//------------------------------------------------------------------------------ /* This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled Copyright (c) 2012, 2013 Ripple Labs Inc. Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ //============================================================================== #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include namespace ripple { boost::optional make_Manifest (std::string s) { try { STObject st (sfGeneric); SerialIter sit (s.data (), s.size ()); st.set (sit); auto const opt_pk = get(st, sfPublicKey); auto const opt_spk = get(st, sfSigningPubKey); auto const opt_seq = get (st, sfSequence); auto const opt_sig = get (st, sfSignature); auto const opt_msig = get (st, sfMasterSignature); if (!opt_pk || !opt_spk || !opt_seq || !opt_sig || !opt_msig) { return boost::none; } return Manifest (std::move (s), *opt_pk, *opt_spk, *opt_seq); } catch (std::exception const&) { return boost::none; } } template Stream& logMftAct ( Stream& s, std::string const& action, PublicKey const& pk, std::uint32_t seq) { s << "Manifest: " << action << ";Pk: " << toBase58 (TokenType::TOKEN_NODE_PUBLIC, pk) << ";Seq: " << seq << ";"; return s; } template Stream& logMftAct ( Stream& s, std::string const& action, PublicKey const& pk, std::uint32_t seq, std::uint32_t oldSeq) { s << "Manifest: " << action << ";Pk: " << toBase58 (TokenType::TOKEN_NODE_PUBLIC, pk) << ";Seq: " << seq << ";OldSeq: " << oldSeq << ";"; return s; } Manifest::Manifest (std::string s, PublicKey pk, PublicKey spk, std::uint32_t seq) : serialized (std::move (s)) , masterKey (std::move (pk)) , signingKey (std::move (spk)) , sequence (seq) { } bool Manifest::verify () const { STObject st (sfGeneric); SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ()); st.set (sit); if (! ripple::verify (st, HashPrefix::manifest, signingKey)) return false; return ripple::verify ( st, HashPrefix::manifest, masterKey, sfMasterSignature); } uint256 Manifest::hash () const { STObject st (sfGeneric); SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ()); st.set (sit); return st.getHash (HashPrefix::manifest); } bool Manifest::revoked () const { /* The maximum possible sequence number means that the master key has been revoked. */ return sequence == std::numeric_limits::max (); } Blob Manifest::getSignature () const { STObject st (sfGeneric); SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ()); st.set (sit); return st.getFieldVL (sfSignature); } Blob Manifest::getMasterSignature () const { STObject st (sfGeneric); SerialIter sit (serialized.data (), serialized.size ()); st.set (sit); return st.getFieldVL (sfMasterSignature); } bool ManifestCache::loadValidatorKeys( Section const& keys, beast::Journal journal) { static boost::regex const re ( "[[:space:]]*" // skip leading whitespace "([[:alnum:]]+)" // node identity "(?:" // begin optional comment block "[[:space:]]+" // (skip all leading whitespace) "(?:" // begin optional comment "(.*[^[:space:]]+)" // the comment "[[:space:]]*" // (skip all trailing whitespace) ")?" // end optional comment ")?" // end optional comment block ); JLOG (journal.debug()) << "Loading configured validator keys"; std::size_t count = 0; for (auto const& line : keys.lines()) { boost::smatch match; if (!boost::regex_match (line, match, re)) { JLOG (journal.error()) << "Malformed entry: '" << line << "'"; return false; } auto const key = parseBase58( TokenType::TOKEN_NODE_PUBLIC, match[1]); if (!key) { JLOG (journal.error()) << "Error decoding validator key: " << match[1]; return false; } if (publicKeyType(*key) != KeyType::ed25519) { JLOG (journal.error()) << "Validator key not using Ed25519: " << match[1]; return false; } JLOG (journal.debug()) << "Loaded key: " << match[1]; addTrustedKey (*key, match[2]); ++count; } JLOG (journal.debug()) << "Loaded " << count << " entries"; return true; } void ManifestCache::configManifest ( Manifest m, ValidatorList& unl, beast::Journal journal) { if (! m.verify()) { Throw ("Unverifiable manifest in config"); } // Trust our own master public key if (!trusted(m.masterKey) && !unl.trusted (m.masterKey)) { addTrustedKey (m.masterKey, ""); } auto const result = applyManifest (std::move(m), unl, journal); if (result != ManifestDisposition::accepted) { Throw ("Our own validation manifest was not accepted"); } } bool ManifestCache::trusted (PublicKey const& identity) const { return map_.count(identity); } void ManifestCache::addTrustedKey (PublicKey const& pk, std::string comment) { std::lock_guard lock (mutex_); auto& value = map_[pk]; if (value.m) { Throw ( "New trusted validator key already has a manifest"); } value.comment = std::move(comment); } std::size_t ManifestCache::size () const { std::lock_guard lock (mutex_); return map_.size (); } ManifestDisposition ManifestCache::canApply (PublicKey const& pk, std::uint32_t seq, beast::Journal