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Update secp256k1 library to 0.6.0 (#5254)

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This commit is contained in:
Michael Legleux
2025-01-27 11:47:47 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent ed4870cdb4
commit b6e3453f49
109 changed files with 12713 additions and 13537 deletions
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24
external/secp256k1/examples/ecdsa.c vendored
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@@ -49,18 +49,16 @@ int main(void) {
assert(return_val);
/*** Key Generation ***/
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
* happening is negligible. */
while (1) {
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey)) {
break;
}
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
* order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
* with a properly functioning random number generator. */
if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey)) {
printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
return 1;
}
/* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */
@@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ int main(void) {
/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS
* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
*
* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler