus"
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.update_positions",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.establish",
      "required_attributes": [
        "converge_percent",
        "proposers",
        "disputes_count"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "childSpan of establishSpanContext_ (Consensus.h:1628), so the parent is consensus.establish — not consensus.round. Also emits a dispute.resolve span EVENT per resolved dispute (Consensus.h:1697-1698), which validate_telemetry.py cannot assert (no event support)."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.check",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.establish",
      "required_attributes": [
        "agree_count",
        "disagree_count",
        "threshold_percent",
        "consensus_result"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "childSpan of establishSpanContext_ (Consensus.h:1837), so the parent is consensus.establish — not consensus.round."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.accept",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "required_attributes": ["proposers", "round_time_ms", "quorum"],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus"
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.accept.apply",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.accept",
      "required_attributes": [
        "ledger_seq",
        "close_time",
        "parent_close_time",
        "close_time_self",
        "close_time_vote_bins",
        "resolution_direction"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "Also carries close_time_correct, close_resolution_ms, consensus_state, proposing, round_time_ms, tx_count. Emits a tx.included span EVENT per transaction in the accepted set (RCLConsensus.cpp:666, with a tx_id attribute), which validate_telemetry.py cannot assert (no event support)."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.validation.send",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [
        "ledger_seq",
        "proposing",
        "ledger_hash",
        "full_validation"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "follows-from consensus.accept. ledger_hash and full_validation are shared with peer.validation.receive (same keys, told apart by span name). Also carries validation_sign_time."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.proposal.receive",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "Context-propagated from the sending peer. No required local attributes."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.validation.receive",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "note": "Context-propagated from the sending peer. No required local attributes."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.validation.accept",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [
        "ledger_hash",
        "ledger_seq",
        "validation_status",
        "accept_gated",
        "full_validation"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "note": "Emitted once per TRUSTED validation as it reaches the ledger-acceptance gate (handleNewValidation), so its rate is bounded by the UNL size per ledger close. Required, not optional: every node in the harness cluster validates and every other node receives those validations, so the span fires continuously. config_flag is trace_ledger, not trace_consensus, because the span is created through the ledger-hash trace join (TraceCategory::Ledger) -- it belongs to the ledger's trace, not the round's. Its trace id is derived from the VALIDATED ledger hash, the same key ledger.validate and ledger.store use, which is what makes one slow ledger read as one connected trace across the three threads that produce those spans. validation_status is one of the 6 ValStatus values and accept_gated says whether the validation actually reached the gate; both are spanmetrics dimensions. See trace_join_groups below."
    },
    {
      "name": "consensus.mode_change",
      "category": "consensus",
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "required_attributes": ["mode_old", "mode_new"],
      "config_flag": "trace_consensus",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "childSpan of roundSpanContext_ (RCLConsensus.cpp:1101), so the parent is consensus.round. Only fires on an operating-mode transition; a steady cluster rarely changes mode after warmup. A mode change outside a round leaves roundSpanContext_ invalid, which yields a null (no-op) guard rather than a root span."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.build",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [
        "ledger_seq",
        "close_time",
        "close_time_correct",
        "close_resolution_ms"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "note": "tx_count/tx_failed live on the child tx.apply span, not here."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.validate",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["ledger_hash", "ledger_seq", "validations"],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "note": "ledger_hash is required because it is the trace-join key, not merely a descriptive attribute: this span is the anchor of the per_ledger group in trace_join_groups, and the join is computed by hashing that value. Both it and ledger_seq are stamped unconditionally by LedgerMaster::makeLedgerTraceSpan (LedgerMaster.cpp:186-190, called at :1089), so requiring it costs nothing on a healthy run. Without this the only symptom of a lost join key would be assert_trace_join_groups reporting that spans landed in separate traces, which names the consequence rather than the cause."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.store",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["ledger_hash", "ledger_seq"],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "note": "ledger_hash is required for the same reason as on ledger.validate: it is the per_ledger trace-join key, stamped unconditionally by LedgerMaster::makeLedgerTraceSpan (called at LedgerMaster.cpp:511). This span is the required_member of that join group, so a missing key here breaks the join from the other end."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.acquire",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [
        "ledger_seq",
        "acquire_reason",
        "timeouts",
        "outcome",
        "ledger_hash"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Only fires when a node must fetch a missing ledger (InboundLedger). A healthy local cluster rarely back-fills history. outcome is one of complete|failed|abandoned and is stamped on every exit path, including the sweep/shutdown path where the fetch never finished (abandoned). ledger_hash identifies the target ledger from the first moment, since a by-hash acquire starts with ledger_seq 0. peer_count is not required: the destructor path deliberately skips the peer lookup to avoid taking the Overlay lock under the InboundLedgers collection lock."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.acquire.header",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": "ledger.acquire",
      "required_attributes": ["ledger_hash", "outcome", "timed_out"],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Child of ledger.acquire, so it is optional for the same reason the parent is: it exists only while a node is fetching a missing ledger, and a healthy 5-node cluster that has agreed from genesis rarely back-fills. Covers the wait for the ledger header, which gates both tree phases -- until it arrives the account-state and transaction root hashes are unknown, so nothing else can be requested. missing_nodes is deliberately absent: a header is a single object, not a tree."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.acquire.astree",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": "ledger.acquire",
      "required_attributes": [
        "ledger_hash",
        "outcome",
        "timed_out",
        "missing_nodes"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Child of ledger.acquire (optional for the same reason). The account-state SHAMap phase, which is nearly all of the work in a real fresh sync -- the flat parent span could not separate it from the small transaction tree. outcome=timeout with a non-zero missing_nodes is the 'peers are not serving this tree' signature. missing_nodes is read from the count getMissingNodes() already produced during its sweep; no extra tree walk."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.acquire.txtree",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": "ledger.acquire",
      "required_attributes": [
        "ledger_hash",
        "outcome",
        "timed_out",
        "missing_nodes"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Child of ledger.acquire (optional for the same reason). The transaction SHAMap phase. Usually completes long before the astree phase, and that asymmetry is the point of splitting them: the parent span's duration is the state tree's, not this one's."
    },
    {
      "name": "ledger.serve",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [
        "object_type",
        "peer_id",
        "served_nodes",
        "outcome"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "The supply side: this node answering a peer's TMGetLedger request on the JtLedgerReq worker. In practice every node in the harness cluster is listed in the others' [ips], so they exchange ledger and tx-set requests continuously throughout the run -- but optional even so, because the supply side cannot be required while every demand-side span is optional. A TMGetLedger request is constructed in exactly two places, InboundLedger.cpp and TransactionAcquire.cpp, and their ledger.acquire and txset.acquire spans are both optional; requiring this one would rest a mandatory check on an optional cause. Promote it together with them if a future harness step forces a real fetch. A fresh trace root -- the request arrives from the wire on a shared worker, so it must not inherit an unrelated span active there. object_type is header|tx|as|txset and outcome is complete|partial|refused, both derived by shared rules in LedgerSpanNames.h so the eight exits of processLedgerRequest cannot disagree. ledger_seq is present only once getLedger() succeeded, so it is not required."
    },
    {
      "name": "txset.acquire",
      "category": "ledger",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": [
        "txset_hash",
        "outcome",
        "timeouts",
        "duration_ms",
        "peer_count"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_ledger",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "One attempt to fetch a transaction set a consensus proposal referenced (TransactionAcquire, which had zero telemetry before WP-B2). Optional because it only fires when a node does NOT already hold a proposed set: in the harness cluster every node sees the same relayed transactions and builds the same set locally, so InboundTransactions::getSet finds it in its map and never constructs a TransactionAcquire. It is the sibling of ledger.acquire -- same TimeoutCounter base, same trigger/onTimer/takeNodes shape -- and shares the trace_ledger flag so the two halves of a stuck sync cannot be enabled apart. outcome is complete|failed|timeout|abandoned, stamped on all three exits (done(); abandonAcquireSpan(), when InboundTransactions stops pursuing the fetch -- giveSet, the newRound sweep, stop, or ~InboundTransactionsImp destroying the container; and cancel(), when the TimeoutCounter base marks the task failed without reaching done()); the destructor only asserts one of them already ran. A fetch dropped in the window before init() runs emits NO span at all rather than an abandoned one, so the outcome set describes the spans that exist, not every TransactionAcquire ever constructed. The requesting round(s) are carried by repeated round.request EVENTS (current_ledger_hash + current_ledger_seq), not by a parent or a link: one round starts many fetches and one fetch is wanted by many rounds, so no round owns the span -- which is why there is deliberately no parent_child_relationships entry for it. Events are not asserted by this validator; they are read in Tempo."
