Implicitly authorize Vault and LoanBroker pseudo-accounts if MPTRequireAuth is set.

This commit is contained in:
Gregory Tsipenyuk
2025-10-31 08:07:16 -04:00
parent 7a758a42f9
commit 7df4d15622
4 changed files with 204 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@@ -673,14 +673,17 @@ createPseudoAccount(
uint256 const& pseudoOwnerKey,
SField const& ownerField);
// Returns true iff sleAcct is a pseudo-account.
// Returns true iff sleAcct is a pseudo-account or specific
// pseudo-accounts in pseudoAccountFields.
//
// Returns false if sleAcct is
// * NOT a pseudo-account OR
// * NOT a ltACCOUNT_ROOT OR
// * null pointer
[[nodiscard]] bool
isPseudoAccount(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> sleAcct);
isPseudoAccount(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> sleAcct,
std::set<SField const*> const& pseudoAccountFields = {});
// Returns the list of fields that define an ACCOUNT_ROOT as a pseudo-account if
// set
@@ -694,9 +697,13 @@ isPseudoAccount(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> sleAcct);
getPseudoAccountFields();
[[nodiscard]] inline bool
isPseudoAccount(ReadView const& view, AccountID const& accountId)
isPseudoAccount(
ReadView const& view,
AccountID const& accountId,
std::set<SField const*> const& pseudoAccountFields = {})
{
return isPseudoAccount(view.read(keylet::account(accountId)));
return isPseudoAccount(
view.read(keylet::account(accountId)), pseudoAccountFields);
}
[[nodiscard]] TER
@@ -1020,7 +1027,8 @@ requireAuth(
* purely defensive, as we currently do not allow such vaults to be created.
*
* If StrongAuth then return tecNO_AUTH if MPToken doesn't exist or
* lsfMPTRequireAuth is set and MPToken is not authorized.
* lsfMPTRequireAuth is set and MPToken is not authorized. Vault and LoanBroker
* pseudo-accounts are implicitly authorized.
*
* If WeakAuth then return tecNO_AUTH if lsfMPTRequireAuth is set and MPToken
* doesn't exist or is not authorized (explicitly or via credentials, if

View File

@@ -1223,7 +1223,8 @@ getPseudoAccountFields()
{
// LCOV_EXCL_START
LogicError(
"ripple::isPseudoAccount : unable to find account root ledger "
"ripple::getPseudoAccountFields : unable to find account root "
"ledger "
"format");
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
@@ -1241,7 +1242,9 @@ getPseudoAccountFields()
}
[[nodiscard]] bool
isPseudoAccount(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> sleAcct)
isPseudoAccount(
std::shared_ptr<SLE const> sleAcct,
std::set<SField const*> const& pseudoAccountFields)
{
auto const& fields = getPseudoAccountFields();
@@ -1249,8 +1252,12 @@ isPseudoAccount(std::shared_ptr<SLE const> sleAcct)
// semantics of true return value clean.
return sleAcct && sleAcct->getType() == ltACCOUNT_ROOT &&
std::count_if(
fields.begin(), fields.end(), [&sleAcct](SField const* sf) -> bool {
return sleAcct->isFieldPresent(*sf);
fields.begin(),
fields.end(),
[&sleAcct, &pseudoAccountFields](SField const* sf) -> bool {
return sleAcct->isFieldPresent(*sf) &&
(pseudoAccountFields.empty() ||
pseudoAccountFields.contains(sf));
}) > 0;
}
@@ -3118,7 +3125,10 @@ requireAuth(
if (mptIssuer == account) // Issuer won't have MPToken
return tesSUCCESS;
if (view.rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault))
bool const featureSAVEnabled =
view.rules().enabled(featureSingleAssetVault);
if (featureSAVEnabled)
{
if (depth >= maxAssetCheckDepth)
return tecINTERNAL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
@@ -3177,6 +3187,13 @@ requireAuth(
// belong to someone who is explicitly authorized e.g. a vault owner.
}
if (featureSAVEnabled)
{
// Implicitly authorize Vault and LoanBroker pseudo-accounts
if (isPseudoAccount(view, account, {&sfVaultID, &sfLoanBrokerID}))
return tesSUCCESS;
}
// mptoken must be authorized if issuance enabled requireAuth
if (sleIssuance->isFlag(lsfMPTRequireAuth) &&
(!sleToken || !sleToken->isFlag(lsfMPTAuthorized)))

View File

@@ -1229,6 +1229,112 @@ class LoanBroker_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
(void)LoanBrokerCoverDeposit::preclaim(pctx);
}
void
testRequireAuth()
{
testcase("Require Auth - Implicit Pseudo-account authorization");
using namespace jtx;
using namespace loanBroker;
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const alice{"alice"};
Env env(*this);
Vault vault{env};
env.fund(XRP(100'000), issuer, alice);
env.close();
auto asset = MPTTester({
.env = env,
.issuer = issuer,
.holders = {alice},
.flags = MPTDEXFlags | tfMPTRequireAuth | tfMPTCanClawback |
tfMPTCanLock,
.authHolder = true,
});
env(pay(issuer, alice, asset(100'000)));
env.close();
// Alice is not authorized, can still create the vault
asset.authorize(
{.account = issuer, .holder = alice, .flags = tfMPTUnauthorize});
auto [tx, vaultKeylet] = vault.create({.owner = alice, .asset = asset});
env(tx);
env.close();
auto const le = env.le(vaultKeylet);
VaultInfo vaultInfo = [&]() {
if (BEAST_EXPECT(le))
return VaultInfo{asset, vaultKeylet.key, le->at(sfAccount)};
return VaultInfo{asset, {}, {}};
}();
if (vaultInfo.vaultID == uint256{})
return;
auto forUnauthAuth = [&](auto&& doTx) {
for (auto const flag : {tfMPTUnauthorize, 0u})
{
asset.authorize(
{.account = issuer, .holder = alice, .flags = flag});
env.close();
doTx(flag == 0);
env.close();
}
};
// Can't deposit into Vault if the vault owner is not authorized
forUnauthAuth([&](bool authorized) {
auto const err = !authorized ? ter(tecNO_AUTH) : ter(tesSUCCESS);
env(vault.deposit(
{.depositor = alice,
.id = vaultKeylet.key,
.amount = asset(51)}),
err);
});
// Can't withdraw from Vault if the vault owner is not authorized
forUnauthAuth([&](bool authorized) {
auto const err = !authorized ? ter(tecNO_AUTH) : ter(tesSUCCESS);
env(vault.withdraw(
{.depositor = alice,
.id = vaultKeylet.key,
.amount = asset(1)}),
err);
});
auto const brokerKeylet =
keylet::loanbroker(alice.id(), env.seq(alice));
// Can create LoanBroker if the vault owner is not authorized
forUnauthAuth([&](auto) { env(set(alice, vaultInfo.vaultID)); });
auto broker = env.le(brokerKeylet);
if (!BEAST_EXPECT(broker))
return;
// Can't cover deposit into Vault if the vault owner is not authorized
forUnauthAuth([&](bool authorized) {
auto const err =
!authorized ? ter(tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS) : ter(tesSUCCESS);
env(coverDeposit(alice, brokerKeylet.key, vaultInfo.asset(10)),
err);
});
// Can't cover withdraw from Vault if the vault owner is not authorized
forUnauthAuth([&](bool authorized) {
auto const err = !authorized ? ter(tecNO_AUTH) : ter(tesSUCCESS);
env(coverWithdraw(alice, brokerKeylet.key, vaultInfo.asset(5)),
err);
});
// Issuer can always cover clawback. The holder authorization is n/a.
forUnauthAuth([&](bool) {
env(coverClawback(issuer),
loanBrokerID(brokerKeylet.key),
amount(vaultInfo.asset(1)));
});
}
public:
void
run() override
@@ -1242,6 +1348,7 @@ public:
testInvalidLoanBrokerCoverWithdraw();
testInvalidLoanBrokerDelete();
testInvalidLoanBrokerSet();
testRequireAuth();
// TODO: Write clawback failure tests with an issuer / MPT that doesn't
// have the right flags set.

View File

@@ -4640,6 +4640,66 @@ class Loan_test : public beast::unit_test::suite
}
}
void
testRequireAuth()
{
testcase("Require Auth - Implicit Pseudo-account authorization");
using namespace jtx;
using namespace loan;
Account const lender{"lender"};
Account const issuer{"issuer"};
Account const borrower{"borrower"};
Env env(*this);
env.fund(XRP(100'000), issuer, lender, borrower);
env.close();
auto asset = MPTTester({
.env = env,
.issuer = issuer,
.holders = {lender, borrower},
.flags = MPTDEXFlags | tfMPTRequireAuth | tfMPTCanClawback |
tfMPTCanLock,
.authHolder = true,
});
env(pay(issuer, lender, asset(5'000'000)));
BrokerInfo brokerInfo{createVaultAndBroker(env, asset, lender)};
auto const loanSetFee = fee(env.current()->fees().base * 2);
STAmount const debtMaximumRequest = brokerInfo.asset(1'000).value();
auto forUnauthAuth = [&](auto&& doTx) {
for (auto const flag : {tfMPTUnauthorize, 0u})
{
asset.authorize(
{.account = issuer, .holder = borrower, .flags = flag});
env.close();
doTx(flag == 0);
env.close();
}
};
// Can't create a loan if the borrower is not authorized
forUnauthAuth([&](bool authorized) {
auto const err = !authorized ? ter(tecNO_AUTH) : ter(tesSUCCESS);
env(set(borrower, brokerInfo.brokerID, debtMaximumRequest),
sig(sfCounterpartySignature, lender),
loanSetFee,
err);
});
std::uint32_t constexpr loanSequence = 1;
auto const loanKeylet = keylet::loan(brokerInfo.brokerID, loanSequence);
// Can't loan pay if the borrower is not authorize
forUnauthAuth([&](bool authorized) {
auto const err =
!authorized ? ter(tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS) : ter(tesSUCCESS);
env(pay(borrower, loanKeylet.key, debtMaximumRequest), err);
});
}
public:
void
run() override
@@ -4669,6 +4729,8 @@ public:
testLoanPayComputePeriodicPaymentValidTotalPrincipalPaidInvariant();
testLoanPayComputePeriodicPaymentValidTotalInterestPaidInvariant();
testLoanNextPaymentDueDateOverflow();
testRequireAuth();
}
};