journal) const { auto const iter = map_.find(pk); if (iter == map_.end()) { /* A manifest was received whose master key we don't trust. Since rippled always sends all of its current manifests, this will happen normally any time a peer connects. */ if (auto stream = journal.debug()) logMftAct(stream, "Untrusted", pk, seq); return ManifestDisposition::untrusted; } auto& old = iter->second.m; if (old && seq <= old->sequence) { /* A manifest was received for a validator we're tracking, but its sequence number is no higher than the one already stored. This will happen normally when a peer without the latest gossip connects. */ if (auto stream = journal.debug()) logMftAct(stream, "Stale", pk, seq, old->sequence); return ManifestDisposition::stale; // not a newer manifest, ignore } return ManifestDisposition::accepted; } ManifestDisposition ManifestCache::applyManifest ( Manifest m, ValidatorList& unl, beast::Journal journal) { /* Move master public key from permanent trusted key list to manifest cache. */ if (auto unlComment = unl.member (m.masterKey)) { addTrustedKey (m.masterKey, *unlComment); unl.removePermanentKey (m.masterKey); } { std::lock_guard lock (mutex_); /* before we spend time checking the signature, make sure we trust the master key and the sequence number is newer than any we have. */ auto const chk = canApply(m.masterKey, m.sequence, journal); if (chk != ManifestDisposition::accepted) { return chk; } } if (! m.verify()) { /* A manifest's signature is invalid. This shouldn't happen normally. */ if (auto stream = journal.warn()) logMftAct(stream, "Invalid", m.masterKey, m.sequence); return ManifestDisposition::invalid; } std::lock_guard lock (mutex_); /* We released the lock above, so we have to check again, in case another thread accepted a newer manifest. */ auto const chk = canApply(m.masterKey, m.sequence, journal); if (chk != ManifestDisposition::accepted) { return chk; } auto const iter = map_.find(m.masterKey); auto& old = iter->second.m; if (! old) { /* This is the first received manifest for a trusted master key (possibly our own). This only happens once per validator per run (and possibly not at all, if there's an obsolete entry in [validator_keys] for a validator that no longer exists). */ if (auto stream = journal.info()) logMftAct(stream, "AcceptedNew", m.masterKey, m.sequence); } else { if (m.revoked ()) { /* The MASTER key for this validator was revoked. This is expected, but should happen at most *very* rarely. */ if (auto stream = journal.info()) logMftAct(stream, "Revoked", m.masterKey, m.sequence, old->sequence); } else { /* An ephemeral key was revoked and superseded by a new key. This is expected, but should happen infrequently. */ if (auto stream = journal.info()) logMftAct(stream, "AcceptedUpdate", m.masterKey, m.sequence, old->sequence); } unl.removeEphemeralKey (old->signingKey); } if (m.revoked ()) { // The master key is revoked -- don't insert the signing key if (auto stream = journal.warn()) logMftAct(stream, "Revoked", m.masterKey, m.sequence); /* A validator master key has been compromised, so its manifests are now untrustworthy. In order to prevent us from accepting a forged manifest signed by the compromised master key, store this manifest, which has the highest possible sequence number and therefore can't be superseded by a forged one. */ } else { unl.insertEphemeralKey (m.signingKey, iter->second.comment); } old = std::move(m); return ManifestDisposition::accepted; } void ManifestCache::load ( DatabaseCon& dbCon, ValidatorList& unl, beast::Journal journal) { static const char* const sql = "SELECT RawData FROM ValidatorManifests;"; auto db = dbCon.checkoutDb (); soci::blob sociRawData (*db); soci::statement st = (db->prepare << sql, soci::into (sociRawData)); st.execute (); while (st.fetch ()) { std::string serialized; convert (sociRawData, serialized); if (auto mo = make_Manifest (std::move (serialized))) { if (!mo->verify()) { JLOG(journal.warn()) << "Unverifiable manifest in db"; continue; } if (trusted(mo->masterKey) || unl.trusted(mo->masterKey)) { applyManifest (std::move(*mo), unl, journal); } else { JLOG(journal.info()) << "Manifest in db is no longer trusted"; } } else { JLOG(journal.warn()) << "Malformed manifest in database"; } } } void ManifestCache::save (DatabaseCon& dbCon) const { auto db = dbCon.checkoutDb (); soci::transaction tr(*db); *db << "DELETE FROM ValidatorManifests"; static const char* const sql = "INSERT INTO ValidatorManifests (RawData) VALUES (:rawData);"; for (auto const& v : map_) { if (!v.second.m) continue; // soci does not support bulk insertion of blob data // Do not reuse blob because manifest ecdsa signatures vary in length // but blob write length is expected to be >= the last write soci::blob rawData(*db); convert (v.second.m->serialized, rawData); *db << sql, soci::use (rawData); } tr.commit (); } }