    },
    {
      "name": "peer.dial",
      "category": "peer",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["remote_endpoint"],
      "config_flag": "trace_peer",
      "note": "One outbound connect attempt (ConnectAttempt), a fresh trace root because a dial is the first thing a starting node does and there is nothing to parent it to. Required: run-full-validation.sh lists the other four nodes in each node's [ips], so every node dials and the span always fires. Telemetry is live in time to catch it -- ApplicationImp::setup() calls startTelemetry() before start() calls overlay_->start(). outcome carries the same six values as the overlay_connect_total counter (connected|tcp_fail|tls_fail|self_connection|upgrade_fail|timeout) and is set from the same reportOutcome() funnel, so span and counter cannot disagree. remote_endpoint is the span-only dimension the counter cannot carry, since one series per peer address would be unbounded cardinality. Among its attributes only remote_endpoint is required. outcome and duration_ms are set on every terminal path, both inside reportOutcome(), but NOT on the teardown path: an attempt destroyed during overlay shutdown, or one whose connect was aborted, ends its span in ~ConnectAttempt with neither, deliberately -- the destructor's own comment records that a span ending with no outcome is the honest record of a dial that never concluded. Because peer.dial is a freshRoot, each dial is its own trace holding exactly one instance of the span, and the validator inspects only the most recent trace; a single newly-aborted dial would therefore fail CI on healthy behaviour. That single-trace sampling of a one-instance span is what makes requiring them unsafe -- not any doubt about the terminal paths setting them."
    },
    {
      "name": "peer.proposal.receive",
      "category": "peer",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["peer_id"],
      "config_flag": "trace_peer",
      "note": "peer_id is set immediately after the freshRoot (PeerImp.cpp:1925) and is the only unconditional attribute. proposal_trusted is set at PeerImp.cpp:1953, after several early returns (stale/duplicate/self-originated proposal checks), so a single rejected proposal in the sampled trace would fail the check — it is therefore not required."
    },
    {
      "name": "peer.validation.receive",
      "category": "peer",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["peer_id", "ledger_hash", "full_validation"],
      "config_flag": "trace_peer",
      "note": "ledger_hash and full_validation are shared with consensus.validation.send (same keys, told apart by span name). Both are set at PeerImp.cpp:2573-2574, BEFORE the isCurrent() gate, so only a too-small or unparseable validation skips them — they stay required (and validate_telemetry.py's PARITY_SPAN_ATTRS already asserts them independently). validation_trusted is set at PeerImp.cpp:2591, after the isCurrent() early return at :2576-2584, so a single not-current validation in the sampled trace would fail the check — it is therefore not required."
    },
    {
      "name": "pathfind.request",
      "category": "pathfind",
      "parent": "rpc.command.*",
      "required_attributes": [
        "pathfind_source_account",
        "pathfind_dest_account"
      ],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Fires on ripple_path_find / path_find RPC. Optional because the harness issues neither: the ripple_path_find weight was removed from rpc_load_generator.py's DEFAULT_WEIGHTS on 2026-08-25, and no workload-profiles.json phase names a path-finding command in a weights override, so no such RPC reaches a node at all. Created as an ambient (scoped) child inside the RPC command handler (RipplePathFind.cpp:35-36, PathFind.cpp:26-27), so its parent is the enclosing rpc.command.* span — RipplePathFind.cpp:30 states this explicitly. Note the span does NOT need pathfinding to be ENABLED, only the RPC to be issued: the ScopedSpanGuard is constructed at RipplePathFind.cpp:35, above the 'if (pathSearchMax == 0) return rpcError(RpcNotSupported)' guard at :48-49, so even a refused call opens and closes it. That positional accident is why the load alone used to satisfy this entry while pathfind.compute and pathfind.discover below stayed unasserted — and why those refusals were also manufacturing a steady ~3% STATUS_CODE_ERROR floor in span_calls_total, which removing the load has now cleared. Restoring the load alone would make this span required again and bring that error floor back; covering the whole family needs pathfinding actually enabled (a [path_search_max] override in run-full-validation.sh — see the pathfind.compute entry below). The workload README section 'Pathfinding is not exercised' carries the full restore recipe."
