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fix: Add tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION and fix flags (#5465)

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* Adds `tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION` for unauthorized transactions sent by a delegated account.
* Returns `tecNO_TARGET` instead of `terNO_ACCOUNT` for the `DelegateSet` transaction if the delegated account does not exist.
* Fixes `tfFullyCanonicalSig` and `tfInnerBatchTxn` blocking transactions issue by adding `tfUniversal` in the permission related masks in `txFlags.h`
This commit is contained in:
yinyiqian1
2025-06-03 18:20:29 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 506ae12a8c
commit a5e953b191
12 changed files with 294 additions and 112 deletions
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1
include/xrpl/protocol/TER.h
View File

@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ enum TECcodes : TERUnderlyingType {
tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED = 195,
tecPSEUDO_ACCOUNT = 196,
tecPRECISION_LOSS = 197,
tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION = 198,
};
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11
include/xrpl/protocol/TxFlags.h
View File

@@ -122,13 +122,7 @@ constexpr std::uint32_t tfClearDeepFreeze = 0x00800000;
constexpr std::uint32_t tfTrustSetMask =
~(tfUniversal | tfSetfAuth | tfSetNoRipple | tfClearNoRipple | tfSetFreeze |
tfClearFreeze | tfSetDeepFreeze | tfClearDeepFreeze);
// valid flags for granular permission
constexpr std::uint32_t tfTrustSetGranularMask = tfSetfAuth | tfSetFreeze | tfClearFreeze;
// bits representing supportedGranularMask are set to 0 and the bits
// representing other flags are set to 1 in tfPermissionMask.
constexpr std::uint32_t tfTrustSetPermissionMask = (~tfTrustSetMask) & (~tfTrustSetGranularMask);
constexpr std::uint32_t tfTrustSetPermissionMask = ~(tfUniversal | tfSetfAuth | tfSetFreeze | tfClearFreeze);
// EnableAmendment flags:
constexpr std::uint32_t tfGotMajority = 0x00010000;
@@ -165,8 +159,7 @@ constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTokenAuthorizeMask = ~(tfUniversal | tfMPTUna
constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTLock = 0x00000001;
constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTUnlock = 0x00000002;
constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTokenIssuanceSetMask = ~(tfUniversal | tfMPTLock | tfMPTUnlock);
constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTokenIssuanceSetGranularMask = tfMPTLock | tfMPTUnlock;
constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTokenIssuanceSetPermissionMask = (~tfMPTokenIssuanceSetMask) & (~tfMPTokenIssuanceSetGranularMask);
constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTokenIssuanceSetPermissionMask = ~(tfUniversal | tfMPTLock | tfMPTUnlock);
// MPTokenIssuanceDestroy flags:
constexpr std::uint32_t const tfMPTokenIssuanceDestroyMask = ~tfUniversal;

1
src/libxrpl/protocol/TER.cpp
View File

@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ transResults()
MAKE_ERROR(tecLIMIT_EXCEEDED, "Limit exceeded."),
MAKE_ERROR(tecPSEUDO_ACCOUNT, "This operation is not allowed against a pseudo-account."),
MAKE_ERROR(tecPRECISION_LOSS, "The amounts used by the transaction cannot interact."),
MAKE_ERROR(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION, "Delegated account lacks permission to perform this transaction."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefALREADY, "The exact transaction was already in this ledger."),
MAKE_ERROR(tefBAD_ADD_AUTH, "Not authorized to add account."),

338
src/test/app/Delegate_test.cpp
View File

@@ -209,10 +209,10 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
}
// when authorizing account which does not exist, should return
// terNO_ACCOUNT
// tecNO_TARGET
{
env(delegate::set(gw, Account("unknown"), {"Payment"}),
ter(terNO_ACCOUNT));
ter(tecNO_TARGET));
}
// non-delegatable transaction
@@ -310,8 +310,9 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
// Fee should be checked before permission check,
// otherwise tecNO_PERMISSION returned when permission check fails
// could cause context reset to pay fee because it is tec error
// otherwise tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION returned when permission
// check fails could cause context reset to pay fee because it is
// tec error
auto aliceBalance = env.balance(alice);
auto bobBalance = env.balance(bob);
auto carolBalance = env.balance(carol);
@@ -526,12 +527,12 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// bob does not have permission to create check
env(check::create(alice, bob, XRP(10)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// carol does not have permission to create check
env(check::create(alice, bob, XRP(10)),
delegate::as(carol),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
}
void
@@ -566,7 +567,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// delegate ledger object is not created yet
env(pay(gw, alice, USD(50)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.require(balance(bob, bobBalance - drops(baseFee)));
bobBalance = env.balance(bob, XRP);
@@ -579,7 +580,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// bob sends a payment transaction on behalf of gw
env(pay(gw, alice, USD(50)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
env.require(balance(bob, bobBalance - drops(baseFee)));
bobBalance = env.balance(bob, XRP);
@@ -596,7 +597,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// can not send XRP
env(pay(gw, alice, XRP(50)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
env.require(balance(bob, bobBalance - drops(baseFee)));
bobBalance = env.balance(bob, XRP);
@@ -684,7 +685,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// permission
env(pay(gw, alice, USD(50)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
env.require(balance(bob, bobBalance - drops(baseFee)));
bobBalance = env.balance(bob, XRP);
@@ -729,7 +730,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// has unfreeze permission
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
// alice creates trustline by herself
@@ -743,38 +744,38 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// unsupported flags
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50), tfSetNoRipple),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50), tfClearNoRipple),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfSetDeepFreeze),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfClearDeepFreeze),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
// supported flags with wrong permission
env(trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfSetfAuth),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfSetFreeze),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
env(delegate::set(gw, bob, {"TrustlineAuthorize"}));
env.close();
env(trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfClearFreeze),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
// although trustline authorize is granted, bob can not change the
// limit number
env(trust(gw, gw["USD"](50), alice, tfSetfAuth),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env.close();
// supported flags with correct permission
@@ -795,30 +796,30 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// permission
env(trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfSetFreeze),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// cannot update LimitAmount with granular permission, both high and
// low account
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](100)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(trust(gw, alice["USD"](100)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// can not set QualityIn or QualityOut
auto tx = trust(alice, gw["USD"](50));
tx["QualityIn"] = "1000";
env(tx, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(tx, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
auto tx2 = trust(alice, gw["USD"](50));
tx2["QualityOut"] = "1000";
env(tx2, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(tx2, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
auto tx3 = trust(gw, alice["USD"](50));
tx3["QualityIn"] = "1000";
env(tx3, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(tx3, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
auto tx4 = trust(gw, alice["USD"](50));
tx4["QualityOut"] = "1000";
env(tx4, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(tx4, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// granting TrustSet can make it work
env(delegate::set(gw, bob, {"TrustSet"}));
@@ -828,7 +829,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env(tx5, delegate::as(bob));
auto tx6 = trust(alice, gw["USD"](50));
tx6["QualityOut"] = "1000";
env(tx6, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(tx6, delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(delegate::set(alice, bob, {"TrustSet"}));
env.close();
env(tx6, delegate::as(bob));
@@ -847,14 +848,14 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// bob does not have permission
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(delegate::set(
alice, bob, {"TrustlineUnfreeze", "NFTokenCreateOffer"}));
env.close();
// bob still does not have permission
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50)),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// add TrustSet permission and some unrelated permission
env(delegate::set(
@@ -893,6 +894,56 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50), tfClearNoRipple),
delegate::as(bob));
}
// tfFullyCanonicalSig won't block delegated transaction
{
Env env(*this);
Account gw{"gw"};
Account alice{"alice"};
Account bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), gw, alice, bob);
env(fset(gw, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50)));
env.close();
env(delegate::set(gw, bob, {"TrustlineAuthorize"}));
env.close();
env(trust(
gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfSetfAuth | tfFullyCanonicalSig),
delegate::as(bob));
}
// tfInnerBatchTxn won't block delegated transaction
{
Env env(*this);
Account gw{"gw"};
Account alice{"alice"};
Account bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), gw, alice, bob);
env(fset(gw, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
env(trust(alice, gw["USD"](50)));
env.close();
env(delegate::set(
gw, bob, {"TrustlineAuthorize", "TrustlineFreeze"}));
env.close();
auto const seq = env.seq(gw);
auto const batchFee = batch::calcBatchFee(env, 0, 2);
auto jv1 = trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfSetfAuth);
jv1[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
auto jv2 = trust(gw, gw["USD"](0), alice, tfSetFreeze);
jv2[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
// batch::inner will set tfInnerBatchTxn, this should not
// block delegated transaction
env(batch::outer(gw, seq, batchFee, tfAllOrNothing),
batch::inner(jv1, seq + 1),
batch::inner(jv2, seq + 2));
env.close();
}
}
void
@@ -920,16 +971,15 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// on behalf of alice
std::string const domain = "example.com";
auto jt = noop(alice);
jt[sfDomain.fieldName] = strHex(domain);
jt[sfDelegate.fieldName] = bob.human();
jt[sfFlags.fieldName] = tfFullyCanonicalSig;
jt[sfDomain] = strHex(domain);
jt[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
// add granular permission related to AccountSet but is not the
// correct permission for domain set
env(delegate::set(
alice, bob, {"TrustlineUnfreeze", "AccountEmailHashSet"}));
env.close();
env(jt, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(jt, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// alice give granular permission of AccountDomainSet to bob
env(delegate::set(alice, bob, {"AccountDomainSet"}));
@@ -940,25 +990,24 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(alice))[sfDomain] == makeSlice(domain));
// bob can reset domain
jt[sfDomain.fieldName] = "";
jt[sfDomain] = "";
env(jt);
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfDomain));
// if flag is not equal to tfFullyCanonicalSig, which means bob
// is trying to set the flag at the same time, it will fail
// bob tries to set unauthorized flag, it will fail
std::string const failDomain = "fail_domain_update";
jt[sfFlags.fieldName] = tfRequireAuth;
jt[sfDomain.fieldName] = strHex(failDomain);
env(jt, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
jt[sfFlags] = tfRequireAuth;
jt[sfDomain] = strHex(failDomain);
env(jt, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// reset flag number
jt[sfFlags.fieldName] = tfFullyCanonicalSig;
jt[sfFlags] = 0;
// bob tries to update domain and set email hash,
// but he does not have permission to set email hash
jt[sfDomain.fieldName] = strHex(domain);
jt[sfDomain] = strHex(domain);
std::string const mh("5F31A79367DC3137FADA860C05742EE6");
jt[sfEmailHash.fieldName] = mh;
env(jt, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
jt[sfEmailHash] = mh;
env(jt, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// alice give granular permission of AccountEmailHashSet to bob
env(delegate::set(
@@ -970,8 +1019,8 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// bob does not have permission to set message key for alice
auto const rkp = randomKeyPair(KeyType::ed25519);
jt[sfMessageKey.fieldName] = strHex(rkp.first.slice());
env(jt, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
jt[sfMessageKey] = strHex(rkp.first.slice());
env(jt, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// alice give granular permission of AccountMessageKeySet to bob
env(delegate::set(
@@ -987,12 +1036,14 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
BEAST_EXPECT(
strHex((*env.le(alice))[sfMessageKey]) ==
strHex(rkp.first.slice()));
jt[sfMessageKey.fieldName] = "";
jt[sfMessageKey] = "";
env(jt);
BEAST_EXPECT(!env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfMessageKey));
// bob does not have permission to set transfer rate for alice
env(rate(alice, 2.0), delegate::as(bob), ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
env(rate(alice, 2.0),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// alice give granular permission of AccountTransferRateSet to bob
env(delegate::set(
@@ -1004,14 +1055,13 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
"AccountTransferRateSet"}));
env.close();
auto jtRate = rate(alice, 2.0);
jtRate[sfDelegate.fieldName] = bob.human();
jtRate[sfFlags.fieldName] = tfFullyCanonicalSig;
jtRate[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
env(jtRate, delegate::as(bob));
BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(alice))[sfTransferRate] == 2000000000);
// bob does not have permission to set ticksize for alice
jt[sfTickSize.fieldName] = 8;
env(jt, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
jt[sfTickSize] = 8;
env(jt, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// alice give granular permission of AccountTickSizeSet to bob
env(delegate::set(
@@ -1029,7 +1079,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// can not set asfRequireAuth flag for alice
env(fset(alice, asfRequireAuth),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// reset Delegate will delete the Delegate
// object
@@ -1038,15 +1088,15 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// alice
env(fset(alice, asfRequireAuth),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// alice can set for herself
env(fset(alice, asfRequireAuth));
env.require(flags(alice, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
// can not update tick size because bob no longer has permission
jt[sfTickSize.fieldName] = 7;
env(jt, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
jt[sfTickSize] = 7;
env(jt, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(delegate::set(
alice,
@@ -1060,12 +1110,11 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
std::string const locator =
"9633EC8AF54F16B5286DB1D7B519EF49EEFC050C0C8AC4384F1D88ACD1BFDF"
"05";
auto jt2 = noop(alice);
jt2[sfDomain.fieldName] = strHex(domain);
jt2[sfDelegate.fieldName] = bob.human();
jt2[sfWalletLocator.fieldName] = locator;
jt2[sfFlags.fieldName] = tfFullyCanonicalSig;
env(jt2, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
auto jv2 = noop(alice);
jv2[sfDomain] = strHex(domain);
jv2[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jv2[sfWalletLocator] = locator;
env(jv2, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
}
// can not set AccountSet flags on behalf of other account
@@ -1080,7 +1129,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// bob can not set flag on behalf of alice
env(fset(alice, flag),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// alice set by herself
env(fset(alice, flag));
env.close();
@@ -1088,7 +1137,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// bob can not clear on behalf of alice
env(fclear(alice, flag),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
};
// testSetClearFlag(asfNoFreeze);
@@ -1117,19 +1166,19 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// bob can not set asfAccountTxnID on behalf of alice
env(fset(alice, asfAccountTxnID),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(fset(alice, asfAccountTxnID));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.le(alice)->isFieldPresent(sfAccountTxnID));
env(fclear(alice, asfAccountTxnID),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// bob can not set asfAuthorizedNFTokenMinter on behalf of alice
Json::Value jt = fset(alice, asfAuthorizedNFTokenMinter);
jt[sfDelegate.fieldName] = bob.human();
jt[sfNFTokenMinter.fieldName] = bob.human();
env(jt, ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
jt[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jt[sfNFTokenMinter] = bob.human();
env(jt, ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// bob gives alice some permissions
env(delegate::set(
@@ -1145,14 +1194,14 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
// behalf of bob.
env(fset(alice, asfNoFreeze),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
env(fset(bob, asfNoFreeze));
env.close();
env.require(flags(bob, asfNoFreeze));
// alice can not clear on behalf of bob
env(fclear(alice, asfNoFreeze),
delegate::as(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
// bob can not set asfDisableMaster on behalf of alice
Account const bobKey{"bobKey", KeyType::secp256k1};
@@ -1161,7 +1210,76 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env(fset(alice, asfDisableMaster),
delegate::as(bob),
sig(bob),
ter(tecNO_PERMISSION));
ter(tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION));
}
// tfFullyCanonicalSig won't block delegated transaction
{
Env env(*this);
Account alice{"alice"};
Account bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close();
env(delegate::set(
alice, bob, {"AccountDomainSet", "AccountEmailHashSet"}));
env.close();
std::string const domain = "example.com";
auto jt = noop(alice);
jt[sfDomain] = strHex(domain);
jt[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jt[sfFlags] = tfFullyCanonicalSig;
