When an AMM account is deleted, the owner directory entries must be
deleted in order to ensure consistent ledger state.
* When deleting AMM account:
* Clean up AMM owner dir, linking AMM account and AMM object
* Delete trust lines to AMM
* Disallow `CheckCreate` to AMM accounts
* AMM cannot cash a check
* Constrain entries in AuthAccounts array to be accounts
* AuthAccounts is an array of objects for the AMMBid transaction
* SetTrust (TrustSet): Allow on AMM only for LP tokens
* If the destination is an AMM account and the trust line doesn't
exist, then:
* If the asset is not the AMM LP token, then fail the tx with
`tecNO_PERMISSION`
* If the AMM is in empty state, then fail the tx with `tecAMM_EMPTY`
* This disallows trustlines to AMM in empty state
* Add AMMID to AMM root account
* Remove lsfAMM flag and use sfAMMID instead
* Remove owner dir entry for ltAMM
* Add `AMMDelete` transaction type to handle amortized deletion
* Limit number of trust lines to delete on final withdraw + AMMDelete
* Put AMM in empty state when LPTokens is 0 upon final withdraw
* Add `tfTwoAssetIfEmpty` deposit option in AMM empty state
* Fail all AMM transactions in AMM empty state except special deposit
* Add `tecINCOMPLETE` to indicate that not all AMM trust lines are
deleted (i.e. partial deletion)
* This is handled in Transactor similar to deleted offers
* Fail AMMDelete with `tecINTERNAL` if AMM root account is nullptr
* Don't validate for invalid asset pair in AMMDelete
* AMMWithdraw deletes AMM trust lines and AMM account/object only if the
number of trust lines is less than max
* Current `maxDeletableAMMTrustLines` = 512
* Check no directory left after AMM trust lines are deleted
* Enable partial trustline deletion in AMMWithdraw
* Add `tecAMM_NOT_EMPTY` to fail any transaction that expects an AMM in
empty state
* Clawback considerations
* Disallow clawback out of AMM account
* Disallow AMM create if issuer can claw back
This patch applies to the AMM implementation in #4294.
Acknowledgements:
Richard Holland and Nik Bougalis for responsibly disclosing this issue.
Bug Bounties and Responsible Disclosures:
We welcome reviews of the project code and urge researchers to
responsibly disclose any issues they may find.
To report a bug, please send a detailed report to:
bugs@xrpl.org
Signed-off-by: Manoj Doshi <mdoshi@ripple.com>
Add a `NetworkID` field to help prevent replay attacks on and from
side-chains.
The new field must be used when the server is using a network id > 1024.
To preserve legacy behavior, all chains with a network ID less than 1025
retain the existing behavior. This includes Mainnet, Testnet, Devnet,
and hooks-testnet. If `sfNetworkID` is present in any transaction
submitted to any of the nodes on one of these chains, then
`telNETWORK_ID_MAKES_TX_NON_CANONICAL` is returned.
Since chains with a network ID less than 1025, including Mainnet, retain
the existing behavior, there is no need for an amendment.
The `NetworkID` helps to prevent replay attacks because users specify a
`NetworkID` field in every transaction for that chain.
This change introduces a new UINT32 field, `sfNetworkID` ("NetworkID").
There are also three new local error codes for transaction results:
- `telNETWORK_ID_MAKES_TX_NON_CANONICAL`
- `telREQUIRES_NETWORK_ID`
- `telWRONG_NETWORK`
To learn about the other transaction result codes, see:
https://xrpl.org/transaction-results.html
Local error codes were chosen because a transaction is not necessarily
malformed if it is submitted to a node running on the incorrect chain.
This is a local error specific to that node and could be corrected by
switching to a different node or by changing the `network_id` on that
node. See:
https://xrpl.org/connect-your-rippled-to-the-xrp-test-net.html
In addition to using `NetworkID`, it is still generally recommended to
use different accounts and keys on side-chains. However, people will
undoubtedly use the same keys on multiple chains; for example, this is
common practice on other blockchain networks. There are also some
legitimate use cases for this.
A `app.NetworkID` test suite has been added, and `core.Config` was
updated to include some network_id tests.
* Introduces amendment `XRPFees`
* Convert fee voting and protocol messages to use XRPAmounts
* Includes Validations, Change transactions, the "Fees" ledger object,
and subscription messages
* Improve handling of 0 drop reference fee with TxQ. For use with networks that do not want to require fees
* Note that fee escalation logic is still in place, which may cause the
open ledger fee to rise if the network is busy. 0 drop transactions
will still queue, and fee escalation can be effectively disabled by
modifying the configuration on all nodes
* Change default network reserves to match Mainnet
* Name the new SFields *Drops (not *XRP)
* Reserve SField IDs for Hooks
* Clarify comments explaining the ttFEE transaction field validation
* Log load fee values (at debug) received from validations.
* Log remote and cluster fee values (at trace) when changed.
* Refactor JobQueue::isOverloaded to return sooner if overloaded.
* Refactor Transactor::checkFee to only compute fee if ledger is open.