    },
    {
      "name": "pathfind.compute",
      "category": "pathfind",
      "parent": "pathfind.request",
      "required_attributes": ["pathfind_fast"],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Created by PathRequest::doUpdate (PathRequest.cpp:749-750), which the harness never reaches: pathfinding is disabled on every harness node, so no PathRequest is ever constructed. Config.cpp:725-726 sets pathSearchMax to 0 when a [validation_seed] or [validator_token] section is present, run-full-validation.sh writes [validation_seed] for every node (:308) and has no [path_search*] override, and doRipplePathFind then returns rpcNOT_SUPPORTED at RipplePathFind.cpp:48-49 — above the request-construction branches and below the pathfind.request span guard at :35. Liquidity is not the reason and never was: the call is refused before any path search is attempted, so the outcome does not depend on what the ledger holds. Since 2026-08-25 there is a second, independent reason: the harness sends no path-finding RPC at all, the ripple_path_find weight having been removed from rpc_load_generator.py. Enabling this span therefore needs BOTH a [path_search_max] override (or a non-validator node) in run-full-validation.sh AND the load restored — see the workload README section 'Pathfinding is not exercised'."
    },
    {
      "name": "pathfind.discover",
      "category": "pathfind",
      "parent": "pathfind.compute",
      "required_attributes": ["pathfind_search_level", "pathfind_num_paths"],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Graph exploration; only fires under pathfind.compute, which the harness never reaches because pathfinding is disabled on every node (see the pathfind.compute entry above for the config chain). Liquidity is not the reason: the RPC is refused before any search runs."
    },
    {
      "name": "pathfind.update_all",
      "category": "pathfind",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["pathfind_ledger_index", "pathfind_num_requests"],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Async recomputation at ledger close. PathRequestManager::updateAll emits the span only when requests_ is non-empty (PathRequestManager.cpp:88-95), so it needs a live path_find subscription. On the harness requests_ can never become non-empty at all: the only two insertPathRequest call sites are makePathRequest (:268) and makeLegacyPathRequest (:296), and both handlers return rpcNOT_SUPPORTED first because pathfinding is disabled on every node (PathFind.cpp:39, RipplePathFind.cpp:48; see the pathfind.compute entry above for the config chain)."
    },
    {
      "name": "grpc.*",
      "category": "grpc",
      "parent": null,
      "required_attributes": ["method", "grpc_role", "grpc_status"],
      "config_flag": "trace_rpc",
      "optional": true,
      "note": "Wildcard \u2014 grpc.<MethodName>. The harness has no gRPC client, so these do not fire. Tracked for completeness."
    }
  ],
  "parent_child_relationships": [
    {
      "parent": "rpc.ws_message",
      "child": "rpc.process",
      "description": "WebSocket message contains processing span",
      "skip": true,
      "skip_reason": "This relationship does not exist in the code: rpc.process is created only in ServerHandler::processRequest() (ServerHandler.cpp:705), reached only from processSession(Session, coro) (ServerHandler.cpp:646) — the HTTP/JSON-RPC path. The WebSocket path (processSession(WSSession, coro, jv), ServerHandler.cpp:467) never calls processRequest, so rpc.process is never emitted at all under the WebSocket-only harness. The earlier diagnosis (cross-thread context loss needing a C++ fix) was wrong: rpc.ws_message is a deliberate freshRoot (ServerHandler.cpp:473-474) so each WS message is its own trace rather than nesting under a span leaked on a reused coroutine worker. Nothing to fix."
