mirror of
https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled.git
synced 2026-07-30 02:20:39 +00:00
fix: undo MPTInvariant changes pertaining vault shares
This commit is contained in:
Vito
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
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#include <test/jtx/TestHelpers.h>
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#include <test/jtx/amount.h>
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#include <test/jtx/fee.h>
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#include <test/jtx/flags.h>
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#include <test/jtx/mpt.h>
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#include <test/jtx/pay.h>
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#include <test/jtx/permissioned_domains.h>
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@@ -4600,15 +4599,16 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::Suite
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}
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}
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// Vault-share transfer: ValidMPTTransfer gates isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen
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// on fixCleanup3_3_0. Pre-amendment, vault-share transfers are allowed
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// even when the underlying asset is individually frozen for the sender;
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// post-amendment they are blocked.
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// Vault-share freeze invariant: isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen descends
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// through sfReferenceHolding to test the vault's underlying asset for
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// each changed holder.
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{
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Account const gw{"gw"};
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MPTID shareID{};
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AccountID vaultPseudoID{};
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auto const preclose = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
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// Vault setup: a1 and a2 both deposit IOU and hold vault shares.
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auto const setupVault = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
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env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
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env.trust(gw["IOU"](10'000), a1);
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env.trust(gw["IOU"](10'000), a2);
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@@ -4617,24 +4617,18 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::Suite
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env(pay(gw, a2, gw["IOU"](500)));
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env.close();
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PrettyAsset const iou = gw["IOU"];
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Vault const vault{env};
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auto [createTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = iou});
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auto [createTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = gw["IOU"]});
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env(createTx);
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env.close();
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// Both a1 and a2 deposit IOU, each receiving vault shares.
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env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a1, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = iou(100)}));
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env(vault.deposit({.depositor = a2, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = iou(100)}));
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env(vault.deposit(
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{.depositor = a1, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = gw["IOU"](100)}));
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env(vault.deposit(
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{.depositor = a2, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = gw["IOU"](100)}));
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env.close();
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shareID = env.le(vaultKeylet)->at(sfShareMPTID);
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// Freeze a2's IOU trustline from the issuer side.
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// a2 is the receiver in the simulated AMM withdraw; the
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// distinction under test is that pre-fix330 the invariant
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// does not apply the transitive vault freeze to receivers.
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env(trust(gw, gw["IOU"](0), a2, tfSetFreeze));
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env.close();
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vaultPseudoID = env.le(vaultKeylet)->at(sfAccount);
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return true;
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};
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@@ -4652,156 +4646,46 @@ class Invariants_test : public beast::unit_test::Suite
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return true;
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};
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// post-fixCleanup3_3_0: full isFrozen() applies to all holders;
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// isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen finds a2's underlying IOU frozen →
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// invalidTransfer → invariant fires.
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments()},
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{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
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precheck,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
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preclose);
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// Case: vault pseudo-account's IOU trustline is frozen.
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{
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auto const preclose = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
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if (!setupVault(a1, a2, env))
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return false;
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env(trust(
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gw, gw["IOU"](0), Account{"vaultPseudo", vaultPseudoID}, tfSetFreeze));
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env.close();
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return true;
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};
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// pre-fixCleanup3_3_0: legacy AMM withdraw only checked
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// checkIndividualFrozen on the destination, not the transitive
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// vault freeze; a2 as receiver is exempt → invariant passes.
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_3_0},
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{},
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precheck,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS},
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preclose);
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}
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments()},
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{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
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precheck,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
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preclose);
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}
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// Side-specific vault-share AMM_WITHDRAW invariant tests.
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// Both cases use a real vault (IOU underlying) and a real AMM whose
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// pool includes vault shares. precheck simulates an AMM_WITHDRAW by
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// transferring 10 vault shares from the AMM pseudo-account to a2.
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{
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MPTID shareID{};
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AccountID ammAcctID{};
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AccountID vaultPseudoID{};
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Account const gw{"gw"};
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// Case: receiver's (a2's) IOU trustline is frozen.
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{
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auto const preclose = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
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if (!setupVault(a1, a2, env))
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return false;
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env(trust(gw, gw["IOU"](0), a2, tfSetFreeze));
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env.close();
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return true;
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};
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// Simulate AMM_WITHDRAW: AMM pseudo-account sends 10 vault shares
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// to a2. The AMM pseudo is the sender (decreasing balance);
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// a2 is the receiver (increasing balance).
