fix: Address NFT interactions with trustlines (#5297)

The changes are focused on fixing NFT transactions bypassing the trustline authorization requirement and potential invariant violation when interacting with deep frozen trustlines.
This commit is contained in:
Vlad
2025-06-02 17:13:20 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent 621df422a7
commit 7e24adbdd0
7 changed files with 969 additions and 96 deletions

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
// If you add an amendment here, then do not forget to increment `numFeatures`
// in include/xrpl/protocol/Feature.h.
XRPL_FIX (EnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FIX (AMMv1_3, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(PermissionedDEX, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)
XRPL_FEATURE(Batch, Supported::yes, VoteBehavior::DefaultNo)

View File

@@ -1885,6 +1885,31 @@ class Freeze_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env.close();
}
// Testing A1 nft buy offer when A2 deep frozen by issuer
if (features[featureDeepFreeze] &&
features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
env(trust(G1, A2["USD"](0), tfSetFreeze | tfSetDeepFreeze));
env.close();
uint256 const nftID{token::getNextID(env, A2, 0u, tfTransferable)};
env(token::mint(A2, 0), txflags(tfTransferable));
env.close();
auto const buyIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(10)), token::owner(A2));
env.close();
env(token::acceptBuyOffer(A2, buyIdx), ter(tecFROZEN));
env.close();
env(trust(G1, A2["USD"](0), tfClearFreeze | tfClearDeepFreeze));
env.close();
env(token::acceptBuyOffer(A2, buyIdx));
env.close();
}
// Testing A2 nft offer sell when A2 frozen by currency holder
{
auto const sellOfferIndex = createNFTSellOffer(env, A2, USD(10));
@@ -1944,6 +1969,68 @@ class Freeze_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
env(trust(A2, limit, tfClearFreeze | tfClearDeepFreeze));
env.close();
}
// Testing brokered offer acceptance
if (features[featureDeepFreeze] &&
features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
Account broker{"broker"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), broker);
env.close();
env(trust(G1, broker["USD"](1000), tfSetFreeze | tfSetDeepFreeze));
env.close();
uint256 const nftID{token::getNextID(env, A2, 0u, tfTransferable)};
env(token::mint(A2, 0), txflags(tfTransferable));
env.close();
uint256 const sellIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A2, env.seq(A2)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A2, nftID, USD(10)), txflags(tfSellNFToken));
env.close();
auto const buyIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(11)), token::owner(A2));
env.close();
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)),
ter(tecFROZEN));
env.close();
}
// Testing transfer fee
if (features[featureDeepFreeze] &&
features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
Account minter{"minter"};
env.fund(XRP(10000), minter);
env.close();
env(trust(G1, minter["USD"](1000)));
env.close();
uint256 const nftID{
token::getNextID(env, minter, 0u, tfTransferable, 1u)};
env(token::mint(minter, 0),
token::xferFee(1u),
txflags(tfTransferable));
env.close();
uint256 const minterSellIdx =
keylet::nftoffer(minter, env.seq(minter)).key;
env(token::createOffer(minter, nftID, drops(1)),
txflags(tfSellNFToken));
env.close();
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A2, minterSellIdx));
env.close();
uint256 const sellIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A2, env.seq(A2)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A2, nftID, USD(100)),
txflags(tfSellNFToken));
env.close();
env(trust(G1, minter["USD"](1000), tfSetFreeze | tfSetDeepFreeze));
env.close();
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A1, sellIdx), ter(tecFROZEN));
env.close();
}
}
// Helper function to extract trustline flags from open ledger
@@ -2021,10 +2108,16 @@ public:
using namespace test::jtx;
auto const sa = supported_amendments();
testAll(
sa - featureFlowCross - featureDeepFreeze - featurePermissionedDEX);
testAll(sa - featureFlowCross - featurePermissionedDEX);
testAll(sa - featureDeepFreeze - featurePermissionedDEX);
testAll(sa - featurePermissionedDEX);
sa - featureFlowCross - featureDeepFreeze - featurePermissionedDEX -
fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2);
testAll(
sa - featureFlowCross - featurePermissionedDEX -
fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2);
testAll(
sa - featureDeepFreeze - featurePermissionedDEX -
fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2);
testAll(sa - featurePermissionedDEX - fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2);
testAll(sa - fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2);
testAll(sa);
}
};

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,624 @@
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*
This file is part of rippled: https://github.com/ripple/rippled
Copyright (c) 2025 Ripple Labs Inc.
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL , DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
//==============================================================================
#include <test/jtx.h>
#include <xrpld/app/tx/detail/NFTokenUtils.h>
namespace ripple {
class NFTokenAuth_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
{
auto
mintAndOfferNFT(
test::jtx::Env& env,
test::jtx::Account const& account,
test::jtx::PrettyAmount const& currency,
uint32_t xfee = 0u)
{
using namespace test::jtx;
auto const nftID{
token::getNextID(env, account, 0u, tfTransferable, xfee)};
env(token::mint(account, 0),
token::xferFee(xfee),
txflags(tfTransferable));
env.close();
auto const sellIdx = keylet::nftoffer(account, env.seq(account)).key;
env(token::createOffer(account, nftID, currency),
txflags(tfSellNFToken));
env.close();
return std::make_tuple(nftID, sellIdx);
}
public:
void
testBuyOffer_UnauthorizedSeller(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Unauthorized seller tries to accept buy offer");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
env(trust(A1, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A1, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A1, USD(1000)));
auto const [nftID, _] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, drops(1));
auto const buyIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
// It should be possible to create a buy offer even if NFT owner is not
// authorized
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(10)), token::owner(A2));
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: G1 requires authorization of A2, no trust line exists
env(token::acceptBuyOffer(A2, buyIdx), ter(tecNO_LINE));
env.close();
// trust line created, but not authorized
env(trust(A2, limit));
// test: G1 requires authorization of A2
env(token::acceptBuyOffer(A2, buyIdx), ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
}
else
{
// Old behavior: it is possible to sell tokens and receive IOUs
// without the authorization
env(token::acceptBuyOffer(A2, buyIdx));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(A2, USD) == USD(10));
}
}
void
testCreateBuyOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Unauthorized buyer tries to create buy offer");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const [nftID, _] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, drops(1));
// test: check that buyer can't make an offer if they're not authorized.
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(10)),
token::owner(A2),
ter(tecUNFUNDED_OFFER));
env.close();
// Artificially create an unauthorized trustline with balance. Don't
// close ledger before running the actual tests against this trustline.
// After ledger is closed, the trustline will not exist.
auto const unauthTrustline = [&](OpenView& view,
beast::Journal) -> bool {
auto const sleA1 =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, G1, G1["USD"].currency));
sleA1->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, A1["USD"](-1000));
view.rawInsert(sleA1);
return true;
};
env.app().openLedger().modify(unauthTrustline);
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: check that buyer can't make an offer even with balance
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(10)),
token::owner(A2),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
}
else
{
// old behavior: can create an offer if balance allows, regardless
// ot authorization
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(10)), token::owner(A2));
}
}
void
testAcceptBuyOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Seller tries to accept buy offer from unauth buyer");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
auto const [nftID, _] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, drops(1));
// First we authorize buyer and seller so that he can create buy offer
env(trust(A1, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A1, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A1, USD(10)));
env(trust(A2, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A2, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A2, USD(10)));
env.close();
auto const buyIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(10)), token::owner(A2));
env.close();
env(pay(A1, G1, USD(10)));
env(trust(A1, USD(0)));
env(trust(G1, A1["USD"](0)));
env.close();
// Replace an existing authorized trustline with artificial unauthorized
// trustline with balance. Don't close ledger before running the actual
// tests against this trustline. After ledger is closed, the trustline
// will not exist.
auto const unauthTrustline = [&](OpenView& view,
beast::Journal) -> bool {
auto const sleA1 =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, G1, G1["USD"].currency));
sleA1->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, A1["USD"](-1000));
view.rawInsert(sleA1);
return true;
};
env.app().openLedger().modify(unauthTrustline);
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: check that offer can't be accepted even with balance
env(token::acceptBuyOffer(A2, buyIdx), ter(tecNO_AUTH));
}
}
void
testSellOffer_UnauthorizedSeller(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase(
"Authorized buyer tries to accept sell offer from unauthorized "
"seller");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
env(trust(A1, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A1, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A1, USD(1000)));
auto const [nftID, _] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, drops(1));
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: can't create sell offer if there is no trustline but auth
// required
env(token::createOffer(A2, nftID, USD(10)),
txflags(tfSellNFToken),
ter(tecNO_LINE));
env(trust(A2, limit));
// test: can't create sell offer if not authorized to hold token
env(token::createOffer(A2, nftID, USD(10)),
txflags(tfSellNFToken),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
// Authorizing trustline to make an offer creation possible
env(trust(G1, USD(0), A2, tfSetfAuth));
env.close();
auto const sellIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A2, env.seq(A2)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A2, nftID, USD(10)), txflags(tfSellNFToken));
env.close();
//
// Reseting trustline to delete it. This allows to check if
// already existing offers handled correctly
env(trust(A2, USD(0)));
env.close();
// test: G1 requires authorization of A1, no trust line exists
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A1, sellIdx), ter(tecNO_LINE));
env.close();
// trust line created, but not authorized
env(trust(A2, limit));
env.close();
// test: G1 requires authorization of A1
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A1, sellIdx), ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
}
else
{
auto const sellIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A2, env.seq(A2)).key;
// Old behavior: sell offer can be created without authorization
env(token::createOffer(A2, nftID, USD(10)), txflags(tfSellNFToken));
env.close();
// Old behavior: it is possible to sell NFT and receive IOUs
// without the authorization
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A1, sellIdx));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(A2, USD) == USD(10));
}
}
void
testSellOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Unauthorized buyer tries to accept sell offer");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
env(trust(A2, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A2, tfSetfAuth));
auto const [_, sellIdx] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, USD(10));
// test: check that buyer can't accept an offer if they're not
// authorized.
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A1, sellIdx), ter(tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS));
env.close();
// Creating an artificial unauth trustline
auto const unauthTrustline = [&](OpenView& view,
beast::Journal) -> bool {
auto const sleA1 =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, G1, G1["USD"].currency));
sleA1->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, A1["USD"](-1000));
view.rawInsert(sleA1);
return true;
};
env.app().openLedger().modify(unauthTrustline);
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A1, sellIdx), ter(tecNO_AUTH));
}
}
void
testBrokeredAcceptOffer_UnauthorizedBroker(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Unauthorized broker bridges authorized buyer and seller.");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
Account broker{"broker"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2, broker);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
env(trust(A1, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A1, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A1, USD(1000)));
env(trust(A2, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A2, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A2, USD(1000)));
env.close();
auto const [nftID, sellIdx] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, USD(10));
auto const buyIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(11)), token::owner(A2));
env.close();
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: G1 requires authorization of broker, no trust line exists
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)),
ter(tecNO_LINE));
env.close();
// trust line created, but not authorized
env(trust(broker, limit));
env.close();
// test: G1 requires authorization of broker
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
// test: can still be brokered without broker fee.
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx));
env.close();
}
else
{
// Old behavior: broker can receive IOUs without the authorization
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(broker, USD) == USD(1));
}
}
void
testBrokeredAcceptOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase(
"Authorized broker tries to bridge offers from unauthorized "
"buyer.");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
Account broker{"broker"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2, broker);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
env(trust(A1, limit));
env(trust(G1, USD(0), A1, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A1, USD(1000)));
env(trust(A2, limit));
env(trust(G1, USD(0), A2, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A2, USD(1000)));
env(trust(broker, limit));
env(trust(G1, USD(0), broker, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, broker, USD(1000)));
env.close();
auto const [nftID, sellIdx] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, USD(10));
auto const buyIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(11)), token::owner(A2));
env.close();
// Resetting buyer's trust line to delete it
env(pay(A1, G1, USD(1000)));
env(trust(A1, USD(0)));
env.close();
auto const unauthTrustline = [&](OpenView& view,
beast::Journal) -> bool {
auto const sleA1 =
std::make_shared<SLE>(keylet::line(A1, G1, G1["USD"].currency));
sleA1->setFieldAmount(sfBalance, A1["USD"](-1000));
view.rawInsert(sleA1);
return true;
};
env.app().openLedger().modify(unauthTrustline);
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: G1 requires authorization of A2
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
}
}
void
testBrokeredAcceptOffer_UnauthorizedSeller(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase(
"Authorized broker tries to bridge offers from unauthorized "
"seller.");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
Account broker{"broker"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, A1, A2, broker);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
env(trust(A1, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A1, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A1, USD(1000)));
env(trust(broker, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, broker, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, broker, USD(1000)));
env.close();
// Authorizing trustline to make an offer creation possible
env(trust(G1, USD(0), A2, tfSetfAuth));
env.close();
auto const [nftID, sellIdx] = mintAndOfferNFT(env, A2, USD(10));
auto const buyIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(11)), token::owner(A2));
env.close();
// Reseting trustline to delete it. This allows to check if
// already existing offers handled correctly
env(trust(A2, USD(0)));
env.close();
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: G1 requires authorization of broker, no trust line exists
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)),
ter(tecNO_LINE));
env.close();
// trust line created, but not authorized
env(trust(A2, limit));
env.close();
// test: G1 requires authorization of A2
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)),
ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
// test: cannot be brokered even without broker fee.
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx), ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
}
else
{
// Old behavior: broker can receive IOUs without the authorization
env(token::brokerOffers(broker, buyIdx, sellIdx),
token::brokerFee(USD(1)));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(A2, USD) == USD(10));
return;
}
}
void
testTransferFee_UnauthorizedMinter(FeatureBitset features)
{
testcase("Unauthorized minter receives transfer fee.");
using namespace test::jtx;
Env env(*this, features);
Account G1{"G1"};
Account minter{"minter"};
Account A1{"A1"};
Account A2{"A2"};
auto const USD{G1["USD"]};
env.fund(XRP(10000), G1, minter, A1, A2);
env(fset(G1, asfRequireAuth));
env.close();
auto const limit = USD(10000);
env(trust(A1, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A1, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A1, USD(1000)));
env(trust(A2, limit));
env(trust(G1, limit, A2, tfSetfAuth));
env(pay(G1, A2, USD(1000)));
env(trust(minter, limit));
env.close();
// We authorized A1 and A2, but not the minter.
// Now mint NFT
auto const [nftID, minterSellIdx] =
mintAndOfferNFT(env, minter, drops(1), 1);
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A1, minterSellIdx));
uint256 const sellIdx = keylet::nftoffer(A1, env.seq(A1)).key;
env(token::createOffer(A1, nftID, USD(100)), txflags(tfSellNFToken));
if (features[fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2])
{
// test: G1 requires authorization
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A2, sellIdx), ter(tecNO_AUTH));
env.close();
}
else
{
// Old behavior: can sell for USD. Minter can receive tokens
env(token::acceptSellOffer(A2, sellIdx));
env.close();
BEAST_EXPECT(env.balance(minter, USD) == USD(0.001));
}
}
void
run() override
{
using namespace test::jtx;
static FeatureBitset const all{supported_amendments()};
static std::array const features = {
all - fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2, all};
for (auto const feature : features)
{
testBuyOffer_UnauthorizedSeller(feature);
testCreateBuyOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(feature);
testAcceptBuyOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(feature);
testSellOffer_UnauthorizedSeller(feature);
testSellOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(feature);
testBrokeredAcceptOffer_UnauthorizedBroker(feature);
testBrokeredAcceptOffer_UnauthorizedBuyer(feature);
testBrokeredAcceptOffer_UnauthorizedSeller(feature);
testTransferFee_UnauthorizedMinter(feature);
}
}
};
BEAST_DEFINE_TESTSUITE_PRIO(NFTokenAuth, tx, ripple, 2);
} // namespace ripple

View File

@@ -160,6 +160,27 @@ NFTokenAcceptOffer::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
if ((*so)[sfAmount] > (*bo)[sfAmount] - *brokerFee)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_PAYMENT;
// Check if broker is allowed to receive the fee with these IOUs.
if (!brokerFee->native() &&
ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2))
{
auto res = nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ctx.view,
ctx.tx[sfAccount],
ctx.j,
brokerFee->asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
res = nft::checkTrustlineDeepFrozen(
ctx.view,
ctx.tx[sfAccount],
ctx.j,
brokerFee->asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
}
}
}
@@ -208,6 +229,38 @@ NFTokenAcceptOffer::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
fhZERO_IF_FROZEN,
ctx.j) < needed)
return tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS;
// Check that the account accepting the buy offer (he's selling the NFT)
// is allowed to receive IOUs. Also check that this offer's creator is
// authorized. But we need to exclude the case when the transaction is
// created by the broker.
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2) &&
!needed.native())
{
auto res = nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ctx.view, bo->at(sfOwner), ctx.j, needed.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
if (!so)
{
res = nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ctx.view,
ctx.tx[sfAccount],
ctx.j,
needed.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
res = nft::checkTrustlineDeepFrozen(
ctx.view,
ctx.tx[sfAccount],
ctx.j,
needed.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
}
}
}
if (so)
@@ -270,42 +323,74 @@ NFTokenAcceptOffer::preclaim(PreclaimContext const& ctx)
}
// Make sure that we are allowed to hold what the taker will pay us.
// This is a similar approach taken by usual offers.
if (!needed.native())
{
auto const result = checkAcceptAsset(
ctx.view,
ctx.flags,
(*so)[sfOwner],
ctx.j,
needed.asset().get<Issue>());
if (result != tesSUCCESS)
return result;
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2))
{
auto res = nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ctx.view,
(*so)[sfOwner],
ctx.j,
needed.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
if (!bo)
{
res = nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ctx.view,
ctx.tx[sfAccount],
ctx.j,
needed.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
}
}
auto const res = nft::checkTrustlineDeepFrozen(
ctx.view, (*so)[sfOwner], ctx.j, needed.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
}
}
// Fix a bug where the transfer of an NFToken with a transfer fee could
// give the NFToken issuer an undesired trust line.
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustline))
// Additional checks are required in case a minter set a transfer fee for
// this nftoken
auto const& offer = bo ? bo : so;
if (!offer)
// Purely defensive, should be caught in preflight.
return tecINTERNAL;
auto const& tokenID = offer->at(sfNFTokenID);
auto const& amount = offer->at(sfAmount);
auto const nftMinter = nft::getIssuer(tokenID);
if (nft::getTransferFee(tokenID) != 0 && !amount.native())
{
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> const& offer = bo ? bo : so;
if (!offer)
// Should be caught in preflight.
return tecINTERNAL;
uint256 const& tokenID = offer->at(sfNFTokenID);
STAmount const& amount = offer->at(sfAmount);
if (nft::getTransferFee(tokenID) != 0 &&
// Fix a bug where the transfer of an NFToken with a transfer fee could
// give the NFToken issuer an undesired trust line.
// Issuer doesn't need a trust line to accept their own currency.
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustline) &&
(nft::getFlags(tokenID) & nft::flagCreateTrustLines) == 0 &&
!amount.native())
nftMinter != amount.getIssuer() &&
!ctx.view.read(keylet::line(nftMinter, amount.issue())))
return tecNO_LINE;
// Check that the issuer is allowed to receive IOUs.
if (ctx.view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2))
{
auto const issuer = nft::getIssuer(tokenID);
// Issuer doesn't need a trust line to accept their own currency.
if (issuer != amount.getIssuer() &&
!ctx.view.read(keylet::line(issuer, amount.issue())))
return tecNO_LINE;
auto res = nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ctx.view, nftMinter, ctx.j, amount.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
res = nft::checkTrustlineDeepFrozen(
ctx.view, nftMinter, ctx.j, amount.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
}
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -524,62 +609,4 @@ NFTokenAcceptOffer::doApply()
return tecINTERNAL;
}
TER
NFTokenAcceptOffer::checkAcceptAsset(
ReadView const& view,
ApplyFlags const flags,
AccountID const id,
beast::Journal const j,
Issue const& issue)
{
// Only valid for custom currencies
if (!view.rules().enabled(featureDeepFreeze))
{
return tesSUCCESS;
}
XRPL_ASSERT(
!isXRP(issue.currency),
"NFTokenAcceptOffer::checkAcceptAsset : valid to check.");
auto const issuerAccount = view.read(keylet::account(issue.account));
if (!issuerAccount)
{
JLOG(j.debug())
<< "delay: can't receive IOUs from non-existent issuer: "
<< to_string(issue.account);
return tecNO_ISSUER;
}
// An account can not create a trustline to itself, so no line can exist
// to be frozen. Additionally, an issuer can always accept its own
// issuance.
if (issue.account == id)
{
return tesSUCCESS;
}
auto const trustLine =
view.read(keylet::line(id, issue.account, issue.currency));
if (!trustLine)
{
return tesSUCCESS;
}
// There's no difference which side enacted deep freeze, accepting
// tokens shouldn't be possible.
bool const deepFrozen =
(*trustLine)[sfFlags] & (lsfLowDeepFreeze | lsfHighDeepFreeze);
if (deepFrozen)
{
return tecFROZEN;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
} // namespace ripple

View File

@@ -44,14 +44,6 @@ private:
AccountID const& seller,
uint256 const& nfTokenID);
static TER
checkAcceptAsset(
ReadView const& view,
ApplyFlags const flags,
AccountID const id,
beast::Journal const j,
Issue const& issue);
public:
static constexpr ConsequencesFactoryType ConsequencesFactory{Normal};

View File

@@ -1004,6 +1004,18 @@ tokenOfferCreatePreclaim(
}
}
if (view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2) && !amount.native())
{
// If this is a sell offer, check that the account is allowed to
// receive IOUs. If this is a buy offer, we have to check that trustline
// is authorized, even though we previosly checked it's balance via
// accountHolds. This is due to a possibility of existence of
// unauthorized trustlines with balance
auto const res = nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized(
view, acctID, j, amount.asset().get<Issue>());
if (res != tesSUCCESS)
return res;
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
@@ -1081,5 +1093,115 @@ tokenOfferCreateApply(
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const id,
beast::Journal const j,
Issue const& issue)
{
// Only valid for custom currencies
XRPL_ASSERT(
!isXRP(issue.currency),
"ripple::nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized : valid to check.");
if (view.rules().enabled(fixEnforceNFTokenTrustlineV2))
{
auto const issuerAccount = view.read(keylet::account(issue.account));
if (!issuerAccount)
{
JLOG(j.debug()) << "ripple::nft::checkTrustlineAuthorized: can't "
"receive IOUs from non-existent issuer: "
<< to_string(issue.account);
return tecNO_ISSUER;
}
// An account can not create a trustline to itself, so no line can
// exist to be authorized. Additionally, an issuer can always accept
// its own issuance.
if (issue.account == id)
{
return tesSUCCESS;
}
if (issuerAccount->isFlag(lsfRequireAuth))
{
auto const trustLine =
view.read(keylet::line(id, issue.account, issue.currency));
if (!trustLine)
{
return tecNO_LINE;
}
// Entries have a canonical representation, determined by a
// lexicographical "greater than" comparison employing strict
// weak ordering. Determine which entry we need to access.
if (!trustLine->isFlag(
id > issue.account ? lsfLowAuth : lsfHighAuth))
{
return tecNO_AUTH;
}
}
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
TER
checkTrustlineDeepFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const id,
beast::Journal const j,
Issue const& issue)
{
// Only valid for custom currencies
XRPL_ASSERT(
!isXRP(issue.currency),
"ripple::nft::checkTrustlineDeepFrozen : valid to check.");
if (view.rules().enabled(featureDeepFreeze))
{
auto const issuerAccount = view.read(keylet::account(issue.account));
if (!issuerAccount)
{
JLOG(j.debug()) << "ripple::nft::checkTrustlineDeepFrozen: can't "
"receive IOUs from non-existent issuer: "
<< to_string(issue.account);
return tecNO_ISSUER;
}
// An account can not create a trustline to itself, so no line can
// exist to be frozen. Additionally, an issuer can always accept its
// own issuance.
if (issue.account == id)
{
return tesSUCCESS;
}
auto const trustLine =
view.read(keylet::line(id, issue.account, issue.currency));
if (!trustLine)
{
return tesSUCCESS;
}
// There's no difference which side enacted deep freeze, accepting
// tokens shouldn't be possible.
bool const deepFrozen =
(*trustLine)[sfFlags] & (lsfLowDeepFreeze | lsfHighDeepFreeze);
if (deepFrozen)
{
return tecFROZEN;
}
}
return tesSUCCESS;
}
} // namespace nft
} // namespace ripple

View File

@@ -152,6 +152,20 @@ tokenOfferCreateApply(
beast::Journal j,
std::uint32_t txFlags = lsfSellNFToken);
TER
checkTrustlineAuthorized(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const id,
beast::Journal const j,
Issue const& issue);
TER
checkTrustlineDeepFrozen(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const id,
beast::Journal const j,
Issue const& issue);
} // namespace nft
} // namespace ripple