    },
    {
      "parent": "rpc.ws_message",
      "child": "rpc.command.*",
      "description": "WebSocket message contains the per-command span — the real relationship on the harness WS path (rpc::doCommand at RPCHandler.cpp:271 creates an ambient child of the rpc.ws_message scope inside the same coroutine). Un-skipped 2026-08-26. The skip existed because _validate_parent_child() used to collapse the wildcard to one literal name via child_name.replace(\"*\", \"server_info\"), which made the check depend on which command the sampled traces happened to carry -- server_info is 25/100 of rpc_load_generator.py's DEFAULT_WEIGHTS, so a healthy run could sample three non-server_info traces and fail. That code no longer exists: d059f21bf3 replaced it with _span_name_matches(), which globs via fnmatch.fnmatchcase, and the check's own comment now reads \"globs for wildcard contracts\". Any rpc.command.<anything> under the parent therefore satisfies the contract and the command mix no longer matters. The reason had simply gone stale for two weeks."
    },
    {
      "parent": "rpc.process",
      "child": "rpc.command.*",
      "description": "Processing span contains the per-command span, on the HTTP/JSON-RPC path. Un-skipped 2026-08-26 for the same reason as the WebSocket pair above: the validator globs a wildcard child via _span_name_matches() and has done since d059f21bf3, so the 'resolves the wildcard to one literal probe' claim this entry carried was describing code deleted two weeks earlier. That claim was not inherited here by accident -- it was copied from the stale WS entry while correcting a DIFFERENT error in this same reason, without checking it. Both ends emit: rpc.process reports 5 traces on a normal run, not from the WebSocket-only load generator but because run-full-validation.sh polls each node's HTTP port with curl for readiness and validated-ledger progress (:449, :502), and every such request runs a command."
    },
    {
      "parent": "ledger.build",
      "child": "tx.apply",
      "description": "Ledger build contains transaction application"
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "child": "consensus.accept",
      "description": "Consensus round contains the accept sub-span"
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.accept",
      "child": "consensus.accept.apply",
      "description": "Accept contains the ledger-apply sub-span"
    },
    {
      "parent": "pathfind.request",
      "child": "pathfind.compute",
      "description": "Pathfind request contains the compute sub-span",
      "skip": true,
      "skip_reason": "Real relationship (pathfind.compute is created inside PathRequest::doUpdate at PathRequest.cpp:749-750, under the pathfind.request scope), but the child never exists on the harness because pathfinding is disabled on every node: Config.cpp:725-726 zeroes pathSearchMax whenever a [validation_seed] or [validator_token] section is present, run-full-validation.sh writes [validation_seed] for all five nodes (:308) with no [path_search*] override, and doRipplePathFind returns rpcNOT_SUPPORTED at RipplePathFind.cpp:48-49 before constructing a PathRequest. The parent used to appear anyway, because its ScopedSpanGuard is created at RipplePathFind.cpp:35, above that guard; since 2026-08-25 not even the parent appears, the ripple_path_find load having been removed from rpc_load_generator.py, so both ends of this relationship are now absent. Liquidity has nothing to do with it — the earlier 'no liquidity, returns before computing' reason was wrong, because no path search is attempted at all. Asserting this relationship needs the load restored AND a [path_search_max] override (or a non-validator node) in run-full-validation.sh."
    },
    {
      "parent": "ledger.acquire",
      "child": "ledger.acquire.astree",
      "description": "Ledger acquire contains the account-state tree fetch phase. Un-skipped 2026-08-26. The old skip reason said the parent is optional because a healthy 5-node cluster agreeing from genesis rarely back-fills, so the check would fail on a parent with no traces. Run 32969481032 refutes the premise: ledger.acquire reported 5 traces and so did each of its three phase children, one per node. The parenting was never the doubtful part -- beginPhaseSpan() parents through the acquire span's own captured SpanContext rather than the ambient thread context, so it holds on whichever worker opens a phase."
    },
    {
      "parent": "ledger.acquire",
      "child": "ledger.acquire.header",
      "description": "Ledger acquire contains the header fetch phase, which gates the two tree fetches. Added 2026-08-26: all three phases are opened identically through the parent's captured SpanContext and all three emitted 5 traces on run 32969481032, but only astree had ever been declared here, so two thirds of the phase hierarchy went unchecked."
    },
    {
      "parent": "ledger.acquire",
      "child": "ledger.acquire.txtree",
      "description": "Ledger acquire contains the transaction-tree fetch phase. Un-skipped once the hierarchy check stopped sampling only the newest parent traces. This phase is the conditional one of the three: header opens on !haveHeader_ (InboundLedger.cpp:672) and astree in the else of haveState_ (:689), both of which hold on essentially every acquire, while txtree opens only in the else of haveTransactions_ (:698) -- and a node in this cluster usually already holds the transaction set, because every node sees the same relayed transactions and builds the same set. So the phase fires on a minority of acquires, which is precisely the case newest-N sampling of the parent got wrong; the child was always emitting, just not in the three most recent acquires."
    },
    {
      "parent": "rpc.command.*",
      "child": "pathfind.request",
      "description": "The RPC command span contains the path-finding request span.",
      "skip": true,
      "skip_reason": "Real relationship, and the one skip here caused by a WILDCARD PARENT rather than by a missing span. _validate_parent_child builds its Tempo query as name=\"<parent>\" with the contract string inserted literally (validate_telemetry.py:801), so a parent of rpc.command.* searches for a span literally named that and finds nothing. Note the asymmetry: the CHILD side does handle globs, through _span_name_matches (:826-828), which is why rpc.ws_message -> rpc.command.* is asserted. Only the parent side is literal. Asserting this needs the parent query to accept a glob -- a TraceQL name=~ regex, or resolving the glob to the concrete names Tempo reports first. Independently of that, both ends are absent today anyway: the harness issues no path-finding RPC, see the pathfind.compute entry above.",
      "added": "2026-08-26 to close the declared-but-unlisted gap"
    },
    {
      "parent": "pathfind.compute",
      "child": "pathfind.discover",
      "description": "The path computation contains the discovery pass.",
      "skip": true,
      "skip_reason": "Real relationship with BOTH ends absent, for the reason given in full on the pathfind.compute entry above: pathfinding is disabled on every harness node because Config.cpp:725-726 zeroes pathSearchMax whenever a [validation_seed] section is present, run-full-validation.sh writes one for all five nodes (:308) with no [path_search_max] override, so doRipplePathFind returns rpcNOT_SUPPORTED before any PathRequest is constructed -- and since 2026-08-25 the harness sends no path-finding RPC at all either. Asserting this needs both blockers lifted, which is a workload and node-config change rather than a harness one. Listed here so that the pathfinding family is fully accounted for rather than partly silent.",
      "added": "2026-08-26 to close the declared-but-unlisted gap"
    },
    {
      "parent": "rpc.http_request",
      "child": "rpc.process",
      "description": "The HTTP request span contains the request-processing span. ServerHandler::processRequest() opens rpc.process as a scoped child and its own comment names rpc.http_request as the parent; processRequest has exactly one caller. Both ends emit on every run: the harness polls each node's HTTP port with curl, so this is the one rpc hierarchy that is assertable without a wildcard."
    },
    {
      "parent": "tx.process",
      "child": "txq.enqueue",
      "description": "Transaction processing contains the queue-admission span."
    },
    {
      "parent": "txq.enqueue",
      "child": "txq.apply_direct",
      "description": "Queue admission contains the direct-apply path taken when the transaction is applied straight to the open ledger instead of being queued."
    },
    {
      "parent": "txq.enqueue",
      "child": "txq.batch_clear",
      "description": "Queue admission contains the batch-clear pass that drops an account's superseded queued transactions.",
      "skip": true,
      "skip_reason": "Real relationship, still skipped but for ONE reason now rather than two. The child never fires at all under this workload -- the run reports \"span.txq.batch_clear: optional span not emitted under this workload\" -- because it is created in TxQ::tryClearAccountQueueUpThruTx (TxQ.cpp:550), which needs one account holding several queued transactions AND an arriving transaction that supersedes the whole batch. Nothing in txq-burst arranges that shape. The second reason this entry used to carry, that newest-N parent sampling would miss it anyway, no longer applies: the hierarchy check now queries Tempo for traces containing both parent and child. So this is now purely a workload gap, and un-skipping it needs the workload to produce a supersedable batch -- nothing further from the validator."
