Update secp256k1 library to 0.6.0 (#5254)

This commit is contained in:
Michael Legleux
2025-01-27 11:47:47 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent ed4870cdb4
commit b6e3453f49
109 changed files with 12713 additions and 13537 deletions

View File

@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@
#include "examples_util.h"
int main(void) {
unsigned char msg[12] = "Hello World!";
unsigned char msg[] = {'H', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'o', ' ', 'W', 'o', 'r', 'l', 'd', '!'};
unsigned char msg_hash[32];
unsigned char tag[17] = "my_fancy_protocol";
unsigned char tag[] = {'m', 'y', '_', 'f', 'a', 'n', 'c', 'y', '_', 'p', 'r', 'o', 't', 'o', 'c', 'o', 'l'};
unsigned char seckey[32];
unsigned char randomize[32];
unsigned char auxiliary_rand[32];
@@ -43,20 +43,17 @@ int main(void) {
assert(return_val);
/*** Key Generation ***/
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
* happening is negligible. */
while (1) {
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* Try to create a keypair with a valid context, it should only fail if
* the secret key is zero or out of range. */
if (secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, seckey)) {
break;
}
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* Try to create a keypair with a valid context. This only fails if the
* secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's order). Note
* that the probability of this occurring is negligible with a properly
* functioning random number generator. */
if (!secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, seckey)) {
printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
return 1;
}
/* Extract the X-only public key from the keypair. We pass NULL for
@@ -146,7 +143,7 @@ int main(void) {
/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS
* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
*
* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler