The new 'Domain' field allows validator operators to associate a domain
name with their manifest in a transparent and independently verifiable
fashion.
It is important to point out that while this system can cryptographically
prove that a particular validator claims to be associated with a domain
it does *NOT* prove that the validator is, actually, associated with that
domain.
Domain owners will have to cryptographically attest to operating particular
validators that claim to be associated with that domain. One option for
doing so would be by making available a file over HTTPS under the domain
being claimed, which is verified separately (e.g. by ensuring that the
certificate used to serve the file matches the domain being claimed) and
which contains the long-term master public keys of validator(s) associated
with that domain.
Credit for an early prototype of this idea goes to GitHub user @cryptobrad
who introduced a PR that would allow a validator list publisher to attest
that a particular validator was associated with a domain. The idea may be
worth revisiting as a way of verifying the domain name claimed by the
validator's operator.
Resource limits were not properly applied to connections with
known IP addresses but no corresponding users.
Add unit tests for unlimited vs. limited ports.
An audit showed that a number of the RPC error codes in
ErrorCodes.h are no longer used in the code base. The unused
codes were removed from the file along with their support code
in ErrorCodes.cpp.
The ledger already declared a transaction that is both single-
and multi-signing malformed. This just adds some checking in
the signing RPC commands (like submit and sign_for) which allows
that sort of error to be identified a bit closer to the user.
In the process of adding this code a bug was found in the
RPCCall unit test. That bug is fixed as well.
If the number of peers a server has is below the configured
minimum peer limit, this commit will properly transition the
server's state to "disconnected".
The default limit for the minimum number of peers required was
0 meaning that a server that was connected but lost all its
peers would never transition to disconnected, since it could
never drop below zero peers.
This commit redefines the default minimum number of peers to 1
and produces a warning if the server is configured in a way
that will prevent it from ever achieving sufficient connectivity.
If a server is configured to support crawl, it will report the
IP addresses of all peers it is connected to, unless those peers
have explicitly opted out by setting the `peer_private` option
in their config file.
This commit makes servers that are configured as validators
opt out of crawling.
Several commands allow a user to retrieve a server's status. Commands
will typically limit disclosure of information that can reveal that a
particular server is a validator to connections that are not verified
to make it more difficult to determine validators via fingerprinting.
Prior to this commit, servers configured to operate as validators
would, instead of simply reporting their server state as 'full',
augment their state information to indicate whether they are
'proposing' or 'validating'.
Servers will only provide this enhanced state information for
connections that have elevated privileges.
Acknowledgements:
Ripple thanks Markus Teufelberger for responsibly disclosing this issue.
Bug Bounties and Responsible Disclosures:
We welcome reviews of the rippled code and urge researchers to responsibly
disclose any issues that they may find. For more on Ripple's Bug Bounty
program, please visit: https://ripple.com/bug-bounty
The /crawl API endpoint allows developers to examine the structure of
the XRP Ledger's overlay network.
This commit adds additional information about the local server to the
/crawl endpoint, making it possible for developers to create data-rich
network-wide status dashboards.
Related:
- https://developers.ripple.com/peer-protocol.html
- https://github.com/ripple/rippled-network-crawler
When deserializing specially crafted data, the code would ignore certain
types of errors. Reserializing objects created from such data results in
failures or generates a different serialization, which is not ideal.
Also addresses: RIPD-1677, RIPD-1682, RIPD-1686 and RIPD-1689.
Acknowledgements:
Ripple thanks Guido Vranken for responsibly disclosing these issues.
Bug Bounties and Responsible Disclosures:
We welcome reviews of the rippled code and urge researchers to responsibly
disclose any issues that they may find. For more on Ripple's Bug Bounty
program, please visit: https://ripple.com/bug-bounty
Specially crafted messages could cause the server to buffer large
amounts of memory which could increase memory pressure.
This commit changes how messages are buffered and imposes a limit
on the amount of data that the server is willing to buffer.
Acknowledgements:
Aaron Hook for responsibly disclosing this issue.
Bug Bounties and Responsible Disclosures:
We welcome reviews of the rippled code and urge researchers to
responsibly disclose any issues they may find. For information
on Ripple's Bug Bounty program, please visit:
https://ripple.com/bug-bounty
