diff --git a/OpenTelemetryPlan/05-configuration-reference.md b/OpenTelemetryPlan/05-configuration-reference.md
index 9ba0a73ad1..493a4bfc56 100644
--- a/OpenTelemetryPlan/05-configuration-reference.md
+++ b/OpenTelemetryPlan/05-configuration-reference.md
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ endif()
 
 > **OTLP** = OpenTelemetry Protocol | **APM** = Application Performance Monitoring
 
-> **Production hardening**: The configurations in this section are starting points. For production deployments where rippled ships telemetry across a network to a centrally-hosted collector, see [Securing the OTel Pipeline](./secure-OTel.md) for the required mTLS receiver config, NetworkPolicy, and peer trace-context validation.
+> **Production hardening**: The configurations in this section are starting points. For production deployments where xrpld ships telemetry across a network to a centrally-hosted collector, see [Securing the OTel Pipeline](./secure-OTel.md) for the required mTLS receiver config, NetworkPolicy, and peer trace-context validation.
 
 ### 5.5.1 Development Configuration
 
diff --git a/OpenTelemetryPlan/OpenTelemetryPlan.md b/OpenTelemetryPlan/OpenTelemetryPlan.md
index 154fca941f..f606bde86c 100644
--- a/OpenTelemetryPlan/OpenTelemetryPlan.md
+++ b/OpenTelemetryPlan/OpenTelemetryPlan.md
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ The appendix contains a glossary of OpenTelemetry and xrpld-specific terms, refe
 
 ## Securing the OTel Pipeline
 
-Threat model and hardening guidance for production deployments where rippled nodes ship telemetry to a centrally-hosted collector across an untrusted network. Covers the two attack surfaces (collector ingress and peer trace-context spoofing) and the chosen defenses: mTLS as primary collector auth, NetworkPolicy as defense-in-depth, and source-side validation plus per-peer rate limiting for the `protocol::TraceContext` field on peer messages.
+Threat model and hardening guidance for production deployments where xrpld nodes ship telemetry to a centrally-hosted collector across an untrusted network. Covers the two attack surfaces (collector ingress and peer trace-context spoofing) and the chosen defenses: mTLS as primary collector auth, NetworkPolicy as defense-in-depth, and source-side validation plus per-peer rate limiting for the `protocol::TraceContext` field on peer messages.
 
 ➡️ **[View Securing the OTel Pipeline](./secure-OTel.md)**