    },
    {
      "parent": "txq.accept",
      "child": "txq.accept_tx",
      "description": "The queue's accept pass contains the per-transaction accept span. Un-skipped once the hierarchy check stopped sampling only the newest parent traces. The child is created inside the loop over queued transactions and behind `if (feeLevelPaid >= requiredFeeLevel)` (TxQ.cpp:1530), so it exists only for a close whose queue held a fee-clearing transaction, while the parent fires on every close (:1499) -- which is precisely the shape newest-N sampling gets wrong. The check now asks Tempo for traces containing both, so co-occurrence is found wherever it happened rather than only in the three most recent closes."
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "child": "consensus.phase.open",
      "description": "A consensus round contains its open phase."
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "child": "consensus.establish",
      "description": "A consensus round contains its establish phase."
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "child": "consensus.proposal.send",
      "description": "A consensus round contains the proposals this node sends during it."
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "child": "consensus.ledger_close",
      "description": "A consensus round contains the ledger close it performs."
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.round",
      "child": "consensus.mode_change",
      "description": "A consensus round contains any mode transition that happens inside it."
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.establish",
      "child": "consensus.update_positions",
      "description": "The establish phase contains each position-update pass."
    },
    {
      "parent": "consensus.establish",
      "child": "consensus.check",
      "description": "The establish phase contains each consensus-reached check."
    }
  ],
  "trace_join_groups": {
    "description": "Groups of spans that share ONE trace id without any parent/child link between them, because each derives its trace id deterministically from the same hash (SpanGuard::hashSpan). This is how spans produced on unrelated threads are joined: no context is propagated, so there is no parent to assert -- the assertion is that the spans co-occur in a single trace. Checked by assert_trace_join_groups() in validate_telemetry.py, which searches for the anchor span and requires at least one of its traces to also contain every member listed in required_members.",
    "groups": [
      {
        "name": "per_ledger",
        "join_key": "ledger_hash",
        "anchor": "ledger.validate",
        "required_members": ["ledger.store"],
        "optional_members": ["consensus.validation.accept", "ledger.acquire"],
        "note": "One ledger's spans, keyed on its own 32-byte hash: the acceptance decision (ledger.validate, LedgerMaster::checkAccept), the persist (ledger.store), the trusted validation that drove acceptance (consensus.validation.accept) and the network fetch (ledger.acquire). Each runs on a different thread, so before the join each was its own single-span trace and a slow ledger could not be read as one unit. ledger.validate is the anchor because it fires for every validated ledger. ledger.store is required with it: both run for every ledger the node accepts, and checkAccept reaches storeLedger on the acquire path while consensus reaches it via buildLCL, so at least one ordering always produces both. consensus.validation.accept is optional here only because a ledger this node built itself is accepted via switchLCL without a peer validation arriving first, so the two need not land in the same trace on every ledger. ledger.acquire is optional for the reason its own entry gives: a healthy cluster agreeing from genesis rarely back-fills."
      }
    ]
  },
  "_conditional_attributes_note": "Five attributes documented in the 'Fresh-node sync diagnostics' table of OpenTelemetryPlan/09-data-collection-reference.md are deliberately absent from required_attributes above, because each is emitted only when its value is known and _validate_span_attributes_otlp() has no per-attribute optional flag -- listing one would fail CI red on a healthy run. ledger.acquire/peer_count is set only when finalizeAcquireSpan() is passed a peer count (InboundLedger.cpp), which the sweep and shutdown paths cannot supply. ledger_seq on the three ledger.acquire.header/.astree/.txtree phase spans is set only when seq_ != 0 (InboundLedger.cpp startPhaseSpan), and a by-hash acquire starts with seq_ == 0 and learns the sequence only when the header arrives -- so a phase that opens before the header legitimately carries no sequence. ledger_seq on ledger.serve is set only when the reply carries one (PeerImp.cpp), which an object-by-hash request does not. All five ARE indexed in the 09-reference table and rendered by the Ledger Sync Health board; the honest encoding is to document them here rather than assert a conditional attribute as required.",
  "total_span_types": 48,
  "total_unique_attributes": 74
}