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auto const precheck2 =
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[&](Account const& /*a1*/, Account const& a2, ApplyContext& ac) -> bool {
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auto sleAMM = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(shareID, ammAcctID));
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auto sle2 = ac.view().peek(keylet::mptoken(shareID, a2.id()));
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if (!sleAMM || !sle2)
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return false;
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(*sleAMM)[sfMPTAmount] -= 10;
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(*sle2)[sfMPTAmount] += 10;
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ac.view().update(sleAMM);
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ac.view().update(sle2);
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return true;
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};
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// Shared vault + AMM setup: a1 deposits 500 IOU into a vault and
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// creates an AMM with XRP + 100 vault shares, giving the AMM
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// pseudo-account a vault-share MPToken balance.
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auto const setupVaultAMM = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
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env.fund(XRP(1'000), gw);
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env(fset(gw, asfDefaultRipple));
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env.close();
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env.trust(gw["IOU"](10'000), a1);
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env.trust(gw["IOU"](10'000), a2);
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env.close();
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env(pay(gw, a1, gw["IOU"](1'000)));
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env(pay(gw, a2, gw["IOU"](500)));
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env.close();
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Vault const vault{env};
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auto [createTx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = a1, .asset = gw["IOU"]});
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env(createTx);
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env.close();
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env(vault.deposit(
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{.depositor = a1, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = gw["IOU"](500)}));
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env(vault.deposit(
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{.depositor = a2, .id = vaultKeylet.key, .amount = gw["IOU"](200)}));
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env.close();
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shareID = env.le(vaultKeylet)->at(sfShareMPTID);
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vaultPseudoID = env.le(vaultKeylet)->at(sfAccount);
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// a1 creates AMM with XRP + 100 vault shares; the AMM
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// pseudo-account receives an MPToken record for shareID.
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AMM const amm(env, a1, XRP(100), STAmount{MPTIssue{shareID}, 100});
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ammAcctID = amm.ammAccount();
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return true;
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};
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// Case 1: freeze the vault pseudo-account's IOU trustline.
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// isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen(ammAcct) calls isAnyFrozen({vaultPseudo,
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// ammAcct}, IOU); since vaultPseudo is frozen it returns true. The
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// AMM sender has a decreasing balance (not a receiver) so it is
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// never exempt from the check — invariant fires both pre- and
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// post-fixCleanup3_3_0.
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auto const preclose3 = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
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if (!setupVaultAMM(a1, a2, env))
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return false;
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env(trust(gw, gw["IOU"](0), Account{"vaultPseudo", vaultPseudoID}, tfSetFreeze));
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env.close();
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return true;
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};
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments()},
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{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
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precheck2,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
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preclose3);
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_3_0},
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{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
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precheck2,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
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preclose3);
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// Case 2: freeze a2's (receiver's) IOU trustline.
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// isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen(a2) → isAnyFrozen({vaultPseudo, a2},
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// IOU) → true. The AMM sender's check passes (vaultPseudo and
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// ammAcct are not frozen). Pre-fix330: receiver is exempt from
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// isVaultPseudoAccountFrozen in ttAMM_WITHDRAW → passes.
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// Post-fix330: full isFrozen() applied to a2 → fires.
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auto const preclose4 = [&](Account const& a1, Account const& a2, Env& env) -> bool {
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if (!setupVaultAMM(a1, a2, env))
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return false;
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env(trust(gw, gw["IOU"](0), a2, tfSetFreeze));
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env.close();
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return true;
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};
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments()},
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{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
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precheck2,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
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preclose4);
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments() - fixCleanup3_3_0},
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{},
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precheck2,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttAMM_WITHDRAW, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tesSUCCESS, tesSUCCESS},
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preclose4);
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doInvariantCheck(
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Env{*this, defaultAmendments()},
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{{"invalid MPToken transfer between holders"}},
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precheck,
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XRPAmount{},
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STTx{ttPAYMENT, [](STObject&) {}},
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{tecINVARIANT_FAILED, tefINVARIANT_FAILED},
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preclose);
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}
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}
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}
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