Before this change any non-zero Sequence field was handled as
a non-ticketed transaction, even if a TicketSequence was
present. We learned that this could lead to user confusion.
So the rules are tightened up.
Now if any transaction contains both a non-zero Sequence
field and a TicketSequence field then that transaction
returns a temSEQ_AND_TICKET error code.
The (deprecated) "sign" and "submit" RPC commands are tuned
up so they auto-insert a Sequence field of zero if they see
a TicketSequence in the transaction.
No amendment is needed because this change is going into
the first release that supports the TicketBatch amendment.
The existing code that deserialized an STAmount was sub-optimal and performed
poorly. In some rare cases the operation could result in otherwise valid
serialized amounts overflowing during deserialization. This commit will help
detect error conditions more quickly and eliminate the problematic corner cases.
* If multiple transactions are queued for the account, change the
account's sequence number in a temporary view before processing the
transaction.
* Adds a new "at()" interface to STObject which is identical to the
operator[], but easier to write and read when dealing with ptrs.
* Split the TxQ tests into two suites to speed up parallel run times.
Tickets are a mechanism to allow for the "out-of-order" execution of
transactions on the XRP Ledger.
This commit, if merged, reworks the existing support for tickets and
introduces support for 'ticket batching', completing the feature set
needed for tickets.
The code is gated under the newly-introduced `TicketBatch` amendment
and the `Tickets` amendment, which is not presently active on the
network, is being removed.
The specification for this change can be found at:
https://github.com/xrp-community/standards-drafts/issues/16
FIXES: #2847
* Transactions that are submitted with the fail_hard flag
and that result in any TER code besides tesSUCCESS shall
be neither queued nor held.
[FOLD] Keep tec results out of the open ledger when fail_hard:
* Improve TransactionStatus const correctness, and remove redundant
`local` check
* Check open ledger tx count in fail_hard tests
* Fix some wrapping
* Remove duplicate test
The existing platform detection code was derived from the old Beast
library, which was, itself, derived from JUCE.
This commit removes that code and replaces it with the Boost.Predef
library which defines a consistent set of compiler, architecture,
operating system, library, and other version numbers.
For more on Boost.Predef, please see the Boost documentation. The
documentation for the current version as of this writing is at:
https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_71_0/doc/html/predef.html
The XRP Ledger utilizes an account model. Unlike systems based on a UTXO
model, XRP Ledger accounts are first-class objects. This design choice
allows the XRP Ledger to offer rich functionality, including the ability
to own objects (offers, escrows, checks, signer lists) as well as other
advanced features, such as key rotation and configurable multi-signing
without needing to change a destination address.
The trade-off is that accounts must be stored on ledger. The XRP Ledger
applies reserve requirements, in XRP, to protect the shared global ledger
from growing excessively large as the result of spam or malicious usage.
Prior to this commit, accounts had been permanent objects; once created,
they could never be deleted.
This commit introduces a new amendment "DeletableAccounts" which, if
enabled, will allow account objects to be deleted by executing the new
"AccountDelete" transaction. Any funds remaining in the account will
be transferred to an account specified in the deletion transaction.
The amendment changes the mechanics of account creation; previously
a new account would have an initial sequence number of 1. Accounts
created after the amendment will have an initial sequence number that
is equal to the ledger in which the account was created.
Accounts can only be deleted if they are not associated with any
obligations (like RippleStates, Escrows, or PayChannels) and if the
current ledger sequence number exceeds the account's sequence number
by at least 256 so that, if recreated, the account can be protected
from transaction replay.
The XRP Ledger allows an account to authorize a secondary key pair,
called a regular key pair, to sign future transactions, while keeping
the master key pair offline.
The regular key pair can be changed as often as desired, without
requiring other changes on the account.
If merged, this commit corrects a minor technical flaw which would
allow an account holder to specify the master key as the account's
new regular key.
The change is controlled by the `fixMasterKeyAsRegularKey` amendment
which, if enabled, will:
1. Prevent specifying an account's master key as the account's
regular key.
2. Prevent the "Disable Master Key" flag from incorrectly affecting
regular keys.
As described in #2314, when an offer executed with `Fill or Kill`
semantics, the server would return `tesSUCCESS` even if the order
couldn't be filled and was aborted. This would require additional
processing of metadata by users to determine the effects of the
transaction.
This commit introduces the `fix1578` amendment which, if enabled,
will cause the server to return the new `tecKILLED` error code
instead of `tesSUCCESS` for `Fill or Kill` orders that could not
be filled.
Additionally, the `fix1578` amendment will prevent the setting of
the `No Ripple` flag on trust lines with negative balance; trying
to set the flag on such a trust line will fail with the new error
code `tecNEGATIVE_BALANCE`.
* mFeeDue is only used in one place by one derived class, so
only compute it as a local in that function.
* The baseFee needs to be calculated outside of the Transactor class
because, it can change during transaction processing, and the function
is static, so we need to be sure to call the right version
* Rename Transactor::calculateFee to minimumFee
Add a new invariant checker that verifies that we never charge a
fee higher than specified in the transaction; we will charge less
in some corner cases where the transacting account cannot afford
the fee.
