Merge branch 'pratik/otel-phase3-tx-tracing' into pratik/otel-phase4-consensus-tracing

Conflict in cmake/XrplCore.cmake: kept phase-4's comment block and applied
phase-3's two-line note about the SField table.
This commit is contained in:
Pratik Mankawde
2026-09-23 18:02:45 +01:00
17 changed files with 621 additions and 161 deletions

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@@ -236,16 +236,17 @@ keys (the dotted form is reserved for resource scope per §2.3.3).
#### Transaction Attributes
| Key | Type | Description |
| -------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------- |
| `tx_hash` | string | Transaction hash (hex) |
| `tx_type` | string | `"Payment"`, `"OfferCreate"`, etc. |
| `tx_account` | string | Source account (redacted in prod) |
| `tx_sequence` | int64 | Account sequence number |
| `tx_fee` | int64 | Fee in drops |
| `tx_result` | string | `"tesSUCCESS"`, `"tecPATH_DRY"`, etc. |
| `current_ledger_seq` | int64 | Open ledger the transaction targeted |
| `relay_count` | int64 | Peers the transaction was relayed to |
| Key | Type | Description |
| -------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `tx_hash` | string | Transaction hash (hex) |
| `tx_type` | string | `"Payment"`, `"OfferCreate"`, etc. |
| `tx_account` | string | Sending account, raw r-address |
| `tx_<field>` | string | One per account-typed top-level field the transaction carries (`tx_destination`, `tx_owner`, `tx_issuer`, ...), raw r-address; keys in `TxAccountSpanNames.h` |
| `tx_sequence` | int64 | Account sequence number |
| `tx_fee` | int64 | Fee in drops |
| `tx_result` | string | `"tesSUCCESS"`, `"tecPATH_DRY"`, etc. |
| `current_ledger_seq` | int64 | Open ledger the transaction targeted |
| `relay_count` | int64 | Peers the transaction was relayed to |
> **Note:** `current_ledger_seq` and `ledger_seq` are the same concept — a ledger's sequence number — but they name different ledgers, so the design keeps two keys rather than one. `current_ledger_seq` is the open or in-flight ledger a transaction's work was applied into; it is named after the RPC field `ledger_current_index`. `ledger_seq` (see [Ledger & Job Attributes](#ledger--job-attributes)) is a closed or validated ledger, set by the ledger and consensus spans. Neither is spelled `ledger_index`: per rule 2 of [Telemetry span attribute naming](../CONTRIBUTING.md#telemetry-span-attribute-naming), one concept gets one key reused verbatim, and a different referent is disambiguated with a prefix rather than a synonym.
@@ -316,12 +317,14 @@ Establish-phase gap fill and cross-node correlation attributes (Phase 4a):
#### PathFinding Attributes
| Key | Type | Description |
| -------------------------- | ------ | ------------------------- |
| `pathfind_source_currency` | string | Source currency code |
| `pathfind_dest_currency` | string | Destination currency code |
| `pathfind_path_count` | int64 | Number of paths found |
| `pathfind_cache_hit` | bool | RippleLineCache hit |
| Key | Type | Description |
| -------------------------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `pathfind_source_account` | string | Source r-address, raw |
| `pathfind_dest_account` | string | Destination r-address, raw |
| `pathfind_source_currency` | string | Source currency code |
| `pathfind_dest_currency` | string | Destination asset: `XRP`, `<issuer>/<currency>`, or an MPT issuance id |
| `pathfind_path_count` | int64 | Number of paths found |
| `pathfind_cache_hit` | bool | RippleLineCache hit |
#### TxQ Attributes
@@ -400,50 +403,50 @@ The following data is explicitly **excluded** from telemetry collection:
#### Privacy Protection Mechanisms
| Mechanism | Description |
| ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **Account Hashing** | Account addresses are hashed both SDK-side (`pathfind_source_account`, `pathfind_dest_account` — always hashed before emission) and again at the collector level, so raw addresses never reach storage |
| **Configurable Redaction** | Sensitive fields can be excluded via `[telemetry]` config section |
| **Collector Tail Sampling** | xrpld head sampling is fixed at 1.0 (every span emitted); the collector retains ~10% of non-error traces, reducing stored data exposure |
| **Sampling** | Only 10% of traces recorded by default, reducing data exposure |
| **Local Control** | Node operators have full control over what gets exported |
| **No Raw Payloads** | Transaction content is never recorded, only metadata (hash, type, result) |
| **Collector-Level Filtering** | Additional redaction/hashing can be configured at OTel Collector |
| Mechanism | Description |
| ----------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Account Addresses** | Emitted raw (`pathfind_source_account`, `pathfind_dest_account`). An account address is a public ledger identifier; hashing it protects nothing and breaks the join against explorers, RPC and logs |
| **Collector Tail Sampling** | xrpld head sampling is fixed at 1.0 (every span emitted); the collector retains ~10% of non-error traces, reducing stored data exposure |
| **Sampling** | Only 10% of traces recorded by default, reducing data exposure |
| **Local Control** | Node operators have full control over what gets exported |
| **No Raw Payloads** | Transaction content is never recorded, only metadata (hash, type, result) |
| **Collector-Level Filtering** | Available for a future genuinely sensitive attribute via an `attributes` processor. None is shipped, and none must be added for account addresses |
#### Account Address Hashing
#### Account Addresses
Account addresses are **always** hashed before they reach the telemetry
backend — there is no opt-out flag and therefore no insecure-by-default
failure mode. Protection is applied in two independent layers:
Account addresses are emitted **raw**, at every layer:
1. **SDK-side** (this node): the path-finding RPC handlers call
`redactAccount()` (`xrpl::telemetry`, `Redaction.h`) before setting the
`pathfind_source_account` / `pathfind_dest_account` span attributes. The
helper emits the first 16 characters of `sha512Half(address)` as
lowercase hex — deterministic (spans for one account still correlate)
but non-reversible.
2. **Collector-side** (defense-in-depth): an `attributes/hash` processor in
the OpenTelemetry Collector re-hashes those same attributes, so any node
that emitted a raw value is still redacted before storage.
1. **SDK-side** (this node): the path-finding RPC handlers set
`pathfind_source_account` / `pathfind_dest_account` to the request's
r-address, only when it parses as one, and `pathfind_dest_currency` to `to_string(Asset)`,
which carries the IOU issuer's r-address. The rationale sits on the attribute
constants in `PathFindSpanNames.h`.
2. **Collector-side**: no collector configuration in this repository hashes
or deletes these attributes.
Why raw: an r-address is a public, enumerable identifier on the ledger. An
unsalted hash of it is reversible by table lookup, so it protects nothing, and
it breaks the one thing the attribute is for: joining a span to the account as
explorers, RPC responses and logs show it. The helper `redactAccount()`
(`xrpl::telemetry`, `Redaction.h`) remains available for a value that is
genuinely private, but it is applied to no span.
#### Collector-Level Data Protection
The OpenTelemetry Collector can be configured (via an `attributes` processor)
to hash or redact sensitive attributes before export — for example, hashing
`pathfind_source_account` / `pathfind_dest_account`, deleting `peer_address`
to drop IP addresses, and deleting `params` to redact request parameters.
No hashing or redaction processor is shipped. If a future span introduces a
genuinely sensitive attribute, an `attributes` processor in the collector is the
place to strip it, and the attribute is added to the §2.4 catalogue with that
note in the same change. Account addresses are not such an attribute.
#### Configuration Options for Privacy
In `xrpld.cfg`, operators control data collection granularity through the
`[telemetry]` section. Besides `enabled`, per-component toggles
(`trace_transactions`, `trace_consensus`, `trace_rpc`, `trace_peer` — the last
often disabled due to high volume) select which spans are emitted. Account
address hashing is not configurable: addresses are hashed unconditionally by
the SDK helper described above, with collector-level hashing as a second
layer.
often disabled due to high volume) select which spans are emitted. There is no
redaction setting: account addresses are public and are emitted raw.
> **Key Principle**: Telemetry collects **operational metadata** (timing, counts, hashes) — never **sensitive content** (keys, balances, amounts, raw payloads).
> **Key Principle**: Telemetry collects **operational metadata** (timing, counts, hashes, public identifiers) — never **sensitive content** (keys, balances, amounts, raw payloads).
---

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@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ The development collector enables an OTLP receiver on both gRPC (`0.0.0.0:4317`)
### 5.5.2 Production Configuration
The production collector adds TLS on the OTLP gRPC receiver and a richer processor chain: a `memory_limiter` (OOM guard), `batch` (5s timeout, size 512), `tail_sampling`, and an `attributes` processor that hashes sensitive fields (e.g. `tx_account`) and stamps `deployment.environment`. Tail sampling keeps all `ERROR` traces, slow consensus rounds (>5s) and slow RPC requests (>1s), and probabilistically samples the remainder at 10%. Exporters target Grafana Tempo (TLS) and Elastic APM; `health_check` and `zpages` extensions are enabled for operability.
The production collector adds TLS on the OTLP gRPC receiver and a richer processor chain: a `memory_limiter` (OOM guard), `batch` (5s timeout, size 512), `tail_sampling`, and an `attributes` processor that stamps `deployment.environment`. Account addresses are public identifiers and are not hashed at any layer. Tail sampling keeps all `ERROR` traces, slow consensus rounds (>5s) and slow RPC requests (>1s), and probabilistically samples the remainder at 10%. Exporters target Grafana Tempo (TLS) and Elastic APM; `health_check` and `zpages` extensions are enabled for operability.
---

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@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ The OpenTelemetry C++ SDK is selected for its CNCF backing, active development,
Span naming follows a hierarchical `<component>.<operation>` convention (e.g., `rpc.submit`, `tx.relay`, `consensus.round`). Context propagation uses W3C Trace Context headers for HTTP and embedded Protocol Buffer fields for P2P messages. The implementation coexists with existing PerfLog and Insight observability systems through correlation IDs.
**Data Collection & Privacy**: Telemetry collects only operational metadata (timing, counts, hashes) — never sensitive content (private keys, balances, amounts, raw payloads). Privacy protection includes account hashing, configurable redaction, sampling, and collector-level filtering. Node operators retain full control over telemetry configuration.
**Data Collection & Privacy**: Telemetry collects only operational metadata (timing, counts, hashes) — never sensitive content (private keys, balances, amounts, raw payloads). Account addresses are public ledger identifiers and are emitted raw; there is no redaction setting. Trace volume is reduced, where wanted, by collector-side sampling. Node operators retain full control over telemetry configuration.
➡️ **[Read full Design Decisions](./02-design-decisions.md)**

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@@ -487,24 +487,25 @@ This gives the best of both worlds: guaranteed cross-node correlation via determ
**Attributes added**:
| Span | Attribute | Type | Source |
| ----------------- | -------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `tx.process` | `tx_type` | string | `TxFormats::getInstance().findByType(stx->getTxnType())->getName()` |
| `tx.process` | `fee` | int64 | `stx->getFieldAmount(sfFee).xrp().drops()` |
| `tx.process` | `sequence` | int64 | `stx->getSeqProxy().value()` |
| `tx.process` | `ter_result` | string | `transToken(e.result)` (set after batch application) |
| `tx.process` | `applied` | bool | `e.applied` (set after batch application) |
| `tx.receive` | `tx_type` | string | `TxFormats::getInstance().findByType(stx->getTxnType())->getName()` |
| `txq.enqueue` | `tx_type` | string | same pattern as above |
| `txq.enqueue` | `txq_status` | string | `queued` / `applied_direct` / `applied` / `failed` / `rejected` |
| `txq.enqueue` | `ter_code` | string | `transToken(directApplied->ter)` (set on the direct-apply path) |
| `txq.enqueue` | `fee_level_paid` | int64 | `getFeeLevelPaid(view, *tx).value()` |
| `txq.enqueue` | `required_fee_level` | int64 | `getRequiredFeeLevel(...).value()` |
| `txq.batch_clear` | `num_cleared` | int64 | queued txs cleared ahead of the applying tx |
| `txq.cleanup` | `expired_count` | int64 | entries dropped for passed `LastLedgerSequence` |
| `txq.accept_tx` | `txq_status` | string | `applied` / `failed` / `retried` |
| `txq.accept_tx` | `ter_code` | string | `transToken(txnResult)` (set before branching on the outcome) |
| `txq.accept` | `ledger_changed` | bool | set at end of accept loop |
| Span | Attribute | Type | Source |
| ----------------- | -------------------- | ------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `tx.process` | `tx_type` | string | `TxFormats::getInstance().findByType(stx->getTxnType())->getName()` |
| `tx.process` | `fee` | int64 | `stx->getFieldAmount(sfFee).xrp().drops()` |
| `tx.process` | `sequence` | int64 | `stx->getSeqProxy().value()` |
| `tx.process` | `tx_<account field>` | string | one per top-level `STI_ACCOUNT` field, raw r-address (`tx_account`, `tx_destination`, ...); keys in `TxAccountSpanNames.h` |
| `tx.process` | `ter_result` | string | `transToken(e.result)` (set after batch application) |
| `tx.process` | `applied` | bool | `e.applied` (set after batch application) |
| `tx.receive` | `tx_type` | string | `TxFormats::getInstance().findByType(stx->getTxnType())->getName()` |
| `txq.enqueue` | `tx_type` | string | same pattern as above |
| `txq.enqueue` | `txq_status` | string | `queued` / `applied_direct` / `applied` / `failed` / `rejected` |
| `txq.enqueue` | `ter_code` | string | `transToken(directApplied->ter)` (set on the direct-apply path) |
| `txq.enqueue` | `fee_level_paid` | int64 | `getFeeLevelPaid(view, *tx).value()` |
| `txq.enqueue` | `required_fee_level` | int64 | `getRequiredFeeLevel(...).value()` |
| `txq.batch_clear` | `num_cleared` | int64 | queued txs cleared ahead of the applying tx |
| `txq.cleanup` | `expired_count` | int64 | entries dropped for passed `LastLedgerSequence` |
| `txq.accept_tx` | `txq_status` | string | `applied` / `failed` / `retried` |
| `txq.accept_tx` | `ter_code` | string | `transToken(txnResult)` (set before branching on the outcome) |
| `txq.accept` | `ledger_changed` | bool | set at end of accept loop |
**New attr keys**: `TxSpanNames.h` (`txType`, `fee`, `sequence`, `terResult`, `applied`), `TxQSpanNames.h` (`txType`).