env(jt);
BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(alice))[sfDomain] == makeSlice(domain));
}
// tfInnerBatchTxn won't block delegated transaction
{
Env env(*this);
Account alice{"alice"};
Account bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), alice, bob);
env.close();
env(delegate::set(
alice, bob, {"AccountDomainSet", "AccountEmailHashSet"}));
env.close();
auto const seq = env.seq(alice);
auto const batchFee = batch::calcBatchFee(env, 0, 3);
auto jv1 = noop(alice);
std::string const domain1 = "example1.com";
jv1[sfDomain] = strHex(domain1);
jv1[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jv1[sfSequence] = seq + 1;
auto jv2 = noop(alice);
std::string const domain2 = "example2.com";
jv2[sfDomain] = strHex(domain2);
jv2[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jv2[sfSequence] = seq + 2;
// bob set domain back and add email hash for alice
auto jv3 = noop(alice);
std::string const mh("5F31A79367DC3137FADA860C05742EE6");
jv3[sfDomain] = strHex(domain1);
jv3[sfEmailHash] = mh;
jv3[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jv3[sfSequence] = seq + 3;
// batch::inner will set tfInnerBatchTxn, this should not
// block delegated transaction
env(batch::outer(alice, seq, batchFee, tfAllOrNothing),
batch::inner(jv1, seq + 1),
batch::inner(jv2, seq + 2),
batch::inner(jv3, seq + 3));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT((*env.le(alice))[sfDomain] == makeSlice(domain1));
BEAST_EXPECT(to_string((*env.le(alice))[sfEmailHash]) == mh);
}
}
@@ -1189,7 +1307,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{.account = alice,
.flags = tfMPTLock,
.delegate = bob,
.err = tecNO_PERMISSION});
.err = tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION});
// alice gives granular permission to bob of MPTokenIssuanceUnlock
env(delegate::set(alice, bob, {"MPTokenIssuanceUnlock"}));
@@ -1199,7 +1317,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{.account = alice,
.flags = tfMPTLock,
.delegate = bob,
.err = tecNO_PERMISSION});
.err = tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION});
// bob now has lock permission, but does not have unlock permission
env(delegate::set(alice, bob, {"MPTokenIssuanceLock"}));
env.close();
@@ -1208,7 +1326,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{.account = alice,
.flags = tfMPTUnlock,
.delegate = bob,
.err = tecNO_PERMISSION});
.err = tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION});
// now bob can lock and unlock
env(delegate::set(
@@ -1241,7 +1359,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{.account = alice,
.flags = tfMPTUnlock,
.delegate = bob,
.err = tecNO_PERMISSION});
.err = tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION});
// alice gives bob some unrelated permission with
// MPTokenIssuanceLock
@@ -1255,7 +1373,7 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{.account = alice,
.flags = tfMPTUnlock,
.delegate = bob,
.err = tecNO_PERMISSION});
.err = tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION});
// alice add MPTokenIssuanceSet to permissions
env(delegate::set(
@@ -1271,6 +1389,74 @@ class Delegate_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
mpt.set({.account = alice, .flags = tfMPTUnlock, .delegate = bob});
mpt.set({.account = alice, .flags = tfMPTLock, .delegate = bob});
}
// tfFullyCanonicalSig won't block delegated transaction
{
Env env(*this);
Account alice{"alice"};
Account bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(100000), alice, bob);
env.close();
MPTTester mpt(env, alice, {.fund = false});
env.close();
mpt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanLock});
env.close();
// alice gives granular permission to bob of MPTokenIssuanceLock
env(delegate::set(alice, bob, {"MPTokenIssuanceLock"}));
env.close();
mpt.set(
{.account = alice,
.flags = tfMPTLock | tfFullyCanonicalSig,
.delegate = bob});
}
// tfInnerBatchTxn won't block delegated transaction
{
Env env(*this);
Account alice{"alice"};
Account bob{"bob"};
env.fund(XRP(100000), alice, bob);
env.close();
auto const mptID = makeMptID(env.seq(alice), alice);
MPTTester mpt(env, alice, {.fund = false});
env.close();
mpt.create({.flags = tfMPTCanLock});
env.close();
// alice gives granular permission to bob of MPTokenIssuanceLock
env(delegate::set(
alice, bob, {"MPTokenIssuanceLock", "MPTokenIssuanceUnlock"}));
env.close();
auto const seq = env.seq(alice);
auto const batchFee = batch::calcBatchFee(env, 0, 2);
Json::Value jv1;
jv1[sfTransactionType] = jss::MPTokenIssuanceSet;
jv1[sfAccount] = alice.human();
jv1[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jv1[sfSequence] = seq + 1;
jv1[sfMPTokenIssuanceID] = to_string(mptID);
jv1[sfFlags] = tfMPTLock;
Json::Value jv2;
jv2[sfTransactionType] = jss::MPTokenIssuanceSet;
jv2[sfAccount] = alice.human();
jv2[sfDelegate] = bob.human();
jv2[sfSequence] = seq + 2;
jv2[sfMPTokenIssuanceID] = to_string(mptID);
jv2[sfFlags] = tfMPTUnlock;
// batch::inner will set tfInnerBatchTxn, this should not
// block delegated transaction
env(batch::outer(alice, seq, batchFee, tfAllOrNothing),
batch::inner(jv1, seq + 1),
batch::inner(jv2, seq + 2));
env.close();
}
}
void

3
src/xrpld/app/misc/DelegateUtils.h
View File

@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ namespace ripple {
* Check if the delegate account has permission to execute the transaction.
* @param delegate The delegate account.
* @param tx The transaction that the delegate account intends to execute.
* @return tesSUCCESS if the transaction is allowed, tecNO_PERMISSION if not.
* @return tesSUCCESS if the transaction is allowed, tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION
* if not.
*/
TER
checkTxPermission(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& delegate, STTx const& tx);

4
src/xrpld/app/misc/detail/DelegateUtils.cpp
View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ TER
checkTxPermission(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& delegate, STTx const& tx)
{
if (!delegate)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
auto const permissionArray = delegate->getFieldArray(sfPermissions);
auto const txPermission = tx.getTxnType() + 1;
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ checkTxPermission(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& delegate, STTx const& tx)
return tesSUCCESS;
}
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
}
void

2
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/DelegateSet.cpp
View File

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ DelegateSet::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
return terNO_ACCOUNT; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
if (!ctx.view.exists(keylet::account(ctx.tx[sfAuthorize])))
return terNO_ACCOUNT;
return tecNO_TARGET;
auto const& permissions = ctx.tx.getFieldArray(sfPermissions);
for (auto const& permission : permissions)

8
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/MPTokenIssuanceSet.cpp
View File

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ MPTokenIssuanceSet::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
auto const sle = view.read(delegateKey);
if (!sle)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (checkTxPermission(sle, tx) == tesSUCCESS)
return tesSUCCESS;
@@ -72,18 +72,18 @@ MPTokenIssuanceSet::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
// this is added in case more flags will be added for MPTokenIssuanceSet
// in the future. Currently unreachable.
if (txFlags & tfMPTokenIssuanceSetPermissionMask)
return tecNO_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
std::unordered_set<GranularPermissionType> granularPermissions;
loadGranularPermission(sle, ttMPTOKEN_ISSUANCE_SET, granularPermissions);
if (txFlags & tfMPTLock &&
!granularPermissions.contains(MPTokenIssuanceLock))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (txFlags & tfMPTUnlock &&
!granularPermissions.contains(MPTokenIssuanceUnlock))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
return tesSUCCESS;
}

4
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/Payment.cpp
View File

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Payment::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
auto const sle = view.read(delegateKey);
if (!sle)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (checkTxPermission(sle, tx) == tesSUCCESS)
return tesSUCCESS;
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ Payment::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
amountIssue.account == tx[sfDestination])
return tesSUCCESS;
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
}
TER

16
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetAccount.cpp
View File

@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ SetAccount::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
auto const sle = view.read(delegateKey);
if (!sle)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
std::unordered_set<GranularPermissionType> granularPermissions;
loadGranularPermission(sle, ttACCOUNT_SET, granularPermissions);
@@ -215,31 +215,31 @@ SetAccount::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
// update the flag on behalf of another account, it is not
// authorized.
if (uSetFlag != 0 || uClearFlag != 0 || uTxFlags & tfUniversalMask)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfEmailHash) &&
!granularPermissions.contains(AccountEmailHashSet))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfWalletLocator) ||
tx.isFieldPresent(sfNFTokenMinter))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfMessageKey) &&
!granularPermissions.contains(AccountMessageKeySet))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfDomain) &&
!granularPermissions.contains(AccountDomainSet))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfTransferRate) &&
!granularPermissions.contains(AccountTransferRateSet))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfTickSize) &&
!granularPermissions.contains(AccountTickSizeSet))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
return tesSUCCESS;
}

16
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/SetTrust.cpp
View File

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ SetTrust::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
auto const sle = view.read(delegateKey);
if (!sle)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (checkTxPermission(sle, tx) == tesSUCCESS)
return tesSUCCESS;
@@ -152,10 +152,10 @@ SetTrust::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
// TrustlineUnfreeze granular permission. Setting other flags returns
// error.
if (txFlags & tfTrustSetPermissionMask)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (tx.isFieldPresent(sfQualityIn) || tx.isFieldPresent(sfQualityOut))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
auto const saLimitAmount = tx.getFieldAmount(sfLimitAmount);
auto const sleRippleState = view.read(keylet::line(
@@ -164,19 +164,19 @@ SetTrust::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
// if the trustline does not exist, granular permissions are
// not allowed to create trustline
if (!sleRippleState)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
std::unordered_set<GranularPermissionType> granularPermissions;
loadGranularPermission(sle, ttTRUST_SET, granularPermissions);
if (txFlags & tfSetfAuth &&
!granularPermissions.contains(TrustlineAuthorize))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (txFlags & tfSetFreeze && !granularPermissions.contains(TrustlineFreeze))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
if (txFlags & tfClearFreeze &&
!granularPermissions.contains(TrustlineUnfreeze))
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
// updating LimitAmount is not allowed only with granular permissions,
// unless there's a new granular permission for this in the future.
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ SetTrust::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
saLimitAllow.setIssuer(tx[sfAccount]);
if (curLimit != saLimitAllow)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
return tesSUCCESS;
}

2
src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/Transactor.cpp
View File

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Transactor::checkPermission(ReadView const& view, STTx const& tx)
auto const sle = view.read(delegateKey);
if (!sle)
return tecNO_PERMISSION;
return tecNO_DELEGATE_PERMISSION;
return checkTxPermission(sle, tx);
}