Detect more anomalous conditions, and improve the logged error
messages.
Clarify the code flow associated with invoking the invariant checker
from `Transactor`, add extra comments and improve naming to make the
code self-documenting.
The six different ranges of TER codes are broken up into six
different enumerations. A template class allows subsets of
these enumerations to be aggregated. This technique allows
verification at compile time that no TEC codes are returned
before the signature is checked.
Conversion between TER instance and integer is provided by
named functions. This makes accidental conversion almost
impossible and makes type abuse easier to spot in the code
base.
Add new functionality to enforce one or more sanity checks (invariants)
on transactions. Add tests for each new invariant check. Allow
for easily adding additional invariant checks in the future.
Also Resolves
-------------
- RIPD-1426
- RIPD-1427
- RIPD-1428
- RIPD-1429
- RIPD-1430
- RIPD-1431
- RIPD-1432
Release Notes
-------------
Creates a new ammendment named "EnforceInvariants" which must be
enabled in order for these new checks to run on each transaction.
A conditional suspended payment is a suspended payment where
completion of the payment is contingent upon the fulfillment
of a condition defined by the sender during creation of the
suspended payment.
This commit also introduces the "CryptoConditions" amendment
which controls whether cryptoconditions will be supported
in suspended payments. The existing "SusPay" amendment can
be used to enable suspended payments without enabling the
cryptoconditions code.
* Tweak account XRP balance and sequence if needed before preclaim.
* Limit total fees in flight to minimum reserve / account balance.
* LastLedgerSequence must be at least 2 more than the current ledger to be queued.
* Limit 10 transactions per account in the queue at a time.
* Limit queuing multiple transactions after transactions that affect authentication.
* Zero base fee transactions are treated as having a fixed fee level of 256000 instead of infinite.
* Full queue: new txn can only kick out a tx if the fee is higher than that account's average fee.
* Queued tx retry limit prevents indefinitely stuck txns.
* Return escalation factors in server_info and _state when escalated.
* Update documentation.
* Update experimental config to only include the % increase.
* Convert TxQ metric magic numbers to experimental config.
Replace Journal public data members with member function accessors
in order to make Journal lighter weight. The change makes a
Journal cheaper to pass by value.
Also add missing stream checks (e.g., calls to JLOG) to avoid
text processing that ultimately will not be stored in the log.
Add a new algorithm for finding the liquidity in a payment path. There
is still a reverse and forward pass, but the forward pass starts at the
limiting step rather than the payment source. This insures the limiting
step is completely consumed rather than potentially leaving a 'dust'
amount in the forward pass.
Each step in a payment is either a book step, a direct step (account to
account step), or an xrp endpoint. Each step in the existing
implementation is a triple, where each element in the triple is either
an account of a book, for a total of eight step types.
Since accounts are considered in pairs, rather than triples, transfer
fees are handled differently. In V1 of payments, in the payment path
A -> gw ->B, if A redeems to gw, and gw issues to B, a transfer fee is
changed. In the new code, a transfer fee is changed even if A issues to
gw.
With the addition of multisigning there are a variety of reasons
a signature may fail. We now return a more descriptive message
for the reason certain signature checks fail.
The RippleAddress class was used to represent a number of fundamentally
different types: account public keys, account secret keys, node public
keys, node secret keys, seeds and generators.
The class is replaced by the following types:
* PublicKey for account and node public keys
* SecretKey for account and node private keys
* Generator for generating secp256k1 accounts
* Seed for account, node and generator seeds
tapENABLE_TESTING is removed from checks, and feature enablement
is the sole method for activating features. Unit tests are updated
to enable required features in the construction of the Env.
Tickets are put on a feature switch instead of a build macro.
This is designed for use by proxies in front of rippled. Configured IPs
can forward identifying user data in HTTP headers, including
user name and origin IP. If the user name exists, then resource limits
are lifted for that session. However, administrative commands are still
reserved only for administrative sessions.
The first few transactions are added to the open ledger at
the base fee (ie. 10 drops). Once enough transactions are
added, the required fee will jump dramatically. If additional
transactions are added, the fee will grow exponentially.
Transactions that don't have a high enough fee to be applied to
the ledger are added to the queue in order from highest fee to
lowest. Whenever a new ledger is accepted as validated, transactions
are first applied from the queue to the open ledger in fee order
until either all transactions are applied or the fee again jumps
too high for the remaining transactions.
Current implementation is restricted to one transaction in the
queue per account. Some groundwork has been laid to expand in
the future.
Note that this fee logic escalates independently of the load-based
fee logic (ie. LoadFeeTrack). Submitted transactions must meet
the load fee to be considered for the queue, and must meet both
fees to be put into open ledger.
* All checks flow through ripple::checkValidity, which transparently caches result flags.
* All external transaction submission code paths use checkValidity.
* SF_SIGGOOD flag no longer appears outside of HashRouter / checkValidity.
* Validity can be forced in known or trusted scenarios.
